CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004400210001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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7 April 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 April 1959
DAILY BRIEF'
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: (High Soviet Foreign Ministry officials showed
obvious pleasure and relief to Ambassador Thompson that a
foreign ministers' conference has been arranged, and adopted
an "almost pleading" attitude in stressing the importance of a
summit meeting. Thompson believes these attitudes reflect
both Khrushchev's pressure on Foreign Ministry officials to
arrange a summit meeting and their realization of the dangers
of the situation brought about by Khrushchev's Berlin move.
Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin remarked to Thompson on 3
April that Khrushchev knew what Secretary Dulles wanted but
now is uncertain what American policy objectives are)I
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*East Germany: East German workers are becoming in-
creasingly "testy and assertive,"
and increased production norms. )
The workers are refus-
ing to cooperate in forced programs involving "voluntary" work
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I.I. ASIA-AFRICA
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India-Tibet: The governments of the Himalayan border
states of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, like New Delhi, are ac-
tively concerned over the possibility of border incidents as a
result of increased Chinese military activity in Tibet and flight
of refugees across the border. Public agitation in India against
Peiping's action in Tibet continues strong. The Indian Communist
other political parties for its defense of Peiping's position.
party has come under heavy attack by Nehru, as well as by all
Iraq: (The British ambassador in Baghdad has advised Lon-
don that th rrest and prolonged interrogation of the senior Iraqi
officer in charge of Mosul Petroleum Company operations may have
been engineered to provide a basis for sequestering the company
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DAILY BRIEF ii
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ly insignificant production. Thus far more than one third of the
(The ambassador believes that Baghdad will attempt to demon-
strate a link between the Mosul uprising and the Mosul Petrole-
um Company--an Iraq Petroleum Company affiliate with relative
157 Iraqi nationals holding senior posts in IPC have been arrested)
III. THE WEST
France-NATO. French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville,
informed of the US decision in principle to furnish arms to Mcorocco,
stated De Gaulle's personal reaction would be unfavorable and in-
cline him to take "further unilateral action in other fields relating
to NATO,' De Gaulle previously linked his withdrawal of the :French
Mediterranean fleet from NATO wartime control to the issue of
Allied support for France's North African policy. This suggests
he might be equally prepared to use the Moroccan arms question
as the pretext for transferring NATO-committed ground units back
to "national" control in line with his concept of NATO as a loose
coalition.)
Spain: Continuing economic deterioration in Spain makes la-
bor disturbances appear probable in April or early May. (The out-
lawed Spanish Communist party is trying to capitalize on workers'
discontent by urging moderate opposition groups to join in a nonvio-
lent strike. These groups have thus far been unwilling to join the
Communists in public demonstrations against the regime, but might
feel obliged by growing worker restiveness over inflationary pres-
su
res to undertake some limited form. of ration)
F
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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East German Regime Facing Difficulties With Workers
The East German workers' refusal to cooperate in the re-
gime+s programs involving "voluntary" work during free time
and their increasingly "testy and assertive" behavior are be-
coming a very serious problem for the Socialist Unity om-
munist art (SED),
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This situation will make it impossible to fulfill
Ulbricht''s boast that the East German standard. of living will
equal that of the Federal Republic by 1961, and will mean a fur-
ther loss of face for the SED.
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(One pro-Ulbricht functionary summed up the situation, ,if
we c1dn't attain our goal the masses will laugh at us. If we do
reach it we'll have lost the workers" He recognized that if the
workers were exploited to the extent necessary to achiev the
goal, they would be completely alienated from the regime)
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
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Himalayan Border States Share Indian Concern Over
Ti etan Developments
India's concern over the possible consequences of Peiping's
military action in Tibet is being increasingly reflected. in the
small independent and semi-independent states which share the
Himalayan frontier. The royal governments of Nepal, Sikkim,
and Bhutan fear that the Chinese Army's intensified effort to
wipe out remaining rebel concentrations along the frontier will
result in an influx of refugees and possibly lead to clashes with
their border troops.
/Independent Nepal appears to be relying on India for guid-
an eY
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i e New a i., Kat-
mandu's closed-door policy on Tibetan re ugees has been mod-
ified so that :asylum probably will be granted in most cases.
Nepali army and police units along the Tibetan border have been
reinforced. The isolated mountain kingdom of Bhutan--a pro-
tectorate of India--appears to be taking similar action.)
The crown prince of Sikkim, a state more closely controlled
by New Delhi, has taken a strong line against Chinese repres-
sion in Tibet, likening it to the revolt in Hungary. The prince,
a prominent Buddhist leader closely related. to the Dalai Lama's
family, on 6 April expressed his conviction that Prime Minister
Nehru would "persuade" Peiping to recognize Tibetan autonomy.
The Dalai Lama, now resting at the remote lamasery of
Tawang in India's North-East Frontier Agency, apparently will
leave on 7 April to begin a five-day trek across the mountains
to Bomdila, headquarters of the Kameng frontier division.
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'T' e
Indian Government, determined eep the Dalai ama iso-
lated. from contacts with the press and foreign officials, prob-
ably will succeed in persuading him to make only noncontro-
versial statements while in India.
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Foreign Office officials have sharply rejected t he am-
bassado 's complaints about the Indian consul general's activities
in Lhasa) Peiping's public comment on the Dalai Lamas who the
Chinese still claim is held "under duress," reflects its embar-
rassment and its intention to avoid a dispute over his presence
in India as long as he makes no public statements.
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III. THE WEST
Possible French Reaction in NATO to US Decision
On Moroccan Arms
&rench Foreign Minister Couve de Murville stated on
5 April that De Gaulle's reaction to the American decision
in principle to furnish arms to Morocco would be "extremely
bad," since it would. be regarded as making a farce of tri-
partite Western policy consultations. Referring to De Gaulle's
recent withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from
NATO wartime control, the,forei:gn.`.minister_said the US
decision on arms for Morocco would encourage De Gaulle to
take further unilateral French action in other fields affecting
NAT
De Gaulle may use the Moroccan arms question as the
pretext for further moves to weaken the "integration" aspects
of NATO in line with his concept of the alliance as a loose
coalition. He will probably maintain his opposition to inte-
gration of the French Air Force with the NATO air-defense
complex, and might go so far as to transfer NATO-committed
ground. units-- ost of them already in Algeria--back to "na-
tional" control
De Gaulle's current views on NATO were made public in
his 25 March press conference. In a 4 April address marking
NATO's tenth anniversary Premier Debrd repeated De Gaulle's
demands for a greater voice for France in deciding free world
strategy and. said NATO must develop cooperation in other than
pjrel.r military matters.)
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Possibility of Strikes in Spain This Spring
he illegal Spanish Communist party (PCE) reportedly is
trying hard to persuade the moderate opposition groups to sup-
port a nonviolent general strike this month or early in May.
these groups are re-
uc an to ac o vious y om.munis ?-inspired demonstrations
but they are not completely unwilling to collaborate with the
PCE
A repetition of the spring strikes of the past three years
is possible. Workers continue to feel the pinch of inflationary
pressures even though the cost of living has tended to level off
in 1959. The US Embassy estimated in February that living
costs in the Madrid area had risen 45.2 percent since Novem-
ber 1956. The government's program to rationalize the Span-
ish economy to qualify for aid from the International Monetary
Fund and to enable Spain to compete in a free European market
may require layoffs of surplus workers to lower production costs
and may give rise to serious strikes.
(The moderate opposition groups have heretofore rejected.
Comunist overtures for joint demonstrations against the re-
gime. Should worker restlessness be such as to compel atten-
tion by the opposition, the moderate groups might feel obliged
to collaborate in some degree with the PCE in order to fore-
stall the Communists--the best organized of all the clandestine
parties- -from making a bid to capture the workers' allegiance)
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National. Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
'United States Information Agency
The Director
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