NO. 7 -- THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003500130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

C rA~ 3~- a ~ 4-
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SECURITY INFORMAIIO~i
llugust 15y 1952
--T FOR IN IT NE RGR
(Prepared in the Central Intelligence gency with the
concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
I, ~t,~,~~~,1 Estimates
1. The organization and procedures established since
October 1950 For the production of national intelligence
estimates have now been proved in practice. These estimates
effectively draw upon the resources of the entire intelligence
community and can be materially improved only as we stre~~gthea
these resources. These estimates derive authority from she
manner of their preparation and from the active particip ~ti~:ix~
of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in them f?.,~anl
review and adoption. Agency dissents are encouraged whe~~e
estimates would be watered down by further efforts to se~~ur~:~
agreement.
2. A production program for national estimates no~~ pro-
vides far (a) closing gaps in estimative coverage; (b) prajectifln
of selected estimates from short to long term; and (c) t:~?orc~ti
re-examination of such fundamentals as global Soviet cap~~.bil :~t ies
and intentions. This program should be accomplished durng
FY 1953 ?
3. Close coordination between intelligence and po_.ic~-
and between intelligence operational planning is basic. So~r~~:
progress has been made, notably through CIA participatiai~ it:
the NSC Staff and in the improved relationships in each.agefno~.
between intelligence and planning components. Further p~.~ogre:~~
is needed! and will be pressed fors in order that policy
planning may be mare effectively served.
4. "Post-mortems," designed to reveal gaps and shE~rtccsr~-
ings in the preparation of given estimates, and to stim~atE
corrective action, are expected to strengthen future est~wmat?~:~.
I I . Pol t ~~-.s~~.i a? ~~..~.s'~
1. The status of political, social and cultural iiltel~i-
gence is very goody due allowance being made for the pauC;it
information on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of ~~ol~~~
ing it. Facilities for the production of such intealige~~ce~
however are adequate only for the most urgent needs oP ~;he i~f
agencies. Less pressing de~,nds can be met only partial_'y ar.~i
inadequately.
2. The principal deficiency in this field is in tyre
effort devoted to the research~in-depth on which sound sstima.j~~a
and analysis on current development depend. Only the US~;R ea~i
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SECURITY IAlFORM,~.'PiON
be regarded as adequately covered in this respect, with China
the European Satellites and Western Europe nearly so. Cn
medium priority areas, such as Iran Indochina and Indic., tnea~e
is considerable lag between production of immediate interpres-
tion and analysis of longer-term factors. On low priority areas,
such as Africa and Latin-America, such factors receive even .f s.
study. World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, is sr~tis-
factorily covered with respect to party strength, political
maneuverings and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines.
Research into matters of organization financial support. and
infiltration into political. and socia~ organizations is
inadequate.
3. Correction of the above deficiencies largely depenct~ en
increased personnel for more intensive research on-the cress
indicated,
III. ~~m~_~o~~es~ ,~ntell~enc,g
1. Qge,,,~,~t~o~},~~ Intel ~~~,pce
Intelligence needed in support of military op~=rati.~}tig
in Korea is generally excellent. Information on instal~.atic=nx3
and on developments in Manchuria such as the movement ar~d
actlvitias of the Chines Communist Forces and North Ko~~ear~
units north of the Yalu River, 1s inadequate. Reliable in-
formation of the enemy's long-range plans and intentior~.~ is
practically non-existent. Little improvement in these cefic=
iencies can be expected in thc~ near future despite our ~~ffar:~~~>
2. Order of $e.ttle and EQUi~ment
Coverage on order of battle intelligence and e~qui~j~-
ment ~.s generally adequate in respect of nations outside of iio
Iran Curtain, except in the case of some neutral natior~:~ fags
reason of circumstances beyond our control. Drder of battle r~~~d
egii:ipment information on the USSR, Communist China, and - tc~ ~~
lesser degree - the European satellites is partial and Fyn?.
adQquata, primarily because of the extreme difficulty o~I' cc1.1~~F~-
tian. However, intelligence on Communist Bloc unite anc et~~::L~~~-
ment in most areas with which the United States or natl.;ins
friendly to the United States are in contact is more ne~:rly
complete and reliable.
3. Tart~etins~
Basic target research is progressing favorabl~? on iiP
economic and industrial vulnerabilities of the Soviet iTrion t3t1~~
satellites; less adequately on Western Europe and the F~tr Es.s-:,,>
Complete target intelligence on the Soviet atomi.e threat, is
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handicapped by gaps in data on Soviet weapons, stoc~cpili~~$
arrangements and delivery capabilities. I'he Bombing
Encyclopedia must be greatly expanded to meet ultimate gals:
current target system studies are reasonably adequate fast ~c~1.~t
and operational planning. Initial production priority o>'
combat target materials is almo?t complete for the USER, but.
varies considerably for approach areas. Extensive tact3.a1
target coverage is completed on erase adjoining the Koren
Theater but is still in initial stages ?lsewhere.
~. Su ort for the North Atlantic Treat Or ani~ation
NATO
The United States has filled NATO requests t~ritn ttie
best available intelligence consistent with the National
Disclosure Policy. In addition to providing intelligent: tca
assist in the establishment of basic intelligence files for Cdr
NATO echelons, the U. S. continues to furnish releasable
current studies and reports pertinent to the area and th= .
mission of the NATO mayor commands.
IV. Economic Intelligence Research
1. Apart from the NiS program there is a continuing
economic intelligence resear+ah effort which is designed to
provide basic studies directly related to national security
problems. As a general proposition this inte111gence is now
good for most of the broad conclusions required by the
estimators; however, it is often not possible to define clean
the degree of reliability of certain data or to provide the
amount of detail that is required iro make the intelligence
sufficiently precise or meaningful, This limits its value both
for operational use and for estimates. However, economic it~~
telligence lzas improved considerably in this respect Yitnin
the past year and measures currently underway should not anwv
provide new sources of data but Improved analytic techniques.
One oxample of this is the program of the past year to ccilc3t
data and develop techniques for analysis of factory markings
on equipment and components. Within the next year reports
under this program should provide intelligence on numbegs o~`
equipment components and en.d-items, including military end-
items produced in the Soviet Bloc.
2. Another mayor deficiency iri the field of economic
intelligence has been the shortage of professional pereonne:a.
with general analytic competence, as opposed to the comueedi.
expert. Under present recruitment programs it is anticlpat~E~
that this problem will have diminished with the next year.
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tailed assessment of economic and structural vulnerabil~tiEs
which can be done except for the gaps noted in that sedi,ion.<
c. Soviet Bloc Ca abilit Studies: Among ~r~e Vii?
3. Support for Ma~,or Programs
In addition to providing support for departme~Yta2
operations and national estimates the major intelligena~
programs in the economic field under NSCIA 15 are e,s fc~:.la~r:
~,. Economic Warfare: Implementation of NSG 10~~=
and the Battle Act programs a requiring increased ecorx~mic
intelligence support. Tt is expected that the newly es~abZi..3rz~;d
coord:tnating committee will assist in bringing availablf3 in-
telligence more quickly and fully to bear on questions ~.risi~.~;
under this program. However, the potential demands for det~. } .~~3c~
operational intelligence in this field are virtually unFimitREi,
and are and will continue to be well beyond the capacit~:~ of ~i~f~
intelligence agencies to satisfy.
~,. Tar et Research: The target inteiiigenc~=
activities outlined in ection III (Armed Farces) invol~~e de~
est priority tas s of the economic inte igence commun~:y 2s ?-.:'ie
continuing study of Soviet Bloc economic capabilities fc~r Tar.
This study currently employe for tha first time a modiP-~ed
form of input-output analysis which is expected to lead to m~7~:
ace~zrate and meaningful estimates.
V. Scientific and Technical
1. Scientific and Technical intelligence regarding thF
USSR and the satellites has made important progress since th4~
beginning of Fiscal Year 1951. Current knowledge, howe~~er, ~.3
partial and inadequate in terms of national security needs.
2. The current estimates of Soviet acCOmplishmen~~s in
the production of fissionable materials and their convez~sicn ~~~
atomic weapons are believed to be more reliable than wa.= pc~:~-T~le
a year ago, although little is known with any degree of certz:in-
ty concerning the current program and nothing is known caf
developments which can lead to radical changes in the f~~ture,
Knowledge of Soviet biological and chemical warfare pr~ras~`
is oor. A number of im ortant intelligence "find$" in sovie~;
have been made withxz t~!e
last ear. Intelli ence on air defense as determined b~.~ the
is much improved,
although, there are still enormous voids with respect to the
developments which lead to radically improved or unique sysLt-;r~s.
Knowledge of current Soviet guided missiles programs is poor
although certain projects based on German d?velopments ~~re i~'
has been set for FY 1953.
2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance wits=. JC~~>
priorities and intelligence agency capabilities. ~imitstic~r~ of
the latter have precluded production of NIS on ail JCS J~igt
priority areas and made it necessary to undertake part#~1
surveys on some areas. However, NIS production on the ~rrotzp ~~
24 areas of highest priority is approximately ~+5~ complete.
whereas the entire program is about 22~ complete. NIS ~~n e:~~:.~t
individual areas are over 75~ complete, and five of the?e F~d~e
in the JCS high priority list. Geographic research supg~ort f`~r
NI5 has been excellent.
3. The quality of the NIS is good and can be exptctFd ca
improve as the gaps in information are fil3.ed and revis:kon
are published under the Maintenance Program which was s~.arte