CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005000220001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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25 March 1960
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 March .1960
0 0
DAILY BRIEF
1. THE COMMUTIIST BLOC
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*Communist China - Nepal: The text of the Sino-Nepalese
economic aid agreement signed in Peiping on 21 March. and re-
leased to the press on 25 March indicates a substantial effort
to expand Chinese influence in the Himalayan kingdom. The
Chinese have granted Nepal $21,000,000 in additional aid; will
send technicians to help implement the program, and will .open
an embassy in Katmandu. The Chinese also signed an agree-
ment accepting Nepal's request that the 4"traditional" boundary
be used as a. basis for final border demarcation. Theestablish-
ment of a joint boundary commission undoubtedly will be cited
as a precedent by Chou En-lai in his April border talks with
25X1 Nehru. F7 I
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11. ASIA.-AFRICA
0
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Indonesia - Communist China: In a revival of the bitter ex-
changes between Djakarta and Peiping last fall over the Chinese
inIndonesia a Djakarta daily -which frequently reflects govern- 0/11M
W
N
Jcy has vehemently attacked Peiping radio for criticiz
ment pol
5
ing Indonesia's handling of Overseas Chinese repatriates. The
and
paper labeled recent Peiping radio attacks "an open insult"
"a big lie:' Djakarta apparently is using this means to answer
the 15 March letter from the Chinese foreign minister which ac-
ME
MIN
cused the Indonesians of persecuting Overseas Chinese and ob- "M
structing their repatriat on. F 25X1
Cambodia - South Vietnam: The recent trend toward im-
proved relations between Phnom Penh and Saigon appears to
A/My
have received a setback as the result of a formal Vietnamese
demand on 9 March that Cambodia renounce its sovereignty over
several disputed islands in the Gulf of Siam. Prime Minister
Sihanouk denounced the Vietnamese claim and declared that his
country would defend itself against invasion and would "not lack
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friends whose higher interest is to help us:' F
(Page 7) (Mp)
MEN
25 Mar 60 DAILY BRIEF ii
IN
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 j I =- IT m
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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Communist Influence in Cuba. . SNIE 85-60. 22 Mar 1960.
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Outlook in West Germany. NIE 23-60. 22 Mar 1960.
Soviet Attitude and. Tactics on the Berlin Problem. SNIE
100-5-60. 22 Mar 1960.
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 Sin -Ne a
or
97
The text of the Sino-Nepalese economic aid agreement
signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in Peiping
on 21 March and released to the press on. 25 March indicates
a substantial effort to expand Chinese influence in the Hima-
layan border kingdom. Peiping will give Katmandu an addi-
tional $21,000,000 in. economic aid during the next three years,
bringing total Chinese grant aid since 1956 to $33,600,000.
Chinese. Communist "experts and technicians" will be sent to
Nepal to help implement the aid program, and Nepalese will
receive technical training in China, Peiping, which for at
least a year., has been seeking permission. to open an embassy
in Katmandu, now has Prime Minister Koirala's agreement.
The Nepalese will establish an embassy in Peiping.
Katmandu probably gave its approval for a resident em-
bassy and the entry of Chinese construction technicians in
return for the increased financial aid. Nepalese officials have
been wary of any influx of bloc experts, however, and probably
will limit the admission of Chinese technicians to the minimum
necessary to carry out the projects involved.
The Chinese Communists also signed an agreement on 21
March accepting Nepal's request that the "traditional" boundary
be used as a basis for final border demarcation. A joint boun-
dary commission will set out. boundary markers and work out
exact border alignment in those areas where boundary lines
shown on Chinese and Nepalese maps do not coincide. In those
areas, "actual jurisdiction" over the ground will determine
which side gets the territory or, if there is disagreement as to
who currently has jurisdiction, the matter will be settled on
"the principles of mutual benefit and friendship." These clauses
leave Peiping room to prolong final demarcation, yet acknowledge
the Chinese position that jurisdiction is a significant factor in de-
termining ownership. The Chinese have repeatedly advanced this
contention to the Indians, and when Chou visits Nehru for border
talks in April he undoubtedly will cite the border commission and
jurisdiction aspects of the agreement with Nepal as a suitable
precedent for future agreement. with India.
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Koirala's main objective had been to secure Peiping's recog-
nition of the customary boundary following the Himayalan watershed
in order to forestall any border incidents and possible entanglement
in the Sino-Indian dispute. He probably feels that the border and
aid agreements consolidate Nepal's' neutral position and balance
.its relations with the major powers in, such a way as to gain max-
imum benefit from each. F77 I 25X1
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Indonesia Threatens Further Obstruction of Overseas
Chinese Repatriation
In an apparent revival of bitter Sino-Indonesian exchanges,
a Djakarta daily- -Suluh Indonesia, which frequently reflects
government policy--on 24 March vehemently attacked Radio
Peiping for alleging that Djakarta obstructs the repatriation
of Overseas Chinese and that Indonesian Foreign Minister
Subandrio does not keep his promises. The paper charged
that Peiping radio propaganda was "an open insult," "a big
lie," and was "aimed at undermining Indonesia's prestige a-
broad." The daily concluded that "such base propaganda"
may cause "unnecessary delays and obstructions that could
have been avoided."
Peiping's news agency has noted the "seemingly official
tone" of the Suluh Indonesia editorial. The Indpnesian Gov-
ernment apparently is using this means to answer the letter
of 15 March to Subandrio from the Chinese foreign minister
accusing the Indonesians of persecuting Overseas Chinese
and demanding a speedy agreement on repatriation. Radio
Peiping, which carried the letter and which has continued
to conduct a querulous campaign on Indonesia's "uncoopera-
tive" attitude, also broadcast a People's Daily editorial of
18 March which charged that the "wanton persecution" of
Chinese in Indonesia had reached 'Yerocious proportions."
Paralleling Suluh Indonesia's blast, however, the army
commander in Central Java--where most of the action to re-
settle Chinese is now taking place.-ordered provincial offi-
cials to implement orders pertaining to the Chinese "expedi-
tiously and in an orderly way." He appealed to the Chinese
not to exaggerate their problems, as any excesses could
create tension between Indonesia and friendly countries.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Cambodian - South Vietnamese Relations Strained by
Territorial Claims
The recent trend toward improved relations between
Cambodia and South Vietnam threatens to be reversed by
Saigon's renewed claim to several small offshore islands in
the Gulf of Siam presently under Cambodian control. Phnom
Penh, has reacted strongly to a note of 9 March demanding '.
that-Cambodia renounce its rights of sovereignty over Ile de
la Baie, Ile du Milieu, Ile a 1'Eau, Ile du Pic, and the Iles
des Pirates, all lying in an arc between the Cambodian - South
Vietnamese shoreline and the large island of Phu .Quoc, which
is under Vietnamese control. Disputes between the two coun-
tries over ownership'of these islands, which were arbitrarily
attached to Cambodia for administrative purposes under
French colonial rule in 1939, have flared intermittently in
recent years.
Cambodian Foreign Minister Son Sann, denying South
Vietnam's right even to Phu Quoc, has stigmatized Saigon's
note as "revealing the annexationist aims of Vietnam"; Prime
Minister Sihanouk has called it another example of the "good
will" illustrated in Thai occupation of a disputed border monas-
tery and the Vietnamese "invasion" of Stung Treng Province
in 1958.
. Cambodia has maintained small garrisons on these islands
since 1958, and Sihanouk has announcd. Cambodia will fight if
necessary to retain them. In a recent speech he clearly im-
plied he would turn to Peiping for assistance if hard pressed.
The furor over the Vietnamese note, allegedly intended
only to reiterate Vietnamese claims 'for the record" before the
Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva, may prevent or make
useless the impending visit to Phnom Penh by a South Viet-
namese ministerial delegation headed by Vice President Tho
for the purpose of ironing out long-standing problems be-
tween the two countries.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific. Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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