CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004900190001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 25, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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25 January 1960 0
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DOCUMENT NO.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 January 1960
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DAILY BRIEF
p
e. When the -
ambassador inquired about the effect of a withdrawal on the East
German regime, Khrushchev said that withdra
l
e
roops in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany.
He added that the USSR was prepared to withdraw all-its forces
if the West accepted his proposal for complete disarmament--
which he undoubtedly realize:s would be unacce
tabl
USSR - East Europe o ~Khrushchev told the West German
ambassador on 18 January that the announcement of a one-third
reduction in the Soviet armed forces would be followed by reduc-
tions of Sovi
t t
wa
would not take
place for several years, and that material conditions there would
improve in the meantime, The USSR could in fact carry out sub-
stantial troop reductions in Eastern Europe without jeopardizing
the security of the regimes. Khrushchev probably believes these
tactics would reinforce his hand at the summit, particularly in
pressing for reduction of Western forces in both (i4 many and
Berlin Page 2)
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Soviet 1959 Economic Results: Tentative appraisal of
the 1959 Soviet economic results released by the'Central
Statistical Office on 21 January indicates that industrial growth
continued at a high rate. Raw material shortages responsible
for the abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan in 1957 seem
to have been largely overcome, and output of some key indus-
trial products increased sighif icantly. However, other diff i-
culties, basically related to production of enough of the right
kind of plant equipment, continue. The grain harvest is re-
ported to be 125,000,000 tons, only about 11 percent below the
harvest of 1958--the best crop year in Soviet history. This
reported crop of 125,000,000 tons appears inconsistent with an
indicated 5-percent reduction in grain acreage and the reported
widespread drought in many major grain-growing areas in 1959.
It is possible that the definition of "grain harvested" has been
changed, since it is unlikely that the harvest ol usable grain.
r-
was much over 100,000,000 tons.
African People's Conference: Underlying friction between
relatively moderate and more radical groups within the African
nationalist movement appears likely to be brought into sharp
11. ASIA-AFRICA
India -Communist China -USSR. 1p: rime Mnister Nehru
has been uraedl 25X
=16 moderate his 79t-and on the border issue and work toward
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ist China as soon as possible.
a settlement with Commun 25X1
~pointing out the probability of a lona strug-
gle against Chinese expansionism, urged Nehru not to make too
much of the immediate issue and to start talks quickly.
the USSR cannot do much more
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to influence China that Khrushchev had advised India not to
make it too diff icult f or Peiping to come to an agreement. While
Nehru may moderate his public statements as a result of this
advice he is unlikely to agree to discussions with the Chinese
as long as they ~efus*eto accept the McMahon line as the basis
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 focus at the second plenary meeting of the nongovernmental
All-African People's Conference scheduled to convene this
week in Tunis. This friction, exemplified by the split between
Kenya's Mboya and Ghana's increasingly militant Nkrumah "
could lead to the splintering of the AAPC- -the organization
fathered by Nkrumah in December 1958 to promote African in-
dependence and unity.
III. THE WEST
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I
E
Cuba-Venezuela: EVenezuelan President Betancourt is 25X1
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F Wr% ~J~nv- -1- -L- -Ll-- ~ ~
his growing lack of confidence in Fidel astro and added that
Cuba was beginning to resemble the Dominican Republic. Betan
court does not favor sendinLT a delegation t o the con-Fer
Bandung-type conference later this year. Betancourt expressed
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which went to Caracas to invite Venezuela to attend Castro's
less all other Latin American nations also attend. Siould Cuba
fail to gain sufficient support for the conference, from other gov-
ernments., Castro will probably call for a similar conference to
be attended by leading politicians of the underdeveloped natio]LS1.
determination to quell the agitati~on
_j.
Guatemala: ' [Demonstrations which began on 20 January
over a minor labor dispute fiave grown into a serious attempt
to discredit the Ydigoras regime by leftist-led politica4 labor,
and student groups. The Communists are attempting to exploit
and direct the unrest)while the strong,, moderately leftist and
anti-Communist Revolutionary party is split over whether to
back the demonstrations. President Ydigoras has expressed
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 LATE ITEMS
*Algeria- France: fhe demonstrations by European settlers 25X1
in Algiers on 23 January, which led to armed clashes with secu-
rity forces on 24 January, reportedly were envisaged by at leas
one anti-republican organization as the first step in a plan to
overthrowthe De Gaulle regime with the aid of paratroopers
based in Algeria and southern France. Prior to the clashes,
some elements of the French army in Algeria were reported as
hoping that settler reaction against De Gaulle's policies would be
so strong and violent that top army commanders would feel obliged
to back the settlers and assume leadership of the revolt. However
active military support for the settler extremists seems to have
been discouraged by the prompt and energetic countermeasures
taken by Delegate General Delouvrier and General ChalleY as well
as by the failure of overt support for the demonstrators to develop
immediatelv in iFrqnr--A- Alfhmirrh +hn 4- '0--- 1L - ---
demned the Algiers riots and. supported De Gaulle's assertion of
S
authority, the extent of the French government's concern i indi-
cated by the Dan it has imposed on all public gatherings in France].
I I Orlyi
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DAILY BRIEF iv
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Khrushchev told the West German ambassador to Moscow on
18 January that the recent decision to reduce Soviet forces by one
third would be followed by reductions of Soviet troops in Poland,
Hungary, and East Germany. He added that the USSR was prepared
to withdraw all forces if the West accepted his proposal for com-
plete disarmament. When the ambassador inquired about the ef-
fect of a withdrawal on the East German regime, Khrushchev said
this would not take place for several years, and that material con-
ditions there would improve sufficiently to permit an eventual com-
plete withdrawal. The USSR currently has 325,000 troops in East
Germany, 55,000 in Hungary, and 35,000 in Poland, and. a substan-
tial portion of these could be withdrawn without jeopardizing the
regimes' security.
the Soviet premier apparently feels that an announcement of
cuts in Soviet forces in these countries and a conditional offer to
withdraw will strengthen his hand in the summit negotiations, par-
ticularly in pressing the West for reciprocal reductions in Western
forces in Germany and Berlin. In his speech in Budapest on 1 De-
cember, he dwelled at length on the contradictions between Western
professions of support for disarmament and their desire to retain
forces in West Berlin.
his talk with the German ambassador, as well as in an un-
official memorandum to the West German Social Democratic party
leaders, Khrushchev reaffirmed his position on Berlin and Germany
and repeated his public threat to conclude a separate peace treaty.
The memorandum, from "responsible Soviet circles," was deliv-
ered by Ambassador Smirnov and was probably intended to, bring
pressure on the Socialists to take a stronger stand in challenging
recent statements by Adenauer and Berlin Mayor Brandt to' the of -
fect that the Western proposal at the Geneva foreign ministers'
conference for an interim Berlin solution should not be the West's
starting point at the summit,
Soviet expectations of a protracted period of negotiation on
Germany and Berlin, evident in Khrushchev's recent statements
were also reflected in information-- 25X1
I F-that rus c ev and Ulbricht have
evolved a long-range strategy for gaining Western concessions.
The Communist leaders feel that they can afford to be patient, be-
lieving that it is only a matter of time until the Western powers
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USSR Releases 1959 Economic Statistics
The value of Soviet gross industrial production increased
11 percent in 1959, according to official statistics released in
Moscow on 21 January. This compares with 10-percent in-
creases reported for the last two years. Production of pro-
ducers goods was reported up 12 percent and consumer goods
10.3'percent, as compared with 11 and 7 percent, respectively,
reported for 1958. Tentative appraisal of production results in-
dicates that industrial growth continued at a high rate.
Raw material shortages responsible for the abandonment
of the Sixth Five-Year Plan in 1957 seem to be largely overcome.
The production of natural gas was the only "leading link" to fall
short of its target, thus reflecting continuing pipe shortages.
The reported increase of 7.4 percent in industrial labor pro-
ductivity reverses the recent trend toward a diminishing rate of
increase.
Total capital investment rose 12 percent to a total of 275
billion rubles. The plan for capital construction for housing was
fulfilled, with 80,000,000 square meters of urban living space and
850,000 rural homes completed. These additions to housing, the
availability of food based in part on the carryover from the record
EjWharvest, and the increasing availability of manufactured con-
sumer. goods indicate that 1959 was a good year for the consumer.
Production of machinery and equipment showed sharp differ-
ences in rates of growth in response to changing priorities. The
largest gain was registered by chemical equipment, which in-
creased 55 percent, three times the annual rate required for ful-
fillment of the Seven-Year Plan. The fact that this item and gen-
erators were reported underfulf illed- -despite the large produc-
tion increases- -suggests that present planning is for goals to be
met in less than seven years.
Substantial decreases in production of agricultural machinery
reflect extensive model changes and planned cutbacks for some
items. Extensive re-equipping of two truck plants and a change
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Soviet Production of Selected Items
Item
1958
1959
To Change
Pig Iron (million metric tons)
39.6
43
+9
Crude Steel "
it
54.9
59.9
+9
Rolled Steel
42.9
47
+9
Coal
496
506.5
+2
Petroleum "
IT
it
113
129.5
+14
Electric Power (billion KWH)
233
264
+12
Natural Gas (billion cubic meters)
29.8
37.2
+25
Freight Cars (thousand units)
40.3
38.6
-4
Tractors
220
213.5
-3
Refrigerators "
360
426
+18
Washing Machines "
538
724
+34
1958
1959
Industrial Out
ut (Percent
e chan
e
p
ag
g
over preceding year) +10
+11
Industrial Labor Productivity (Percentage change
over preceding year) +6
+7.4
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in the basic truck model at a third plant contributed to the 5-
percent decrease in production of trucks and buses. This
decrease may also reflect an anticipated transfer of trucks
from the military to the civilian economy as ground forces
are reduced.
The large number of decreases and moderate increases in
machinery and equipment suggest some reallocation of resources
to the production of equipment for the chemical and other raw ma-
terial processing industries. Except for motor vehicles, rates
of growth for machinery and equipment items appear to be suffi-
cient to ensure fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan.
In agriculture, the reported figure of 125,000,000 tons of
grain harvested is only about 11 percent below the harvest of
1958--the best crop year in Soviet history. This is inconsistent
with an indicated 5-percent reduction in grain acreage and the re-
ported widespread drought in many major grain areas in 1959, and
it is unlikely that the harvest of usable grain was much over 100,-
000,000 tons.
In 1958 Khrushchev admitted past deceptions in grain statis-
tics and berated Malenkov for attempting to pass off the "biolog-
ical yield" for the "barn harvest." However, in spite of Khru-
shchev's stand on this point, which he reaffirmed at the central
committee meeting on agriculture : last month, some change in the
definition of "grain harvested"-appears possible.
Detailed Central Statistical Office data for nationwide agricul-
ture in 1959 is not yet available, nor was such data reported pub-
licly at the December central committee meeting.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Sino-Indian Relations
Prime Minister Nehru
-to
moderate his stand on the Sino-Indian border issue ancl. to work
toward a settlement as soon as possibie]-
I sees the border threat as part
of a long-term struggle India will have to wage against Chinese
expansionism in Asia. He feels, however, that it would be un-
wise for India to make too much of the immediate tactical issue
and thereby divert its attention from the major strategic problem
ahead. He has recommended talks with Peiping as soon as they
can be arranged]
he USSR has tried to in-
fluence the Chinese and cannot o much more than it has already
done the Chinese are too
sensitive to world opinion to indicate immediately that they have
"submitted" to Soviet advice, and that India should not make it
too hard for them to come to an agreement.
0
everything be done to end the border conflict.
[Ithough Nehru may moderate his public statements as a
result of this advice, he is unlikely to take action in the near fu-
ture significantly to alter his present, firm stand. on the border--
that the McMahon line must be the basis for negotiation. Strong
conservative elements in his cabinet and government, as well as
the press and public, would be quick to point out the fallacy of
encouraging Chinese expansionism over the long run by readily
ceding Indian-claimed territory to China to settle the current
conflict
(Rehru presumably is also aware that legitimation of Chinese
"aggression" in Ladakh would weaken his stand against Pakistani
"aggression" in western Kashmir. Pakistan has already publicly stated
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hat it cannot recognize any Indian concession to China as long
as the status of Kashmir is in dispute before the United Nations,
In any case, Nehru is unlikely to take firm steps until he sees
the results of prospective Sino-Burmese border talks and has a
chance to converse with Khrushchev in February.
[ehru has been and probably still is opposed to personal
talks with Chou En-lai until there is evidence that such talks
would be successful in reaching a settlement. He is not averse
to working-level conversations, however, and may urge his am-
bassadors to attempt to place pressure on Peiping to bring such
talks abouf
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 A. 4; 00190001-7
The second plenary meeting of the nongovernmental All-
African People's Conference (AAPC), which convenes in Tunis
from 25 to 29 January, may intensify significantly underlying
friction between relatively moderate and more radical groups
within the African nationalist movement. Exemplified by the
personal split which has developed between Kenya's Tom Mboya
and Ghana's increasingly militant Nkrumah since the organiza-
tion's inaugural meeting in Accra in December 1958, this fric-
tion could lead to a schism which would further impair the al-
ready limited effectiveness of the AAPC--the major organiza-
tion for expression of African nationalism.
The gathering's Tunisian organizers expect[aout 1 2 5
representing virtually all major African nationalist
organizations. Already concerned about keeping the meeting
on an essentially moderate course, they claim to have eliminated
"some more Communist organizations" from the invitation list
prepared by the AAPC's Communist-oriented secretary general,
Abdoulaye Diallo of Guinea. Nevertheless, the radicals, spear-
headed by strong and aggressive delegations from Ghana, Guinea,
and Morocco, may succeed in dominating the proceedings, es-
pecially if moderate African leaders from French Community
states and other areas fail to attend and if Mboya is unable to be
present because of the London conference on Kenya's constitution.
A number of observers from Sino-Soviet bloc countries are
expected to be on hand and to lobby, as did their counterparts at
the 1958 meeting, for extreme resolutions. Casir's representa-
tives, on the other hand, are reported planning to play a less ag-
gressive role than they did at AccrJ
Public presentations by the conferees and final resolutions
probably will emphasize commonly held general positions on
African independence, solidarity, and economic and social de-
velopment. They will certainly single out the impending French
nuclear tests in the Sahara for particularly violent condemnation.
Behind the scenes, however, serious discord may develop over
such specific issues as the attitude to be adopted toward the French-
sponsored Ahidjo regime in newly independent Cameroun, the French
Community, and the continued adherence of many African labor
leaders--including Mboya--to the Western-oriented International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
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III, THE WEST
Venezuelan - Cuban Relations
in apparent deterioration in Venezuelan- Cuban relations
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could further reduce Fidel Castro's prestige in the hemisphere
and even tend to isolate him with other dictatorships in the area
which he has been seeking to overthrow. Venezuelan President
Betancourt reportedly spoke harshly to a Cuban delegation which
was in Caracas to invite Venezuela to attend Castro's conference
of underdeveloped nations scheduled for Havana later this year.
Betancourt told the delegation that Cuba was beginning to resem-
ble the Dominican Republic, and he expressed lack of confidence
in the Cuban leader. Leftist groups and the Communist-influenced
press in Venezuela have thus far provided Castro with valuable
propaganda support.
Cetancourt, who sent a high-level personal emissary to
Havana this month to try to influence the Cuban regime toward
moderation, has stated his concern over Castro's authoritarian
policies on previous occasions. 25X1
saying that Castro is "crazy:'
Last November, moreover, Betancourt personally blocked an in-
tended visit to Caracas by Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara, Cas-
tro's top lieutenants, and forced the recall of the Cuban ambas-
sador as an aftermath to the affair
LP.iblic knowledge of official Venezuelan coolness toward
Castro would be a blow to Communists, leftists, and extreme
nationalist groups in Latin America who have lumped together
the two revolutionary regimes as a symbol of anti-imperialism
in order to promote anti-US sentiment and other objective
Letancourt is reported under increasing pressure from his
majority Democratic Action party to force the hand and possibly
oust from his three-party coalition the Democratic Republican
Union party (URD)--a stanch supporter of Castro and a dissatis-
fied component of the coalition. He might use the issue of Cuban
relations to force a showdown with the UR
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Leftist Demonstrations in Guatemala
The antigovernment demonstrations that began in Guate-
mala City on 20 January have grown from a minor labor dis-
pute among the employees of the government's social security
institute into serious leftist attempts to discredit the Ydigoras
administration. Leftist-led political, labor, and student groups,
each with individual grievances against the regime, have joined
in sympathy strikes and demonstrations. Extreme leftist splint-
er parties are encouraging the agitation, which the Communists
are attempting to aggravate and direct.
discontent among the people is sufficient to cause the
government's fall, and that they hope to influence the composi-
tion of the succeeding regime.
Leaders of the strong, moderately leftist, but anti-Commu-
nist Revolutionary party (PR), still smarting from the defeat
they suffered in the fraud-ridden congressional elections of 6
December, are split over whether it is to their party's best in-
terest to join the demonstrations. The PR did issue a general
strike call on 21 January, but the PR mayor of Guatemala City
ordered city employees to remain on the job.
President Ydigoras has expressed determination to quell
the agitation, but he has ordered the police and the army to move
carefully to avoid creating martyrs. Troops used tear gas to
disperse demonstrators on 20 January, and army reinforcements
have arrived in the capital. The armed forces can be expected
to back up the President in his present efforts to maintain his
authority.
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 THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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