REMARKS PREPARED BY LEWIS L. STRAUSS, CHAIRMAN U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION FOR DELIVERY TO JOINT U.S.-CANADA CIVIL DEFENSE COMMITTEE, BATTLE CREEK, MICHIGAN, OCT. 19, 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04718A002000420040-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: October 19, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Washington 25, D. C.
Tel. ST 3-8000 FOR RELEASE AT 2:00 P.M. (EDT)
Ext. 307 FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1956
Remarks Prepared by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
for delivery to
Joint U.S.-Canada Civil Defense Committee
Battle Creek, Michigan, Oct. 1.9, 1956
It is a pleasure to be here today and to partic-
ipate in this discussion of the planning and the problems
of civil defense. It is a particular pleasure since it
affords me an opportunity to pay my sincere respect to
the men and women of our Civil Defense organization --
at all levels -- for the public-spirited work they are
doing under very considerable difficulties. Not the
least of these difficulties and no doubt the most
discouraging -- is the apparent apathy with which theirl
efforts are received by large segments of the public.
need not tell you that the organization is composed of
devoted, patriotic citizens performing one of the most
essential tasks confronting our nation. Many of them
work tirelessly, without pay, long hours after their
regular labors are done, and with few thanks from their
fellow-citizens. I would respectfully salute you all,
from the neighborhood wardens to the officials of the
national headquarters.
(more)
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : IA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
I am happy also to be here today with our friends
from Canada with whom we, in the Atomic Energy Commission,
enjoy an enduring and highly important cooperation for the
defense of our common security and freedom. That friend-
shipand joint effort, whether it finds us united in time
of peril or working together for peaceful progress, is one
of the most reliable of all the bulwarks of the free world.
It is an alliance, not of politics and diplomacy, but of
the hand and the heart. It rests, not so much upon
covenants and treaties, as upon the common ideals and the
moral identity of two friendly neighbors.
I shall not attempt to discuss with you this
afternoon any of the technical characteristics of the
effects of nuclear weapons, or the extent of the calamity
which would befall exposed populations if -- God forbid --
such weapons should ever be used in all-out warfare. I
am not a scientist, and I would not presume therefore to
present a technical treatise. I recognize among those
on your program many specialists who are qualified to
speak on those matters.
However, there is one aspect of this general
subject of Civil Defense which I should like to mention,
since it involves a problem common to all our efforts.
It is a problem which, on occasion, the Atomic Energy
Commission has encountered in its program of promoting
the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I know, too, that
it also lies at the root of many of the difficulties
which impede your efforts to give the public an under-
standing of the nature of nuclear war and what the
effects of such a war might be upon civilian populations.
It can probably be best and briefly described
as an educational problem.
Nuclear energy -- within the brief span of
eleven years, commencing as a secret and remote subject --
(more)
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
has become one of intimate concern to every individual.
It has an ever-widening influence on our daily living,
our well-being -- perhaps even on. our destiny. With
each passing day, the energy that is bound up in the
invisible nucleus of the atom comes to be a more potent
forced in our environment. The discovery of nuclear
energy, like every invention of man's ingenuity, has
brow ht to us both promises and problems. Thus, the
words "nuclear energy" have many interpretations. As
they bring to mind the terrifying spectre of a war of
exploding A-bombs and H-bombs, they are horrible words.
Yet those same words, used to describe the many uses
of the atom for man's peaceful progress -- in medicine,
agriculture, biology, industry and the production of
electric power -- bear no relation of association to the
uncontrolled fury of the atom as it might be employed
in war. And finally, the words "nuclear energy" as they
relate to the controlled testing of nuclear weapons so
that'we may be assured of the means of defending our-
selves, ought not to be confused with the unrestrained
use of large numbers of such weapons in actual warfare.
Despite all efforts to the contrary, there is
still confusion in the minds of many people as to the
differing and even contradictory meanings of the words
"nuclear energy".
I am sure that all of you have encountered,
in your civil defense work, a rather widespread mis-
understanding of the significance of such words as
"fall : out" and "radioactivity." There is a disposition
among some persons to think of what might happen in
event of a nuclear attack upon us in terms of what
does ''happen when we test nuclear weapons under strictly
controlled conditions affording maximum safety. There
also is lack of understanding as to the true meaning
of such phrases as "permissible dose levels" as applied
to peacetime activities in the field of atomic energy.
There is a tendency to regard these peacetime safety
standards as being the limits for survival in event of
actual attack. Sensational and oftentimes irresponsible
articles have no doubt contributed to this confusion.
(more)
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
For example, the public reads lurid pieces about
biological hazards from radiation following tests, and is
led to-believe that the greatest hazard that we face in the
world today is an estimated or supposed danger to future
generations, resulting from exposure to radioactivity.
Rarely, if ever, do these articles compare such problematical
dangers to the other hazards of living and the menaces to
survival in this modern world.
Exposure to radioactivity, as a vague, unproven
danger to generations yet unborn, must be weighed against
the more immediate and infinitely greater dangers of de-
featand perhaps of obliteration at the hands of an enemy
who possesses nuclear weapons of mass destruction and who
might} have no compunction about using such weapons if
he tkought we were too weak to defend ourselves and retaliate
in kind.
As a peace-loving people, and as members of the
worl community of peoples, we recognize clearly that
scie ce has raced ahead of manns readiness to deal with
all he complexities of what science has created. With
the dvent of nuclear weapons, war has ceased to offer a
solu ion for disputes among nations. War has become,
not only out-of-date, but senseless. That is why President
Eisenhower has dedicated himself with all his heart and
mind to seeking agreement among the nations on a system
that will lift from mankind the twin burdens of fear and
armament. He has assumed leadership among the leaders
of the world in pointing the way toward that goal. Despite
the many difficulties and frustrations, he p*r_erveres in
working for peace.' He says he means to continua to do so.
Until a system of comprehensive disarmament is
achieved -- based on something more relia.blehan dramatic
gestures and mere promises made by nations which have re-
peatedly violated their solemn commitments s- our national
sure vat and the security of. our homes requires that we
have-- in being -- the means of defending ourselves
against sudden nuclear attack. There is no other prudent
course. Without the ability to defend otarselves, we
could not hope to deter an enemy from making war upon us,
or to retaliate effectively and decisively once we were
(more)
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A002000420040-1
under attack And without that strength, we would have to
speak in a small and deferential voice in our efforts to
build the foundations of a durable peace. Only so long as
we are strong can we negotiate; the weak can only submit.
Until others in the world come to their senses,
and! join with us in banishing the awful spectre of nuclear
war, we must be strong; we must have weapons fully as modern
and; as effect eve -- if possible more effective -- than the
weapons which we know to be in possession of others who
would destroy our way of life. At the same time, we must
do all in our power to ensure the survival of the largest
possible numbers of our population if war should be forced
upgn us. A major part of this latter effort is, of course,
the responsibility of you who are engaged in civil defense.
Our civil defense efforts, as I mentioned a
moment ago, have been faced with many difficult problems.
These problems will continue and no doubt .increase.
As other nations develop and produce nuclear
weapons of still greater efficiency and more destructive
capabilities, our current planning for civil defense
continuously requires revision lest it become outmoded.
If we assume that an enemy can deliver an appreciable
fraction of the weapons which we believe he can produce,
the delivered cost of any one of those weapons may be
almost insignificant compared with its potential damage.
Also, an enemy is probably in a position to increase
his destructive power of attack faster than we can hope
to provide new and better civil defense measures to
combat that increase. Civil defense, however efficiently
organized it may be, simply cannot expect to keep ahead
of the enemy9 s growing stockpile of more destructive,
more diversified and presumably more effective nuclear
weapons. This is not a reassuring thought, I am deeply
aware of that. But unless we are willing to be realists,
our planning will be useless. Our people must not only
be well-informed, but we must -- as a nation - face the
facts.
There are those who, after hearing of the
probable results of a nuclear attack, throw up their
(more)
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A002000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A002000420040-1
hands and groan., "Oh, what's the use." The cost of pro-
viding bomb shelters adequate for the protection of all
ourcity dwellers against high-yield nuclear weapons
would be staggering. Attempted mass evacuation under
les than ideal circumstances might prove to be disas-
tros in actual war. The dispersal of populations, be-
sides being almost prohibitive in cost, might be found
to ffer no additional protection against radioactive
fal out.
Yet the prospects of survival., grim though
the may be, are not so discouraging as they may appear.
The e are many things which can be done, and are being
don under the guidance of the Federal Civil Defense
Adm nistration, to minimize casualties and the disruption
of civilian services in the event of nuclear attack.
Survival in such an unhappy eventuality would
de end largely on what prior precautions had been taken
by individuals and families for teiT orn safety, in
li e with the recommendations of the civil defense
authorities. This, I believe, is a point so important
tht you cannot over-stress it to the American people.
I tress "prior precautions" because post-attack mead-
su es may be too late.
The Government, regardless of the extent of
it planning or of how many billions of dollars it
mi ht spend on civil defense, cannot assume responsi-
bi. ity for the safety of its individual citizens after
th. ~ bombs or missiles have started fallings At that
go nt, survival will depend largely on how well. we
have learned the lessons of civil defense, as ?i.ndi-
vi4uals and families -- to what extent we have prepared
home shelters, stocked emergency supplies and acquainted
ourselves with decontamination procedures. It will de-
pend also on how well we understand the problems of
t e lingering dangers of fallout. If a nuclear attack
sIould be made upon us, the decision of life or death --
far the individual -- may have long since been made by
him, in indifference or in healthy solicitude.
(more)
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A002000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
In order to provide our people with the guidance
and instruction which may later save their lives, the civil
defe se authorities need constant access to new and up-to-
date information about, the effects of nuclear weapons of
all types and sizes o This data relating to blast, heat and
radiation effects must be interpreted and translated in
term of survival requirements.
Thus, it can be seen that civil defense cannot
be a static program. Its requirements are constantly
chan i.ng. As new and improved weapons are added to the
worl t s nuclear arsenals, new information, essential to our
safely is acquired.
The only source of this data so necessary to civil
defese planning is the actual testing of nuclear weapons.
We cannot, of course, obtain any reliable, first-hand
information as to the effects of enemy weapons -- those
particular weapons which, in the event of war, would be
directed against our homes and cities. Soviet Russia
conducts her nuclear tests in secrecy and in callous
disregard for world opinion. Meanwhile, she has for
year' laid down a world-wide propaganda barrage against
our tests. The barrage has had some effect too.
The Communists -~ in sharp contrast to our
policy and our practice refuse to divulge any informa-
tion from their tests which might help other nations in
protecting 6_i3 r people against the horrors of nuclear
warn If they do this for their satellites, it is a
program conducted in secret.
Thus, it becomes apparent that the survival
of our own people and the civilian populations of the
entire free world largely depends, from the civil de-
fense viewpoint, on information which is derived from
our own car?efuiiy-controlled nuclear tests.
Without such tests -- in the existing world
climate, and in the absence of disarmament based on
proper safeguards -- progress in civil defense plan-
ning throughout the free world would be dangerously
curtailed, if not brought to a standstill. We would
Approved For Release 2005/08/0c TA-)RDP78-04718A002000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A002000420040-1
teadily become more and more vulnerable to surprise
hack; we would soon be depending upon antiquated
methods of protecting ourselves. Our defenses would
deteriorate -- both in terms of civil defense, and in
the weapons which we need to repel any nuclear aggres-
sion.
Our weapons tests are not conducted in order
tiat we may develop and stockpile weapons of ever greater
destructive force. As President Eisenhower has stated,
w do not test merely to make larger and yet ever larger
w apons.
Our tests are equally for the purpose of
rengthening our defenses against nuclear attack by
hers.
Our most recent test series at the Eniwetok
Pry ving Grounds in the remote Pacific -- called Operation
Rewing -- placed heavy stress on the development of
do ensive weapons, including nuclear warheads for missiles
wh ch would be used against enemy attacks by land, sea or
ai . The largest weapon tested in this series was sub-
st ntially smaller in yield than the maximum test of the
pr vious 1954. series.
As a result of the recent Pacific tests we now
kn w that we can produce weapons of megaton-range with a
gr atly reduced amount of radioactive fallout for a given
re ease of explosive energy. In other words, we have be-
gun to make weapons which reduce widespread fallout to a
minimum, while their destructive effect is concentrated
against the military objective. We are paying close
att ntion to this matter of fallout, and it is only
thr:ugh the testing of high-yield weapons that we can
continue these efforts.
As for the information which is so essential
to he organization of up-to-date civil defense, such
dat can be obtained only from the testing of high-yield
nuclear weapons. There is no other way. You cannot
test small explosives against model structures and
reliably extrapolate to large explosions and full scale
(more)
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A002000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
-9-
buildings and installations. We would suppose that, in
the event of war, our cities would be attacked -- not with
A-bombs of relatively small energy yield -- but with thermo-
nuclear weapons in the megaton range. If we are to have
any reliable knowledge of the effects of such large weapons
on which to base our plans for survival, that knowledge
can come only from our own test program.
It is for this reason that the Atomic Energy
Commission works in close cooperation with the Federal
Civil Defense Administration; why, in fact, the FCDA
is a integral part of our test organization and has been
given an important voice in the conduct of all tests.
The test series held in the early part of 1955
at the Commission's Nevada Proving Ground was largely
devoted to providing information needed by civil defense.
The final reports on the civil effects of that series are
now being issued, and a great body of the information is
available, not only to civil defense authorities, but to
the general public. Since 1950, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sionand the Department of Defense have been providing
such information and it has become basic to our civilian
defense, planning. You may be interested to know that the
handbook "The Effects of Atomic Weapons" which was issued
in June, 1950, is being revised to include the most up-
to-date knowledge -- particularly as it relates to the
effects of high-yield thermonuclear weapons. We hope
that it will be available early this coming year.
At this year's REDWING test series in the Pacific,
the Federal Civil Defense Administration was represented
on the staff of the Joint Task Force Command throughout
that operation. The FCDA was kept fully and currently
informed.
In addition, I had the pleasure -- on behalf
of the Commission and the Department of Defense -- of
inviting 17 special representatives of the FCDA to visit
the Eniwetok Proving Grounds where they observed a couple
of the detonations.
(more)
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
a- 10 -
The Atomic Energy Commission also has expanded
its scientific and technical assistance by the addition
of consultant services to assist in civil defense matters.
For example, the health and safety laboratories of our
New York headquarters are helping the FCDA to develop
specifications and to obtain equipment for aerial monitoring
of radiation. The feasibility of this technique is a
direct outgrowth of information gained from the 1955
weapons tests in Nevada.
Within the continental United States, there has
been established a network of 39 radiation monitoring
stations, operated by the AEC and the Public Health
Service, and some 70 additional'monitoring stations are
located in other areas around the world. These form an
essential part of our civil defense organization.
As I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks,
the world greatly fears a nuclear war; people are terrified
at the thought of the widespread contamination of the air
and soil by radioactivity if nuclear war should be in-
flicted upon us. I do not seek to minimize those horrors
of nuclear war; there is every reason to regard them with
dread.
Yet we must not confuse the eventuality of
radioactive fallout resulting from the wholesale use of
such weapons in war, with the conditions that exist under
carefully-controlled testing, conducted far from any
civilian centers of population.
The most distinguished scientific body in 'the
United States -- the National Academy of Sciences --
recently completed an exhaustive study of the biological
effect of fallout from all weapons tests, everywhere in
the world.
It found (and IQm quoting directly from its
report now): "Thus far the biological damage from peace-
time activities (including the testing of atomic weapons)
has been essentially negligible."
The National Academy's report went on to state.
"Fallout from weapons testing has so far led to considerably
(more)
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1
- 11 -
less -irradiation of the population than have the medical
uses,; and has therefore been less detrimental."
And finally, the National Academy reported that
radiation exposure fm all tests to date, and from future
tests at the same rate as in the past, would be a small
fraction of the exposure one receives in daily living.
What it comes down to is simply this:
Our testing program is not ""poisoning" the
atmosphere. Soviet propagandists have been spreading that
"scare'" for months, while conveniently neglecting to men-
tion,'their own secret tests.
Nuclear testing, at the present rate, may safely
be c+antinued for as far as one can see ahead. This is the
conclusion reached by our foremost and most reliable
scientists.
To remain free, we must have the means of de-
fen ing ourselves against surprise attack, and we must
kno how best to protect the lives of our civilians. To
do his, we must develop modern weapons which are at
lea t as powerful as those in possession of those who
threaten us.
the
Only through our obvious strength can we deter
recklessness of others.
Until such time as there exists an effective
int rnational agreement safeguarded by adequate inspec-
tio to limit or control armaments, the United States
has no safe course but to maintain the most modern and
efficient military strength in the interests of peace.
The survival of our people -- and the work of
yob who are charged with protecting the lives of our
pe ple -- demands such prudence.
-30-
101556
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718AO02000420040-1