DISCUSSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100030043-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 43
• Content Type: REPORT

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DISCUSSION
Results of the 191-1252 Local Elections, In these elections,
which were held Generally in Northern and North Central Italy in 1951
and in Southern Italy in 1952, the center parties increased their
control over local administrations. A 1951 election law made it
politically rewarding for the parties to form linked lists, and three
such lists were, uith local excepticns, presentedt (a) a leftist list
of Comunists, Left-Socialists, and small independent groups; (h) the
center list of Right-Socialists Republicans, Christian Democrats,
ald Liberals; and (e) a right-wing list of Monarchists and Neo-Fascists
(JBI). Through its linkage with the smaller moderate parties the
predominantly Christian Democratic (CD) eovernmont carried most
of the important northern cities end Rome. In Southern Italy,
believer, where the.Christian-Domocrats drew a heavy vote in 1948,
the extremes eained control of certain key local administrations?
Naples, Bari, and a number of other Southern cities vont to the right,
while all three major Italian naval base cities (Brindisi and
Taranto in the south and La Spezia in the north) remained Communist.
be aienificant, however, is the eenoral loss of popular
vete by the center parties as compared to the 1948 -tuitional election
(ace Th A),. The two parties now composing the government (Christian
Democrats and Republicans) received only 38 percent of the vote,
compared to about 51 percent in 1948. On a nation-wide basis, the
Christian Democrats won numerically about 1/3 lose votes than in 1948.
The numerical vote of the other three center parties fell off to
C lossor degree but their percontaT9 of the popular vote remained
substantially unchanged. However, even if the votes for the Right-
Socialists and Liberals (who originally participated in the government
formed after the 1948 elections) were added to those of the present
two -,overnment parties, the total would still be a little less than
50 percent conpured to about 62 percent in 1948, , .he
Socialist Loft leCt hot about 35 percent of the vote (Ji pereent in 1948)
and pained rougale 500,000 votes. The greatest increase wu: in the
vote received by the Noo-Fescist/Monarchist right which got about U.
percent, compare. to 5 percent in 148 (with most of the substantial
iacrease going to the Neo-Fescists). The increases in both rightist
and Cowlnisi votes were achieved largely in Southern and South Central
Italy,27
2S-1iI1an $11:ialiommunal elections the three-nay split
between, extreme left (30 percent), Christian Democrats (31
percent), and extreme right (21 percent) which occurred in the
1951 regional elections, was more or less re-affinmed.
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gignificance_of the Local Elecgena. Although the 1951-
1952 elections were only local and provincial, they were understood
to be of national significance and, despite numerous qualifying
factors, the results roughly indicate the national political trend.
The chief result is that the Italian democratic center appears to
have lost the substantial popular majority it received in the 1948
elections, and to be approximately balanced by the forces of the extreme
left and right,
Several factors contributed to the sharp losses of the Christian
Democrats. In 1948, the threat of Communism was considered so great
that anti-Communists gave their vote overwhelmingly to the CD, on the
grounds that the anti-Communist vote should not be split. By 1951-1952,
although the Communist throat was considered much reduced, many anti-
Communists who had voted for the Christian Democrats in 1948 were
still dissatisfied with the government because it had not drastically
curbed Communist activities. They no longer felt it necessary or
advisable that a single party, especially a Catholic one, should
monopolize anti-Communism, and accordingly casttheir votes for ,the
rightist parties. Tho reaction of propertied interests andtheir clientele,
especially in Southern Italy, to such limited land reforms as have
been effected, nationalist reaction to the loss of the Italian colonies
and failure to regain Trieste and nostalgia for the melodramatics of
Fascism probably also contributed to rightist gains, On the other band,
the De Gasperi government's inability, despite marked progress in other
lines of economic policy, to reduce substantially Italy's chronic
unemployment caused substantial lasses to both left and right. The
same is true of the fear of the growing influence of Catholic Action
on the CD party. The government's goeslow approach to the agrarian
question undoubtedly also contributed to this lops.
Likelihood of New Political Aliments. The current trend
away from the center will almost cortaialy lead De Gasperi and his party
to take measures to avoid defeat in the national elections. They will
probably attempt to do so by broadening the government's political
base, and by taking more vigorous measures against the extremist parties.
De Gasperi could broaden the base of his government in any one of three
ways: (a) by a left-center coalition embracing the fellow-traveling
Left-Socialists as well as the Right-Socialists and Republicans; (b)
by reconstituting the 1948 center government, which included the Right-
Socialists, Republicans, and Liberals; and (0) by a right-center coalition
adaracing the Liberals and Monarchists and possibly the Republicans.
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Do Gaoperils choice between these alternatives will be largely
influenced by the composition of the Christian Democratic Party and its
sources of support. The party encompasses a wide range of social,
economic and geographical interests, some of them sharply opposed to each
other. 411e essential common characteristics of the party are ita anti-
? Communism and Catholicism, and we believe that these forces will continue
to hold the various party factions together. The CD's major source of
support is the Catholic Church and its powerful lay political organization,
Catholic Action. With the exception of the Communists, Catholic Action
is probably the best organized extra-governmental group in Italy. In
contrast the CD party itself is poorly organized and overlaps considerably
with the Catholic Action groups. Luigi Gedda, the head of Catholic
Action, is a man of energy and ability whose authoritarlan.tendencies
have brought him into conflict with Be Gaspori on occasion, and who
favors a broadening of the government to the right. Before the recent
elections Gedda urged that the CD align itself with the right in order
to min the touch-and-go Rome elections. Be Gosport opposed such an
alignment and was justified when the center ticket mon. On the other
hand the strength of Catholic Action and the fact that the balance of
power within the CD parliamentary group probably lies with theright-
center, gives these elements a restraining power over De Gasperi's
actions'.
We believe that any proposal that the CD form a coalition
with the left-wing Socialists would probably be opposed by those right-
ming groups. Nei-cover, although left-wing Socialist leader Nenna
recently raised the possibility of separating his party from its long
held Communist association and entering the government, we cannot
estimate whether this is more than a tactical maneuver on Nennils part.
On the other hand, De Gasperi will probably not favor early
creation of a right-center coalition with the nonarchists, because
llonarchist strength does not yet appear sufficient to compensate for
the loss of at least Right-Socialist support which would probably
follow such a move, Be Gasperi would be wholly opposed to any coalition
which would embrace the ilea-Fascists, who so far compose the bulk of
extreme right-wing strength.
? Therefore, we believe that the reconstitution of a balanced
center coalition by bringing the Right-Socialists and Liberals back
into the present Christian Democratic-Republican government is almost -
certainly the course which will be preferred by De Gasperi and which
will be attempted by him. While the Right-Socialists and Liberals
might be milling to join the government before the national elections,
it is more likely that they would prefer not to enter the government
until after the electionsa
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However, in view of the trend toward increased rightist strengthe
the CD will probably make continuing effOrte to prepare the ground and
leave the way open for a later shift to the right should this became
necessary. The Christian Democrats will almost certainly attempt to
split the present rightist alliance between the Ebnarchists and Neo-
Fascists, since it is improbable that the CD would ally with the Noo-
Fascist NSI. Such efforts could well prove successful despite the
failure of an earlier CD effort to split off the Monarchists prior
to the recent elections in Southern Italy. Since thenvex-King Umberto
_hes expressed displeasure at continued Monarchist alliance with the MSle
Moreover, the Neo-Fascists of the Salo Republic tradition in the North
are opposed to an alliance with the Monarchists of the South. ?
Other Factors Influencing the Next Election. Aside from the
fluidity of the Italian political situation, there are a number of
other variable factors which make the outcome of the next elections
extremely difficult to predict. We believe, for example, that Italy
faces an unfavorable economic outlook for next year. Further economic
deterioration would intensify social conflict and benefit the extremist
parties, especially the Left. Because of the importance of the Trieste
issue to all shades of Italian public opinion, failure to resolve the
issue prior to the elections would also heighten popular dissatisfaction
with the government and benefit the nationalistic extreme right. On
the other hand a solution on Trieste favorable to Italy would benefit
the government by demonstrating its ability to protect Italian interests.
However, the extremists will undoubtedly attack almost any feasible
solution, maintaining that it involved "unnecessary sacrifices.
Another factor which will influence the elections is the extent
of government action to restrict the Right and Loft extremes. U6
believe that De Gasperi? encouraged by.the strong anti-Communist stand
of Piney in France and faced with the necessity of strengthening
his position in the next elections, will take some such action. Parliament
has just approved an anti-Fascist law, which can be used to greatly
restrict the activities of the Neo-Fascists. Also under consideration
Is a revision of the penal code to provide penalties against anti-
democratic activities of either the right on left. Finally, the
eovernment is considering some revision of the present proportional
representation system of voting to improve its chances of retaining a
celerity in the Chamber.
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eetrZITIC-7
Probable Timing of the National Elections:, Ue believe that
the national elections, now scheduled for the spring of 1953, will
probably be hold at that time, despite Various suggestions to advance
them to the fall of 1952. The CD party is unlikely toeyield to euch'
pressures; it will Probably desire to have as much time as possible -
for political maneuvering to strengthen the coalition* to pass and
implement the proposed anti-extremist measures, ancia new electoral
law, and to achieve a successful solution of the Trieste problem.
Probable Outcome of the Elections. Vs consider it unlikely
that the present center coalition, especially the CD, will regain the
degree of popular support obtained in the national election of 1948.
The government's difficulties over the past five years in coping with
Italy's deep-seated socio-economic problems, especially that of unemploy-
ment, as well as increasing concern in some quarters over the Church's
political influence, will limit its popular support. At the paw
time, the good organization and popular appeal of the Communistshave
not boon effectively countered, and we believe that their vote will
not be significantly redueod. fore important, this continued Communist
threat, together with the national frustration over Trieste and the
apprehension of propertied interests over further economic reforms,
will probably lead to a continued increase in the strength of the
extreme right. Even though the NSI May be outlawed, the political
interests it represents will remain A highly vocal minority force.
Nevertheless, eo believe that as a result of De Gasperi's
efforts to broaden and strengthen his government, the four center
parties will probably obtain a narrow majority suffieient to form a
new center coalition government.
However, this government will probably find itself severely
hampered by its narrow majority and its lack of political hompeeneity.
Such coalitions in the past have not worked together effectively
because of 'conflicts between clericals and anti-clericals and diverse
socio-economic views. Defection of any one of the four earties would
probably be sufficient to overthrow the government. Under these
circumstances, and particularly if the Ebnarchiets had gained substantially
in the elections, we believe that the CD party would move: to create a
new right-center coalition, probably CD's, Liberals, and Nonarchiets.
Such a shift to the right would accentuate the polarization of Italian
political life and would be considered by the left-wing parties as a
serious threat. It might have major repercussions affecting Italian
social and political stability.
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The Political Future of De Gasperi, De Gasperi-himself may
oppose any such move to the right, and if it takes place he might step
dem as Prime flinister. His retirement for reasons of a.,-;e orhealth
(he is now 71) is also possible, although we consider this unlikely.
His most likely successors appear at present to be Piccioni-- the
CD Deputy Prime III-lister or Gonella--the Secretary General of the CD
party, in that order.
ImpagLOf a Change in Government on Ita.?1,>licT,
The advent of a more right-vring Government probably would not lead to
any basic shift in Italyes foreign policy, Italy would remain a firm
NATO supporter, and would not for this reason alone reduce its preseat
rearmament effort, However, a rightist government probably would be
more nationalist in outlook, would insist on greater recognition of
Italian interests, and might be less enthusiastic in regard to European
inte7ration, EDC, etc.
"TAB An
' (Italian Party Strength in 1948 and 1951-1952 Elections)
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TAB
Italian Party Strength in 1948 and 1951-1952 El
NtlE
Neo-Fascist (MST)
Monarchist
Liberal
Christian Democrat
Republican
Right-Socialist
Left-,Sociali;
Communist
Fro-Communist Indep.
Other Prrties
1.9.0__Kag2.11.
ElectionA
52 Lo E1eoio
527,000
2.Q%
116939000
729,000
2.810
1,009,000
4.15
998,000
3.9%
929,000
12,505,000
48.4
8,688,000,
35.5%
651,000
2.5%
607,000
2.5%
1,825,000
7015
1,792,000
2,888,000
11.8%
8,09;,000
31.4r;
5,239,000
21.4'41
509,000
475,000
1,112,000
4.5%
Those figures do not add fully to 100 percent because of rounding.
Thay include Sici3.7 but exclude Aosta, Trento, Bolzano, and Trieste.
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