PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO WEST GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EDC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 6, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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C 3 N T R A L INTEL.1IGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
6 August 1954
MEMORANDUM FCR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL IN ELLIGENCE
SUBJ`+' T: Probable Developments with Respect to West German
Sovereignty and the . 7C
Aa The Poat-Geneva Situation and the New Soviet Note
la The recent Soviet proposal for a new alto European conference
on collective security indicates that the USSR still regard. preven.,
tion of West German rearmament as a primary objective and is seeking
to capitalize on the favorable atmosphere created by the Geneva
"settlement" through new initiatives designed to forestall EDC rati
fication and to split the US from its allies, The Kremlin undoubtedly
hopes to disrupt the delicate Western negotiations on EDC and resto-
ration of West-German sovereignty by creating the impression that.,
in the light of Geneva., a successful East-West conference on Europe
also is possible. If the initial Soviet proposal is rejected as
"more of the same"., we believe that the USSR will follow up with further
proposals aimed at German neutralisation. These proposals may be
accompanied by a series of gestures aimed at softening Western Europe,
by a heightened propaganda campaign designed to prove that US-'UK
policy vis a vis Germany will lead to World War III., and perhaps by
incidents in the Far East designed further to upset Western solidarity.
The Kremlin will probably also indicate that rejection of its proposals
told lead to an alliance between the USSR and East Germany., and end
hopea3 of the peaceful unification of Germany.
2a In making these gambits the USSR will seek to influence those
numerous non-Communist Western Europeans who appear to view the outcome
of the Geneva Conference as evidence of changed Soviet intentional, and
as a portent for "peaceful co=existence". The corollary of this view
is that Western Europe is no longer under compulsion to press for a
buildup of NATO strengths, and that there is no urgent need for West
German rearmament. Moreover., the agreement at Geneva is reviving hopes 25X1
that the German problem may still be resolved through negotiation
between the Soviet Bloc and the West if the US does not prove too
intransigent.
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3. At the same tiwe, speculation is rife in Western Europe as
to the real meaning of the current US-UK program to grant sovereignty
to West Germany if EDC is not ratified this summer. Opponents of EDC
in France and Germany are claiming that the US and the UK have given
up on the EDC and that German rearmament has been indefinitely posh
ponedo J and UK declarations of full support for EDC and of deter-
mination to achieve a German defense contribution may counter this
propaganda to a considerable extent. However, the US and UK may be
unable to correct such interpretations fully until the French Assemblyaa
intentions with respect to EDC are clear, and the US-UK proposals can
be xevealedo
bo Thus three new elements - confusion over the new USotK
proposals on West Germary, the "relaxed" post-Geneva atmosphere in
Western Europe, and above all the new Soviet Initiative for negotiac
tiona on European problems -- have created a situation in which EDO
ratification may no longer appear as urgent as before,, Given the
present climate of European opinion, further Soviet proposals which
created a strong belief that the USSR actually desires a compromise
Germ settlement wa uld probably force our Western European allies
to demand that these be explored, even at the cost of further delay
in West German rearmament. The recent Soviet notes, with their rehash
of well-worn theses, are unlikely to have this effect. However' if the
USSR should follow them up with such proposals as would lead to a new
Eaat=West conference on European issues, we believe that a completely
new situation would be created and the estimates which follow would
have to be revised.
B a Probable Developments in France
So If Soviet pressure for new negotiations can be successfully
reasi.sted, and if Mendel=France remains persuaded of US-UK determination
to change West Germanyl a status, we believe that the Rnonch premier
will continue his efforts to obtain a decision on EDC o In the paste
the French have been sceptical regarding suggestions that US policy
would undergo an "agonizing reappraisal" if EDC were not ratified.
Hover, the knowledge that the US and UK were considering new and clear-
out courses of action toward West Germany, coupled with the firm
Benelux and West German stand on EDC, at least initially impressed the
French with the gravity of their situation a While Churchill e e paarliaa
mentary explanation and Secretary Dulles o notification to Congress of
the US-UK proposals have prompted French opponents of EDC to represent
them as an "alternative." to EDC, such an interpretation is unlikely to
disauade Mendel-France from his publicly stated intention to obtain a
prompt decision on EDC0 His success in meeting his deadline on Indochina
probably will encourage him to attempt to meet the other tasks he has
set, We believe that MendeaJrance, his prestige bolstered by success
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at Geneva, will probably remain in office long enough to force the
Assembly to vote on EDC before it adjourns.
6. Pros cts for EDO Ratification. However, the committee
appointed by Mends s ranee to effect a -compromise acceptable both to
supporters and opponents of EDC has failed, and he now is faced with
making his own proposals, as promised in his investiture speech. Spaak
and Adenauer appear ready to accept certain modifications in the treaty
which could assist French ratification, but which would not require
legislative confirmation. Since such changes probably could only be
minor, however, MendesJranoe may seek to obtain a gentleaanOs agreement
from the other prospective EDO members to modify the treaty after its
ratification. The French might propose such later changes ass a) wi.denn
ng area in which unanimous agreement is required; (b) increasing
the powers of the Council at the expense of the Commissariat; and
(c) delaying iapleaentatton of some supranational aspects of the treaty.
Adenauer has already expressed willingness to discuss such modifications
and we believe that the EDC signatories would reluctantly accept changes
that would not destroy the supranational features of EDC.
7. Consequently Mendes France probably will be able to obtain or
promise sufficient modifications in the treaty to convert a number of
fence-sitters and less vehement opponents of DCo Nevertheless, he will
be unable to secure changes sweeping enough to satisfy the majority
of EDO opponents, particularly the forcer Gaullists (GRS) now in the
Mendes=France government. The ex-Gaullists are already applauding the
USA proposals as an acceptable alternative to EDC, which not only
retains the independence of the French ary, but also affords opportuni-
ties for indefinitely delaying West German rearmament. Accordingly,
in forcing a decision on EDC, Mendel-France probably would lose the
support of the ORS and their ministers probably would then resign.
B. Other problem which present obstacles to EDC ratification
are the Tunisian reform program, and Mende. ranceas request for decree
powers to implement his economic program. The effectiveness of Gaullist
and other opposition to EDC in the Assembly will depend to a large
degree on the outcome of these issues. The actions and statements of
other Western governaente, especially any public pressure on France
and Western responses to Soviet proposals on European issues, will also
influence the outcome of an Assembly vote on EDC. However, if Mendel.
France successfully surmounts these hurdles, and if the forthcoming
Soviet proposals are effectively countered by the West, we believe that
there is an even chance that the Assembly would ratify EDC. 14endes-
France may be able to secure at least a slim aajority, chiefly among
the present center_ and left-center parties, if he can promise some
aodifloations in the treaty, and force the issue to a voxe.
n3
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9, Should. MendesJrance fail to gain a decision on EDC, no successor
government would be likely to obtain French ratification. Moreover,
even if EDC is ratified by the Aasembly, the ratification process will
not be completed until it is either approved by the Council of the
Republica or repassed by an absolute majority of 3l1 votes on the
second reading in the Assembly, In any case action by the Council
will not take place until the fall, Mendes trance believes that, the
Council is likely to reject EDO and that its decision would have to be
overridden by the Assembly. Therefore, he'has pressed for modifications
in EDC in order to achieve an absolute majority in the Assembly, In
the event of a required second reading the changes in EDC he will propose
would be even more essential, and a dramatic new gesture of support
for EDC by the West might also be necessary,
10. Prospects if EDC is not Ratified. If the French Assembly
does not r-aUry Mc s summer and the UK then seek French
acquiescence to granting West German sovereignty, we believe that France,
aware that the US and the UK might otherwise proceed without it, would
reluctantly agree after considerable bargaining. However, France probably
would make every effort to strengthen the proviso postponing West
Germ"T's right to rearm. It might seek some form of veto power over
German rearmament. Nevertheless, if the US and the UK refused =7
alternative to a clear French agreement to decide on German rearmament
within a certain period, and if they seemed prepared to abrogate the
present tripartite occupation agreements, we believe the French would
ultimately agree to the US-UK proposals,
11, Assuming French agreement to the US=UK proposals on condition
that any decision on German rearmament would be postponed for a certain
period, we believe they would use the interim to seek some other
method for rearming West Germary* than the establishment of a national
German arroyo They night make such suggestions as: a special subordinate
status for West Germany within NATO; a coalition araw with limited
German, and possibly British, participation; or some form of arms pool.
If these proposals were unacceptable, the French might prove intransigent
on German rearmament even if faced with the threat of unilateral US
action to arm the Germans in its.soneo In the last analysis, however,
we believe that they would be more likely to yield to US-UK pressure
and accept the formation of a national West German army under some form
of NATO control, They would reason that: (a) Fraioe would otherwise
be isolated in Western Europe; (b) the NATO machinery provides a
means fbr control of West German rearmament; and (a) the NATO states
would probably agree that production of such arms as nuclear weapons,
submarines, and military aircraft should be prohibited in "strategic
areas" like West Germargr,
44m
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Co Probable Developeoente in West Geraan
ra~rr..~mwrr.~.~i r r re~rr~~r+~
12, Adenauer is being sorely pressed because of French hesita-
tion on EDO and his resultant inability to make further progress
toward West German sovereignty and European integrations The recent
Soviet grant of sovereignty to East Germany, the numerous demonetrac
done of French weakness compared with growing German strength, and
rising European criticism of US po1iqr have contributed to the
growing impatience of the German publics However,, Adenauerea relative
success in the recent North Rhine-Westphalia election and the favor-
able German reaction to the Eisenhower-Churchill conference appear to
have curbed that restiveness temporarily, Moreover, Adenaueras force-
ful speech demanding sovereignty for West Germany and closing the door
to renegotiation of EDC before its ratification almost certainly
strengthened his domestic position,
130 The Soviet proposals have already been taken up by the SPD
and neutralist elements,in West Germanys These groups are demanding
another effort at negotiation with the USSR to see whether or not a
basis for German reunification can be achieveds We believe, however,
that unless the MSR comes up with markedly new proposals, the basic
scepticism of the West Germans will remain strong and Adenauer will
probably remain able to control unrest within his own party and within
the coalition so long as hope remains for EDO. Nevertheless, the US=UDC
decision to grant-sovereignty to West Germany if the French do not
ratify EDC this suxwer would make it difficult for him to acquiesce
in any delay beyond that tLueo
l1, However, the West German people are far more interested in
ending the occupation and acquiring sovereignty than in rearmament,
and they would almost certainly be satisfied in the short term by a
four-power declaration granting sovereignty but including a temporary
prohibition on rearmaments Adenauer himself appreciates French
sensitivities, believes that Fraynco-Gernan cooperation is the keystone
of harmonious relations in Western Europe, and is apprehensive con?
corning a revival of German militarism, Therefore, if sovereignty
were granted, he would probably not press the French for early approval
of West German rearmaments
15o On the other hand, if the French more unwilling to join the
US and the UK in granting West Germany sovereignty, Adenauer would be
forced to adopt increasingly independent policies toward the French,
He would find it politically impossible to agree to granting France
a veto power over German rearmament in return for French agreement
on West German sovereignty, If France rejected all the US-UK proposals,,
Adenauer would most likely attempt to negotiate tt th the US and the UK
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alone, even though he would be aware that the consequent Franco-German
resentments would threaten the foundations of his E ropean policy.
16. Should the US and the UK fail to grant West German sovereignty
in event of French failure to act on EDC this summer, Adenauer
probably would be forced to follow an even more ostensibly independent
and "neutralist" course, Nationalist feeling would increase in all
levels of the West German populations the moderate elements in both
major parties would be weakened, and the popular appeal of the Right
extremists would increase significantly. Moreover, sentiment favor-
ing a unified but neutralized Germany would increased Adenauer would
probably have to seise the initiative from his critics, who would be
likely to press both for bilateral understandings with the Western
Powers and more flexible policies toward the Bloc.
D. Probable Developments in the UK
17o Most Britons have a lively fear and mistrust
of German nationalism and military and economic power. However, a clear
majority in the UK reluctantly approves West German rearmament on the
grounds that this development is inevitable, that it is essential to
Western EuropeQa defense, and that the real issues concern timing and
method. The British government apparently hopes that knowledge of
the US=UK intention to restore West German sovereignty will help per-
suade the French to ratify MCo If the French Assembly failed to
ratify before the summer recess, we believe that Britain would favor
proceeding with the London agreements but would probably be willing
to delay West German rearmament for six months or even a year in order
to obtain French concurrence. However, it would probably not be
willing to accede to an indefinite delays and if EDC appeared dead,
would favor seeking French agreement to German rearmament under NATO.
18o .French failure to act on ADC would make German rearmament
an even more lively issue in British politics and would almost certainly
strengthen those who oppose it. The Labor Party would seize upon
the ostensible failure of EDC to reopen debate on policy toward West
Germano If France failed to ratify EDC, and if no alternative
acceptable to the French appeared by the time of the fall Labor Party
convention, majority opinion in the Labor Party would alaoat certainly
oppose West German rearmament until such an alternative had appearede
On the other hand, if a new formula for West German rearmament appeared
which seemed likely to win French approval, Attlee would probably
back such a fbrmulao In such circumstances the chances are better than
even that the majority of his party would support hind
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Eo Probable Deyelopeents in the other EDC Countries
19. The Low Countries which favor a West German defense con-
tribution because it would improve their own defenses, would almost
certainly support arq- policy proposed by the Big Threeo They would
probably support bilateral US-UK action even if France opposed0 In
event of disagreements they would tend to follow the policy of the UKo
The Dutch in particular night prove sticky on any proposals to water
down the supranational features of the )Co
20o The chances of Italian action on A)C will be influenced
largely by the nature of the French decision on EDC and the outcome of
the negotiations on Trieste o If a satisfactory Trieste settlement is
achieved' if the French have not rejected EDC, and if the US and UK
continue to press for ratifications we believe that Italy would ratify
EDC promptly in the fallo On the other hands the implementation of a
new US-UK policy vis-a-vis West Germany would probably lead the Italian
government to support the US-UK actiono
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Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates
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CONp'IDNTIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3 August 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Probable Short Term Comet Courses of Action in
the PosU.3eneva Period*
1. CONSISTENCY OF SOVIET POLICY
1, We believe that the Communist acceptance of a Geneva
settlement does not constitute a major shift in Soviet policy,
but is consistent with the main policies the USSR has been
pursuing for some time. The principal Soviet strategic aim
over the last few years has been the weakening and eventual
disruption of the US-led anti.-Canmun .et alliance. Following
the checks which Conemunist aggression encountered in Korea in
I95O-51 and the steps taken by the aroused Western Powers to
build a heavily-armed and closely-knit alliance the Communist
leaders apparently concluded that, if they continued on their
provocative course, they would not only soon be faced with a
military combination highly dangerous to their security but
night be risking a general conflict.
2, The USSR reacted by avoiding further aggressive moves
on the pattern of the Berlin blockade and Korea, and by moving
toward a more "conciliatory" line which held out hope to the
hard-pressed Western states that the burdens of ream t
could be escaped through negotiated settlements, Stalin's death
apparently facilitated this shift, and was employed to encourage
Western hopes of a genuine change in Soviet policy. At the
come time, the Gommnist leaders apparently concluded that the
continuation of colonial "liberation movements", such as the
armed insurrections in Southeast Asia, was not incompatible
with the main line of their policy0 Not only did these actions
tax Western resources, but they were themselves the source of
divisions among the Western allies, and between them and the
free nations of Asia.
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3. Communist Aims at Geneva. In view of the considerable
Viet mink military successes between the Berlin and Geneva
meetings, the Communists do not seem to have capitalized as
fully on their Indochina military opportunities as would have
been possible. By further delaying tactics at Geneva, they
might have hoped to seize the whole of Indochina in a relatively
short tire. In addition, by causing Mendes'F'r?ance to fail in
his dramatic bid for peace, they might have intensified the
internal crisis in France.
4. That the Communist leaders chose to sacrifice these
immediate gains was probably due at least in part to their
fear that continued war in Indochina would greatly increase the
risk of US intervention, or at a minimum lead to solidification
of an anti-Communist alliance in Southeast Asia, perhaps even
including many Asian states. But their decision was probably
also in large part due to their belief that a compromise
Indochina settlement would bring still greater advantages than
a military conquest of Indochina, the winning of which they
probably regard as only temporarily postponed in any cased The
Communists probably calculated that a compromise settlement
would enhance their reputation for moderation and sharpen the
divisions among none-Communist countries, thus serving the
Kremlin's main strategic aim of splitting the US from its allies.
II. PROBABLE POST.( E1TA COMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION
5. Summary, In view of the success of their tactics in
Indochina-., we believes that the Communists are unlikely to
follow up the Geneva settlement by major new aggressive moves.
While they will continue to exploit existing pressure points
to the extent which they consider will not stiffen rather than
weaken the Western alliance, we believe that, in the short terra
at least, they will capitalize on the favorable atmosphere
created by Geneva through intensified efforts at negotiation
designed to: (a) forestall EDC and German rearmament; (b) fore-
stall creation of a SEATO alliance or of a US-backed Middle
East defense grouping; and (c) further split the US from its
allies. They apparently hope to profit more from a further
relaxation than from a sharpening of East-West tensions.
6. Soviet propaganda and diplomacy since Geneva indicate
that the Soviet leaders are eager to prose their advantage and
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maintain the momentum of negotiation, or at least of talk
about negotiation. Communist propaganda is bearing down hard
on the themes of nuclear energy control and disarmament,
collective security plans for Europe and Asia, and admission
of Communist China to the UN, contrasting these to the "dangers
to peace" inherent in "warlike" US policies, The Soviet note
of 25 July states that Geneva gave "fresh proof of the fruitful
ness of efforts directed at normalizing international relations,
at resolving important problem not only in Asia but in mope
as well,"
7o Western Europe, The Soviet call for a new all-European
conference indicates that the USSR still regards prevention of
lost German rearmament as a primary objective and is seeking to
forestall the US-UK drive for F.DG ratification by creating the
impression that, in the light of Geneva, a successful East-Wersat
conference on Europe is also possible, The Soviet leaders must
have recognized that in allowing an Indochina settlement they
risked bringing about a situation more favorable to French rati-
fication of EDC. Their proposal for a new European conference
seems calculated to minimize that risk, The USSR will probably
concentrate on prance, hoping that the Indochina cease fire will
induce a mood receptive to Soviet European proposals,
8. Whether or not the initial Soviet proposal is rejected.,
we believe that the USSR will follow it with further proposals
aimed at exploiting French opposition to EDC, West German desires
for reunification, and British doubts on German rearmament by
urging the alternative of a unified but neutralized Germany held
down by all-European collective security guarantees, The Kremlin
also will further develop the line that rejection of its proposals
will lead to an "alliance" between the USSR and Fast Germany, and
"end forever" hopes of peaceful reunification. However, we see
no evidence that the USSR will basically revise the position it
took at Berlin, We still believe that it will not accept free
all-German elections or withdraw its troops from East Germany
until it feels confident that all Germany would thus come under
its effective control,
9, Along with preventing West German rearmament, the
Soviets aim at disrupting the Western alliance by enticing the
European members of NATO into their alternative collective se-
curity scheme. As set forth in the Soviet notes of 31 March and
25 duly,, this scheme would require the abandonment of NATO
commitments, deny West Germany to the NATO alliance, and and
in the withdrawal of US forces from Europe and isolation of the
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US, While the Kremlin hardly expects such sweeping successes,
it apparently regards the Molotov plan as a useful gambit for
appealing to European opinion,
10. As in the case of the Danish-USSR trade talks in
Moscow, the USSR will also continue to exploit the disruptive
possibilities of East-.West trade negotiations, Moreover, the
USSR has been raking efforts to tie Finland more closely to the
Bloc; in the recent Finnish-Soviet trade negotiations, it sought
to secure political commitments from the Rtnns. However, we see
no indications that unusual Soviet pressure is likely to be
applied,
n. The Far East, The principal immediate Communist effort
in the Faris likely to be to prevent the development of
any Weaternsponsored collective defense arrangement in the area,
The Communists will fend Asian neutralist sentiment by emphasizing
"Asian solidarity" and the prospects for peaceful co.stencs
via negotiated settlements, as demonstrated by Geneva. Peiping
may propose an Asian "collective security" pact as a counterpart
to Molotov?s European security plan, or a series of bilateral
pacts along the lines of Chou?en?Iai's "Five Principles". Peiping
Is also likely to attempt to frighten prospective Asian members.
of a SEAM by threats as to the consequences of joining any such
organization.
12. At the same time, the Communists will probably intenr
sift' their long standing efforts to pronote frictions between
the US and other non-Communist states over Asian issues, and create
situations in which Communist China can appear to uphold Asian
solidarity against US "'warlikns" designs, The question of Com-
munist Chinese admission to the UN will be vigorously exploited
for this purpose,
13. Above all, Peiping will almost certainly attempt to
make the status of Taiwan a major issue over the next year,
With its flanks in oKorea and Tonkin now secured by armis-
tice agreements, it may feel that the risks involved in a more
aggressive policy have been reduced. While a Chinese Communist
invasion remains unlikely, Peiping may feel that "military
incidents" in the Taiwan area can be exploited to create appre-
hension in the non-Communist world concerning US policy in the
Far Eaast.
14m Communist successes in Indochina may also give new
impetus to guerrilla warfare and subversive activities in
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Southeast Asian areas where they now exist, In particular,
there is likely to be a stepping up in Communist political
warfare activities in Thailand, to serve as a reminder to
Asian neutralists thatM"'Tignment with the US invites Communist
aggression. We believe it unlikely, however, that the Comer
monists will make any major aggressive military moves in South-
East Asia, lest they solidify anti-Communist opposition and
undermine their own efforts to encourage neutralism.
15. In Indochina we estimate that for the next year or
so the Ccmm nis s w not deliberately break the armistice
agreement by making large scale attacks across the Geneva
demarcation lines., However, we believe that the Communists
will not give up their objective of securing all Indochina, but
will pursue their objective by paramilitary, political and
psychological means, Subversive and local guerrilla actions
against the Drench and Vietnam authorities will probably continue.
Nevertheless, we believe that Soviet and/or Chinese Communist
control,over the Viet Minh will remain effective enough to in-
sure that no local developments will contravene the broader
Moscow and Peiping desire that purely local gains must be
subordinated to their general strategic aims,
16. The Communists probably regard the situation in Korea
as stabilized for the present, and believe that their prospect
in Korea will not be worsened by the indefinite continuance of
this stalemate. To score a propaganda point against the US.,
however, they may make "new" proposals for unification and
advocate the resumption of negotiations,
17o We believe that the communists will follow up their
Geneva success by intensified efforts to wean Ja away from
the US, They probably expect Japanese neutrals sentiment to
be strengthened by Geneva, and will approach Japan with attractive
economic inducements in order to encourage such neutralism.
Peiping and Moscow may even offer Japan a favorable peace treaty
in order to normalize relations, although territorial issues
will pose an obstacle to this coursed
18. The Middle East, We believe that Geneva and post-
Geneva developments w nnot of themselves have much significant
effect on the scale and nature of Communist activities in the
Middle East. The USSR is already pursuing a more active policy
in the area than in the past, but such activity appears to be
primarily in response to US efforts to strengthen Middle East
defenses. This Soviet activity, marked both by offers of
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economic assistance and other friendly gestures and by
propaganda and diploratic pressures against potential parti-
cipants in a US-backed defense grouping will probably be
intensified to the extent that the US and its allies appear
to be making progress toward bolstering their position in the
19o However, the indications are that in the short term
at least the USSR will use inducements more than threats,,
The USSR still appears to have reo sense of urgency about
achieving actual Communist control over the area. While it
might be tempted to turn to the Middle East as offering fruit-
ful opportunities for pressure on its Western adversaries, it
is difficult to see how it could undertake any drastic action
without alienating the neutralist opinion it is seeking to
cultivate in the Middle But and other areas.
SHERMAAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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