CRITICAL FACTORS UNDERLYING THE VIABILITY OF A SOUTH VIETNAM STATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 7, 1954
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release/13 : CIA-RDR00904A000100050023-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC!
7 r 19541
I lORANDUN FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT, Critical Factors Underlying the Viability of a
South Vietnam State
THE PROBLEM
To estimate what factors would be of critical iaportanee in
the establishment of a viable South Vietnam stags after the
withdrawal of the non-Cosstt tee
le In the paragraphs below, we have described the fact
we regard as essential in the eetablIshment of a viable South
Vietnam state, We have stated these in broad terms, without
regard for the circumstances prevailing at the time the action
of establishing such a state was taken, We recogr .z that in the
rapidly deteriorating Indochinese situation the tiffing, the
e utionf and the oircumatancs Surrounding the action would be
crucial, but we are unables, within the scope of this paper, to
NOTES
I 00 53 ~Jy~t,2~?~eg&ar~rpd/~q~Ja~,~
~ ~/'~J
~ -"? ~.q. vli
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050023-3
discuss these aspects. We have not assessed the degrees of diffL.
vult4r involved in creating the conditions for a viable South
Vietnam state. In general, we consider that those difficulties?
already great, will grow in also and number if the situation in
Vietnam continues to deteriorate.
2< InternatioKaal recognition and
s . It would be essen-
tial that the government of South Vietnam receive international
recognition and support. It would be most beneficial if the
military strength of the US and UK were connitted to protecting
the integrity of the south Vietnam state. The political stature
of the South Vietnam state would be enhanced if the Colosabo pMor*
extended recognition and support.
3. Secure borders. in the event of a cease fire and the
establishment of a damnation line between North and South Viet.
nam, it would be essential that this border, as well as the borders
of ]Laos and Cambodia, be secured by international guarantee. The
problem of controlling Coro moist infiltration would be facilitated
by international Aston. We do not consider the precise
location of the north-south border to be a critical factor so
long as it: (a) bite Vietnam north of Tourane and south of
Vinh; and (b) is so dram as to facilitate international super r
vision and military defense. To insure the security of South
Approved For Releas 7/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050023-3
 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-'P79R00904A000100050023-3
Gleffllf
Vietnam's western border and for less tangible benefits as well,
it would be essential that Laos and Cambodia be independent non-
Coimuwist countries with effective governments and that the
Viet MLnh forces currently operating in Laos and Cambodia be with
drawn. Maximum political stability would accrue to South Vietnam
if these forces were withdrawn as the result of international
agreement. In the event a cease fire were not obtained and the
fighting continued, it would be essential that substantial outside
forces were committed to the security of South Vietnam's borders.*
14. National inde endence. It would be essential that South
Vietnam be independent of France and that this be manifested in
term visible to the average Vietnamese. Most Vietnamese groups,,
both political organizations like the Dai Viet and confessional
groups like the Cao Daists, have as their first political tenet the
independence of Vietnam. Unless it were apparent to these groups
at the outset that the goverment was truly independent and that
Vietnam was not irrevocably divided,, they would probably withheld
their support and they might take this occasion to join foram
with the Viet Minh OnationaL.stsa. It is doubtful that the South
Vietnam government could maintain the necessary appearance of
independence while holding membership in the French Union as
paper oeaa not disarms the strictly military requirements
of holding a military line south of the Delta. These require.
merits have been set forth in REir a1 Report of the F'i..vePo
Military Conference* of ,m 1954 (Top Secret), dated 11 jum
1954,
Approved For Release DG5/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050023-3
 Ap rived For Release 20058RftVTCIA-R~P79R00904A000100050023-3
presently constituted. However, the Vietnamese might be able
and willing to be members of a less formal organisations some.
what similar to the British Qommoiwlaith, if the French in return,
were willing to give up their dominant economic position in Viet.
non, The Vletnazwe desire to control their own economy and would
probably demand a reapportioning of a substantial share of French
interests and the relinquishment of other French economic pri vi.
loges, If French colonial interests were undiling to accept,
such a development, the South Vietnam government would probably
find it necessary to withdraw from the French Union and to tam
drastic steps to reduce the economic position of the French,
Internal security. It would be essential that the govern.
ment be capable of providing physical security to the Vietnamese,
After many years of war and gullla activity the Vietnamese
crave security above all else. Maximum political advanta would
accrue if this were accomplished bye (a) the withdrawal of Viet
Minh regulars and guenei1las through international agreement under
effective international supervision; and (b) the establishment of
a competent national police force, probably drawn initially from
Vietnamese army units. In this circumstance, and provided that
South Vietnam was not required for the short term to assume nacre
than a minor share in the defense of its borders, adequate forces
would probably be available from among present Vietnamese forces
S
Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050023-3
 App7oved For.Release 2005/07/13 : CIA- 79R00904A000100050023-3
in Central and South Vietnam for the eetablisbment of such a
force* An essential first step would be to remove all security
functions from the Dinh XtrM, a Saigon underworld group. Over a
longer term, it would be essential that the Vietnamese leaders be
assured that a national arv would be established on a parity with,
the Viet Minh forces in North Vietnam.
6. Ec nomiro viabin . it would be essential that the govern,
spent achieve short term economic viability by: (a) reducing the
foreign share of national income; (b) exporting sufficient raw
materials,, principally rice and rubber, to pay for importe of mam-
factured goods; and (a) obtaining adequate technical and financial
assistance to support Vietnam during the initial period. Present
US technical and financial assistance to Vietnam totals approxi..
mately $25 million annually. It would be essential that the mew
god t continue to receive such aid, expanded in those areas
of the economy where it would facilitate economic developeat,
The government would require additional financial assistance, both
to rehabilitate and develop such basic services as power and trans:
portation and to meet whatever balance-of ppaymente deficit e3dateC
This deficit could probably be held to $2O0-250 million annually
if the Vietnamese could achieve small increases in rice and rubber
exports while eliminating the large quantities of luxmry goods
a etnamese orces currently in Central and South Vietnam number
153 ooo (59 regular battalions, 47 light battalions, 23,000
national guard, and 44,0oo auxiliaries). To this number might
be
added Vietnamese personnel from the 59 battalions now In the
Tonkku
for ' D~ P4e%#WP"ArR*MftMI*AOftWW6*a-3
 Apd'ved For Release 2G9 .079ROO904AO001
present]y imported. A sizeable arount of this deficit would
be met if the US continued to give financial support to mill.-
tang programs in Irndochina. The government might also ed
financial assistance to support resettlement projects to take
ewe of evacuees from the Viet Mthb territories. This might alto
be used as a program to induce increasing n mberss of north r o
to leave the Viet Minh areas. The period of financial support
would probably be at least, five years? although the amount re-
quired would probably diminish toward the latter part of this
period.
7. Adydnistrative reform. The form of the now South Viesetrn
governmcct would be less i rtant than that it quickly establ h
among the Vietnamese a reputation for hoxosty and efficiean,
Present widespread corruption and graft wuld have to be reduced
or eliminated. If such an efficient government were. established..
%,.e do not consider that it would be essential in the short tom to
hold national elections. If it were necessary to tale some
political action in order to offset Viet Minh propaganda about
Communist der ocracy and elections,, the government could hold local
electi in tovann and villages and announce plans for eventual
national eleotton s. A mu fiber of French advisers and technical
assistants would probably be retained but it would be essential
that the Vietnamese be able to replace any Individual with pes: nnal
Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050023-3
 Applied For Release 2005. ,1JitlL~fLA-R[ 9R00904A000100050023-3
f other countries if deemed desirable. ldminietrative re-
form of the extent required would be impossible wader the
present leadership of Sao Doi and his entourageo
would be required for an indefinite periodj of time.
$. To carry out the aotions described above, it would be
essential to identify a few leaders and a large nunber of honest
and competent adsudrdstrator+s, who at the same time were repre.
sentative of North, Center,,.. and South Vietnam. Because of the
long period of French control,, there are relatively few gist-
name with political training or experience. Howevw, there
are a few individuals who have displayed genuine leadership and
others m?sy emerge when an independent South Vietnam state is
established. In any eventi, foreign administrative amid
25X1
S d KENT
Assistant Director
>R~at9onal Estimates
e 7.I
Approved For Release 2005/07/13.: CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050023-3