CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004000230001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 October 1958
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cil for Mutual Economic Assistance will be held sometime this
month. This session presumably will evaluate progress made
since the earlier plenum in June in achieving closer coordina-
tion of long-range national economic plans and discuss the rela-
tion of bloc integration to the forthcoming Soviet Seven-Year
Plan. Plenary sessions have not previously been held more
Soviet bloc EMA: A plenary session of the bloc Coun-
often than annually.
made the basic theme of the visit.
1956. Stability of Soviet- Polish relations probably will be
Poland-USSR: At the invitation of the USSR, a Polish del-
egation headed by party First Secretary Gomulka and Premier
Cyrankiewicz will make a "friendship" visit to Moscow during
the latter part of October= -the first such trip announced as
purely ceremonial since Gomulka assumed power in October
exaggerated.
Communist China: In celebration of their National Day
on 1 October, the Chinese Communists claim that in the past
year their economy has progressed at a rate never before
achieved either at home or "anywhere abroad," presumably
including the USSR. Definite progress has been made under
this year's "giant leap forward." Current agricultural and
certain industrial production claims, however, such as one
that the value of industrial output for the third quarter of 1958
was double that of the corresponding period last year, appear
.8 Oct 58 DAILY BRIEF ii
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Syria-Iraq: Kurdish dissident leader Mulla Mustafa
Barzani arrived in Baghdad on 6 October following 12 years'
residence in the USSR, and on 5 October Syrian Communist
001
hh'F-? to presage attempts to increase local Communist activity
25X1 V and influence in both Syria and Iraq. Barzani, however,
first spent three days in Cairo, where he may have sought
to dispel Nasir's concern over Communist maneuvering in
the area, especially among Kurdish nationalist elements.
*Pakistan: President Mirza on 7 October took over the
overnment of Pakistan with the support of the army. Mirza
named army commander Ayub as administrator of martial
law throughout the country. Mirza abrogated the constitution,
dismissed the central and provincial governments, and abolished
all political parties. While there apparently has been no initial
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violence, strong opposition may develop later to Mirza's can-
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or February. Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy is likely
to be maintained by the new regime.
(Page 8)
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III. THE WEST
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of labor unions.
8 October which will be given popular support by a number
*Uruguay: Students who staged violent demonstrations
n Montevideo on 1 and 2 October plan a demonstration on
8Oct58
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 Approved ForliAeas4
Soviet Bloc CEMA Meeting Scheduled for October
A plenary session of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CEMA), the second in four months, is to be held
later this month`at an unspecified place. It presumably will
evaluate the progress made in achieving closer coordination
of the individual long-range national economic plans. The
step-up in activities of CEMA, which normally holds a plenary
session only once a year, suggests that its role in intrabloc
economic affairs is being enhanced; in view of growing eco-
nomic cooperation in Western Europe, bloc integration is re-
ceiving increased attention.
Since the ,.June plenum, Eastern Europe has largely com-
pleted the coordination of 1958-60 bilateral trade plans, and
national planning commissions have consulted one another on
the integration of longer range economic plans. CEMA an-
nounced in July that by mid-1956 national plans for 1961-65
are to be fully coordinated and intrabloc economic coo era-
tion up to 1975 is tQ be outlined.
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Polish Delegation to Visit Moscow
At the invitation of the USSR, a Polish delegation headed
by party First Secretary Gomulka and Premier Cyrankiewicz
will pay a "friendship" visit to Moscow during the latter part
of October. Although Gomulka has traveled to the USSR several
times for talks with Soviet leaders since he assumed power
in October 1956, this will .be his first ceremonial visit. Both
the Poles and Russians probably will utilize this occasion to re-
emphasize the, stability and solidarity of Soviet-Polish relations;
a united front against revisionism andother divisive influences
is presently a major bloc goal. The composition of the
Polish delegation suggests that the talks will deal largely
with political and cultural matters, although the general
terms of further economic assistance to Poland may be dis-
cussed.
The Polish party central committee is scheduled to hold
a plenum within the next ten days. and presumably will deal
with a number of political, ideological, and organizational
questions, including the drafting of the theses and plans for
the long-postponed party congress. The Soviet leaders are
probably particularly anxious to study and, if necessary, to
try to modify the Polish theses to bring them into line with bloc
thinking prior to the CPSU's own congress in mid-January.
Some improvement in Polish-Soviet relations has been.
noted recently despite an apparent absence of major concessions
either by the Poles, or by the Russians. While Gomulka has made.
some policy changes which bring him more in line with the USSR,
he has consistently refused to compromise any of the fundamental
principles of the Polish road to socialism.
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Peiping Claims Record Economic Achievements
Peiping claims that...in_the past year the nation's econ-
omy has progressed at a rate never before achieved either
at home or "anywhere abroad," presumably ..including the
USSR. Peiping claims to have gathered the equivalent of
last year's harvest of 185,000,000 tons of food grains, with
late crops yet':to be.harvested, the Chinese Communists ex-
pect the year's total crop to be almost twice this figure.
Peiping's early crop estimates have, generally been inflated,
but this year's early claims appear even more exaggerated.
There is as yet no evidence that rations are being improved
in either rural or urban areas.
Peiping asserts that the total value of industrial pro-
duction during the first three quarters of the year was 57. 1
percent greater than that of the corresponding period last
year and that in the third quarter alone it was double the
third quarter of 1957. It also asserts that on 29 September
daily output of steel reached a record 53,220 tons. It is
probably too early for Peiping to have completed all of the
complex computations which go into the gross value of in-
dustrial production during. the' first. three . quarters.. of 'the
year, and it is likely that a substantial portion of the steel
turned out at the high daily rate claimed was of low quality.
In many cases. Peiping appears. to be generalizing from.
some particularly favorable local achievement, and the
figures as a whole very probably go far beyond the realities
of China's. present economic situation, in order to add
impetus to the "leap forward" campaign.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Communist- indoctrinated Leaders Return to Syria and Iraq
Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bakdash and Iraqi Kurdish
dissident Mulla Mustafa Barzani have returned from the Soviet
bloc. Bakdash, who like Barzani is of Kurdish origin, led his
party in opposition to Egyptian-Syrian union and left Syria.for
Prague and the USSR at the time of the UAR's formation last
February.
Barzani, who returned to Baghdad on o er, na neen 111
the USSR since leading an unsuccessful Kurdish rebellion against
Iraq and Iran in 1946. He stopped first at Cairo on 3 October,
where he met with Nasir.
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Nasir's current efforts to strengthen his control over Syrian
affairs and to bring Iraq into the UAR orbit could be sabotaged
by the activities of Bakdash, Barzani, and their followers. 25X1
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ommun
are encouraging anti-UAR feeling within Syria and are probably
in contact with the Iraqi Communists, who are also opposing
Cairo's influence. The large Kurdish minorities in Iraq and
Syria may be brought into opposition to the UAR by the promise
of an independent Kurdish state, and Barzani's presence will
probably heighten such feeling. Nasir, nevertheless, may hes-
itate to move directly against men of the stature of Bakdash and
Barzani.
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President Mirza Takes Over Government of Pakistan
Pakistani President Mirza on 7 October seized full con-
trol of the government with the support of the army. Martial
law was proclaimed throughout the country with army com-
mander Ayub as administrator. Troops occupied key points
in Karachi. Mirza abrogated the two-and-a-half-year-old
constitution, dismissed the central and provincial govern-
ments, and abolished all political parties.
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The initial public reaction appears to be calm. While
some elements may welcome Mirza's take over as a respite
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majority of the people- -especiain East a is. an--are
likely to protest the imposition of dictatorial rule at a time
when preparations for the country's first national elections
next February were nearing completion. Mirza has already
canceled the elections and apparently will try to implement
his long-standing objective of framing a new constitution with
a much strengthened executive.
The seizure of power is the culmination of a long battle
between Mirza and Pakistan's leading politicians. Certain
political figures, particularly those with leftist tendencies,
probably will be arrested without delay. While their activ-
ities are likely to be sharply curtailed for some time, Pak-
istani politicians probably will unite to oppose Mirza's rule
to the fullest extent possible.
Mirza may find it difficult to recruit qualified indi-
viduals to form the national "revolutionary council" he plans
to assist him in administering the country. There is thus
no assurance that his regime will be any more successful than
previous governments in solving Pakistan's pressing economic
and political problems.
Mirza is likely to continue to receive the army's support
in the immediate future. However, 25X1
I Isome military elements have oppose Ayub's
political support of Mirza. Prolongation of dictatorial rule
could result in a split in the army's heretofore unified of-
ficer corps.
The Mirza-Ayub regime is likely to maintain Pakistan's
pro-Western orientation. Mirza's proclamation categorically
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pledged support of the country's international commitments,
which include membership in the Baghdad and SEATO pacts.
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Uruguayan Students to Demonstrate on 8 October
Uruguayan students, who staged violent demonstrations
in Montevideo on 1 and 2 October over congressional handling
of a proposed new charter for the university, plan another
demonstration on 8 October which could cause serious diffi-
culties for.the government. The new demonstration has been
promised support by 35 labor unions in Montevideo and river
port workers from western. Uruguay who have been
marching toward the capital since 29 September to seek
improvements for their union.
The 1 - 2 October demonstrations were the most violent
witnessed in Montevideo in many years. Police efforts to break
up the rioting brought demands for the resignation of the
interior minister and police chief. Some 120 students were
arrested briefly and 200 others barricaded themselves in the
university, where a die-hard remnant vows to remain until
Congress approves the new charter without changes.
The proposed charter, drafted by the university and
approved by the Communist-infiltrated student federation,
would grant the university autonomy and presumably increase
the students' voice in administration.
Although they are not directly involved
students joined one demonstration' F
some 1
MO0
secondary
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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