CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004400150001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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31.March 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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31 March 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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*USSR: LMoscow's prompt repiles to tne western notes oi
26 MarcFreflect Ehrushchevts belief that the West is substan-
tially committed to holding a summit meeting regardless of the
outcome of a preliminary foreign ministers' conference. The
Soviet notes seek to create the impression that the three West-
ern powers and the USSR have already agreed to both a foreign
ministers' conference and. a summit meeting. Khrushchev's ap-
parent desire not to obstruct the convening of a ministeriAl,con-
ference by insisting on the participation of Poland and Czecho-
slovakia at the outset is evident in Moscow's willingness to have
this question decided by the conference itself. While the Soviet
notes indicate agreement to Western proposals on the date,
place, and agenda of a conference of foreign ministers., the
reference to the Soviet note of 2 March suggests that the USSR
will insist that substantive discussions be confined to a German
peace treaty and the Berlin question'.I
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
*India Tibet: Prime Minister Nehru in his statement on
Tibet before an aroused Parliament on 30 March appeared to
balance his expression of sympathy for the rebels with a re-
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munist China. Nehru sharply rejected Peiping's charges that
,Ul11 UH PUL-114111C11LUL-Y U1Z~1:L1bblUllb of the 11L)ULa11 a1LUUL1V11 Wt jVu
"impolite" and that the revolt was directed from Indian terri-
tory. Indian political groups and many newspapers are inten-
sifying their pressure on the government to take an unequivocal
stand against Chinese repression in Tibet
)Tibetan resistance
e
leaders based in India on 28 March apparently were planning an
immediate appeal to Nehru for recognition of ibetan Provi-L
sional Government," for asylum for refugees, for diplomatic
IsTdd
and. material assistance to the rebel movement. The Dalai Lama's
party was expected to reach the Indian border on 31 March)
5
Japan: The decision of the Tokyo district court to acquit
seven Japanese nationals of trespassing on an American air
NO, base and its opinion that the presence of foreign troops in Japan
j is unconstitutional may make it more difficult for Kishi to of
j fect an early revision of the US-Japanese security treaty, The
opposition Socialists almost certainly will exploit it in their na-
tionwide tionwide campaign against revision of the treaty, and this could
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ment intends to appeal the decision, which in the interim will
have no practical effect on the status of US forces in Japan,
31 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF
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Greece: CEDA, the Communist-front party, apparently has
reaefi-edagreement on at least limited cooperation in the 5 April
nationwide municipal elections with Sophocles Venizelos, leader
of the largest faction of the non-Communist Liberal party. In
the last general elections EDA polled nearly 25 percent of the
total vote and attracted a plurality in some large urban areas.
Kit stands to gain both political influence and greater respect-
ability hrough cooperation with the Venizelos Wing of the Lib-
eraj~~. I
Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios., who previously has sought
to promote a modus vivendi between right- and left-wing Greek
Cypriots through a tacit understanding with the Communists,,
now has agreed to support moves to weaken the Communist-
dominated labor federation on Cyprus. A period of labor un-
rest, may result and could lead to anend of the political truce
within the Greek Cypriot community.
III. THE WEST
France: (Paris believes the West should try to put the USSR
on the d5lensive by following up De Gaulle's public suggestion
for a joint aid program attacking basic human problems in un-
derdeveloped countries. The French Government may soon
propose that a number of Western nations develop a program
TV economic developmentl.
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Argentina: In calling a strike for 3 April
g general. 3 the
Peronistas and Communists are renewing strong pressure on
President irronaizi to lilt the state of siege and taxe steps which
would enable them to regain control of a large segment of or-
9 anized labor. Although politically motivated, the strike call
'0 may find considerable support because of widespread discontent
over high living costs and require firm police and militar con-
trol measures. 2
IA
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. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
(No Back-up Material)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indian Reaction to Tibetan Situation
The Indian Government apparently is finding it increasingly
difficult to maintain its official position of friendship toward.
Communist China in the face of increasing pressure from polit-
ical groups and many newspapers to take a less equivocal stand
on the Tibetan situation.
Prime Minister Nehru, in his sth.tement before a tense Par-
liament on 30 March, adhered to his established policy of non-
interference. His expression of sympathy for the Tibetan rebels
was balanced by a reaffirmation of India's desire for friendly
relations with Peiping. However, in sharply rejecting the Chi-
nese allegation that discussion of Tibet in the Indian Parliament
was "impolite," Nehru made it clear that he would countenance
no limitations on parliamentary debate "by any external or inter-
nal authority."
Several non-Communist opposition parties now are actively
agitating along anti-Chinese lines as expressed in much of the press
during the past week, thus intensifying pressure on the government
to condemn Peiping for its suppression of the resistance movement.
Despite demands even among progovernment newspapers for a
"realistic reassessment of the basis of our foreign policy," how-
ever, New Delhi is unlikely to deviate markedly from its policy
of outward conciliation with Peiping. Nehru apparently is willing,
as on past occasions, to let the press and opposition elements
express the stronger and more representative views which he
feels his government cannot officially endorse.
(he Dalai Lama's party was expected to reach the Indian border
on 31. March, probably en route to the large lamasery at Tawang in
Assam--the first center inside Indian territory on the route from
Tibet. Tibetan resistance leaders based in India on 28 March ap-
parently were planning an immediate appeal to Nehru for recogni-
tion of a "Tibetan Provisional Government" for asylum for the
Dalai Lama and other refugees, and for diplomatic and material
assistance to the rebel movement. While New Delhi reportedly is
ready to extend political asylum to the Dalai Lama and some ref -
ugees, it may try to ease the diplomatic problem posed by their
presence by restricting Tibetan activities to nonpolitical affairs
and limiting its overt support of the resistance movementl
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Japanese Court Declares Presence of US Troops in Japan
Unconstitutional
The Tokyo district court's opinion that the presence of.for- -
eign troops in Japan is unconstitutional may make it more dif-
ficult for Prime Minister Kishi to effect an early revision of
the US-Japanese security treaty. Since the government plans
to appeal the decision it will have no immediate effect on the
legal status of US forces in Japan. It could, however, involve
the Kishi government in an undesirable political controversy
prior to the parliamentary elections in early June. It also gives
added impetus to a nationwide Socialist campaign against revi-
sion of the security treaty.
In its action, the district court acquitted seven Japanese
nationals accused of trespassing on an American air base in
1957. There is the possibility that incidents similar to that
for which the seven were arrested--i. e, , breaking down the
fence surrounding Tachikawa air base in protest against its ex-
pansion- -may be repeated. Left-wing labor and student groups,
with Socialist encouragement, would be particularly prone to
such action.
In declaring the presence of foreign troops unconstitutional,
the district court cited article 9 of the Japanese Constitution,,
which prohibits the maintenance of an "army, navy, air force, and
other war potential:' The Japanese Government, in maintaining
a limited. military establishment, has interpreted this provision
most liberally on the premise that every country has the inherent
right to provide for its own defense, but it has avoided. a legal
test on this point. The court's decision could lead to additional
juridical action on the entire question of military forces in Japan.
A Foreign Ministry official has indicated that the government will
a peal the decision.
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Greek Elections
The United Democr l c Left (EDA), 1egKl front for the pro-
scri ed Communist party of Greece, is trying to make the
municipal elections scheduled. for 5 April a test of the pro-West-
ern government's popularity]
fDA leaders are seeking collaboration of non-Communist
opposition parties in sponsoring joint slates of candidates for
the municipal councils. While EDA has been rebuffed by spokes-
men for several minor nationalist opposition parties, it appar-
ently has achieved some success with Liberal leader Sophocles
Venizelos.
operation, even if not effective in the council elections, may
become evident in the subsequent election of mayors by the
councilors
Venizelos, however, is spokesman for only one faction of
the rapidly deteriorating Liberal party. Several prominent
Liberals have denounced collaboration with EDA and are work-
ing with other nationalist leaders to defeat the Communists.
This grouping may hold the balance of power in some cities if
the elections result in approximately equal distribution of coun-
cil seats between EDA and the government
The government favors holding "nonpolitical" elections,,
--emphasizing candidates rather than parties- -apparently for fear
that EDA, which captured 25 percent of the popular vote in the
general elections in May 1958, has continued to gain strength
among the electorate. EDA will probably gain new respectabil-
ity from its association with the Venizelos wing of the Liberals.
It will take credit for the victories of several non-Communist
candidates and will probably increase its representation in local
governments throughout Greece]
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Labor Contest May Disrupt Political Truce on Cyprus
Leaders of the conservative Cyprus Confederation of Work-
ers (SEK) assert that Archbishop Makarios has agreed to sup-
port their efforts to increase their membership at the expense
of the Pan Cyprian Federation of Labor (PEO), the island's
largest union and a bulwark of Communist strength. Appar-
ently Makarios is counting on the Communists' desire for
legislative representation to keep them from breaking the po-
litical truce among Greek Cypriots in retaliation against at-
tacks on PEO. Recently it was reported that in return for PEO
leader Andreas Ziartides' agreement not to contest elections
for an independent Cyprus, Makarios promised the Communists
a guaranteed proportion- -possibly as much as 25 percent--of
the seats assigned to the Greek Cypriots.
Now at the zenith of their prestige, the conservative Greek
Cypriots are anxious to disorganize and weaken the Communists
and. leftists, who stand to gain in strength as the new govern-
ment grapples with the political and economic problems of an
independent Cyprus.
District leaders of the recently disbanded and disarmed
EOKA paramilitary organization are being brought into the now-
ineffectual SEK, and an official of the International- Confederation
of Free Trade Unions will give them a six-week course in labor-
union methods. While regional leaders are sorely needed, the
danger exists that these former EOKA leaders will resort to
strong-arm tactics and disrupt the present favorable security
situation on Cyprus.
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III. THE WEST
De Gaulle Wa s Broad Cooperat to Ald . Undeveloped Countries
Fr nce may soon follow up De Gaulle's press statement: of 25
March that he would welcome a summit discussion aimed at at-
tacking the basic human problems of disease, hunger, and shel
ter. Premier Debre told Ambassador Houghton on 26 March
that De Gaulle believes it important to introduce into the sum-
mit talks a topic broader than Berlin which would appeal to the
peoples of the West and would put the USSR on the defensiveb)
De Gaulle has long felt that sooner or later the USSR would
be obliged to cooperate with the West against the upsurge of na-
tionalism among non-European peoples, particularly the Chinese.
A recent article by Chief of Staff General Paul Ely in the French
National Defense Review developed the idea that in another gen-
eration an "Americanized" Russia would need help to stave off
Chinese expansion westward
Cebrcs tends to look on De Gaulle's plan for the economic de-
velopment of Algeria as a prototype for undeveloped areas else-
where. He feels that a great psychological advance has already
been achieved by the plan, although its economic goals are long-
range:)
The French Government has increasingly encouraged foreign
investment in France's dependencies, and some officials seem
inclined to favor a joint Western economic development program
for Africa as a whole.
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General Strike in Argentina Called for 3 April
In calling a general strike for 3 April, the Peronistas
and Communists are renewing strong pressure on Argentine
President Frondizi to lift the state of siege and take steps
which would enable Peronistas to regain control of a large
segment of organized labor. Publicly, however, the strike
leaders are emphasizing that wages are inadequate in relation
to the rapid price rises since the US-backed austerity plan was
initiated on 1 January.
Because of widespread discontent over the almost 40-per-
cent increase in living costs this year, the anti-Peronista
labor group is meeting to decide whether it must join the strike
to avoid losing support among labor. Consequently some Argen-
tine press sources believe the strike could assume the propor-
tions of the general strike in mid-January, which resulted in
the government's taking control of ten major unions, including
the main Peronista strongholds and the three national unions
led by. Communists.
The armed forces strongly support a firm line toward labor
and the Communists. They will probably be deployed to support
the police in controlling any disturbancesa
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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