NOTE TO BOB FROM STAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002700040004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 8, 1977
• Content Type: HW

Approved For-Release 2004/12/20 : -RDP79R00603AO0270004000
,p li The Director of Central Intelligence 1/
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NI-1934-77
4 August 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligenc
FROM : Acting NIO for Latin America
SUBJECT : Response to Dr. Brze inski's Request for an Estimate
on the Cost to Cuba./of its Angola Intervention
1. Action Requested: ase forward the attached paper to
Dr. Brezinski.
2. Back round: In the/Tcourse of the meeting of the Policy Review
Committee -(PRC on Cuba on13 August 1977, Dr. Brzezinski requested an
estimate of the cost to Cubba of its military intervention in Angola..
Dr. Brzezinski said thatrin his view the cost to Cuba must be pro-
portionate to the US costs in Angola. When asked to comment on this,
I pointed out that thebntire logistical cost was being borne by the
USSR with Cuba providing only the troops and support personnel --
individuals who Cuba could have to pay even if they remained in Cuba.
f
f'
3. Attached i, an extract of an interdisciplinary CIA paper on
the subject which was originally published on 30 June 1977. Some minor
adjustment in thee cost figures have been made to accommodate our present
estimate of some/9,800 Cubans in Angola. I believe this paper should
satisfy Dr. Brzezinski's needs. If you consider this response adequate,
please forward'!the attached paper to Dr. Brzezinski.
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Attachment: (1) as stated
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Approved For ReSe 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R 00603A0 700040004-8
SECRET
NI-1934-77
SUBJECT: Response to Dr. Brzezinski's Request for an Estimate
on the Cost to Cuba of its Angola Intervention
Distribution:
0 - DCI w/att
1 - A/DDCI w/att
1 - D/DCI/NI w/att
1 - AD/DCI/NI w/att
1 - ER w/att
1 - NI Reg w/att
2 - NIO/LA Watts
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Economic Costs to Cuba of Involvement in Angola
The economic burden of Angola is not yet an important constraint on
Cuban policy makers. The estimated 19,800 men now stationed in,"Angola
represent only 0.6 percent of Cuba's labor force and a maximum economic
drain of $45 million annually -- 0.6 percent of total GNP --,'assuming
average worker productivity and zero Cuban unemployment. Actual oppor-
tunity costs obviously are less, given the existence of Underemployment
in Cuba. Havana bears only the subsistence and salary costs of maintaining
personnel in Angola, and even part of these are covered by Luanda. In
addition, the diversion of merchant vessels for logistic support involves
at most 10 percent of the Cuban fleet and a financial loss of $15 million
annually if these vessels were available for charter.
Virtually all materiel costs of the Cuban involvement are borne by
the USSR. Moscow has replaced -- probably on a grant basis -- most of
the military equipment which Havana has sent to Angola. Much of this
replacement stock sent to Cuba is newer and in some cases more sophisticated.
Moreover, most of the military equipment being used in Angola was sent there
directly from the USSR. The Soviets have provided Soviet planes and pilots
to facilitate Cuban logistics and have leased two long-range IL-62s to Cuba
for twice-weekly flights to Luanda. This has enabled Havana to continue
its civil air service on Cubana's,current routes without interruption.
While the real economic cost is relatively small, Havana is reportedly
becoming increasingly concerned over the Cuban populace's exaggerated
perception of the cost of the Cuban involvement in Angola. Few Cubans
have detailed knowledge of Havana's overall commitment in Angola, but they
are aware that the highly visible callup of forces has coincided with a
sharp economic decline. The Cuban leaders have consistently and correctly
maintained in all of their public announcements that the island's economic
decline is due to low world sugar prices. Nevertheless, the populace
apparently views the Angolan adventures as a major cause of Cuba's
economic difficultie . Castro prefers to rule through genuine popular
support rather than9repression and does pay close attention to mass
attitudes. Out ofrespect for public opinion, he has never told the Cuban
people the full story of the intervention in Angola.
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