CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004400180001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 3, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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3 April 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 April 1959
E
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Japan. The Kishi government is confident that the
Supreme Court will reverse the lower-court opinion that
the presence of US troops in Japan is unconstitutional. A
ruling is not likely prior to the upper-house elections in June.
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miners, who are armed, object to the government's insistence,
under pressure from the International Monetary-Fund, on re-
III. THE WEST
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republic next February.
Cyprus: The provisional cabinet for the new Cyprus Gov-
ernment which Archbishop Makarios named on 2 April repre-
sents a compromise between the "old guard," represented by
Makarios himself, and the "young blood," represented by for-
mer EOKA leaders. Makarios, probable president of the new
Cypriot state, has assured personal dominance by retaining
the key posts of foreign affairs and. finance and by including
some of his personal followers. Two of the seven ministers
named from the Greek Cypriot community are former terror-
ist leaders. The ministries of Defense, Health, and Agricul-
ture will be filled. by Turkish Cypriots. The provisional
cabinet will function until Cyprus becomes an independent
Bolivia: &he government evidently expects violence in
the t o mining area in the next few days) President Siles
has postponed a scheduled state visit to Argentina. The tin
moving subsidies for mine commissaries.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Dalai Lama Enters India
IThe Chinese Communists already are
concerned Mat a new spate of unfavorable publicity will fol-
low any statements made by him on the Tibetan situation. On
2 April, Peiping charged that he crossed the Assam border
near Bhutan "under duress of the traitors," which suggests
that the Chinese plan to refute any of his statements as made
under compulsion)
e~Peiping now may demand that India return the "kidnaped."
23-year-old Bhuddist leader to Tibet. The Chinese also are
likely to make further charges that Kalimpong has been used
by "imperialists" as a "center" of the revolt and imply the
Indians have thus abetted the rebellion. On 1 April, a Chinese
Communist news agency report suggested that Nehru was giv-
ing comfort to the rebels when he received. a visit from the
"traitor" former Tibetan prime minister, who returned. to
Kalimpong "satisfied with the talk with Nehru.)
New Delhi is not likely to force the Dalai Lama to return
to Ti. et against his will. Nehru probably will try, however, to
isolate him from the press and restri t his political activity
in order to lessen friction with Peipin
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Early Japanese Supreme Court Decision on Legality of US
Troops in Japan Unlikely
The Japanese Supreme Court is not expected. to rule for at
least four months on the controversial opinion of the Tokyo dis-
trict court that the presence of US forces in Japan is unconsti-
tutional. Fear that charges of submission to political pressure
would be raised against the court could delay the final ruling
even longer, However, the government is confident that the
lower court's decision will be reversed because of the "progov-
ernment" views of the justices and because of the large number
of court decisions which have upheld the validity of the US-
Japanese security treaty and the administrative agreement.
In the interim, the Socialists will exploit the issue in the
local elections this month and in the upper-house elections in
June. They may be able to offset the damage to their position
which resulted from their recent endorsement of Chinese Com-
munist objectives in Asia. The issue also gives added. impetus
to a nationwide Socialist campaign, conducted as a joint front
with the Communists and leftist labor, against the government's
plan to revise the security treaty.
The initial reaction of the Japanese press to the Tokyo
court's ruling was critical, but largely on other than legal,
grounds. The press suggested that a question so vital to na-
tional interests and world. peace is not subject to legal inter-
pretation.
Foreign Minister Fujiyama has urged Ambassador Mac-
Arthur to continue their informal discussions on revising the
security treaty to offset the growth of any impression that, the
negotiations are stalled because of doubt about the status of
either US or Japanese forces. Ambassador MacArthur com-
ments that if the Supreme Court overrules the lower-court
decision in clear-cut terms, the over-all effect of the public
and legal debate may be a healthy clarification of Japan's
right to take adequate steps for self-defense, including spe-
cific judicial sanction for US-Japanese defense arrangements.
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Provisional Cypriot Cabinet Represents Compromises
Leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots made public
their choices for a provisional cabinet on 2 April. The list
is a compromise between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and
between the "old guard" of Greek Cypriots, represented by
Archbishop Makarios himself, and the "young blood," rep-
resented by former leaders of the Greek Cypriot terrorist
organization EOKA. Although EOKA has been formally dis-
banded, its leaders recently announced. the formation of a
new political party--the United Democratic Reform Front.
Makarios, who is slated to become the chief executive
of the new Cypriot state, reserved for himself the posts of for-
eign affairs and. finance,, apparently in order to keep a firm
grip on the government and. to preclude other choices which
might have promoted further disunity among the Greek Cypri-
ots. Apparently no concessions were made to the strong Com-
munist element on Cyprus, which appears to be playing a
waiting game until personal rivalries and factional differences
end the surface unity of the more conservative elements among
Greek Cypriots.
The provisional cabinet is intended to become the formal
government when Cyprus is proclaimed an independent repub-
lic next February,
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Bolivian Government Expecting Violence
The Bolivian Government evidently expects violence in
the tin-mining area between now and the 9 April celebration
of the 1952 revolution, and President ,files has postponed a
state visit to Argentina scheduled for 6 April. Armed tin
miners violently oppose the government's assurance to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to eliminate subsidies to
mine commissaries. This assurance, given in mid-March
during a bitter two-week strike over maintenance of subsi-
dized prices in the commissaries, brought Bolivia $500,000
in ICA funds. The IMF, however, is insisting that the as-?
surance be implemented before further funds are made ava:il-
ablea The Bolivian Central Bank's foreign-exchange deficit
has risen to $2,300,000, and significant exchange receipts are
not likely before mid-April.
The Bolivian Government apparently also faces the harass-
ment of a new rightist plot which is unlikely to be successful
but could contribute to violence. The plotters are said to have
labor, police, and army support)
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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