(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100040011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 27, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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4. USSR's industrial plant was brought back to
normal prewar level by 1948, has since increased
its output by 50 to 60 percent.
a. Steel production in 1952--34, 000,000 tons--
equals combined output of Germany, Italy
and Japan at individual peaks of World War II
production. Rest of Orbit contributes
10,000,000 tons per year.
b. Gross national product by 1948 recovered to
1940 level. Growing at rate of 9 to 10 percent
since, compared to our 4 to 5.
c. Emphasis in all expansion on military con-
struction, which increased 90 percent.
Production of capital goods increased about
66 percent and consumer goods only about
33 percent. - 8 -
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DOCUMENT NO.
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5. USSR need not be our equal industrially to risk a
test of strength.
a. Although in 1956 the gross national product
will be only one third that of the US, the
effort devoted to the military will be closer
to two thirds. Ninety percent of value of
electronics industry production goes to
military; about 37.5 percent in US. With 1952
steel production of 35 percent of US, two thirds
as much steel went into armaments in USSR as
in US.
b. At present rate, by 1957 production of war
goods will be one third higher than peak
wartime production.
c. In case of war in latter 50's, 60 percent of
resources could be devoted to war production,
giving a total of four and a half times that of
1944.
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POLITICAL THREAT
1. Economic aspects arise from other countries'
need for markets and their desire to obtain raw
materials which Orbit has for export.
a. Clandestine trade. Difficulties in getting
other nations to:
Embargo strategic goods to Communist China.
Forbid vessels flying their flags to engage in
the China trade.
Take effective steps to control use of their`
free ports.
b. Overt transactions:
A Ceylon needs Chinese rice, but must export
rubber.
A Finland, unable to find Western markets
for its forest products, must turn to the USSR
to survive.
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An Austria, requiring Polish coal, must
exchange embargoed ball bearings.
France has been encouraged in its
intransigence on the oil issue by Soviet
offers over the past two years.
2. Main Political effort is to split the West.
a. Peace offensive, with its world peace confer-
ences and organizations.
b. Hate America campaign, with its charges
against the US of biological warfare and
cruelty to civilians in Korea.
c. In France and Italy, among Western European
countries, Communist parties are large and
active.
d. There are special situations:
In India, Communism can color the thinking
of an otherwise friendly government.
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In Guatemala, a nominally non-Communist
government is susceptible to Red influence.
In Argentina, Peron is willing to play along
with the Communists.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL THREAT
1. This is closely akin to the political.
a. Plays on world desire for peace and quiet.
b. Drop in tension produces pleas in Europe
for arms cutbacks.
c. At its most effective, this threat might
cause us to drop our guard again.
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EFFECTS OF STALIN'S DEATH
1. What will be the effects of Stalin's death?
a. Many have professed to see a willingness to
negotiate displayed in the "softer" approach
of recent weeks, and in such statements as
the relatively moderate Pravda reply to
Eisenhower.
b. On the basis of what we know, we cannot af-
ford to accept that.
2. Whatever Moscow's present tone may be, it's
own statements have offered no grounds to
believe it has any intention of reaching an over-
all settlement except on its own terms.
3. What happened when Stalin died?
a. Malenkov unquestionably had reached a new
peak of prominence at the party congress
in Moscow last October, when he was
deliberately pushed into the forefront.
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b. Malenkov may well have made a bid for
pre-eminence in the days following Stalin's
death.
c. No one man, obviously, could hope to usurp
immediately the power and prestige of a
Stalin.
d. Malenkov, however, seems to have failed
even to establish himself as measurably
more powerful than say, Molotov and Beria.
e. Perhaps the "Old Bolsheviks" teamed against
him.
f. Perhaps Malenkov and Beria, between whom
there is some evidence of a strong link,
were not strong enough together to push
to the fore.
g. We do not know at this point.
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4. We do know that Pravda suddenly proclaimed
the principle of collective leadership and col-
lective responsibility, in contrast to rule by
one man.
a. We know that experts in Soviet phraseology
think the Pravda reply to Eisenhower bore
the stamp of group authorship.
b. It had more of Molotov's doggedness than of
Stalin's sheer venom.
5. We have then a collective regime which on the
surface gives the appearance of harmony and
effectiveness.
a. There may be great pressures, great
uneasiness underneath, and there could
be trouble.
6. That is no cause for rejoicing.
a. Stalin was a cautious man.
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b. These, particularly Malenkov, are
relatively unknown.
c. An adventurer or group of adventurers
would be dangerous, because:
d. The end goal of Communism is unchanged.
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