CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700130001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 15, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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15 September 1959
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DOCUMENT NO.
13
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State Dept. review completed
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 Approved F
15 SEPTEMBER 1959
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists trying to press
to curtail activities of Dalai Lama.
Laos--UN subcommittee "presence"
to provide breathing spell for Vien-
tiane; Moscow calls for reconvening
1954 conference on Indochina.
Japan Socialist party faces possible
split.
Paraguayan Government's stability ap-
pears threatened by dissident members
of ruling Colorado party,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Communist China - India. Peiping apparently is trying
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to put pressure on Nehru to muzzle the Dalai Lama, who
plans to present his case to the UN. Lengthy Chinese Com-
munist press and radio commentary on 13 September echoes
charges made by Foreign Minister Chen Yi that the Indians
I/ are condoning activities of the Buddhist leader which are hos-
tile to Communist China, The Chinese are suggesting that
these activities will have "serious consequences" for Sino-
Indian relations, In trying to implicate the Dalai Lama in
"cold-war conspiracies." the Chinese hope to detract from
any sympathy which might be given to his a eal for UN inter-
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11. ASIA-AFRICA
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15 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Laos: The presence of the United Nations fact-finding
subcommittee in Laos is expected to bolster Laotian morale
and should provide a breathing spell during which the nation's
presently off-balance military posture can be rectified. Strong
support is building up for an arrangement whereby some form
of United. Nations presence can be retained. indefinitely in Laos
as a help in deterring covert Communist operations)
*Meanwhile, the USSR moved to undercut the work of the
subcommittee by issuing a 14: September statement challenging
the legality of the council's- action and calling for a conference
of the participants in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina.
The statement contains- an implied threat of Communist retalia-
tory pressures by warning that "annulment" of the Geneva agree-
ments would destroy the "only legal basis for the maintenance
of peace in Vietnam Laos, and Cambodia." 25X1
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Japan: The opposition Japan Socialist party is, facing a
i e split as the right-wing Suehiro Nishio faction walked
paas~T s~p
out on the party convention in Tokyo on 14 September and threat-
ened to bolt the party. Nishio's action was taken in opposition
to the extreme leftward trend of the party However Nishia,s
group of about 30 Diet members would need the support of other
right-wing Socialist groups before it could form an effective
third party, and a compromise may still be worked out, C
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111. THE WEST
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Paraguay: The stability of the Stroessner government seems
increasingly threatened by the activities of dissident members of
the ruling Colorado party. One important member of the dissi-
dent group has, predicted serious uprisings against Stroessner be-
,tween 15 and 30 September. He also anticipates the possibility of
the formation of a government-in-exile, probably in the hope of ex-
ploiting the strong hemisphere sentiment against dictators.
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DAILY BRIEF
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping Accuses New Delhi of Abetting Dalai Lama
Peiping has accused India of abetting the Dalai Lama in
activities hostile to Communist China, This new effort to in-
crease pressure on Prime Minister Nehru to muzzle the Tibetan
leader began on 13 September with a speech by Foreign Minister
Chen Yi on the Sino-Indian border issue. Chen said the Dalai
Lama's appeal for UN intervention in Tibet far exceeded "what
is allowed under the international practice of asylum."
The same day, Peiping propaganda media, without attack-
ing the Dalai Lama directly, charged that "reactionary forces
in India and abroad are using the Dalai Lama as a tool against
China." The Dalai Lama's various press conferences and his
meetings with Indian officials and. foreign diplomats in New Delhi
were cited as evidence of Indian complicity in "conspiracies
against the Chinese Government." Implying that continued. polit-
ical statements from the Dalai Lama would lead to even greater
strains in Sino-Indian relations, one broadcast quoted a left-wing
Indian newspaper as warning that "if supporters of the Dalai Lama
use India as a base for their activities, it would necessarily in-
volve India in a conflict with China.'
This propaganda treatment contrasts with Peiping's reluc-
tance to mention the Dalai Lama for several months, in order
to avoid drawing attention to Tibet, The Chinese probably now
believe that some discussion of Tibet is bound to arise in the UN
and, by implicating the Dalai :Lama in cold-war "conspiracies,'
they may hope to detract from any sympathy which might be given
his appeal.
Peiping's latest allegations against New Delhi will be particu-
larly annoying to Indian officials ,since they have taken pains to
advise the Dalai Lama against taking a strong anti-Chinese stand
during his stay in India. New Delhi probably will respond by again
denying any responsibility for the Dalai Lama's actions and disso-
ciating the Indian Government from his policies.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
The Situation in Laos
The presence of the UN fact-finding subcommittee in
Laos is expected to bolster Laotian morale.and should pro-
vide a breathing spell during which the nation's resently off-
balance military posture can be strengthened. Laotian For-
eign Minister Khampan Panya told British Foreign Secretary
Lloyd in London recently that he expected the Communist par-
tisans to "lie low" while the subcommittee was in Laos, and I
that he doubted there would be further border crossings from
North Vietnam during that time. Khampan believed that under
such conditions his government could regain control of the sit-
uation throughout Laos
At a recent special session of the SEATO council represent-
atives in Bangkok it was concluded that it was essential for at
least a nucleus. UN group to remain in Laos to help deter the re-
sumption of covert aggression by North Vietnam. (An assessment
of the Laotian situation submitted to the British Foreign Off ice by
Sir Robert Scott, Britain's Commissioner General for Southeast
Asia, concludes that North Vietnam will not abandon its aims of
overthrowing the pro-Western Laotian Government, and. therefore
the UN should "continue to show itself in Laos for some time to
come." Scott, who visited Laos, last week on a one-man fact-find-
ing mission, reported his belief that the North Vietnamese have
interfered in Laos' internal affairs by various measures short of
large-scale military support but possibly including introduction of
small numbers of regular Vietnamese forces
(Emphasizing that a serious crisis could develop unless the
internal situation in Laos is consolidated, Scott urged that Britain
consider what practical, nonmilitary help it can give Laos., and he
advised that the West must be prepared in the event an appeal for
armed forces is made
(Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold believes that
the real value in UN action taken to date is the establishment of 0
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"presence" in Laos. He is anxious to shift from Security Council
action to General Assembly action, which could legally enable him
to appoint a personal representative to Laos.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Government's 14 September statement
calling for a conference of countries which participated in the 1954
Geneva conference on Indochina is designed to undercut the work
of the Security Council subcommittee by challenging the legality
of the council's action on 7 September. A threat of Communist re-
taliatory pressures, against Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam
is implied in the warning that Western moves to "wreck" the Ge-
neva agreements of 1954 "may lead to far-reaching consequences
for the peace and security of Indochina." The statement added that
"annulment" of these agreements would. destroy the "only legal
basis for the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia.'
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Japanese Socialist Party Faces Possible Split
The opposition Japanese Socialist party is facing a pos-
sible split. The right-wing Suehiro Nishio faction walked out
of the party convention in Tokyo on 14 September and is threat-
ening to secede. Nishio's action climaxed a long-standing
power struggle in which the right wing has advocated a broadly
based party instead of the class party demanded by the left
wing and by Sohyo, the principal Japanese labor organization.
The present crisis appears to be more serious than any that has
confronted the party since it was formed by the merger of the
Right Socialist; and Left Socialist parties in 1955.
For the first time in a decade the popular vote of the So-
cialists declined in the June election for the upper house. This
intensified Nishio's opposition to the party's continued trend to-
ward the extreme left. The leftists, rejecting all moderate
criticism, backed a reorganization plan that would permit them
to exploit their numerical superiority to elect party officials.
The left wing also displayed willingness to support Communist
objectives despite right-wing efforts to have the party adhere
to a "realistic neutralist" policy which would not be anti-US.
Nishio's faction comprises about 30 members of the ap-
proximately 250 Socialists in the upper and lower houses of the
Diet. He will need the support of many more moderate right-
wing elements to have any prospects for a successful third
party. Son:e efforts appear to be under way to prevent a split
in the party, and a compromise may still be worked out.
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III. THE WEST
Paraguayan Government Stability Weakened by Plotting
The stability of General Alfredo Stroessner's regime in
Paraguay seems increasingly threatened by the activities of
dissident members of the ruling Colorado party, including
some of the leaders arrested in late May.,. At that time, as
a result of political difficulties growing out of the student
strikes, the state of siege was reimposed and Congress dis-
solved.
Serious uprisings against Stroessner between 15 and 30 Sep-
tember reportedly have been predicted by Lt, Colonel Nelson
Rolon, one of the arrested leaders who escaped to Brazil.
Rolon is connected with "clan-
destine movements" in Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. Rolon
was also quoted as stating that if the Colorado party convention,
scheduled for 19 September, does not censure Stroessner, the
clandestine movement will form a government-in-exile, Such
a move would probably be calculated to exploit the strong senti-
ment in the hemisphere against dictators.
Another important dissident who escaped to Brazil with
Rolon--former Ambassador to the United States Osvaldo
Chaves--recently arrived in Argentina to try to unite all groups
seeking Stroessneras ouster. Thus far the major non-Colorado
opposition groups have been reluctant to cooperate with one
another, but they may be more inclined to cooperate with the
dissident Colorados, who have influential connections within
Paraguay.
The recent stresses in the Colorado party have been reflected
in shifts in government posts and opposition in the Colorado
Youth group, but thus far no change has been reported in the
strong military support for Stroessner,
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States, Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved For
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