SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE'S DRAFT BILL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00983A001800060008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 28, 1977
• Content Type: MF

r - - - - ------ --`' CONFIDENTIAL
n10 ----
-77--__-
THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
28 March 1977
Deputy, Legislative Counsel
FROM . Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
SUBJECT : Senate Select Committee's Draft Bill
I am sure that a number of people will be making comments
to you regarding the bill's philosophy and the implications
of the changes it would make -- especially in CIA. I will
defer on that, and instead point out some items that are of
particular concern to the NIOs. All of my comments refer to
the section by section analysis, not the bill itself which
is too imprecise and unclear for useful comment.
1. The definition of "national intelligence" in
Section 3 is simply inaccurate. Greater heads than the
SSCI staff have wrested with defining the line between
national and tactical intelligence and so far no one
has succeeded. Specifically, there are indeed times
when the position of a particular destroyer is national
intelligence -- one has but to recall the critical situation
following the mining of Haiphong when a Soviet warship
turned toward Haiphong and everyone from the President
on down followed that ship with great attention.
We are currently using the definition of
national intelligence postulated in the new NSCID #3
which was approved by DCI Bush and sent to the NSC for
approval and promulgation. It. states that national
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intelligence is that intelligence required by the
President, the NSC, and other officials of the US
Government involved in formulating and directing the
implementation of national security policy. This
definition recognizes that not all national intelligence
can, or indeed even should, be coordinated and of interest
to more than one department. The true test instead is
the use to which it is put -- that is serving the
President, the NSC, and other foreign policymakers.
2. The sentence "Any preference which the Director
might have, based on institutional loyalty, for the
intelligence product of his own agency, would thus be
eliminated.", should be deleted.. It misstates the
current situation and completely overlooks the requirement
placed on the DCI to ensure that the national intelligence
product clearly reflects any significant differences of
judgmental opinion that exist among knowledgeable and
responsible components of the government concerned with
the matter.
3. Section 6 (10), page 5, and Section 7 (b).
These two notions are inconsistent. Section 7 states
that the DCI will be supported by.-a small staff not
unlike the current IC Staff since he will no longer
be able to look to CIA for staff support. Section 6,
however, charges him with receiving, correlating, analyzing,
and evaluating all national intelligence. He simply
cannot do this without a large analytical staff
approximately the size of the current DDI. Certainly
the NIO staff., even if expanded, would not be equal to
the charge placed on the DCI in Section 6. If it is
intended that the DCI exercise this charge by giving
him the analytical resources of CIA, I would suggest that
this bill would for all practical purposes end the CIA
as a "central" agency.
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Richard Lehman
CONFIDENTIAL
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DCI/IC-77-0767 P
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23 March 19771
/QAF~ I ; uric
FROM .
Special Assistant to the D DCI IC --
SUBJECT: DDCI-D/DCI'/IC Conference with the Staff Director,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1. Mr. Knoche, George Cary and
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I I met at 1500 hours on 22 March in Mr. Knoches office
with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence; and Elliot Maxwell, senior staffer
on the SSCI Charters and Guidelines Subcommittee. Topic of
discussion was the SSCI draft bill to establish a National
Intelligence Authority (NIA) headed by a Director of National
Intelligence (DNI).
2. Highlights of the discussion are as follows
a. Mr. Miller stressed that Senator Huddles ton,'
Chairman of the Charters and Guidelines Subcommittee,-
wants to introduce the bill within a month. A new
draft will be ready for review by 25 March. He wants
to work as closely as'possible with the DCI staff,
recognizing that this does not bind the Executive
Branch to agreement with provisions of the bill.
The problem.with the timing of the bill and develop-
ment of the response to -PRN-11 was recognized.
b. Mr. Miller said the intent of the legislation
is to give the DNI the tools to enable him to be the
coordinator of all national intelligence activities.
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c. Mr. Miller noted the bill was intended. to take
the entities now in the Intelligence Community, put
them under DNI control, develop the appropriate fittings
for this control, and then address charters for the
various entities.
d. Question was raised. whether removal of the DNI
from the operating head of CIA was needed. to carry out
purposes of the bill. said that if
the SSCI wanted such a split, the present bill does it
in part. 1\ir. Knoche felt that leaving the DNI as also
head of the CIA would create a bureaucratic target.
e. noted1:he bill makes no provision
for, a ITNI role in tile actual production of intelligence.
Mr. Miller asked that consideration be given to what the
DNI would have under his direct control so he could pro-
duce national intelligence. Discussion centered around
an expanded NIO group alone, the NIOs augmented by part *
of DDI, particularly the current intelligence personnel,
or the NIOs and all of DDI. Mr. Knoche- was concerned that
splitting off all or portions of the DDI would "hurt the
cutting edge of CIA." Mr. M1axwell asked what moving DDI
but of CIA would do to the concept of competing centers of
intelligence analysis.
I
f. Mr. Knoche wondered, if the functions being con-
sidered for the DNI, were split off from CIA, would the
Agency be left with a job which was doable.
g. In response to a question as to what Senator
Stevenson's subcommittee was thinking about the DNI role,
Mr. Miller said the subcommittee- felt there were limita-
tions on both the BNE and NIO concepts and that perhaps
there. should be two approaches:
(1) The view-of the world as seen by intelligence
professionals.
(2) Intelligence estimates viewed in terms of
particular problem areas such as SALT negotiations,
which would involve ad hoc approaches using personnel.
both. within and from outside the Intelligence Community.
Mr. Miller said the problem of current intelligence produc-
tion and crisis management had not been addressed by the
Stevenson subcommittee.
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h. I I noted the national/tactical
discussion in the was "muddy" and all agreed that
improvement in the definitions was required, Mr, Maxwell
asked for help in this area. He also agreed to acid
provision that departmental and tactical intelligence
be passed to.the DNI.
. i.. -noted the present draft would give
the DNI equal authority over all entities, but there was
a marked difference in the control the DNI should have
over organizations such as NSA and.the special reconnaissance
elements, as against the intelligence elements of State,
ERDA and the FBI. Mr. Miller said it was intended that
organizationally NSA would remain as,it is now, but the.
"crunch point" is whether it could be pulled out of Defense
if departmental needs are still met. .
j. Both Mr. Knoche and questioned 25X1
whether or to what extent there should be a shift of DNI,
responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense in wartime,
and Mr. Miller emphasized this would be a matter to be
worked out and not dictated by the bill itself..
Icd - Mr. Knoche asked whether the DNI should be
responsible for security risks and improprieties, as the
bill suggests. He noted the IGs of agencies other than
CIA do not now report to the DCT on the information they
provide to the Intelligence Oversight Board. Mr. Maxwell
asked that thought be given as to what the DNI role should
_be with respect-to.-resolving cases.of slipshod security.
1. thought that language to "fence"
the NFIP budget needed careful consideration so that the
verbs used would not be subject to varying interpretations.
Mr. Miller said the bill was seeking to-foster coordinated
budget cycles and was meant to give the DNI control of the.
allocation of funds. - .
M. There was considerable discussion of the size of
the staff the DNI might need. Mr. Maxwell. said the drafters
were hopeful the proposed system would develop savings in
manpower and dollars, but recognized the DNI would need
a sizeable staff. guessed this might amount'
to as many as 350-4UL) persons,-and the total size would be
much dependent on what production resources were provided
to the DNI.
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n. Mr. Miller and Mr. Maxwell agreed the%.bill. should
not define the duties of the Assistant DNIs, but only
greed
indicate the. number authorized,
F la
to provide a paper which would describe what tour Assistant
DNIs would do, to support an increase in the authorization
from three to four.
o. Question was raised as to why the bill is so
detailed in coverage of PRC/covert action ma.tters.
Mr. Maxwell explained this was needed to face expected
floor opposition if covert action handling is not set
out in detail.
D> offered help in review and
improvement of the bill's provisions re countdxintelligence.
q. also agreed to provide assistance to
the SSC -1iLill-L rning the specific wording of sections
of the bill that needed clarification.
T. In response to queries as to the basis for stress
on DNI responsibilities to the Congress, Mr. Miller
emphasized that the provisions called for reporting only;
Congress will not be telling the DNI what to do.. He said.
that the provisions were in the bill to emphasize that
intelligence information is important to the Congress and
Congress should be able to satisfy itself that the job
is being well done.
s. Mr. Cary said attention -should be given to the
"atmospherics" of reporting requirements, since this
could cause a reaction on the part of foreign intelligence
agencies who work with U.S. organizations. Mr. Maxwell
said. attempt would be made to work out other wording,
but that the phrase that Congress should be kept fully
and currently informed is in S. Res. 400. Mr. Cary noted.
there should be words in the bill which would protect
against House Rule ll..
3. The session broke up, shortly after 1700 hours.
Mr. Knoche departed at 1600 hours.
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Distribution:
Orig. & 1 -.D/DCI/IC
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OLC
2 - ES/ICS.
1 -.IC Registry
SA-D/DCI/
(23 March 1977
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I closed. the loop with
0
and, he now has (I returned
my original note to my note
and he will put a note on it to
to consider the attached as guid ance
in future dealings with Bill Miller..
P. S. I also gave I I a copy
and he will close the loop with DDGI.
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22 March 1977 I77_1bo/
01C RECORD COPY
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence r
Community
nepucy e i a i.ve Counsel
Comments on 18 March 1977 SSCI
Staff Draft Bill
Memorandum to DCI from Legislative
Counsel, Subject: Comments on
SSCI Staff Draft Bill, dated 17 March 1977
1. This draft bill is somewhat more complete than the 25 January
version, which was commented upon in the referent memorandum. The
revision is still far from the complete legislation which is envisaged
and retains much of the ambiguities noted in the earlier draft.
PL/
2. It is essential that the concept of the bill to strengthen
centralized management and control of the national intelligence mission
apparatus, product, capabilities and resources be delineated with
preciseness, otherwise the principal objective of the legislation of
strengthening the DNI's role will not be achieved. The ambiguity in the bill
may be correctable but it is impossible to do so without precise
guidance, e.g., the precise nature of the DNI's directory authority is not
clear nor are his relationships with entities (CIA, NSA, NRO, etc. ).
3. There is nothing wrong with charters per se but they must
clearly establish relations and authorities, including supporting mechanisms
and proscriptions. A secondary question is whether the form should
be statutory or executive document--decisions which are governed
by the need for flexibility, security, permanence, etc.
4. We should enter into direct consultative relationships
with the committee staffers on the Hill who will draft the charter. There
must be an understanding by the Hill, however, during this
consultative period of not impinging upon the decision making process
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 INTERNAL USE Y
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where positions are divergent from those they propose and to
deal with such divergent views only after the final executive
decision is made. In this connection, there is a danger
that the side that won in uncovering excutive abuses not prevail
in watering down or impinging on Presidential authorities by placing
restrictions on activities and forumlating oversight procedures
which tip the Constitutional balance.
5. Attached are suggested talking points for the session
with Senator Huddleston.
6. Also attached are more detailed comments on the revised
bill. Comments are being solicited from the NFIB agencies,
through the Intelligence Community Staff and the CIA, with a
due date of Friday, 25 March. This should provide us with the
type of data base we need to contend with both the opportunities
and problems in the bill.
Attachment:
As stated
Distribution:
Orig - Add'e
1 - DDCI
1 - D/DCI/IC
1-ER
1 - General Counsel
dam- OLC Subject
1-OLCChrono
OLC:LLM:ndl (22 March 1977)
I,NTERNNAL 1"
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Office of Legislative Counsel
22 March 1977
TO: Director
Regarding the attached for
your meeting with Huddleston, I
have avoided commitment to statutory
charter. That is a threshhold for you
and the President to pass.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central. Intelligence
VIA:
FROM.:
SUBJECT:
E. Henry Knoche
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
George L. Gary
Legislative Counsel
Comments on SSCI Staff Draft. Bill
1. Attached are comments on the ramifications of the
25 January 1977 SSCI staff draft proposal for a National Intelligence .
Authority. The comments augment and are supplemental to those
STAT- submitted to you by
2. In light of the incompleteness and ambiguity of the bill
from the. standpoint of concept, management and control, and entities,
our comments are directed to some of the more salient issues it raises.
STAT 3. disagrees with the comment on the top of
page 6 that the draft bill does not grant line authority over those elements
of the Intelligence Community which remain within their parent or. ganiza--
tion. Since others interpret the provisions of the bill. differently, this is.
further evidence of the ambiguity in the language of the draft bill.
4. The threshold issue in dealing with the Committee on this"
matter is that PRM 11 is the most sensible approach to a subject as
complex as this and that the hand of the Executive Branch should not
be forced by a proposal as incomplete as the present. text and prior
to assurance that the text receives the thorough review such legislation
merits,
eor'ge L. Car
STAT
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 tho>~ P ov;,!,A fnrpth. dnte. num?
th,.~'~GE~~S
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IN THE SENATE, OF THE UNITED STATES
introcluced the following bill; which wain read twice and referred to the Committee on
To improve the national intelligence system of the United States by
the establishment of a National Intelligence Authority, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and I ou. e of representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the
"National Intelligence Act of 1977".
Sec. 2. It is the purpose of this Act
(1) to insure that all intelligence activities of the
United States are properly, effectively and efficiently
directed, regulated, coordinated, and administered;
(2) to provide-the executive and legislative branches
of the government with such accurate, relevant, and timely
information and analysis as may be necessary to enable
such branches to (A) make sound and informed decisions
regarding the security and vital interests of the United
States, and (B) protect the United States against foreign
espionage, sabotage, . clandestine intelligence activities,
assassination, terrorism, and other forms of foreign
.aggression; and.
(3) to insure that the intelligence activities of the
United States do not infringe upon or violate 'rose individual
 rg},ts r g b t e Constitution or cJS of the
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Sec. 3. (1) The term "intelligence activities"
(A) the collection, file retention, analysis, pro-
duction, or dissemination of information, including
political, economic, scientific, technical, military,
cultural, sociological, and geographic information
which relates to any foreign country, or any government,
political group, party, military force, movement, or
other association of persons in such foreign country,
and which relates to the defense, foreign policy, national
security, or related policies of the United States, and
file retention, analysis, production, dissemination, or
use of information;
(B) any activity taken to. counter any activity
similar to any activity described in clause (A) directed
any activity which is in support of any of such collection,
and analysis related to the 'national defense, national security
out under the direction of the National Security Council
and subject to the oversight of the 'appropx?iate
committees of the Congress.
(2) The term "national intelligence" means information.
against the United States;
(C) any special. activity which is any activity
other than the collection and production of information
and analysis and related support functions, which is
designed to further official United States programs and
policies abroad and which is planned and executed so
that'the role of the.United States Government is not
apparent or. publicly acknowledged and which is carried
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and foreign policy interests of the United States, which
information is used primarily by national policymakers such
as the President, the National Security Council, and the
Congress. It does not usually include that information and
analysis which is used primarily by departmental or agency
heads or tactical commanders of United States armed forces,
and which has no significant national policy-making purpose,
(3) The term "national intelligence activity" means
intelligence ?activitie-s -for the purpose of producing national
intelligence. It includes the activities of (A) the Central_
Intelligence Agency, (B) the Defense Intelligence Agericy,
(C) the National Security Agency, (D) the intelligence compon-
ents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (E) the Special.
Offices for Reconnaissance Activities, (F) the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, (G) the
intelligence components of the Department of the Treasury,
(H) the intelligence components of the Energy Research and
Development Administration; and (I) such other activities
as the President shall designate.
(4) The term "tactical or departmental intelligence"
means information and analysis which is used primarily by
departmental or agency heads or tactical commanders of United
States armed forces, and which has no.significant national
policy-making purpose.
(5) The term "tactical or departmental intelligence
activities" means intelligence activities other than special
.activities in support of national foreign policy objectives for
the purpose of producing tactical or departmental intelligence.
(6) The term "intelligence community of the United States"
means all entities of the Federal Government to the extent
that such entities are engaged in national intelligence
activities, including, but not limited to (A) the Central
5.7
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and foreign policy Interests of the United States, wni.ch
information is used primarily by national policymakers such
as the President, the National Security Council, and the
Congress. It does not usually include that information and
analysis which is used primarily by departmental or agency
heads or tactical commanders of United States armed forces,
and which has no significant national policy-making purpose.
(3) The term "national intelligence activity" means
intelligence activities for the purpose of producing national
intelligence. It includes the activities of (A) the Central
Intelligence Agency, (B) the Defense Intelligence 'Agency,
(C) the National Security Agency, (D) the intelligence compon-
ents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (E) the Special.
Offices for Reconnaissance Activities; (F) the' Burea.u of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, (G) the
intelligence components of the Department of the Treasury,
(H) the intelligence components of the Energy Research and
Development Administration; and (I) such other activities
as the President shall designate.
(4) The term "tactical or departmental intelligence"
means information and analysis which is used primarily by.
departmental or agency heads or tactical commanders of United
States armed forces, and which has no significant national-
policy-making purpose.
(5) The term "tactical or departmental intelligence
activities" means intelligence activities other than special
activities in support of national foreign policy objectives for
the purpose of producing tactical or departmental intelligence.
(6) The term "intelligence community of the United. States"
means all entities of the Federal Government to the extent
that such entities are engaged in'national intelligence
activities, including, but not limited to (A) the Central
 (C) the National Security Agency, (D) the intelligence
components of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (L;)
Special. Offices for Reconnaissance Activities, (F) the
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Intelligence Agency, (B) the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of
State, (G) the intelligence components of the Department
of the Treasury, (H) the intelligence components of the
not a citizen of the United States, who owes permanent
allegiance to the United States.
(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person, though
activities as designated by the President.
(7) The term "national of the United States?, means
Energy Research and Development Administration, and (I)
such other entities as are engaged in national intelligence
(8) The term "special activities" means activities other
than the collection, correlation, production,. and dissemin-
ation of information and analysis and related support
activities which are designed to further official United.
States programs and policies abroad and which 'are. planned and
executed so that the role of the United States Government is
not apparent or publicly acknowledged and which are carried
out under the direction and control of the National Security
ation Act or Acts for such departments or agencies.
more departments or agencies of the government for a temporary
period of time pending the enactment of the regular appropri--
(9) The term "Attorney General" means the Attorney
General of the United States.
(10) The term "continuing resolution" means a joint
resolution of the Congress appropriating funds for one or
Council and subject to the oversight of the appropriate'
committees of the Congress.
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Sec. 4.
There is established in the Executive.
Branch an office to be know-7n as the National Intell_,;ence
Authority which shall operate under, and be subject to the
direction and control of, the National Security Council.
(b) The National Intelligence Authority shall be
composed of all entities of the intelligence comunity of
the United States.
(c) It shall be the function of the National Intelligence
Authority to collect, analyze, and disseminate, to the
executive and legislative' branches of the government, accurate,
relevant, and timely intelligence information and analysis.
It shall also be the function of the National Intelligence
Authority to engage in special activities in support of
national foreign policy objectives of the United States
pursuant to the provisions of Seca - of this Act.
DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Sec. 5. (a) The National Intelligence Authority shall
have as its head a Director of National Intelligence (herein-
after referred to as the "Director"). There shall also be a
Deputy Director of National Intelligence to assist the Director
in carrying out the functions of the National Intelligence
Authority and to act in the place of the Director during the
absence or disability of the Director.
(b) The Director and the Deputy Director shall be
appointed by the-President, by and with-the advice and consent
of the Senate, and each shall serve at the, pleasure of the
President. No person may serve as Director of Deputy Director
for a period of more than six years unless such person is
reappointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. No person who has served as Director
or Deputy Director for a period of less than six years and is
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subsequently appointed or reappointed to that same office
may serve in that office under such appointment or reappoint-
ment for a term of more than six years. In no ever may
any person serve as Director or Deputy Director for more
than a total of twelve years. At no time shall the to
positions of Director and Deputy Director be-occupied
simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services
whether in active or retired status.
(c) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services
is appointed as Director, or Deputy Director, then---.
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director
or Deputy Director, he shall be subject to no. supervision,
control, restriction, or prohibition (military or other-
wise) other than would be operative with respect to
him if he were a civilian in. no way connected with the
Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the
Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or
any component thereof; and
(B) he shall shall not possess or exercise any
supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than
such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to
exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director) with respect
to'the armed services or any component thereof, the
Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or
the Department of the Air Force, or any-branch, bureau,
unit, or division thereof, or with respect to any of the
personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except, as provided in paragraph (1) of this sub-
section, the appointment to the office of Director, or Deputy
Director, of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and-
his acceptance 'of and service in such office, shall in no way
affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or
hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite,-right,
41
 priviileige t *'or bene"r t incident to or arising t of any
A t roved F r. Re ease 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP79M00 83 0
such stn oJ. lce, 1-ank. , or grade. .tiny u ~WE M a ed
officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, or;
Deputy Director, continue to hold rank and grade not lower
than that in which serving at the time of his appointment and
to receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired,
as the case may be, including personal money allowance) payable
to a commissioned officer of his grade-and length of service
for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from
any funds available to the National Intelligence Authority.
He also shall be paid by the National Intelligence Authority
from such funds an annual compensation at a rate equal to
the amount by which the compensation established for such
position exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and
allowances.
(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer
shall, during the period in which such'commissioned officer
occupies the office of Director of National intelligence, or
Deputy Director of National Intelligence, be in. addition to
the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized and
appropriated for the armed service of which he is a member.
(d) The Director shall serve as an ex officio member
of the National Security Council.
AUTHORITY AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR
Sec. 6. (a) It shall be the duty of the Director, under
the direction and control of the National Security Council, to
direct and control the national intelligence activities of
the United States.. The President shall determine, with the
guidance and assistance'of the National Security Council
and the Director which 'intelligence activities of the United
States constitute national intelligence activities subject
to the direction and control of the Director.
r ~
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 (b) The Direr or. is authorized to revi all depart-
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M00983AO01800060008-6
mental or tactical intelligence activities and all intelli-
gence-related activities of the United States.
(c) The Director shall make such recommendations to the
President, the National Security Council, and the appropriate
committees of the Congress as he deems appropriate regarding
any intelligence activity or any proposed intelligence
activity
of the United States.
(d) The Director shall also--
(1) serve as the President's primary advisor on
matters relating to national intelligence and provide
the President and other officials of the executive
branch of the government with accurate, relevant, and'
timely information analysis;
(2) keep the President and the committees of
Congress having jurisdiction over the National Intelli-
gence Authority fully and currently informed of all
national intelligence activities of the United States,
including any significant anticipated national intelli-
gency activity, which are the responsibility of or are
engaged in by any. entity of the National Intelligence
Authority; but the foregoing shall not be construed as
requiring the approval of any committee of the Congress
prior to the implementation of any such anticipated
national intelligence activity;
(3) keep the President, the National Security..
Council, and the appropriate committees of the Congress
informed on-the relationship between. national intell.i-
gency activities and the departmental and tactical
intelligence activities of the United States and all
intelligence-related activities of the United States;
(4) provide 'for the effective and efficient direction,
management, and coordination of the entities which make
 upA 6vA r9CXsPA(H/6 /*,V 9 CfAAb0 Gd 8A001800060008-6
(5) prepare an annual budget for presentation to
the President which includes funds for all national
intelligence activities of the United States;
(6) establish and be responsible for the allocation
and control of-all funds appropriated for carrying out
national intelligence activities;
(7) establish requirements, develop plans, and
assign priorities for all national intelligence
activities of the United States, taking into account
the need for the intelligence components. of departments
and agencies of the government to also perform depart-
mental and tactical intelligence activities assigned by
the heads of such departments and agencies;
(8) evalute current and proposed intelligence
activities to insure the efficient use of intelligence
resources and the fulfillment of national intelligence.
requirements established pursuant to clause (7);
(9) supervise the operation of and make recommen-
dations for, such'review procedures as are consistent
with the provisions of this Act and necessary for the
effective review of proposals for the clandestine
collection of intelligence;
(10) receive, correlate, analyze, and evaluate all
national intelligence, taking into account the need
to insure that diverse points of view are heard and
cons-idered;
(11) supervise the timely dissemination of national
intelligence to all. appropriate departments and agencies
of the government, except that no dissemination shall
be made of any such national intelligence which unduly
infringes -upon the privacy of any national of the
United States or which violates any right guaranteed or
=~4jiproved For F2elease20.05%04/1J~ :CIA-RD~791t1100~383 ~Ob060~508 6-'~~ ~''"`~"`"'~""'?'
 Pr Approve Forb2elease Z4rG1A 79MII6383b006~0~8=
States;
(12) make every reasonable effort to furnish to
the departments and agencies of the government concerned
and to all tactical. commanders of the armed forces of
the United States all relevant national intelligence;
(13) be responsible for all relationships between
the various entities of the National Intelligence
Authority and the security services of foreign govern-
ments, including any agreements, arrangements, or
understandings governing such relationships; provided,
however, that no component of the National Intelligence
Authority shall pay, cause, or encourage any agency. of
any foreign government to engage in activities which
are prohibited to the components of the National.
Intelligence Authority. The Director of National.
Intelligence shall not be relieved of any requirement
to report any activity to the Congress or to any committee
of the Congress because such activity is carried out
through or by any agency of a foreign government;
(14) submit all agreements, arrangements, and
understandings described in clause (13) to the appro-
priate committees of Congress for review as required
by law;
(15) assign to the components of the National
Intelligence Authority responsibility :Eor services of
common concern as can best be performed centrally;
(16) coordinate with the Attorney General the
counterintelligence activities of the United St-aces
directed against foreign espionage, sabotage, clandestine
intelligence activities, assassinations, or terrorism,
such coordination to include the review and evaluation of
proposals for such activities as well as the monitoring
z+'.rn t ,.. I1 (`?=s.. i~'y ~'t -ti: ~!'l..r 5T .i ~r~-'- -r J. _-+s'+:~.L.'~.~.._."" aY'v- -'-'.
 `~ ~ urpose of
a n Apj'roveR Fob :1~r9MU0983 1800060008-6
insuring that such activities safeguard and do not
abridge any right guaranteed or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the united States;
(17) supervise the operation of, and make. recom-
mendations for; such review procedures as are consistent
with the provisions of this Act and necessary for the
careful evaluation of proposals for, and the, monitoring
and periodic review of, the conduct of special activities
in support of national foreign policy objectives.
(18) develop security standards for the-management
and handling of national intelligence, for the granting
of access to such national intelligence, and for entering
into such lawful security agreements as are necessary
for the protection of properly classified, intelligence
sources and methods;
(19) establish, in consultation with the Attorney
General,. procedures for the lawful protection, retention,
disclosure, and dissemination of information acquired
by the various entities of the National Intelligence
Authority, but no such information may be retained,
disclosed, or disseminated if it unduly infringes upon
the privacy of any national of the United States or if
it violates any right guaranteed or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(20) be responsible for (A) the establishment of
security standards, priorities, and practices for the
protection of United States communications, (B) monitoring
the implementation of such standards, priorities,, and
practices by the departments and agencies of the govern-
ment and contractor facilities concerned, and (C) taking
all reasonable steps recommended by the Attorney General
to protect the privacy of such communications;
(21) formulate, in consultation with 'the Secretary
C~ 's`ue. r- ? ,+J^..~ - ~'~?'~'-- - - _ .. - _ ..~_. .. _~_~._ ~ e. ~~~ ''r--.-~.1. -j. ~_ 1_ ,. M . 's
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 o fA `PFrd for F 1 fj 2p '4/413?t g1X- 1DP7 O1Q83Abe1
?OM0a46y
of Defense of such elements of the National Intelligence
Authority as may be required in time.of war; -
(22) terminate the employment of any officer or
employee of the National. Intelligence Authority whenever
he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable
in the interests of the United States notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 652 of Title 5, or the
provisions of any other law, but such termination shall
not affect the right of such officer or employee 'to
seek or accept employment in any other department or
agency of the Government if declared eligible for such
employment by the United States Civil Service Commission;
(23) assure (on the basis of advice given by the
Attorney General) that the intelligence activities of
the United States serve to safeguard and do not abridge
any right' guaranteed or protected by the Constitution.
or laws of the United States; and
(24) provide such administrative, technical, and
support activities in the United States and abroad as
may be necessary to carry out effectively and efficiently
the duties of the Director and the functions of the
National Intelligence Authority.
(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit
any department or agency of the-government from collecting,
evaluating, and disseminating departmental and tactical
intelligence'if such department or agency is otherwise authorized
to do so; and nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit any entity of the National Intelligence Authority
from producing its own analyses of national intelligence, but
any such analyses shall be promptly submitted to the
Director.
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 ASSISTANT DIRE_ RS; STAFF; COMMITTEES AN OARDS
Appr ve FQrR I ase 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP79M00983A001800060008-6
Sec. I. ~ (L) The President is authorize to appoint,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, not
more than three Assistant Directors of National
Intelligence.
(2) The Assistant Directors of.National Intelli-
gence shall perform such duties as the Director shall
prescribe. Such duties may include, but sha1.l not be
limited to (A) the coordination and ass.essment of the
analysis, evaluation, production, and dissemination of
national intelligence,' (B) the review of proposals for,
and the monitoring and direction of, United States
clandestine collection, special activities, and the
coordination of United States counterintelligence
activities, and (C)- the planning, development, and
management of United States technical collection systems.
(b) The Director. is authorized to employ such personnel
as may be necessary to assist in carrying out the functions
of the National Intelligence Authority. Such staff may
include, but shall not be 'limited to, persons employed by any
entity within the National Intelligence Authority.
(c) The Director is also authorized to establish such
committees or boards as may be necessary to carry out
effectively the provisions of this Act, including., but not
limited to, committees or boards of intellignece collectors,
producers, and consumers.
(d) The Director is also authorized to establish such
advisory committees as may be necessary to prov.de expert
advice.regardingthe administration of this Act. The names
of all persons appointed to serve on any such advisory
committee shall be submitted to the committees of the 'Congress
having jurisdiction over the National Intelligence Authority,
and, except when. to 'do so would compromise the national
 ser_tia-ity ,oE the Un red States , the names o sue'. e r so; s
Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP79M00983AO01806060008-6
and a description of the committee or committees to which
Sec. 9. (a) The Director shall maintain a complete
they are appointed shall be published -in the Federal Register.
REPORT OF VIOLATIONS
Sec., S. (a) The Director shall report to .the Att-orrey
General immediately -upon the discovery of any intelligence
activity -which may constitute a violation?of-any right
b
guaranteed or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or of any other violation of law, or of any
violation of an executive order, presidential directive,'
or departmental or agency rule or regulation.
(b) The Director and the Attorney General shall report,
in a timely manner, to the President -arid to the appropriate
committees of the Congress any violation described in sub-
section (a).
Authority.
record of all authorities, regulations, and guidelines
affecting the national intelligence activities of the United
States. A complete copy of such record shall be maintained
in the Office of the Federal Register under conditions suf-
ficient to protect the national security of the United
States. The Director shall make such'record available,,
upon request, to any committee of the Congress having.juris-
diction. over matters relating to the National Intelligence
Authority.
diction over matters relating to the National Intelligence
(b). The Director shall maintain a complete record of
all decisions and implementing orders pertaining to the
intelligence activities of the United States under his
jurisdiction. The Director shall make such record available,
upon request, to any committee of the Congress having juris-
 P13T:~I~ F ~THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 1
Sec. 10. (a) No funds may be appropriated for any
fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1977, for the
purpose of carrying out any national intelligence activity
unless such funds have been previously authorized for such
activities by legislation enacted during the same fiscal
year or the fiscal year irnimediately preceding the fiscal year
for which they are appropriated, except that the foregoing
limitation shall not apply to funds appropriated by any
continuing resolution. The Congress and the President shall
make available to the public information regarding funds
appropriated and expended for intelligence activities of the
United States to the extent required by Article x, section 9,
clause 7, of the Constitution of the United States.
(b) (1) All funds for carrying out the national intelli--
gence activities of the United States shall be appro-
priated to the Director.
(2) Funds may be appropriated to the Director to
cover matters relating to national intelligence activities
of a. confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature;
and the expenditure of such funds shall be accounted
for solely on the certificate of the Director. Every
such certificate shall be deemed a. sufficient voucher
for the amount certified therein. All other funds
appropriated to the Director shall be subject to audit
and review, subject to appropriate security standards,
by the Comptroller General of the United States`, at
the request of the committees of Congress having juris-
diction over matters relating to the National Intelli-
gency Authority, provided, however, that information
resulting from such audits and reviews shall only be
available 'to such committees of the Congress.
F.
 -16-
Approved For F-elease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M009$3 001800060008;6
(c) The Director is authorized to establish a Contin-
gency Reserve Fund and to credit to such fund any sums of
money specifically appropriated to the Director for such
fund. The Director is authorized to use funds from the
Contingency Reserve Fund.to cover the expense in any fiscal
year of any national intelligence activity not anticipated.
at the time the President's budget for such fiscal year Uwas
submitted to the Congress and which the Director certifies
are necessary to be protected against unauthorized disclosure.
However, funds from the Contingency Reserve Fund may be.
expended only with the approval of the Office of Management
and Budget and after the appropriate committees of the
Congress have been given 72 hours' notice of the intent to
expend such funds and the specific purposes, authorized under
this Act, of such expenditure.
ANNUAL REVIEW AND REPORT
Sec. 11. (a) There is hereby established a board to
be known as the National Intelligence Authority Review Board
(hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board") .
It shall be the function of the Board to conduct.a compre-
hensive review and evaluation of the work of the National
-Intelligence Authority each year and report the results of
that study and evaluation, together with such comments and
recommendations as the Board may deem appropriate, to the
President and the appropriate committees . of the Congress.
(b) (1) The Board shall be composed of nine members
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.'
(2) The term of office of the first members of
the Board shall expire'as follows: three at the end
of one year; three 'at the end of two years; and three
at the end of three years. The terms of office of all
 Approved For Mire 2005/04/13 CIA-RDP7 M00K3fOt1 ~00eq 08-6
successors s a expire three yea s a N r-
ation of the terms for which their predecessors were
appointed, but any member appointed to fill a vacancy--
occurring prior to the expiration of the term =or
which his predecessor was appointed shall he appointed
only for the unexpired term of his predecessor.
(3) Only persons who are eminently qugLlified by
virtue of their background, education, training, and
experience to review and evaluate the work of the
National Intelligence Authority shall be appointed to
the Board.
(4) The Board is -authorized to employ such
personnel as may be necessary to assist in carrying out
its functions under this Act.
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REPORTS
See. 12. (a) The committees of the Senate and the House
of Representatives having jurisdiction over matters relating
to the National Intelligence Authority shall make regular
periodic reports to their. respective Houses on the nature and
extent of the national intelligence activities of the National
Intelligence Authority. Such committees shall- promptly
call to. the attention of their respective Houses, or to any
other appropriate committee or committees of their respective
Houses, any matter relating to intelligence activities which
requires or should have the attention of such House or other
committee or committees. In making such report, the committees
of the Senate and the House of Representatives having juris
diction over matters relating to the National Intelligence
Authority shall do so in a manner consistent with the protec-
tion of the national security interests of the United States.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) are enacted by
the Congress
" _ --%p rA etE FQr -RV j 244/- e1-Y 1yA= 79- W-.-W983AUD-
 (l) as exercise of the rulemaki- '. power of
? tAP.PrPMg0h ~0 ~4~s ' cC ~preM~~i~B PQ 11
000 QOs0 ecti.vely,
and as such they shall he considered as part of the
rules of each House, respectively, and shall. s .percede
other rules only to the extent that they are incon-
sistent therewith;' and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional
right of either House to change such rules. as far as
relating to such House) at any time, in the same manner,
and to the same extent as in the case. of any other rule
of such House.
ANNUAL. REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
Sec. 13. (a) The Director shall prepare and submit
to the committees of the Senate and the House of Represen-
tatives having jurisdiction over matters relating to the..
National Intelligence Authority an annual report in which
the activities of the various entities of the National
Intelligence Authority and the intelligence activities of
foreign countries directed at the United States or its
interests are reviewed and discussed by the Director.
(b) The Director shall make an unclassified version of
such annual report available to the public. Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed as requiring the public
disclosure, in any such report made available to the public,
of the names of individuals engaged in intelligence activities
for the United States or the divulging of intelligence
methods employed or. the sources of information on..which any
such report is based.
Approved Fo TRiTease,2005/04i13 CIA-RDP79M00983AOO1800~60008-.k
 A,ppro~vd For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M00983A001800060008-6
SeT. .~. 'The review of proposals for, and the conduct
of, special activities in support of national foreign policy
objectives and sensitive clandestine collection projects.
(1) Special activities in support of national foreign
policy objectives are to be reserved for extraordinary
circumstances when there are grave threats to the national
security of the United States and when the overt'means avail-
able to the U.S. Government would not allow the successful
accomplishment of national foreign policy objectives.
(2) Special activities in support of national foreign
policy objectives must he consistent with publicly defined
U.S. foreign policy goals.
(3) A special committee of the. National Security
Council [hereinafter referred to as the Policy Review
Committee (PRC)] shall be established to review special
activities in support of national foreign policy objectives
and sensitive clandestine collection.projects. (For purposes
of this section, the term "sensitive clandestine collection
project"'.means any secret intelligence collection activity
which if discovered or revealed might cause harm or embarras-
sment to the United States or adverse reaction from other
countries.) The PRC shall consist of (A) the Director
of National Intelligence, (B) the Secretary of State, (C) the
Secretary of Defense, (D) the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, (E) the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (F) the Attorney General and
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall
be eligible to participate as observers, (G) Wherever possible
and appropriate, the views of the respective U.S. Ambassador(s)
will be solicited.
(4) The members of the Policy Review Comittee designated
by this Act can designate senior representatives to attend
... _ _ - .. - , ?-... - : ~- Yom.
Appr.overi_F.or_ Release a0 DP7-9M00W3AQQ1.SQQQB.D. W7-6._.__ _
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M00983AO01800060008-6
in their place.
(5) No special activities in support of riatiofal foreign
policy objectives or sensitive clandestine -collection projects
may be conducted without the approval of the PRC
(6) Each proposal for a special activity in support
of national foreign policy objectives shall include: (A) a
summary of the activity; (B) a statement of just:fication of
the activity including evidence that the objectives cannot,
be achieved by. overt means; (C) a statement as to the pro-
bability of success of the special activity; (D) a description
of the expenditures required; (E) a statement of the activity's
proposed duration; (F) a description of anticipated risks
including the consequences of disclosure; (G) a statement.
of previous coordination in developing the proposal; (I-I)
an itemized list of references to previously approved
related special activities.
(7) Each proposal for a sensitive clandestine collection.
project shall include (A) a summary of the activity; (B)
a statement of the justification of the activity including
evidence that the information cannot be obtained by overt
means; (C) a statement as to the probability of success of
the clandestine collection project; (D) a description of
the expenditures required; (E) a statement of the activity's
proposed duration; (F) a description of anticipated risks
including the consequences of disclosure;-(G) ,a statement of
previous coordination in developing 'the proposal; (II) an -
related
itemized list -of references to previously appfoired/clandestine
collection projects.
(8) Favorable recommendations to the President shall
be made only upon a favorable vote of a majority of those
members present after consideration of the proposed special
activity or sensitive-clandestine collection project in a
formal meeting of the Policy Review Committee. No formal
InyJ ~Tf~.~ Ftf3P7 111L 983i 001ffQ =f,
PO
------------
 significant or major
security problems related thereto. The appropriate committees
of Congress shall also be advised in a timely manner, o.f -`
of significant or major changes in any special activity or
sensitive clandestine collection project, as well as any
collection projects.
(13) The Policy Review Committee shall also be Informed
(12) The Policy Review Committee shall also engage in an
annual review of all special activities in support of
national foreign policy objectives and all sensitive clandestine
t,~p rDv fob l gse ?005/04/1:? CIA
nl ~Rt P7911(IOOQB .018?
QQQQQO -~thaut
ee tn.-t ~gx .evze:a ,oxtE~c ?4
a majority of the members present.
(9) Favorable recommendations to the President shall;
include the proposal and written statements from each o= the
members . This is to be forwarded to the President along
with an opinion of the Attorney General on the legal aspects
of the special activity or sensitive clandestine-collection
project.'
(10) No special activity in support of national foreign
policy objectives may be implemented unless and. until the
President certifies that it(A) is consistent with publicly
defined U. S. foreign policy goals; (B) is necessary to meet
an extraordinary circumstance in which 'there is a grave
and
threat to the national security;/(C) that the overt means
available to the United States Government are not sufficient
to allow the successful accomplishment of U.S. national
foreign policy objectives; and notifies the appropriate
committees of the Congress. -
(11)? The Director of National Intelligence is responsi-
ble for reporting to the Congress such Presidential cer_ti?-
fication and shall also be responsible for keeping a written
record of the time, manner, and content of the report
which he makes to the Congress including congressional.
reaction and responses.
 changes in any spe.al activity or sensitive zndestine
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M00983AO01800060008-6
collection project and any security problem related thereto.
(14) The Director of National Intelligence shall be
required to submit a semi-annual report on all special
activities in support of national foreign policy objectives
and all sensitive clandestine collection projects to the
committees of Congress having jurisdiction over.the .National
Intelligence Authority.
(15) Special activities in support of "national foreign
policy objectives shall be conducted only by the. Central
Intelligence Agency unless the Director of National. Intelli-
gence certifies that the objectives cannot be achieved by
the use of the Central Intelligence Agency and designates
another entity within the National Intelligence Authority
to conduct the particular special activity.
(16) The President must approve the choice of another
component within the National Intelligence Authority to
conduct the particular special activity.
(17) The notice to the appropriate committees of
Congress must specifically include the fact that the special
activity is being implemented by an agency other than the
Central Intelligence Agency.
(18) In no case shall special activities in support of
national foreign policy objectives include political
assassination, efforts-to subvert democratically elected
democratic governments, or support of the writing or production
for open distribution within the U.S. of any book, article,
film, or tape, unless publicly attributed to the NIA.
(19) In no case shall any component of the National
Intelligence Authority utilize (a) journalists accredited to
U.S. media organizations, (b) individuals who regularly
contribute material for distribution by any U.S. media
" ~J - .-.." i ~- - w +5..~ ..'r' -. ~_Sj 1kir';c'.e~r?e:,xcr~'.~itQ~%13IX:FZ~f 7A~]d~40(i7 $r1~~~~ = ....r';r , ~>.
 -24-
'we
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M00983AO01800060008-6
CnlTi~ TERINTEI.:.Tfr~:CE CC-L I'L TE
Sec. 15. (a) There is established within the Nationa.l
Security Council a committee to be known as the Coin. ter-
intelligence Committee.
(b) The Counterintelligence Committee shall b:-:- composed
(1) the Attorney General of the United States,
who shall be the chairman;
.(2) one of the two Deputy Secretaries of Defense,
as designated by th"e Secretary of-Defense;.
(3) the Director of National Intelligence;
(4) the Assistant to the President for. National_
Security Affairs.
(c) The function' of the Counterintelligence Committee
shall be to coordinate and review counterintelligence activities.
As part of such coordination and review, such. committee shall
insure that all such counterintelligence activities are _
conducted in strict conformity with the Constitution and
the laws of the United States and shall make an annual
report to the appropriate committees of Congress certifying
that such activities have been so conducted, or, if the
Counterintelligence Committee has reason to believe that
any such activity has not been so conducted, certifying which
such activities have been so conducted and which have not.
(d) The Counterintelligence Committee shall review the
P=' .
standards established by each intelligence agency for the-
recruitment of intelligence agents.
(e) The Counterintelligence Committee shall provide'
guidance for the protection of foreign intelligence assets
whcih enter the United States, and the establishment of
the actual status of any alien purporting to be a defector
and seeking asylum in the United States.
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Section I. Title
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The purpose of the bill is to assure that U.S. intelligence
activities are properly and effectively directed, regulated and
'Section 2. Purpose
ligence activities do not, violate the rights of Americans and
United States security interests; and to assure that U.S. Intel--
administered; to provide useful information and analysis to the
executive and legislative branches to assist them in protecting
in which policymakers have confidence when and where it is needed;
other persons. The bill thus responds to three needs which the
Committee believes are the most pressing facing the intelligence
community : improved management; providing reliable information
and preventing intelligence abuses.
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 Sectio fizahRX~i~z . `.,~
prar~e Po`er R~ seZ CIA-RDP79MOO983AO01800060008-6
(1) "Intelligence activities" means (a) the collection
of information related generally to defense foreign affairs;
(2) "National intelligence".means information produced
(referred to in this bill as "special activities")
(b) counterintelligence activities; and (c)-covert action
(3) "National intelligence activities" means activities,
a Naval commander in the area-
particular destroyer,rhich would be important information for
and overall military deployment, but not the position of a
would thus include information regarding Soviet military strength
.for the use of national policymakers. It does not include
tactical or departmental intelligence.' National intelligence
for the purpose of obtaining national intelligence-
activities of a number of agencies are specified as falling-
designate other activities which fall within the definition as
within this definition, but the President is authorized to
by tactical commanders in the field not used by national
intelligence principally used-within departments or agencies-or
well.
(4) "Tactical or departmental inteligence" means
example, falls generally within this category..
policymakers. The example of the position of a Soviet destroyer
described' above would be tactical or"departmental intelligence.
(5) "Tactical or departmental intelligence activities"
means activities for the purpose'of obtaining tactical intel-_
l:Lgence. The use of_ radar on .American. ships and planes, for
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their national intelligence activities, unless otherwise specified-;
ligence community of the United States only with respect to
activities, they shall be subject to rules governing' the intelw?
engaged in national intelligence activities. Where some-entities
are engaged in national intelligence activities as well. as other
a:Ll elements of the government to the extent that they are-
"Intelligence community of the United?.~tates" means
the United States or permanent resident alien. -Permanent resident=
"National of the United States" means a citizen of
in this or other law.
production of information, which are designed to further the
() "Special activities" means activities, other than the
and Naturalization Act to mean permanent resident alien.
United States. This is the same term used in the Immigration
a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the
alien is described in this paragraph as a person who, though'not
foreign policy objectives of the United States. These activities
are carried out in secret and generally known as covert actions.
They are to be carried out under the direction. and control of the
National Security Council and subject to the oversight of the
appropriate committees of the Congress.
() "Attorney General" means the Attorney General of the
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enactment of the appropriate regular appropriation act.
"Continuing resolution" means a joint resolution of
Congress to fund a department or agency temporarily, pending
United States.
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There is established the National Intelligence
Section 4.
Authority (NIA) which is to operate under the National
Security Council (NSC), and to be composed of all
entities of the ' U.. S.. intelligence. community. Its func-
tion is to collect, analyze, and disseminate useful
intelligence to the Executive and legislative branches,
and to engage in special activities through the CIA.
The collection, analysis and dissemination of
intelligence is assigned to the CIA in the National
Security Actof,1947, and the CIA will continue to
carry out at least some of these functions. .Ultimate
responsibility for producing intelligence, however, is
now being placed in an authority composed of all elements
of the intelligence community, the director of which
will be able to manage the various agencies more effect-
ively than the Director of Central Intelligence.
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Section 5. Director and Deputy Director
A Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and a Deputy
Director (DDNI) are to be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the President. The DNI would head the
NIA and assume the role currently held by the Director of Central"
Intelligence as chief intelligence officer of the government.
The roles of chief of the CIA and chief intelligence officer
would thus be-separated.' Any preference which the Director might
have, based on institutional loyalty, for the intelligence produce
of his own agency, would thus be eliminated. In addition, it
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is expected that the various intelligence agencies other than
CIA-will
accept most readily the management of an official
not associated with'a "competing" agency, and that the DNI
will have more time to devote to this important task than is
Because it is important that the DNI, in particular, have
presently the case with the DCI.
oversight of the work of these two officers, neither may serve
the pleasure of the President. To facilitate congressional
the confidence of the President, both officers shall serve at
for more than six years without being reconfirmed by the Senate_
In no event may either officer serve more than twelve years..
.Either the Director or his Deputy,'but not both, may be a
commissioned officer of the armed forces. If a commissioned'
officer does serve in either of these posts, he shall-not be
subject. to any military command during his tenure as Director or
Deputy Director. The purpose of these provisions is to permit
the President to draw from the armed services for his Director
if he chooses, but to stress-the importance of civilian control
11i-ence provided
TheyAOkM FbPF4e,~A&mo 4 m Gtt -R 1 1~1~~8 A~01 600D$-6
are their interests always the same as those of policymakers.
national intelligence, but their role is not to make policy, nor,
over intelligence. The armed services both produce and use
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 CIA-RDP79M00983A001800060008-6
status of the Director of National Intelligence and his
deputy are identical to those governing the Director and
The provisions of this section regarding the military
Deputy Director of. Central Intelligence- in the National
Security Act of 1947..
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 The DNS. is =assigned the duty and responss.b)J_1Ey, under the
guidatnApprarddiPID kel hsae 2q@010=31. (AA-FO1 9 98 P 1dd00t60O88d control
the national intelligence activities of the United States:" `. Y
This language is designed to assign to the DNI.m_6re power
to manage the intelligence community than is presently avail--
able to the DCI, who "coordinates" but does not "direct and
control."
It is to be the responsibility of the President to
establish what are national intelligence activities, and thus
what is the jurisdiction of the DNI. He does so, however,
with the guidance'of.the NSC and the DNI himself, who is
authorized.tb review all departmental or tactical intelligence..
activities, and all. intelligence-related activities. The DNI
shall make recommendations to the President, the NSC, and the
congressional committees on any intelligence activities he
deems necessary, although his.authority to "direct and control"
extends only to national intelligence activities.
The duties of the DNI are further outlined as follows:
(1) The DNI is to serve as the President's primary advisor
on national intelligence, and to provide the President and other
executive branch officials with accurate, relevant, and timely
foreign intelligence;
(2) The DNI is to keep the President and the committees of
the Congress having jurisdiction over the National Intelligence
Authority fully and currently informed of all intelligence acti-
vities of the United States, including any significant anticipated
activities,_but this provision does not require the approval
any congressional committee prior to the implementation of any
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intelligence. activity. The language of this paragraph is
This paragraph assigns this responsibility to one official;
.Senate that the various intelligence agencies should keep the
new committee fully and currently informed of -their. activities
Committee.on Intelligence and expressing the sense of the_
very similar to that of S. Res. 400, establishing the Select
diction over the NIA, including any intelligence committee
the DNI; and requires reporting. to.all..committees_-.having juris--
unlike the similar provision in S. Res. 400, this paragraph,
which maybe established in the House of Representatives-.Also,?
if enacted, would have the force of law.
(3) The DNI is to inform the President, the NSC, and. the
national intelligence activities and other intelligence activities
"appropriate committees of Congress" on the relationship between
for policymaking purposes, and what is useful primarily as
officials on what intelligence, at any given time, is necessary
of the United States. This means informing the appropriate.
department or tactical intelligence.
The term "appropriate corn-
mittees of Congress" is used here, rather than "committees having
jurisdiction over the National Intelligence Authority", as above,.
because committees not directly concerned with national intel-
ligence will have an immediate and direct interest in tactical
(4) The DNI is to provide for the effective direction,
management, and coordination of the entities which make up the
intelligence.
NIA.
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(5) The DNI .is to prepare an annual budge.t of all U.S. national intelligence activities for presentation to. the_Presi-
dent. This is a change or at least a clarification from present
budget procedures as outlined in Executive Order 11905. There.
the DCI is charged to "ensure the development and submission of
a budget" and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence is to
"control budget.preparation and resource allocation," but the
role.of each is ambiguous, and neither actually prepares .the
intelligence budget.. That is done by the individual agencies,
often with no or little thought for what is going on in:other
agencies. The CFI can subsequently amend the various agency
budgets before. they are submitted to OMB, but this does not permit
the same flexibility as the initial preparation. This.
paragraph is part of.an effort to consolidate management of the
intelligence community. Control of the budget is a key element
in effective management..
(6) The DNI is to.provide for the allocation and'control
of funds appropriated for national intelligence purposes.
(7) He is to establish requirements, develop plans and
assign priorities for all national intelligence activities-of
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :-1A-RDP79M00983A001800060008-6
point which is ambiguous in E.O. 11905 -- the role of the DCI
in actually establishing requirements -- or assigning tasks
the United States. This language attempts to cl .rify a
only to.national intelligence and.in:assigni_ng these requirements,
:authority to establish these requirements, of course, applies
which the intelligence agencies are obliged to perform. The
intelligence components of various department and agencies also
the DNI is required to take into account the need for the
to-perform intelligence tasks assigned by the heads of these
departments or agencies.
insure the efficient use of intelligence resources and the ful-
(8) The DNI is to evaluate intelligence activities to
that clandestine collection programs are highly sensitive and
(9) He is to establish procedures to review proposals for
clandestine collection of intelligence. This paragraph recognizes
fillment of national intelligence requirements;
should be reviewed at the highest levels to insure that they are
and that the risks to the national interest.in`herent in each
not undertaken to obtain intelligence which can be obtained ovdrtl.y,
proposal do not outweigh the value of any information which is
risks that.policies publicly established by the United States
Covernment, or values widely accepted by the American people,
likely to be obtained. The risks to be considered should include,,
but not be limited to, risks of disclosure of the operation and
will be compromised. It.-is explicitly stated that these review
procedures should insure that clandestine collection activities
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 w -5y
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(10) 'The. DNI is to receive, correlate, analyze and
sidered. This means that the DNI is responsible for-providing
.policy-makers with useful intelligence.. Where there is signi-
ficant disagreement within the. intelligence community with
respect to interpreting raw data, he is responsible for pro-
evaluate all national intelligence, taking into account the
need to insure that diverse points of view are heard and con-
.and with providing that conflicting views are also presented.
viding policymakers with his own evaluation of the intelligence,
his own evaluation of the available intelligence, and with
providing fora presentation of the opposing view. If there
military intentions, the DNI would be responsible for presenting
Thus, in the case of the dispute over estimates of Soviet
is more than one significant opposing view, he is responsible
for seeing that all are presented.
(Note that subsection (e) of this section. provides that
no entity of the'NIA is prohibited from producing its own evalu-
ation of national intelligence, which is to be provided promptly
to the DNI for his use in carrying out his duties.)
(11) The DNI is to supervise the dissemination of national
intelligence to appropriate departments and agencies, except
that no dissemination shall be made of information which unduly
infringes upon the privacy of any national of the United States
or which violates any, right guaranteed by. the Constitution-and
laws of the United States. The purpose of this latter provision
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 Now
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is to assure that no information inadvertently or purposely.
obtained which infringes on the rights of any person shall
(12), The DNI is to make reasonable efforts to furnish
be disseminated.
the departments and agencies of the.govermment and all tactical.
can use it.* (The National Security Act of 1947 presently
provides that the CIA shall "provide for the appropriate
dissemination " of "intelligence relating to the National
provided to those departments, agencies, and commands.which
ical purposes in addition to or instead of policymaking
purposes. Efficiency mandates that such intelligence be
produce intelligence which is'useful for departmental or tact-
produce national intelligence,. the NIA can be expected to
commanders all relevant intelligence produced by the NIA. This
paragraph recognizes, that, while the purpose of the NIA is to
Security." .
to wiretap an American abroad, if the CIA itself were legally
out. For example, the CIA could not ask a foreign agency
ment which the U. S. entity is itself prohibited from carrying
make up the NIA are prohibited from requesting, encouraging
or approving any activity by an agency of a foreign govern-
(13) The DNI is to be responsible for all relationships
between U.'S. intelligence agencies and the intelligence and
security services of foreign governments. The entities which
prohibited from that activity.
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 -7-
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(14) The DNI is to submit all agreements, arrangements,
C.
and understandings regarding relationships between U. S.
intelligence agencies and foreign services-to the appropriate
committees of Congress, as required by the Case Amendment.-
It is intended that this responsibility apply to informal
or unwritten agreements, as well as formal agreements.
(15). The DNI may assign to any entity of the NIA any
"services of common concern" to be performed on behalf of
all the NIA. One such service would be monitoring open
foreign radio' broadcasts.
tion or laws of the United States.
(16) The DNI is to coordinate with-the Attorney General
the counterintelligence activities of the United States, this
coordination to include review and evaluation of proposals
for counterintelligence activities and monitoring and reeval-
uating such activities to insure that they safeguard and-do
not abridge any right guaranteed or protected by the Constitu-
no responsibilities with respect to domestic terrorism or
Counterintelligence activities as used in this bill do
not include internal security activities.. Thus the DNI has
subversion. The DNI does, however, share with the Attorney
General responsibility for foreign counterintelligence, a
function carried out by both the FBI and foreign i.ntelli-
gence agencies, particularly the CIA. This bill does not
anticipate that the DNI will assign to foreign intelligence
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agencies responsibility.for counterintelligence in the
United States. Because foreign counterintelligice is
carried.out at home and abroad by different agencies, how-
ever, it is essential that one person, the chief intelligence
officer of the government, have direct responsibility for
its coordination, and for assigning counterintelligence.require-
ments.' The Attorney Cenral_ shares this responsibility insofar
as counterintelligence affects the rights of Americand and
.other persons protected by U.S. law. He does not share the
DNI's responsibility for assigning counterintelligence.require-
ments, but he does have a significant responsibility with
respect to the limits within which those requirements can be
carried out.
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(17) The* DNI is to establish procedures for, evaluating,
activities (covert actions) specific standards for which
monitoring and approving proposals for conducting special-'
will be established elsewhere'in the bill.
management and handling-of intelligence information, for
(18) The DNI is to develop security standards for the
granting access to such information, and for entering into
protection of intelligence information, sources and methods.-
luch lawful security agreements as are necessary for
access to intelligence information, not to disclose the inform-
a person agrees, as a conditioft of employment or of gaining
The security agreements in question are contracts by wh'i'ch-
ation to any unauthorized person.
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It is not the intent of this paragraph to assign to the
DNI authority to withhold information from the legislative;
.or judicial branches.
(19) The DNI is to establish, in consultation with the
Attorney General, procedures for the lawful protection, re-
tention, disclosure and dissemination of information acquired
by the various entities of the NIA, but no. information may be
retained, disclosed or disseminated if it unduly infringes
upon the privacy of any national of the United States or-if it
violates any right guaranteed or protected by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
The purpose of the last part of this paragraph is to
specify the proposition implicit in the whole of this legis-
lakion, that the NIA is subject to the same laws as anyone else.
It.further states that the privacy of American nationals must
.be protected where possible, whether or not protected by the
Constitution or other U.S_ law..
(20) The DNI is to be responsible for establishing and-
monitoring security standards, priorities, and practices for
the protection of U.S. communications, and taking reasonable
steps recommended by the Attorney General to.protect the privacy-
of such communications.
(21) In-consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the -
DNI is to formulate plans for use by the Department of Defense
..of such elements of the NIA as may be required in time of war.-
This provision is based on the assumption that certain forms of
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intelligence or sources of intelligence, which in peacetime
are used for policymaking purposes or to acquire national
intelligence, 'will become' essential for tactical purposes in
time of war.
(.22) The DNI may terminate the employment of any *employee
of the NIA if he deems it advisable in the interests of the.
which permits the DCI to fire any employee of the CIA, and
United States. This language tracks that of the 1947 Act,
it is considered necessary for security reasons.
(23) The DNI is to assure (on the basis. of advice given
and agencies under his direction and control are lawful.
.gence.officer, direct .responsibility to assure that the activities
the U.S. This paragraph assigns to the DNI, as chief intelli'
by the Attorney General) that the intelligence activities of.
the United States serve to safeguard and do not abridge any
.right guaranteed or protected by the Constitution or laws of
support activities in the United States and abroad as may be
(24) The DNI is to provide administrative, technical and.
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 _12`
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include: procurement, maintenance and transport; communications
(Note: Detailed administrative.provisions will be set
out in separate drafts and cross-referenced here. These will
necessary to perform the functions of the DNI anaNIA.
ledge of National Intelligence Authority sponsorship by the
limitations and procedural restrictions such as. requiring know-
research, analytical and development services and specialized
expertise. The separate draft will also include appropriate
stitutions to provide services such as classified or unclassified
cover and proprietary arrangements; entering into contracts
and arrangements with apppropriate private companies and in-
and data processing; recruitment and training; the provision
of personnel; financial.and medical services; development of
Finally, Section 6 specifies that nothing in the bill
to be construed as prohibiting collection, evaluation, and
'dissemination of departmental and tactical intelligence by
appropriate university official:
departments and agencies otherwise authorized to engage in these
-activities, or prohibiting any entity of the NIA from producing
provision is, first, to reserve the prerogatives of the individual
departments and agencies with respect to departmental and tactical
intelligence, which services to assist the departments and
agencies themselves to carry out their own special functions, and
its own analyses of national intelligence, but such analyses
are to be promptly submitted to the DNI. The purpose of this
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13f. CIA-RDP79MO098TA001800060008-8.
which is thus best managed on .a departmental'or agency level.
At the same time, the entities of the NIA which are involved
in producing national intelligence are authorized'to analyze
such intelligence, and thus to contribute their.own perspec-
tives to'the intelligence picture which is seen by national
policymakers and by the DNI.
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 C
ssi it s- stawe; colim,Lueus dL,u uv a C)
Re Q6ooo8-6
(a) The President is authorized to appoint, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, not more than,-three Assistant
Directors of National Intelligence (ADNIs). The duties of
these Assistant Directors is not mandated by the bill,-for it
is anticipated that the needs of the DNI and the NIA will change
in time and that flexibility is needed in the functions assigned
these officials. Duties suggested for the ADNIs, however,
include coordination and assessment of intelligence analysi
evaluation, production and dissemination; management. of clan-
destine collection, special activities, and counterintelligence
activities; and planning, developing and managing U.S. technical
rely as well on the staff of.the CIA. to carry pit some of his
This staff will be similar to the present IC staff, although it
may be larger, since unlike the DCI the DNI will not be able to
(b) The DNI is authorized to employ such personnel as may
be necessary to assist in carrying out the functions of the NIA.
collection systems.
duties. The staff may include, but shall not be limited to,
.employees cif any entity within the NIA. (The House Appropriation
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Committee has recently suggested that a core group represen-
ting a specified.percentage of the IC staff should be career
employees, not detailed from intelligence agencies. A similar
provision might govern members of the NIA staff.)
(c) The Director is authorized to establish such com-
mittees or boards as may be necessary to carry out effectively
the provisions.-of the bill.
(d) The Director is authorized to establish such advisory
committees as may be necessary to provide expert advice regarding
the administration of this Act. Except in those unusual circum-
stances when to do so would compromise the national security
of the U.S., a description of each committee and the names of
.its members are to-be published. in the Federal Register.. In any
event, the names of all committee members are to be submitted
to the appropriate committees of Congress.
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Section 8.' Report of Violations.
The DNI shall report to the Attorney General, and the DNI.
and Attorney General shall report to the President and appro-
priate committees of Congress any intelligence activity which
may constitute a violation of law, executive order, Presidential
directive, departmental or agency rule or regulation,'or con-
stitutionally-or legally protected right..
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Section 9. Records
The Director is to maintain a record of all authorities,
will be published in the Office of the Federal Registry.
national security of the United States. (It is intended that
regulations and other authorities not properly classifiable
A complete copy of-these records is to be maintained in the
Federal Register under conditions sufficient.to protect the
affecting the intelligence activities of the United States,
regulations, guidelines, decisions and implementing orders.
The DNI is to make'any such record available, upon request,
to any committee of the Congress having jurisdiction over
carried out;. and (2) to establish clearly. responsibilities for
The purpose of this section is (1) to establish clearly
the legal authority under which intelligence agencies are
matters relating to the NIA.
would be no question, in the future, as to the source of
intended that these records should be specific. Thus there*,
authorizing particular intelligence activities. It is
an order to carry out a specific action.'
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Section 10. Requirements Relating to Appropriations
for the National Intelligence Authority.'
(a) Funds for national intelligence activities are
to the intelligence budget as is required by the Constitution,
and the President should publish such information related:
orized.) In addition, it is required that the Congress
required to be. authorized on an annual basis. (Prior to
this year, intelligence funds have been appropriated but
not authorized. S. Res. 400 requires that funds approved.
by the Senate for intelligence g uposes must also be auth-
Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
which mandates that "No money shall be drawn from
. and Expenditures of all. public Money shall be published from
time to time."
(b) (1).. All.. funds for carrying ..out the national intelli.-...
gence activities of the United States shall-be appropriated to
the Director, who shall be responsible for their. allocation to
the various entities within the NIA. The purpose of this
provision, again, is. to consolidate management of national
. intelligence activities through budget control.
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(2) Funds may be-'appropriated to the Director to cover
fidential,-extraordinary, or emergency nature, and the expen-
matters relating to national intelligence activities of a con--
the Director shall be subject to-,audit and review by the Comp-
certificate of the Director. . All other funds appropriated-. to
diture of'such funds shall be accounted for solely on the
troller General.
This provision is not intended to
exempt the Director
from reporting to the appropriate committees of Congress on the
.uses of funds expended on his certificate.
(c) The Director is authorized to establish a contingency
fund for uses not anticipated at the 'time of budget submission
Congress. However,. funds, from this contingency fund maybe
expended .only with the approval of the Office of Management and'
Budget after notification to the appropriate committees
of Congress.
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 _MMOI
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Section 11. Annual Review and Report
There is established a National Intelligence Authority
The Committee is to be composed of nine members serving
:idert and the appropriate committees of the Congress.
Review Board to conduct an annual comprehensive-review and
evaluation of the work of the NIA and to report to the Pres-
they:result in serious shortcoming in the production of
staggered terms, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate' The Board is to be provided with
staff, and the members of the Board are to'be pazticularly
qualified by virtue of their background, education, training
and experience to evaluate the work of the NIA. Their pur-
pose is to provide. continuing outside evaluation of intelli-
gence work, to identify problems which inevitably will
develop within-the-intelligence-community, and *to provide
a mechanism by -which those problems can.be reviewed before
useful intelligence.
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Section 12. Congressional Committee reports'
(a) The committees of Congress having jurisdiction-
reports to their respective Houses on the national intelli--
over matters relating to the NIA shall make. regular periodic
?gence activities of the NIA, and shall promptly call to the
attention of their respective Houses or to any other?appro-
priate committee any matter relating to intelligence
a mechanism whereby the intelligence community can report on
related to the Select Committee on Intelligence. It provides
reports, the committees are to take steps to protect. their
confidentiality when necessary to protect the national
security interests of.the United States.
This provision parallels a provision of S.'.Res. 400
activities which requires their attention. In making these
? a regular basis to one committee' on all of its-activities,
.and that committee when necessary can act as a conduit for
information of'interest to. other committees. This provision
is not meant to absolve the executive branch from reporting
to other committees'with respect to intelligence information
that committee, such as assessments of Soviet military
on a regular basis on matters within the jurisdiction. of
intelligence agencies report to the Armed Services Committee
clearly relevant to their jurisdictions --- for example, the
strength, and the process by which those assessments
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(b) This is a housekeeping provision pro--k;idirg that
the.provisions.of subsection (a) related to committees`
reports are enacted.as.an exercise of the rulemaking power
of the Senate and House of Representatives, and may be
amended by either House, as. far as relating to.that House,
the same as any other rule of that House.
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 Section 13. Annual Report of the Director'.
The DNI is required to submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an annual report of the activities
of the various entities of the NIA and of the intelligence-
activities of foreign countries. directed against the United
States. The-Director is further required to make an unclas-
sified.version-of-this report available to the public,
but he is not required to.make public intelligence sources
and methods.,
intelligence sources and' methods . It is intended,. however,
..This section recognizes that the intelligence community,
along with other agencies of the United States Government, must`
be held accountable to Congress and to the public. The amount
of detail to be provided in these reports is not specified,.
lthough it is noted that the public report need not include
that reports to congressional `committees ' krill contain" all infor--
given legitimate requirements to protect the national security.
oration required by'those committees to carry out their duties,
and that the.public report should be as detailed as possible,
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OLC 77-1026
17 March 1977
TMr-L-7, f!-1TJ ANTTIU MT FOR Director of Central Tni-(.11ige.nrn 40002
VIA:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
E. Henry Knoche
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
Comments on SSCI Staff Draft Bill
1. Attached are comments on the ramifications of the
25 January 1977 SSCI staff draft proposal for a National Intelligence
Authority. The comments augment and are supplemental to those
submitted to you by F I
2. In light of the incompleteness and ambiguity of the bill
from the standpoint of concept, management and control, and entities,
our comments are directed to some of the more salient issues it raises.
3. disagrees with the comment on the top of
page 6 that the draft bill does not grant line authority over those elements
of the Intelligence Community which remain within their parent organiza-
tion. Since others interpret the provisions of the bill differently, this is
further evidence of the ambiguity in the language of the draft bill.
4. The threshold issue in dealing with the Committee on this
matter is that PRM 11 is the most sensible approach to a subject as
complex as this and that the hand of the Executive Branch should not
be forced by a proposal as incomplete as the present text and prior
to assurance that the text receives the thorough review such legislation
merits.
,eorge L. Ca y
Attachment
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 :rte
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
: George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel
ID / DCI /IC
1. Attached are comments on the ramifications of the
25 January 1977 SSCI staff draft proposal for a National Intelligence
Authority. The comments augment and are supplemental to those
submitted to you by
2. In light of the incompleteness and ambiguity of the bill
from the standpoint of concept, management and control, and entities,
our comments are directed to some of the more salient issues it raises.
3. The threshold issue in dealing with the Committee on this
matter is that PRM 11 is the most sensible approach to a subject
as complex as this and that the hand of the Executive Branch should
not be forced by a proposal as incomplete as the present text and prior
to assurance that the text receives the thorough review such legislation
merits.
4 eon e ary
This memo was redone to reflect
comments.
STAT
STAT
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