THE ITALIAN POLITICAL OUTLOOK THROUGH THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100030045-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 45
• Content Type: REPORT

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The
ian Polica1 Outloohrough
DISCUSSION
Results of the 1951-195.2 Local Elections. In these
elections, which were held generally in Northern and North
.Central Italy :in 1951 and in Southern Italy in 1952, the center
parties increased their control over local- administrations
.A 1951 election law made it politically rewarding-for the
parties to form linked lists, and three such lists were, with
local exceptions, presented. (a) a leftist list of Communists,
Left-Socialists, and small independent groups; (b) the center
list of Right-Socialists, Republicans, Christian Democrats,
and Liberals; and (c) a right-wing list of Monarchists and
Neo-Fascists (MSI). Through. its linkage with the smaller
moderate parties the predominantly Christian Democratic
.(CD) government carried most of the important northern
:cities and Romeo In Southern Italy, however, where-the
Christian Democrats drew a heavy vote in 1948, the extremes
gained control of certain, key local administrations. Naples,
Bari, and a number of other Southern cities went.to.the right,
while all three major Italian naval base cities (Brindisi and
Taranto in the south and La Spezia in.the north) remained
Communist.
More significant, however, is the general loss of
popular vote by the center parties as compared to the 1948
national election (see Tab A), The two parties now composing
,the government (Christian Democrats and Republicans.) received
only 38 percent of the vote, compared to about 51 percent in. 19480
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J
On a nation-wide basis, the Christian Dem
WIM -V
s remained substantially unchanged. However,
even if the votes for the Right-Socialists and Liberals (who
originally participated in the government formed after the
1/3 less votes .than. in. 1948. The o
ment parties, the total would still be a little less than 50 per
cent compared to about 62 percent in. 1948. .The Communist-
Socialist Left got about 35 percent of the vote (31 percent. in
1948) and gained roughly 500,000 votes. The greatest increase
was in the vote received by the Neo-Fascist/Monarchist right
which got about 11 percent, compared to 5 percent in. 1948
(with most of the substantial increase going to the Neo-Fascists).
The increases in.both rightist and Communist votes were
achieved largely in Southern and South Central Italy. /
Significance of the Local Elections. Although the 1951-
iyoz elections were only iocai ana provincial, is
dom#na-t
the national political trend. The chief result is, that
the Italian democratic center appears, to have lost the substantial
popular majority it received in the 1948 elections, and to be
approximately balanced by the forces of the extreme left and
right.
numerous qualifying factors, the
In the 1952 Sicilian communal elections. the three-way split
between extreme left (30 percent), Christian Democrats (31
percent) and extreme right (21 percent) which occurred in
the 1951 regional elections, was more or less re-affirmed.
-BECRTT
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Several factors contributed to the sharp losses of
the Christian Democrats. In 19489 the threat of Communism
was considered so great that anti-Communists gave their
vote overwhelmingly to the CD, on the grounds that the anti-
Communist vote should not be split. By 19511952, although
the Canmunist threat was considered much reduced, many anti-
communists who had voted for the Christian Democrats in 1918
were still dissatisfied with the government because it had not
drastically curbed Communist activities. They no longer felt
it necessary or advisable that a single party, especially a
Catholic one, should monopolize anti-communism, and accordingly
cast their votes for the rightist parties.4
4ur-&Q.4 &Q bhp ri 16& 4 aa ry r
re?"i The reaeuu nVIL jJL vrr.ti -- --
interests and their clientele, especially in Southern Italy, to
such limited: land reforms as have been effected, nationalist
reaction to the loss of the Italian colonies and failure to regain
Trieste, and nos llgia for the melodramatics of Fascism prob-
ably also contributed to rightist gains. On the other hand, the
De Gasperi government's inability, despite marked progress in
other lines of economic, policy, to reduce substantially Italy's
l
ft-
t
e
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chronic unemployment caused substantial losses
Thee goveir.nment's go-slow approach to the agrarian questi
may
'p'`r
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Likelihood of New Political Alignments. The current , --~
trend away from the center will almost certainly lead De Gasperi
and his party to take measures to avoid defeat in the national
elections, They will probably attempt to do so by broadening
the government's political base, and by taking more vigorous
measures- ai.nst the e.xt-r"emist parties, De Gasperi could
broaden the base of his government in any one of three ways:
(a) by a left-center coalition embracing the fellow traveling
Left-Socialists as well as the Right-Socialists and Republicans;
(b) by reconstituting the 1948 center government, which included
the Right-Socialists, Republicans, and Liberals; and (c) by a
right-center coalition embracing the Liberals and Monarchists
and possibly the Republicans,
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On the other hand, De Gasperi will probably not favor
early creation of a right-center coalition with the Monarchists,
because Monarchist strength does not yet appear sufficient to
,compensate. for the loss of at least Right-Socialist support
which would probably follow such a moved De Gasperi would
be wholly opposed to any coalition which would embrace the
.Neo-Fascists, who so far compose the. bulk of ' right-wing
strength.
Therefore, we believe that the reconstitution of a
balanced center coalition by bringing the Right-Socialists
and Liberals back into the present Christian Democratic-
Republican government is almost certainly the course which
will be preferred by De Gasperi and which wi4l be attempted by
him. While the Right-Socialists and Liberals might be willing
to join the government before the national elections, it is more
likely that they would prefer not. to enter the government until
after the elections,
However,. in view of the trend toward increased rightist
strength, the CD will probably make continuing efforts to pre-
pare the ground and leave the way open for a later shift
to the
.
,jL,-0 The Christian Democrats will almost certainly attempt
to split the present rightist alliance between the Monarchists
and Neo-Fascists, since it is improbable that the CD would ally
with the Neo-Fascist MI. Such. efforts could well prove success-
ful despite the failure of an earlier CD effort to split off the
Monarchists prior to. the recent elections in Southern Italy. Since
then, ex.-King Umberto has expressed displeasure at continued
Monarchist. alliance with the MI. Moreover,. the N'eo-Fascists
,of the. Salo Republic tradition in . the North are opposed to an
alliance with the Monarchists of the South.
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moo,
De Gasperl's choice between these alternatives will
be largely influenced by the composition of the Christian
Democratic Party and. its sources of support. The party
encompasses a wide range of social, economic, and geo-
graphical interests, some of them sharply opposed, to each
other. The essential common characteristics of the party
are its anti-Communism and Catholicism, and we believe
that these forces will continue to hold the various party
factions together. The CD's major source of support is the
Catholic Church and its powerful lay political organization,
Catholic Action. With the exception of the Communists,
Catholic Aetion.is probably the best organized extra-govern-
mental. group, in. Italy.- In contrast the CD party itself is poorly
organized,and overlaps considerably with the Catholic Action
groups. Luigi Gedda, the head of Catholic Action, is a man of
energy and ability whose authoritarian tendencies have brought
him into conflict with De Gasperi on occasion, and who favors
-a .broadening of the government to the right. Before. the recent
elections Gedda urged that. the CD align itself with the right in,
order to win the touch-and.-go Rome elections.. De Gaspers
opposed such. an alignment and was justified when, the center
ticket won. - On. the other hand the strength of Catholic Action
.and the fact that the balance of power within the CD parliamentary
group probably lies with the right-center, gives these elements
a. power over De Gasperi's actions.
e believe that any proposal that the CD for a coalition
with the left-wing Socialists would 'probably be AVU* by these
domAaPA right-wing groups. Moreover, although left-wing
,Socialist leader Nenni recently raised the possibility of separating
his party from its long-held Communist association and entering
the govern in t, we cannot estimate whether this is more than a
tactical maneuver on.Nenni's part.
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iv VM
C7SRCRXT___V
Other Factors Influencing. the. Next Election. Aside
from the fluidity of the Italian political situation, there are a
number of other variable factors which make the outcome of
the next elections extremely difficult to predict. We believe,
for example, that Italy faces an unfavorable economic outlook
for next year. Further economic deterioration would intensify
social conflict and benefit the extremist parties. especially
> the Left, failure. to resolve the a issue prior to the
elections would also heighten popular dissatisfaction with the
government and benefit the nationalistic extreme right. On
.the other hand a solution on. Trieste favorable to Italy would
benefit the government by demonstrating its ability to protect
Italian. interests. However, the extremists will undoubtedly
attack almost any feasible solution, maintaining that it involved
:"unnecessary sacrifices.'"
Another factor which will influence the elections is the
extent of government action to restrict the Right and Left extremes.
We believe that De Gasperi, encouraged by the strong anti-Commu-
nist stand of Pinay in France and faced with the necessity of
strengthening his position. in the next elections, will take some
such action. Parliament has just approved an anti -Fascist law,
which can be used to greatly restrict the activities of the Neo
Fascists.. Also under consideration is a revision of the penal code
to provide penalties against anti-democratic activities of either
the right or left. Finally, the government is considering some
revision of the present proportional representation system of
voting to improve its chances of retaining a majority in the Chamber.
Probable Timing of the National Elections. We believe that
the national a ec. ons, now sc e -e or a spr? ng of 1953, will
probably be held at that time, despite various suggestions to advance
them to the fall of 1952. The CD party is unlikely to yield to such
pressures; it will probably desire. to have as much time as possible
.for political maneuvering to strengthen the coalition, to pass and
implement the proposed anti-extremist measures,, and to achieve a
successful solution of the Trieste problem.
X,-,01 or ,ejN
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i~we Now
Vs c r
Probable Outcome of the Elections.: We consider it
unlikely that the present center coalition, especially the CD,
will regain the degree of popular support obtained in the
national election of 1948. The government's difficulties over
the past five years in coping with Italy's deep-seated socio-
economic problems, especially that of unemployment, as well
as increasing concern in some quarters over the Church's
political influence, will. limit its popular support. At the same
time, the good organization and popular appeal of the Commu-
nists have not been. effectively countered, and we believe that
their vote will notbe significantly reduced. More important,
this continued Communist threat,' together with the national
frustration over Trieste and the apprehension ;of propertied
interests over further economic reforms, will probably lead
to a continued increase in the strength of the extreme right.
Even though the MSI may be outlawed, the political interests
it represents will remain a highly vocal minority force.
Nevertheless, we believe that as a result of De Gasperi's
efforts to broaden and strengthen'his government,, the four center
'parties will probably obtain a narrow majority sufficient to form
a new center coalition government.
However, this government will probably find itself
severely hampered by its narrow majority and its lack of poli-
tical homogeneity. Such coalitions in. the past have not worked
together effectively because of conflicts between clericals and
anti-clericals and diverse socio-economic views. Defection. of
any one of the four parties would probably be sufficient to over -
throw the government. Under these circumstances, and particularly
if the Monarchists had gained substantially in the elections, we
believe that the CD party would move to create a new right-centr.,
coalition, probably CD's, Liberals., and Monarchists. Such a shift
to the right would accentuate the polarization of Italian political
life and would be considered by the left-wing parties as a serious
threat. It might have major repercussions affecting Italian social
and political stability.
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The Political Future of De Gasperi. De Gasperi himself
may oppose any such move the right, and if it takes place he
might step down as Prime Minister. His retirement for reasons
of age or, health (he is now 71) is also possible, although we con-
sider this unlikely. His most likely successors appear at present
to be Piccioni--the CD Deputy Prime MinistereGonella--the
Secretary General of the CD party
in or
Impact of a Change in Government on Ital 9s Foreign
.Policy. e advent of a more right-win Government probably
WOU19 not lead to any basic shift in Italy Fs foreign policy. Italy
would remain a firm NATO supporter, and would not for- this
reason. alone reduce its present rearmament effort. However, a
rightist government probably would be more nationalist in outlook,
aril would insist on greater recognition of Italian. interests
" TAB A"
(Italian Party Strength in 1948 and 1951-1952 Elections)
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*41900
TAB "A"
Italian Party Strength in 1948 and 1951-1952 Elections*
Part
194ae_, ?~ cti _X951-52 Local Elections
Neo -Fascist (MSI)
527,000
2.0%
1,69$,000
6.9%
Monarchist
799$060
2.8%
fto09,000
4.1%
Liberal
998,000
3.9%
929,000
3.8%
Christian Democrat
12:'005,000
48.4%
8,688,000
35.5%
Republican
851,000
245%
607,000
2.5%
Right-Socialist
1,825,000
7.1.%
1,.792,900
7.3%Q
Lef t-Socialist
2,888,000
11.8%
Communist
8,099,000
31.4%
5,239,000
21.4%
Pro-Communist Indep.
509,000
2.1%
Other Parties
475,000
1.8%
1,112,000
4.5%
* These figures do not add fully to 100 percent because of rjunding.
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