SIGNIFICANCE OF CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100040083-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: April 6, 1953
• Content Type: MF

2: CIA-RDP79R009
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CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR TBE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTFIMGENCE
SUBJECT: Significance of Current Communist Tactics
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1. It is now clear that the recent acts and statements
of the Soviet and Chinese Communist governments mark a change
of Communist tactics. The number and nature of these acts,
the swiftness with which they have followed one upon another,
the prominence given them by the Communist press and radio,
the high authority of the Communist leaders involved, and the
fact that these unexpected developments began to odour almost
immediately upon the death of Stalin all indicate that a change
has taken place in the manner of conducting Suviet policy.
For the time being the Communists have adopted a conciliatory"
approach both at home and abroad.
2. The situation is developing so rapidly, and new
evidence is appearing so abundantly, that any estimate of the
meaning of the new Communist tactics may be out of date before
it is written. The entire series of events since the announce-
ment of Stalints death has occupied less than a month.
3. There is no evidence that the ultimate objectives
of the Soviet rulers have changed, or that they have hitherto
been misunderstood in the West. The potential threat of Soviet
armed forces remains as formidable as before; there is no basis
for supposing that the menace of Communism to the free world
has diminished, or that the basic hostility of the Kremlin to
the West has altered.
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4. The change of Communist tactics may indicate no more
than that the Kremlin hopes by a series of conciliatory moves
involving no substantial concessions to weaken military strength
and political cohesion of the Western alliance and to postpone
or confuse the decisions of the new US administration. The
Soviets have already seized the diplomatic and propaganda ini-
tiative by their maneuvers. By continuing to make minor gestures
at little expense, such as the release of sick and wounded
prisoners in Korea, the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of
war and Japanese fishermen, the freeing of
the settlement of lend-lease obligations, and similar moves,
the Kremlin may expect to keep the new peace offensive alive
for a considerable time.
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5. On the other hand, the change in Communist tactics
may signify that the Kremlin has decided to make substantial
concessions, and to negotiate on some important issues with a
view to reaching agreement rather than solely with a view to
waging political warfare. The aims of such a policy would be
the same as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, but in
addition this policy would be designed to insure an extended
period of calm for building the strength of the Soviet Bloc and
for consolidating the power of the new Soviet rulers, while con-
fidently awaiting the inevitable decline and fall of capitalism.
This is not to say that the USSR will accede to all Western
demands, or that it will press on to a settlement of all outstand-
ing issues. The Kremlin would undoubtedly drive the hardest
possible bargains, but it would do so with the intention of
arriving at an agreement.
6. On balance we believe that the Soviets have in fact
changed their approach to the West, that they intend to make
substantial concessions on some points, and to negotiate agree-
manta if possible on various important outstanding issues. In
particular we believe that the Communists are now prepared to
accept voluntary repatriation of prisoners in Korea and a Korean
armistice, provided this can be done in such a way as to conceal
the Communist abandonment of principle and provided the West is
willing to pay the Communist price. This price will probably seem
high to the US, but it will almost certainly be designed to appear
reasonable to the allies of the US and to the rest of the non-
Communist world. We also believe that while the Korean and related
Far Eastern questions are still under discussion the new Soviet
rulers are likely to come forward with far-reaching and superfi-
cially attractive proposals for the settlement of other problems
such as disarmament and German unity.
7. However, this conclusion is based on the premise that
the new government of the USSR is united and securely entrenched
in power. We do not have enough knowledge of the situation in
the Kremlin to be sure that this premise is correct. The events
of the past few weeks may indicate that a struggle for power is
in progress within the USSR. If such is the case, and coherent
leadership does not exist in Moscow, Communist tactics are unlikely
to be pursued with consistency and effectiveness, and the future
of Soviet foreign policy will become so problematical as to be
beyond the possibility of estimate.
Acting Assistant Direc or
CONFIDENTIA
National Estimates
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