CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A004200310001-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
21
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 2, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 9, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A004200310001-0.pdf1021.15 KB
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Approved For RelleaseTop/06 FI IETT00975AO04200310001-0 25X1 9 January 1959 Copy No. C 6 3 P., 25X1 Ct ,45:; C.`9S WO D TJ: i S C j R[V EW DR!'r=: r :, yet r~I : 25X1 25X1 DIA and DOS review(s) completed. / Approved For Release yop04:~b0975A004200310001-0 ~/ 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 /i~~~ Approved For a as 2002/0 /04: CIA-RDP79T0097 200310001-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25X1 25X1 9 January 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC agreement. Soviet propaganda has charged that the intro- duction by the US of new information on the difficulties of detecting underground nu lear explosions is a further move to prevent agreement, United States continued to insist on majority voting in the proposed control commission The nuclear test talks re- convened in Geneva on 5 January with a gloomy forecast by the Soviet delegate in view of the West's refusal to ac- cept Soviet demands for a permanent and unconditional Geneva talks: (koyan, speaking with Secretary Dulles on 5 January, questioned the desire of the United States to reach agreement on nuclear test cessation and warned that such agreement would be impossible if the 25X1 2 ME j Approved For Releas - 0310001-0 j L 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 e East drought: or the secon consecutive year, severe ought and locusts seriously threatennfood crops in Jordan and Israel. Both governments have requested the US to supply foodstuffs in the very near future. Yemen is also undergoing food shortages as the result of drought 25X1 Morocco: he situation in the principal areas of Berber triba ssidence apparently continues unresolved despite govp ernment claims that the tribesmen are responding to King Mohamed V's 48-hour ultimatum of 5 January ordering them xi 0( to submit to central authority. Berber tribes in the High Atlas region south and east of the southern Moroccan city of Mar- rakech now are also reportedly becoming increasingly restive? Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 25X1 25X1 VON, Approved For a as 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0097 , 4200A10001-0 j+ j Vir i j Belgian Congo: Belgian security forces have re-estab- lished order, and Leopoldville is outwardly calm after three days of rioting. Some Congolese leaders have been arrested. Accra, Cairo, and Moscow view the riots as springing out of 25X1 African desire for independence, while the Belgian press pri- arilv blames economic conditions for the rioting. Philippines: Ambassador Bohlen notes an increasing re- in Philippine official thinking toward a re-orientation of for- ?eign policy away from the US and closer to the islands' Asian neighbors. This nationalistic feeling has been evidenced by a hardening Philippine attitude in base talks with the US. III. THE WEST *France: few Premier Michel Debrd, an ardent Gaulli is critical of US policies which he regards as frustrating France's claims to great power status The new cabinet, cam posed mostly of holdovers, including the minister of foreign lJ affairs, is expected to follow very closely ,the policy and ad- 25X1 ministrative framework De Gaulle has outlined in recent de- crees. Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 %E 9 11 72 MX: :ngn iiiiiiiii25iiXii1 Approved For se t002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975 200310001-0 j 00 25X1 Government. However, major government policies are being- held in abeyance pen n-g decisions by Castro, who only arrived in Havana on 8 January. Lernment, there are signs of feeling against the United States Cuba: the formative stage of the Castro-Urrutia gov- 25X1 M 0 MEN 9 Jan 59 DAILY BRIEF iv IN 11 111m. A /// pproved For Releas 2002/09/04 .CIA-RDP79T00975 0I~ 4rVVJ Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AQ420031000.bX1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR- -Geneva Talks With resumption on 5 January of negotiations at Geneva for an agreement on cessation of nuclear tests, Moscow re- verted to its insistence on a Western commitment to a per- manent unconditional agreement before further discussion of the details of the proposed control system. On 6 January, the Soviet delegate to the talks took issue with four specific Western positions: insisting upon majority rule in the com- mission; linking extension of a one-year test suspension with progress in other areas of disarmament; giving any party the right to denounce the agreement when violated by another; and international staffing of control posts to minimize use of na- tionals of the host state. At the 7 January session he insisted on postponing discussion of any other issues until the question of duration of the treaty is resolved. Sjeaking with Secretary Dulles on 5 January, Soviet Dep- uty Premier Mikoyan questioned the desire of the United States to reach agreement on nuclear test cessation and warned that such agreement would be impossible if the United States con- tinued to insist on majority voting in the proposed control com- mission. At a private dinner on the same day, Mikoyan stated that the USSR would not give up the veto on such a commission, since decisions would be meaningless if they were not unan- imous Moscow has charged that the new technical information introduced by the United States delegate on 5 January with re- gard to the difficulties of detecting underground explosions was a further Western effort to prevent agreement. Soviet delegate Tsarapkin rejected a Western request for a three- power study of this problem, maintaining that the establishment of such a study would undermine the entire basis on which the conference was organized, i. e. , the conclusions and recommen- dations of the Geneva conference of experts. Moscow's renewed emphasis in the negotiations on its ob- jections to the Western stand on duration and the link to other 25X1 Approved For Release) - _ __ _..1.4200310001-0 25X1 9 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved Fore ease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975,~04200310001-025X1 25X1 disarmament measures probably reflects the concern of the Soviet leadership over the possibility of a stalemate on the sole issue of Soviet insistence on veto rights in the control commission. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 9 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 Approved Fo>(elease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0097wA004200310001-0 MOROCCO 6 GIBRALTAR (U.K.) GO- MPs Cana _Pr011.Melilla CANARY ISLANDS (sr.) 90JNO' r ' Tindouf A. L G E R LA PRINCIPAL AREAS OF BERBER DISSIDENCE MILES Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975UP4200310001-0 Middle East Drought 25X1 Iti.despread drought for the second consecutive year threat- ens to bring disaster to Jordanian agriculture. Winter-wheat crops have been seriously affected, and Jordan's crop potential for 1958-59, even if rain falls now, is estimated at 80,.000 tons in contrast with 242,000 tons produced during the last normal crop year of 1955-56. Further aggravating the situation is the lack of fodder for herds, which are decreasing below basic breed- ing levels. Export blockades of livestock to Jordan by Syria and Iraq have resulted in a perennial meat shortage. The Jor- danian prime minister has requested the United States to pro- vide "not less than 50,000 tons" of wheat in the near future-- 10,000 tons immediately. An additional request has been made for 40,000 tons of livestock feed. Assistance to finance work relief which would provide 50,000 jobs is also desir7 (y.rael, where the situation is somewhat less serious, has had almost no rain since last February, and crops sown in the southern part of the country must be considered lost, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. Unless the situation radically changes within the next few weeks, crops will be smaller than last year's poor production. The water table has been so low- ered by the protracted dryness that there will be insufficient water for irrigation. Israel has requested wheat shipment LLa.rge swarms of locusts in Israel, as well as Jordan, are an additional menace to agricultural production. However, it appears that crop losses from this source have been moderate. An estimated 90 percent of the population of Yemen is said to be faced with severe famine or starvation as the result of drought which has cut crop production to one third of normal. A Yemeni Government representative in Aden has stated that 20,000 tons of wheat will be needed. within the next four months 7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 9 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved or elRel ease - 10001-0 Situation in Morocco Available evidence does not appear to justify Moroccan Government claims publicized on 7 and 8 January that dis- sident Berber tribesmen in northern Morocco are responding in large numbers to King Mohamed V's 5 January ultimatum ordering them to submit to government authority and return to their homes within 48 hours. Their virtual rebellion is still directed primarily against the Arab/urban-dominated Istiglal party, which has been the principal force behind Mo- roccan governments since the country regained its independ- ence two years ago. However, they are unlikely to accede to the King's directive unless they receive firmer assurances than they have apparently been offered thus far that at least some of their principal demands will be satisfied. These in- clude the installation of local inhabitants in local government posts, more adequate representation in the central government, greater local autonomy, and measures to relieve the area's depressed- economic conditions $,oyal Army elements in northern Morocco continue to be reinforced and redeployed, but they have apparently not yet attempted to force the re-establishment of contact by land with the garrison at the Mediterranean port city of Alhucemas-- reported encircled by armed Berber partisans as of 7 Janu- ary--nor to move against the dissidents' Middle Atlas strong- hold near Fez. A clash on 6 January between army forces based at Alhucemas and the dissidents, which reportedly re- sulted in over 100 casualties, may have reinforced the King's reluctance to order an all-out drive by the army despite his recent implicit threat to take such action. American repre- sentatives in Rabat reported on 7 January that the troop move- ments in progress as of that time appeared designed primarily to secure control of the main lines of communication in the affected regions and to isolate the Middle Atlas from the Rif-- not to penetrate difficult mountain terrain where the defiant Berber elements are ensconced. The American Army attache continues to believe that the Royal Army is almost certain to be decimated by desertions if ordered to suppress the dissi- dents and could not in any case cope with a general Berber up- risi7 25X1 25X1 Ceanwhile, the attache reports that other Berber tribes residing in the traditionally turbulent High Atlas region Approved For Rele a 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200 10001-0 25X1 9 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved For Fjase 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T009754200310001-0 25X1 tsouth and east of Marrakech, in. southern Morocco, are also becoming increasingly restive 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 9 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 Approved For F? ase 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AW4200310001-0 Developing Philippine Nationalism (Ambassador Bohlen notes increasing sentiment among Philippine officials for a modification of present Philippine for- eign policy in the direction of less dependence on the United States. Filipinos have criticized the level of American mil- itary and economic aid in the light of what they regard as their "special relationship" with the United States. Growing nation- alist feeling has also been evidenced by a hardened Philippine attitude in talks concerning American bases. Foreign Affairs Secretary Serrano recently declared that a "redefinition of the Philippine-American mutual defense concept" would be an immediate Philippine policy target in 1959. In part this trend stems from frustration over an unsatisfactory domestic polit- ical and economic situation Recently heightened interest in developing closer economic and political ties with neighboring Asian countries appears to be a manifestation of this growing nationalist sentiment. The goal of greater regional cooperation was heavily emphasized in the joint communique issued on 6 January by President Garcia and visiting Malayan Prime Minister Rahman. Within the. framework of a strongly anti-Communist approach, Garcia discussed the same theme in a major foreign policy address in December, and he is said to be looking particularly to closer economic cooperation with Japan e increased momentum toward a "Filipino First" out- look is not at this stage indicative of a desire for a major policy shift, but it may foreshadow further strains in Philippine- American relation) 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 9 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved For Reuel ase 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T0097W4200310001-0 25X1 III. THE WEST The New French Cabinet Premier Michel Debre's cabinet reflects the strong rightist- nationalist orientation of the new National Assembly. It includes most of the leading personalities of the Soustelle-sparked Union for a New Republic (UNR), which won the largest bloc of deputies in the October elections. Most of the members are holdovers from the government formed by De Gaulle last June. The key posts of foreign affairs and defense went to non- political "technicians," an arrangement which permits De Gaulle to exercise close control over those areas in which the new con- stitution and recent decrees give him special powers. The Min- istry of the Interior, which had been sought by Soustelle, also was placed in the hands of a technician. Attachment of Soustelle to the office of the premier, however, may somewhat mollify his integrationist supporters among the European settlers in Algeria, who hoped he would be premier. Though the Socialists are absent, intending to go into "con- structive opposition,' the rightist weight of Debre and the UNR will be tempered both by the presence of the Popular Republicans and by De Gaulle himself, who has already laid down the guide- lines of French domestic and external policy and who is expected to play an active role in his new position as President. Further- more, at least 50 UNR deputies can be considered leftist in their social and economic views. The combination of Debra as premier and De Gaulle as Pres- ident should provide France with an effective executive team. The two men hold similar views on most questions. De Gaulle may occasionally use the outspoken Debrd to set up extreme positions for bargaining purposes. The most immediately urgent problem facing the government will be the implementation of the austerity program announced on 28 December. The program initially aroused hostility in working-class and trade-union circles, and the discontent has spread to Finance Minister Pinay's Independ- ent party as well. Debre a 47-year-old lawyer, won prominence by his strong nationalist stand in the Council of the Republic, where he was a leading Gaullist spokesman from 1948 until De Gaulle appointed 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 9 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved or a ase - 0310001-0 25X1 him minister of justice last June. He has firm ideas about asserting the authority of the executive vis-a-vis Parliament, a view reflected in the new constitution, which is largely his handiwork. Debrd's excessive nationalism has been frequently appar- ent in the critical attitude he has taken on American policies which he considers inimical to FranceTs. international prestige. He is similarly outspoken in his opposition to submerging French sovereignty in European integration projects and is insistent on holding Algeria at all costs, rejecting the federal- type solution De Gaulle is presumed to consider acceptable. His sincere attachment to De Gaulle is expected to limit any early overt friction between them. Nevertheless,, his strong personality and stubborn attitudes on controversial interna- tional issues may eventually lead to policy differences with De Gaulle. 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 9 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 Approved For Ree ease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975, O4200310001}WjX1 25X1 The Situation in Cuba are some signs of feeling against the US Government among I peting rebel groups had awaited his arrival. Meanwhile, there The arrival of Fidel Castro in Havana on 8 January, after his triumphal progress from Oriente Province, will assist the regime of Provisional President Urrutia in its efforts to form a workable government. Numerous decisions on governmental policy, on military reorganization, and on relations among com- members of the new regime and a general desire to speed the "Cubanization" of foreign-owned industries, particularly sugat for some years plantations. At present, about 50 percent of total sugar invest- ment in Cuba is US capital, The percentage has been declining The US Army attache found Camp Colombia, Cuba's chief military base near Havana, completely disorganized on 7 Jan- uary. The army is undergoing a thorough purge of all officers guilty of "crimes" under Batista, and at least 15 are reported already to have been executed. Even the capable Colonel Bar- quin and other professional officers associated with him in the 1956 attempt to oust Batista have apparently been retired. Of- ficers of the 26 of July Movement in Havana told the attachd that the highest army rank will be major and that present officers of higher rank permitted to remain in service will have to accept demotions. Many rebel soldiers are expected to be integrated into the armed forces. These drastic measures may well, in the long run, create a core of embittered former career officers dangerous to the regime. Fidel Castro, who is slated to head the armed forces, is quoted as belittling the value of the US Military Mission to the Cuban Army under Batista and claiming that it is no longer needed. He has also indicated, however, that the government will not establish diplomatic relations with Sino-Soviet bloc gov- ernments, or any other dictatorships. Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200310001-0 9 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 13 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Fp THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director 25X1 25X1 Approved For Relerase 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004g00310001-0 e 2(%(P/Iyi~hAfF79;qp 000r, 20TOP/Q-9EgA-BIjP79 M711-0o71111zxx1xx11,e