CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A004500200001-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 27, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 3, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A004500200001-9.pdf571.43 KB
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Approved Fo R-leaseT0ll/2'5ICRel'0097 004500 00001-9 3 June 1959 opY o. 62 DOCUMIENT rvo. NO CHANGE !N CLASS. f f DEt;LAr;;! IEn CLASS CHANGED TO: TS NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH' ,HE,ZO-2 DATE! State Dept. review completed / Approved For Release 21 00975AO04500200001-9 s ir 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04500200001-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04500200001-9 Approved Fo 4500200001-9 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 3 June 1959 25X1 DAILY BRIEF Q I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-UAR: Soviet-UAR cooperation in international front organizations such as the Afro-Asian "solidarity move- ment" appears to be steadily deteriorating as a result of Nasir's attacks on Communists and, the bloc. Cairo has apparent- ly decided hot to send a UAR delegation to the Communist World Youth Festival in Vienna this summer. II. ASIA-AFRICA Indonesia: The Constituent Assembly's; failure on final read- ing to adopt President Sukarno's proposal for a return to the 1945 constitution creates a political stalemate in Indonesia. While some compromise might yet be worked out, Sukarno and the army may impose the 1945 constitution, which gives the executive greater political power. Already army chief Nasution, in what may be a preliminary step, has banned "all political activity in Indonesia." Approved For (ease 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00975 004500200001-9 j FINE Approved For Release 2002/10/21 CIA-RDP79T00975AO04500200001-9 MEN j? j 25X1 j III. THE WEST 9 Nicaragua: President Somoza's public admission that revolu- tionaries have landed may encourage additional labor and other un- committed groups to join the general strike, which has already at- tracted considerable support and should reach its peak on 3 June. Despite the imposition of martial law and the arrest of opposition leaders, the government faces serious domestic defiance for the first time in its 25 years. While several external threats re- main, the Costa Rican Government has acted swiftly to prevent further attacks from its territor b Nicaraguan revolutionaries. IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN ' SITUATION The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100- 2/1-59 (17 March 1959). 1. There is no indication of any change in the basic Soviet position at Geneva, but Khrushchev in Tirana appeared to introduce a harder line by categorically rejecting all parts of the Western package plan for Berlin. V A.~.~.~??~J r l- M-1---- /fAA/1/AA/AA /CIA 1"11"11"17f1TAAf17GA flAGAA/fAAAAA A j 3June59 j DAILY BRIEF ii MIJIJI U r 1 I IGabG LVVL/ IVIL i. '...w-rwrI a I VV Iv V 4JVVLVVVV i-a j Approved Fo - 004500200001-9 2. So long as the USSR estimates that nego- tiations at Geneva are promising or that the pros- pects for a summit meeting are good, it will prob- ably not go so far as to turn over access controls to the GDR. However, negotiations may be reaching a stage where the USSR might consider it to be advanta- geous to increase the threats of such action. The actual physical transfer of controls could. be accomplished with little or no warning. 3. While there are no reliable indications of a bloc intent to deny Allied or West German access to West Ber- lin,,; or, to seal off West Berlin in the immediate future, the USSR could take such actions with little or no warning. 4. There have been no significant changes in Soviet capabilities, to respond to possible Western actions in the event of turnover, harassment, or blockade. 5. The rumor in West Berlin that the US might give up BIAS has resulted in declining staff morale. WAS is an important symbol of the US position in Ber- lin. 3 June 59 DAILY BRIEF M 25 01 j Approved For~2elease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097511004500200001-9 Approve o ease - 4500200001-9 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet-UAR Cooperation in International Fronts Declining The rift between Moscow and Cairo produced by Nasir's attacks on Communists and the bloc has caused a steady deteriora- tion in Soviet-UAR cooperation in international front organizations. The Afro-Asian solidarity movement, which has depended on the cooperation of the UAR and other Afro-Asian countries with the Communists, has been particularly affected. The national solidarity committees on which the international organization theoretically is based have also encountered difficulties, because the committees of some neutralist countries such as India apparently are split between Communist and neutralist elements as a result of Nasir's charges, A critical period for the movement may well occur when preparations are begun for a second "Solidarity Con- ference"--a repeat of the December 1957 meeting held in Cairo--and for the Afro-Asian Women's Conference, Both are scheduled for later this year, There are indications of frictions between Cairo and Moscow in other international front activities. Cairo has apparently de- cided not to send a delegation to the Communist-run World Youth Festival in Vienna this summer, 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004500200001-9 3 June 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 500200001-9 II. ASIA-AFRICA Political Stalemate in Indonesia The Constituent Assembly's third rejection on 2 June of President Sukarno's proposal for the readoption of the 1945 constitution has created a political stalemate in Indonesia. Opposition to the constitution, under which both Sukarno and the army would gain increased political power at the expense of party activity, came from the Moslem parties, including the pivotal Nahdlatul Ulama party, which insisted on the incorpora- tion of religious guarantees for the Islamic religion. The in- itiative now returns to President Sukarno and the army. Sukarno, now in the United States, will be met and briefed at his next major stop--Tokyo--probably on 6 June by Ruslan Abdulgani, head of the appointive national council and a Sukarno confidant. It has been speculated that the President's two-month world tour was timed to keep him uninvolved in the political ma- neuvers attending the constitutional debates and free to work out new arrangements if necessary. Although further attempts at compromise cannot be ruled out, army leaders have consistently hinted that they would take action to enforce the 1945 constitution if necessar Nasution on June banns a political ac- tivity, poss y as a preliminary move to further action. Prime Minister Djuanda had told the assembly that failure to accept the constitution might precipitate "undesirable events" similar to those which "have taken place in neighboring countries 11--obviousl a thinly veiled warning of an army take-over. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004500200001-9 3 June 50 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04500200001-9 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04500200001-9 Approved Fore ease ZUU - .r 4500200001-9 III, THE WEST Situation in Nicaragua President Somoza's public admission that revolutionaries have landed may encourage additional labor and other uncom- mitted groups to join the general strike, which has already at- tracted more support than anticipated and should reach its peak on 3 June. Despite the imposition of martial law and the arrest of opposition leaders, the government faces serious domestic de- fiance for the first time in 25 years. There are apparently no immediate plans to call for action by the Organization of American States, since President Echandi of Costa Rica has already acted to prevent the many Nicaraguan exiles in his country from further attacks on Nicaragua by land or air. The National Guard under General Anastasio Somoza, Jr. , is considered capable of containing the small rebel groups re- ported to have landed. It apparently remains loyal, although several former guard officers have recently taken refuge in Costa Rica and may have, joined the exiles. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004500200001-9 3 June 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For-Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T009754p04500200001-9 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004500200001-9 Approved For lease LQP21RET00975~Ar004500200001-9 Approved For Relea 0/ ft7f T00975AO04500200001-9