THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CABINET CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 19, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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19 October 1966
1. The South Vietnamese cabinet crisis is subject to
hourly changes, and we in Washington must look for the latest
word to Embassy Saigon -- which is in direct touch with the
Presidential Party.
2. On the whole, we think the chances are better than
even that the crisis will be compromised in some fashion which
will limit the damage and leave Ky where he is. In these
circumstances, the best thing the US can do is play it as cool
as possible. However, there is sufficient potential here for
real trouble that it is worthwhile assessing the more ominous
possibilities. This we have done in the attached -- working
with SAVA and OCI. At the moment, we do not believe that it
would be useful to initiate coordination with other agencies
on a paper.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
cc: DDCI
DDI
DDP
OCI
SAVA,
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SECRET
19 October 1966
SUBJECT: Ir*lications of the Current Cabinet
Crisis in South Vietnam
Situations The current cabinet crisis derives from
an unfortunate meshing of to of the major divisive factors
which have long complicated political life in South Ski _t7
regional rivalries and the issue of civilian versus military
1
control.' it does not represent a now development, but
t significant manifestation of the se fundamental m1adies
since the September cleetions.
t will not be the last.
seven cabinet miniters (out of 29) who have proferred
their resignations are all of Southern (Cochinchinese) origin and
are civilians. They share the general Southern antipathy toward
the Northern "carpet-baggers" who dominate the Ky government and
the military establishment. They also suspect that the military
A third major divisive influence is religion which is not
yet openly involved in the crisis; but should th crisis
drag on, religious animosities and political jockeying
among the various religious groups could readily come into
play.
The exact status of these ministers is unclear. Ky has said
that they have agreed to remain at their posts until after
the Manila Conference (24-26 October). Nonetheless, the
resignation statements have appeared in the press after the
ministers supposedly agreed to stay on, and the statements
at least appear unequivocal.
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l d :rship will not fulfill its pledge for a transttiOn 'Co
a civilian government. The visits of various f leaders (in
particular those of Police Director, General Nguyen Ngoc Loan)
ry-dominated South Korea adds fuel to Southern suspicions.
this backdrop of traditional mistrust, th;. heavy-handed
action by Loan, a Northerner, in arresting an acting cabinet
minister provided a rallying-point for the Southern ministers.
They began to pressure NY and to charge that Loan was attempting
is create a "police state." Moreover) the irAdnence of the Manila
Can;
e gave them an advantageous moment to bring pressure on
ministers assumed that Ky would be eager to avoid any
political crisis before the Confer--ace
r one involving
the issue of civilian-military relations which the US considers
crucial to the "ether war" in Vietnam-
3. It is also likely that General Dang Van: quetng (IV Corps
Cinder) and perhaps General Nguyen Kuu Co (Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of War) are involved behind the scenes in the challenge
to ,y s s regime. Both men are Southee me rs . More important, they
have strong personal reasons to oppose ,y: both men are prime
candidates to be removed from their posts for corruption.
4 In any event, Hy, a Northerner (Tonkinese) and a military
a, is almost certainly the ultimate target of the Southerners,
although the ministers have scrupulously avoided attacking Xy
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personally. Instead they have aimed their attack- at those close
to K y, particularly Loan, head of the two principal security
organizations; but also at General Le Nguyen Xhang, III Corps
and Marine Commander; Bui Diem, Secretary of State for 'oreign
Affairs; and Dinh Triuh Chinh, Secretary of State to the Prime
Minister: (Ii'r. T'hes : men are all Northerners. Because they
cormnd the. security forces in the Saigon area, Doan and Chang
provide much of the physical protection for the K7 regime. Shot
Ky be obliged to remove these men, his power base and prestige
would be seriously weakened.
The crisis has already done some damage to Ky's itOge:*
dle as of the immediate outcome of the crisis) Kly will go to
Manila with hi domestic house in a state of some public disarray.
There has already been adverse foreign publicity on this score,
they heavy press coverage of the proceedings in Manila will
engender more. In South Vietnam, the crisis has heaped film the
glow left by the successful September election. It also has
publicly raised the issue of civilian-military conflict. This
will have reverberations in the Constituent A :sembly where there
is a sizeable and vocal bloc of Southern delegates, the most notable
and most vocal being gran Van Van, who may be working covertly
with the dissidents.
. npl.ications. The crisis can almost certainly not be
6. j
resolved before the Manila Conference, and the best that can be
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WW
looked for is its e?eferral until after the Manila Conference.
Such a deferral would put the beat face an an embarrassing
problem at aiila and might allow things to simer down in
Saigon. On previous occasions, Ky has been adroit at fashioning
cromi.sea which have at least temporarily tended to placate
the contending elements. If no compromise can be reached this
or if cy is compelled to meat the problem head on, he has
two alternatives s 1) to accept the cabinet resignations, or
2) to sack or sbustantia:ly curb Loan.
7. If Ky does accept the resignations, it would be a
blow to civilian-military relations and would further exacerbate
rivalries. There would be a chorus of unfavorable
publicity in the foreign press. To lessen the impact of such
a move, Ky would probably try to replace the ministers with other
Southerners. He could probably do so, and this would help.
Nevertheless, there would be a new round of anti-GVN = atemert s,
charges of "military dictatorship," and the like. Som: of
firebrand Southerners in the Assembly might resign in Protest
In these circumc-tances, there might be some street demonstration
and the mi.litant Buddhists might strike up a temporary alliance
with some Catholic Southern elements.
8. A move by Kr to drop Loan could cause more immediate
and serious problems. K realizes this and has said that he will
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not fire Loma., though like all decisions in South Vietnam, this
is probably not irreversible. As director of the two major
security organizations, Loan is a power In his own right. More-
over, he is the foremost figure in the loose grouping of young,
hard-line officers collectively called the "Baby Turks." fn's
removal would raise the spectre of renewed military factionalism
which has not seriously plagued the CJVN :-ince the removal of
last spring. Moreover., Iy has confidence in Loan,
,'dyed a major role in upholding the GVN In its recent victory
over the militant Buddhists, In considering a move against Loan,
would be aware that this would only temporarily appease the
opposition elements and. only whet the Southerners' appetite for
move concessions. Loan's removal under pressure would weaken
in the eyes of all concerned.
9. On the whole, the best thing that could happen would be
that the crisis not come to a final head before Manila and that
after Manila it can be settled by a compromise or at least by a
not overly disruptive showdown. The worst that could happen
would be a shattering of th_. unity among the military. At present
and for a long time to come, military support,, and probably pre-
dominance as well, is essential for any regime in South Vietnam.
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