CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005100170001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 20, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For elease'IOR/25E IT00
20 May 1960
2
IN
10
OOGUMENT N?.
ftME4GE CLASS.
1.J ~~UL~15Sie@EU
0
00
completed.
Approved For Release IMWNW21 ~"00975AO05100170001-6 /
00' '01 "1 5111111111 iiiiiiii~ 1111111~ 1111,111 1111111~ 1111111~ 1111111 111,111111111,111 1 111111 1 1111 111,
Army and State Dept.
review(s)
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100170001-6
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100170001-6
 10
10
Effl
e a s e 9 0 0 9 1 1=0 1 1, - C A =-"" 0 0 5 10 0 17 0 0 0 1 -6 H
25;
Approved
101
5AO05100170001-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 May 1960
DAILY BRIEF
Soviet-Japanese Fishing Agreement: The Soviet Union and
Japan on 17 May concluded their 1960 fishing agreement, which
educes ,Japan's salmon catch quota by 30 percent and estab-
ishes new zones where fishing operations will be banned al-
ogether. Japanese fisheries interests have announced their
25X1
 \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\~\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\Oo~o\oooo~o~~~~~ooooo~o~o~~~~~~ooo~~~oo~~~~~~oo~~~oooo~~~~oo~~o~~~~~~o~~~~ooo~~oooooooo~ooo~\
25X1 Approved FQ R6Iease 2002/10/21 - CIA-RDP79T009I8A005100170001-6 .
increase pressure on the Kishi government.
(Page 2)
1959 fishing convention, suggesting that the USSR intends to
extreme dissatisfaction with the agreement and called for gov-
ernment compensation of fishermen who thus will lose their
traditional fishing grounds. On the same day that agreement
was reached, Moscow accused the Japanese of violating the
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesia - Communist China: Indonesia has as a ommu-
nist China to withdraw its consuls from the cities of Medan in
Sumatra and Bandjermasin in Borneo as the result of renewed
tension over the repatriation of Overseas Chinese. Djakarta's
action brings Sino-Indonesian relations to a new low.
Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk, increasingly angry over South
Vietnamese and Thai hostility toward his neutralist regime, has
called for a referendum on 5 June to prove to the "world in gen-
eral and our imperialist neighbors in particular" that he has
solid popular support. Sihanouk's announcement that foreign
observers and "particularly journalists" will be invited as wit-
nesses indicates he is planning a full-blown propaganda show.
20 May 60 DAILY BRIEF
25X1
Approved For Rele - 5AO05100170001-6
25Xf
 NEWN'
25X1 Approved F elease 2002/10/21 CIA-RDP79T00 A005100170001-6
d that US military aid makes possible
\ charge
Sihanouk, recently the "aggressive designs" of South Vietnam and Thailand, and
hinted that Cambodia could get additional arms from the Sino-
25X1 Soviet bloc.
M 011
25
25X1
0
0
iii
DAILY BRIEF
May 60
Approved For Release - A00510017000?U1
South Korea: LIVlinister of Defense Lt. Gen. Yi Chong-chan
says. astudy of the South Korean military structure is under
way. The probability that any reorganization would be designed
to preclude military involvement in politics is indicated by Yi's
25X1
hints that any particular organizations involved in political activ-
ities would be abolished or revamped. Yi's refusal to indicate
any plans to punish commanders involved in the rigging of the 15 25X1
March election suggests he wishes to avoid widespread resigna-
tions that would weaken the Korean defense posture.]
Belgian Congo: Patrice Lumumba, leader of the influential
Nationa Congo Movement, is threatening a forceful reaction to
Belgium's plans to add 1,000 regulars to the 2,000 army troops
and some 24,000 men of the paramilitary Force Publique in the
Belgian Congo. In Stan]Leyville, where recent anti-European
demonstrations are believed to have been instigated by his followers
Lumumba warned on 18 May that "we will take to the streets to
demand the withdrawal of Belgian troops... and the immediate
transfer of power" to an African provisional government. C
20
 "'M M
_ ?5X1
anp 2002/10/21
CIAR
Approved Farrel
005100170001.6
M\
\\ Guinea: Sekou Tours apparently has assigned a high priority
to ear y implementation of the large-scale Konkoure hydroelec-
tric dam project, which France had agreed to underwrite before
Guinea opted for independence in 1958. Toure has followed up a
recent public appeal for foreign aid with private approaches to
US officials in Conakry, and Washington. He told the American
\ Fiat German
anies already had ex- \\.
and three Western com
y
p
pressed an interest in the pro'ect but that Guinea had not yet
\ entered any "engagements:'
\
III. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
RE PORTS AND ESTIMATES
VINI
(Available during the preceding week) 25X1
ME X,
Sino-Indian Relations. ME 100-2-60. 17 May 60.
25X1
Soviet Capabilities and Intentions re Introduction of Weapons
of Mass Destruction intGUS. NIE 11-7-60. 17 May 60.
20 May 60
Approved For Rel
DAILY BRIEF iv
5A005100170001-6 25X1
25X1
D
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100170001-6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100170001-6
 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005100170001-6
Soviet-Japanese Fishery Agreement
After three months of negotiations, the Soviet Union and
Japan on 17 May concluded their 1960 fishing agreement. The
accord limits the Japanese to a total salmon catch of 67,500
tons--a 30-percent reduction compared with 1959--and enlarges
the prohibited zone in an area considered by them vitally impor-
tant to the success of smaller fishing operations. Since 1957,
when the quota was set at 120,000 tons, the figure has been stead-
ily reduced. Japanese :fisheries interests have announced their
extreme dissatisfaction with the agreement and called for govern-
ment compensation for fishermen who will thus lose their tradi-
tional fishing grounds.
Although the Japanese ambassador to Moscow had earlier re-
ported that the fisheries negotiations were more difficult than ever
before, the Japanese were struck by Khrushchev's obvious attempt
to avoid provocative statements in a talk they had with. him on 10
May. Khrushchev, according. to Vice Foreign Minister Yamada,
did bring up the subject of US bases in Japan. The Soviet leader
also said that it would be impossible to conclude a civil aviation
pact with the Japanese allowing them to fly into Moscow, as "he
knew the Japanese had four or five U-2 planes and might want to
take photographs."
These and similar pressures were brought on the Japanese
delegation in order to obtain maximum concessions. The necessity
of reaching an agreement in time for the start of the fishing season,
however, normally about. 15 May, was probably the decisive. factor
in the Japanese decision to conclude the agreement.
On the same day the agreement was reached, Moscow accused
the Japanese Government of violating the fishing. convention of 1959.
The commentary claimed that this action shows the failure of Jap-
anese Government agencies to honor its international commitments.
The timing of this propaganda attack suggests that the USSR,. in the
wake of the collapse of the summit talks, intends to increase pres-
sure on. the Kishi government.
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005100170001-6
20 May 60 CENTRAL IINTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For elease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097
II. ASIA-AFRICA
4005100170001-6
Indonesia Requests Withdrawal of Two Chinese. Consuls
Indonesia has asked Communist China to withdraw its
consuls from the cities of Medan in Sumatra and Bandjer-
masin in Borneo, It Is not clear, however, whether all
other members of the two consulates will be withdrawn.
Djakarta's action. is the most drastic yet taken in the pro-
longed Sino-Indonesian friction over the Overseas Chinese
problem.
At the same time, Indonesia also rejected a Chinese
protest over the recent house arrest of the consul in Bandjer-
masin and filed a counterprotest against the activities of
Chinese officials in Indonesia. Djakarta complained that
Chinese officials have, behaved in "an improper and unfriend-
ly manner" toward Indonesian functionaries and that the Chi-
nese Embassy in. Djakarta has issued anti-Indonesian state-
ments to both the foreign and domestic press.
Incidents in Sumatra and Borneo, which led to Indonesia's
action, developed when the local Chinese consuls apparently
influenced repatriating. Chinese to resist Indonesia's involved
emigration procedures. Approximately 14,000 Chinese have
left Indonesia as .the result of Djakarta's ban on alien retail
trade in rural areas.
This reactivation of a major foreign policy dispute may
to some extent divert official and public attention- -in Indonesia
from recently revived anti-Dutch issues which the Indonesian
Communist party is exploiting. The Indonesian. Communists
have attempted to avoid involvement in the Chinese problem.
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100170001-6
20 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975
Sihanouk Calls for Referendum to Clarify Cambodian Situation
Cambodian leader Sihanouk has called for a referendum on
5 June to disprove to the world the propaganda charges by "trai -
tors and their imperialist masters" that his neutralist policy is
opposed by the masses. Prince. Sihanouk charges that this prop-
aganda provides a pretext for interference or intervention in
Cambodian affairs and poses a grave danger to the nation.
Sihanouk--who resigned from the premiership last month but
still runs the country with solid popular backing-recently has be-
come increasingly agitated over South Vietnamese and Thai hos-
tility toward his regimeE~. South Vietnam's recent claim to several
islands in the Gulf of Siam considered Cambodian territory by
Phnom Penh apparently ? forms the basis of Sihanouk's accusations,
but there are other factors. These include. persistent reports of
South Vietnamese and '.Thai support of dissident Cambodian bands,
the recent reactivation of a clandestine anti-Sihanouk radio, and
large-scale incidents along the Cambodian - South Vietnamese bor-
der in recent months.
Sihanouk last October proposed a referendum. to choose between
his leadership and that of dissident leaders Sam Sary and Son Ngoc
Thanh, but no date was ever set and the. project was quietly shelved.
His intention this time seems firmer, and the announcement that
foreign observers and "'particularly journalists" are to be invited
suggests a full-scale propaganda effort.
In a recent editori.aLl, Sihanouk pointed a finger at "increased"
American military aid to South Vietnam and Thailand as making
possible their "aggressive designs." Asserting that Cambodia
must act quickly to defend itself against an "imperialist encircle-
ment," he stated that Cambodia has some "big friends" who will
supply arms--now provided solely by the United States. Sihanouk
previously has hinted that he could get military aid for the asking
from Communist China,, and he apparently looks on Chou En-lai's
statements of support for Cambodia, made during Chou's visit
earlier this month, as a guarantee of Cambodian national integrity.
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA ,RDP79T00975A005100170001-6
20 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
 Approved Fo Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975~A005100170001-6
South Korean m Forces Nhy- Be organized
New South Korean Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Yi Chong-
chan appears to be moving to preclude the involvement of the
military in domestic political affairs. Unit commanders, un-
der instruction, from the Rhee administration, had delivered
the military vote to Rhee and his running mate in the 15 March
presidential elections. Also under Rhee, military counter-
intelligence and security units had been diverted from normal
missions, including counter subversion, for use against non-
Communist political opponents of the administration.]
LYi stated publicly on 17 May that a study of the over-all
organization of the military is under way and implied that
those units primarily concerned with political activities would
be abolished or revamped. The Joint Provost Marshal Gen-
eral Command--headed by. U. Gen. Won Yong-tok, a Rhee
hatchet man--reportedly is one of those slated to be dropped.
It has been decided that units of the Army Counter Intelligence
Corps, which under Rhee was semiautonomous, will be subor-
dinate to the various unit commands in order to end the organi-
zation's political activities-
LY1fs refusal to indicate any plans to punish commanders
involved in the rigging of the 15 March elections suggests he
wishes to avoid widespread resignations that would weaken
South Korean defensive capabilities. He also may feel that a
purge at this time would dissipate the prestige gained by the
military's handling of the postelection disorders that toppled
Rhee from power. Yi had previously been. quoted in the press
as stating that all corrimanqers proven to have been involved
in the election rigging. and the diversion of military funds for
political purposes would be punished.]
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100170001-6
20 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100170001-6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100170001-6
 Guinea Intensifying Effort to Implement Konkourd
Hydraelectric Project_
[The Guinean Government apparently as assigned a high
priority to early implementation of the large-scale Konkourd
hydroelectric project, which has been in abeyance since Guinea
opted for independence. from France in September 1958. That
action. had prompted Paris to drop plans to participate directly
in the project's financing and also to underwrite a $60,000,000
loan expected from the World Bank. As envisaged in 1958,
the scheme called for the construction on the Konkourd River
of a dam and power plant capable of furnishing up to 3. 2 bil-
lion kilowatt-hours of cheap electricity a year. The energy
was intended for an aluminum smelter which private interests
were prepared to build, as well as for other industrial project
.Early last month President Tourd, speaking at an economic
conference convened to consider the Three-Year Plan which
Guinea intends to launch on 1 July, made a public appeal for
foreign help in constructing the dam. Subsequently, Ameri-
can officials in. Conakry and Washington received several pri-
vate appr_oacheswhich. dwelt on Guinea's need for electric power
and, in effect, inquired as to the possibility of obtaining US
assistance
LOn one such occasion last week Toure, in response to a
question raised by the American ambassador, indicated that
Guinea already had received "offers" from the USSR,. Czech-
oslovakia, East Germany, and three Western companies,
but that it had not yet entered into any "engagements." The
Guinean leader claimed that the USSR had asked either for
the existing dossier on the project or for permission to send
technicians to draw up new plans. He said the Czechs and
East Germans jointly had offered to form a "mixed" construc-
tion company or to extend a loan.?
25X1
25X1
25X1
20 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
 Approved F04 R
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department.of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved Fo -
25X1
25X1
 ^Approved For Release
IOY/lS'/2lA7CIM--CRRRT00975AO05100170001-6
OOV
7A
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 CIA-RDP79T00975A005100170001-6
TOP SECRET
,