LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JOHN C. STENNIS, CHAIRMAN FROM W.E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00552R000100080001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LETTER

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 NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC'
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Honorable John C. Stennis; Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. .20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your request for comments on S. 244,
a bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to clarify certain
provisions of that Act: regarding activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The language of the bill is identical to the Year eld75e t t o th14592e
Military Procurement Authorization Act of Fiscal
Section 703), approved by the Senate on 11 June 1974, which was the
subject of my letter to you of 14 June 1974. As you know, the amendment
was not approved by the conference committee.
S. 244 is very similar to the bill you "introduced to the 93rd
Congress--S. 2597 (copy enclosed). In response your
25 September 1974, 1 assured you that the Central Intelligence Agency
will abide by the letter and the spirit of the provisions of S. 2597 in the
conduct of our activities even though the bill had not been enacted.
In my confirmation hearings in July 1973 and in the. two letters
to you referred to above, I expressed my full support for those pro-
visions now proposed in S. 244 which insert the word "foreign" immediately
before the word "intelligence" in Section 102(d) of the. 1947 Act, thus
clearly expressing the mission of CIA as relating only to foreign intelligence.
While I believe the word intelligence" in the original Act was generally
understood to refer only to foreign intelligence, the proposed. language will
make this limitation even clearer to Agency employees, other Government
officials, and to the public.
I also indicated in the correspondence noted above that I was
pleased to accept the provisions now proposed in S. Z44 concerning
Section 102(d)(5) of the Act, which converts to a statutory requirement
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Ifte *of
respect to fully appropriate activities in the United States essential to
the support of foreign intelligence activities abroad.
Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 charges the
Director of Central Intelligence with the responsibility "for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." As
you know, Mr. Chairman, I believe that more effective deterrents are
needed to prevent unauthorized disclosures of intelligence sources and
methods. I am hopeful that efforts to clarify this Agency's authority
will ultimately be coupled with action to protect these essential resources,
such as the proposal I submitted in January 1974 which is still under
consideration in the Executive branch.
Please allow me to express my appreciation of your continuing
interest in clear statutory delineation of CIA responsibilities. I wish to
assure you of our understanding that the scope of this Agency's unique
authority applies only to foreign intelligence and related activities.
The Office of Management and Budget advises there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's.
program..
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your request for comments on S. 2597
and S. 3767. Both of these bills would amend the National Security
Act of 1947 to strengthen and clarify certain provisions of the Act
regarding activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. For the most
part their provisions are identical and these provisions are acceptable
to me. Where the two bills differ, I prefer the language of S. 2597.
The language of S. 3767 is the same as section 703 of the
Senate amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 1975 (H. R. 14592)
which was added to the bill as a Senate floor amendment and which was
the subject of my letter of 14 June 1974 to you.
I fully support the identical provisions which insert the word
"foreign" immediately before the word "intelligence" in section 102(d)
of the 1947 Act, thus clearly expressing the mission of CIA as relating
only to foreign intelligence. While I believe the word "intelligence" in
the original Act was generally understood to refer only to foreign.
intelligence, the suggested language will make this limitation even
clearer to Agency employees, other Government officials, and to the
public.
I am pleased to accept the identical provisions concerning
section 102 (d)(5) of the Act, which converts to a statutory requirement
the long-standing practice of complete congressional oversight of our
activities. Pursuant to current congressional procedures, the Agency
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reports fully on its activities to the oversight committees of the House
and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. This
system has worked well in protecting the numerous highly sensitive
matters reported to these Committees over the years. I am confident
that any future congressional procedures which may be established
will be as effective as the existing ones in meeting the dual objectives
of complete security and maximum oversight.
Both S. 2597 and S. 3767 add a new section 102 (g)(1) to the Act
which reiterates the existing prohibition against any police, law-enforce-
ment, or internal-security functions, while setting forth permissible
areas of domestic activity for the Agency. While both bills explicitly
recognize the necessity that the Agency protect its installations, conduct
personnel investigations, and provide information to other agencies,
only S. 2597 recognized that the Agency must conduct activities within
the United States in support of its foreign intelligence responsibilities.
This latter proviso in S. 2597 is deemed essential so that there is no
question that the Agency is permitted to conduct certain necessary
activities in the United States. Of course such activities could not
contravene the proscriptions in the Act against internal security
functions but would be solely in support of our foreign intelligence
mission, such as: (a) interviewing American citizens who are willing,
voluntarily and without pay, to share foreign intelligence information in
their possession with their Government; (b) collecting foreign intelligence
from foreigners in the United States; (c) establishing support structures
necessary to foreign intelligence operations abroad; and (d) providing
technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for its
counterintelligence operations against foreigners.
S. 3767 adds a new section 102 (g)(2) which states that the Agency
shall not "participate, directly or indirectly, in any illegal activity
within the United States. " I believe this section is inappropriate and
unnecessary. No agency need be reminded by statute that it must obey
the law. The personnel of this Agency are well aware of the legal
requirements under which we operate as an instrumentality of the
Federal Government and are fully committed to carrying out our mission
within the confines of the law. Additionally, I believe the inclusion of this
section in the basic charter of this Agency would imply that agencies not
under such a restriction are free to engage in illegal activities.
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Section (4) of S. 2597 reenforces the charge in the 1947 Act that
the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
Intelligence Sources and Methods from unauthorized disclosure by
requiring the Director to develop plans, policies, and regulations in.
the implementation of this responsibility. Any information indicating
a violation of the Director's plans, policies, and regulations would,
be reported to the Attorney General for appropriate action. Section (4)
would not create additional penalties for unauthorized disclosure.
As you know Mr. Chairman, I am of the opinion that more
effective deterrents are needed to prevent unauthorized disclosures of
Intelligence Sources and Methods. Specific legislation to this end is
under active consideration within the Executive Branch. I do, however,
support section (4)(g) of S. 2597 as clarifying the existing provision
in the 1947 Act concerning the protection of Intelligence Sources and
Methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Your interest in a clear statutory delineation of this Agency's
functions and authority is appreciated, and I wish to assure you of our
clear understanding that this Agency's responsibilities apply only to
foreign intelligence and related activities.
The Office of Management and Budget advises there is no
objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the
Administration's program.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE: AGENCY
WASHING, 0.:, D.G. 2.0505
i4JU 14
Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
a,- %.%;.p t e amended provision of Clause (5) of
subsection (d), adding a requirement to report to the Congress any
"... functions and duties related to foreign intelligence affecting the,
national security as may be specifically directed front time to time by
the fNational Security] Council...''.
With respect to the modified version final) ad L d f
On June 3rd the Senate approved certain amendment, to the
CIA section of the: National Security Act of 1947 irl voting on H. ,,, 1 x59Z1.
With certain understandings outlined below, I an. pleased to say that
.these aanendmentss are acceptable to me.
As you know, I fully accept the amendment inserting the word
"foreign" immediately before the word "intelligence" in the Act, to
clearly express the mission of CIA as relating only to foreign intelligeaQi,
I also am pleased to t h
a t
&z ced.
under Clause (5) of subsection (d) noted above, if s1 ,, ecifically directed by
the a+atiozal Security Council and reported to tho Cony;:; ,ssw
'.Chioao vvoule;.
essary to the
support of foreign intelligence oparatio;xs can be l.egit.imat,,l r c
exgzx xntelixgence operations and certain activities nec
e
a
e, I b lieve that
this language is fully appropriate on the understanding that certain.
~; For
x a, new
section restricting CIA's activities in the Unit
d St
t
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include such current activities, described in my confirmation hearings, as
(a) interviewing American citizens who are willing voluntarily and without
pay to share foreign intelligence information in their possession With their
Government; (b) collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners; (c) establ-.;
ing support structures necessary to foreign intelligence operations abroad;
and (d) providing technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigatio-
for its counterintelligence operations against foreigners. If this were not
the intention of the Congress, I believe the United States would be unable to
acquire significant foreign intelligence important to the national security.
'Perhaps this understanding could be included as an element of the
legislative history of this Act,
The new subsection l02(g)(Z) seems redundant and hardly appropriate
in providing that a Federal agency should not participate in illegal activities?
Further, I believe it possible that some could argue that such language
affects the now clearly authorized acts of the Agency such as those outlined
in Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the CIA Act of 1949, exempting CIA from various'
provisions of law where necessary to the security of foreign intelligence
operations.
Please allow me to express my appreciation of your interest in a.
clear statutory delineation of this Agency`s functions and authority and
my assurance that this Agency will respect in every way in the future
the scope*of the Agency's unique authorities as applying only to foreign
-intelligence and. related activities.
Sincerely, ? .
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.suggested L anguage fox ln.corpoz-atzon zn
Conference Report on. R 14592
New. subsection 102(g)(1) of the bill clarifies activities
in which the CIA' may not engage within the United Stales.
In enacting this new subsection, it is not intended to
impinge upon activities authorized by law such as those
currently undertaken within the United states in support:
of the CIA's foreign intelligence mission, including the
receipt of foreign intelligence inforrnatioa.
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at~
PREPARED STATEMENT ON H. R. 15845
BY t3~
WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
22 July 1974
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on H. R. 15845
introduced by you and Mr. Bray. The amendments proposed in this bill would
be the first changes in the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency,found
in the National Security Act of 1947. In conformity with our American
constitutional structure, the existence of the Central Intelligence Agency stems
from an Act of Congress. This is a unique contrast to the tradition and
practice of most intelligence services, but it is a necessary reflection of
our free society. The result, I believe, makes us a stronger nation, whose
citizens live in a freedom envied by most of the world.
The amendments would add the word "foreign" before the word
"intelligence" whenever it refers to the activities authorized to be undertaken
by the Central Intelligence Agency. I fully support this change. While I
believe the word "intelligence" alone in the original Act was generally under
stood to refer only to foreign intelligence, I concur that this limitation of the
Agency's role to foreign intelligence should be made crystal clear to its own
employees and to the public. I hope this amendment will reassure any of our
fellow citizens as to the Agency's true and only purpose.
Section (3) of the bill reenforces the charge in the original Act that
the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "protecting
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intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The
amendment states that pursuant to this responsibility, the Director shall
develop appropriate plans, policies and regulations but such responsibility
shall not be construed to authorize the Agency to engage in any police,
subpoena, law enforcement or internal security activities, and that any
information indicating a violation of the Director's plans, policies and
regulations, should be reported to the Attorney General for appropriate
action.
This amendment conforms to my own understanding of the meaning
of the original statutory language. As I said in my confirmation hearing, I
believe that the original Act gives the Director a charge but does not give
him commensurate authority. Under existing law, the Director is responsible
for developing such internal administrative controls as are possible and
appropriate to protect against unauthorized disclosure, but if such a
disclosure is identified, his only recourse beyond internal disciplinary
action, including termination of an employee, would be to report the matter
to appropriate authorities for examination of possible legal action. As you
are aware, Mr. Chairman, the Government did take legal action with respect
to one of our ex-employees who declined to abide by the agreement he made
when he joined CIA to protect the confidential information to which he would
be exposed.
Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with this clarification of the precise
nature of the charge on the Director to protect intelligence sources and
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methods against unauthorized disclosure. As you know, I am of the personal
opinion that additional legislation is required on this subject to improve our
ability to protect intelligence sources and methods against unauthorized
disclosure. The contract theory on which the previously mentioned litigation
is based is indeed a very slender reed upon which to rely in all cases. My
views on this subject became known publicly as a result of that case and the
specifics of my recommendations on this subject are still under active
consideration within the Executive ,Branch, so that an appropriate Executive
Branch recommendation can be made. to the Congress.
The bill would also require that the Agency report to the Congress "in
accordance with such procedures as the Congress may establish" on those
'other functions and duties related to[fore ign]intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The.
National Security Act authorized the National Security Council to direct the
Agency to conduct a number of foreign intelligence activities which by their
nature must remain secret. The Act made clear, however, that these functions
and duties could only stem from a specific direction by the National Security
Council rather than being determined by the Agency itself. The amendments
do not change this situation but add the requirement of reporting to Congress.
Mr. Chairman, at present the Agency reports to the Congress about
its activities in a number of ways. On certain matters the Agency reports
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publicly, such as in this hearing and in my own confirmation hearings. The
Agency further identifies for public release a number of matters affecting
it or resulting from its efforts. A recent example was the publication of
testimony on the economies of the Soviet Union and China provided to the
Joint Economic Committee and published on July 19th with only a few deletions
which related to intelligence sources and methods.
The second area in which the Agency reports to Congress is in its
assessments of foreign situations. The Agency briefs appropriate committees
of the Congress in executive session, using the most sensitive material
available, thus providing the Congress the fruits of the intelligence investment
made by the United States. I believe this type of reporting is particularly
important, as I hope to make our intelligence of maximum service to the
nation as a whole, and this can only take place if it can assist those in the
Congress who share in the American decision-making process under our
Constitution. The Appropriations Committees, the Armed Services Com-
mittees, the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, and others have been the recipients of this
kind of material. Again, to the extent possible, information provided and
discussed in these executive sessions is later screened for publication. In
many cases the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved does not
permit such publication, but the classified transcript of the briefing can
be made available to the members of Congress.
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The third area in which the Agency reports to Congress concerns
its operations. Pursuant to long-established procedures of the Congress,
reports on these matters, including the most sensitive details, are provided
only to the Intelligence Subcommittees of the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of each House. Mr. Chairman, there are
literally no secrets withheld from these Subcommittees. In fact, I believe
I have more than a duty to respond to them; I must undertake the positive
obligation to volunteer to these Subcommittees all matters of possible
interest to the Congress. As you know, these reports cover our annual
budget, the details of our activities, and problems which may have arisen
in some regard or other.
The procedures established by the Congress for this reporting have
worked well. Large numbers of highly sensitive matters have been revealed
to these Subcommittees over the years, and their classification has been
respected. I am also aware of the sense of responsibility of the members
of the Congress as a whole with respect to matters which must remain
highly classified because of their sensitivity. Thus, I am confident that
congressional procedures in the future will be as effective as those of
the past and I welcome the codification of this relationship in the proposed
amendment. which requires the Agency to report to the Congress.
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Mr. Chairman, the bill also reenforces the proscription. in the,
original Act against police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal
security functions. I wish I could say that this clarification was not
necessary but as you know, Mr. Chairman, I have frankly admitted that the
Agency did make some mistakes in recent years in this area. Your own
report of the investigations of this Subcommittee dealt with those incidents.
The Congress has, in Public Law 93-83 of August 6, 1973, made clear
that the CIA may not provide help to the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration in assisting local police and law enforcement agencies of
the states and municipalities. The language of the bill would go further
in this regard and prohibit the Agency from engaging directly or indirectly
in the above type of activities within the United States either on its own or
in cooperation or conjunction with any other department, agency, organization
or individual. This would restrict our collaboration with the FBI to the field
of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. It may also limit the degree
of assistance the Agency could provide to the Secret Service, under the Secret
Service Act, which authorizes it to call upon the-assistance of any other agency
of the Government to assist it in its mission (Public Law 90-331). While this
amendment might restrict certain of our activities of the past which were not
in any way reprehensible, I believe that its enactment at this time would be
an appropriate way of clarifying the purpose of the Agency as related only to
foreign intelligence.
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I do` note that the bill contains a proviso in this area which I believe
is both appropriate and essential to the proper functioning of the Agency.
This makes it clear that nothing in the Act shall be construed to prohibit
the Agency from conducting certain necessary and appropriate activities in
the United States directly related to its foreign intelligence responsibilities.
I welcome this proviso not only for its content but also for its clarification of
the propriety of some of the long-standing activities of the Agency which are
essential to its foreign intelligence mission. These include:
a. Recruiting, screening, training and investigating employees,
applicants and others granted access to sensitive Agency information;
b. Contracting for supplies;
c. Interviewing U. S. citizens who voluntarily share with their
Government their knowledge of foreign subjects;
d. Collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in the
United States;
e. Establishing and maintaining support structures essential
to CIA's foreign intelligence operations; and
f. Processing, evaluating and disseminating foreign intelligence
information to appropriate recipients within the United States.
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These matters were publicly reported by me in my confirmation hearing
last summer, and I believe that there is general understanding of their
necessity and propriety. The proviso in the amendment, however, would
make this explicit.
The bill also adds a new subsection to the Act to prohibit transactions
between the Agency and former employees except for purely official matters.
I fully subscribe to the purpose of this provision, to assure that former
employees not take advantage of their prior associations to utilize the
Agency's assistance or resources or to have an undue influence on the
Agency's activities. This is particularly directed at the possible use of the
Agency's assets for "nonofficial" assistance outside the Agency's charter. I
would like to say that such a provision is not necessary, but again I must
admit that errors have been made. While I do not believe there were any
instances of major import, I accept the desirability of making the limitations
on the Agency's unique authorities quite clear.
The normal legal proscriptions against improper influence on Federal
employees apply, of course, to the Agency. In addition, a regulation has
been developed within the Agency, which is brought to the attention of each
employee each year, that any CIA employee who believes that he has received
instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative
charter will inform the Director immediately. I might point out that
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in those cases which presented questions concerning the Agency overstepping
its bounds, the propriety and dedication to American traditions of our own
employees caused them to object to possible Agency activities outside its
charter. In my confirmation hearing I stated that I am quite prepared to
leave my post if I should receive an order which appeared to be illegal and
if -my objections were not respected.
--Thus, we in the Agency are fully in accord with the purpose of this
amendment. At the same time, I confess concern over some possible
interpretations of the language of this subsection. I assume that "purely
official matters" would include our normal relationships with our retirees
or others who left. the Agency. I would assume it would also enable us to
maintain normal official relationships with individuals who left the Agency
to go on to other Governmental activities -so long as the !'official natters"
fall within the scope of CIA's legitimate charter and there is no undue
influence involved. I do wonder, however, whether certain activities might
be included under this provision as official which neither the Congress nor
the Agency would want to countenance, and on the other hand whether the
phrase might interfere with a contact with an ex-employee volunteering
important information to the Agency.
Since the Agency has certain unique authorities under the National
Security Act and the CIA Act of 1949 and since much of its work does involve
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highly classified activity, -I would think it appropriate that the Congress add
to the Agency's legislative charter some special recognition of the high
degree of responsibility imposed on the Agency and its employees as a result
of the grant of these unique authorities. This could require the Director to
develop and promulgate a code of conduct for CIA employees at a higher
standard than that expected of Federal employees generally. Thereby,
the intelligence profession would become one of those with special standards
such as the medical or legal professions. The Director's unique authority
to terminate employees in his discretion when necessary or advisable in
the interests of the United States, pursuant to the National Security Act of
1947, would provide a sanction for the application of such high standards.
Regular congressional review would provide an assurance that such a
code of conduct was adequate and that it was being promulgated, applied,
and adhered to.
Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure to have had this opportunity to
comment on H. R. 15845. With the few reservations I have noted above,
I fully support the bill. Most of all, I fully support the purpose of the
legislation in clarifying the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency only
to conduct foreign intelligence activities. At the same. time, I am pleased
that the modifications proposed to the CIA charter would not adversely affect
its authority or capability to carry out the challenging task of collecting,
processing and disseminating foreign intelligence in the world today. I believe
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these amendments would mark an important milestone in eliminating
any apparent conflict between our ideal of an open American society
and the minimum requirements of secrecy in the intelligence apparatus
necessary to protect this free nation.
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Another amendment would amplify the current restrictions
in law by specifying that within the United States the
Agency will not engage:
"in any police or police-type operation or activity,
any law enforcement operation or activity, any internal
security operation or activity, or any domestic intelli-
gence operation or activity."
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The Agency fully accepts such amendments as a statement
of prohibited activity and as a way to reassure any con-
cerned that CIA has no such function. Last July, I so
testified before the legislative oversight Committee in the
House and last September, I wrote to the Chairman of the
legislative oversight Committee in the Senate assuring him
that the Agency will abide by the letter and the spirit of
the proposed amendments.
The prohibition in these bills is supplemented by the
following additional proviso:
"Provided, however, that nothing in this Act shall be
construed to prohibit CIA from protecting its installa-
tions or conducting personnel investigations of Agency
employees and applicants or other individuals granted
access to sensitive Agency information; nor from carry-
ing on within the United States activities in support
of its foreign intelligence responsibilities; nor from
providing information resulting from foreign intelli-
gence activities to those agencies responsible for the
matters involved."
Again, we welcome this as a clear statement. of what the
Agency properly does in the United States in support of its
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foreign intelligence mission. As I described to`you earlier
and explained in my confirmation hearings, these include:
(1) Recruiting, screening, training, and investigating
employees, applicants, and others granted access to
sensitive Agency information;
(2) Contracting for supplies;
(3) Interviewing US citizens who voluntarily share
with the Government their information on foreign topics;
(4) Collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in
the United States;
(5) Establishing and maintaining support structures
essential to CIA's foreign intelligence operations; and
(6) Processing, evaluating, and disseminating foreign
intelligence information to appropriate recipients
within the United States.
I respectfully suggest that the Committee might indicate
its support of these or similar legislative amendments in
its recommendations.
A separate matter of concern deals with the question of
appropriate oversight of the Agency. Within the Executive
Department, the Director is appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate and serves "during the
pleasure of the President of the United States and for the
time being."
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Statement
W.E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Before
Defense Subcommittee
of the
House Appropriations Committee
February 20, 1975
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This Committee is well aware of the contribution
intelligence makes to decisions about defense
levels. I would also like to remind you of its
contribution to the Strategic Arms Limitation
and similar treaties. Such agreements help
reduce the need for the heavy expense of arms.
I would like to stress another aspect of
intelligence today ---- its contribution to peace-
keeping. Aside from its assistance to our ability
to make treaties to reduce tensions between us and
other nations, it has on occasion provided our
Government information with which it has been
able to convince other nations not to initiate
hostilities against their neighbors. This peace-
keeping role can grow in importance as our intelli-
gence coverage improves. Correspondingly, it can
decline if our intelligence machinery is made
ineffectual through irresponsible exposure or
ill-founded exaggeration.
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 NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY
HEARING
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL ,INTELLIGENCE
Printed,for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-278 WASHINGTON : 1973
 Senator SYMINGTOI. I know you know that much. of the CIA opera-
tion in Laos had as much to do with intelligence as the production of
carpets in the United States. It was the operation of a war conducted,
at least in some cases, by the State Department and' the Central In-
telligence; Agency to cover up what we were actually doing. That is
what worries the American people, they find something going on for
years, killing a lot of people, about which they had no idea.
Turning now to domestic activities the 19-17 act provides. "The `
Agency shall' have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or 1T
internal security functions." I would ask you about several recent
events, some connected with the Watergate case, involving the CIA.
The purpose of these questions is not to elicit your opinion about deci-
sions made' by your predecessors or other CIA officials, right or wrong,.
good or bad; rather, to clarify the meaning of these statutory restric-
tions on domestic activity as expressed in the 1917 act.
Do you believe the prohibition against the CIA having police or law
enforcement powers, or internal security functions, Would prohibit the
preparation. of a psychological profile on a U.S. citizen? .
Mr. COLEY. Not in every case,. Mr. Chairman, because, for instance,
we prepare.a.psychological profile on our applicants,,on our.-applicants
for employment, and I think we consequently have a legitimate func-
tion: for some of these. But I think I agree with the tllrtist of your
question, .which!is with reference to Mr. Ellsberg. It is not our function
to use this capability in that case.
Senator SYMIINGTON. That was my next question. Would it pro-
hibit the preparation of a psychological profile on a U.S. citizen who
was under indictment for crime, as was the case with Mr. Daniel Ells-
berg in August 1971?
Mr. CoTBY. Let its say that I do not intend to do this, Mr. Clrairma.n.
Senator SYMINGTON. If anybody asks you to do it would. you conic
back here and protest?
Mr. Col-,BY. If I cannot handle it any other way.
Senator SYMINGTON. If you cannot handle it any other way?
Mr. Coil~;vY. Right. .
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank vou.
Would these provisions of the 1947 act prohibit the Agency from
providing .a caruera,- tape recorder, disguises and alias documentation
to. a White. House employee if the Agency was informed. that that
employee was to use these materials to conduct an "interview," as was
apparently the case with Mr. E. Howard Hunt, in 197t?
Mr. CO:r,nY. This is a very COnlp)licated question, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. Simplify It for US:
Mr. Cor.,riY. For example, the Secret Service Act calls for. the full
collaboration of other agencies of the Government in the protection of
the individuals designated for protection by that, service. The question
as to whether we should give the Secret Service. certain assistance
comes up. I propose to draw the distinction between---=
Senator SYMuNGTON. This was not Secret Service. The While House
called the Deputy Director of the CIA requesting all of this apparatus
be given Mr. Hunt.
Mr. Cor. nv. Right. I was using this as an illustration of the com-
plexity of the problem, Mr. Chairman. In other words, I find it very
 difficult to say here that Ave will never give any other agency of the
U.S. Government help which they might use in their responsibilities
because, for instance, we provide a considerable amount of intelligence
to the FBI, and there are other ways in which we help the other
agencies of the Government.
The fact is, however, that I think in that particular case a mistake
was made and it will not be made again.
Senator SYMINGTON. A good answer.
Would the provisions of the 1947 act prohibit the use of a so-called
safe house to provide such materials to a White House employee?
Mr. COLBY. I think the same answer applies to that question, llr.
Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would these provisions of the 1947 act pro-
hibit the developing of a film for such a White Mouse employee?
Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, that depends. I mean, if one of the
White House employees has a film of some particular thinly or even
needs a safe house for some perfectly legitimate purpose I really see
no problem in the Agency helping him with that particular fuunction.
I think it is really a matter of what he is doing and whether the
Agency participates by helping him in some improper activity, and I
assure you that the Agency is not going to participate in any improper
activity, although I can envisage a situation in which it would be
appropriate for the Agency to help not Mr. Howard Hunt but a White
House official to meet somebody without coming to public notice.
Senator SYDIINGTON. In the CIA's interest, it is proper to state that
when the Deputy Director, General Cushman, found out the nature
and degree of this operation he notified the White House staff member
who had requested it that he would no longer approve it.
Mr. CoLBY. Yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. So I would not think you would have any prob-
lem with this question.
Mr. COLBY. I think that is exactly it. When it began to be indicated
that the Agency would begin to participate in the activity in the United
States in that regard the Agency withdrew from that participation.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would these provisions of the 1947 act require
the Agency to insure materials loaned to a White House employee for
one function were not used for another illegal function?
Mr. CoLBY. Let us say I think we are going to be very careful with
some of our unique equipment, DIr. Chairman, and we are not going to
let it out without control.
Senator SriluNcToN. Is there any practical way the CIA can moni-
tor the, use of materials it provides to various employees in Govern-
nient, including those in the White. House?
Mr. COLBY. It depends on the equipment. With certain equipment
we can, and frequently do, insist on knowing precisely what is clone
with that equipment, and that it is used in a legitimate purpose by the
Agency in question.
However, I think that it is possible in most cases for us to do this,
and we propose to do it.
Senator SY3MINGTON. Is there any agreement between the FBI and
the CIA regarding what is to occur if one agency, in the course of
its operations, comes across the operations of the other?
Mr. COLBY. There is an agreement between the two agencies which
was drawn up some years ago. I have not had a chance to review this
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itt detail but I propose to now that there, is new leadership in both
agencies.
Senator SYMIINGTO . WW'hell you review it, will you submit to this
committee your Cone] usions ?
Arr. CoLBY. I would be glad to.
Senator SYhUNOTO;v. Thank you.
Does either the CIA or the FBI have the authority to tell the other
not to continue with, or conduct, certain investigations; or, is there
merely an agreement to notify the other agency in case of a potential
Conflict?
Mr. COLBY. I think the latter is correct. I do not think the CIA
has the authority to direct the I+ BI to suspend an investigation. We
do not. We do have the ability to explain to them that some activity
has another, explanation which they might not have known -and as a
practice we always do this.
Senator SYMINGTON. -Nor would they have a right to do so to you?
Mr. COLBY. They do not have the authority to give me an order to
suspend any activity, except, I suppose, in t`he area of domestic law
if they told me I was doing something improper, they might have au-
thority, to direct me not to do it or arrest me.
[The following additional statement was provided for the record:]
We have an agreement that CIA's foreign intelligence operations in the
United States will be coordinated with the FBI and terminated if the FBI deter-
mines them prejudicial to their activities.
Senator SYIITNOTON. They would appeal to the President through
the Attorney General, and you would appeal to the President direct,
correct?
Arr. COLBY. I would go to the President, right.
Senator SYrliivorov. Aside from protecting the physical security
of CIA property, such as the headquarters in Langley, Va., and con-
ducting security investigations of its own employees, does the CIA
need to have authority to provide direct or indirect support to any
domestic law enforcement agency?
Arr. COLBY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do in terms of support to, for
example, the FBI. If we learn that a certain agent of another coun-
try is coining here, I think it is important we be allowed to pass that
information to the FBI and not be prohibited from doing so.
Senator SYMINGTON. Does the authority of the CIA to collect in-
telligence outside the United States extend to collecting intelligence
on U.S. citizens abroad who do not appear to be involved with the
activities of foreign governments or foreign institutions?
Mr. COLBY. NO; it does not.
Senator SYMINGTON. Your answer is "No?"
Mr. COLBY.-My answer is," _'N'o," who were not involved with foreign
institutions.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you subscribe to Ambassador helms state-
ment in his published address of April 1971 that ``We do not target
on U.S. citizens?"
Mr. COLBY. I do subscribe to that. We target on foreign intelligence,
Mr. Chairman, foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence services.
'T'here is occasionally some incidental mention of American citizens in
this regard. That kind of information, if it indicates something im-
proper, is turned over by us to the FBI. It is not handled by our
Agency.
 Senator SYMINGTON. 1 ow, the so-called Watergate Committee, the
one chaired by Senator Ervin, has recently released a set of documents
dealing with the plan during the summer of 1970, apparently approved
by the President, to establish an Inter-Agency Committee on Intelli-
gence, which would include the Director of the CIA, and. would deal
with domestic intelligence operations. Do you believe that the prohibi-
tion in the 1947 act against the Agency having any police or lawv en-
forcement powers, or any internal security functions, would prohibit
the Director of Central Intelligence from participating' in the evalua-
tion of intelligence on domestic groups?
Mr. Cou.ISY. No; I do not, Mr. Chairman. I think that in that respect
the Agency. has an obligation to provide to the Government the re-
suits of. its foreign intelligence activities and collection and if this can
contribute to the Government's knowledge of some problem in the
United States that this can properly be passed by the Agency to an
interagency group but the Agency,would not itself be engaged in those
functions or exert, those. powers. It would merely pass the results of
its activities abroad to that interagency effort and to the appropriate
authorities of the Government.
Senator SYMINGTON. Well, it is my understanding that when the
Central Intelligence Agency was created the most difficult problems
that they hadin writing the law were the objections`of the'Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation because of his apprehensions
about interference in domestic activities. You have no intention of do-
ing anything of that character?
Mr. CoLBY. Absolutely not, Mr. Chairman. I repeat that I read the
sword "foreign" before the word "intelligence" in the authority under
this act.
Senator SYMMIIqGTO.N. Based on some papers we received we have the
right, I think, to believe that Attorney (general Mitchell did not know
of this so-called plan presented by Mr. Charles Tom Huston, a lawyer
in the White House at that time. Perhaps Mr. Hoover in reporting to
his boss, the Attorney General, requested that the plan-the request,
be put in writing. If he did that, Mr. Mitchell, being a lawyer, unques-
tionably would have felt that higher authority was requesting Mr.
Hoover to break the law. It may well be that is what happened and the
reason the plan, after a few days, was abandonded. In any case, the
people that I have discussed this matter with, who are far greater au-
thorities on the Constitution than I am, feel that it was in effect a re-
quest to circumvent the Constitution, violate the Constitution. I am not
asking for your opinion on that fact or lack of accuracy but I would
hope that you would be very careful about this in the future because
now everybody will be considering this from the standpoint of your
operations. As I understand it, you do not intend to participate in any
way in any domestic intelligence, is that correct?
Senator SYMIIiGTON. Would this prevent you from helping to make
policy regarding the collection of intelligence on domestic groups?
Mr. Coiny. I believe it would, ves, Mr. Chairman. I do not see that
as within my responsibilities at all.
Senator SY,IIINGTON. Would the 1917 act prohibit the CIA from col-
lecting, or providing the support necessary for collecting, intelligence
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 Mr. CO BY. I believe that is the:satne-question, essentially.
Senator SYMINGTO:ti. Yes.
Mr. COLBY. And it would prohibit me from doing that.
Senator SYhMINGTON. Would it clarify your responsibilities, Mr.
Colby, and the responsibilities of the CIA under the 1947 act, if it were
made clearer that your responsibilities extended only to foreign intel-
ligence--namely, intelligence about or.relatedto foreign governments,
groups, or individuals.?
Mr..:Cor r3Y. I would certainly have no objection to that. If it would
relieve any concern that anybody feels about CIA, I would fully recom-
mend that that be done. I think the easiest way for it is just;to use the
words "foreign intelli gence."
.Senator S3.-MINGTON.Ambassador Helms testified:before.the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the requirement ,for the'Dir-ector of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence .sources and methods has
sometimes -led to the existence of a "gray area;" usiig'his words,,of
CIA responsibilities by implication verging on the requirement to'be
involved in domestic activities.
Do you know .ofany way to clarify or correct this situation?
Mr. Corny. My interpretation of that particular provision, Mr.
..Chairman, is that it gives me a charge but does not give me authority.
It gives me the job of identifying any problem of protecting sources
and methods, but in the event I identify one it gives
me the-res
n
ibil
.
po
s
-
ity to go to the appropriate authorities with that information and it
does not give me any authority to act on my own. So I really see less of
i
a.gray area
n that regard. I believe that there is really.no authority
under that act that can be used. 'If, on the other hand, there is some
concerzr,over the matter I would have no problem because T donot vie
w
it as giving me any authority.
Senator.SYMINGTOrr. Do you believe that .some other Government
official should have the overall responsibility to protect intelligence
.sources and metliods,in.order to make.it clear, for example, that it is
,not the CIA's responsibility to .get involved .in domestic law enforce-
mennt .functions.?
Mr. COLBY..I think, in a sense, 1Vir. Chairman, we all have the
responsibility of protecting national security ,information, and that
most intelligence sources and methods fall into that category.
Senator 9YMINGTO.N. WVell, if I understand, if there is a Q verument
official that should have such responsibility, it should be yourself?
Mr. CoLBY. For the intelligence field, I think it is myself, no question
about it.
Senator:SY.ni,,NG1TO . Right.
In genoral, what do you consider to be the proper scope of your
agency.act.ivities.within tlie United States?
Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, we obviously have to run a headquarters
here; we have to recruit people for our staffs, and so forth; we have
to. conduct investigations on those,people; we have to protect our own
intelligence sources-and methods within.the Agency; we have to con-
tract with a large number of American firms for the various kinds
of equipment that we might have need for.abroad. We also, I believe
quite properly, can collect foreign intelligence in the United States,
including requesting American citizens to share with their Govern-
ment certain information they may know about foreign situations.
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 We have a service that does this, and I am happy to say, a very large
number of American citizens have given us some very important in-
formation. We do not pay for that information. We can protect their
proprietary interest and even protect their names if necessary, it they
would rather not be exposed as the source of that information.
We also, .I believe, have certain, support activities that we must
conduct in the United States in order to conduct foreign intelligence
operations abroad. Certain structures are necessary in this country
to givo our people abroad perhaps a reason for operating abroad in
some respects so that they can appear not as CIA employees but as
representatives of some other entity. Lastly, I think that there are a
number of activities in the United States where foreign intelligence
can be collected from foreigners, and as long as this is forein-n intelli-
gence, I think it quite proper that we do so, I can certainty go into
more detail on this in executive session any time you would like, Mr.
Chairman, but I reiterate that the focus should and must be foreign
intelligence only, and that all the other activities are only supportive
of that major function.
Senator SY.AlINcroy. If you should receive an order in the future
which appears on its face to ire illegal, what would you do?
Mr. COLT;Y. I would object to it and, if necessary= I am quite prepared
to leave this responsibility it it came to that.
Senator SYniI\ c ro v. I ciid not hear you.
Mr. COLT Y. And I am quite prepared to leave this job if it comes
to that.
Senator Svinxcz?ox. Do you believe that CIA officials should refrain
from rnalnng policy, or explicitly making recommendations about
policy, and, if so, what steps can you take to insure that the CIA
maintains its role as solely an intelligence organization?
Mr. COLBY. I do indeed believe that the CIA's role is to try to call
what is happening abroad very accurately and precisely, and inci-
dentally, to show two or three different interpretations if these legit-
imately exist. But the action that should be taken about that is a larger
question dealing with the interest and policies of the United States
and the various capabilities of the United States. These are not within
the responsibilities of the intelligence community and, therefore, I
think that the intelligence, community should stick to its own business
and not get into recommending what should be done.
Senator Sr irxcroN. What would be your position regarding CIA
collaboration, with private American corporations overseas?
3-Ir. Cor.BY. Well, I think that in many respects there are perfectly
legitimate ways in which we can collaborate with American corpo-
rations overseas in terms of the exchange of information and in some
situations corporations overseas can help the intelligence activity and
mission.
However, I think your reference is rather to the situation that de-
veloped with ITT in Chile and I think that our position there is that
we are not going to be a conduit for corporate policies and that we will
not allow ourselves to be controlled by some corporation.
Senator SYnrinc'rox. There would appear no reason, from the stand-
point of logic, that prevents you utilizing American citizens in a for-
eign country to the best of your ability to obtain information. You
would agree, would you not?
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MIr. Cor.nv. Right.
Senator SYMLNGTO\. On the other hand, you would not want that
corporation to take advantage of your request by in turn obtaining
special favors from the Government?
Mr. Coi.nY. Right. I think we have. only one source of our authority
and that is the statute, and the President, and that we should inalce
decisions on what we do overseas based on the best interests of the
United States as articulated by the Congress and the President, and
not by any individual company.
Senator SYMINGTON. As a member of the Subcommittee) on Multi.-
National Corporations of the Foreign Relations Committee, I was
impressed with the obvious lack of coordination with other commit
tees and I think much of that trouble could have been -avoided if there
had been closer cooperation between the various interested committees.
I have some questions here, Mr. Colby, that Senator Hughes would
like you to answer for the record. Many of them cover ground we have
already discussed this morning.
Mr. COLBY. I will be glad to provide those answers, Mr. Chairman.
Senator HUGHES. Can you tell us publicly the budget totals for the
CIA and for the rest of the intelligence community? If not, how are
we to judge whether these amounts are appropriate, in view of the
intelligence product and the competing claims for Government
resources?
Mr. COLIBY. The budget totals for the Central Intelligence Agency
and the members of the intelligence community have traditionally been
maintained on a classified basis and revealed only in executive session.
I defer to the appropriate congressional authorities for any change in
this procedure. Budget requests are reviewed in detail in the Agency's
annual budget hearings with the Appropriatiolis Committees of the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
Senator HUGIIE.S. In order for the responsible committees of Con-
gress to do their work on national security matters in a better informed
way, would you accept legislation requiring the CIA to furnish tliese
committees regular and special reports on matters witliiii their pur-
view, subject, of course, to proper security measures? Would this not
be a valuable addition to the infrequent and wide-rangini-i -briefings
now given the committee ?
Mr. COLBY. The Director of Central Intelligence traditionally has
given briefings on the world situation and on specific topics to a num-
ber of Senate and House committees. I will review the matter and
report to the Armed Services Committee on the possibility of. supple-
menting such briefings by appropriate written materials, 'provided
these can be maintained on a. classified basis. I think this can be accom-
plished without legislation.
Senator HUGHES. What steps have been taken or will you take to
insure that the CIA never again will be involved in domestic Ameri-
can activities, as it was in the training of police personnel from several
U.S. cities and in the assistance to Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy,?
Mr. COLBY. A careful review has been made. of all possible Agency
involvement in domestic American activities, and instructions are
being issued to ensure that no violation of the limitations of CIA's
statutory authority takes place in the future. With respect to the train=
ing of local police personnel, I reiterate Dr. Schlesinger's assurance
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that, despite the fact that its legality might be defended, any further
such action will be taken only in the most exceptional circumstances
and with the Director's personal approval. Regulations are being de-
veloped with respect to CIA assistance to other U.S. agencies and per-
sonnel to ensure that any such assistance raises no question of CIA
I invol vement in domestic American activities.
L~~?--?--~~~ Senator IIIICHEs. Mr. Colby, published reports say that your ex-
perience has been in the plans and operations side of the CIA rather
than in intelligence or science and technology. Because of the avail-
ability of new technical intelligence gathering means, not to mention
the backlash and suspicion in ninny areas of the world regarding
agents, do you believe that the time has come to reduce some of our
overseas operations in order to put greater stress on intelligence analy-
sis and science and technolog ?
Mr. Corny. Over the past 15 years great stress has been placed on
scientific and technological intelligence gathering, which has made a
great contribution to accurate knowledge of important foreign devel-
opments. ,Overseas intelligence operations must only be conducted in
circumstances fully justifying the risks involved and -in situations
which cannot be covered by more normal methods. Analysis has made
a substantial contribution to intelligence and is being improved and
refined to the greatest degree possible.
Senator HUGHES. Published reports also give you a key policy role
in decisions to involve the United States in clandestine operations in
Laos in the late I950's and early 1960's-operations which grew into a
secret, CIA-run war.
(a) On,reflection, do you believe that it was wise for the Agency to
.get involved in.such military operations?
(b) Do you believe that it is proper under our Constitution for such
military operations to be conducted without the knowledge or approval
of the Congress?
(c.) Where should the line he drawn between-CI1 and Defense De-
partment activities involving. the use of-armed force?
':Mr. Corny. The Agency's activities in Laos were undertaken in di-
rect response to Presidential and National Security Council direction
in order to carry out U.S. policy and at the same time avoid the neces-
sity for uniformed U.S. involvement in Laos. These activities grew in
size over the years to meet greater North Vietnamese and Pathet,Lao
pressure. The size.to which these operations grew made it difficult to
maintain normal intelligence procedures. Despite the difficulties for
'CIA, I submit that the Agency fulfilled the charge given it efficiently
and effectively.
The appropriate committees-of the Congress and.anumber of indi-
vidual senators and congressmen were briefed on CIA's activities in
Laos during the period covered. In addition, CIA's programs were
described to the Appropriations Committees in our annual budget
hearings.
In general, the line should be drawn between CIA and the Defense
Department with respect to armed force at.the point in wvliich the
United States acknowledges. involvement in such activities. Asa prac-
tical ma.tter,'however, the. scale of the activity will, in many cases, also
affect whether the United States is, revealed as engaged in the activity.
Senator HUGHES. Where do you-and should we-draw the line
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Question. Mr. Colby, ?lour precious testimony abort domestic anti-cities of CIA
lies pr6voked seine critical Continent in the press. IVortlrl you lire the Coal inittee
(?.rttnrplcs-ltylpothetical esantpies if you line-of the kind of CIA inquiries and
r'ntervicias which you would view as proper within the United states?
Answer. Provided that CLV.?; activities within the U.S. are in the prosecution
of foreign intelligence and do not contravene U.S. law, I believe they do not. cou-
fliet with the statutory restriction against Cf.-.t involvement in doine tie affair,':
Example, of this kind of activity tire:
(a) Interviewing American citizens who knowingly and willingly share their
inforniafion about foreign subjects with their governrnetf.
(b) (.Ldiect foreign intelligence front foreigners tenipora rlly within the U.S..
(c) Establish support structures within the U.S. to permit (.'IA operations
abroad.
(d) Recruiting, screening and training our o i-u personnel.
(e) C nttra.cting for supplies essential to foreign intelligence operations.
(f) Providing training to foreigners in the U.S.
(g) Passing the results ot foreign intelligence operations to appropriate T.T.R.
agencies having a legitimate interest therein, e.g., the FBI.
(h) Under the economy act, providing assistance or service to other U.S. agen-
cies for activities within their statutory authority which do not involve CIA in
activities outside its statutory authority.
Question. In the same vein, would you cite instances of CIA assistance to other)
(Jorernment agencies which- you would view as proper under the 1947 Act?
Answer. (a) Advising the FBI of the imininent arrival in the U.S. of it
foreign terrorist.
(b) Training in Communist doctrine and practices to the FBI. Secret Service,
etc. Advise other agencies with personnel serving abroad on Communist espionage
techniques likely to be practiced against theta.
(c) Passage to the Drug Enforcement Administration of results of intelli-
gence operations abroad revealing the details of the drug traffic.
(d) Reporting to.appropriate authorities evasion of U.S. export controls as
learned by foreign intelligence operations.
Question. Some recent critical press comment has been provoked by the fact
that Director fIelms approved' or signed off on-the now eohtroversial 1970
dontestic intelligence plan. Would that plan, to your knowledge, have involved
('I-,I. in activities beyond the authority of the 1947 law, either inside or outside
the United States?
Answer. The history of the 1970 domestic intelligence plan demonstrates that
CIA participation was limited. to the foreign intelligence contribution to meet the
problems of internal secti its>. The only specific option considered for CIA was that
CIA coverage of American students (and others) traveling abroad or living
aboard should be increased insofar as they are involved with foreign subversive
elements which might litilizle them against the interests of U.S. internal security.
If implemented, this would have been consistent with the provisions of the
National Security Act of 1947.
Question. There has been recent press. speculation with respect to CIA involve-
ment in a reported 195.9 attempt to overthrow Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia.
Will you comment, please?
Answer. Prince Sihanouk is under a somewhat understandable inisappreheusiou
as to CIA's involvement in a 1959 attempt to. overthrow hint. CIA did not sup-
port or instlgate that attempt. Some of our allies were involved in support and
stimulation Of that attempt, and Prince Sihanouk Inferred U.S. responsibility
from their iilvolvctnrent. His belief was reinforced by his discovery of an intelli-
gence operation conducted by CIA which maintained contact with the leader-
ship of the coup group for intelligence purposes only. Since this group carried
a raclio and other paraphernalia, Prince Sihanouk inferred that this signified
active support of the coup effort rather than merely a contact for intelligence
purposes.
Question. A press report from Cambodia published yesterday (Washington
Strur-N(lws)' surrjests the development there of a. clandestine aid and advisor
program sirrbilar to that in, Laos. Please tell us what role CIA ?isnow playing in
i'antboclia Are CIA employees engaged in any activities other than intelligence
.riuthcrinq and analysis?
99-275-73---11
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reucecoverage of the Vietcong infrastructure and these questions are ones.
which I shared and at the same time tried to resolve.
Question. How relevant are the contents Of the [deleted] cables to the sitna-
tion in 1973?
Answer. I think there are a number of intelligence indicators that VCI
strength. in 1973 is considerably less than it was in 1970, both in terms of
numbers and, particularly, in terms of effectiveness and capabilitySince the
several. ft ictor s present in 1973 which were not present in 1976':
January' ,11973 Paris Agreements, North Vietnam has infiltrated ethnic North
Vietnamese , administrative and political personnel to perform VCI functions
that would. . certainly be performed by ethnic southerners if the latter were
available. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese have had to dispatch north-
erners to perform these local functions despite the release of substantial num-
bers of civilian prisoners (former VCI) held by the GVN, who would presum-
ably be available to resume their VCI activities on the other side. In 1973, there
is of course a much higher degree of GVN presence, security and effective ad-
ministrative control in the countryside than there was in 1970. This may well
reduce the- incentives to participate in the VCI, even for Communist sympa-
thizers. Factors such as these, I believe, make the July 1973 situation appl'e-
ciably different from that of June 1970. part:
Question. Paragraph [deleted] of the [deleted] 1910 cable stutc?4, in pa 970, [deleted] agreement lof developinents rentesituatio a in! South iViet-!Infligt of na.m., comment on this statement. -
Ans\ver;:I believe the strength and effectiveness of the VCI has been sub-
stantially reduced since 1970. I would prefer not to set a statistical level. The
VCI and the North Vietnamese are infiltrating sonic additional strength, as
noted above, but there is no indication at this time that the VCI has gained
strength oe effectiveness since January 1973. mate
CJnestion. I)e ne the objectives of the Phoenix Program. With appro1
dncicrcentatiota, ul+at is your understanding of the degree of success or failure
in accomplishing these objectives?
Answer. The Phoenix program was designed to bring order and effectiveness
to the gover'nnient, if not the Communist, side of the struggle between the
VCI and'the people.and government of South Vietnam. I believe it made a
substantial, but not necessarily decisive contribution to the government's ability
to resist the attempt to overthrow it and the massive military assault in 19721.
PREPARED QT`ESTIONS FROM SENAT01'. HUGHES
[Questions' submitted by Senator Hughes. Answers supplied by 11r. Colby.]
Question. Can you tell us publicly the budget totals for the CIA and for the w rest the intelligence in view of not, lt#,)v re ire to the c'ompcti ig
amounts are "'op 7
claims for govcrnment resources.
Answer. The budget totals for the Central Intelligence Agency and the meni-
hers of the intelligence community have traditionally been maintained onte a
classified basis andrevealed only in executive session. I defer to the ai t 1 i
congressional authorities for any change in this procedure. Budget requests
are reviewed in detail in the Agency's annual budget hearings with the Appro-
priations Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Question. In order for the responsible committees of Congress to do their
work- on national security matters in. a better informed 2cag, would you accept
legislation requiring the CIA to furnish these committees regular and sprcial
reports on matters within their purview, subject of course to proper security
measures?-JV,,ould this not be a valuable addition to the infrequent and -wide
ranging briefings now given the Committee?
Answer. The Director of Central Intelligence traditionally has givenibcl efi11gE
on the world situation and on specific topics to a number of Sena committees. I ;will review the matter and report to the Armed S rrvice Committee
on the possibility of supplementing such briefings by apI I
terials, provided these can be maintained on a classified basis. I think this rail
be accomplished without legislation.
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180
r Question. Wliat steps have been taken or will Von take to ensure that the
C[
. never again will he invold i dti A
venomescmericana activities, as it wai
in t710 trainhcq of police personnel from several U.S. cities and in the rassistunc
Answer. A careful review has been made of all possible Agency involve?rnent
that: no violation of the limitations of CIA's statutory authority dices place
in the future With
t
respec
. to the training of local police personnel, I reiterate
Dr. Sell) esitiger's assurance that, despite the fact that its lgal'tty !night be
defended an
f
rth
y
u
,er such action will be taken only in the nio t exceptional
circninstances and with the Director's personal approval, Ilegirlation are being
-"
"
"
' """"' "' ""'?~? ?. .,t~c,l,,It':f 1-ti ptul~:imult?1
-.. to ensure that any such assistance raises no question of CIA 'invlrLVelnent in
Question, FMr.Colby, published reports say that your eapcrience has been
-
r/once l//
setcrr T
and technology Because of the ae'ailabil,itV'of rarrv tcclrraical irrtclligenee gatlrcr-
Ifi// means not to
,,
t.,,.- a,.- z _., _. - v , -
n
m
..
_.
.. .,..,../..,...,. ~ ire r,v_.y 14 v l{ of the
. arorht re17terdinll agents, do Vol, believe that 'the time has come to reduce some
Answer. Over the past fifteen ;Years great stress has been placed 1n ScihrLtifc
and technological intelligence gathering, which has made a great contribution tip
accurate knowledge of important foreign developments. Oversehs intelligence
and
it
111 s
uations which cat bd b
nnoe coverey 'lore normal metho(N.
Analysis has mnde a substantial contribution tit 'iiitelligedce and is i'teiiig im-
Question. Published reports also :ijive you it, key Policy role lit decisions to
involve the United States in clandestine operations in Laos in the late I950s and
On reflection, do g/oia believe that it was it ise for the -lgeney M #et invo'lrcel
Answer. The Agency's activities in Laos were undertaken in direct response to
Presidential and National Security Council direction it, order to carry out IJ.S.
policy and al; the same time avoid the necessity for uniformed U.S. involvement
in Taos TI`h urn -
r
"? ???
.-.-,. 1 a1.net Lao pressure, The Size to which these operatiolsgrew made
it difTicult. to maintain normal intelligence procedures. Despite the difficulties for
Qu-estion,. Dri r/yin belier?c that it is proper under oiar'Constitution for 9icch rnili-
----
f
b
-
-"-
"" '-"?? i
ec o11 intLiVLrL-
nal senators and eong1'essulen were briefed on CIA's activities in Laos during the
7)PH111I T- -111:1:.1.. 11 1 1 1_
Qu.c.stion, Where should the line be drawn between CIA and Defense Depart-
Answer. In general, the line should be drawn between CIA and the Defense
at oint
-.___ a -1(,t;U States
aclcnonvledges involvement in such activities. As a practical matter, however, the
Question. Where do you--awl should ice-draw the line between siniryrll7 gather-
hurl intelligence and rnanipulatinfl events or interfering in the ?cntcrndl affairs of
Au wer. As indicated above, the use of intelligence techniques should be re-
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Question. What reason does the National Security Council give for.not ntal.?iug
public the secret "Charter" of the CIA. the NSCIDs?
Answer. I respectfully suggest that this matter be raised with .the National
Security Council.
Question. Could you provide copies of dation.al Security Action Memorandums
(N .S.1-11) impnberect 55, 56, and j-, to the Committee?
Question. Is it accurate that A' SAM 55, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, charged him with responsibility/ for all military type operations by the
intelligence community.' Is this NSA.JI still in effect? I1ow is it presently inter-
preted ?
Answer. Since the document is a Presidential document, I do not have the au-
thority to release it.
Question.- Is it accurate that 11 SAJI 57 expressly set out guidelines for opera-
tions being restrained to it squall size and only then with adequate denialtility? Is
this -1"S_AM still in effect? /Tow is it presently interpreted?
Answer. Since the document is a Presidential document. I do not have the
authority to release it.
Que.stion. What other NSA ifs or other forms of direction from. the e:cec!rtiie
department detail or describe the operations of the CIA or other intelligence coan-
ponnts"Are these available to the Committee
Answer. Operations of the CIA and other intelligence components are cot-
dncteil under the authority of the NS(-'.IZ)s and a variety of other executive orders
and directives. I have been authorized to brief the Committee on the basic ones,
the N SC'IDs, on a classified basis.
Questiott..At the present time. is the CIA or any other intelligence components
cttgai/ed in training or assistance to any late enforcement agencies or` bodies
within the US aside from. the FBI? Where and under what arrangements?
Answer. Yes. CIA disseminates its foreign intelligence reports to Several agen-
cies concerned with the matters covered in these reports such as the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Armed Services, the Customs Service, the Secret Service and others; oit a routine
basis. With respect to training, we provide limited training to the Drug Enforce-
uient Administration personnel in inter-agency procedures, intelligence coorclina-
Lion practices in overseas missions, to the Secret Service in defensive driving
and explosives and demolition devices as re'ated to the Secret Service protective
responsibilities against terrorist activities and to representatives of ISIB nvem-
bi rs in counter-audio surveillance measures. Any such training bi'C'IA is under-
taken only upon formal request and detailed review and senior approval..
With respect to other intelligence components. I do not have precise informa-
tion immediately available but will determine that if the Committee so requests.
Qitestion_At the present time, with, how many foreign internal security or in-
telligence agency organizations does the CIA have contact? Ilou; nusny-have rep-
resentatides here in the United states? 110w are these arrangements formalized!
Answer. [Deleted.]
Question. Ifas the CIA ever trained or assisted in the creation of fo'r'eign intel-
ligence agencies' When and Where? Under what authority' Is any 'PU1-f-i0RlZED_
Copies available,-.!,,.,hen authorizers by Corn-_ rnittee;only t.hrough Official Reporters
(A)Da")y
OFF ICIAL HE
.P 0 r r F;
300:;EVk: ru S'IRt: is"(, S.V.
WASi tINGTON, D.C. 20024
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