CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005200510001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 29, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

For Release 200TOP CS ET75AO 00510001-7 X
29 August 1960
Copy No. C _
DIA and DOS
review(s) completed.
DOCUMENT NQ, S1
HO fail:+id E d CLASS. ,C7
Q L6~1G1.?~:s=iIR',CQ T'~
CLASS. TO: TS S C
kfi!'H
Hfl 10.2
oarE 9 JUN wo
REVIEWER
Approved For Release 20 CT5A005200510001-7
25X1
X1 A
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200510001-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200510001-7
 A roved For Re e e 2nn incum ? CIA-RDP79Tnnq A 00510001-7 25 ) MEN:
pp
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25
29 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
1i
East Germany: The number of East Germans registering
at the West Berlin refugee center during the week ending 23
August was 4,034--1,791 more than during the corresponding
1959 period, and the fifth highest weekly total since 1955.
Since the regime began forced agricultural collectivization
last winter, refugee flow to West Berlin has been consistently
higher than during. 1959. Although the peak in defections is
usually reached in late August and September, the present
greatly increased flow of refugees reflects growing popular
fear that further repressive measures may be impending and.
that tighter controls may be imposed on travel to Berlin. Re-
gime pressure during the harvest period may have led many
farmers to flee immediately after selling their last private
owned crops. F_ I
II. ASIA-AFRICA
0
Communist Masjumi and Socialist parties. Lukarno is reported
"very angry" over the army's ban and undoubtedly will take some
.0 IL
Indonesia: Political tensions are increasing.in Indonesia
over Hie army's ban on 24 August of the Communist party and
its front groups in South Borneo. Although South Borneo is not
an area of Communist strength, the ban is a significant act of
defiance against President Sukarno and is presumably a retalia-
tory move for the President's dissolution on 17 August of the anti-
counteraction, which could lead to a showdown with army chief
of staff General Nasution.
25
 Approved For Re a 2002/09/05 :CIA-RDP79T0097 Ove 00510001-7 25
p
ures, In an effort to forestall UN intervention, Lumumba may
soon press his demand that UN troops leave the Congo as soon as
Belgian troops complete their withdrawal--expected .in early Sep-
tember.
Secretary General Hammarskjold indicated
Congo: Premier Lumumba's success against the secession-
ist ", Mining State" in Kasai Province may encourage him to plan
an early invasion of neighboring Katanga Province. . Katanga
President Tshombe has already started defensive military meas-
26 August that he would regard such a demand by Lumumba as
a "formal request" and would. call an emergency session of the
Security Council. He would tell the council that the Congolese
Army could not maintain order and that a UN withdrawal would
.lead to foreign intervention. Hammarskjold believes the Congo
crisis will come to a head within the next week. The mood of the
Congolese Army was demonstrated when it made widespread at-
tacks on Europeans--including American and UN personnel--at
Stanleyville on 27 August.
The American ambassador in Leopoldville believes that the
USSR has selected "foodlifts" as an easy way to introduce men
and materials into the Congo without the usual customs inspec-
tion. He reports that "over 100 Caucasians" have arrived in the
Congo via Soviet aircraft since 1 August and expects that a sub-
stantial number will arrive soon aboard 10 large Soviet aircraft
understood to be en route.
25
25
29 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF
Approved For Relea a 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 05200510001-7 5) WWII,
-IN
 Aooroved For ReJe se 2002/09/05: CIA-RDP79T0097 A200510001-7 25 A
25
LATE ITEMS
25X1
among American observers that a compromise settlement can
isms are still running high but there is cautious optimism
to start on 30 August. Mutual suspicion and personal antagon-
before a reunited National Assembly in sessions now scheduled
*Laos: Delegations from.Savannakhet and Vientiane, led re-
spect ely. by General Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma, are arriv-
ing in the royal capital of Luang Prabang to mediate differences
be reached. Although overt military command in Vientiane is
to influence the formation of the new government. 25
General Ouane, Captain Kong Le is apparently still in a position
passing increasingly into the hands of Laotian Army commander
0
29 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF
Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005200510001-7
25
 Approved For ReiRP4 2002/09/05. CIA-RDP79T00975A 00510001-7 25
11
*Cuba. Cuba's defiant walkout from the OAS foreign
ministers' meeting on 28 August further isolates the
Castro regime from other hemisphere nations and empha-
sizes to them that the Cuban Government has rejected the
inter-American system in favor of greater dependence on
support from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Cuban Foreign Minister
Roa, whose position was based on the alleged "imminent
threat" of US military intervention, hinted that Cuba :.may
take its case back to the UN Security Council. His speeches
clearly implied that the Castro regime continues to regard
itself as the vanguard of "the antiimperialist revolution"
that will eventually sweep re continent.
29 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iv
25
VV J Al'
~%///%%%///////%%%%%////000%%y~i~y~ri~ii~~~~~v~d~~d~r~~~~q~gy FEE ~~~~D~~~~~~~i~~~~~~l~f~/~~
~rM
%%
 25X1
25X1
25X1
. Approved For R$
Increased Political. Tensions in Indonesia
Political. tensions are increasing in Indonesia over the
army's ban on 24 August of the Communist party and its front
groups in South Borneo. These developments will further ag-
gravate the strain between the army and President Sukarno
and could culminate in a showdown. between the two.
President Sukarno is reported "very angry" over the army's
ban and has questioned army chief of staff General Nasution con-
cerning the local commander's authority to take such action. The
army, however, intends to extend the ban, on a staggered basis,
to South Celebes, South Sumatra, and the Lesser Sundas. The
Communist party has protested to the attorney general's office
that the South Borneo commander has no right to ban the party,
and has asked the War Administration Office, which is headed by
Sukarno, to review his action
The South Borneo commander banned the party within the
broad powers he holds as regional war administrator under the
prevailing state of emergency in-most areas of Indonesia. Al-
though the Communist party is active in South Borneo, it is not
an area of Communist strength, and any overt resistance to the
ban can be easily contained. The ban is a significant act of defi-
ance against Sukarno and is presumably a retaliatory move for the
President's dissolution on 17 August of the anti=Communist Masjumi
and Socialist parties.
Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200510001-7
29 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
 25X1
Approved For Rei ase 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 5 00510001-7
The Situation in the Congo
Premier Lumumba's success in capturing the capital of the
secessionist "Mining State" in Kasai Province may encourage him
to plan an early invasion of provincial President Tshombe's rebel-
lious Katanga Province. Tshombe's forces have already begun
preparing defensive installations, and UN Ethiopian troops have
reportedly taken up positions along the Kasai-Katanga border, pre-
sumably to discourage attacks from either side. Lumumba's de-
sire to avoid possible intervention by UN troops in his invasion
plans may cause him to press for rapid compliance with his re-
newed demand of 26 August that UN troops leave the Congo as soon
as Belgian troops complete their withdrawal--now expected within
a week.
(ecretary General Hammarskjold,
on 26 August, stated that Lumumba must be "broken." He im-
plied this might be accomplished by discrediting Lumumba in the
UN should the African leader persist in his demand for withdrawal
.of UN troops from the Congo. The secretary general indicated he
would regard this as a "formal request" and would call an emergency
session of the Security Council for instructions. He added that his
intention in this event is to inform the council that the Congolese Ar-
my could under no circumstances maintain peace and order in the
Congo and. that a withdrawal of UN troops would undoubtedly lead to
foreign intervention and therefore to a breach of the peace
CHammarskjold believes the Congo crisis will come to a head
following the end of the current meeting of African leaders in Leo-
poldville--expected on 30 August- if Lumumba believes
he has the support of these leaders
The conferees, however, reportedly have advised Lumumba
against taking any move to weaken UN influence in the Congo and
indicated further that. any aid given by their countries must be chan-
neled through the UN.
The mood of the Congolese Army was demonstrated on 27 August
when it made widespread attacks on Europeans-including the crew
25X6
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200510001-7
29 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
 Approved For Reieas 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975 00510001-7 25X1
1%W ~ 4W,
of an American transport aircraft as well as Swedish and Cana-
dian members of the local UN headquarters--in the Stanleyville
area. The army has repeatedly used strong-arm tactics against
numerous "white" UN personnel as well as against Caucasian
members of the press throughout the Congo crisis.
Meanwhile the Communist bloc continues to make significant
gains in the Congo. The American ambassador in Leopoldville
reported that "over 100 Caucasians" had arrived on Soviet air-
craft since 1. August and a "substantial number" was expected soon
aboard 10 large. Soviet aircraft understood to be en. route--osten-
sibly carrying food. The ambassador believes the USSR has se-
lected "foodlifts... as an easy way to introduce men and materials
with impunity," since these Soviet aircraft are permitted to dis-
pense with normal customs procedures. In addition, an undisclosed
number of bloc technicians arrived in. the Congo aboard a Soviet
vessel on 22 August.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200510001-7
29 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200510001-7
Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200510001-7
 25X1
Approved For Release
Situation in Laos
y members of the two contending political factions in
Laos, headed by General Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma, are
converging on the royal capital of Luang Prabang to resolve
their differences before a reunited National Assembly, now
scheduled to open sessions on 30 August. Phoumi, accompanied
by 22 assembly deputies and other principal supporters, arrived
from Savannakhet on 28 August. Premier-designate Souvanna
and 34 fellow deputies from Vientiane are scheduled to arrive
on 29 Augusta Both Phoumi and Souvanna are anxious to have
private discussions with King Savang prior to the assembly
deliberations, since his attitude could be a decisive factor
Spokesmen for both factions claim the loyalty of a majority
of the deputies, but the attitude of many`ls open to question
since party affiliations have been severely shaken by the 9 Au-
gust coup. Mutual suspicion and personal antagonisms are still
running high between the principal leaders of the two groups,
but there is cautious optimism among American observers in
Laos that a compromise settlement is in the making. The
assembly apparently will vote again on the motion of nonconfi-
dence in the previous Somsanith government and on the investiture
of the Souvanna cabinet which Phoumi asserts were originally
voted under duress in Vientiane
Formation of a new government will be influenced by the fact
that Captain Kong Le still retains considerable authority in the
Vientiane area, despite the passing of overt control to General
Ouane, commander of the Laotian Army. Kong Le has relinquished
command of the 2nd Paratroop Battalion to a subordinate officer,
apparently in order to concentrate on his position as Ouane's
deputy
Most of the paratroops are positioned on strategic approach
routes several miles outside Vientiane where they reportedly
are acting as cadres for irregular forces assisting in the
capital's defense
Ouane also places the total forces in the
Vientiane area at about 6, 000, but the American military attache
believes this figure is too high, even if police elements are in-
c luded.-
Approved For Release - 0510001-7
29 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Rp'
5200510001-7
[Duane stated on 27 August that he assumed that the 3, 800
arms issued to civilians would not be collected until Phoumi's
countercoup forces withdrew or a political agreement was
reached.
25X1
25X1
25X1
240we Fc l *41 E FWKWbbb75 8ge260510001-7
 25X1
Approved For 4elease 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0052 0510001-7
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
Approved Fora Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400510001-7
 i i"
Approved For ReI ?se 20T201p : (S1 RET75AOW00510001-7
000,
Approved For Release 20f(t,P : (MCRY
.T75A005200510001-7