CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004900380001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 16, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002O'PCI RE75A004900380001-6
25X1 X
;/
16 February 1960 ;40,
25X1
/ Copy No. /
X,
X,
X
X
TELL16E- CE
X,
X
X
/
/ ST4iE5 Of ~~ F
/
/ 25X1
State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
 A proved For F~-Jase 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO97 0 900380001-6
16 FEBRUARY 1960 Z,
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow shows concern that Qasim has
not "licensed" orthodox Iraqi Commu-
nist party.
Nehru's invitation to Chou En-lai to in-
formal meeting on border dispute, rep-
resenting shift in earlier position, will
be viewed by Peiping as concession. 2Q
Indonesian official characterizes rela-
tions between Communist China and Indo-
nesia as "subsurface political and eco-
nomic warfare:'
France's nuclear test gives new impetus
to anti-French feeling in independent
African states.
25X1
III. THE WEST
Q Cyprus --Makarios may be using press
"leaks" in obvious effort to embarrass
British and force further concessions on
base issue.
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO04900380001-6
 ,r Approved Fo Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
16 February 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Iraq: Extensive publicity by the Soviet press and
radio for the "platform" of the "orthodox" Communist party
of Iraq (CPI) indicates Moscow's concern over Qasim's recent
efforts to curb the CPI by recognizing a Communist splinter
faction and forcing the CPI to resubmit its application to be-
come a legal party. The CPI platform calls for formation of
a "unified front;" implementation of agricultural reform, lim-
itation of foreign oil concessions to their present areas, and
an increase in oil royalties for Baghdad. Moscow nonetheless
is continuing its efforts to expand ties with the Qasim regime,
as exemplified by the announcement on 10 February that the
USSR is willing to help Iraq by building a large hydroelectric
U
25X1
1/11/111
i
0
dam and several water control proiects in the TiLyris -Euphrates
basin.
E
25X1
25X1
~~~
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
 Approved 1or Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A 04900380001-6 25X1
Indonesia - Communist China: An Indonesian Foreign
Ministry official has characterized relations between Com-
munist China and Indonesia as "continuing subsurface polit-
ical and economic warfare." He said Djakarta will not relent
in its domestic anti-Chinese program and claimed that Pei-
ping, in retaliation, is doing its utmost to aggravate Indo-
nesia's economic difficulties. In addition, a Djakarta news-
paper alleges that Chinese citizens departing Indonesia are
using the Chinese Communist Embassy as a "warehouse"
for deposit of their goods to circumvent export controls and
also are said to be turning over their property deeds: to: the
embassy. Over 1,300 Chinese affected by the ban on alien
traders reportedly left Indonesia over the week end on a
chartered Dutch ship.
African Reaction to French Nuclear Test: France's suc-
cessful nuclear test in the Sahara has given new impetus to
anti-French feeling latent in most independent African states. 25X1
Ghana, which has long exploited the test issue as part of its
drive for leadership of the African bloc, is reported pressing
Guinea and Liberia to agree to a severance of relations with
France and may take such action regardless of the attitude of
Conakry and Monrovia. The UAR, which may have influenced
Accra's decision to freeze French assets in Ghana, also ap-
pears to be urging other African governments to take strong
retaliatory measures. Morocco and Tunisia can be expected
to exploit the test to bolster their respective campaigns for the
early evacuation of French forces. 25X1
III. THE WEST
Cyrus: EArchbishop Makarios may be using optimistic
press "leaks" about negotiations in an attempt to make it awk-
ward for London to remain adamant over further concessions on
the size of the future British military bases on the island. The
Turkish Government, meanwhile, feels that Britain should make
16 Feb 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
 OF
25X1
Cno further concessiohs'on bases and appears intent on pre-
venting Turkish Cypriots from aiding Aftkarios in future
negotiations on this issue. A public split between Greek
and Turkish Cypriot leaders at this time could have serious
long-range effects on inter-communal relationsf-
16 Feb 60 DAILY BRIEF
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO04900380001-6
 Approved For
Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO049
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Sino-Indian Border Dispute
Prime Minister Nehru's suggestion that Chou En-lai meet
with him informally in New Delhi during the second half of
March
mar s a signs scan previous insistence on certain preconditions to such talks.
While stating that a meeting "might be helpful;' however,
Nehru reasserted that formal negotiations on a border settle-
ment were "not possible" on the basis of China's contention
that the entire border is undelimited. This qualification prob-
ably was intended to preserve the Indian bargaining position
and at the same time make it clear that any progress toward
substantive negotiations would be up to the Chinese. Despite
Nehru's rejection of Peiping's premise, a meeting with Chou
would provide an opportunity to explore informally some com-
promise formula. There have been indications that New Delhi
might eventually consider ceding some territory now occupied
by the Chinese in the Ladakh area of Kashmir in return for a
guarantee of the McMahon line in Assam.
New Delhi's noted
reierae a e inaimr'
vernmen is prepared only to discuss particular places in
dispute along the Sino-Indian frontier and to make minor ad-
justments where it is agreed they are necessary.
For several months, the Chinese have called for a Nehru-
Chou meeting to settle "some principles of the boundary ques-
tion." Nehru's willingness to meet Chou without insisting, as
he has in the past, that Chinese troops first be withdrawn from
all Indian-claimed territory probably will be viewed by Peiping
as a concession. Although Chou may express a preference for
meeting in a third country, earlier he had suggested Burma, the
Chinese probably will agree to a spring meetin believing Nehru
can be maneuvered into some compromise.
16 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
 Sine-Indone
App?oved Fa e 1 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
An Indonesian Foreign Ministry official on 13 February
characterized present Sino-Indonesian relations as a "con-
tinuation of subsurface political and economic warfare." He
said Djakarta would not abandon its domestic anti-Chinese
program and that Peiping, in retaliation, was doing its ut-
most to intensify Indonesia's economic difficulties.
The Indonesian official also stated that the Chinese Em-
bassy obviously would attempt to ship through diplomatic
channels privately owned goods of Chinese who are leaving
Indonesia. Suluh Indonesia, a progovernment daily, reported
on 10 February that the Chinese Communist Embassy and
Consulate have been converted into a "warehouse" where
Overseas Chinese who are returning to mainland China are
depositing goods which they are not permitted to take out of
Indonesia. departing Chinese are
turning over property deeds to the Chinese Embassy. Should
the embassy seek to protect this property from confiscation,
the matter would become a government-to-government problem
rather than one involving the Indonesian Government and for-
eign citizens.
The reaction of Overseas Chinese to Djakarta's anti-Chinese
campaign is contributing markedly to Indonesia's problem of spi-
raling inflation. The flight of local Chinese capital, principally
to Hong Kong, and the purchase of large quantities of commodi-
ties by departing Chinese have accelerated rupiah depreciation
during the past six weeks. The Indonesian Government, faced
with serious economic and political internal difficulties, can be
expected not only to persist in its program of "economic nation-
alism" but also to blame most of its economic troubles on the lo-
cal Chinese and on Peiping.
25X1
25X1
The Chinese lead-
ers oresee a long period of strains with Djakarta and have re-
cently indicated that there will be "ups and downs" in Sino-
Indonesian relations on the matter of the Overseas Chinese.
They are seeking to avoid, however, the angry exchanges of
late 1959 and are now careful to use Hong Kong newspapers--
rather than the mainland press or radio--to launch any direct
criticism of Indonesian mistreatment of Ch;nPgp -t
25X1
25X1
25X1
16 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 2
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
 Approved For el Jease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 00380001-6
Saharan Nuclear Test Intensifies Anti-French Feeling in Africa
France's nuclear test in the Sahara on 13 February has given
new impetus to anti-French feeling latent in varying degrees in
most independent African states. Intergovernmental talks on pos-
sible joint retaliatory measures have apparently already been held
in Accra and may soon take place at the United Nations as well.
Ghana, which has long exploited the test issue as part of its
campaign for leadership of the African bloc, announced on 13 Feb-
ruary that, "as a first step," it was freezing the assets of French
companies operating in Ghana- -unofficially valued at approx-
imately $14,000,000- -until the effects of the French testing pro-
gram on Ghana's population become known. Prime Minister
Nkrumah's action followed shortly after the UAR ambassador in
Accra was observed visiting the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry and
may have been patterned after Cairo's similar move at the time
of the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. Fin addition, Accra has report-
edly pressed Liberia and Guinea, at tripartite talks now going on
in Accra, to agree to a coordinated move to break diplomatic rela-
tions with France. The American ambassador in Accra believes
Nkrumah may at some point take such action regardless of the
attitude of Monrovia and Conakry
The UAR, meanwhile, is reported to have instructed its
delegation in New York to seek "unified action" in the UN by the
African bloc, which last fall successfully promoted a General
Assembly resolution calling on France to forego the Saharan
tests. Appeals for a severance of relations with France being
disseminated by Nasir's Afro-Asian "solidarity" organization
suggest that Cairo may also be paralleling Nkrumah's efforts
along this line.
Morocco--which lays claim to a large portion of the Sahara
west of the French test site--and Tunisia can be expected to at-
tempt to use unfavorable domestic and international reaction to
the French test in their respective campaigns for the early evac-
uation of French forces. The Moroccan cabinet announced on 13
February, after a special meeting over which King Mohamed
presided, that "a certain number of steps" had been decided on.
Morocco's Istiglal party sponsored a four-hour protest strike on
15 February. r- I
16 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 3
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
 25X1
Approved For Wase 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097504900380001-6
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Aaministration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6
 AN // / / / / / // // / / / // / // / / // / / / / / / / /
Approved Fc/ eIgOP2/gE EP79TO09?004900380001-6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900380001-6