INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED UNDER NSC-159

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04915A000400040045-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: September 9, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For ase 2005/08/02 CIA-RDP78-0491540$A449A96
S EC R ET
TAB A
9 September 1953
Ni ='11ORM DUM FOR DIRER TOR OF CIMEAL INTELLIGENCE
S l'ECT: Intelligence Required under NSC-159
1. NSC-159 states that "the value of more complete Intelligence
(related to continental defense) would be so tremendous that no
restrictions on funds or manpower should be permitted to hamper
technological or covert avenues of approach". DCID ?4/2 has long
placed the highest priority on collection and production of intelligence
bearing on possible Soviet attack on the Continental United States.
The intelligence community and the highest policy levels of the govern-
mm have until now interpreted this as giving overriding Importance
to information on the Soviet atomic and thermonuclear program. Recently,
however, informed opinion has almost unanimously conceded that., once
the Soviets acquired an atomic weapon stockpile in the hundred.;, the
question of exact number omee academics
24 Now, the paramount threats facing those responsible for our
national security are, first, the Soviet ability to deliver an atomic
attack on targets in the Western Hemispheres and second, the soviet
capability to counter the U.S. retaliatory attack.
3. Conceding that the Soviets can cover m. os t of the United States
with existing aircraft on one-way missions, the key factor in the first
threat in their ability to navigate to and locate exactly the desired
targets versus our early warning and interception capability. In the
second threat, the crucial factor is the Soviet ability to locate and
effectively intercept our attacking aircraft. In the ultimate,; the
outcome in each case will hinge.,, to a large extent, upon the :-'iXengthe
of the opposing electronic systeUe, and they become the prime U.S.
intelligence problem.
NSA review(s) completed.
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 Approvdd For Itl ase 2005/08/02: CIA-RDP78-0491500400040045-7
SECRET
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6.
it is recomanended s
a. That the Intelligence Advisory Committee:
(1) Establish Soviet delivery capability as the
highest National Intelligence Objective.
(2) Establish Soviet air defense capability as the
second highest National Intelligence Objective,
b. That the National Security Council direct the Seci~:;ary
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence joint?y toe
(1) Study all means that can be employed to collecoa
Intelligence onThese objectives.
(2) Recommend to the .MSC the establishment of sup=;.:.
organization as trill insure the most efficient develo i ant
and utilization of such means and the optimum collation and
evaluation of all resultant data.
ROBERT ANOR , JR.
Deputy Director/Intel].igen c,.
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04915A000400040045-7