THE STRENGTH OF THE VIET CONG IRREGULARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001000030013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 22, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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22 August 1966
THE STRENGTH OF THE VLT CONG IRREGULARS
iu
A review of captured Communist documents available in Washington
strongly suggests that the long-used estimate of Viet Cong irregular
strength--100-120,000--is too low. Analysis of the documents suggests
the estimate should probably be at least doubled. If the estimated
strength of the irregulars is raised to a more realistic level, it
will help resolve some of the analytical problems which have arisen
in connection with estimates of Communist numerical strength. Most
itportant, perhaps, is that it would help explain why the southern
Counists have been able to field an increasingly large regular army
despite heavy casualties and a high desertion rate.
The evidence put forth in the following pages represents a review
of about 1 of the documents available in Washington. The case for a
higher estimate of irregulars could probably be strengthened slightly
by a further review of the remaining evidence available here. However,
a better tray to approach the problem would involve calling on MACV in
`z'ictnam for a new study of irregular strength in which they could use
the greater amount of material and expertise available in Vietnam.
Definitions
1. Irregulars are subordinate to the Communist apparatus in
villages and hamlets. There are three types:
a. Guerrillas, consisting of full-time squads and platoons,
not always operating in their villages or hamlets.
b. People's Self-Defense Forces (SDF, often called "militia"),
consisting of part-time paramilitary forces assigned to defend
hamlets and villages.
. c. Secret Self-Defense Forces (SSDF), which operate clandest-
inely in goverment-controlled areas.
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Present Intelligence Estimates
2. For over a year, MACV's Order of Battle has held 103,573 as
the number of Viet Cong irregulars. The estimate includes 34,315 guerrillas,
35,661 in the SDF, and 33,597 in the SSE'. Using these figures, the intelli-
gence community usually estimates that there are between 100,000 and
120,000 irregulars in the Viet Cong. MACV's 0B breaks down the irregulars
by province, as well as by type.
Viet Conn Goals
3. I-7e know from Communist documents that the insurgents have been
trying to build an irregular force over 200,000 strong. A report issued
by the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), apparently in the spring
of 1965, states that efforts were then being made "to increase the
militia-guerrilla strength in the entire SVN to 250,000-300,000 men."
The context of document suggests the Viet Cong hoped the goal would be
reached during 1965. The report indicated that the recruitment of
guerrillas and militiamen during the first quarter of the year had met
t'be "development criteria" set by COSVN.
4. In promulgating irregular force requirements to lower echelons,
OS\TN seems to have asked for more recruits than it thought it could
Two similar documents dated August 1965 picked up in Quang Nam
2'hu Yen Provinces outlined COVN's requirements. According to the
'"eats, "the participation of the people" was required as follows:
-- Guerrillas, 5% of the people in the lowlands and 10% of the
people in the highlands.
-- Self Defense, 15% of the people. (Here the documents disagree;
one says 25%.)
-- Women, to make up approximately one-third of the irregulars.
5. It is unclear exactly who the "people" are to which the above
percentages apply. Presumably, the Viet Cong mean "people in Viet
Cong-controlled areas." The US intelligence community currently
estimates there are from 3-5 million people in these areas, but the
Viet Cong themselves -- presumably using their own criteria -- stated
in a document dated 30 November 1965 that they controlled ,6 million people
and that another 3 million lived in areas of "mixed control." It seems
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liLely also that in applying the percentages, the Viet Cong exclude
half the women (since women are to make up only one-third of the
irregulars), and all but a few children. In any case, Viet Cong
irregular recruitment goals, as promulgated, would appear to be well
over 300,000.
l:egul.ar Strength
6. Available evidence suggests that MACV's overall estimate of
Viet Cone irregular strength is too low, and that the Communists have
reached and perhaps surpassed minimum goals for the recruitment of
__ gulars set by COSVN in early 1965.
7. In three provinces one can compare MACV's irregular strength
estimates with strengths listed in Viet Cong documents. They are:
a. Binh Dinh Province.
spring of 1966, the irregular strength for Binh Dinh was listed
as 15,084 guerrillas (including 2,990 women), 34,441 people
:(including 6,147 women) in the SDF, and 719 people in the SSDF,
totalling 50,244 irregulars.* MACV's OB lists Binh Dinh as
having 1,446 guerrillas, 1,056 people in the SDF, and 2,166 in
the SSDF, totalling 4,668 irregulars. MACV's estimate is 9%
of the figure in the document.
25X1
b. Phu Yen Province. 25X1
1 965., the irregular strength In u Yen was listed as 3.,304
guerrillas (including 1,226 women), 17,009 people (including
9,334 women) in the SDF, and 94 women in the SSDF, totalling
20,407. MACV's OB lists 916 guerrillas, 2,039 in the SDF, and
255 in the SSDF, totalling 3,210 in Phu Yen. MACV's estimate
is 16% of the figure listed in the document.
C. Phuoc Long. Province. 25X1
the irregular strength for Phuoc Long was listed as 17 guerrillas,
and 141 in the SDF, totalling 315 irregulars. MACV's OB list
Phuoc Long as having 387 guerrillas, 40 in the SDP and 106 in the
SSDF. MACV's estimate is in the right ball park.
The Strength figures are consistent with those found in other documents
captured in Binh Dinh in 1966.
- The document indicated that most people recruited in the province were
being placed in regular, rather than irregular, units.
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8. A preliminary survey of MACV estimates of irregular strength
in ether provinces suggests that many are too low. The OB lists Long
.", province as having only 160 irregulars, in spite of there having
b-- over 300 irregular defectors in Long An last year.xxx A combination
of factors--including the level of Viet Cong activity, the number of
people controlled by the Viet Cong in the province, and the relatively
shall number of irregulars listed in the OB -- suggest that irregular
.strengths have been substantially underestimated in Bien Hoa, An Xuyen,
Chuong Thion, Quang Tin and Quang Nam. Probably several other
provinces should be on the list as well.
Conscciuences
9. A raising of the-estimated total of irregulars in the Viet Cong
L have a number of important ramifications for an analysis of the
position in South Vietnam.
10. The most important would be that it would provide an explana-
w~rs for the Viet Cong's ability to increase its regular force strength
cscopite heavy casualties and a high desertion rate. Documents
the irregulars for replacements, and in order to create new units.
11. Secondly, other intelligence estimates would have to be
reviewed. Among the subjects needing review would be Viet Cong
allocation of manpower, and the strength of the Communist Party in
South Vietnam.
12. Finally, a realistic appraisal of irregular strength would
analysts to estimate more accurately than they can now how many
trained soldiers the Viet Cong have. With a reasonably solid statistical
bace, a more reliable estimate of the relative strength of the guerrillas
and the militia could be made. The difference between these two types is
ccial. A Viet Cong guerrilla is often an experienced and well-armed
woidier. Militiamen of the SDF are frequently unarmed, inadequately
trained, and poorly led. In this regard, it should be noted that the
1..CV OB estimates that the ratio of guerrillas to SD 'to SSDF is approx-
imately 1:1:1. Captured documents indicate the ratio is about 20:60:1.
In March, 1966.,l
re thought there were at least 2.,000 guerrillas
in e province.
One estimate puts the Viet Cong regular desertion rate at 25 per
cent, that is, somewhat higher than ARVN's.
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