LETTER TO HONORABLE LESLIE ARENDS FROM GEORGE L. CARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 303
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 13, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

'""r77.vi
??????,,x : ?
(/0
Approved Focrielawa0,20WirltalalainpmmtepRO00800100008-2
OLC 76-1927
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
13 July 1976
Honorable Leslie Arends
%Mr. Wheaton Byers, Executive Secretary
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. Arends:
In light of our conversation on 24 June 1976, I am enclosing
for your information compendiums on two of the topics we discussed:
covert action and the future of CIA relationships with Congress. Some
of the material has been overtaken by events but a great deal of it still
has validity and it is offered to you on that basis. I also thought you might
be interested in the enclosed writeup concerning Rule XI of the House of
Representatives, its meaning and a possible remedy._
I hope we can keep in contact on this and related subjects
and do hope that you find the enclosed information responsive to your
interest. ?
Sincerely,
George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
Enclosures
. Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/encl
OLC Su.bj w/ encl.
1 - OLC Chrono (wo/encl)
25X1 oLcA I:baa (9 Jul 76)
25X1
This letter downgraded to ourrto4f
ez- r o
Unclassified when removed
from enclosure. (' -.-4-
-4
fil
IT-C
0 ??-
OGC Has Reviewed
-&--
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
FROM
iaence
NOR 200249
V 4
hi'to.. D. c. Z0505
DATE
4 jiy 970',L
T
"
Arends
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ENVELOPE (SI
%Mr. WhkAton Byers
PFIAB
PACKAGE
S
The Situation l'acr-)m
OTHER
LOG DATA
DATE AND TIME OF PICK-UP
cr
7,6
COURIER'S INITIAL
M/14
ORIGINATING I
OFFICE LOG 2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. Future of CIA Relationships with Congress.
B. Membership of Oversight Committees.
C.
House Rule Granting Access to Committee Records
to All Members.
E. Article From Progressive Magazine on CIA and Chile.
F. Proposed Joint Committee on CIA with Exclusive Authority
to Receive Information on CIA.
G. Letter to Chairman McClellan on Open Budget for CIA.
H.- Legislative Proposal Not Yet Cleared by Executive Branch
? For Criminal Sanctions on Unauthorized Disclosure.
I. Letter to Oversight Committee Chairman on Agee Case
and Need for More Effective Criminal Sanctions.
J. Prepared Statement On Nedzi Bill Amending the CIA
Section of the National Security Act of 1947.
K. Prepared Statement by Mr. Colby before the House
Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee.
L. Assorted Legislation Affecting CIA.
M. Summary of Activities of the Murphy Commission Study
of Intelligence, including Covert Action. Final Report
Due to Congress 30 June 1975.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
25X5 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
September 1974.
CIA SUBCOMMITTEES
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
John L. McClellan (D., Ark.), Chairman
John C. Stennis (D. , Miss.) Milton R. Young (R., N. Dak. )
John 0. Pastore (D., R. I.) Roman L. Hruska (R. , Nebr. )
SENATE ARMED SERVICES
CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), Chairman
Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) Peter H. Dominick (R., Cob.)
Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) Strom Thurmond (R., S. C.)
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Lucien N. Nedzi (D., Mich.), Chairman
F. Edward Hebert (D., La.)
Melvin Price (D. , )
0. C. Fisher (D., Texas)
William G. Bray (R., Id.)
Leslie Arends (R. , Ill. )
Bob Wilson (R., Calif. )
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS
"SPECIAL GROUP'
George H. Mahon (D., Texas), Chairman
Jamie L. Whitten (D. , Miss. )
Robert L. F. Sikes (D. ; Fla.)
William E. Minshall (R. , Ohio)
Elford A. Cederberg (R. , Mich.)
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
25X5 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Next 13 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
. Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
. On 4 June 1974 the Senate by a vote of 55 to 33
defeated an amendment to the Defense Procurement Authori,..a-
tion bill (S. 3000) which would have required the Director
of Central Intelligence to submit an annual unclassiEied
report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds
requested in the budget .for the National Intelligence Program.
A number of Senators, including the Chairman of the
Agency's Oversight Committees in the Senate, strongly opposed
the amendment on the basis that such disclosures would ? -
provide valuable assistance to our adversaries by virtue of
the trends disclosed over the years and that the publication
of the total figure would only stimulate further inquiry for
greater detail on foreign intelligence activities, for
explanations of changes or trends, and for the. component
elements. of the total figure. -
They also pointed out that the four committees
charged with oversight of the Agency in the Congress are
fully aware of the details of the foreign intelligence
budget and inquire into these matters deeply. The point was
also made that if any member of theSenate wished to. know
what the total figure was it would be furnished to -him on a
classified basis.
The discussion on the amendment is covered on pages
S. 9601-9613 in the Congressional Record of 4 June 1974.
Excerpts follow:
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
ApprovsgiDERfilegse Aril/92/17 r791A-R9P78M02660R000800100008-2
7:1 are an op.:a ::,oc:ety and,
for. Wo IlaYa been abl.t to cry oa
in),...Thuence pi .7,3n
tX,10.11 tO
?' ''1 bon:, of dolln.rs "...;ur., if
we are goiug to abanilori Ute i7lea. of
Z.;12.5? 1)?t:1"..:
ch51-!.. then. in rry lu;m'Jle odinlen.
rni..;ht
would be saying', in erfect. thAr.
?_do r.ot want this secret intelir.ce after
all, that we do not need it, and that. we
Will abandon It.
?? We riiU pay an avtul price for that.
arn lamiiiar with thc budfzet.
I can satisfy most any Senator in the
? cloakroom. tahin to hlms,.7.me about
tlts. but I w?ill publicly say that it is a
clean budget and they have j.istified
many times over tile eNpendisure of t.he
money. 11
Senator Pastore:- ". .
?? We 1-ia7e to know
what they are doinir..?17o we car. lr.r..oz7;
what we have to do in order to guarantee.
the security ot our ow-n country.
So c; e cannot. come out here and tell
? the whole world. We spent SI biUJsn Or
82 billion for the Central Intelligence
Agency." That does that mean to any--
one else, except that perhaps some 7.ecple
think they are spending too much. And.
the minute -the question is asked where
the.7 are spending it we are in -serious
trouble.
So what happens to your clalid_ron and
?? my children-, ivi.r President? What hap-
pens to you when you go home toril;ht?
What happen.3 tomoc-ro7=? What hap?
pens to the se-zu1-it-7 of our country?
Can we arford to tell them? Oh yes, I
would like to tell the public e?."erythir.7, it
Is po.ssible to tell them. I .beliere in that.
X have been in public life continually foz
40 yearn. I believe in the ri;ht of the
public to kno:v. But I certztinly would
not. come to the fluor of the Senate. and
tell you. ilr. President, 1-1077 to put to-
gether an atom bomb. I would not tell
you that. I v.-otild not tell you how far
our nuclear sub; are able to travel; I
viould not tell you we can datect; o_a
enemy sub: and I would not. tell you ho7,r
they trii311t detect ours. .1 would not
you that-Why would I not tell you that?
I would not tell you that because the
? minute I told you that I would Jeopardiaa
the ;uture of your chiiclren.
? ? ?
I 117.*.-e :tat clown F-nator from
the
fom CaliforrIla
s;)lutlon. and I have at. 117.71 r.h Mr.
Cc:by. 7...ho iz a grc7..t ,\:7?.:-.1an. He
"fle7.ie do noc do this. .1": vo; vtrtt.9
ray job plea:n do not do
tht2;." I cannot zit El,. erL, after that atl?-
? ro.onit.ion aad er..hoz:atlon and tim
around an-i 51.7. Coloy, I do not
what you 15370 to cly. If I be-
lievo.:1 that ;or I rainu,-.:2, ; n
"YO'( 011.7,ht to ;-tre up your .
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA7RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Sena tor
.?
Mr.
;?... to co.- -.?!ivi the :iei...One
I5lacr.1 rv:s ?:..uate
hi:, cuium-NO.3. .2.en.?tor Point out
.vtbry prooeriy that VII.?
g'-c' :has in the
ActLv1;?iis that ? n lc.--)k?!d upon ly/
certain .Z.,;!..':.1.32:7, of the Ccre-.;.s tt:i nn-
desirab:e; bo.t. .1 want to nva;:e it clenr
that. e7erj one of ?theze a:.?tties ha1
betrt ordered by a Pres-r.dent. The Cen-
tral. Inteliisence .A:Zeciej d0-:-.5 not just
engaze L-t actiyit1es for the lave of work.
I knori that the Central Liteiii;ence
Agency. (11.z:in..; the 1?Zenr.edy years and
the Zrohr-loa year-5, was eniaged in ac-
tti25 in Laos-
3 ? ?
1?.1r. Presicient. the Central ir.telii7encc..
Agency 13 possibly the most Important
azeacy l.a this Govern:r.ent. By and large;
it is made up of people who are com-
pete.ht, able. :and who iieserved this
country and faithfully. To be sure.
there are times -whert it ha.s er.gaged in
actiV5, as h-a said. that
le>ol-zed upon suspic,.ori; but I thLn
it would be folly for us to publicize all ot
it activities, to publicize the ?arr-?owats it
particals.rly wl-ten there are
way:, and me-aas withist this body and
within the othe.r body of Coarress to
superrise, it.and to keep a .chec% rein,
. upon it.
1 ? ?
I har.1 the pririle.g.e of
ser-ling on the National "Scurity Council.
and i wrint to tell my colleagues that. the
. Ge.ntral Intelligence Azency Was the most
.? accurate and effecti*:e instrument of
Government for that council. Is reports
we.re rho-st accurate, and had
the ad./4.ce of the Central In.telliTcance
Ag.ency Irt many areas, we would ;a a7e.
be-en better off, but at least it 172.3 therz.
"
But just n.-1 surely 2-5 Tie are In thZ5
.bcdy tay del-i?ttin,.: whether not we
otit to have a rea:.e or: the fur,
? ctr it- wilt be ..-7-ri^ thT: it ls tr.lo
or too 111..tle, aryl then it wilt be what i5
in it. Tin when we sr...z-t to 57.y what 13
we are :;o;,?.7.t. 11.7....-e t. e.:cose
acty7:hat we 11:vie (1.:in-r in order
F;ain ye,57.-s
hultclag :,?Ccs an-.1
of miclear ? 7? .7?.!re. 571.7/ r.1?.t.
fhr
sci2:-.?;.fic pre zr w-.5.I co
not thL-L74: it in-
for all o: '..7--)rrr.-1-1..i.)n 11.1.v..!:
beer. lala out. I-.it crcOyCt
our Intel1i.4eace - cor.Aple,:?.!;/. -
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Senator McClellan: ". .
?
'But, let us t......?ar 1;1 rn:nd that.1; we are
- to h.tve zet:ur:tyinca;r,enc..y.
c?nnot have it with. ne.t.loaal publicity
Ort.,Witat i.t 1107,' it does it, and how
. much it s:::enC:.3 here, or much it
ko.nds there.. . 11
Senator'Stennis:
? ?
'On my rczponsIbiiit.7 to my coll.eaz-aes,
they in CIA k--.:ep a clean house. The?
have had a co nze rvati-ie oPeratir. dol..2r-
T-Ise. and. ila7e aczounted ;tor the rnoney
in a splendid way. That hoz been ti-us
without e:.:ceptica.. There has been r.o
great spilia;e. of money o 7eat e.xtravs-
gances, and not one bicuof scandal or
odor of any kLd. . . .
Senator Thurmond:
belie7z t'ctat buz .14.7ation Is unique La
the attention Its levtzlature has Giv--a to
specifying and cb.-rarn_scrU7in-: the. ac tivt-
tie.3 of the a3er.cy designated to perform
its foreieva intelligence missionJ.? 1'
?
Senator Proxmire: "..
?Zr.? President, the purpase of the. 1
arnendrr...ent which I arm et:Tering now PI
to pro-tide th?..t the overail tt,Tur-z, for the
intelligence comr_nunity .o_sa -;;rhole, no-t.
bort don but tile overi'd fizure,
woUld be made 2...railable, so that the
payers of this country would have sorne
1d-2a or ho-.7 much.-how many bl.1.11r.)-ns of. _
dollars?and it. is billions' of. I
r.re going _for in`....e_aigence elfor4-3 by our
Government. ...1
? ? ?
j't 2t7F9"! t??11 o": ad--1
yen-Arles? They 7.-ould not knorr if It ail ;
went to the CLA. or DTA. ',Vhether the
:NSA spent mo..3% or the mone.y, or the. Air
Force.
Irow about yearly nitctuatior_s? Say for
example:. tna% the buct.s;et ..:se2t up 10 /
in 1 What w'nnt:hycon- 1-
c? .iatrr.ano,-;-.-;,er was I
si7e? That tne. CL'. W1-3 soenchn; more
for L.2-^,3? That the D'..A a I
ne.7; co:nguter cf....I:ion? That NSA ?
hLr more pepple1 They would
"
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
- A -
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Senator Hughes:
Tie teo.7.-!:3- wtii come fror-.1.!.c,inz
trot on the 1:-..3ida, I.0
tin ti
thin4r. ::;nould h pccaa....ed :o t.V.r.e that
oun:) of LI it-2_3t1t u set!
publicly ar.d the peopie zee public:17
wh;"ther we are sot:hi:11:1T :33 bi.aion. 37
or. .i..Q...b112.1oo.. and how we.. are
concealing it and hic1.1:. it, :lad LC 1-7.e a.ra
p.rntectL-Ig oa ies from the inside 3-1
lye; e-s from. the out-side.
.1 Vain's.- that. ounce or ri, 12 it ex:st.s.
Is worth takLn3, and I tha-.1.:4 tha cas-
tiresuished Seantor fro:a Vitscoosin for
?
Senator Jackson:
? In sunirny. Ottr forei7n ini--eNigence
ariFe5 Mit of an. act .of C:0111:1:CS3
and Ii of its1"..,0,171t1;'.'5 are closely'scru-
- tIrdzed by a number of representative
raPtrkbers of both the- Zie.nate and the.
House of r.epresentati,Tes. 'Ellis is Ikon"
Nye have. resolved tile b3lance be.tween
the ne-24.13 of ark open society and t'ne
needs for a secret .foreirrn LIice
servNe. cairtly do noc iiLtk Coat.
. thi! ; 17. CopFrntiu itirt.:
tiori rts I am confkdent enactnierlti of the
prop-osed arn?nd-rrkent would no..
Senator 'Young: ". .
-1r.ow there is great luterest in thpubUce:
'kno,-..-.-111;. everythln.z posr;LOIe, "011;1
- I think thare axczorne teLns_:s ;hat zhould.
1-cep t secret for our own se-,.;usity. 31
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
.1
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17(,CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Rule XI.
record vote is demanded. The result of each .rolleall
vote in any meeting of .any committee shall be made
available by that committee for inspection by the
public at reasonable times in the offices of that .com-
mittee. Information so available for pliblic inspection
shall include a description of the amendment, motion,
order, or other proposition and the name of each
Member voting for and each Member voting against
such amendment; motion, order, or proposition, and
whether by proxy or in person, and the names of those?
Members present but not voting. With respect to
each record vote by any committee an each motion
to report any bill or esolution of a publi-c character,
the total number of votes cast for, and the total
number of votes cast against, the reporting. of such
bill or resolution shall be included in the committee
report.
The [inst part of this paragraph was derived from Sec. 133(b) of
the 1,pi,lative Reorganization Act of 1916 (GO Stat. 812) and made
part or the Y.uc1ing rule:s on January 3, 19:i3, p. 24. The requirements
that committr!e rdl cclis be subject to public inspection and that the
comm:ttec rrport, on a public bill or resolution include the vac thereon,
wcre added by Sec. 10.1(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1070 (34 Stat. 11.10) and made a part of the rules on January 22, 1071,
yi
p. H. Res. 5.
1!)..6' ? committee Hearings, records, data, .charts,
and Mos shall be kept separate and distinct from the
congressional office records of the Member serving
as chairman of the committee; and such records shall
be the property of the House and all Members of the
llouse shall have access to such receals. Each corn-
AppTved For Release 2005/02/17:
?
RULES OF TIIE HOUSE Or REPRESENTATIN'ES
Ilule Xl.
mittec is authorized to have printed and .
testimony and other data presented at hearing.
by the committee.
This provision from See. 202 (d) of the Leci,lative
Act of 194G (GO Stat. 812) was made a part of thc imini
January 3, 1953, p. 24.
(d)(1.) Itshall be the duty of the chairman c
committee to report or cause to be repel-fed prcl.
. to the House any measure approved by his coin:
and to take or. cause to be taken ne.cessary? st ?
bring the matter to a vote.
? (2) In any event, the report of any commii
. a measure which has been approved by the corn:
shall be filed within seven calendar days (ex
of days .on which the Rouse is not. in session
the day on which there has been filed with
of the committee a written request, signed
majority of the members of the committee, f(
reporting .of that measure. Upon the filing o
such request, the clerk of the committee
transmit immediately to the chairman of the
mittee notice of the filing of that request. This
paragraph does not apply to a report. of the
mittee on 'Rules with respect to the rule,
rules, or .order of business of the. House or to
reporting of a resolution of inquiry addressc
the head of an executive department.
? (3) If, at the time of approval of any Inca stu
/natter by any committee (excopt the Cnnonit
? Rules) any member of the committee, [.:iveA
CIA-RbP78M02660R000800100008-2
13791
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
?
? CIA SUBCOMMITTEES
SENATE APPROPRJATIONS
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
September 1974
John L. McClellan (D., Ark.), Chairman
John C. Stennis (D., Miss.) Milton R. Young (R., N.Dak.)
John 0. Pastore (D., R.. I. ) Roman L. Hruska (R., Nebr.)
SENATE ARMED SERVICES
CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
John C. Stennis (D.,
Stuart Symington (D., Mo.)
--iry M. Jackson (D., Wash.)
Miss.), Chairman
Peter H. Dominick (R., Colo.)
Strom Thurmond (R., S. C.)
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Lucien N. Nedzi. (D. Mich.), Chairman
.William G. Bray (R., Ind.)
Leslie Arends (R., Ill.)
Bob Wilson (R., Calif.)
F. Edward Hebert (D., La.)
Melvin Price (fl., )
0. C. Fisher (D., Texas)
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS
"SPECIAL GROUP"
George H. Mahon (D., Texa.$), Chairman
L, Whitten (D. , Miss. )
Rorr r. F. Sikes (1D? Fla.)
V,rilliam E. Minsh-all (a. , Ohio)
Elford A. Cederber::: (R, Mita) ?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R00080010000872
TASS Reports Colby Testimony on CIA actions in Chile
L231142 %loscow TASS in English 1350 GMT 23 Oct 73 L
? TEXT) rASHINGTON OCTOBER 23 TASS--FRESH FACTS- HAVE BEEN LEARNED
HERE ABoUT THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY OF THE USA CENTRALINTELLIGENCE
AGECY AGAINST SALVADOR ALLENDE'S POPULAR UNITY GOVERNMENT PRIOR
TO SEPTEMBER ELEVENTH. THESE FACTS ARE CONTAINED IN THE TRANSCRIPT
OF SECRET TESTIMONIES BY CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM COLBY AND CIA SENIOR
STAFF-MEMBER F. DAVIS AT THE INTER--AMERICAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. A SUMMARY OF THE TESTIMONIES WAS PUB-
LISHED BY THE"WASHINGTON POST."
THE TESTIMONY OF THE CIA LEADERS ,SHOWS THAT THE DEPARTMENT
CARRIED ON LARGE-SCALE SECRET INTERVENTION IN THE INNER-POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF CHILE. THIS ACTIVITY, THE NEWSPAPER SAID,
INCLUDED INFILTRATION INTO ALL PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PARTIES,
SUPPORT OF ANTI-GOVERNMENTAL DEMONSTRATIONS AND ALIGNMNETS,
SUBSIDIES FOR OPPOSITION PRESS ORGANS.
THE UNITED STATES, THE WASHINGTON POST GOES ON TO SAY,
REFUSED CREDITS TO THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT TO WRECK THE
CITT,EAN EGONOMY AND ALSO OBSTRUCTED THE GRANTING OF LOANS TO
CE',E-BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AGENCIES. THE ONLY EXCEPTION
1;!AS :ADE FOR THE SALE ON CREDIT OF AMERICAN WEAPONS TO THE
ARMED FORCES. THUS, THE UNITED STATES SOUGHT TO SPEED UP
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE COUNTRY AND TO ENCOURAGE INTERNAL
OPPOSITION TO THE POPULAR UNITY GOVERNMENT.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE CIA DIRECTOR AND OTHER INFORMATION
7
SHOW THAT THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINED CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE
CHILEAN MILITARY THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD FOLLOWING ALLENDE'S
ELECTORAL VICTORY, THE NEWSPAPER SAYS.
THE WASHINGTON POST ADDS THAT THE CIA ALLOCATED 400,000
DoLL:,.as FOR SUPPORTING PRESS ORGANS OPPOSING ALLENDE ON THE EVE OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
23 OCT 1755Z JB/GS
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
rrriv
,f-)
II
IiWLI
VifiSHIZ:GTITIZI POST
21 OCT l'j73
war there remains "a tool prsriility."
N'el, evrn Colby warned that the junta
may "1:1yr:cif)" reprcii.n.
Colb"s ancl Davis' tr5tin1oay, in parts
Unclear and contradirtoty? offered
pletUre 01 the CIA.; Arti,'ities in Chile
between Allende's election In 1970 and
the Sept. 11 coup ranging from the
"penetration" of all the .major Chilean
political parties, support for nnti-regirne
demonstraLions and financing of the op
other -
vs .5 on in
position press and oer groups to here-
junta va granted S24. milli
tofore unsuspectud Agency involvement r.Itcat credits after MI Whits ifou5e
in financial r.egotiations between Wash- overruled Stale Department ehjection.s.
ington and Santiago in last 1972 and Tho department's Bureau - of
early 1973 7.11en the Cbil.eatis dc 5- American Affairs reportecik? be.lic7eci
perately scek.ing an accovnoclation. that su..:h A inture was prematnro p.rut
There are .indications- that the CIA, could be politically embarrassing..
acting on the basis of its own reports ? -
on She ."deterioration" of tite Chilean ? An wrillftrattria113" Ctroi,
economic situation, WP5 among the agen- -;roAltADOXICALLY, Washington had
CieS counseling the White 'House to rc- not hoped for tha kind of
attewis to work ouk,A. military takeover that oecurre!..! en. Sept_
.Settle'rucnt on the compensationa lo be 11. For political reasons, it preferred
? paid fur naionaIiled American prcPeri-1.., a gradual ciestruction from wit'hin
and 'a renegotiation of Chile's Si.? b1.1-:- the Chilean economy so that ?-th-3 Al-
: lenrie regime would collapse or its cr.-m"
lion debt. to the Unit t+I S tales.
; ,weight. The CIA's role, it z.ppeared,
A .So-lielca Polioj was to help quick:en this proccs3.
g
A CTUALLY, the bnsic U.S.. p Under questionin by fl.2-2ture .
fA
set by J. :Harrington (D-Mass?), tiosvard A;Ichile v.-3s
testified that the "appret?iat.
Iiency A. Kissinger, then the White
f e V
'House special assistant for national se-' O th Chilcztn economy. was-
ettrily affairs, at a background briefing 7.tas on a declittini: plana on tite
in Chicago on pomie ground in term-. of interr? al
f1u2rota'75P.irfetses Sept.r .11endc 'on apIt,r1aGjilt.y 9. 7o, itne Per c
om iee ont inflation In f1c
thc eicctions.and awaited a run-off ,0
tire of the copper inirs, and 50
the ci-
in Cottgres. Kissiti.ger said then that it
your total foreign deficit Vr5 mora
than tha need for it. They .coulen't
port the food because their deficit we;
such that over the lok; term th,:y had.
Jrb7r'i7 ?
t;-1
it
st.
By Tad. .5.7u1c
is c 'Wc.thiagtes u.-riter-and
fcr?-:r ic.-eigst" correspondent. Via. lat.
Spw: The Strange
'Cibcr of 2: . liatr.crd
'A3 TITE United States, throug.h
11' Central Intelligence Agency
or ? er.e:?xise, directly involved in the
ev*.tnts led to the bloody coup dtltat
hi Chs last Sept.- 117
involveident in the ntiliory
ritl7.1n that ousted the late President
moDzens, a Socialist,
h:s roundly denied by, the Nixon
a..!ininl.:...latien and the CIA in particular..
en the CIA's track record in
or .1:tempting, to over-
Lilrow !ozeign ge7ornments?lranGuate-
J
??iJay of Pigs, Laos 4 o on
3:'SpiciotIs have persisted that,
tit? operating under White'
11;15 ItCeii much More
thr.n '..n;:occnt observer of the Chilean
Allende's c?ction in 1070.
the. C!A rather sur-
inost relin?t2m.!:,?, went quite
a !) c-mfirrn oiRoy of (hese suspi?
:2?.4.. so in secret testimony on
C':: . the lio"s-: Subcommittee
'?.......crican by its di.
?;:i:'.;:m 1. Cc.,:ity, and Frederick
.,,a am. .cfEiciA.I in, the
of C.urre-t.
1; ? ;1'.211": ;r1
Z:17').1;115tl'Obi1'3
n' ' aba.,!t
py
a;tpri.?.,.-.-I PG". on!. that 1!?e
o'C 1'J-> of
fusal to ltzlp CitI,1-,3ri on hum.3n1-
tartan- grounds, was craptissizad xbeuz
A week before tho military coup v.-hen
It turned doy.n Santlazo's requelt for
crodits to .buy .3(1:),C00 tons of wlitat
hers at a tima when the _Chileans had
run
shortages wera developing.
On Oct. 5. howeer, the new
out of foreign currency and bread
raiiltary
Allende %% ere confirmed, a Communist ?
rcginie.would emerge in Chile 'and that
? Argentina, Eolivia and Peru might fol-
? low this example.
_no base for it." Eiser.itere in his tz!:ti-
l'er lite next three 5-cors, the U.S.
many, Colby said that the CEA rep?rr.r.-f
policy develrperl alongtwo principal
" a
lines. One was lite denial of all credits accurately n overall assessiiient of
deterioration ' and that with th:.. Citilcsn
to the Allende governtmlit?Washing-
tiloi3ntiteurteinont:Leet1-0:ecia;?orz'arani,s.ab.,.?y icnit.171-en,5atioencalo_ rttviT;tiPotntshoi;Igtiriftozr
before it cams.
C'4 Colby Llso told Cite rtibeemrHt:oa
riurnic situation vt,licn Attend,: hint5elf
was. ho iiig dovit iii vast nlisn1i11x2s,.. tilits_rrour assessment was it rokbt
went of his own, Tii ettl?r liie xv,.? Funfortunate If a coup took
.0:ational S!Eurl:y Court:II twn
the 501';,0' like CI.\ a-ti\ity acecirrate
the ceromic? c:iip mid tlic7t 1,.? ellc9-11?_?_Lih:',: it I CoilSii:':?;1:: With, CI;r:
110t hl
?:?.101?Nkz gip?cchincilt ii21.0;r?ol5 it." E.1 rriP.(1.1 1.h!I
Rr.r..caar.,-7 :17,
T1? Oiliy ii::cepti,n to '?'h.o ban on ricJColb;.?_
v,13th voi of ?Ito. . ezrn.,:r trstinviny by Jac::
icrrc ii n.tAt.,s 1.7r
.-Nruerican alfitC5, !lir!
L11.1 dcr:k ju
icsa 11:t n,: to 00,1 ;,.001ct
jet tI. I ? to et..r Own Urki.Z;', Stat.cslilt i!he
' presurnal,ii to ri:.:tini 1-,'runtent Q4 c'1;.;.1
poit for 0...1 1-.iihtary. t-..1!1:rnny rroil fortlier evri
;???Dr.1 1:;,?;;;t:-..4_ A. ".'a ;?;-,
Dii;-.?; 17;;:h"7".1
th:tt ths S!atcs 1,...latlitt4ti zt
me:It to the farces?
tic t;:c. C'tt!c1i cinotIia5i IlA0,/ C:U1
foy.1 L'rirut crn. J. ?I:1
tlt tt'd p( ii
*ri:e6
n:
-? itcrr, r- 1i1t'eiiii _ re,tocit,
111 11r1 -or
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R00080010068-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
BEST COPY
AVAILABLE
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2,
I ??
'd thit KUI..;i3C11 t'.)?)% th, V1CW
r? t '''S not in our in',.'rest to have
take over in Chill. It
woo!;', i..? better had Attend?
0.ov entire term taking the mi.
J1
COLCY consist:ntly re-
fuwd t;" tCII the subcoinmittes
whether the CIA's operations in Chile
had been authorized by the 40 Corn-
mittce," the top secret grotto headed
IssikeiLiiiii.Qsislisaie6Ue?i"le int?'c-='..?...lay? Kissinger in the National S...curity
t?:..tal ruin. Only then would Council that approves clandestine in-
t?sercditint; of socialism have. .
ta:?:on Only then would people
telligence op cirr
Prations, he Filltcd that
.r, 7.,'1?.:e. a'-::. ,--, the messaze that .socialism "we have had .. . various relationships .
doesn't o.ork. What has happened has 1 over the years in Chile Ivith rarlous:
cod :his lesscm," .ip1-7 groups. In soma C21t3 this r.".33 ApprOV*d .
"No Ittdit'aliUtt" ,01 Stirport ? by the National Security Council and it ..,- 1
??:`,I..n.'S TESTIMONY on the CIA's i has meant ;anis assistance to them.. I
,
tJ
e?.;;Ivi::e.s ip Chile supplied a con. That has not fallen Into the categocy
3kit:31)1e amount of new information, we are talking about here ? the turbit-P4
aorne c.,,f it contradictory, under vigor- 1P ce or the millary coup."
c?-:''' ("'-; !ill=7. bY Cfle- .13bc!)'.77,/iTlitr?.ec, ::(3a-Ch7 La prev4.,ous testimony before a Seri-i
Th:ls at one point Colby said that "I ate subcommittee, _former CIA ,Director
can r-:-:e z clear statement that cer- -ori....Rieharcl_IIelms disclosed that .11-oe.CIA, ?
?i teln:,7. C:? had no connection with the i
? coup it:7~..lf, with the military coup. We. had earmarked S-100 C,00 to support 1 anti.-
.i.-1..s.rnecila shortly be/ore his
eidn't si.:aport it, we didn't stimulate . 11ende new
election. This was authorized by ihe.-
i,.. ret'idn't bring it about in any way.
?! We Ovioosly had some intelligence "40 Committee" at a meeti.og in June,
i covera;c o;cr the various moves bcingi 1070. Colby, however, refure.d to asy
?1 made
but -.,:e were quite meticulous in!, whether this effort wss subsequently
making sure there was no Indication o/ " maintained, claiming, that the secrecy
...enceUra;c:nesit from our aide." of CIA, operations had to be protected.
1 CC.1: i
7 A.S.) inssted that the CIA was He then became engaged in this ex?-
?4-t?- - ,
with the prolonged strike change with Harrington:
Ch!lean truckers that preceded ths COLBY: That dots go precisely on
i!oi.ion hi Itch, prevent Allende's
rleclion and subsequently proocovi
cictait..:d plan to plunge Chile into eco-
nomic chaos.
Rep. Dante It. Frisco:a (D?lia.)..
stcommittue.chairman, raised the ques-
tion of Involvement by Brariiian or
other Latin American corporation
many of them. sUbsidiade.s. of United
States firms. because of reports that the -
anti-Allende moves- were widely coor-
dinated. Speaking for the CIA, Davis
renlied:
"There is some evidence of coopera-
tion -between business groups in
and Chile. No:Fever, this is a small share
of the- financial support. Most of the
support via% internal. There Jr some
-1u-tiding and cooperation among groups
with similar outlooks in other Latin
Ameri('-;.art. countries. This 1.1 true with
regard to fr103t of those govemmenta.
. . . I was not thinking so much of
companies or firms so much as groups,
organization: of businessmen, chambers
of, commerce, and that kind of thing
In a country Such as Brazil" -
Discussing the CIA's intelligarrce op...
erations in Chile, Colby said he "would
assume" that the Agency had contacts
..?
with ,Chileans opposed to Allen:is.
Astomd by Harrington whether the CIA.
. ' -
maintained such contacts In secial con-
2
coup. .. ...J to what we were operating ;....nd wisat,,... texts, Colby said:
.2-Yrez.ted by 'Rep. Harrington, Colby- our operations were. I -would Prcier k?',.:'if a gentleman talks to us under thli R.--,.,
m...3
..a:kr.a-.vIar.:;ed that the CIA may have'D leave that out of this particular re- f
I assurance ha will not ba.revniaci, v.-hiell.
- assised certain. . anti-Allende . demon. port . . . :---.4g-e
) can he dangerous In sOITID COttrItritl,. it
; could have been. ,very dangerous for
those in Chill .--.17-: the protac:ion o: ..(3':---
1
1 that relationship, fiduciary relationship
; with the individual, requires that I ha
of infor-li
____I -
following dialogue dsvai; .. .
-
strations. The :following discussion.
ensned: ?
ITA.?.IIINGTON: Did the CIA, dlrect7?Ily
Or cLrectiy,assist these demonstra-
tions the use of subsidiaries of
rtilted .8ln:es corporations in Brazil or
other .1.;;:in American countries? '
COL:3Y: I think I have said that the-
, ? CIA r asist. the trucking strike.
1, 7 **-1-'1"0;;; .1 think it's a broader,
.d intenionally broader, cues:.
1..-bon?any of the demonstrations that
are re.:-.?:%?ed to in the COUTS3 Of this
COV: I era not. quite aura of the
I s:Dr-e co.astion.
I - ?
I make ?:-,7eciflc .ref ? r01-1)01-aie Cpoperttlion
in th- Otcer p.fN Ti QUESTION of
one in rch of 1073. anti-Alien/le AOVC's:,i by United
?' .C72: rather not ans..ver the.. States or Brazilian co:Toratbas, Colby
arc assurance -?:nd nod Dovi.3 giv, citrnal mawerz to
17-1_ would ratii?J .not, .the su),c,.oronitt??,c, Coitv 301:1. 11:71
wNit to be in a poli- ' pot sure," Davis 11,1vr: no
- ,tIldp't. lint it wo. d.N.tee al to 031," but (.7oli,y latercupo-.d.
? 7- iiy dank .nond sa:.:n-;:, I htrn to rcoiark that "I v,?oultIn't rxcluile
..:17.-roo.111 it donao't :11..1,1_, lint it, l'.1710;-:1Y, I (INCA !woo/ of any. How-.
to h.. In potion of i..1v.? ever, I could nut soy it Itipovn."
cc Cr, '111,:7/:0;2, mentlx:`111 '111.:1'70ted at
r,ut, A-1,1i, semi. len..; :h the po:e in...oloetnent
er,??-?:iy (ton': l.rnoor the so? ,
by A rzte.,?1(??to covpovotionJ (;1,10.-.1n
coop oof...0,-.e or
" I lit LIW 'icirr; ph itt?;
Cov?). c:iA
HARRINGTON: I think we have ran
exactly into Vi113t makes this a purpose-
less kind of exercise . "[Urn
COLBY: If I might comment, the pre-
sumption under which we conduct tbia
typo of operation 13 that it is a, covert
operation and that the sUnited States
hand is not to show. For that reason
we in the .executive branch restrict any
knowledge of this type or operation
very severely and conduct procedures
so that very few people learn of any
type of operation of this nature.
HARRINGTON: And we ....lid up with
a situation such as At Sept. 1.1 because
LEit have a cozy 'arrangement.
:
Lvery restrictive of that kind
mation."
Then the
aped:
?7
II TASCELL: 13 it reasonable. to-assurnel
'that the Agency' lies penetrated all of.
ithe political parties in Cbi1.T.7
COLBY: I wish I could say yes. I
?f cannot assure you all, hecaus.s we get
into some splinters.
; FASCELL: M'alor!
COLBY: I thiuk we have an intelJZ-
f f.fenc- CoVr:C;10 Of most Of. them Let's
it that ?.vdy.
?FA3r.r..I.L: Is that atanclat,1
izt procedure?
; COT,DY: it depeue.s on th,..
For a.CC.Untry Of the Intporta:io,o( Cii
the UtIlLt.:(1 StaLvs'
; try to :-s'et an insi:le ?).Ttur-s of
; mizati go'In;: on tikqe. I co ti
.1 a lot of cou:ttrie, wiyre wn
?I :;p:nd lit110 1.1'0[73,10!!
: ;;;;"
! Li its Pelt?!LC:C,11, t.I.
LSointnunist 1%trty of the Soviet if
t; 1,nu aca,
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approve:fit For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
z
l ii - . olio:slit` Tilsit') "Gosiroint Oxon. 5'oo-isrlto," '
0.? IHrt '.v,c,,o;',' 'intriguing di:- I Oil (115Siclent 3, 'roc military Iraolers oo,-
ol.- pal ein.
rilTill0:!(;:li?lf 1' Hi tc-lialooy. Crith; -,. . ,ly arc willinz 11 Plier.f.i ) Truno
N..; -one; roa,lo to,. Col'hY In hi; tel. ..;i.. i's c' is grim piri is of the i?Int:''' i '. support. at lionse.? rod ow:biro r. Is ol
? we% th?... Coe CIA 1, Actively rn- relirc:zsion ;Ind. its effect. '0;i:dieters th-t i press 0003(1. in order 'to con:xi:ids:1
e':1,;1011;:iielr,tioris betl,yroo U. would r'olo.tosioVell 311"..r.'_IKT:117.7 of _ 1 their hnitt on tho country Pne, lirils'n
l'oo-f 'States Pr: i tOreir:r1 coun- the cooli ,,,, ct'. ".,.'t '; t-,, f?-'-'1,?1:::,TT " :1:11-6 job oT rooting out Marxist in!lu-
os I i . 1 C 0,10 OE I (.. l ..t.
i sag.
I_Ctinui:c Pi' "CiNil -Wriz17
1:-NESCRIBING tilt present aitnatioa,
i ? o
i ...tol Colby said:
"2lrmed resistE:rs contir,tta to ba
eNceuted %there they arc four.d, and a
hat no: l."-cri ccnevAlY knqn 'left, IIii estimates or the death toil
..
?
lor?o? ..o. Colby told the subcoturnittea were rouoltiy foor timea the fiouren
!.."?:..' ? ? e v ouid normally coistribute to announced by the junta and he toll ths
t,,i r -oo.ting team." 'subcommittee that the Chilean rallitzry?
? He soi:-1 that !'we o'ould try to pro. had a list of the "most wanted" Al_13n:13
v'oe. tl-ero iotelli;ence as backdrop for followers whom they hoped to find acd
1 ', ?,:ir reootiations and sometimes help possibly execute.
? t'n with appreciatri of the. PEOb r"Communist l'arty chief Luta C7r-s% ,... number of prisoners bevo h:.?en shot,
We follo-v theilay-to-day prog- valan is being or will bs tried YO7 PeTsnoposccily while tryinx to c:scool!
.r.C7--ress !-: negotiatioro If it's an import-p7 treason. He may well be .rentenced t', such deatile.s probably number noa cr
i .
_organic nev.eti-o_ion, like (Treas.. death regardless of the cfcct on Intor- more . ' Several thousand peools rs-
?'1
1 nry) Sr.erctary Shultz over la Nairobi r,ational opinion," Colby ettd. This 1n-* Isiah' under arrest. Incluciiriz lilr,ioran:e?
Io-o.l ofoiC::.9 like that. :ve would be in-
farroi-j of what thay are doing and try formation led to this exchange: Lt? .official3 of ? the Allcnda ao-i2cr,
spent." , ?
L
to he:p them." WIJAL;?;N: You mentioned thoss
10 :he context Chilean-Arnerl
being accused of treason. Did thesa Answerin:: tpre.'stions. Colby agr-or.1
et the -
legedly trcoionablo activities occur aft.t1 that th
. e Cf,\.'s figure of more than ZO.)
o_oorn r.e:Ootiations before the coup, ti a
" ? did h v the takeover by tip: rnilitary7 executions was higher thr.n tlin jonta's
CIo. 3 Davis. said that..we a el
? official ostimat.e. lic added thati"thero
some quite reliable reporting at ths020 COLBY: I think what- T. referred ts.
TVvere a couple thousand, at lea71:, kill.
ti-ne indicatinz that the liussiar,3 were' was the head of the Communist Party
I cci (luring the fighting which ::,.irrourol-
v'vitio.7.. Allende to put his relations who would probably 134 tried :for t .
I ea the coup. It is quite posozible that if
with tile United Str,tes in order, if not treason. . ,
. ! you went to a city morgue you vould -
to stt'le compensation, at least to reach He would probably ba tried reT i find that number. The official fio?nol? of
sort ef accommodation which
ene the strain between the two
?-rr7 2,
(.0.!r:'.:?!es. There were reports indicat-.
ic:: that, unlike the Cubans. they were
? in cff,ct trying to move Allende 'to-
7L'fr .ward a compromise agreement . . it
o wa's on:- judgment that the [Chileans]
_ t
_ ?ko?cre interested in working out some
3csr.c1 of rr.odu.s tivcridi without, however,
. .
retrra:ing substantialiy from thein pa-
Nor."
Dr?:ia added that "our intelligence
requioemorit in the negotiations be:-
too:en the ,Unitcd States and , Chile
1110:rty-otilri he to try in find out, tisratieli
' coo.- 1o s000res, what their reactions to a
o
rco-'.'i.ng session wore, what thr:?
, read:7.7 a our position was, what th:ir
La '0ent bf the 'State of ne;otiZtiorts
..._ p7_VICtiritY. Til'2 government probably la,
is."
right in believing that is opponenta
ln ''-..; narration of tile event:IP:PAL:1g I
have not been fully neutrali7cd. Or.u?
'yin. Colbysaid 111.21-11ntJlo? His ? reports indicatc that the extrerni:t
Iz,'???-?:.*1 deterioration: It wai osaly ..Is movement of the ilevolutionary Left
treason. He would probably 1:''? trIci4irrl'!--)t0ta1 killed is 4.j1G civilians and .:;-; troon)
for activities prior to the tnkeover. Y Or%
can have some question as to how vAliil
that is in a constitutional Iola.'
There have been acriV2 who have be.t.rt
accused of it since the takeover.
WHALEN: That confuses ma. If ht. In
tried for treason against aCovernose,ot
(he] supported, I cannot under,:tand .., Colby clisaorecd. however, with
Ithat.
?R
iC.5 obert Steele (P..-Conn.) that Cf:.
You are right.
junta' killinoA have "Lions no ant" pn:f
-
This was Colby's assessment of this gu'D.(1-"
"I think our appreciation Is that it
does them some gond . The junto.,;;;;
their concern is whether they- coUl.:!.?
! to a total of 513. We would
I would estimate, it is bett-cen 2.3a and
I 3.009 killed during the strocole:?. That
I- would not be in my clar5ification r's
execution ':::-',L-. Some of those wcr.... shot
\
down. There is no question about that.
Lillie:I are not just by:7tanders ..."
_p_Esscat situation:
"Armed opposition now appears te
he confined to sporadic, isolated
at-
tal:e this action or W.-dn.; over t'oca
tach; on ectirity forces, but the re..oho-?
t. ener
b?llovel that the left Is rozroupial government and no g ats
coordinated zabotare and ru?..riii4 I civil war, -.vhich was the ran chanes
. because the Allende supporter f r,..00
fairly activist. There were armies in
I, the country. There was at least a 5,:ood
I chance of a roal civil war occurrino as
I a result of this coup," Colby said.
t?
ef gettirt; the Army, 017 liso-y believes its aw:ts have mint be-T1
: ' Force to cover it. lilorntn- damaced beyond rconir. It wont; to
s ,
? OA ;et tho-n all lo." Col'or
--selred the Cioiron couo to
*---loneslars terolotion, repot,zgy
by the C1.1. when the ainn7
'?? . i'refident Suklruo. He said 6;7
-; the sospicions of tha
o:o 3ry, that 1\1.:enti, WA] 71.12,-
1 of )1V! own on Sept. .10 In
this arraed forces, but srI?1
had no firm information con,
.ne.sp suspicion.%
launch ass's ifovernamr.mt aztivity as
soon as 1.".?:?tici:t. A!?(1 i:1 lt:i.,:-:--,In T. to .r:...: reel poso.ibility. Yea, 1 thiit',...; it i-..-.., zoo,o'f.
form a tii"ied from of 1..;oiorot ,,,,..?,..071, -1. poasibility. OVhctiter We a (ono amity or
parties. OthrT ir,ii1:-,.t. group!. to.:iooiroT LEot L. not at .all aura." . .. ,
the Comm:olio,: and O.;ocioll3t. oartis I,
are in di sariny, lost they h; ye not been
/ destroyed. 7,xi:e4 supoo.ters Oi the oat':
erl goverament rre nrr,antzins; obrund,
11 oaroei:.? in /loose." , . , * ' - r: ?'??-r-
t?Colhy ?told tiro 1.1:bcomin!tte??.? thr.;
1"coocern over s,-..curity vi000loot;ly in
1 is hat acco.mts for 1.:1?3 :111t3.1 Cont!a?
tied use of harsh mneasu:es.to deal 7-t'it'a
Asked whetter civil war rernhiozoi ri
possibility, Colby replied thr.t2'it Tros..
but it 7ra)
Approved For Release' 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78Md2660R000800100
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
.0
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R0008-00100008-2
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
.v
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
etedi es ? W...
91s1 Congress, 2d Session .
House Document No, 439
CONSTITUTION
? JEFFERSON'S MANUAL
AND
RUES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNITED STATES
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
By
LEWIS DESCHLER, M.P.L., LL.D.
PARLIAMENTARIAN
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
guie XI.
the clerk
ii of the
(lir days
does not
id within
-equest,
may file
en notice
I be held,
ensure or
The
r. Imme-
erk of the
.ommittee
"1:I inform
or mat ter
1r matter
N.1 at that
limit 15
or spi--TizI
v.!,inber of
present.
'!niirtnan'
or clause 3*
,ess of each
_hlic except
/.1etermines
ty to open
r by para-
is Rule.
'-:'erence is to
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
RULES OF THE HorSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ule XI. This clause was adopted December S, (VIII, amended
Jo mary 3, 1953, p. 24, and revised by the Legislative Reorganiza-
tio Act of 1970 (St Stat. 1110): H. rtes. 5, January 22, 1971, p. ? ?
This latter revision also added the requirement of open committee
meeti gs in paragraph (1) of this clause.
A c nmittee scheduled to meet on stated days, when convened on
such da ? with a quorum present may proceed to the transaction of
business egardtess of the absence of the chairman (VIII, 2213, 2214).
A cortun'ttee meeting being adjourned by the chairman for lack of a
quorum, a ajority of the members of the committee may not, without
the consent ? the chairman, call a meeting of the committee on the
same day (VI , 2213).
27. (a) Th Rules of the House are the rules of its
committees and subcommittees so far
? 715. Rule of
Committee as applicable, except. that a motion to
Procedure.
rece.'s from day to day is a motion of
high privilege in ommittees and subcommittees.
Committees shall a pt written rules not inconsist-
ent with the Rules of he Rouse and those rules shall
be binding on each sub ommittee of that committee.
Each subcommittee of a ommittee is a part of that
committee and is subject the authority and direc-
tion of that committee.
This paragraph was adopted De inher 8, 1931 (VIII, 2215),
amended March 23, 1955, pp. 3569, 35S5, and January 22, 1971, p.
when the House incorporated provision. of the Legislative Reorga-
nization Act of 1970 (S) Stat. 1110) in th rules (H. Res.
A committee may adopt rules under wh ?h it will exercise its func-
tions (I, 707; III, 1811, ES t2 VIII, 2214) L\-41d may appoint subcom-
mittees (VI, 52), which should in.?lude m,1).ority and minorily rep-
r2.sentation (IV, 4551), and confer 1)11 them lOpwers delegated 'to the
committee itself (VI, 532); but express authori v has also been given
subcommittees by the House (III, 1754-1759, H 1, 2499, 2501, 2508,
2517; IV, 4548).
(b) Each committee shall keep a cot plete record
of all committee action. Such record s.`1,111 include
a record of the votes on any question o- which a
[3771
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
? 735 \
recorNvote is demanded. The result of each I-oilcan
vote ins);kny meeting of any committee shall be made
available\ by that committee for inspection by the
public at r'esonable times in the offices of that com-
mittee. Infor`mation so available for public inspection
shall include a scription of the amendment, motion,
order, or other \proposition and the name of each
Member voting fo and each Member voting against
such amendment, m tion, order, or proposition, and
whether by proxy or i\ person, and the names of those
Members present but}it voting: With respect to
each record vote by any rnarnittee on each motion
to report any bill or resolutki of a public character,
the total number of votes est ,for, and the total
number of votes cast against, le reporting of such
bill or resolution shall be includegl in the committee
report.
The first part of this paragraph was derived corn Sec. 133(b) of
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1916 (60 St. S12) and made
part of the standing rules on January 3, 1953, p. 24. Te requirements
that committee roll calls be subject to public inspectiON and that the
committee report on a public bill or resolution include the \ote thereon,
were added by Sec. 104(b) of the Legislative Reorganiza)}0n Act of
1970 (84 Stat. 1140) and made a part of the rules on January' 22, 1971,
Rule Xl.
p. --, H. Res. 5.
(c) All committee hearings, records, data, charts,
and files shall be kept separate and distinct from the
congressional office records of the Member serving
as chairman of the committee; and such records shall
be the property of the House and all Members of the
House shall have access to such records. Each corn-
[378]
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Rule Xt.
rnitte
testi:h
by t
Thi
Act 1-4:
Jan,
(dii
Carl=
to th.-
and t,
brn
(2)
a mea
shall
of da:
the df
of th
major
report
such
trans'
mitteE
pa ra
mitte:
rules,
repo ri
the
(3?)
mat 1?
Rule NI.
'h
be made
fl by the
r t com-
:nspection
7-, motion,
of each
ng against
,ition, and
i,2s of those
respect to
{th motion
character,
. the total
ng of such
committee
1.A of
i12) and made
nniiirernent:i
-. And that the
o thereon,
:ization Act of
1,iary 22, 1971,
It'd, charts,
from the
)or serving
cords shall
her of the
Each corn-
Approved FOI; ReleaSe200570-2117 : CIA:RDP78M02660R00080010000.8,2?
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Etute 735.
mittee is authorized to have printed and bound
testimony and other data presented at hearings held
by the committee.
This provision from Sec. 202 cd) of the LegiAative Reorganization
Act of 1946 (60 Stat. S12) was made a part of the standing rules
January 3, 1033, p. 24.
(CI)"( ) It shall be the duty of the chairman of each
comnn ee to report or cause to be reported promptly
to the H ise any measure approved by his committee
and to tak-, or cause to be taken necessary steps to
bring the niL tter to a vote.
(2) In any vent, the report of any committee on
a measure whim has been approved by the committee
shall be filed wit in seven calendar. days (exclusive
of days on which Lhe Rouse is not in session) after
the day on which th re has been filed with the clerk
of the committee a ritten request, signed by a
majority of the mcmbe of the committee, for the
reporting of that measuf Upon the filing of any
such request, the clerk f the committee shall
transmit immediately to the chairman of the com-
mittee notice of the filing of tnat request. This sub-
paragraph does not apply to a 7eport of the Com-
mittee on Rules with respect t the rules, joint
rules, or order of business of the ouse or to the
reporting of a resolution of inquiry addressed to
the head of an executive department.
(3) If, at the time of approval of any easure or
matter by any committee (except the Con mittee on
Rules) any member of the committee, gives tfhre of
r791
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
1;ov. 1974
717,'71fl
Cg"il 11 _ err:ice
JUDITH MILLER
Though political purists may bridle at the comparison,
the late president of Chile, Salvador Allende, and the
Democratic Senator from South Dakota. George
McGovern, had mucTit in common. Both aspired to the
presidency of nations with long democratic traditions.
Both publicly espoused a more equitable distribution of
wealth and greater governmental control of giant cor-
porations. Both were feared by the middle classes, who
believed their own economic power and prestige would
decline to the extent that the lot of the poor was
unproved. Most fundamentally, however, both were
victims?targets of a White House-directed effort to
prevent their election to office; targets of vast con-
spiracies to subvert the free election process through
which citizens exercise the right of self-determination.
Many of the tactics brought into play in the Nixon
Administration's secret intervention in the Chilean
election of 1970 were also employed in the U.S. Presi-
dential election two years later. The dirty tricks that
Allende had managed to overcome?funding of opposi-
tion candidates, manipulation of the media, violations
of individual privacy, illegal campaign contributions?
all were components?or the corruption now categorized
in our national shorthand as "Watergate." What the
United States unknowingly experienced in 1972. and
ultimately exposed and repudiated two years later, was
the "Chileanii.ation" of American politics.
Although congrcss has now seemed to repudiate
such activities at home, it has not rejected their use in
Chile or in other nations unfortunate enough to be
considered eve!) marginally significant to American
Judith Miller is -rho Progressive's 1.Yoskinivon
corresponde,,L
"national security." In the Watergate affair, Congress
was compelled to begin impeachment proceedings
against Richard M. Nixon for his orchestration of the
White House coverup of illegal activities. In the ease of
Chile, however, the coverop of similar White House-
inspired activities is being carried out by Congress
itself.
By rejecting a thorough investigation of the Central,
Intelligence Agency's role in the "destabilization" of.
the Allende regime, Congress is adopting the Nixon
technique of "stonewalling." Moreover, by refusing to
conduct a broader investigation of the origins of the,
U.S. Government's anti-AHende policy, the Senate is.
abandoning its constitutional responsibility for advising
and consenting to the Executive's foreign policies.
Finally, through inaction, Congress is inviting another
Watergate, a second round of domestic internaliaticin
of the cloak-and-dagger activities commonly deployed
abroad by the American intelligence establishme.m. As.
Senator Frank Church, Idaho Democrat, warned six
months before the CIA in in Chile was pub-
licly disclosed, "Is it possilde to insulate our constitu-
tional and democratic processes at home from the kind
of foreign policy we have conducted . . . a policy of
almost uninterrupted cold war, hot ?var, and cl
anoes-
tine war?"
The Congressional effort to shield the CIA from
public scrutiny in this case is all the more batfliny
view of what CIA Director William Colhy and Presideii
Ford have already acknowledged about covert CIA
intervention in Chile. In th past, Congress could rely
on its traditional rationale for unwillingness to exercise
oversight: "The agency never fully briefs us; we (lid ik)i
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Ford, Secretary of State I lenry Kissinger, the 'ranking
members of the House and Senate Armed Services
coMMIttees (who are responsible for overseeing covert
CM operations), and Congressional leaders held a
two-hour meeting. Although the White House claimed,
in proper diplomatic language. that the group had
engaged in "full and frank" discussion of CIA covert
activities in Chile and elsewhere, several sources report
that the major topic of conversation was the danger
supposedly posed to "the national interest" by such
incidents as the -Harrington leak, and the problem of
safeguarding future "sensitive" testimony before leg-
islative committees. "They really had a rope with
' Harrington's name on it," says one Capitol Hill source.
In briefings of top Congressional Republicans and
the Senate Democratic Caucus, Kissinger also empha-
sized the importance of safeguarding delicate CIA
testimony before Congressional committees.
The House demonstrated little enthusiasm for the
kind of investigation Harrington had requested. Fas-
cell, whose subcommittee had been holding innocuous
hearings on Chile for a year, expressed no interest even
in obtaining a transcript of Colby's actual testimony
before the Nedzi oversight group. "That's not the way I
want to run my subcommittee," Fascell told inc.
There has been continuing interest, however, in
identifying the source of the leak of Colby's testimony.
On September 25, Harrington appeared before the
Nedzi oversight subcommittee to testify about the leak
of his letter. Although Harrington made it clear that he
had volunteered to appear, subcommittee members
made it equally clear that the panel had power to
subpoena him if he were to refuse. Instead of discuss-
ing the substance of Harrington 's complaints about the
lack of oversight ,of the CIA, the subcommittee pre-
ferred, in closed session. to take up the issue of
%vhether Harrington ought to be censured for citing
details of Colby's secret testimony in confidential let-
ters to Representatives and Senators ostensibly respon-
sible for foreign affairs.
With one major exception, the Senate's reaction to
the disclosures has closely paralleled that of the House.
The exception, Senator Frank Church. is chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multi-
-national Corporations, whose hearings on the Interna-
tional Telephone and "felegraph Company's involve
ment in the 1970 Chilean elections had previously
produced testimony revealing sonic degree of CIA
cooperation with ITT efforts to prevent Allende's elec-
tion. But Colby's April 22 testimony. as disclosed in the
Harrington letter. clearly C011tNidiCted sonic of the
testimony CIA and State Department officials had given
during the Church subcommittee's hearings.
Incensed over the apparent discrepancies, Church
:innounced he would turn over any "misleading" testi-
mony to the Justice Department for investigation :Ind
possible perjury charges. He also said he would for-
intillv ask the full Foreign Relations Committee to
Vu6C1.4A?Drr-
.? ? .. .. ?
Engelhardt in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
'How Else Can We Protect Our Democratic
Ideals If We Don't Beat The Commies At Their
Own Game?'
Cum, Church instructed the chief of his subcommitLef..
staff, Jerome Levinson, to write a report based nit a
review of the apparently contradictory testimony.
Senator Fulbright, preoccupied in the last months of
a lame duck term with hearings on Soviet-American
detente, was less than eager to mount a full-fledged
investigation of U.S. policy towards the former Allende
government. Nevertheless, the revelations in the press
forced the Foreign Relations Committee to take up the
issue in secret session.
On the morning of the scheduled committee meeting.
The Washingtoo Post and The New York Times can ed
stories disclosing the recommendations of the confi('..en-
tial report Church had requested his subcommittee
staff chief to prepare. The Levinson report recom-
mended that a perjury investigation be initiated aeains:
former CIA Director Richard lvi. Helms. In addition, it
accused Kissinger of having "deceived" the Foreiei
Relations Committee in sworn testimony about the
scope and objective of CIA operations in Chile.
memo further questioned the testimony of the former
Assistant Secretary of st,t, for Inter-American A ffaii.s.
teviewA0paivedTiorkeletstec2006/0211 7gatIA-FiDP781140166OROCMG01.0000612.S. Ambassador to ChIc
constitutionally elected Allende government. In addl. Edward M. Kerry; and ; he former chief of the CiA's
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
sional oversight power of the intelligence agencies
themselves (though Congress has rejected about 150
such efforts in the past). Senator Symington contends
that the Senate's ability to ride herd on CIA covert
activities has actually diminished over the years. When
the late Senator Richard Pussell. Georgia Democrat,
was chairman of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, Symington notes, high-ranking members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee were occasionally
invited to attend CIA oversight sessions. These invita-
tions ceased, however, when Senator John Stennis,
Mississippi Democrat. succeeded Russell as chairman,
and oversight meetings became a rarity. As a result of
this experience, many Senators believe that any over-
sight procedure must be written into legislation rather
than remain dependent upon a "gentlemen's agree-
ment."
The Administration, clearly, would prefer to head off
legislation. Toward that end, Kissinger offered early in
October to have Colby provide detailed briefings on
future clandestine operations to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee as well as to the Armed Services
Committee. Whether Congress?and particularly the
Senate?will be content with this arrangement remains
to be seen. Representative Harrington dismissed it as
"a small step for the Foreign Affairs Committee and a
smaller step still for the cause of Congressional control
over the CIA, but so far still more illusion than reality."
Proposals now pending range from one by Senator
James Abourezk, South Dakota Democrat, who would
abolish the CIA's covert operations branch, to a biparti-
san plan to establish it fourteen-member joint Congres-
sional oversight committee for all intelligence organiza-
tions. Senator Walter Mondale, Minnesota Democrat,
has called for formation of a Select Committee on
Intelligence, fashioned after the Select Committee on
Emergency Powers, to study the most effective means ;
of overseeing the intelligence community.
Ultimately, however. Congress is likely to do what it ,
has done in the past?nothing. As the Chilean experi-
ence demonstrates, most Senators and Representa-
tives?and certainly most of those in leadership posi-
tions--favor the maintenance of a U.S. capability for
clandestine operations against foreign governments in:
general, just as they supported the intervention against ,
Allende? in particular.
Congress has had an excellent opportunity to conduct
a searching inquiry of the American involve-meld in
Chile and the foreign policy that encouraged such,
involvement. It has passed up that opportunity on the
shopworn pretext that to pursue it might endanger
"national security." Although a number of legislators
criticized Ford's justification of the intervention in :
Chile, most accepted Ins rationale: all powerful nations
conduct such shady operations; we spend less money
on them than do others.
The United States spent only 58 million to undermine
the elected government of Chile. According to Ford's
logic?logic that Congress accepts and tacitly sup-
ports?it was a cost-effective coup.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
94th CONGRESS S.
1st Session
Mr.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
introduced the following bill; which was read twice
and referred to the Committee on Rules
BILL
To establish a Joint Committee on .Central Intelligence, to
amend the National Security Act of 1947, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives
2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that
3 ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON _CENTRAL -
4 INTELLIGENCE
5 SEC. 2. (a) There is hereby established a JOint Committee
6 on Central Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the
7 "joint committee") which shall be composed of twelve members
8 appointed as follows:
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
2
1 (1) two members of the Committee on Armed
2
3
4
Services of the Senate;
(2) two members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate;
5 (3) two members of the Committee on Government
6 Operations of the Senate;
7 (4) two members of the Committee on Armed
8 Services of the House of Representatives;
9 (5) two members of the Committee on Foreign
10 Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
11 (6) two members of the Committee on .Government
12 Operations of the House of Representatives.
13 (b) The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice
14 chairman from among its members at the beginning of each Congress.
15 The vice chairman shall act in the place instead of the chairman in the
16 absence of the chairman. The chairmanship shall alternate with each
17 Congress between the Senate and the House of Representatives, and the
18 chairman shall be selected by the joint committee members of the house
19 entitled to the chairmanship. The vice chairman shall be chosen from
20 the house other than that of the chairman by members of the joint
21 committee from that house.
22 (c) Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shalt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
3
1 not d,ffect the power of the remaining members to execute the
2 functions of the joint committee and shall be filled in the same
3 manner as in the case of an original selection.
4 (d) A majority of the members of the joint committee shall.
5 constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that
the joint committee may fix a lesser number as a quorum for the
7 purpose of taking testimony.
8 DUTIES OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
9 SEC. 3. (a) The joint committee shall make continuing studies of
10 the activities and operations of the Director of Central Intelligence and
11 the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director of Central Intelligence s:ia:
12 keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to all
13 his activities and those of the Central Intelligence Agency.
14 (b) All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or House
15 of Representatives relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and the
16 Central Intelligence Agency or to the foreign intelligence activities of the
17 United States Government shall be referred to the joint committee, and
18 except for the Appropriations Committees, the joint committee shall have
19 exclusive jurisdiction and access to information on he operations
20 of the Central Intelligence Agency, its program_s_anci functions.
a
21 (c) Information obtained or_furnIshsed pursuant to this section
22 shall be subject to specific rules and instructions regarding
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
4
? 1 protection and further dissemination as established by the joint
-
committee. These rules and instructions shall take precedent-over
3 any other rules or instructions of the Senate or the House of
4 Representatives, .with which they may conflict.
5 (d) The chairman and vice chairman of the joint committee or
6 their designees shall from time to time report to their respective
7 houses, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect
8 to matters within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.
9 POWERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
10
SEC. 4. (a) The joint committee, or any subcommittee
11 thereof, is authorized, in its discretion: to make expenditures; to
employ personnel; to hold hearings; to sit and act at any time or place;
to subpoena witnesses and documents; to take depositions and other
testimony; to use, on a reimbursable basis, the facilities and services
of personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the prior consent
of said Agency; to procure printing and binding; to procure the
temporary or intermittent services of individual or organizational
consultants; and to provide for the training of its professional staff.
(b) Subpoenas may be issued over the signature of the chairman
12
kl13
.14
15
16
17
18
19
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
5
1 of the joint committee or by any member designated by him or
2 the joint committee, and may be served by such person as may be
3 designated by such chairman or member. The chairman of the
4 joint committee or any member thereof may administer oaths to
witnesses. The provisions of sections 102 to 104 of the Revised
6 Statutes (2 U. S. C. 192-194) shall apply in the case of any failure
7 of any witness to comply with a ubpoena to testify when summoned
8 under authority of this subsection.
9 CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION
10 SEC. 5. The joint committee may classify information
11 originating within the committee in accordance with standards
12 used generally by the executive branch of the Federal Government
13 for classifying defense information dr other information relating to
14 the national security of the-United States, including information
15 relating to intelligence sources and methods.
16 RECORDS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
17 SEC. 6. The joint committee shall keep a complete record
18 of all information it receives pursuant to section 3- All committee
19 records, data, charts and files shall be the property of the joint
20 committee and. shall be kept in the office of the joint committee,
21 or such other places as the joirt committee may direct,
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
6
1 under such security safeguards as the joint committee shall
2 determine to be in the interest of national security but not less than
3 the standards p-rescribed forthe Executive branch.
4 EXPENSES OF JOT COMMITTEE
5 SEC. 7. The expenses of the joint committee shall be paid
from the contingent fund of the Senate from funds appropriated for
7 the joint committee, upon vouchers signed by the chairman of the
8 joint committee or by any member of the joint committee
9 authorized by the chairman.
10 PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
11 SEC. 8. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, aS
12 amended, (50 U.S.C. A. 403) is further amended by adding the
13 following new subsection (g):
14 (g) In order further to implement the proviso of
15 section 102(d)(3) of this Act that the Director of Central
16 Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
17 sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure--
18 (1) Whoever, being or having been in duly
19 authorized possession or control of information
20 relating to intelligence sources and methods, or
21 whoever, being or having been an officer or employee
22 of the United States, or member of: the Armed Services
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
7
1 - of the United States, or a contractor of the United States
2 Government, or an employee of a contractor of the United
3 States Government, and in the course of such relationship
4 becomes possessed of information relating to intelligence
5 sources and methods, knowingly communicates such infoLdiation
6 to a person not authorized to receive it shall be fined not more
7 than S5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both;
8 (2) For the purposes of this subsection, the term
9 "information relating to intelligence sources and methods"
'10 means information concerning
11 (a) methods of collecting foreign intelligence;
12 (b) all sources of foreign intelligence, whether
13 human, technical, or other; and
14 (c) methods and techniques of analysis and
15 evaluation of foreign intelligence
16 and which for reasons of national security, or in the interest
17 of the foreign relations of the United States, has been specifically
18 designated for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution,
19 pursuant to authority granted by law, Executive order, or
ZO Diri.-.:ctive of the National Security Council, by a department or
agency of the United States Government which is expressly
22 authorized by law or by the Piesiclent to engage in intelligence
23 activities for the .United States;
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : DP78M02660R000800100008-2
8
1 (3) A person not authorized to receive information relating
2 to intelligence sgurces and methods isnot subject to prosecution as an
3 accomplice within the meaning of section 2 and 3 of Title 18, United
States Code, or to prosecution for conspiracy to commit an offense
5 under this subsection, unless he became possessed of the information
6 relating to intelligence sources and methods in the course of his relation-
7 ship with the United States Government;
8 (4) No prosecution shall be instituted under this subsection
9 unless, prior to the return of the indictment or the filing of the
10 information, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence
11 jointly certify to the court that the information was lawfully designated
12 for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution within the meaning
13 or paragraph (2) of this subsection at the time of the offense;
14 (5) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this
15 subsection that the information was communicated only to a regularly
16 constituted subcommittee, committee, or joint committee of Congress,
17 pursuant to lawful demands;
18 (6) Whenever in the judgment of the Director of Central Intelligence
19 any person has engaged, or is about to engage, in any acts or practices
20 which constitute, or will constitute, a violation of this subsection, or
21 any rule or regulation issued thereunder, the Attorney General, on
22 behalf of the United States may maize application to the appropriate court
"23 for an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000-800100008-2
9
1 compliance with the provisions of this subsection, and upon a showing
that such person has engaged, or is about to engage, in any such acts
3 or practices, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order,
4 or other order may be granted.
5 (7) In any judicial proceeding under this subsection, the
6 court may review, in camera, information relating to intelligence
7 sources and methods designated for limited or restricted dissemination
8 or distribution for the purpose of determining if such designation was
9 lawful and the court shall not invalidate the designation unless it
determines that the designation was arbitrary and capricious.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASNitiGTON, D.C. 20505
2 2 FEB 1974
Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In your letter of 5 February 1974 you asked for my views on
proposals made by Senator William Proxmire in a letter to you dated
30 January 1974 that the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee release
an aggregate figure broken down by agency which indicates the total
amount spent on intelligence by the U.S. yearly.
Senator Proxmire goes on to say he agrees that the release of
manpower statistics and budgetary information that indicates the relative
priorities of the intelligence community cannot be permitted. His basic
purpose is to show to the American public the rough apportionment of
intelligence dollars to defense and civilian agencies while fully protecting
intelligence programs.
You will recall that on Z7 July 1973 I responded to a similar request
from you regarding the disclosure of the budget figures for the National
Intelligence Program which I presented to the Subcommittee on 11 July 1973.
I believe the considerations which I outlined in that letter still apply. I
stated my view that disclosure of the total figure would not in and of itself
present a security problem. I went on to explain, however, that I felt it
would establish a precedent for the disclosure of this figureannually. If
this were to occur, the annual fluctuations in our total intelligence effort
would be revealed and it would not be in the national interest to disclose
that kind of inforrnation to foreign nations.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
I pointed out that such disclosure of total figures for all programs
would reveal considerable information about the distribution of our
intelligence resources among different types of intelligence activity and
an annual update of those figures would provide insights into the changes
and trends in our intelligence programs which could be damaging to
intelligence sources and methods.
I am still concerned that public disclosure of total intelligence figures
on an annual basis would lead to pressures for further public explanation
of the programs for which the monies ,were appropriated. In my judgment
this is the very kind of information which Senator Proxmire has indicated
in his letter to you should not be released.
I feel that the final determination of how information on these funds
should be handled within the Congress is a matter for the Congress to
decide. I feel quite strongly, however, that because of the responsibility
placed upon me by the Congress in the National Security Act of 1947 for
the protection of intelligence sources and methods, I could not authorize
the release of the figures which Senator Proxmire has proposed.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
23 April 1975
Honorable James T. Lynn, Director
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D. C. 20503
Dear Mr. Lynn:
This submits proposed legislation in accordance with Office of
Management and Budget Circular No. A-19, revised. Enclosed are
six copies of a draft bill, "To amend the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended." Also enclosed are copies of a sectional analysis, a
comparison with existing law, cost analysis, and drafts of the letters
of transmittal to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
The proposed legislation amends Section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947 by adding a new subsection (g) defining "information
relating to intelligence sources and methods" as a separate category of
vous, information to be accorded statutory recognition and protection similar
to that provided "Restricted Data" under the Atomic Energy Act. The
proposed law recognizes the authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence and the heads of other agencies expressly authorized by law
or by the President to engage in intelligence activities for the United
mot States, to limit the dissemination of information related to intelligence
sources and methods of collection. It provides for a criminal penalty
for the disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons and for
injunctive relief.
The continued effectiveness of the United States foreign intelligence
collection effort is dependent upon the adequate protection of the intelligence
sources and methods involved. In recognition of this, Congress, under
Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, made the Director of
am. Central Intelligence responsible for the protection of intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Unfortunately, there is no
statutory authority to implement this responsibility. In recent times,
serious damage to our foreign intelligence effort has resulted from unauthorized
disclosures of information related to intelligence sources and methods. The
circumstances of these disclosures precluded punitive criminal action.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
In most cases, existing law is ineffective in preventing
disclosures of information relating to intelligence sources and methods.
Except in cases involving communications intelligence, no criminal
action lies unless the information is furnished to a representative of a
foreign power or the disclosure is made with intent to harm the United
States or aid a foreign power. Except in the case of knowingly furnishing
classified information to either a foreign government or a foreign agent,
prosecution requires proof, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the
information affects the national defense within the meaning of the statute.
This can only be established by further public disclosure in open court
which may aggravate the damage to the security and intelligence interests
of the United States and raises an additional obstacle to prosecution. The
difficulties imposed by these burdens substantially reduce the effectiveness
of the general criminal statutes as a deterrent to unauthorized disclosure
of sensitive intelligence sources and methods information.
The proposed legislation is aimed solely at persons who are
entrusted with information relating to intelligence sources and methods
through a privity of relationship with the U. S. Government. A fully
effective security program might require legislation to encompass the
willful disclosures of information requiring protection by all persons
knowing or having reason to know of its sensitivity. However, in order
to limit the free circulation of information in our American society only
to the degree essential to the conduct of a national foreign intelligence
effort, this legislation proposes that prosecution be provided only for
persons who have authorized possession of such information or acquire
it through a privity of relationship to the Government. Other persons
collaterally involved in any offense would not be subject to prosecution.
Further, disclosures to Congress upon lawful demand would be expressly
excluded from the provisions of the proposed law.
In order to provide adequate safeguards to an accused, while at
qww the same time preventing damaging disclosures during the course of
prosecution, subsection (g)(7) provides for an in camera determination
by the court to decide as a question of law the validity of the designation
for limited distribution of the information upon which prosecution is
brought. Also, under subsection (g)(4), prior to court action, the
Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence must certify
that the information was lawfully designated for limited distribution,
2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
the information was not placed in the public domain by the Government,
and there existed a procedure whereby the defendant could have had the
information reviewed for possible public release. Further under sub-
section (g)(4), it is an affirmative defense if the information was lawfully
provided to a Committee of Congress, or if the defendant did not know or
had no reason to know that the information had been specifically designated
for limited distribution.
Finally, in order to prevent disclosures authority is provided
in subsection (g)(6) for the courts to enjoin those to whom the proposed
legislation otherwise applies upon the Attorney General's application
and showing that the person is about to make an unauthorized disclosure.
Your advice is requested as to whether there is any objection
to the submission of the proposed legislation to the Congress from the
standpoint of the Administration's program.
Enclosures
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
3
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
A BILL
To amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for
other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
2 the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
3 Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
4 (50 U. S. C. A. 403) is further amended by adding the following
5 new subsection (g):
6 (g) In the interests of the security of the foreign
7 intelligence activities of the United States, and in order further
8 to implement the proviso of section 102(d)(3) of this Act that the
9 Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
10 protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
11 disclosure--
12 (1) Whoever, being or having been in duly
13 authorized possession or control of information relating
14 to intelligence sources and methods, or whoever, being
15 or having been an officer or employee of the United States,
16 or member of the Armed Services of the United States,
17 or a contractor of the United States Government, or an
18 employee of a contractor of the United States Government,
19 and in the course of such relationship becomes possessed
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
1 of such information, knowingly communicates it to a
2 person not authorized to receive it shall be fined not
3 more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
4 years, or both;
5 (2) For the purposes of this subsection, the
6 term "information relating to intelligence sources and
7 methods" means sensitive information concerning--
8 (A) methods of collecting foreign
9 intelligence;
10 (B) sources of foreign intelligence,
11 whether human, technical, or other; or
12 (C) methods and techniques of analysis
13 and evaluation of foreign intelligence which,
14 in the interests of the security of the foreign
15 intelligence activities of the United States, has
16 been specifically designated for limited or restricted
17 dissemination or distribution, pursuant to authority
18 granted by law or Directive of the National Security
19 Council, by a department or agency of the United
20 States Government which is expressly authorized by
21 law or by the President to engage in intelligence
22 activities for the United States;
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
1 (3) A person who is not authorized to receive
2 information relating to intelligence sources and methods
3 is not subject to prosecution as an accomplice within
4 the meaning of sections 2 and 3 of Title 18, United States
5 Code, or to prosecution for conspiracy to commit
6 an offense under this subsection, unless he became
7 possessed of such information in the course of a relation-
8 ship with the United States Government as described in
9 paragraph (1); Provided, however, That the immunity
10 conferred by this paragraph does not preclude the
11 indictment or conviction for conspiracy of any person
12 who is subject to prosecution under paragraph (1)
13 of this subsection,
14 (4) No prosecution shall be instituted under
15 this subsection unless, prior to the return of the
16 indictment or the filing of the information, the Attorney
17 General and the Director of Central Intelligence jointly
18 certify to the court that at the time of the offense--
19 (A) the information was lawfully
20 designated for limited or restricted dissemination
21 or distribution within the meaning of paragraph
22 (2) of this subsection;
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
1 (B) the information had not been
2 placed in the public domain by the United States
3 Government; and
4 (C) there existed a review procedure
5 through which the defendant could obtain review,
6 by the Government agency described in paragraph (2)
7 of this subsection, of the necessity of continuing
8 the designation described in paragraph (2) of this
9 subsection in the interests of the security of the
10 foreign intelligence activities of the United States.
11 (5) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution
12 under this subsection that--
13 (A) the information was communicated only
14 to a regularly constituted subcommittee, committee
15 or joint committee of Congress, pursuant to lawful
16 demand, or
17 (B) the person communicating the information
18 did not know or have reason to know that the information
19 had been specifically designated as described in
20 paragraph (2) of this subsection.
21 (6) Whenever in the judgment of the Director of
22 Central Intelligence any person is about to engage in any
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
acts or practices which will constitute a violation of
this subsection, the Attorney General, on behalf of
the United States, may make application to the appropriate
court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, and
upon a showing that such person is about to engage in
any such acts or practices, a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order may be
granted.
(7) In any judicial proceedings under this
subsection, the court--
(A) may review, in camera, information
relating to intelligence sources and methods
designated for limited or restricted dissemination
or distribution within the meaning of paragraph (2)
of this subsection for the purpose of determining if
such designation was lawful and the court shall not
invalidate the designation unless it determines that
the designation was arbitrary and capricious. The
determination of the validity of such designation
under the circumstances is a question of law;
(B) in any in camera review, may in
its discretion, require the presence of all parties
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
1 or their attorneys and production of a record
2 of the proceedings;
3 (C) shall, at the close of the in camera
4 review, enter in the record an order pursuant to
5 its findings and determination.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
SECTIONAL ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
The draft bill by adding a new subsection (g) to the National
Security Act of 1947 further implements a proviso of that Act imposing
a duty upon the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Where possible,
the new subsection is based upon existing provisions of law specifically
18 U.S. C. 798 (relating to communication intelligence) and 42 U. S. C.
2204 et seq. (relating to atomic energy Restricted Data).
Paragraph (1) of the new subsection identifies the special and
limited class of individuals having privity of access to the sensitive
information defined in paragraph (2) below and proscribes their culpable
communication of such information to an unauthorized recipient.
Paragraph (2) of the new subsection defines the special category
of information relating to intelligence sources and methods which is subject
to the new provisions. It also recognizes the authority of the Director and
heads of other agencies expressly authorized by law or by the President to
engage in intelligence activities for the United States, to provide for the
appropriate designation of such information.
Paragraph (3) of the new subsection assures that only the special
and limited class of individuals identified under paragraph (1) above will
be subject to prosecution as a result of the violation of the new subsection.
This is in keeping with the intent that the new provision penalizes as
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
unlawful only the conduct of those whose access to the designated informa-
tion is dependent upon understandings arising out of a relationship involving
trust and confidence. Collateral prosecution related to the violation of any
other provision of law, however, is not vitiated by this paragraph.
Paragraph (4) of the new subsection provides that no prosecution
shall be instituted unless the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence first jointly certify to the court that the information was lawfully
designated for limited dissemination; the information was not placed in the
public domain by the Government; and a review procedure existed whereby
the defendant could have secured a review of the information in question for
a determination on public releasability.
Paragraph (5) of the new subsection provides an affirmative defense
to prosecution if the information was provided to a congressional committee
pursuant to law or the person communicating the information did not know or
have reason to know, that the information had been designated for limited
dissemination pursuant to paragraph (2).
Paragraph (6) of the new subsection permits the Attorney General to
petition a court for the injunction of any act which the Director believes will
violate any provision of the new subsection. This authority is intended to
provide prompt judicial action to avoid damage to the U.S. foreign intelligence
effort in circumstances where punitive criminal action alone, being
necessarily ex post facto, may be inadequate in achieving the underlying
objective of the legislation which is to protect intelligence sources, methods
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 ?CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
and techniques from unauthorized disclosure.
Paragraph (7) of the new subsection provides for judicial review
as a question of law of the validity of any designation made pursuant to
paragraph (2) above. This will ensure that the designation is not applied
arbitrarily or capriciously. It provides that the judicial review may be
conducted in camera, with all parties and counsel present at the court's
discretion, to preclude the disclosure of sensitive information in open
court and avoid aggravating the damage to intelligence sources and methods.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17q CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
moi Bugs!x3 u! saBuoyD
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Now'
Nett
IRO
IOW
-wad
UMW
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
Changes in existing law made by the draft bill are shown as
follows: existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in
roman; new matter is underscored.
*
SEC. 102
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
as amended
(50 U. S. C. A. 403)
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
*
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(g) In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence
activities of the United States, and in order further to implement the
proviso of section 102(d)(3) of this Act that the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure--
(1) Whoever, being or having been in duly
authorized possession or control of information relating
to intelligence sources and methods, or whoever, being
or having been an officer or employee of the United States,
or member of the Armed Services of the United States,
or a contractor of the United States Government, or an
employee of a contractor of the United States Government,
and in the course of such relationship becomes possessed
of such information, knowingly communicates it to a
person not authorized to receive it shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both;
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
dir Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
.00
Imor
WM,
(2) For the purposes of this subsection, the
term "information relating to intelligence sources and
methods" means sensitive information concerning--
(A) sources of foreign intelligence,
whether human, technical, or other;
(B) methods of collecting foreign
intelligence; or
(C) methods and techniques of analysis
and evaluation of foreign intelligence which,
in the interests of the security of the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States, has
been specifically designated for limited or restricted
dissemination or distribution, pursuant to authority
granted by law or Directive of the National Security
Council, by a department or agency of the United
States Government which is expressly authorized by
law or by the President to engage in intelligence
activities for the United States;
(3) A person who is not authorized to receive information
relating to intelligence sources and methods is not subject to
prosecution as an accomplice within the meaning of sections 2 and 3
of Title 18, United States Code, or to prosecution for conspiracy
to commit an offense under this subsection, unless he became
possessed of such information in the course of a relationship
with the United States Government as described in paragraph (1);
Provided, however, That the immunity conferred by this paragraph
does not preclude the indictment or conviction for conspiracy of
any person who is subject to prosecution under paragraph (1) of
this subsection.
(4) No prosecution shall be instituted under this subsection
unless, prior to the return of the indictment or the filing of the
information, the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence jointly certify to the court that at the time of the
offense--
(A) the information was lawfully designated
for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution
within the meaning of paragraph (2) of this subsection:
2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
(B) the information had not been placed
in the public domain by the United States Government;
and
(C) there existed a review procedure through
which the defendant could obtain review, by the
Government agency described in paragraph (2) of
this subsection, of the necessity of continuing the
designation described in paragraph (2) of this
subsection in the interests of the security of the
foreign intelligence activities of the United States.
(5) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under
this subsection that--
(A) the information was communicated only
to a regularly constituted subcommittee, committee
or joint committee of Congress, pursuant to lawful
demand, or
(B) the person communicating the information
did not know or have reason to know that the information
had been specifically designated as described in
paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(6) Whenever in the judgment of the Director of Central
Intelligence any person is about to engage in any acts or practices
which will constitute a violation of this subsection, the Attorney
General, on behalf of the United States, may make application
to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or
practices, and upon a showing that such person is about to engage
in any such acts or practices, a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order may be granted.
(7) In any judicial proceedings under this subsection,
the court--
(A) may review, in camera, information relating
to intelligence sources and methods designated for limited
or restricted dissemination or distribution within the
meaning of paragraph (2) of this subsection for the purpose
of determining if such designation was lawful and the court
3
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
shall not invalidate the designation unless it determines
that the designation was arbitrary and capricious. The
determination of the validity of such designation under
-or the circumstances is a question of law;
.4*
Alf
*NJ
(B) in any in camera review, may in its discretion,
require-The presence of all parties or their attorneys and
production of a record of the proceedings;
(C) shall, at the close of the in camera review,
enter in-The I__:_gs?ord an order 42.ursu,ant to its findings
and determination.
4
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
S.184481 1044p.USU0i1
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
asnoH pup apuas
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D .0 . 20505
Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
President of the Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. President:
This letter transmits for the consideration of the Congress a
wit draft bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
Over the years, serious damage to our foreign intelligence
effort has resulted from the unauthorized disclosure of information
related to intelligence sources and methods. In most cases, the
sources of these leaks have been'persons who were made privy to
sensitive information by virtue of their relationship of trust to the
United States Government. Deliberate breach of this relationship
of trust to the detriment of the United States Government is subject
only to partial legal sanction. In most instances prosecution lies
only if the offender makes the unauthorized disclosure to a represen-
tative of a foreign power or the prosecution must show an intent to
harm the U.S. or aid a foreign power. Moreover, in many instances
the requirement to reveal in open court the significance of information
disclosed is a deterrent to prosecution.
Presently, Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947,
IGO as amended, places a responsibility on the Director of Central
Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods. However, no
legal sanctions are provided for him to implement this responsibility.
The legislation proposed in this draft bill would close this gap to the
limited degree necessary to carry out a foreign intelligence program,
but at the same time give full recognition to our American standards
of freedom of information and protection of individual rights.
The proposed legislation recognizes the authority of the Director
of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other agencies expressly authorized
by law or by the President to engage in intelligence activities for the
United States, to limit dissemination of information related to intelligence
00-0-no
?4
Are
7776 -191C3
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Mir
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
sources and methods of collection and provides criminal penalty for the
disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons.
The proposed legislation is limited to individuals entrusted with
the sensitive information described in the legislation by virtue of their
position as officer, employee, contractor, or other special relationship
with the U. S. Government. Strictly from the standpoint of protecting the
information, this legislation ideally would encompass willful disclosure to
unauthorized persons by any person knowing, or having reason to know of
its sensitivity. However, our American tradition would not permit a law
sufficiently broad to apply to the media or other private citizens. Hence,
application of the proposed legislation is limited to those given access to
the information by virtue of their relationship to the Government.
In order to provide adequate safeguards to an accused, to prevent
damaging disclosures during the course of prosecution, and to prevent
prosecution with respect to information unreasonably designated, the
legislation provides for in camera review by the court of the information
disclosed to review and decide as a question of law the validity of the
designation for limited distribution. Further, prior to court action, the
mei
Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence must certify
that the information was lawfully designated for limited distribution, the
information was not placed in the public domain by the Government, and
there existed a procedure whereby the defendant could have had the informa-
tion reviewed for possible public release. It is also an affirmative defense
if the information was provided to a committee of Congress pursuant to law
or if the defendant had no reason to know that the information was designated
for limited distribution.
IMO
The legislation also provides for injunctive relief in those instances
where unauthorized disclosure is threatened and serious damage to the
intelligence collection effort would result.
We would appreciate early and favorable consideration of the proposed
bill. The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no
objection to presenting the proposed bill to the Congress from the standpoint
of the Administration's program.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
Approved For Release 2005/02/174 CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
.411
.00
mei
,leee
420
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
Honorable Carl Albert
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
This letter transmits for the consideration of the Congress a
draft bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
Over the years, serious damages to our foreign intelligence
effort have resulted from the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information related to intelligence sources and methods. In most
cases, the sources of these leaks have been persons who were made
privy to sensitive information by virtue of their relationship of trust
to the United States Government. Deliberate breach of this relationship
of trust to the detriment of the United States Government is subject
only to partial legal sanction. In most instances prosecution lies only
if the offender makes the unauthorized disclosure to a representative of
a foreign power or the prosecution must show an intent to harm the U. S.
or aid a foreign power. Moreover, in many instances the requirement
to reveal in open court the significance of information disclosed is a
deterrent to prosecution.
Presently, Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, places a responsibility on the Director of Central Intelligence
to protect intelligence sources and methods. However, no legal sanctions
are provided for him to implement this responsibility. The legislation
proposed in this draft bill would close this gap to the limited degree
necessary to carry out a foreign intelligence program, but at the same
time give full recognition to our American standards of maximum feasible
freedom of information and protection of individual rights.
The proposed legislation grants to the Director of Central
Intelligence, and to the heads of other agencies expressly authorized by
law or by the President to engage in intelligence activities for the
United States, the authority to limit dissemination of information related
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
eat
New,
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
to intelligence sources and methods of collection and provides criminal
penalty for the disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons.
The proposed legislation is limited to individuals entrusted with
the sensitive information described in the legislation by virtue of their
position as officer, employee, contractor, or other special relationship
with the U. S. Government. Strictly from the standpoint of protecting the
information, this legislation ideally would encompass willful disclosure to
unauthorized persons by any person knowing, or having reason to know of
its sensitivity. However, our American tradition would not permit a law
sufficiently broad to apply to the media or other private citizens. Hence,
application of the proposed legislation is limited to those given access to
the information by virtue of their relationship to the Government.
In order to provide adequate safeguards to an accused, to prevent
damaging disclosures during the course of prosecution, and to prevent
prosecution with respect to information unreasonably designated, the
legislation provides for in camera review by the court of the information
disclosed to review and decide as a question of law the reasonableness of
the designation for limited distribution. Further, prior to court action,
the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence must certify
that the information was lawfully designated for limited distribution, the
information was not placed in the public domain by the Government, and
there existed a procedure whereby the defendant could have had the
information reviewed for possible public release. It is also an affirmative
defense if the information was provided to a committee of Congress pursuant
to law or if the defendant had no reason to know that the information was
designated for limited distribution.
The legislation also provides for injunctive relief in those instances
where unauthorized disclosure is threatened and serious damage to the
intelligence collection effort would result.
We would appreciate early and favorable consideration of the
proposed bill. The Office of Management and Budget has advised that
there is no objection to presenting the proposed bill to the Congress from
the standpoint of the Administration's program.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
COST ANALYSIS
This legislation does not involve any measurable costs. Any
court costs to the Government would be more than offset by the
savings that would result if the legislation deters the compromise of
sensitive sources and methods which, if compromised, would require
extensive and costly counteractions to mitigate the damage and to
offset the advantages to the opposition.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
25X5 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
STATUTES AFFECTING DISCLOSURE
18 U.S. C. 793 - .Espionage laws - Criminal penalty for obtaining, copying,
corrirriunicating national defense information.
18 U. S. C. 794 - Espionage laws - Criminal penalty for gathering or
.delivering defense information to aid foreign governments.
18 U.S. C. 798 - Criminal penalty for disclosure of any classified
information prejudicial to U. S.
18 U. S. C. 952 7 Criminal penalty for unauthorized publishing or transmittal
to another of diplomatic codes and corresp. ondence.
35 U. S. C. 186 - Criminal penalty for disclosure of patented information.
42 U.S. C. 2161-2166 - Atomic Energy Commission authority to
protect Restricted Data.
47 U.S.C. 154 - Federal Communication Commission can withhold .sJecret
information affecting the national defense.
50 U. S. C. 141 - Criminal penalty for disclosure of information on manufacturing
and distribution of extilosies in connectian'.with the national defense.
50 U. S. C. 4.03 - Director of Central Intelligence protection of intelligence
sources and methods.
50 U. S. C. 783b - Unlawful for government employees to communicate
classified information to representatives of foreign governrrients
50 U.S. C. 783d - Crimixpl penalty for violation of 50..U. S. C. 783b.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
?o
50 U. S. C. Appendix 2026 - Prohibits unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information on export controls.
5 U. S. C. 1396 - Employees of agency to which classified information
is transferred are subject to the same disclosure restrictions as the
transferor agency.
7 U. S. C. 1351. - Criminal penalty for fraudulent disclosure of
insecticide formulas.
7 U.S. C. 472 - Department of Agriculture - criminal penalty for
unauthorized disclosure of cotton statistics and, estimates.
7 U. S. C. 507 - Prohibits unauthorized disclosure of tobacco statistics.
7 U.S. C. 608d - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of information
regarding payments under marketing agreements.
7 U. S. C. 955 - Prohibits unauthorized disclosure of peanut statistics.
8 U. S. C. 1202 - Visa information declared confidential.
12 U. S. C. 77 - Information regarding removal of a bank director by the
Comptroller of the Currency shall not be disclosed.
13 U. S. C. 214 - Criminal penalty for disclosure of confidential information
by Census Bureau employees.
15 U. S. C. 78x - Unlawful for employees of Securities and Exchange
Commission to disclose information not made available to the general public.
15 U. S. C. 176a - Protects information of Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce,
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : ClaRDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
15 U.S. C. 717g - Prohibits unauthorized disclosure by employees of
Federal Power Commission.
18 U. S. C. 605 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of names
of persons on relief for political purposes.
18 U.S. C. 1902 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of crop
information by U. S. government employee.
18 U. S. C. 1904 7 Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of
Reconstruction Finance Corporation information.
18 U. S. C. 1905 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information generally by U. S. Government employees.
18 U. S. C. 1906 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of
information by bank examiners.
18 U. S. C. 1907 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of information
by farm credit examiners.
18 U. S. C. 1908 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of information
by national agricultural credit corporation examiners.
26 U. S. C. 7213 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of income
tax information by U. S. Government or state employees; Criminal penalty
for unauthorized disclosure of corporation financial statement by share -
holders; Criminal penalty for Unauthorized disclosure of operations of a
manufacturer by U. S. Government employee.
38 U. S. C. 3301 - Veterans Administration files are confidential.
42 U. S. C. 1306 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of certain
information in possession of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare.'
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RFP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
50 U. S. C. 2160 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information by U.S.. Government employee for purpose of commodity
speculation.
5 U. S. C. 637 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure by Civil Service
Commission employee regarding employment applicant.
35 U. S. C. 122 - Protection of patent applications.
7 U. S. C. 1159 - Protection of sugar information by Secretary of
Agriculture.
26 U. S. C. 7237 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of narcotics
information.
39 U.S. C. 762 - Protection of postal savings depository fund information.
42 U. S. C. 260 - Protection of information regarding voluntary hospital
commitment of narcotics addicts.
45 U.S. C. 362 - Protection of certain Railroad Retirement Board information.
46U. S. C. 234 - Penalty of dismissal for any Coast Guard employee
disclosing information on ship defects.
46 U. S. C. 643 - Protection of Coast Guard information on discharge of
seamen.
46 U. S. C. 819 - Unlawful for common carrier to disclose confidential
information to detriment of any other carrier.
47 U. S. C. 220 - Protects information from records examined by employees of
the Vede'ral Conimunica.tion Commission.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-5DP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
(.0)
fte
47 U.S. C. 605 - Prohibits unauthorized publication or use of interstate
or foreign communications.
48 U. S. C. 55 - Protects certain public voting information.
49 U. S. C. 15 - Protects certain information concerning shipments by
common carrier.
49 U.S. C. 320 - Protects certain information of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. .
50 U. S. C. 139 - Protects certain information of the Bureau of Mines.
50 U.S. C. Appendix 327 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure
of Selective Service information.
50 U.S. C. Appendix 1152 - Criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosure of
certain information regarding acquisition of vessels.
50 U. S. C. Appendix 1896 - Protects certain housing and insurance
information.
5
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
25X5 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
PREPARED STATEMENT ON H. R. 15845
BY
WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
22 July 1974
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on H. R. 15845
introduced by you and Mr. Bray. The amendments proposed in this bill would
be the first changes in the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency,found
in the National Security Act of 1947. In conformity with our American
constitutional structure, the existence of the Central Intelligence Agency stems
from an Act of Congress. This is a unique contrast to the tradition and
practice of most intelligence services, but it is a necessary reflection of
our free society. The result, I believe, makes us a stronger nation, whose
citizens live in a freedom envied by most of the world.
. The amendments would add the word "foreign" before the word
"intelligence" whenever it refers to the activities authorized to be undertaken
by the Central Intelligence Agency. I fully support this change. While I
?
believe the word "intelligence" alone in the original Act was generally under-
stood to refer only to foreign intelligence, I concur that this limitation of the
Agency's role to foreign intelligence should be made crystal clear to its own
employees and to the public. I hope this amendment will reassure any of our
fellow citizens as to the Agency's true and only purpose.
Section (3) of the bill reenforces the charge in the original Act that
the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "protecting
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The
amendment states that pursuant to this responsibility, the Director shall
develop appropriate plans, policies and regulations but such responsibility
shall not be construed to authorize the Agency to engage in any police,
subpoena, law enforcement or internal security activities, and that any
information indicating a violation of the Director's plans, policies and
regulations, should be reported to the Attorney General for appropriate
action.
This amendment conforms to my own understahding of the meaning
of the original statutory language. As I said in my confirmation hearing,
believe that the original Act gives the Director a charge but does not give
him commensurate authority. Under existing law, the Director is responsible
for developing such internal administrative controls as are possible and
appropriate to protect against unauthorized disclosure, but if such a
disclosure is identified, his only recourse beyond internal disciplinary
action, including termination of an employee, would be to report the matter
to appropriate authorities for examination of possible legal action. As you
are aware, Mr. Chairman, the Government did take legal action with respect
to one of our ex-employees who declined to abide by the agreement he made
when he joined CIA to,protect the confidential information to which he would
be exposed.
Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with this clarification of the precise
nature of the charge on the Director to protect intelligence sources and
Approved For Release 2005/02+ : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
methods against unauthorized disclosure. As you know, I am of the personal
opinion that additional legislation is required on this subject to improve our
ability to protect intelligence sources and methods against unauthorized
disclosure. The contract theory on which the previously mentioned litigation
? is based is indeed a very slender reed upon which to rely in all cases. My
views on this subject became known publicly as a result of that case and the
specifics of my recommendations on this. subject are still under active
consideration within the Executive Branch, so that an appropriate Executive
Branch recommendation can be made to the Congress.
The bill would also require that the Agency report to the Congress "in
accordance with such procedures as the Congress may establish" on those
"other functions and duties related to[foreign]intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The
National Security Act authorized the National Security Council to direct the
Agency to conduct a number of foreign intelligence activities which by their
nature must remain secret. Tie Act made clear, however, that these functions
and duties could only stem from a specific direction by the National Security
Council rather than being determined by the Agency itself. The amendments
do not change this situation but add the requirement of reporting to Congress.
Mr. Chairman, at present the Agency reports to the Congress about
its activities in a number of ways. On certain matters the Agency reports
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
publicly, Such as in this hearing and in my own confirmation hearings. The
,
Agency further identifies for public release a number of matters affecting
it or resulting from its efforts. A recent example' was the publication of
testimony on the economies of the Soviet Union and China provided to the
Joint Economic Committee and published on July 19th with only a few deletions
?C
which related to intelligence sources and methods.
El
,
The second area in which the Agency reports to Congress is in its
assessments of?foreign situations. The Agency briefs appropriate committees
?
of the Congress in executive session, using the most sensitive material
available, thus providing the Congress the fruits of the intelligence investment
made by the United States. I believe this type of reporting is particularly
important, as I hope to make our intelligence of maximum service to the
nation ad a whole, and this can only take place if it can assist those in the
),
Congress who share in the American decision-making process under our
Constitution. fihe Appropriations Committees, the Armed Services Corn-
mittees, the 'Oreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Joint
?
Committee on Atomic Energy, and others have been the recipients of this
kind of material. Again, to the extent possible, information provided and
discussed in these executive sessions is later screened for publication. In
many cases the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved does not
?
permit such publication,.1 but the classified transcript of the briefing can
be made available to the members of Congress.
4
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
The third area in which the Agency reports to Congress concerns
its operations. Pursuant to long-established procedures of the Congress,
reports on these matters, including the most sensitive details, are provided -
only to the Intelligence Subcommittees of the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of each House. Mr. Chairman, there are
literally no secrets withheld from these Subcommittees. In fact, ? I believe
I have more than a duty to respond to them; I must undertake the positive
obligation to volunteer to these Subcommittees all matters of possible
interest to the Congress. As you knoW, these reports cover our annual
budget, the details of our activities, and problems which may have arisen
in some regard or other.
The procedures established by the Congress for this reporting have
worked well. Large numbers of highly sensitive matters have been revealed
to these Subcommittees over the years, ?and their classification has been
respected. I am also aware of the sense of responsibility of the members
of the Congress as a whole with respect to matters which must remain
highly classified because of their sensitivity. Thus, I am confident that
congressional procedures in the future will be as effective as those of
the past and I welcome the codification of this relationship in the proposed
amendment which requires the Agency to report to the Congress.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
?. Mr.? Chairman, the bill also .reenforces the proscription in the
original Act against police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal
security functions. I wish I could say that this clarification was not
necessary but as you know, Mr. Chairman, I have frankly admitted that the
Agency did make some mistakes in recent years in this area. Your own
report of the investigations of this Subcommittee dealt with?those.incidents.
The Congress has, in Public Law 93-83 of August 6, 1973, made clear
that the CIA may not provide help to the Law Enforcement Assistance
?
Administration in assisting local police and law enforcement agencies of
the states and municipalities. The language of the bill would go further
in this regard and prohibit the Agency from engaging directly or indirectly 0
in the above type of activities within the United States either on its own or
in cooperation or conjunction with any other department, agency, organization
? or individual. This would restrict our collaboration with the FBI to the field .
of foreign intelligence or .counterintelligence. It may also limit the degree
of assistance the Agency could provide to the Secret Service, under the Secret
Service Act, which authorizes it to call upon the,assistance of any other agency.
? of the Government to assist it in its mission (Public Law 90-331). While this
amendment might restrict certain of our activities of the past which were not
in any way reprehensible, I believe that its enactment at this time would be
an appropriate way of clarifying the purpose of the Agency as related only to
foreign intelligence.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17,: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
I do note that the bill contains a prOviso in this area which I believe
is both appropriate and essential to the proper functioning of the Agency.
This 'makes it clear that nothing in the Act shall be construed to prohibit
, the Agency from conducting certain necessary and appropriate activities in
the United States directly related to its foreign intelligence responsibilities.
I welcome this proviso not only for its content but also for its clarification of
.the propriety of some of the long-standing activities of the Agency which are
essential to its foreign intelligence mission. These include:
a. Recruiting, screening, training and investigating employees,
applicants and others granted access to sensitive Agency information;
b. Contracting for supplies;
c. Interviewing U.S. citizens who voluntarily share with their
Government their knowledge of foreign subjects;
d. Collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in the
United States;
Establishing and maintaining support structures essential
to CIA's foreign intelligence operations; and
1. Processing, evaluating and disseminating foreign intelligence
. .
information to appropriate recipients within the United States.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
These matters were publicly reported by me in my confirmation hearing
last summer, and I believe that there is general understanding of their
necessity and propriety. The proviso in the amendment, however, would
?make this explicit.
The bill also adds a new subsection to the Act to prohibit transactions
between the Agency and former employees except for purely official matters.
I fully subscribe to the purpose of this provision, to assure that former
employees not take advantage of their prior associations to utilize the
Agency's assistance or resources or to have an undue influence on the
Agency's activities. This is particularly directed at the possible use of the
, Agency's assets for "nonofficial" assistance outside the Agency's charter.
would like to say that such a provision is not necessary, but again I must
admit that errors have been made. While I do nof believe there were any
instances of major import, I accept the desirability of making the limitations
? on the Agency's unique authorities quite clear.
The normal legal proscriptions against improper influence on Federal
employees apply, of course, to the Agency. In addition, a regulation has
? been developed within the Agency, which is brought to the attention of each
employee each year, that any CIA employee who believes that he has received
instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative
charter will inform the Director imMediately. I might point out that
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
? * ?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
in those cases which presented questions concerning the Agency overstepping
its bounds, the propriety and dedication to American traditions of our own
employees caused them to object to possible Agency activities outside its
charter. In my confirmation hearing I stated that I am quite prepared to
leave my post if I should receive an order which appeared to be illegal and
if my objections were not respected.
Thus, we in the Agency are fully in accord with the-purpose of this
amendment. -At the same time-, -I-confess concern over som-e-possible
interpretations of the language of this subsection. I assume that "purely
official matters" would include our normal relationships with our retirees
or others who left. the Agency. I would assume it would also enable us to
maintain normal official relationships with individuals who left the Agency
to.-other Governmental activities so long as the "official matters"- -
fall within the scope of CIA's legitimate charter and there is no undue
influence involved. I do wonder,- however, whether certain activities might
be included under this provision as official which neither the Congress nor
the Agency would want to countenance, and on the other hand whether the
phiase 'night interfere with a contact with an ex-employee volunteering
important information to the Agency.
Since the Agency has certain unique authorities under the National
Security Act and the CIA Act of 1949 and since much of its work does involve
9
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP781002660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
? highly classified activity, -I would think it appropHate that the Congress add
to the Agency's legislative charter some special recognition of the high
degree of responsibility imposed on the Agency and its employees as a result
of the grant of these unique' authorities. This could require the Director to
develop and promulgate a code of conduct for CIA employees at a higher
standard than that expected of Federal employeez generally. Thereby,
the intelligence profession would become one of those with. special standards
? such as the medical or legal professions. The Director's unique authority
to terminate employees in his discretion when necessary or advisable in
. the interests of the United States, pursuant to the National Security Act of
? 1947, would provide a sanction for the application of such high standards.
Regular congressional review would provide an assurance that such a
code of conduct was adequate and that it was being promulgated, applied,
' and adhered to.
Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure to have had this opportunity to
comment on H. R. 15845. With the few reservations I have noted above,
I fully support the bill. Most of all, I fully support the purpose of the
legislation in clarifying the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency only
to conduct foreign intelligence activities. At the same time, I am pleased
that the modifications proposed to the CIA charter would not adversely affect
its authority or capability to carry out the challenging task of collecting,
processing and disseminating foreign intelligence in the world today. I believe
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000809100008-2
10
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
these amendments would mark an important milestone in eliminating
any apparent conflict between our ideal of an open American society
and the minimum requirements of secrecy in the intelligence apparatus
necessary to protect this free nation.
11
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R00080010000.8-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Statement of
WILLIAM E. COLBY
Director of Central Intelligence
before
HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMII1EE
August 1, 1974
W. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on
H.R. 12004, introduced by you and others, to replace with a statutory
classification system the existing system established by Executive
Order 11652, and to discuss the operations of this Executive Order
within the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want you to know that while we in
the intelligence profession do have some special security needs, we
fully recognize that the bedrock of our system of government is an
open society and an informed public.
In a report issued last year your committee stated that "...there
is an unquestioned need for Federal agencies to avoid the release or
dissemination to the public of certain sensitive types of information,
the safeguarding of which is truly vital to protecting the national
defense and to maintain necessary confidentiality of dealings between
our country and foreign nations." The necessity to safeguard certain
truly vital foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the
Congress in its direction to the Director of Central Intelligence in
the National Security Act of 1947 to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
There are special problems involved in protecting intelligence
sources and methods which I believe bear directly upon H.R. 12004
and Executive Order 11652. These problems flow from the very nature
of intelligence information - its substance and the means by which
it is obtained.
The flight characteristics of .a foreign fighter plane, the
accuracy and numbers of a foreign ballistic missile, or the plans
and capabilities of a foreign country in the economic or political
fields are examples of substantive intelligence information. Very
often such intelligence information can be a benefit to this nation
only if our potential adversary is unaware that we have such knowledge.
On this basis such substantive intelligence information is deserving
of protection as affecting our nation's vital interests.
But inherent in the substantive information itself are clues
to the means through which it was obtained - intelligence sources
and methods. Unless these means are protected, countermeasures can
be mounted to nullify or impair collection efforts. It was
this concern, I believe, which led to the statutory directive that
the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
- 2 -
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R0008-00100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
-- Clearly a secret agent operating abroad in a hostile
climate must be protected -- not only to enable him to con-
tinue to supply intelligence, but also because the freedom
and lives of individuals may be at stake. The exposure of
6, an agent obviously ends his immediate usefulness. It may
or may not expose his sub-agents and any networks for
collecting information he may have established. Finally it
may affect our ability to obtain assistance from others.
Credibility in protecting our sources is the sine qua non
of the intelligence profession.
-- Foreign intelligence services and security agencies
are also positive contributors to our intelligence and counter-
intelligence programs abroad and continued cooperation often
depends upon confidence that the existence of the relationship
will be protected.
-- Revelation of methods of technical intelligence collection
may result in countermeasures to mislead or obstruct methods
of collection and render ineffective costly programs.
-- While a particular piece of intelligence information by
itself may not be revealing of sensitive sources and methods,
accumulation of bits of intelligence information may well
'eventually lead back to the sources or methods relied upon for
its.collection.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-13DP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
In view of these considerations, I believe Congress acted wisely
when in the 1947 National Security Act it identified a focal point
to assume the responsibility to protect against the unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
Recently I testified before the Intelligence Subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 15845, which amends the
charter of the Central Intelligence Agency in the National Security
Act of 1947. One amendment in that bill would reinforce the charge
in the original Act by requiring the Director to develop appropriate
plans, policies and regulations for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. In that testimony I pointed out that I do not
believe the present statutes provide sufficient measures to enforce
this responsibility, and that proposals are under consideration in
the Executive Branch to remedy this weakness.
The Central Intelligence Agency is not a public information
agency, but was established to provide our government with information
and assessments to assist policy decisions about developments abroad
affecting the United States. Much of this material is necessarily
classified as it comes from sensitive intelligence sources. It is
thus made available in classified form to the members of the Executive
Branch concerned with these questions. Such material is also made
available to the Congress, in executive session, to endeavor to assist
the Congress in its role in decision making under the American Con-
stitution. To the extent feasible, moreover, the Agency's information
is made available to the public directly or indirectly, in a number
Approved For Release 2005/02/17': CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
of ways.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
? -- Where possible the Agency identifies for public release
information resulting from its efforts. A recent example was
the China Atlas published in 1972 and an atlas on the Middle East
published in 1973.
R,
V The Agency briefs appropriate committees of the Congress --
the Foreign Affairs and Foreign' Relations Committees, the Armed
Services Committees and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy --
in executive session in order to provide the fruits of our nation's
intelligence investment. To the extent possible, such information
is later cleared for publication. A recent example of this pro-
cedure was the detailed testimony on the economies of the Soviet
Union and China provided to the Joint Economic Committee and
published on July 19th after appropriate screening. We also fully
brief the CIA oversight subcommittees of the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees on budget and operational matters.
-- We are completing a review of nearly 1,000 cubic feet of
classified OSS records in the custody of the Archivist and over
90 percent of them are being declassified. Moreover, we have
reviewed and declassified nearly 250 OSS films.
-- The Agency responds affirmatively whenever possible to
requests for information under the Freedom of Infolmation Act
and Executive Order 11652. Of requests received and acted on in
1973, affirmative action was taken in 80 percent of the cases.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : -61A-14DP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
In our efforts to screen our information to decide what can
be made available to the public, we must depend upon the training,
background, and experience of professional intelligence officers
to identify those matters which might appear innocuous but which
could reveal to a foreign intelligence service our intelligence
sources or methods.
With this background, I would now like to address myself to the
provisions of H.R. 12004.
Very simply, H.R. 12004 would conflict severely with the re-
sponsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods. Under the bill all SECRET and
CONFIDENTIAL information must be declassified in two and one years,
respectively. A great deal of our intelligence product, even of our
sources and method; would not meet the standard under the language
of the bill to be classified as TOP SECRET. All such information
thus would be declassified in no more than two years. I would find
it very difficult, in good conscience and in terms of practicality,
to urge a foreign intelligence service or a strategically placed
individual in a foreign government or a foreign country to cooperate
with this Agency and to provide information in confidence if the law
of this country required that such information be made available to
the public two years later.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CrA-41415078M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
All TOP SECRET information would be declassified under the bill
in three years, unless it falls within one of several categories,
one of which is information which would disclose intelligence sources
and methods. But even this information could be declassified by the
Classification Review Commission which the bill would establish.
Moreover, the Commission could do *so in the face of and notwithstanding
a written detailed justification by the President himself "for the
continued safeguarding of such information based upon national defense
interests of the United States of the highest importance." This
would seem to raise constitutional questions and it surely would impair
my ability to protect intelligence sources and methods.
Under the bill information may be classified only in the interest
of "national defense," as contrasted with "national defense or foreign
relations of the United States" as now provided by the Executive Order.
I believe it important that the bill be in terms which make it clear
that the information which maybe protected is not limited to strictly
defense information.
The bill requires that the names and addresses of all persons
authorized to classify must be furnished quarterly to the Classification
Review Commission and, upon request, to any member of Congress or the
Comptroller General. This feature would hamper severely the operation
of the intelligence-gathering function of this Agency, since it would
serve to identify many employees whose duties and prospective duties
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CI1ADP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
'require that their status as employees of CIA not be revealed. It
would also be in conflict with the provision of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 which exempts the Agency from the provisions of
any law which require publication or disclosure of certain information
concerning Agency personnel.
The requirements for downgrading and declassifying existing
information in the first and succeeding years after enactment would
pose tremendous administrative burdens. The requirement to transfer
to the Classification Review Commission information downgraded from
TOP SECRET likewise would be administratively-burdensome. Further,
it would impinge on my responsibility to protect intelligence sources
and methods.
My final point with respect to H.R. 12004 concerns the impact
its enactment would have on the authority departments would retain
to withhold information based on one of the exemptions of the Freedom
.of Information Act. Exemption 1 of that Act permits withholding. of
information classified pursuant to executive order. Exemption 3 permits
withholding of information which is "specifically exempted from dis-
closure by statute." If enactment of H.R. 12004 resulted in the re-
scission of Executive Order 11652, as I assume it would, the protection
of Exemption 1 would be gone. And it might be contended that classification
actions made under H. R. 12004 and the regulations of the Classification
Review Commission are made "pursuant ta" rather than "by" statute and
therefore are not to be withheld under Exemption 3. If this contention
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-14)1578M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
is sound it would mean that classified information requested under
the Freedom of Informtion Act could not be withheld. Clarification
by appropriate revision would be highly desirable.
I turn now to Executive Order 11652. That Order, and H.R. 12004
as well, obviously represent an effort to overcome the problem of too
much classification and for too long. I believe responsible opinion
is in agreement that there are problems in this area. Executive Order
11652, the first major change in classification practices in nearly
20 years, was an attempt to make a turn-around in the government's
classification practices which date back to World War IL and to deal
with the untold volumes of documents which remain classified. This
is a major undertaking. It will require time and much work.
The Order of course has impacted on CIA operations in a number
of ways, some of which I mentioned earlier. I propose now to summarize
certain others, Mr. Chairman,and, with your permission, I will submit
for the record a supplementary statement which provides certain
statistics and details.
To meet the requirements of the Executive Order, we have made minor
modifications in our data index system, which we had developed through
the years as an aid in locating and retrieving information. We have
made significant reductions in the numbers of persons authorized to
classify information.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-TP78M02660R000800100008-2
;.?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
We have, conducted a number of seminars and briefings to familiarize
employees with the Order. The Order, the Agency implementing regulation
and other written materials are readily available within the Agency and
some of this is circulated periodically as required reading.
As a final point, Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that the
principal purpose of H.R. 12004 is to replace the existing executive
order system for classification with a statutory system. It is my belief
that a statutory basis for classification by CIA already exists. Congress has
declared in the National Security Act of 1947. that the Director of Central
Intelligence must protect foreign intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure. Later it declared in the CIA, Act of 1949 that
information relating to such Agency areas as organization, functions,
and identities of personnel is protected information. In general, then,
H.R. 12004 as it applies to such areas in CIA is in conflict with ex-
isting statutes relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, and would
dilute my responsibility and ability to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.
To summarize, Mr. Chairman, my particular concern with respect to
H.R. 12004 arises from my statutory charge to protect intelligence sources
and methods. We are working to carry out the requirements and objectives
of E.O. 11652 but its full implementation will take time and it is too
soon to conclude that it is entirely satisfactory. And finally, Mr. Chairman,
I am committed to the view that the intelligence investment is to be fully
returned to the taxpayer in the form of 'quality intelligence for the govern-
ment's policymakers and for the public, to the extent possible while
PlVartoiii/A Pakeiegel0F6i9sielrAci-14-64:4626g6AigiCAti6602 to me by the
National Security Act of 1947.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Supplementary Statement of
WILLIAM E. COLBY
Director of Central Intelligence
? August 1, 1974
A, brief description of some of the specifics of CIA implementation
of Executive Order 11652 might be useful to the Committee.
One of the major requirements under the Executive Order, and one
which has attracted some interest, is the establishment of a data index
system. The implementing NSC Directive calls for such a system for
classified information in categories approved by the Interagency Classifi-
cation Review Committee "as having sufficient historical or other value
appropriate for preservation." Happily the CIA was in a relatively good
position when this requirement was established. For some time the Agency
has had a sophisticated, computerized data index system, improved and
refined through the years, by which it has indexed, among other documents,
finished intelligence reports. Such reports have been approved by the
Interagency Classification Review Committee as a category of information
appropriate for preservation. Only a few relatively minor adjustments
in the system were necessary to completely conform it to the requirements
of the NSC Directive.
The principal purpose of the index system was to retrieve information
and it is highly efficient for this purpose. As modified, it also can
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
be useful in the review and declassification process. It is anticipated
that usefulness in these areas will increase as the years go by and as
the data base of an ever-increasing proportion of the indexed documents
includes the now required classification data elements. The data index
system, on the other hand, can be of little or no value in guarding
against or tracing leaks of classified information, and this is especially
true in this day of the copying machine.
In concert with other departments, CIA has experienced a significant
reduction in the numbers of authorized classifiers in each of the three
classification levels. The initial reduction was in excess of 40 percent and
there has been an additional small reduction. One factor which limits
the Agency's ability to reduce these numbers is that its people are
located in so many places abroad. In all such installations, even if
there is only a one-man component, that individual must have authority
to classify information. Nevertheless it may be possible to make
further reductions in the future.
Under the Executive Order, any person may request a review for
declassification purposes of any sufficiently identified document
which is at least 10 years old. CIA has had a number of requests for
review and declassification. In 1973, 110 declassification requests
were received, SO of which were granted in full, 19 granted in part,
18 were denied, and action on 23 was pending at the end of that year.
- 2 -
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
A number of requests have originated with other government depart-
ments in connection with their consideration of declassification requests
to those departments. Requests have come in from the press, from current
and former employees, from professors, graduate students, high school
_and college students, and from individuals who have not revealed their
occupation or position. Perhaps the greatest number of requests originated
with other departments, with the press and scholars constituting the second
and third largest categories.
Requests revealed an interest in World War II and OSS activities,
in CIA involvement in Guatemala and Cuba, and -- probably the greatest
number -- in Agency involvement in Vietnam. Denial of.reauests is hased
on the nature of the information as measured against the standards of
the Executive Order. Documents have been denied which reveal a con-
fidential intelligence source or agent. Information received from a
foreign government with the understanding that it be kept in confidence
has been denied. Documents have been denied which would disclose that
an individual whose duties and career require that his CIA employment
not be revealed, in fact is a CIA employee.
It has been possible to approve the request for over 200 OSS
documents made by a historical researcher who was writing a book on
his experience as head of the OSS mission to Hanoi. A number of
requests for documents concerning certain Indonesian matters from a
Vassar professor doing research on U.S./Indonesia relations during
-3-
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
the early 1960's have been approved. The French Broadcasting System
requested the OSS film "Mission to Yenan." This was made available to
them, and to the public, by declassifying it and transferring it to the
National Archives.
In the area of training, security briefings are given new employees
covering the standards and procedures established by the Executive Order.
A series of meetings were held in 1973 for 160 key personnel for the
purpose of briefing these supervisory personnel on the requirements of
the Order. Overseas assignments and job requirements would preclude
training for all employees, but the CIA regulation contains the require-
ments of the Executive Order and is readily available throughout the
Agency. The security and records management features of the Executive
Order are treated in various Agency lectures and seminars, including
the regular Mid-Career Executive Development Course and the Management and
Services Reviews. Basic information pertaining to E.O. 11652, including
the criteria for classifying information, is included in required reading
which is circulated periodically to all personnel.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
- 4 -
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
EMPLOYEE
BULLETIN
No. 425
PROPOSALS RELATING TO COVERT ACTION
AND LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
29 October 1974
This bulletin is being published in accordance with the
Director's desire to keep employees informed of matters af-
fecting the Agency. It includes summaries of the status of
various proposals in Congress relating to covert action
activities of the Agency and legislative oversight, as well
as views of the President and the Director on certain of
these proposals.
CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS ON COVERT ACTION
1. Abourezk Amendment
SUMMARY: Senator Abourezk introduced a floor amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act (S. 3394) which would have
prohibited funds being used by any U.S. governmental agency
to carry out any activities which would violate or encourage
violation of the laws of the U.S. or the country involved.
Excluded were activities necessary to national security
which were intended solely for intelligence collection.
STATUS: Defeated on Senate floor on October 2 by a
vote of 68-17.
2. Hughes Amendment
SUMMARY: Senator Hughes also introduced a floor
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (S. 3394) dealing
with covert operations, but much less restrictive than
Senator Abourezk's. It would bar funds for covert opera-
tions (defined to exclude intelligence gathering) unless the
President finds the operation to be vital to the defense of
the U.S., and transmits a report of his findings, with a
description'of the operation, to the congressional intelli-
gence oversight committees. These procedural safeguards
would be eliminated during a war.
STATUS: On October 2, following the acceptance of
the amendment by Senator Stennis,- the entire Foreign Assis-
tance bill was recommitted to the Foreign Relations Committee.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
3. Holtzman Amendment
SUMMARY: Representative Holtzman introduced a House
floor amendment to the 1975 Continuing Appropriations reso-
lution (H.J. Res. 1131). The amendment would have banned
the use of any money appropriated under the joint resolution
for use by CIA to "destabilize" or undermine any government.
STATUS: The amendment was defeated 291-108 on Septem-
ber 24.
4. House Foreign Affairs Committee
SUMMARY: On October 10 the House Foreign Affairs
Committee reported for floor action its version of the
Foreign Assistance Act amendments (H.R. 17234). Included
was a section patterned after the Hughes Amendment. This
provision bans operations in foreign countries, except
intelligence collection, unless the President finds the
operation to be important to the national security, and
submits a timely report describing the operation to Congress.
The report is to go to the "appropriate committees" of the
Congress, specifically including the foreign affairs commit-
tees. The provisions are to be suspended during war.
STATUS: This bill has not yet come before the entire
House.
EXECUTIVE POSITION ON COVERT ACTION
The President, in his 16 September news conference,
stated that "our Government, like other governments, does
take certain actions in the foreign intelligence field to
help implement foreign policy and protect national securi-
ty---...it is a recognized fact that historically as well as
presently, such actions are taken in the best interest of
the countries involved."
The Director, in a letter to Chairman Fulbright of the
Foreign Relations Committee, emphasized the possible adverse
impact of the proposed Abourezk amendment on the Nation's
national Security interests. The Director restated his
views that "I think it would be a mistake to deprive our
nation of the capability of some moderate covert response to
a foreign problem and to leave us no alternative .between a
diplomatic protest and sending the Marines."
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROPOSALS
There are three distinct approaches in this category:
bills which attempt to supplement (A below), supplant (B below)
or, study (C below) existing oversight procedures.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : C1A-kDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
A. Supplement .
1. Bolling-Hansen House Committee Reform Amendments
SUMMARY: Representative Zahlocki introduced a
floor amendment providing the Foreign Affairs Committee a
special oversight function of reviewing and studying "intel-
ligence activities relating to foreign policy." The chairman
of the Armed Services intelligence subcommittee, Representa-
tive Nedzi, supported the amendment as conforming to an agree-
ment between Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Colby, and the Chairmen of
the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees, Representa-
tives Hebert and Morgan.
STATUS: The Zablocki amendment passed by voice
vote, and the entire Committee Reform Amendments were agreed
to by the House on 8 October.
B. Supplant
1. Baker/Weicker bill (S. 4019)
SUMMARY: This bill would create a Senate-House
Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight to supplant Armed
Services Committee jurisdiction. The Committee would have
14 members, appointed by the leadership, and the chairmanship
would alternate between the House and Senate for each Congress
The jurisdiction of the Committee would extend to CIA, FBI,
Secret Service, DIA, NSA, and all other governmental activi-
ties pertaining to intelligence gathering or surveillance of
persons. Chiefs of all named departments would be required
to keep the Committee fully and currently informed of all
activities.
STATUS: Referred to Committee on Government
Operations; hearings are planned after Congress reconvenes
in November.
2. Harrington Resolutions (H. ?Res. 552 and 1231)
SUMMARY: These alternative resolutions would
transfer to a new House committee jurisdiction over the
Central Intelligence Agency or over the entire intelligence
community and all matters relating to foreign intelligence.
STATUS: Referred to the House Rules Committee.
3. Hathaway bill (S. Con. Res. 23)
SUMMARY: This resolution would create a Senate-
House Joint Committee which would have oversight of CIA and
all other intelligence and information agencies of the- U.S.
Government.
STATUS: Referred to Armed Services Committee.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
- 3 -
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
. Study
1. Mondale Resolution (S. Res. 404)
SUMMARY: This resolution would create a Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Policy, composed of five
members of Armed Services, Five members of Foreign Relations
and five other Senators. The Select Committee would be
authorized to examine U.S. intelligence policies and opera-
tions, to determine the role of intelligence decisionmaking,
and evaluate' the impact of intelligence on national security
and foreign policy. The Committee is to report to the
Senate by June 30, 1975.
STATUS: Referred to Armed Services Committee.
2. Mathias and Mansfield.Resolution (S. Res. 419)
SUMMARY: This resolution would create an 8-
MeMber (801Pctea Wt.1.4rge) %alect. Cnmmittoe t.(-1 stuay fluvPin-
mental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities.
The Committee is instructed to study and investigate all
domestic and foreign intelligence activities of the U.S.
Government and past effect and future role of such activities
?The Committee's report is due two years after enactment.
STATUS. Referred to Committee on Government Operations.
3. Humphrey bill (S. 1547)
SUMMARY: This bill would create a Joint Committee
on National Security, consisting of the Speaker, majority
and minority members of each House, the chairman and ranking
minority members of the Armed Service, Appropriations,
Foreign Affairs, Joint Atomic.Energy Committees, three other
Representatives, and three other Senators. Functions of the
Committee are to study foreign, domestic, and military
national security policies, study the National Security
Council, and study Government classification practices, and
report periodically to each House on the Committee's fundings
STATUS: Bill recently transferred from Armed
Services to Government Operations Committee at Senator
Humphrey's request.
4. Harrington Resolution (H. Res. 1232)
SUMMARY: This resolution would authorize the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct a complete
investigation of CIA.
STATUS: Referred to Committee on Rules.
AGENCY POSITION
It has been the consistent view of the Director that
the manner in which legislative oversight of the Agency is
exercised is a question for the Congress itself to decide.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES (1-6)
- 4 -
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
_ILT PI, 0 Jr Fit E
BULLF,TIN
No. 409
CONGRESSIONAL COMMENTS RELATING TO THE CIA BUDGET
1. The purpose of this bulletin is to keep employees
informed on recent events in the Congress of the United
States *hich affect the Agency.
2. On 4 June 1974 the Senate by a vote of 55 to 33
defeated an amendment to the Defense Procurement Authoriza-
tion bill (S. 3000) which would have required the Director
of Central Intelligence to submit an annual unclassified .
report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds
requested in the budget for the National Intelligence Program.
3. A number of Senators, including the Chairman of the
Agency's Oversight Committees in the Senate, strongly opposed
the amendment on the basis that such disclosures would
provide valuable assistance to our adversaries by virtue of
the trends disclosed over the years and that the publication
of the total figure would only stimulate further inquiry for
greater detail on foreign intelligence activities, for
explanations of changes or trends, and for the component
elements' of the total figure.
4. They also pointed out that the four committees
charged with oversight of the Agency in the Congress are
fully aware of the details of the foreign intelligence
budget and inquire into these matters deeply. The point was
also made that if any member of the Senate wished to know
what the total figure was it would be furnished to him on a
classified basis.
S. The discussion on the amendment is covered on pages
S. 960179613 in the Congressional Record of 4 June 1974.
Excerpts follow:
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
True, we arf..? an open society and, so
we iia.ee been ab:e to carry on an
intellieence nrcerem efteetively which
hae been worth to tI3-biilions end billions
and uiiiion3 of dollars inretvictes: Mit, if
we are going to abamion the idea of
keeping these figures from being dis-
closed, then. in my humble opinion, we
mi4lit as well abolish the agency. It .
would be lilts: saying, in etrect, that we
do not want this secret intelligence after
all, that we do not need it,..Nrid that we
will abandon it.
We will pay an awful price for that.
I am familiar with the CIA budget.
I can satisfy most any Senator in the
cloakroom:talking to him some about
this, but I will publicly say that it i3 a
clean budget and they have justified
? many times over the expenditure of the
money. 1'
?
Senator Pastore: "? ? ?
haie to know
what they are doing, ?llo we can know
what we have to do in order to guarantee
? the security of our own country.
So we cannot come out here arid tell
the whole world, "We spent $1 billion or
$2 billion for the Central Intelligence.
Agency." What does that mean to any-
one else. except that perhaps some people
_think they are spending too much. And
the minute the question is asked where
they are spending it we are ln serious
? trouble.
? So what happens to your children and
? my children; Mr President? What hap-
'pens to you when you go home tonight?
What happens tomorrow? What hap-
pens to the security of our country?
Can we afford to tell them? Oh yes, I
? would like to tell the public everything it
is possible to tell them. I believe in that.
? I have been in public life continually for
40 years. I believe in the right of the
public to know. But I certainly would
not come to the floor of the Senate and
tell you, Mr. President, how to put to-
gether an atom bomb. I would not tell
you that. I would not tell you how far
our nuclear Subs are able to travel; I
would not tell you how we can detect an
enemy sub; and I would not tell you how
they might detect ours.' I would net tell
you that. Why would I not tell you that?
would not tell you that because the
minute I told you that I would jeopardize
? the future of your children,
? ? ?
/ have sat down with the Senator frora
Wisconsin (Mr. Peo:renar.), the Senator
from California (1`.;r. Ceaesroze), to find
a solution. and I have sat down with Mr.
Colby, who Is a great American. He said,
"Picnse do not do this. If you want to
make- my job easier. 'please do not do
this." I cannot sit there after that ad-
monition and exhortation anel turn
around and say. "Mr. Colby, I do not
believe what you have to say." If I be-
lieved that fpt I minute. I would .say, n
"You ought to (live up yo'itz? . .
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : Clfk-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
.-?
ri,;:! to commend tne Senator l'rorn
Island and to associate myself. fully with
his comments, The Senator pointed out
very properly that the Central ;nteili-
gence Agency has in the past engaged in
activities that have been looked upon by
certain 'Members of the Congress as un-
desirable: but want to make it; clear
that every one of those activities had
been ordered by a President. The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency does not Just
engage In activities jar the loye of work.
I know that the Central Intelligence
Agency, during the 'Kennedy years and
the Johnson years, was engaged in ac-
tivities in La -tai?
? ? ?
Mr. President, the Central Intelligence
Agency Is possibly the most Important
Et g e c y in this Government. By and lar,ge,
it is made UP Of Pe.L.ople who are com-
petent, able, and who have served this
.cotintry well and faithfully, To be sure,
there are times when it has engaged in
activities, as we have said. that are
looked upon with su_spicion; but I think
it would be folly for us to publicize all of'
its activities, to publicize the amounts it
receives, particularly when there are
ways and 121 e4.1113 W thin this body and.
within the other body oZ Congress to
supervise. it ..and to keep a check rein.
upon it.
I had the priYile.ge of
servingon the National Security Council.
. and I want to tell my colleagues that the
. Central Intelligence Agency was the most
accurate and effective instrument of
Government for that council. Its reports
were mosv, accurate, and had we followed
the advice of the Central Intelligence
Agency in many areas, we would have
been better oa, but at least it was there..
But just; as surely as we are In this'
body today debating whether or not we
ought to have a release of the figure,
next year it will be wh2t'ner it is too big
or too little, and her it will be. what is
in it. Then when we start to say what is
we are going to have to expose ex-
aCtly what we have been doing in order
to galn informa.tlon; for example, years
ago as to. where the Sovie.t Union was
building' its nuclear subs and the kind.
of nuclear subs they were. I saw that mal
terial M 1065?how far they were along,
what t'nelr scientific preg'z'ess 7; a 3 I do
not think it would servg the public in-
terest for all of that information to have
been laid out. It would linve. destroyed
our intelligence gathering cbmpletely. ? ? ?
II
- 3 -
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
But, let 113 bear in mind that if we are
to have a security intelligence agency, we.
cannot have it with national publicity
on what it does, how it does it, and how
much it spends here, or how much it
8pend3 there.. .
Senator Stennis: 11. . .
On my responsibility to my colleagues,'
they in CIA keep a clean house. They
have had a conservative operation dollar-
wise and have accounted for the money
in a splendid way. That has been true
without exception. There has been no
great spillage of money or great extrava-
gances, and not one bituof scandai or
odor of any kind. . . .
Senator Thurmond: ". .
I believe that our Nation Is unique in
the attention its legislature has given to
specifying and circurriscril:,:n1 the activi-
ties of the agency designated to perform
Its foreig-,a intelligence mission,.. n .11
Senator Proxmire: "..
; Mr. Presiaent, the. purpose of the
a.rnendment which I am offering now is
to provide that the overall figure for the
Intelligence community ,as a whole, not
broken down but the overall figure,
would be made available, so that the tax- ?
payers of this country would have some
Idea of how much, how many =loos of..
dollars?and it is billions of dollars?
are going for intelligence effortz by our I
Government.
NOW lust vhat VOnld thn tell our ad-- ?
- versaries? They would not know if it all
went to the CIA, or DIA. 'Whether the
NSA spent most of the money, or the Air
Force.
How about yearly fluctuations? Say for
example, that the budget went up 10
percent in I year. What what they con-
clude? That manpower was more expen-
sive? That the CIA was spending more
for Laos? That the DCA had bought a
new computer dvrision? That NSA was
hiring more people? They would know
.nothing. . . It ?
?
- 4 -
Approved For Release 2005/Q2/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Senator hugs:
11
? ?
?
The threat will come from losing con-
trol on the inside. 11, maintaining that
control requires an ounce o rhk. then I
thirt k. we should be prepared to take that
ounce, of risk in at least letting us see
publicly and the peopie .see pu'oitcl.re
whether we are spending 53 billion, $7
billion, or -:?390 biLLion, and how we are
co:Ice:I:in:3 it and hiding it, and if we are
protecting ourselves from the iaside az
well as from, the outside.
I th1r2k that. ounce of risk, ii it exists,
L s worth taking. and I thank the
tinguished Senator from Wisconsin for ?
yielding. .
Senator Jackson: ". . .
In summary, our foreign intelligence
service arises out of an. act of Congress ?
and all of its activities are closely sun- .
tinized by 5 number of representative
members of both the. Senate and .the .
souse of Representatiyes. This. is how
we have resolved Fne balance between
-
the needs of an open society and the
needs for a secret .foreign intelligence
service. I certainly do not think that
this is the time to' imbalance the .5.1tila-: .
tion as I am comldent enactmenc of the .
proposed amendment. would do.
Senator Young:
11
? ? ?
I know there is great interest In the.-
-public knowing everything possible, but.
I think there :WC some things that should
be kept secret for our own security. it
5
Approved For Release 2005/02/1.7 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
, ? ?
6. , Other, amendment.:3 a-p-ffored by_ the
:enate an 3 June 1974. Ail ,
?amendments were patternedf-or,.1:0-12.?.mpst?part after
inc..1_uslecL lArdauced by Senator Stennis,
who is Chairman of the Subcommittee on Central Intelligence 4
of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The amendments
th,e_CIA?s-ect-ion?o-f?th:e?NatiOnal 5-e-Eiray-A-Ct?of-194.71,
. a. emphasize that CIA is concerned only with
foreign intelligence by inserting the word- "foreign"
as a modifier throughout the section of the law setting
forth the Agency's -responsibilities. ?
b. ,require that functions.and duties related to
? foreign intelligence performed by the Agency at the ?
direction of the National Security Council shall be
reported to the Congress. This provision .established.
in.statute.d procedure followed for a number of years
with the Agency's four oversight committees.
c. clarify the current statutory prohibition
concerning law enforcement, police, or internal
security matters by providing that the Agency shall
not carry out on its own or assist other agencies of
Government in carrying out law enforcement or
poli-
type operations. The amendment specifically authorizes
the Agency to protect its installations, conduct in-
? vestigations of those granted access to sensitive- .
Agency information, and provide information resulting
from foreign intelligence activities to other appropriate
departments and agencies.
. 7. It is expected thit S. 3000 will be approved by
the Senate some time this week and in thenormal course of
legislative processing will be the subject of a-Conference
Committee and final action by both Houses before'submission
to the President for his approval. -
DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES (1-6)
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For ..Reipqp'4105t9L_WITJCPIAIRCIRM0206411100.0800100008-2
2025 M 11.W.
WASHIPICTW, D.C. 20503
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-352.,
July 13, 1972) established a joint Presidential-Congressional study ?
commission. to .submit to the Congress and the President findings and
recommendadorts "to provide a more effective system for the formulation.-
and implementation of the Nation's foreign policy."
In describing the duties of the Commission the law states that
"the Commission shall study. and investigate .the organization, methods
of operation, and powers of all departments, agencies, independent estab-
lishments, and insfrumentalides of the United States Government
participating in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign
policy." In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission may make -
recommendations with respect to the reorganization of the .departments a,ncl
agencies, more effective arrangements between executive branch and.
Co.ngress,. improved procedures ardon.g departments and agencies, the
.abolition of services., acdvid.e3 and functions not necessary to the efficient
conduct of foreign policy, and "other measures to promote peace, economy,
efficiency and improved administration .of foreign policy."
The report of the Commission, i.vhich?is to be submitted to the
President and the Congress by June 30, 1975, may include "proposed
constitutional amendments, legislation, and administrative- action considered
appropriate in carrying out its duties." The Commission, in performing
its responsibilities, is authorized to hold hearings, subpoena witne.sscs
and secure directly information from any executive department or age.ncy.
COMMISSION MEMBERS
? .The Commission .is composed of twelve members, four each
appointed by the President of the Senate", the Speaker of the House,
and the President. The members are:
THE HONORABLE ROBERT D. MURPHY - Chairman
Coning Glass International
Nev.' York, New York
THE HONORABLE JAMES B. PEARSa?T, - Vice Chairman
United States Senate
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
ApprovecYFOr Release 2905/02/17 : CIA-RDP7811/1026601V00800100008-2
(.lti It, ciL 01.1.tLiti:E;
Cr0.0'.";1;,!k)Wn
MRS. Al'IN1.2. AD.STRONG
Counsellor to the President
White House
THE FIC.):?;"011ABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Ex-Im Bank
MRS. CHARLES W. ENGLEHARD , JR.
Far Hills; New Jersey
MR. AREND D. LUBBERS
? President, Grand Valley State College
Allendale, Michigan
MR. FRANK Cr P. PylcGLDIN
Exe.cuave Vice President
Fidelity Bank
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
? THE HONORABLE Peter Frelinqhuysen
House of Representatives
THE HONORABLE MIKE MANSFIELD
United States Senate
-DR. STANLEY P. WAGNER
? President, East Central State College
Ada, Oklahoma -
THE HONORABLE CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
House of Represz.m.tadves
CO:`..1,1ISSION STAFF
FRANCIS 0. WILCOX is the Executive Director of the Commission and
FISHER HOWE is the Deputy Executive Director. Former Senator WILLIAM B.
SPONG, JR., is General- Counsel to the Commission. The Commission offices
are located at 2025 M Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20506. Telephone
[phone].
J1.1le I, 1973
C;F.P STAFF I
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 ; CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R00088Q190008-2
uu/it'P D2
co,,,AmissioN ON THE ORGANIZAT:ON OF THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
2025 M STREET., rr.w.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20306
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
The objective set forth in the first section of the
legislation authorizing the Commission is simple and
straightforward: "to submit findings and recommendattions
to provide a more effective system for the formulation
and implementation of the Nation's foreign policy." The
statute goes on to specify the kinds of recommendations
sought. .It directs that they address "the reorganization
of the departments, agencies ... and instrumentalities
of the Executive Branch participating in foreign policy
matters; e.. improved procedures among those departments
and agencies; the abolition of unnecessary activities and .
functions; and such other measures as may serve "to promote
peace-, economy, efficiency and, improved administrationof
foreign policy.." In addition to these issues, all con-
cerned with the functioning of the executive bi-aiieh, nle
Itimission is directed to recommend ".more effective arrange-
me--s between -the'executive branch and Congress, which will
be ,er enable .each to carry out its constitutional -
responsibilities,"
The mandate of the Commission, in short, is not to
concern itself directly with the substance of foreign policy,
but to propose improvements in the means by which, in
both the executive and legislative branches, foreign
Policy is made and implemented.
In order to focus and airect its inquiries and the
work of its 'staff, the Commission finds it Useful to
amplify that, statement of objectives with further comments
of two kinds. Some concern the characteristics the
CommissiOn believes "a more effective system" of foreign-
policy-making should possess. Others address the problems
of .making the work of the Commission itself effective. .
-
Elements of Governmental Effectiveness
Any effective system for the formulation and implementation
of' foreign policy will possess certain characteristics. Those
L. which this Commission expects7to give-hc,,;hest priority
Apprord For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Subj: statement of Objectives Page Two
??
are ne following:
That in the FORMULATION of policy,decisions should
be based upon --
(a) a continuing analysis of major trends and
developments in the changing world environment;
? (b) a coherent conception of both the immediate and
longer-range objectives of this country;
(c) the best obtainable information from a wide
range of sources;
(d) rigorous and objective analysis of implications
flowing from available information;
(e) a careful balancing of the full range of '
relevant considerations-- specifically
including domestic political and economic
factors;
(f) the consideration of a full range of realistic
alternative courses from which to choose;
)
adequate coordination and consultation with those
who should participate in the policy process;
?(h) procedures which keep to the minimum the
decisions which must be made at the top.
That in the IMPLEMENTATION of policy, decisions
hould be
(a) communicated to those responsible or affected
by them in a clear and timely fashion;
(b) monitored to insure that those decisions promptly
become policy in fact as well as in word;
(c)
reviewed and evaluated in their effects through
a continuing process of reassessment.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Staleeeent of Objectives Page Three
,
That
in both FOBULATION and IVIPLEYIENTATION
(a) the coTemitment of resources -- personnel and
budgetary -- be appropriate in scale and skill
to the task;
(b) the several processes operate in as open and
public a manner as their nature makes
possible, and
(c) all actions taken be broadly consistent with
the public's sense of the nature of U.S. interests
and the means legitimate to advance those interests.
The role of the Congress is critical in both the formulation
and implementation .of foreign policy. The organization of
the Congress for these purposes, however, can only be deter-
mined by the Congress itself. Nevertheless, the Commission
will explore various arrangements concerning the organization
jurisdiction, and staffing of the Congress, and the informa-
tion and analytic support whjeh m7ight be hele'ful -ee it in
the conduct of foreign policy.
The Commission will also examine the organizational and
-1-'ocedural arrangements important to the relationship
:tween the legislative and executive branches in the
conduct of foreign policy. In particular,. the Commission
will examine the flow of information and consultation
between the two branches.
Making the Commission Itself Effective
The Commission anticipates two principal problems in
making its own work effective. The first is that organiza-
tional arrangements must in some degree depend on both the
personal preferences and the policy predilections of top-
level officials. Clearly, therefore, no single best
organizational framework. for the future can now be authori-
tatively established. The Commission, therefore, expects to
propose single preferred arrangements for those kinds of
foreign policy issues which can be resolved at levels of
government below the very top, and which consequently need
not reflect so directly the decision-making style of
particular individuals. As to the kinds of issues which
inevitably receive the attention ofheads of departments,
'1117emen of Congressional committees and presidents, the
-ession ee:pects to propose alternativ methods of
erganization, any of which might be serviceable and one
Approve() For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
.Subj: Statement of Objectives Page Four
of which would be preferable, depending on the working
styles of the senior officials. In addition, the
Commission will undertake to specify the criteria which
it believes any organization framework, at all levels,
should meet.
The second and larger problem is posed by the fact
that many of the issues which this Commission will examine
have been addressed by prior commissions, study groups and
task forces and that the practical results of many of these
studies have been meager. We believe there may have been
two principal reasons for this fact. The first is that for
every proposed organizational change substantial costs or
disadvantages as well as benefits can be discerned. They
are proposals therefore on which, if the experience and
judgment of individuals are the only basis for decision,
reasonable men may reasonably disagree. And few prior
studies were able to offer their readers any other basis
of decision; they did not present a body of evidence to '
show that the advantages of their .recommendations would
clearly outweigh Lne costs or disadvantages. The second
reason appears to be that in many cases prior commissions
were unable to enlist in the development and review of
their recommendations the full participation of the
several agencies, departments and indeed branches of
government which would be affected by them.
This Commission recognizes an obligation, therefore,
to present not merely a set of recommendations and their
rationale, but a body of evidence which suggests that
such recommendations, if implemented, can reasonably be
expected to produce beneficial results. It recognizes
also an obligation to offer the many parties inevitably
affected by such recommendations the opportunity to
comment critically, on them and to offer alternative suggestions.
The Commission also recognizes that there may be -
circumstances under which it can advance the cause of improved
organization for foreign policy prior to the issuance of its
final report. As its views on appropriate organizational
changes develop, therefore, it expects to consult with
the officials now responsible for the conduct?of foreign
policy to determine whether organizational changes which
they may be contemplating deserve the Commission's support.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
ol Objectives Page Five
beans to Those Ends
Accordingly, the Commission expects its own work
and that of its staff to involve, among others, the
following activities.
1. A thorough review of the findings and recommenda-
tions of previous relevant- studies and reports..
2. A solicitation of the views of a larger number of
public and private persons with experience in the analysis
or operation of foreign policymaking.
3. A detailed canvassing (DT the attitudes and desires
of members of Congress with respect to the appropriate
role for Congress in the making of foreign policy and the
means necessary .to the effective performance of that role.
4. An intensive study program designed both to canvass
existing materials and to develop fresh sources of informa-
tion on thertential benefits and probable effects of
alternative organizational arrangements.
Prospectives on the Commission's Assignment
We undertake this effort and believe it to be important
not alone to deal with any inadequacies in our government's
current organization for the conduct of foreign policy but
for two other reasons as well.
The first .has to do with complexity. The world is now
not bi-polar but multi-polar. We can no longer neatly divide
the nations of the world into antagonists, allies, and
neutrals. The pace of technological change increases. The
interdependencies of nations become more numerous and more
sensitive. Even more pertinent, many of the most important
problems are no longer clearly "domestic" or "foreign";
they cannot therefore be adequately dealt with in existing
organizational frameworks. In this setting the tasks of
foreign policy grow more numerous, more subtle, and more
direct in their impact on our daily lives. Some changes
in the organization of our government to perform those
tasks may therefore prove highly beneficial.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved Stat For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02K0R0M9100008-2
1 :? ement of Objectivw3
vow The second reason has to do with power. From the
und of World War II until very recently the Dower and
influence of the United States were sufficient to insure
; that its principal objectives would be attained even
where those objectives were only simply perceived and
crudely pursued. Those days have gone, and they are
? not likely to return. Our margin of error is considerably
reduced. If the United States is to attain its ends in
' the future; it must formulate and implement its policies
with far greater foresight, precision and control.
. Here again, organizational changes may prove useful.
It is with the expectation of making substantial
contributions to these ehds that the Commission
pursues its work.
bruary 20, 1974
kqe26
; Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August, 8, 1974
The Honorable William E. Corby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Bill:
As the Commission on the Organization of the GoVernment for the
Conduct of Foreign Policy moves from the briefing phase to the phase of
study in depth of some selected features, I would like to outline for you
our approach in the area of intelligence. Intelligence obviously plays a
major role in the formulation and execution of Poreign policy. We would like
to identify that role clearly and look at various ways intelligence could
make an even better contribution to foreign policy deliberations. This will
require us to be aware of some of the organizational aspects of the intelli-
gence relationship to foreign policy and to assess the ways in which intelli-
gence contributes to foreign policy, from the raw report to the finished
estimate. We must also cover the degree of success our intelligence has and
can hope to have in accurately reporting events abroad and projecting their
likely future directions. I think we must include a review of the political
costs involved in intelligence operations where they do cause problems for
foreign policy. As a related but somewhat separable issue, we will need to
identify the role in our foreign policy of what is called covert action and
come to some judgments on its desirability, extent and decision-making
process.
On the other hand, I do not view the Commission's function as review-
ing and making recommendations on the organization of our intelligence services
and community, its budgets, personnel strengths, etc., or the details of its
operations and procedures. The Commission will not be conducting an investiga-
tion of the organization of intelligence itself, but, rather, the role of
intelligence as it affects the conduct of our foreign policy. In order to
make informed judgments on the latter, of course, we must be aware of some of
these matters as necessary background, but I want to assure you that the thrust
of our work will be in the latter category. I share what I know is your great
concern about the necessity to protect the sensitive operational aspects of
the intelligence effort. We will conduct our inquiry and maintain our records
so as not to expose such matters.
As you know, we have consulted a number of experts to help the
Commission draw up a Study Plan, and I enclose a copy of their suggestions
for your information. The plan would operate under the close supervision of
our Executive Director Francis Wilcox and his Deputy Fisher Howe. It will be
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
The Honorable William E. Colby Page 2
will
noted that Mr. William J. Barnds/drow up Paper #1 and ht on "Intelligence Func-
tions and Policy Making in the Institutional Context"; Mr. ClintaiW. Kelly III,
Paper #3 on "Innovation in Intelligence Production", and William R. Harris,
Paper A, on "Authority for the Conduct and Management of Foreign Intelligence".
? As you will note from the enclosure, there will be an "all source"
? study project under Intelligence Project Director Mr. Kent Crane, which will
include analysis of past studies and reports on the intelligence community.
He and others will be discussing with you the specifics of these studies and
be sure that appropriate clearances are obtained and other arrangements made.
? The Commission is most grateful for your cooperation and encouragement
in the initial phase of our work.
With warm regards
Yours sincerely,
Robert Murphy
Chairman
RM:lb
Enclosures
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
--September 20, 1974
i'laiORANDUM
TO: The Intelligence Subcommittee
SUBJECT: Study Plan and Study Group
Pending the formation of the Subcommittee for National
Security and Intelligence, the staff proceeded with plans
for review of intelligence matters pertinent to the Commis-
sion's mandate and initiated research studies on several
aspects of the-subject to be ready for. a study group's de-
liberation. The Study Plan, including a short outline of
the research now underway, is enclosed..
. Spbcommittee_annrov.ese,c9j1cept.! A Study Group
should be formed comprised of the Subcommittee members supple-
mented by five or six knowledgeable public citizens. It is
i-P-esur?ad that, 1though the func.on of Intellicrence :;.n the
'Government involves many technical matters and much that is
highly classified, the deliberations of the Subcommittee, and
indeed of the Commission as a whole, will be greatly enhanced
by ?the participation of a variety of distinguished private
citizens who can bring to the discussion differing backgrounds
of experience and views. Specialists and experts can be ?
-marshalled to provide support. A "fresh" approach may indeed
be the important contribution the Commission can make in this
area.
A suggested composition of the .S..lialy_aua.is set forth
in a memorandum enclosed.
The Subcommittee should bear in mind that for a number
of years the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
.CTFIB) composed of private citizens, has existed to advise
the President on Intelligence matters and has had the Int-PM-
gence Community under cons ant review. The Subcommittee clear-
ly does not want to duplicate the work of PFIAB nor fail to use
tho fruits of its deliberations. On tho othar hand, the Com-
miion's mandate would probably indicate that the nature of
.PVIAB and the contribution that it has made should ha explored
by the Subcommittee, even as it is examining comparable advisory
boards and commissions for such other important functions as
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Su:3j: Study Plan and Study Group
Page 2
aid, cultural. affairs, foreign information and arms control.
The present membership of PFIA3 is as follows:
Anderson, George 11.,.Jr.
Baker, William 0. '
Cherne, Xpao
Connally, John B.
Foster, John.S., Jr.
Galvin, 'Robert W.
Gray, Gordon
Land, Edwin T-h.
Luce, Clare Boothe
Rockefeller, Nelson A.
Teller, Edward
At some stage the Study Group will probably want to meet with
PFXAB.
FR.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R0008001000084L'
---Sepi:ember 23, 1974
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Subcommittee/Study Group on intelligence and Covert
Action
An outline of proposed activity for the Intelligence Sub-
committee, as expanded into a Study Group, is set forth as
follows:.
1. The Key Substantive Issues
The basic issues for consideration by the Sub-
committee/Study Group presented in Enclosure A.
2. Relevant Material Available to the Subcommittee/Study
Group
?
(a) Major TrStitlational Report: A letter (12 pages)
from DCI Colby to .Chairman Murphy outlining formal
procedures and organization throughout the Intelli-
gence community.
(b)- Major Institutional Hearincs (19-20 November 1973):
Testimony of DCI Colby; Ray Cline and.William
Porter from the State Department; and Dr. Hall
and Admiral de Poix from the Defense Department.
(Summaries of 7-9 pages are available for each one.)
The CIA and State testimony is more thoughtful and -
? less regid than the Defense testimony, but few
.organizational and procedural changes are recommend-
ed by any of them.
(c) Research Program Case Studies: Some important in-
telligence matters, including especially an exami-
nation of the usefulness of intelligence support.
in a variety of specific foreign policy situations,
will be addressed in the case studies of the Com-
mission's Research Plan.'
(d) .Analvtical Studies: -A set of intelligence analy-
tiM-1-ssue papers is being prepared under the
direction of Dr. William Harris. .The papers, be-
tween 25 and. 75 pages, will be a critically impor-
tant contribution td the Subcommittee/Study Group
deliberations.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Subj: Subcommittee/Study ,i:oup on Intelligence and Covert Action
They will be availahle.in late October and will
cover the following topics:
1. An overview of intelligence functions;
i
2. Intelligence and policy-maikng n the
institutional context;
3. Innovation in intelligence production;
4. The authority for foreign intelligence;
5. Intelligence resource management; and
6. Covert action.
(e) An All-Source Study: An all-source study project
is being mounted by J. J. Hitchcock, under .the
direction of Kent Crane/ to analyze past studies
and reports on the intelligence community. This
limited-access report, of between- 30 and 50 pages,
will be available in late October.
(f) Recommended.Readire,1: Enclosure Bis a short .
bibliography of particularly useful books and
articles. .
3, Suggested Plan of Subcommittee/Study Group Action
A total of perhaps five or six 2-day meetings
spread over a period of four months will. probably be
required to review the materials and prepare findings
and recommendations:
(a) A meeting in conjunction with the October Commis-
sion meeting to review the key substantive issues
in Enclosure A and the outlines .for the Analvtical
.Studies (2d above) and "All Source Study" (2e above).
(b) Second and third meetings in November primarily to
discuss with the authors the papers developed in the
"AnalIrtical Studies (2d above) and the "All Source
Study" (2e above).
(c) Fourth and fifth meetings in December and early
January for the preparation of findings and
recommendations.
?
(d) A final meetincl in January to discuss and revise
as necessary a Subcommittee/Study Group report to
the Commission.
Approved FOr Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
ENCLOSURE A
The Key Substantive Issues.
a. General
.What is the proper function performed by intelli-
gence in support of the conduct of foreign policy?
b. Intelligence Analysis
(1) How can the relationship between the producers
and consumers of finished intelligence be
improved?
(2). In the process ofnanalysis.to produce finished
intelligence, what are the roles best played by
the State Department (INR), the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, and the'various analytical officeS-
in the CIA? ?
(3) What shotild be the system for producing National
-Intelligence Estimates?
(4) What new forecasting and scoring techniques should
be applied to intelligence analysis?
c. Collection of Information for Foreign Pplicv Support
(1) What is the best organization for the collection
of raw information of use to the foreign policy
community - either directly or in support of in-
telligence analysis? What is the best procedure
for setting priorities, allocating missions, and
controlling collectors overseas?
(2) 'What are the strengths and weaknesses of collection
by Foreign Service Officers, CIA Stations, military
attaches, and technical sensors?
(3) How can intelligence resources be of greater assis-
tance in new fields and in suppprt of new potential
customers?
(4) What are the best mechanisms for providing feedback
to the collectors and analysts? ?
D. The Role of the; DCI
(1) What is the most desirable relationship of the
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-NDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Director of Central Intelligence to the President
and NdEional Security Council? What should be the
extent of his authority over the full range of in-
telligence programs, military as well as civilian?
(2) What changes, if any, are called for in the stat-
utory base and general authorities for foreign
intelligence?
e. Resource Manaement
(1) Since the overwhelming share of the combined in-
telligence budget is expended by DoD agencies,
with practical constraints upon intervention by
the DCI or his Intelligence Community Staff, what
are the implications for the reorganization of
DOD intelligence management?
(2) If there are systematic misallocations of resources,
what organizational or legislative reforms are
advisable?
f. ,Cc,vert Action
? (1) What are the pros and cons of maintaining a capa-
bility for covert action, and what criteria ought
to govern its use?
(2) Where .should the responsibility for covert action
be lodged, and underwhat controls should it operate?
Congressional Oversight
What kind of Congressional oversight should be
applied to intelligence activities and to covert political
action?(NOTE: THIS SUBJECT WILL BE REVISED IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE IN SUBCOMMITTEE I AS A FUNCTION OF THE LARGER
SUBJECT OF CONGRESSIONAL. EXECUTIVE RELATIONS.)
g?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
?Recommended Reading.
(a)
ENCLOSURE B
The intelligence Establishment, by Harry Howe Ransom,
Cambridge,- 1970. The most thorough and best balanced
treatment of the intelligence community by any academic
(254 pages)-.
(b) The U.S. Intelligence Community, by Lyman Kirkpatrick,
jr., New York, 1973. The view from the inside by one
of the old timers in the Intelligence business. A
somewhat shallow, but quite reliable, survey (191 pages)
(c) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Marchetti and
Marks, 1974. A comprehensive and current discussion
of the. issues, albeit highly one-sided and biased. -
The authors admit the utility of intelligence analysis
in principle but come out strongly against covert
operations (337 pages).
(d) "The CIA and Decision Making" article by Chester
Cooper in Foreign Affairs., 1972. A provocative paper
on the problems of estimating and the relationship
_bwtween_intelligence and policy-makers '(13 pages).
(e) "Intelligence and Foreign Policy, Dilemmas of a
Democracy," article by William Barnds in Foreign
Affairs, January 1969. A wide-ranging paper on in-
telligence activities, covert action, and public
attitudes (17 pages).
(f) "Intelligence and Covert Operations; Changing
Doctrine and Practice," unpublished article by Paul
Blackstock based on a.questionhaire circulated among
former intelligence officials. It raises many of
the basic issues and offers a multitude of differing
opinions (126 pages).
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
July 19, 1974
SUBJECT: Study Plan - Intelligence and Covert Action
1. The Problem.
(a) What organizational and procedural steps should
be taken to improve intelligence support for the
conduct of foreign affairs, and what level of
effort is required to provide adequate support?
(b) Should the U.S. have a capability for covert
political action; if so, where should the responsi-
bility be lodged and unaer what controls should
it operate?
Some important intelligence matters, including especially an
examination of the usefulness of intelligence support in a
variety of foreign policy situations, will be addressed in
the case studies of the Commission's Research Plan. But
many aspects of the organization and procedures of the
intelligence community also deserve separate and reasonably
comor-ahensive study. The agencies are large, costl,", and
important to the conduct of foreign policy. Furthermore.
there is disagreement about the roles they should play in
the post-cold war era. Some of the issues involved have
not been thoroughly examined by previous commissions.
The problem of intelligence generally breaks down
into the following components:.
(a) The Role of Intelligence. What is the proper
function performed by int-blligence in support
of the conduct of foreign policy; what should it
? do and what should it not do? Involved here is
an analysis of the manner in.which intelligence
can give support to a wide variety of customers.
It also calls for a review of misunderstandings and
? different perspectives that distort the relation-
ship between intelligence users and intelligence
producers and collectors.
(b) The Activities Appropriate to that Role.
1. In the process of. ai.nalvsis to produce
"finished" intelligence, what are the roles
best played by the State Department (INR),
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Page 2
DIA, other Agencies, and the various
analytical offices in CIA. What should
.be the system forrroducing National
Intelligence Estimates?
2. What is the best organization for the collec-
tion of raw information in support of
intelli-
gence analysis and of policymakers who set
priorities, allocate missions, and control
collectors overseas; how much collection is
related to foreign policy as opposed to other
purposes; what are the strengths and weaknesses
of collection by Foreign Service Officers,
CIA stations, military attaches, and technical
sensors; what is the procedure of disseminating
raw data; what are the mechanisms for insuring
feedback to the collectors?
(c) The Role of the Director of Central Intelligence.
What is the most desirable relationship of the DCI
to the President and the National Security Council.;
what should be the extent of his authority over the
full range of intelligence programs, military as
well as civilian.
In addition to the foregoing aspects of the intelligence
function, the problem of covert political action, including
its sensitive relationship to clandestine intelligence
collection, must be closely examined.
The Commission's exploration of the problems of intelligence
and of covert action in relation to the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy is made particularly
difficult by (a) the size and complexity of the intelligence
community, (b) the intricacy of the relationship between the
several components of the intelligence effort and policymaking,
but particularly (c) the highly classified nature of the
intelligence function and materials. For these reasons, a
special and quite different study plan' must be developed.
2. Study Plan.
A Study Group composed of two or three Commission members
and a number of experts knowledgeable about intelligence
matters, drawn from several different quarters, will prepare
conclusions and recommendations for the Commission's review.
The group will be equipped to deal with classified information.
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Page 3
The Study Group will base its work on the findings of the
case studies underway as part of the Commission's Research
Program and on special preparatory materials developed by
two complementary sets of studies.
The plan of Study, therefore, falls into two stages:
STAGE I - Preparation of papers for the review of the
Intelligence Study Group, as follows:
(a) Analytical Issue Papers: Studies focused
on specific issues, and problems prepared
by informed observers from outside the
intelligence community in accordance with the
outline attached (TAB A). The research
consultant supervisor is William R. Harris
of Santa Monica, California. To the
extent possible, thrs group of analytical
issue papers will be unclassified although
classified data will need to be reviewed
in their preparation, including interviews
with intelligence and policymaking officials.
? (b) A special "All Source Study," focused
principally on findings and resulting changes of
previous reports of the intelligence
community- The "All Source Study" will be
undertaken by the Intelligence Project
Director, Kent Crane, with the assistance
of a staff officer in accordance with the
attached outline (TAB B). It is understood
that this study must be handled in a special,
limited access rianner that would insure
absolute protection of not only the security
classification of the material but also
agency views and plans which are under-
standably highly sensitive quite apart from
classification.
The Deputy Director will assure that there is no duplication
of interviews of agency personnel or requests for. documentation
on the part of those making the two sets of studies,
STAGE II - Intelligence Study, Group to review the fore-
going papers in conjunction with the findings
of Research Program case studies, and to make
recommendations on appropriate organization and
procedures for intedligence support of the
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Page .14
?
conduct of foreign policy. The Study Group
may require a numbercf meetings at spaced
intervals over two or three months period. Under
the overall direction of the Executive Director,
the Intelligence Project Director will coordinate
the staff support for the Study Group, and
collate the data for the Commission.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release,.200,5(0,2/171?,Rilk;Rp1171,11.Fpn00.pAOsTTE.)0008-2
PAPERS
TAB A
Paper #1, INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
Author: William J. Barnds
Commentator #1: (to be determined, background
in intelligence production)
Commentator #2: (to be determined, background
in policy uses of intelligence)
12.11_r_p_c_g_fa This paper would have two purposes:
(a) To define alternative, normative concepts of
intelligence functions, and to link alternative conceptions
of management responsibilities and functions. This paper
would review the misunderstandings and different perspectives
that distort the relationship between intelligence users and
producers. In defining the proper function of intelligence,
the author would stress the limits of the intelligence mission.
(b) To relate in broad terms the Conceptions of func?
tion and performance to organizational and procedural alter?
natives. The paper would discuss .the roles and relationships
of the DCI; the NSC; the Intelligence Coordination Staffs,
Committees, and Processes;and policymakers.
Research Methodoloo.y: review of literature on intelligence
? functienz:, (Evans, tilsiian, iilensky, Kent, Graham, etc.) inter-
-views ?with selected-intelligence producers and collectors (active
and retired), policymaking consumers and military service
consumers.
Anticipated length: 20-30 pages
:Deadline for submission -(in draft): September 9,.1974
Paper #2, INTELLIGENCE AD P0LICYM2KING IN THE INSTITUTIONAL
*
CONTEXT
Author: William-J. Barnds
Commentator: to be determined
Purpose: This paper would relate the concepts of intelligence
and the broad organizational and procedural alternatives (addressed
in Paper #1) to the institutional mechanisms andpractices of the
Intelligence community. It would seek to address such questions
as the following:
If many of the demands of key consumers cannot be
met, and if much of intelligence production is
not read by the intended recipients, are there
organizational implications?
Approved Fori Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02560R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Wm, maw
????
OM. ????
f/1/00 4.0
???? Wm.
????????
ed.
What is the need for mutual educatic,n of intelli-
gence and policy officials?
For the determination of production requirements
and the process of analysis (estimative, current,
and basic)?
'What should be done about the present intelligence
requirements staffs?
Can the intelligence system be reformed to provide
more relevant, responsive products to consumer
groups (more carefully differentiated) without com-
promising the independence or integrity of the
intelligence analysts? .
How can analysts best be encouraged to initiate
new intelligence products which. are .helpful to
consumers?
How can top quality analysts be retained and .
recruited for intelligence work?
What are the responsibilities of policymakers to
JfltelligencP officers?
This paper would examine the role and performance of the
NSC Intelligence Committee and other mechanisms for getting the
consumers' points of view across to the intelligence community.
It would also address the role of competition and coordination
in intelligence analysis: in what areas is analytical
duplication useful or counterproduetive?
literature and
Research MethodoloFI.: Review of relevant/intensive interviews
with intelligence producers, consurs, and other observers (below
the level of the DCI or SecDef). All
organization charts and deScriptive reference material will
be included in a detailed, classified appendix.
Anticipated length: 50-75 pages
Deadlirefor submission (in draft): September 27, 1974
,Paper #3, INNOVATION IN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
Author, Part I: Clinton W. Kelly, III
A
Commentator, Part I: Dr. Thomas Brown, Associate Head
(N.thematics), The RAND Corp.
Author Part II: to be determined --(, --/,
?
Commentator, Part II: to be determined
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
?i: This paper would summarize prior work on
probabilistic forecasting and scoring techniques to evaluate
Intelligence products and forecaster performance. Examples
of experimental intelligence products would be included as
a classified annex. The paper would differentiate between
those topics which are particularly susceptible to quantitative
analysis and those which are not.
Anticipated length 30-40 pages ?
. Deadline for submission (in draft): September 9, 1974
Part II: This paper would discuss new fields for
intelligence research, such as environmental issues, certain
aspects of economic intelligence (food production, climate
forecasts, population studies, marine resources, etc.), inter-
national terrorism, and narcotics control. The paper would
consider new consumers for intelligence support, not only within
the U.S. Goernment but in international organizations such as
the UN. The paper would also assess innovations in :hformation
processing, real-time consumer access, and alternative
paradigms of analysis.
Anticipated length: 50-60 pages -
Deadline for submission .(in draft): September 9,-1974'
?
Research Methodology: For Part 1, revision of prior
:search. Fox. Part 11, interviews with methodology expel=ts at
the ,Center for .Analytical 'Methodology, CIA, IC Staff, Ci,
OPR, OSR, OER, OSD/NAG, etc. Both Parts I and II will be
written on an unclassified basis, with classified appendices as
necessary.
. .
Deadline for submission (-in draft): Sep.fiember 9, 1974
Paper R4, AUTHORITY FOR THE CONDUCT0AND MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN
? INTELLIGENCE
Author: William R. Harris
Commentator #1; John T. Elliff, Brandeis University
Commentator #2: General Counsel, CIA
Purpose: This paper would discuss the constitutional
and statutory base for foreign intelligence, with explicit re-
ference to the National SecUrity Act of 1947, the CIA Act of
1949, and the full range of NSC Intelligence Directives. The
paper would address: the authority of the DCI and the IC
Staff; the role of the President and Congress in delegating
authority to collect intelligence information; the adequacy
of the present authority for the conduct of covert operations
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
by the CIA. and the DoD; ti:e authority to collect information
.within the US; the authority to release information of
commercial value; the authority to collect and disseminate
information on international organizations and multinational
corporations; the authority to exchange information with
foreign governments.;-and the authority to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.. The paper
would suggest alternative approaches and discuss the pros
and cons of recommending statutory reforms.
Research Methodolo,7y: This paper will be unclassified,
though NSCIDs may be included as a classified appendix.
Research will use public laws, Guide to CIA Statutes and
Laws, legal commentaries, interviews with general counsels,
and others volved in review of present authority.
Anticipated length: 40-60 pages
Deadline for submission (in draft): September 9, 1974
Paper #5, INTELLIGENCE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Author: Robert Macy ?
Commentator: .
Pur_pose: This paper should addres not only questions
_of efficient resource allocation but.also the capacity the
DCI and others to make appropriate decisions and to manage
resources appropriated to other agencies. The stress would
be on these programs run by the Secretary of Defense on behalf
of the national intelligence effort. The paper would examine
the role of the :htelligence Resources Advisory Committee and
the other committees that coordinate expensive and sensitive
collections programs. What role should be played by OMB,
the DCI, the IC Staff, PFIAB, and4ongress? Is it -Practical
to expect the DCI to exercise greater authority over the
annual budget of the intelligence community and to set long
range planning goals? Since the overwhelming share of the
combined intelligence budget is expended by DoD agencies,
with practical constraints upon intervention by the DCI or
his IC Staff, what are the implications for the reorganization
of DoD intelligence management? If. there are systematic -
misallocations of resources, are there organizational or
legislative reforms which are advisable? Alternative techniques
for budgetary review of intelligence activities will be dis-
cussed. Alternative roles for intelligence consumers in 'deter-
mining intelligence expenditures-,or consumer-aEency funds for -
acquisition of special intelligence products will be considered .0
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
, PRproved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
.L.age
Research Methodology: review of relevant literature
(Marchetti/Marks, etc.); interviews with budget specialists
in DoD, IC Staff, OMB, and IRAC.
Anticipated length: 30-50 pages .(with classified
appendix discussing specific
budget figures)
Deadline for submissbn (in draft): September 9 1974
Paper #6, CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS AND COVERT ACTION
Author: to be determined
Commentator: to be determined
Purpose: This paper will discuss the pros and cons of
maintaining a capability for covert action, and the criteria
which ought to govern its use. The paper will explore the rela-
tionship between covert action and human intelligence collection
in terms of cover, coordination, personnel, management, and
control. The paper will address problems of command and
control inherent in highly compartmented operations, and it
will examine carefully the review process of the 40 Committee
and othcr oversight groups.
Research Methodology: Review of the extensive (largely
critical) literature on clandestine operations; interviews
with DoD hierarchy as available. Emphasis on organization
and procedure, rather than on any specific operations. Paper
to be unclassified, but may contain classified annex.
Anticipated length: 40-60 pages
Deadline for submission (n draft): September 9, 1974
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
TAB B
All Source Study
Study Purpose. An "all source" study project will be
mounted to prepare a limited access report of perhaps 30-50
pages of analysis, without recommendation, of past studies
and reports on the intelligence community. Requests for
interviews, documents, written questions and possibly for
reasonable staff assistance may be made to the DCI. As with
the complementary Analytical Issue Papers on Intelligence,
the "All Source " project will be designed for the sole
purpose of assisting the Study Group in arriving at findings
and recommendations for review by the Commission.
Methodology. The Commission, with the assistance of
the DCI, would obtain copies of a limited number of previous
reports to be stored in the PFIAB vault.. The Intelligence
Project Director and a staff officen would carry out a
number of interviews in order to judge the effectiveness of
these studies and reforms and present an analysis of the
critical elements for Study Group review.
Timing. Stud:y. 'L.(' be completed by October 1.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
COMMISSION ON THE 0,--ZGANIZAflON OF THF GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDIJCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C..20506
MEMORANDU:i: FOR:
August 7, 1974
Intelligence Community Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
As you requested, I am providing information on our
major research projects in progress, since some investiga-
tors working on these Studies may need to interview
individuals in the Intelligence Community. You understand
that these Studies, and therefore the interviews, are not
related in any way to the Study Plan for the Intelligence
Community about which we are separately in touch.
The projects are outlined in the &tate Department
memoranda signed by William Galloway. The names included
in the four memoranda have had a "name check" and have been
granted a temporary SECRET clearance, unless they already
hold a permanent clearance as indicated. The draft
memorandum on the project on The Interaction of the United
States and Foreign Economies will be sent by Galloway as
soon as all name checks are completed. However, all those
listed, except Edward Hamilton, Edward Skloot and Linda S.
Graebner, have already been cleared.
Finally, a copy of the proposal for Alexander George's
Study on iiinimizing "Irrationality" in Foreign Policy-making
is included for your use. As I mentioned to you, Professor
George has a current RAND clearance through SECRET.
Thank you very much for your help.
Lnclosures
Fisher H ae
Deputy Executive Director
P.S. William Bacchus is overseeing this project and he
or I would want to assist further in any way we
can in Tom Reckford's absence..
ApprovedFor Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
? Approved For Release 2005/02/1-71-4. tiALR66410042160R000800100008-2
WASHINGTON
?
20a1:?5:
July 17, 1974
MEMORANDUM
To: M/DG - Ambassador Davis
S/P - Mr. Lord
INR - Mr. Hyland
EB-- Mr. Enders
S/S - Mr. Springsteen
Subject: Study on "The Effectiveness of Organizational
Change" undertaken for the Commission on the
'Organization of the Government for the Conduct
of Foreign Policy
Introduction and General Background
The National Academy for Public Administration, a
non-profit organization of scholars and practitioners,
Roy W. Crawley, Executive Director, is undt-rtakilig a
major stuOy under contract from the Commission on the.
Organization of theGovex:iment for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy. The study-will examine a number of attempts to
reorganize various parts of the foreign affairs community
in the past two decades, with the goal of better under-
standing the actual effects of such changes and the.fac-
tors which account for those effects, anticipated and
unexpected. . This knowledge should help make it possible
for the Commission to .develop recommendations which are
both informed by past experience and.iihich can stand the
test of practicality. This study is one of a number being
conducted for the Commission, all of which,will be used
as background for its report.
Timing 'and Format:
This topic will be pursued through a number of case
studies, under the general direction of a panel of ex-
perts which includes Amb. Edmund Gullion, Harold Seidman,
Frederick C. Mosher, Warren Bennis, James W. Fesler,
Wayne K. Thompson, and I. M. Destler. The cases and the
investigators selected to date are:
Approved For Fielease 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
2.
? ?
Manlio De Angelis, "The -Transition from ICA
to AID"
Leland Barrows, "The Peterson/Hannah AID
. Reform Proposals"
Crocker, "Changes in the N.S.C.
System - 1961 and 1969"
McDonald-, "The Wristonization Program"
McDonald, "The Herter Committee Report
and its Consequences"
Chester A.
William T.
William T.
Erasmus nornan, ,"The Evolving Role of the U.S.
. Ambassador"
Dominick Del Guidice "The Creation of the Council
on Foreign Economic Policy
(C.I.E.P.)"
Michael Harmon, "The Creation of the Arms Contlol
and Disarmament Agency (A.C.D.A.)"
Melbourne Specter, "Policy Planning - Improvement
Attempts"
A number of these projects will require consultation
with officers of the Department who will be contacted
between now and mid-September. It is anticipated that
it will be possible for the investigators to obtain all
the information they require on an unclasSified basis,
and the Commission intends that the report they prepare
will be unclassified.
Contacts
The panel secretary and National Academy coordinator
for the project is Melbourne Spector, telephone [phone].
The Executive Director, Roy Crawley, may be reached at the
same number. The Commission's project officer for the
study is Dr. William I. Bacchus, telephone [phone].
William J. Galloway
Executive Assistant
4
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
? Approved For Release 2005/02/17 ?;-CIA-RDP78M02660R800800100008-2
FOR MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON.
July 18, 1974
MEMORANDUM
To: NEA - Mr. Atherton
INR - Mr. Hyland
S/P -.Mr. Lord
S/S - Mr. Springsteen
Subject: Study on "The Coordination of Complexity in
South Asia," undertaken for the Commission
on the Organization of the Government for
. the Conduct of Foreign Policy
Introduction and General Description '
The Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy has contracted with
Professors Tdoyd I. and Susanne Hoebor jh oit the
University of Chicago, to lead a major study on the con-
duct of U.S. policy toward the Indian subcontinent from
1965 to the present. The emphasis will be on the capacity
of the U.S. to maintain coordination among a large number
of policies which impinge upon a single region. South
Asia has been selected both because of the rich variety
of issues which have arisen in the period under study,
and the substantial presence of a number of U.S. ,agencies
and activities there. The goal of the study is to pro-
duce answers to the question, "How adequate are current
U.S. governmental organizational forms to insure adecuate
coordination in complex settings, i.e., in those in which
many activities of high importance are conducted simul-
taneously?" Ultimately, the results of this research .
project will be used, along with those of a number of
other Studies, to provide background for the Commission's
recommendations.
Timing and Format
? The topic will be pursued through a number of indi-
vidual case studies conducted by associates of the Rudolphs
(see attached list for names and topics), and many officers
?
' .
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02117 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
2.
in the Department who have responsibilities which include
South Asia will be contacted by one or more of these re-
searchers between now and the end of September.
' The Office of Security has granted name check clear-
ances to these researchers on a "need to know" basis for
access to classified material and information up through
the category of SECRET. These clearances have been given
on the explicit understanding between the Commission and
the Department that the use of such information will not
include the citation of materials or individuals. The
researchers understand that they are to read classified
materials in the Department and not ask to take them
away.
?
Professor Glynn Wood of the Graduate School of Public
Administration, American University, telephone [phone],
will be acting as local coordinator for the project, and
will make every effort to providenecessary additional
information and to reduce the inconvenience to those indi-
viduals the researchers desire to interview.
The Commission's project officer for this study is 0
Dr. William I. Bacchus, Associate Research Director, tele-
phone [phone].
William' J. Galloway
. Executive Assistant
Attachment:
As stated
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP7811/102660R000800100008-2
. Topics and Persons
Diplomatic and Strategic
Philip Oldenburg, Assistant Professor of Political
Science, University of Illinois (Urbana), "The
Break-Up of Pakistan and Recognition of Bangladesh."
Roger Sack, Ph.D. student, Department of Political
Science, University of Chicago, "U.S. Military
Assistance and the Ayub Regime."
Gerald Heeger, Assistant Professor of Political
Science, University of Virginia, "U.S. Policy
.Toward the Bhutto Regime."
Stephen P. Cohen, Associate Professor of Political
Science, .University of Illinois (Urbana), "Strategic
and Military Dimensions of U.S. Relations with Asia."
Economic
Haxinder Shourie, M.A. student, Committee on interna-
tional Relations, University of Chicago, "The Uni-1-1(3.
States, the World Bank and South Asia."
Anthony Moulton, Ph.a. student, Department of Political
Science, University of Chicago, -"The United States,
IDA and South Asia."
Susan G. Hadden, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, "Assessment
of a Bi-Lateral Economic Policy; AID'S Program in Sup-
port of the Rural Electrification Corporation."
Stanley Kochanek, Professor of Political Science, Penn-
sylvania State University; "U.S. Commercial Policy
Toward Sotth Asia."
James Bjorkman, Research Staff Scientist, Health Policy
Project and Ph.D. student, Department of Political
Science, Yale University, "PL 480 Program AID in U.S.-
South Asian Relations."
Cultural and Humanitarian
Charles Lenth, Ph.D. student, Department of Political
Science, University of Chioa-go, "The Peace Corps in
U.S.-South Asian Relations."
Approved ForRelease 200/02/17 :.CIA-RDP7AM92q6QM00890100008-2
.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 :,C1AvRDITE83102860R000800100008-2
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1974
MEMORANDUM
204-17a
To: T - Mr. Maw
C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
S/P - Mr. Lord
INR - Mr. Hyland
S/AJ - Ambassador Johnson
PM - Mr. Vest
S/S - Mr. Springsteen
Subject: Study on "The Adequacy of Current Organization
for Security Policy (Defense and Arms Control)"
for The Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
:
Introduction and General Background
Under cc:Itract from the Colamission on the Organizatisn
of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy,
Professor Graham T. Allison, of Harvard University, is
leading a major study on the adequacy of current organi-
zation for the conduct of policy in the Defense and'Arms
Control Area. He will be assisted by a number of other
scholars, listed below. The objectives of the project
also include assessing performance, and developing spe-
cific changes in the current organizational arrangements
that would provide a more effective..system for the formu-
lation and implementation of foreign policy with respect
to defense and arms control matters. The results of this
study, together with a number of others also being under-
taken for the Commission, will be used to provide back-
ground for the Commission's recommendations.
Timing' and Format
This topic will be pursued through a number of indi-
idual case studies of specific decisions and projects,
conducted by associates of Professor Allison. While a
complete list of individuals and topics has not been set,
it will include the following, with additional researchers
and topics to be added later:
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
A. "The Making of ,.2fense Budgets." Professor John
P. Crecine, 1,71 others possibly to be added.
B. Weapons Acquisition.
1. "The Size and Mix of U.S. Strategic Forces
in the 1960's." Professor Allison (has
full clearance from DOD to TS), and Frederic
A. Morris.
2. "MIRV." Allisbn, and possibly one other
to be added.
3. "ABM." Morris, and possibly one other.
4. "Trident." John Steinbruner (has full
clearance from DOD to TS).
Note: Cases in this category seem least likely
to require State Department consultation,
but some may be desirable. One or two
additional cases may also be added.
C. Formulating Strategic Doctrine: "Nuclear Op-
tions." Professor Henry S. Rowen, .Stanford
Business School (has full clearance from DOD
through TS).
D. Managing Alliances
?
1. "Troops and Costs: Offset Agreements, 1966,
1967, 1969." Gregory F. Treverton.
2. "The Production of Weapons Jointly (Skybolt).
Richard.Neustadt (has full clearance through
TS from DOD), Jay"Philip Urwitz.
3. "The Production of Weapons Jointly (MLF)."
Neustadt and Steinbruner.
?
4. "Base Agreements: Okinawa, 1967, 1969."
Investigator to be added.
It
5. "Security Assistance (Aid and Sales): Taiwan."
Henry B. Miller
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R00080- 0100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
3.
6. "Commitments and Expectations." Thailand
1961, 1970." Earnest May (has full clear-
ance from DOD through TS).
E. "Establishing Arms Control Positions: SALT."
1. "SALT: 1968, 1969-72, 1972-74." Burton E.
Rosenthal.
2. "CBW: 1967, 1.969." Investigator to be
added.
F. Others.
1. "Reorganizing Decision Making: Strengthen-
ing Unified Commands." Investigator to be,
added.
2. Several other cases to be added later.
While this project will focus most intensively on
units of the government other, than the Department of
State, it is nevertheless likely that a number of the
.investigators will desire to conduct interviews with
officers of the Department. A name check has been com-
pleted by the Office of Security for researchers listed
on the basis of which they may consult documents within.
the State Department and discuss matters through SECRET,
on a-not for. attribution or citation basis. Certain re-
searchers already possessing full clearances through TOP
SECRET are so indicated.
Contacts
General information on the project and the Commission
can be obtained from Peter L. Stanton, Research Director,
or William I. Bacchus, Associate Research Director, both
at 254-9850. John Treat of the Commission Staff is acting
as local coordinator for the research project and will .be
largely responsible for making necessary arrangements.
He can also be reached at 254-9850.
, -f. ,
?-Ze------J,
William J. Galloway(
Executive Assistant
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
DEPUTY I DER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON
July 25,1974
To: ARA-LA - Mr. Kubiseh
S/P - Mr. Lord
INR Mr. Hyland
EB Mr. Enders
S/FW-COA
S/S - Mr. Springsteen
Subject: Study for the Commission on the Organization
' of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy on "The Making of U.S. Policies Toward
Latin America: The Variables Affecting "Routine'
Relations"
Introduction and General Background
Dr. Abraham F. Lowenthal, of the Center for
International Studies of Princeton University and the
Council on Foreign Relations, is undertaking, in asso-
ciation with several colleagues, a major study for the
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the
Conduct of Foreign Policy. This study, which employs
Latin America as a geographic focus, is intended to
assess the relevance and utility of those "routine"
activities which fotm the bulk of U.S. relations with
most countries and of the means by which they are eon-
ducted. The results of this study, together with those
of a number of others also being undertaken for the Com-
mission, will be used to provide background for the Com-
mission's recommendations.
Timing a-d Format
This topic will be pursued through a number of indi-
vidual case studies of specific decisions and projects,
conducted by associates of Dr. Lowenthal. The individuals
and their projects include the following, with the possi-
bility that one or two additional case studies will be
added at a later date:
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
2.
Dr. Edward Gonzalez, UCLA, "The 200-Mile Fishing Rights
Controversy."
Mr. Gregory F. Treverton, Harvard, "The International
Petroleum Company
(IPC) Case."
Mr. Harry Weiner, Harvard, "The Role of Non-Governmental
Interest Groups in U.S. Policy
Toward Latin America: Brazil's
'Fifth Institutional Act'."
Mr. Harry Weiner, Harvard, "Personnel Skills and Require-
nentS in the Middle-Range
Bureaucracy."
Mr. Robert Pastor, Harvard University, 'Sugar Politics:
Domestic Causes
and International
Consequences."
It is likely that all of these researchers will desire to
consult with officers in the Department who are knowledge-
able about one or more of the topics in question, at some
time between now and November. The Office of Security has
granted name check clearances to these researchers on a
"need to know" basis for access to classified material and
information up through the category of SECRET. These clear-
ances have been given on the explicit understanding between
the Commission and the Department that the use of such in-
formation will not include the citation of materials or
individuals. The researchers understand that they lare to
read classified materials in the Department and not ask to
take them away.
Contacts
Gereral information on the project and the Commission
can be obtained from Peter L. Szanton, Research Director,
or William I. Bacchus, Associate Research Director, both at
254-9850. Mr. Robert Pastor, one of the researchers on the
project, is acting as local coordinator for the study, and
will be largely responsible for making necessary arrange-
ments. He .can also be reached at 254-9850.
? 1- ? ,
??7,4Z-Z-e?-?,>3.-?? ? /
William. J. Gallowar
Executive Assistant
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
? Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
MEMORANDUM
TO
FROM
SUBJECT: Study on "The Adequacy of Current Organization:
Interaction of U.S. and Foreign Economies,"
undertaken for the Commission on the Organization
of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
Introduction and General Description
The Commission on the Organization of the Government
.?
for the Conduct of Foreign Folicy ha o contracted with
Mr.. Edward K. Hamilton, President, Griffenhagen-Kroeger, Inc.,
public management consultants, to lead a-major study on the
adequacy of current organizatiOn for the conduct of policy
in the Economic area. Mr. Hamilton will be assisted by P
numbP?' of consultants, all employees of Griffenhagen-Kroeger,
as listed below. The objectives of the project also include
assessing performance, and developing specific changes in
the current organizational arrangements that would provide
a more effective system for the formulation and implementation
of foreign policy with respect to economic matters. The
results of this study, together with a number of others also
being undertaken for the Commission, will be used to provide
background for the Commission's recommendations.
Timing and Format
.%
This topic will be pursued through a number of individual
case studies of specific decisions and projects, conducted by
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
. Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
a6;zwelLit;es ai1on. The current list of topics
and researchers is as follows:
1. The decision to terminate AID development lending
to India (1971),Joan Hochman.
2. The suspension of AID's "additionality" rule
(1969), William Seelbach.
3. The dollar devaluations of 1971 and 1973,
Elizabeth Stabler.
4. One decision dealing with the effort-to enter
into trade with the Soviet Union, possibly the
1967 proposal for an East-West trade bill,
Edward Skloot.
5. The imposition of import quotas on Canadian oil,
.(1970), Katheryn Voight.
6. The suspension of all import quotas on oil (1973),
Katheryn Voight and Linda S. Graebner.
7. Two key decisions dealing with international
monetary reform: (a) the decision to favor the
creation of a man-made reserve assist (1965);
and (b) the announcement of post SDR-U.S. objectives
(1972).
8. The development of the U.S. position during the
textile dispute with Japan (1970-'71), Peter
? Henschel.
Approved For.41ease 2005/02/17 CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : Cla-R9P/8M02660R000800100008-2
9. The evolving role of the President's Special
Trade Representative Anne Rightor-Thornton.
10. Two domestic tax decisions with substantial
implications for foreign economic policy;
(a) President Johnson's decision not to propose
a tax increase in 1966; and
(b) President Nixon's decision to announce
"new economic policy" in 1971.
Matthew Golden.
While this project will focus most intensively on
units of the government other than the Department of State,
it is nevertheless likely that a number of investigators
will desire to conduct interviews with officers of the
Department. A name check has been completed by the Office
of Secretary for the researchers listed, on the basis of
which they may consult documents within the State Depart-
ment and discuss matters through SECRET, on a not for
attribution or citation basis.
Contacts:
General information on the project and the Commission
can be obtained from Peter L. Szanton, Research Director,
or William I. Bacchus, Associate Research Director, both
at 25479850. Elizabeth Stabler?pf this project's staff,
is acting as local coordinator for the research project
and can be reached at 232-3236.
Approved For I:elease 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008My 23, 1974
Title of Proposed Study: Minimizing "Irrationality"
in Foreign Poliev-making
Introduction
. Alexander L. George proposes to undertake for the
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the
Conduct of Foreign Policy a,stUdy on minimizing "irrationality"
in foreign policy making.
I. Objectives
The proposed study will follow closely the .general
purpose and scope of Study II.C, "Ninimizing Irrationality,"
which was briefly described on page 13 of "The Commission's
Studies Program" (3/21/74). To this end four, interrelated
objectives are set forth for the proposed study, as follows:
A: Identify and Differentiate Sources of "Irrationality"
")rratinna)ity" ic enet-csm loosely applicd to a variety
of quii-e.? different behavioral phenomena. The proposed study
will avoid a narrow psychiatric approach to this problem.
Instead, it will draw more broadly upon relevant work in
political, behavioral, and psychological sciences in order
to identify the variety of situational factors and behaVioral
patterns that can interfere with optimal procedures of
search, evaluation, and choice in policy-making.
Impediments to "rationality" in policy-making can emerge
(a) from certain dynamics of individual behavior; (b) from
dynamics of small group behavior that affect the performance
of policy-making tasks by advisers and staff personnel; and
(c) from organizational and bureaucratic behavior in complex
organizations such as the Executive Branch. Impediments to
rationality often arise from these three sources during the
course of efforts to cope with stressful experiences encoun-
tered in decision-making and' policy implementation.
The study will draw together in a detailed, systematic
way available knowledge regarding the variety of maladaptive
ways with which individuals, small groups, and organizations
often atteTc?pt to cope with different kinds of stress. The
following sources of maladaptive adjustments to stress will
be examined:
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2 .
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA7RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
(1) Maladaptivc responses to "cognitive stress" and
"Value stress" generated by the intellectual diffi-
culty of. dealing with the well-known limits on the
ability to evaluate the expected consequences of
policy alternatives in order to decide which course
of action is "best";?
(2) Maladaptive ways of coping with stress generated
in international crises and when making fundamental
foreign policy choices in non-crisis situations by
the, perception of major threats to important national
(and personal) values;
Maladaptive adjustments to stress generated by organi-
zational and role conflicts experienced by individuals
occupying key points in the policy-making system;
Maladaptive ways of coping withthe psychological
and physiological effects of fatigue; .
Maladaptive responses to "secrecy" on the part of
those who do and do not have access to highly classi-
fied information (including the related question of-
imn-:lct (inferential access can riPve on
the working 4.2lationship,z :If those participating in
the-policy-making system).
B. Impact on Policy-making Tasks
? While knowledge of the sources of possible impediments to
rational policy-making is of some value, it cannot easily be
utilized to prevent the occurrence of potentially disruptive
individual, small group, or organizational dynamics. Rather, the
emphasis must be on neutralizing, or compensating for, the adverse
impact various sources of "irrationality" can have upon policy-
making. Accordingly, the proposed study will attempt to indicate
in some detail how different ?kinds of impediments to "rationality"
manifest themselves at what points in the search for effective
policies and their implementation.
? The study will dr4aw together available knowledge of this kind
with the expectation (1) that it will serve to sensitize parti-
cipants, in. policy-making to the problem, thereby improving their
ability to recognize in a timely fashion the intrusion of disrup--
tive factors on policy-making tasks, and (2) that it will help
those who specialize in developing and managing policy-making
.Approved For elease 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
, Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP-78M02660R000800100008-2
systems to devise strategics for timely and appropriate
"interventions" to prevent such factors from having a damaging
effect on the search. for effective policies and decisions.'
C. Implications for Monitoring and Nanaging the?Policy-
raking Process -
Having identified the types of "malfunctions" a policy-ming
system can suffer via intrusion of different kinds of "irrationalities
the study will indicate ways in which the tendencies toward such
intrusions might be countered. Such recomendations will c=7....ohasize
means of monitoring the policy-making process in orderto obtain
timely identification Of emergent malfUnctions and to undertake
approeriate corrective or countervailing actions. -These critical
role tasks must be infused into the definition of roles to be
formed by by certain participants in the policy-making system.
Thus the study will focus Nost closely on minimization of
"irrationality" through close monitoring and effective management
of the day-to-day workings of the polfcy-making system. This is in
sharp contrast to the traditional, practice of relying upon periodical
structural reorganization of the policy-making system whenever
sufficient dissatisfaction with its 'performance has accu,aulated.
Thc recommendation of certain structural chancle,-; is not precluded,
however.
Variation in Executive Operating Styles
The study will take into account that each executive is li?.ely
to have a somewhat different notion as to the kind of policy-making
system and procedures he wishes to create around himself, feels
comfortable with, and can utilize. This observation has beec7e
part of the conventional wisdom in recent years, but its full im-
plications for the design and ranagement of policy-making systems
remains to be determined.. This objective is of importance .not
only for Study II.0 but possibly in other studies undertaken by
the Commission as well.
It is questionable wisdom to try (as specialists in organi-
zation and public administration have advocated in the past) to
impose a single standardized model of policy-making on each execu-
tive. The proposed study, it will b-c. noted, is entirely consistent
in this respect with the observation on page 4 of the Commission's
Studies Program to the effect that organizations "should be de-
signed to fit the operating styles of their key individuals, and
not vice versa."
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R00080010000872
Accordingly, the proposed study will move in the direction
of developing somewhat different models of policy-making that?
are appropriate to ?the distinctive management "styles" of
different executives.
II. Methodology/Approach
A large body of relevant empirical and theoretical work in
political, behavioral, and psychological sciences will be
screened and evaluated .from the standpoint of the objectives
of the study. ?Several detailed appraisals of this kind have
been made in recent years by the principal investigator and '
other scholars. The proposed study will draw upon them-and
supplement with additional library rese:Arch and consultation
With specialists in these several field in order to expedite
the search for relevant up-to-date high. Quality material.
Where appropriate and feasible -- and in consultation with
the Commission's research director -:- the principal investigator
will arrange to interview current and former foreign policy .
officials in order to obtain additional information and judgment
bearing on tha objectives of the sLudy.
The principal investigator plans to draw into the study the
contribution of a number of part-time consultants. A prelim-
inary conference will be held in mid-June with some six special-
ists. to help plan the study in more detail.
The principal investigator will be responsible for request-
ing specific inputs to the study from consultants and for inte-
grating them into the final report.
III. Personnel
A relatively large number of specialists will be contacted
during the course of the study. Some will be asked for specific
inputs on a consulting basis. Decisions on this will be made
after the planning conference, and will depend of course on how
much time the persons in question have available, what they are
interested in doing, how well it will contribute to the obieetives
of the study. Among those who have indicated interest in attend-
ing the mid-June planning conference and who have some available
time for possible consulting during the summer are Charles Hermann,
Ole Holsti, Robert Jervis, Richard_Smoke, and .John Steinbruner.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-IpP78M02660R000800100008-2
In addition, Grahem Allison and Irving Janis (?) -- both
currently at the Center for Advancod Study_ in the Lehavioral
Sciences at Stanford -- will sit in on at least p:!rt of the
-
planning conference. Other specialists who will be contacted
include Thomas Schelling, Lincoln Bloomfield, Doris Kearns,
David Hamburg, Chris Argyris, Eugene Webb, James March, Rithard T.
Johnson.
IV. Administrative Arrangements
Alexander L. George will direct the study and will be the
principal investigator. He will c%ork virtually full time on
the study from mid-June to the end uf September, and one or two
days a week as necessary thereafter until coxpletion of the
final report towards the end of December.
The contract will be administered by Stanford University.
V. Finished Product.
?
The final repnrr w111 reflect th5 objectives of th(-
-a,0-discuss.the relevant materials and findings in considerPhie
detail.- The report will include a general statement of conclusions
and recommendations of approximately 10-20 pages. The report as
a whole can be expected. to be well over 100 pages.
VI. Schedule ?
a. Final project outline -- July 15
b. detailed progress report -- August 15
c. a sUbstantial review draft -- October 15
d. final report -- DeceMber 20.
[This schedule is tentative and permits of SaX0 adjustments.]
VII. Budget
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
ApprovedLFOrRelease 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660ROOD8On00004-2
? Su. ,,ry
RESEARCE -)1a0GRAM
Phase I Studies
The utilityand Limits of an Organizational Approach: .Given
that organizational. patterns necessarily vary with differing
key personalities and differing policy Concerns, what kinds
and degrees of organizational -change can the Commission
propose in the absence of knowledgz about either future
U.S. political leadership or of the dominant policy concerns
of the near future?
The Problems Commonly Cited: What are the major criticisms
commonly made about the conduct of foreign policy, in parti-
cular substantive areas' (e.g,, economic, cultural); functions
(planning, implementation, etc), resources (budgets,
personnel); and other categories?
.The Future Envirunmelit: What are the major alternative future
?en-4ronments which current developments may foreshadow,
.in 4hich U.S.. foreign policy will operate over the next
de; what policy problems may prove paramount, and what
Nare'
fu. cions, resources, and organizational arrangements may
be most severely taxed in such circumstances?
Lessons of Prior Studies: What have been the issues
addressed, the recommendations made, and the factors which
have determined the impact and .degree. of success of each
of the major studies of foreign affairs organization since
1945?
-Characteristics of an Effective Foreign Policy System:
.What characteristics should any effective system for the
conduct of the nation's foreign policy possess?
Alternative Models of Organization: What alternative patterns
of both Executive and Legislative Branch organization for
the conduct of foreign policy seem plausible, and what are the
likely relationships between various combinations of Executive
and Congressional models?
Comparable Patterns of Other Governments: What aspects of
organization for the conduct of foreign policy in other
/la Dns can provide lessons applicable to U.S. conditions?
(This study will be selective in the features of the
practice of other countries which it examines.)
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP7811/102660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
RESEARCH PROGRAM
Phase II Studios
The Effectiveness of Organizational Change: What makes
organizational change effective in meeting intended purposes;
as suggested by examination of a. number of prior attempts at -
.such change in the foreign affairs area of the U.S. Govern-
ment?
Adequacy of Current Organization: How effective has current
organization for policymaking been in recent administrations
as suggested by a review of a large number of recent deci-
sions and actions in each of the following areas:
I. The Interaction Of U.S. and Foreign Economies: How well
does the U.S. Government succeed in conducting policy ?
.which reflects both domestic necessities and the-f.
realities of the international economic system?
2.. National. Security.Issues:.._How well do .w.e.balance foreign
policy implications, economic and budgetary impact, and ?
national security requirements, in decisionmaking on
defense-related topics?.
3. Coordination in Complex Settings: How adequate are
current U.S. Government organizational forms to insure
coordination where many activities of high importance
are conducted simultaneously? (South Asia has been
tentatively selected as the geographic focus for this
study.)
4.. Multilateral and Global Issues:. How well organized is
the U.S. Government to develop and conduct policy
dealing with that group of increasingly prominent issues
which tend to be global in nature, contain both domestic
and international implications, cross traditional juris-
dictional lines, and involve important technical compo-
nents (e.g., multinational corporations, seabed policy,
environment, population, food)?
Toward Greater Rationality: what organizational steps can
be taken to minimize vulnerability of officials to -political,
bureaucratic, organizational, physiological, and psychologi-
cal pressures in both crisis and routine situations?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
2
'onduct of Routine Relations: How adequate are current
organizational arrangements to manage Continuing and .
NR?pv ;,?:?
reasonably routine relations, which nevertheless can
substantially shape U.S. foreign relations? (Latin America
has been tentatively selected as a geographic focus for
this study.)
4 Resources for Foreign Affairs: How well is the
government'organized for identifying and providing the
1 resources needed to carry out the nation's foreign policy
effectively?
?
1. Perscnnel: What types of personnel are needed for the
effective conduct of foreign affairs, and what organi-
zational and procedural steps should he taken to
improve foreign affairs personnel systems?
2. Budgets and Resource Management: What organizational
and procedural steps should be taken to improve the
budget processes related to foreign affairs, and to
mesh policymaking and resource utilization more
effectively?
OTHER ZTUDIES/PROBLEMS
Confidentiality and Security Classification: What-organiza-
tional and procedural steps can be taken to limit classifi-
cation of imformation relating to the conduct of foreign
policy to. the minimum clearly required by the needs of
national security?
Public Opinion and Public Information: What are the responsi-
bilities of the Executive Branch to inform the American people
about the conduct of foreign affairs, and to assure -- other
than through the Congress -- that actions taken arc broadly
consistent with the public sense of the nature of U.S.
interests and the:means legitimate to-advance those interests;
and what organizational steps are necessary to fulfill these
responsibilities?
Intelligence: What organizational and procedural steps should
be taken to improve -intelligence support for the conduct of
foreign affairs, and what level of effort is required to
provide adequate support?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP7.8M02660R000800100008-2 .
Covert Political Action: Should the U.S. have a capability
for covert political action overseas and if so, under what
safeguards and organizational responsibility?
Overseas Establishments: How can U.S. representatives abroad
and to multilateral organizations be most effectively
organized and controlled?,
Cultural Affairs Programs: What should be done with respect
to reanalysis of basic concepts, organizational modification
classification Of jurisidictions and coordination mechanisms,
and improvement of procedures to make cultural affairs
programs more effective?
Foreign Information Programs: . What should be done with respect
to reanalysis of basic concepts, organizational Modification,
clarification Of jurisdictions and coordination mechanisms,
and improvement of procedures to make foreign information
programs more effective? .
Foreign Assistance Programs (Development .and'Security): -What
steps are necessary with respect to basic concepts, organi-
zation, jurisdicLiur.6, oordination mechanisms and proc.eaures
to,mak-both.developmental .and security assistance programs
more effective?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP781V102660R000800100008-2
? SUMMARY
Mr. William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence 11/19/7:
I. Ifitroductory Remarks
Mr. Colby began his informal remarks by addressing the
dilemma of maintaining secrecy in a free society: "we are
going to have to run an American intelligence service," but
it must be "different from others." It has no domestic re-
sponsibility, and it is more open than its counterparts in
Britain,. France, Sweden, or anywhere else. Indeed, the
CIA's constant exposure in the press makes it difficult to
conduct liaison with foreign intelligence services and to
recruit agents. It can also Ceffect our use of such technical
collection methods as cryptography and photography.
Colby then traced the history of intelligence in the
U.S. He pointed out that the government invariably con-
structed an intelligence system in wartime, then dissolved
it afterteards. Tt i.onk the advc:nt of the Cold War to pro-
duce .a. peacetime intelligence apparatus. The National
Security Act of 1947 established the CIA and gave it the
responsibility to draw together information collected by other
services and Departments. In addition, the CIA was given
the authority to conduct certain services of common concern
and, as directed by the National Security Council, "other
functions related to intelligence", such as clandestine
collection operations abroad as well as paramilitary and
political operations.
According to Colby, intelligence has come of age but
must prove its usefulness in a period of detente and lessened
tensions overseas. He believes that intelligence has become
an essential part of the conduct of foreign policy but that
those in. the intelligence business must work hard to make
the system work. Colby explained that his responsibility
for coordinating and managing the intelligence community
was important, but less so than his responsibility for pro-
ducing substantive intelligence... "to be able to inform the
President, the NSC, the appropriate committees of Congress
and so forth, of what is happening in the world." He
added that, if he could focus on the substance and get the
entire community also focussed on substantive questions,
he would be in the best position to allocate resources and
to measure the effectiveness-of 'different techniques of
collection, processing, and analysis.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
?
Colby pointed out that the intelligence community must
develop a systematic way to evaluate the usefulness of its
products to its customers. He said that he would put his
major effort into identifying the key substantive problems
and evaluating how well the community handles them.
Colby added some general remarks about the entire' in-
telligence process. Collection of information includes
listening to Radio Moscow, planting bugs, etc. Processing
the information is also very complicated, sometimes involving
highly technical work. "You really wouldn't believe what some
of those engineers can get out of small little squiggles that
come out of the airwaves." The last part of the process is
"the production or presentation problem... It doesn't do any
good for the intelligence community to know the answers and
even to write a very learned tome giving the answers, if the
tome is in a fashion that cannot be absorbed and actually
used by the fellows making the decisions."
II. Genel 11 Discussion
a. The Reputation and Image of Intelligence
'Chairman Murphy asked what was being done, or should
be done, to give the word "intelligence" a better reputa-
tion. Mr. Colby replied that a full scale public relations
campaign was not the answer. Rather the CIA should concen-
trate on doing its work well and, whenever possible, on
educating people about the real nature of. the intelligence
process.
Mr. Casey pointed out that the public should be told
about the importance of the research and analysis function
and about the number of Ph.D's and other specialists who
work on intelligence. Colby replied that the CIA en-
courages its personnel to belong to professional societies
and to attend conferences, and that it is moving in the
direction of producing more unclassified publications.
He added that the CIA should do more work in an unclassified
form.
b. Congressional Oversight and Substantive Briefings
Senator Mansfield asked Colby whether he favored
creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligen0
to throw a protective shield around the CIA and to keep
Congress informed about crisis situations. Colby replied
that the CIA "has always taken the position that we will
handle our relations with Congress in any way that Congress
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
?3--
wants us to." He later remarked that the Congressional
oversight committees have been very responsible and "have
been given the most sensitive kinds of information... We
have never had a leak from them."
Colby explained that the CIA handles its relationship
with Congress on three levels: unclassified briefings;
substantive briefings, with classified material, for
a number of committees and for individual members; and
a discussion of operational matters with the Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and
Senate. In the last few years of Senator Russell's rule
over the Armed Services Committee,: Senator Mansfield and
two other members of the Foreign Relations Committee were
also..invited to participate in the oversight hearings.
Dr. Abshire pointed out that there should be a better
system for giving substantive information to interested
members. Colby said that the CIA does brief individual
Congressmen and Senators upon request and that he had
committed himself in his confirmation hearing to be
even more responsive in this area. He said, "I have
some people looking now at a.way to do this on a regular,
periodic basis... It will...push some of this material
towards them that they really might not know they want
to know." Dr. Abshire suggested that, every six weeks,
intelligence briefers might give interested members of
Congress a general rundown of world events and stress
emerging problems. Colby said he would be delighted
with this approach.
Dr. Abshire then asked Colby for his views on
Senator Cooper's bill about National Intelligence Estimates
being made available to Congress. Colby replied that
briefings of Congress are often based on NIE's, but that
he was concerned about the physical security of the NIE's
themselves and leery about sending NIE's to Congressional
staff assistants, who might be prone to leak intelligence
information. Colby was hesitant about absolute rules
in this regard and suggested that briefings be handled
orally whenever appropriate. He added, however, that the
CIA could adjust to any changes in Congressional procedures
on this matter.
c. The Rellt.L.21.2Lh_iaLDLILILe_n_i=ss_t2_12L9,1-Eraz-e
Mr. Colby suggested that the CIA should maintain a
certain distance from the foreign polity process -- providing
assessments of foreign situations but not casting a vote
for a particular policy. Dr. Kissinger regularly requires
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
-4-
an intelligence briefing before meetings of the Washington'
Special Action Group. After that, Colby says no more.
Colby added that the President reads intelligence
daily briefs and other material. Furthermore, Colby can
see the President any time he wants. (as of November, he
h4d seen him on intelligence matters three or four times).
Dean Wilcox asked whether Colby received ample
reports on the discussions of the President and Dr.
Kissinger with high level foreign officials. Colby said
he personally is privy to the general line and must levy
requirements on the intelligencecmmmunity without giving
any details.
d. Organization of the Intelligence Community
When asked about the extent of his own authority,
Mr. Colby aescribed his role in the community. As DCI,
he chairs the U.S. Intelligence Board, the Intelligence
Resources Advisory Committee, and various other committees
that pass on certain sensitive collection programs. Colby
also has the last word on National Intelligence Estimates.
is, in short, the President's principal intelligence
'avisor...the only one who regularly attends meetings of
the various NSC subcommittees, the WASAG, the 40 Committee,
and the Cabinet. Colby is also Vice-Chairman of the NSC
Intelligence Committee, which is designed to solicit the
views of intelligence consumers.
?
Colby said that relations between the intelligence
agencies used to be competitive, hut now are maturing.
There are, however, "many areas in which we can work
together much better," e.g. in coordinating the activities
of military attache. Colby explained that different
agencies have to be involved in the process of collecting
information. Foreign Service Officers and attaches have
unique contacts abroad and can collect a lot of informa-
tion overtly. The CIA's job is.to collect information
clandestinely that cannot be collected any other way.
Colby admitted that there was some overlap in functions,
but that this was often deliberate. Thus the CIA's
office of Strategic Research takes on independent look
at basic military questions. Furthermore, each agency or
Department head insists on having his own intelligence
support. Said Colby, "when I go to the President with
an assessment of some new Soviet missile...I have to be
assured that I am right. .-:and not just parrot what a
particular agency says." There is also a disti.netion
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIALRDP78M02660R000800100008-2
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
-5-
b.etween national intelligence (in support of foreign policy)
and departmental intelligence (in support of individual
departments and agencies). DIA, for example, contributes
to national intelligence but also serves the Joint Chiefs
and the Secretary of Defense.
Colby pointed out that the total number of people in
the intelligence business is going down sharply and will
continue to do so. It has to because of sharp annual
increases in personnel costs.
Colby said it was useful to have analysts, collectors,
and operators all under one roof. He likes experts in
one field talking to experts in another, and not hiding
in their ivory towers. The National Intelligence Officers
(NIO's - successors to the Board of National Estimates) ,
cut across functional lines within the bureaucracy and
thus get the best brains working on any given problem.
The NIOs are real specialists in their fields (and not
generalists like the former Board of National Estimates).
When asked what organizational changes he would
recommend, Colby said that he would like the authority to
deter someone from getting sensitive information 3ut,then
spilling it (e.g., the Mardetti/Marks Case). When asked
about the National Security Act of 1947, Colby recommended
that the word "foreign" be put before the word "intelligence,'
so the public would be reassured about the limits of CIA
authority. ? 25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
25X1
g: Covert Action
Mr. Colby said that covert action overseas was a
valuable tool that. had been at times overused. In the
1950's, for example, there was a "missionary feeling"
about these operations and a sense- that."we had to go
out and fight every fight around the world. Obviously
we have a different policy now, a much more reserved
polioy.".
On the subject of controls over covert action,
Colby said'that "we don't do this without getting very
specific instructions from the NSC," via the 40 Committee
(an interagency group chaired by Dr. Kissinger). If the
CIA is asked to carry out some covert action or believes
one should be carried out, it will write a paper describinc)
the problem ?Ald what needs to be done. This paper is
then circulated to the members of the 40 Committee, who
either get together to discuss it or sign off on the
program by telephone. It then goes to the President for
approval.
When asked whether Congress is also informed, Colby
said that budgetary details are discussed with the appropria-
tions committees and general plans are discussed with the
Armed Services Committees. All significant operations
are described.
h. Paramilitary Operations: The Laos Example
Mr. Colby described the CIA's role in Laos as an
effort to carry out policy in non-attributable,
non-official, non-military terms. "Obviously it got to
be a very noisy war," but "so long as you don't confront
the other side with the necessity of reacting because of
your open approach to a problem...that is accepted."
When asked about the negative reaction of many Americans
to CIA involvement in Laos, Colby replied, "I think it
is a good thing, because the pressure is such that it
requires you to operate secretly only where there is a
very good reason. And, if there isn't a good reason,
you just don't do that in-our society, and that is fine."
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
-7-
1. Indo China in General
Senator Mansfield said that, in his opinion, the
best intelligence reports on Vietnam were furnished by
the CIA, and it was too bad that these reports were not
given proper attention by the administration.
Senator Mansfield asked whether the CIA played a
part in the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk. Colby said
that "Sihanouk is under an understandable misapprehen-
sion that we tried to overthrow him in 1959... A
General in the Cambodian Army did try to overthrow him..
we had one officer who was in contact with an associate
of that General for intelligence purposes, because we
were curious as to what was going on... As to his
overthrow in 1970, we did not have anything to do with
it."
When asked about the drug traffic in the Golden
Triangle, Colby said that the CIA has tried to keep
itself from being involved in the drug traffic in that
area and has vigorously worked against it. The Meo in
Laos did produce opium. We supported the Mea against
the North Vietnamese. We, however, spent a good deal
of our effort to get them out of the opium busins-ss.
The CIA also has caught a few drug traffickers and
closed down some refineries.
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
COVERT ACTION
A. Statement of Mitchell Rogovin before the House Select Committee on
Intelligence (9 December 1975) on Constitutional, Statutory, and
-Legal Basis for Covert Action
B. Legal Memorandum on Constitutional Powers of the President with
Respect to Covert Action
C. Fact Sheet Prepared Concerning Amendments to the Foreign Assistance
Act which would have Prohibited Covert Action Programs Involving
the political, Electoral Process and Assassination
D Article on Covert Action by Art Jacobs in Freedom At Issue
E. Article by Melvin Laird on CIA in Readers Digest ?
F. Article by Dr. Ernest W. Lefever, entitled The CIA and American
Foreign Policy" from the Lugano Review
G. Selection of Historical Examples of Covert Intelligence Operations
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
As defined by the Senate Select Committee, covert action is
Many clandestine operation or activity designed to influence foreign
governments, organizations, persons or events in support of United
States foreign policy."
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Statement of
Mitchell Rogovin
before
The House Select Committee on
Intelligence
December 9, 1975
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
October 24, 1975
Re: The Constitutional, Statutory and Legal
Basis for Covert Action
By means of explicit, formal instructions to the Director. of
Central Intelligence, the President and the National Security Council
have directed that the Central Intelligence Agency assume responsibility
for planning and conducting "covert action" in support of this countrYls
foreign policy objectives. The legal authority for the delegation of
this responsibility to the CIA derives from three fundamental sources,
each of which, in itself, constitutes a sufficient legal basis for the
delegation. The three fundamental sources are: (1) the inherent con7-
stitutional power of the President with respect to the conduct of
foreign affairs; (2) the National Security Act of 1947; and, (3) the
ratification, by Congress, of the CIA's authority to plan and conduct
Covert action.
The major portion of this memorandum is devoted to an
analysis of these fundamental legal sources. Before proceeding with
this analysis, however, it is useful to set forth a description of the
kinds of activities which are comprehe6ded by the term "covert action."
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
I. COVERT ACTION DEFINED
In general terms covert action means any clandestine activity
designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations or .
persons in support of United States foreign policy, conducted in such
manner that the involvement of the United States Government'is not
apparent.
There are four general categories.of covert action:
(1) Covert Political Action or operations designed to eXercise
influence on political situations in foreign countries; this could
involve funding -a political party or other group, or the use of an
agent in a high government position to influence his government's
domestic or foreign policy in a manner beneficial to the United
States;
(2) Covert Propaganda or the covert use of foreign media assets
including newspapers, magazines, radio, television, etc., to disseminate
information supporting United States foreign policy or attack the
policies and actions of foreign adversaries;
(3) Intellioence deception operations involving the calculated
feeding of information to a foreign government or intelligence
service for the purpose of influencing them to act or react in a
manner favorable to our purpose; and
(4) Covert paramilitary action, the provision of covert
military assistance and advice to foreign conventional and
unconventional military forces or organizations.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
II. FUNDAMENTAL SOURCES OF LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR CIA TO ENGAGE IN ?
COVERT ACTION
As indicated above, the legal authority for the delegation of
covert action responsibility to the CIA by the President and the
National Security Council derives from three fundamental sources: :
(1) the inherent constitutional power of the President with respect to
the conduct of foreign affairs; (2) the National Security Act of 1947;
and, (3) the ratification, by Congress, of the CIA's authority to'
plan and conduct covert action. Each of these fundamental sources is
discussed separately below. -
A. INHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT WITH RESPECT
TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Supreme Court, the Congress, and the framers of the
Constitution itself, have all recognized that the President possesses
broad powers with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs. No less
a constitutional authority than John Marshall, in an address to the
House of Representatives, declared:
"The President is sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."*/
The United States Senate, at an early date in its history, .
acknowledged the supremacy of the President with respect to foreign
affairs, and recognized that he has broad powers in that area. In
1815, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report which
concluded:
fj 10 Annals of Congress 613 (1800), reprinted in 5 Wheat.
Appendix note 1, at 26 (U.S. 1820).
'''''''"AiR8VeltraltelgairtIM2117reir-M5781VIMMI6606T6TOIrgl''''''
4
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
"The President is the constitutional representative
of the United States with regard to foreign nations. He
manages our concerns with foreign nations and must
necessarily be most competent to determine when, how
and upon what subjects negotiation may be. urged with
the greatest prospect of success." */
Each of these statements was cited approvingly by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 311
(1936). In that case, the Court upheld the power of the President to
proclaim it unlawful for United States citizens to supply arms to any
of the belligerents in the Chaco War in South America. Although the
Court could have rested its opinion solely on the grounds that the
proclamation was issued pursuant to a Joint Resolution of Congress,
it cited the statements of Marshall and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee excerpted above and spoke at length of the inherent
constitutional powers of the President with respect to foreign affairs_
Specifically, the court spoke of:
"[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the Federal government
in the field of international relations--a power which
does not require as a basis for its exercise an act
of Congress..." 299 U.S. at 320.
The Court has frequently reaffirmed the constitutional
doctrine sat forth in Curtiss-Wright that the President is supreme
in the area of foreign affairs and that his powers in that area are
"plenary." For example, in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (19'12),
a case in which the Court upheld the power of the President to recognize
*/ 8 U.S. Sen. Reports, Comm. on Foreign Relations, p. 24.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : dA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
foreign governments and to conclude executive agreements with them
which have the force of domestic law, the Court repeated that
"the President...is the 'sole organ of the Federal government in the
field of international relations." 315 U.S. at 230. Then the
Court added:
"Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of
foreign relations requires no less. Unless such
a power exists, the power of recognition might be
thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacle
can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of
relations bet,4een this country and another'nation,
unless the historic conception of the powers
and responsibilities of the President in the
conduct of foreign affairs.. .is to be drastically
revised." Id.
Pursuant to this "historic conception of the powers and respon-
sibilities of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs," the Court
has made it clear that the President may: proclaim it unlawful for United
States citizens to supply arms to foreign belligerents, Curtiss-Wright, sura
recognize foreign governments and conclude binding executive agreements
with them, Pink, suora; use military force to protect United States citizens
and property abroad, In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890);
and repel an armed attack by meeting "force with force," Prize Cases,.
2 Black 635, 668 (1862).
The court has never Considered the precise question of whether the
President may direct an agency of government to perform covert action
in foreign countries. However, in view of the Court's recognition of
the broad powers of the President with respect to the conduct of foreign
affairs, and in ivew of the overwhelm'ng historical precedents, it is
clear that the President does have this power.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
6
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
The historical precedents are every bit as compelling as the
strong language used by the Supreme Court. Chief among these precedents
is the longstanding practice whereby Presidents, acting on their own
authority, have dispatched. troops to foreign countries and authorized
the use of military force short of war. This practice was originated
by Thomas Jefferson when he, on his own authority, sent the Navy
to combat the Barbary pirates in an effort to protect American
shipping. By 1970 it was estimted that Presidents, on their own
authority, had asserted the right to send troops abroad in "more
than 125" instances differing widely in purpose and magnitude.*/
Although the Constitution vests Congress with the power to "declare"
war (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11), Presidents have, throughout
history, insisted on and exercised their right to use force short
of war. President Taft, who later served as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, wrote:
"The President is the Commander-in-Chief
of the army and navy, and the militia when
called into the service of the United
States. Under this, he can order the
army and navy anywhere he wills, if the
appropriations furnish the means of
transportation."**/
*/Backqround Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in
Foreicn Countries, 1970 Revision by the Foreign Affairs Division,
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, for the Sub
Committee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development
of the House- Committee. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong.. 2d Sess.
15 atsec. and Apoendices I and II, (hereafter, "Background Information.')
i. H., Our Chief Magistratc! His Powers, pp. 94-95.(1915)..
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Recent examples of presidential use of force short of war include:
President Truman's peacetime stationing of troops in Europe; President.
Eisenhower's sending of Marines to Lebanon in 1958 to prevent foreign
intervention in the affairs of that country; President Kennedy's
imposition of a naval "quarantine" on Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis,
and his sending of planes to the Congo to evacuate civilians in 1960;
President Johnson's sending of troops to the Dominican Republic in
1953 to prevent formation of a hostile government;*/ and, President
Ford's use of force against Cambodia ?'in 1975 to obtain the
release of American seamen held by Khmer Rouge troops..;
Congress has formally acknowledged that the President has inherent
constitutional authority to use military force short of war. This
acknowledgment is implicit int-he War Powers Resolution, which became
effective on November 7, 1973.51 In Section 3 of that Resolution,
it is provided that:
"The President in every possible instance shall consult
with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and after every such introduction shall consult regularly
with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no
longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from
such situations."
Moreover, the Resolution specifically states, in Section 8(d)(1),
that it is not intended in any way to "alter the constitutional
authority" of the President: .
*/Background Information, suora:
**Public Law 93-148, 87 Stat. 555_ .
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
8
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
"Nothing in this joint resolution--
"(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority
of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions
of existing treaties..."
If the President has the power to dispatch troops tofbreign
countries and to use military force short of war--and the foregoing
discussion clearly demonstrates that he does--then it would logically
follow that he has the power to send civilian personnel to foreign
countries to engage in covert action, since such action is rarely, if
ever, as drastic as the use of military force. In fact, the historical
precedents in support of the President's power to conduct covert action
in foreign countries are every bit as clear as those in support of his
power to use military force.
Long before the CIA was established, Presidents; acting on their
own authority, directed executive agents and executive agencies to
perform what has come to be known as covert action. Beginning with
George Washington, almost every President has appointed "special agents"
to engage in certain activities with, or against, foreign countries;
although the activities conducted by these executive agents have
included such overt assignments as negotiating treaties and conferring
with wartime allies, they have frequently included covert action as
well. In the first century of the nation's existence alone, more than
400 such agents were appointed by the President.*/
*/S. Doc. o.23l, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., part 8, at 337-62 (1901);
H.R. Doc, Ho. 387, 66th Cong., 1st Sess, part 2, at '5 (1919).
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
9
? ?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Early examples of covert action performed by these agents are'
legion. The following three are typical: (1) in 1843 President Tyler
secretly dispatched an agent to Great Britain to meet privately with
individual government and opposition leaders and to attempt to influence
public opinion with respect to matters affecting the two countries,
without ever disclosing that he was a representative of the United
States Government; (2) in 1845, when President Polk feared that Mexico.
was on the verge of ceding California to Great Britain, he secretly
dispatched an agent to California for the purpose of "defeating any
attempt which may be made by foreign governments to acquire a control
over that country;" (3) in 1859, when the United States had territorial
designs on central and western CAnada, President Grant sent an agent to
that area to foment sentiment for separation from Canada and union
with the United States.*/
These examples show that the practice of appointment ofTecial
agents by the President for the purpose of conducting covert action
in foreign countries is deeply-rooted in our national history. The
practice is so deeply-rooted that historians have acknowledged the
existence of abroad presidential discretion with respect to
appointment of such agents and assignment of functions to them.
According to Henry M. Wriston,'for example:
*/7/-THET,-7,:ierritt, Executive Aoents in AFIericin Forei_p Relations,
7.....altimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press (1920, reprinted G1ouster, Mass,
-
Peter Smith (1967).
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
10
APIMPIFOrRellAgter09.914MagiA-FRPIAmM60008-2
in his conduct of foreign reTations, none is more
flexible than the use of personal representatives. He
is free to employ officials of the government or
private citizens. He may give them such rank and :
title as seem appropriate to the tasks... .He may send
his agents to any place on earth that he thinks desirable
and give them instructions either by word of mouth,
or in writing, or through the Department of State, or
in any other manner that seems to him fitted to the
occasion...
"Their missions may be secret, no one. ever being
informed of them... .The President may meet their
expenses and pay them such sums as he regards as
reasonable. In this matter there is no check upon
him except the availability of funds which has never
proved an insoluble problem. rn short, he is as
nearly completely untrammeled as in any phase of his
.executive.authority.". *-/ (Emphasis added.)
Individual agents, appointed by the President, were the exclustva
means?by which covert action was conducted prior to Vorld War IL
During the war, the President created the Office of Strategic Services,
and charged it with responsibility for secret subversive ooeratinns
against the enemy, as well, as general intelligence activities; the OSS thus
became the first gOvernmental agency to be assigned the task of planning
and conducting covert action. , The OSS exercised this task until it
was disbanded in September 1945. Then, in January 1946, President .
Truman, by Executive Order, established the Central Intelligence Gro0p,**/
Although the CIG was primarily a centralized intelligence organization,.
it was also assigned the function of conducting covert action.
w/33 Foreign Affairs 219 (1960).
**/ Executive Order 9690, January 26, 1946, 11 Fed. Reg.
1339(February 5; 1946).
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02.660R000800100008-2
11
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
What these historical precedents show is that, beginning long
before the CIA was established, Presidents exercised their independent
power to direct executive agents and executive agencies to perform
covert action in foreign countries. Consequently, when the CIA was
established in 1947, and when, shortly thereafter, it was delegated
the responsibility for covert action, there was no attempt by the
President to assert or exercise any new or theretofore unrecognized
executive authority; he was merely delegating to the CIA various
executive functions which were previously assigned to ad hoc
special agents and other executive agencies.
In sum, the decisions of the Supreme Court, the actions of Congress,
land the constitutional precedents developed by historical example
clearly establish that the President has broad, inherent powers with
respect to foreign affairs, and that these powers include the
authority to assign an executive agency, such as the-CIA, the
responsibility for planning and conducting covert action in support
of this country's foreign policy objectives_
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
B. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
The National Security Act of 1947 provided for the establishment
of the CIA. However, the idea for a central intelligence organization
was actually conceived three years earlier. In 1944, Colonel (later
Major General) William J. Donovan, head of the wartime Office of
Strategic Services, prepared a plan for President Roosevelt which called
for the establishment of a centralized intelligence service. Donovan's
plan envisioned an acency similar to his own OSS, which would procure
intelligence by overt and covert means and which would be responsible
for "secret activities" such as "clandestine subversive operations."
The OSS itself, as indicated above, was disbanded at the close
of World War II in September 1945. However, Donovan's plan, as
developed and amended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reached fruition
on January 22, 1946; on that date, President Truman, by Executive
Order, established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).*/ The.CIA
thus became the first peacetime central organization in American history
?
devoted to intelligence matters. Heading the CIG was a Director of
Central Intelligence, whose duties were to:
"(a) Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of-
intelligence relating to the national security, and.
the appropriate dissemination within the Government
of the resulting strategic and national intelligence
policy . .
"(b) Plan for the coordination of such of the.activi-
ties of the intelligence agencies of /other-7 depart-
ments as relate to the national security and recw,mend
*/ Executive Order 9690, sy.pra
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
to the National Intelligence Authority [composed of the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and a personal repre?
sentative of the President] the establishment of such
overall policies and objectives as will assure the most
effective accomplishment of the national intelligence
mission.
"(c) Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence
agencies, such services of common concern as the
National Intelligence Authority determines can be
more efficiently accomplished centrally.
"(d) Perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the
President and the National intelligence Authority may
from time to time direct."*: (Emphasis added..)
The National Security Act of 1947 called for the CIA to have
the same powers and responsibilities as were accorded the GIG under
the 1946 Presidential Directive. Accordingly, when the House
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments held hearings on
the 1947 Act, it paid special attention to the broad authority
delegated to the CIG by subsection (d).*/ During these hearings,
for example, Representative Clarence Brown questioned Lt. Gen. Hoyt S.
Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, about the authority
which subparagraph (d) conveyed:
*/ Id. at 1337.
,e
"/Hearincs before the House Committee 09 Expenditures in the
Executive Deoertments, June 27, 1947, Addendum No. 1 to
Volume 1 (hereafter."Hearings").
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
REP. DROWN: "[T] his other section (i.e., subparagraph (d))
Approved POilReielater20015/0tta1/ yCIA-RDAT8Rd02640RODC?84900048-211.at you
decided was either advantageous or beneficial, in your
mind?'
LT. GEN. VANDENBERG: "Yes, sir."
REP. DRCWN: "In other words, if you decided you wanted
to go into direct activities of any nature, almost,
why, that could be done?"
LT. GEN. VANDENBERG: "Within the foreign intelligence
field, if it was agreed upon by all of the three
agencies concerned [i.e., State, War and Navy, the
three agencies represented on the NIA]."*
A subsequent witness, Peter Visher, the draftsman Of the
Presidential Directive establishing the CIG, recommended to the committee.
that it pass the Act without authority for the CIA to perform any
"other functions related to intelligence affecting the national
security." He called this provision a "loophole" because it enabled the
-
President to direct the CIG to perform almost any operation.** Various.
members of the committee discussed the provision with the witness***
It is significant, then that when the bill was reported out, and when
it was passed, it authorized the CIA to:
"perform- such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council
(which replaced the NIA) may from?time to time direct." (Section
102(d)(5)).
In other words, the committee, with full knowledge of the broad
implications of subparagraph (d) of the 1946 Presidential Directive,
conferred the identical powers and responsibilities on the CIA: This
legislative history indicates that the committee, by including Section
102(d)( ) in the final bill, intended that the CIA have the authority,
subjEct to directions from the Nationa. Security Council, to conduct
a broad range of direct operational assignments.
"'Hearings, suF;raL p.11.
7-1d. pp. 78-103.
,ARPrPved. For_Releae 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 .? CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
C. CONGRESSIONAL RATIFICATION OF CIA AUTHORITY TO PLAN AND
CONDUCT COVERS ACTION
Throughout the 28-year history of the CIA, the Agency has
reported its covert action programs to the appropriate members of its
oversight subcommittees in bath the House and Senate. Moreover, Congress,
through ?the mechanisms it has established for funding the Agency, has
continually appropriated funds to the Agency for these activities.*
The Justice Department, in its 1962 memorandum;discussed
supra, provided the following description of the history of CIA
reporting of its covert action programs to Congress, and Congressional
appropriation of funds for such programs:
"Congress has continued over the years since 1947 to
appropriate funds for the conduct of such covert
activities. We understand that the existence of such
covert activities has been reported on a number of occasions
?to the leadership of both houses, and to members of the sub-
committees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Com-
mittees of both houses. It can be said that Congress as
a whole knows that money is appropriated to CIA and knows
generally that a portion of it goes for clandestine
activities, although knowledge of specific activities
is restricted to the group specified above and occasional
other members of Congress briefed for specific purposes.
In effect, therefore, CIA has for many years had
general funds approval from the Congress to carry
on covert cold-war activities.. ."*/
*/The history of CIA reporting of covert action programs and Congressional
appropriation dates bact to 1948. In April 1948, when the House Armed Services
Committee was considering the CIA Act (ultimately adopted in 1949), Director
of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter told the committee that the Act was
needed to enable the Agency to, inter alia, do research on and purchase -
explosives, utilize and supply,underground resistance movements in overrun
countries, purchase printing presses for the use of agents; and do
research for psychological warfare purposes. Passage Of the Act clearly
reflects Congress' determination that the Agency be able to conduct
activities, such as covert action, sim'lar to those Conducted by the OSS;
for example, the permanentappropriatiuns language in the CIA Act was
modelled after the appropriations langLage for the OSS because of its
flexibility and its provision for confientiality of: appropriations-for
secret .operations.
**/DOJ Memorandum, pp.12-13.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
16
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
The law is clear that,under these circumstances, Congress has
effectively ratified the authority of the CIA to plan and conduct covert
action under the direction of the President and the National Security'
Council. The leading case on this point is Brooks V. Dewar, 313 U.S.
354 (1941). In that case, a 1934 Act of Congress authorized the estab-
lishment of livestock grazing districts on certain federally-owned -
land, and charged the Secretary of the Interior with responsibility for
administering and maintaining these districts; although the powers
conferred on the Secretary were broad, the Act did not explicitly'
authorize him to require persons wishing to utilize the land to purchase
licenses. Nevertheless, the Secretary promulgated regulations which
imposed a license requirement, and sought to bar respondents who -had
- not purchased a license, from utilizing a particular grazing district
In the Supreme Court, the Secretary argued that, even though the
1934 Act did not explicitly authorize him to require users of federal.
grazing lands to purchase licenses, his exercise of this authority was
lawful because Congress, by its own actions,- had ratified it. The
Secretary aruged that, on several occasions, he fully informed the
appropriate Congressional committees that he had imposed a license
requirement and that, in light of this information, Congress
continually appropriated funds for the operation of the grazing district
program; this, he contended, amounted to a ratification of his
authority to institute the license requirement.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDF78M102660R000800100008-2
17
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 ? CIA-RDP78M02660R000801:1100008-2
The Supreme Court agreed that Congress, by conLinuing to appro?
priate funds with knowledge of the Secretary's actions, ratified those
actions. The.Laurt..e.;91ained:
"The information in the possession of. Congress was plentiful
and .from various sources. It.knew from the annual reports of the-
Secretary of the Interior that a system of temporary . .-
liscensing was in force. The same information was .furnished
the Appropriations Committee at its hearings. Not only was.
it disclosed by the annual report of the Department that
no permits were issued in 1936, 1937 and 1938, and that
permits were issued in only one district in 1939, but it was
also disclosed in the hearings that uniform fees were being
charged and collected for the issue of temporary licenses.
And members from the floor informed the Congress that
the temporary licensing system was in force and that as much as
$1,000:000 had been or would be collected in fees For such.
licenses. The repeated appropriations.of the proceeds-
of the fees thus. covered and to be covered into the TreaUry;:--
not only confirms the departmental construction of the
statute, but constitutes a ratification of the action
of the Secretary as the agent of Congress in the
administration of the act.". (Footnotes omitted.)
313 U.S. at 3607361,
The Brooks case requires the conclusion that Congress
has ratified the CIA's authority to plan and conduct covert.
action. Relying on Brooks, the Justice Department reached
precisely that conclusion:
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
"It is well-established that appropriations
for administrative action of which Congress
has been informed amount to a ratification
of or acquiescence in such action. Brooks .
v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 361; Fleming v. Mohawk Co.,
331 U.S. 111, 116; see also Ivanhoe Irrig Dist. v.
McCracken, 337 U.S. 275, 293-294; Power Reactor Co,
v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 409. Since the
circumstances effectively prevent the Congress from
making an express and detailed appropriation for the
activities of the CIA, the general knowledge of the
Congress, and specific knowledge of responsible
committee members, outlined above, are sufficient
to-render this principle applicable"*/ (Footnote
omitted).
Recent legislative developments provide further support for the
Justice Department's conclusion that Congress has ratified the CIA's
authority to plan and conduct covert action. In September and
October 1974, attempts were made in both the House and Senate
to limit the Agency's power to conduct covert action; these attempts
were soundly defeated. In the House, the attempt took the form of
a proposal by Representative Holtzman for a joint resolution
amending the Supplemental Defense Appropriations Act as follows:
"After September 30, 1974, none of the funds
appropriated under this joint resolution may
be expended by the Central Intelligence Agency for
the purpose of undermining or destabilizing the
government of any foreign country." ?
*/ COJ Memorandum, p. 13.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
`....e.W1,4...PEUIGNalklitArsr?aberu
APPrhYgdrfrgIrpsV-raq2AT.4tNFP4OPR? MV,Rg,10, 1974,
by a vote of 291-108.
. In the Senate, Senator Abourezk attempted to amend the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 so that it would state:
"(a) No funds made available under this or any other
law may be used by any agency of the United States
Government to carry out any activity within any
foreign country which violates, or is intended to
encourage the violation of, the laws of the
United States or of such country.
"(b) The provisions of this section shall not be
construed to prohibit the use of such funds to carry
out any activity necessary to the security of the
United States which is intended solely to gather
intelligence information...."
This amendment was defeated by the Senate.on October 2, 1974, by
a vote of 68-17.
However, the following amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961.was enacted:
"Sec. 663. Limitation on Intelligence Activities.
"(a) No funds appropriated under the authority
of this or any other Act may be expended by or
on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for
operations in foreign countries, other than
activities intended solely for obtaining
necessary intelligence, unless and until the -
President finds that each such operation is
important to the national security of the
United States and reports, in a timely
fashion, a description and scope of such -
operation to the appropriate committees of
the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the United States Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States
House of Representatives.
,,impLoveg For Release 201:TOR/17 : CIA-RDP781Q26?09,90001Q020472
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
This provision prevents the CIA from engaging in any Covert
action unless and until the President ma'Aes a finding that such
action, is important to the national security. It also requires the
President to report on the description and scope of the action "in a timely
fashion" to the appropriate Congressional committees. The provision
clearly implies that the CIA is authorized to plan and conduct covert
action. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York
has concluded, in fact, that the provision serves as a "clear
Congressional authorization for the CIA to conduct covert
activi ti es.
In sum, the history of .Congressional action since 1947
makes it clear that Congress has both acknowledged and.ratified
the authority of theCIA to plan and conduct covert action.
-
III. CONCLUSIONS ? , :-
There is ample legal authority for the Central _Intelligence -
Agency to plan and conduct covert action in foreign countries.?
:
First, o is within the inherent constitutional authority of .,the
--. ,
....
..
. ..
President with respect to foreign affairs to delegata to an executive - ..
agency, such as the CIA, the responsibility for planning and conduct.ir
. . .. .
suct a.ctivities; in fact; by means of various Nati ['mai Security Council
... . ? -:-..--.:_o...-
Directives, and National Security Decision Peo:orandurq 40 (issu-ors ".,'.1,r tto?.
?
President himself), he has lawfully delegated this responsibill t.cr:
_
CIA.
51/The Central-- Intellicence Acencv: Oversight and Py,:countabilitv, by t.11-
Committee. on Civil ki(:;ilts and th2 Committee on ii:1-lernationa1 Human
?
Relations of the Association of the Bar of the City of Mew Yor% (1975),
p. 15.
? ? r:"0.;"!1:.?_, -77 . ;
li4.1941-94 '41;:fr*. .P.tAiRg.600101=9-04:
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Second, the National Security Act of 1947 authorizes the CIA,
at the direction of the National Security Council, to engage in covert
action in foreign countries. The legislative history of this stat;Jte,
partio.J,arly in the House of Representatives, gives support to this
conclusion. Third, the 28-year history of Congressional action
with respect to the CIA clearly establishes that Congress has
ratified the authority of the Agency to plan and conduct covert
?
' SPECIAL COUNSEc,ricl THE ocr
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
I.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
I. Constitutional Powers of the P.r.e sident.
"AD a nation with all the attrib-utesOZsove:eignty,
the United State's is vested with all the powers of. -2,,overn.n.-..ent
?
necessary to rnaintz.b.in an. eflecti-ve control of. inte:national
'. relations." B Ili 11 e tv. Broolcs, 238 U.S. 373, 39G. These
powers do not "depend upon the2aiifirrna-tive grants of. the
?
1.,- Constitution," 'out aro "nece sary conco;nitantsol nationality."
2,99 304,
' r ?
? ? ?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Releaie 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
"In the preservation of the safety and integrity of the United
States and the protection of its responsibilities and obligations
as a sovereignty" the constitutional powers of the President are
broad. 30 0. A. G. 2,91, 292. "The very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the solo orga-a.%of the federal
government in the ? field of international relations . . does
not require as a:basis for its ex-ercise an act of Congress's,
although, like all governmental powers, it must be exercised
in subordination to any applicable provisions of the Constitution.
United States v. Curtiss-.Wright Corn. supra, p. 320. His
,
? duty to take care that the laws he faithfully executed extends
not merely to express acts of Congress, but to the enforcement
? of "the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the
Constitution itself, our 1.-aternationa,l relations, and an of
-? the px.otectiota by the nature of the goveryunent under
.?
the Constitution." In Re Nea.y?;10, .135 U.S. 1, 64. (1890).
of the exercise of those broad powers are
? . numerou9 and varied. T1Ci 5COO may be illustrated by the
following: The President may take such action a. may, in
:indicoJent, bo appropriate, including the VAst.,1 Cfco,.170;: to
? .! 1.).L.otoct i ;1.:1-1(.1
?
? 4 ? 7,11' e..;;.?,?? ? e N ( ? :N. Y. (.1.80));
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000500100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
? 135 U.S. at 64; Hamilton. v. M'Claugh.ry, 136 Fed. 445, 449-50
(D. :Kansas, 1905); I Hackworth, Digest of International Law,
327-334; VILL., 464-5. Notwithstanding the exclusive power
of Congress to declare war, the President may repel armed
_attack and "meet force with force." Prize Cases, 2 Black 635,
668 (1862).- He may impose restrictions on the operation of
domestic radio stations which he deems necessary to prevent
'unneutral acts which may endanger our relations with foreign
. Countries. 30 O.A.G. 291.
? Congress' grants of powers to executive agencies in
areas relating to the co-aduet of foreign relations and preser-
vation of the national security from external threats are
generally couched in terms which neither limit the powers of
.the President nor restrict his discretion in the choice of the
r.agoncy through which he will exercise these powers.
in
establishing a :Depart:me:at of State in 1799, Co:agress directed.
that the Secretary should perform duties relatini, to "i:uch ?
matterrespec.tin foreign affairs as the President of the
? Z.fnitecl 5t.--?tos shall as
the, De.rt-..-rient",
?
conduct the of the department in si.ich manner as the
Ii
\
Lill direct. " S. 202.,, 5lJ S. C.
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2'
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R00p800100008-2
More recently, in establishing the National Security Council,
Congress gave it the function oadvisi-ng the Presidett "with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security." 50 J. S. C. 402 (a).-
From the beginning or our history as a nation, it haa
been recognized and accepted that the conduct or fore.i.g,a affairs
on occz-4:sion requires the use or covert a.ctivitics, which raight
be of a qua.si-military nature. See, e. cr. , the act., of ally 1,
1790, 1 Stat. 128, and ;:v1a.r. 1, 1810, sec. 3, 2 Stat. 609. In
. ? a message to the House of Representatives declining to furnish
?. an account or payments made for contingent expenses of foreign
intercourse, President Polk reviewed that practice and stated
.a.? rel?nan ....???
"The experience of every nation on earth. has
dernonstr.ated that c.:niergencies may arise in which.
it 'OE:co:T...3s absolutely necessary or
safety or the -public gooa to make o..w.panditures
the VCY 0OCt or wc,uld o dof o apiicity.t e d
"
/ I'resiciont Polk continued:
dsposa1, nave ane Nr.stiy
than tin.ie
1)eena 1atca fo:: on-..,...3resilent';.;
,no of: rn.ade
,
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
ootliote 1/ coz,tinu.ecl:
public. In time or war or impending clanger the
situation of the country may -make it necessary
to employ individuals for the purpose of obtain-
ing inrip-frnatioll or rende.ring other important
services who could never be prevailed upon to
act if they entertained the least apprehensior.
that their names 0-47 their agency would in any
contingency be divulged. So it may ofte-n
becor.rie necessary to incur ari epc-aditure
for an object highly useful to the country;
or example, the conclusion of a treaty witi
barbar.ia.n power whose customs require on.
such occasions the use of presents.. But this
object: r.night be altogether defeated by the
intrigues of other powers if our purposes
were to be made lcno..v.n by the exhibition or
the original papers and vouchers to the
accounting officers of the Treasury. It
would be easy to 6pecify other cases other
cases (sic) which may occur in the history of a
great nation, in its intercourse with other
nations, wherein. it rri.ght become absolutely ??
necessary to incur expenditures for object:3 . ?
which coulci never 'oe accomplished zit wore
suspected in advance that the items of. ex-
penditure and the agencies employed would b.
made public." 4 Richardson, Messages and
Papers of 1.---)residents, 431, 435 (April 20,
).846)
Compare also Stuart, Al-neric.an. Diplornat;c arid Consl
Practice (1952) p. 196, (commenting on prevailing diplomatic
practice or all cou-ntries), "s.ctual cases of interferenc.o
the internal affairs of states jco whielT., the envo,?(s,
vy
Approved Fo? Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
?
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
ATI early e.xample of such a secret operation is afforded
by the Lewis and Clarlc expedition of 1803. That expe.dition was
authorized prior to the Louisiana Purchase by a statute providing
"That the sum of two thousand five hundred
dollars be, and the same is hereby appropriated
for the purpose of extending the external
commerce of the United States (2 Stat. 206)."
Congress used this cryptic latguage at the recuest of President
Jefferson because, in the words of a present-day udgo, the
"expedition, military in character, would enter in.o lands ov,rned
by a foreign nation with which the United States was at peace
2/
and . . . the utmost secrecy had to be observed. "
1"-1
??.. J.rs
t? 1 S
Co. of St. Paul v, :Minnesota Historical Soc. , 146 F. Sup?. 652,
656 (D. C. ;Vann. (1956)), a.f.i'd sub, nom, United States v. First
Trust Co. of St. Paul 251 F. 2d 686 C.A. 8).
????????.????.*
tta,??????.y.
? 2/In his message to the Congress, President Jefferson
stated: "* * a-o-pronriation of ',;2,500 ' for tne
1. A ?
purpose of extending the external conlmerce of the
United States, ' while understood and considered by
the -Executive as giving the legislative sanction, would
cover the rindertnicing from notice and prevent the
obstructions which interested individuals might other-
? WASO provion slf TJrepzre n ts way." (1 i.-lich;_,rf-ison,
352 a:: 354.)
and :3 0 1
\
Approved For Release 2005/02/17-:-CIA:RDP78M02660R000800100008-2'
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Under modern conditions, the President can
properly regard the conduct of covert activities as necessary
to the effective and successful conduct of foreign relations and
the protection of the national security. .When the United
States is attacked from without or within, the President may
"meet force with force," Prize Cases, .sia-ora, In attempting
to strengthen the free nations of the world and contain our
adversaries, and thereby to advance the national security of
the United States, the President should be deemed to have
authority to meet covert activities with covert
? activities if he deenla such action necessary and consistent
with our national objectives. As Charles Evans I-7.ughes said
in another context, "Self-preservation,is?the first law of
national life and the constitution itself provides the necessary
.? powers in order to defend and preserve the United States, " War
powers Under the Constitution, 42 A, B. A. R. 23Z (1917). ;inst.
as "the power to wage war is the power to wage w a 7: su ccossfurci
id. Z38, so the power of the Presi '',ent to conduct foreign rclat
should be deemed to b the pow ?.r to conduct foreig-a re.lAtions
on s
UM. CCObLif ully, , by any means ncc :tssary to combat tie mea sursta:c
y 'Conn-nist bloc, iacludirg both
open and co,fort
Approved For Release 2005/02/17: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
The exclusive power of Congress to declare war has been held
not to 'prevent use by the President of force short of war to
'protect American citizens and property abroad. A fortiori,
? does not prevent his use of force short of war for other
purposes which he deems necessary Co our national survival.
'In either case the magnitude and possible grave international
consequences of a particular action may be such as to render
it desirable for the President to consult with, or obtam
the approval or ratilication of, the Congress if circumstances
permit such action. But the necessity for obtaining such
approval does not depend on whether the action is overt or
covert,
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
3 March 1976
Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act to
Prohibit Covert Action Programs Involving
the Political, Electoral Process and Assassination
I. BACKGROUND
a. Presidential Statement. On 16 September 1974, the
President stated that "our Government, like other governments,
does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement
foreign policy and protect national security. I am informed reliably
that Communist nations spend vastly mor.e money than we do for
the same purposes." The President went on to describe effiarts
made by foreign.governments to destroy democratically based opposition
political parties and concluded that there are times. when it certainly
is in our best interest to preserve such opposition political parties.
b. Congressional Action
1. House. On 27 September 1974, the House, by
a vote of 291 to 108, rejected an amendment which
would have banned the use of any money appropriated
for use by CIA to "destabilize or undermine any
government."
2. Senate. On 2 October 1974, the Senate rejected
by a vote of 68 to 17, an amendment which would have
prohibited funds for U.se.by any U.S. agency to carry
out any activities which would violate or encourage
violation of laws of the country involved, except for
intelligence collection.
3. Statute . Public Law 93-559, approved
30 December 1974 (.ForeignAssistance Act of 1974) --
established a statutory limitation on intelligence
activities (Section 32). Regarding operations in
foreign countries,. by or on behalf of the CIA, other
than activities solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,
the provision requires a report, in a timely fashion,
of the description and scope of such operations to six
committees oi the Congress, inclUding the House
International Relations Committee. This provision
gives the members of these committees (43 members
of the Senate And House) a vehicle for presenting their
views to the President concerning such operations.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDID78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Congressional Investigations
c.
Both Houses of Congress have thoroughly reviewed the activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency, including covert actions. There are
24 members from both Houses serving on these committees. Although
their final recommendations are either in the process of formulation or being
studied by appropriate committees in the'Oongress, there is no recommendation
to abolish or restrict our nation's covert action capabilities, except for the
subject of assassination which is clearly opposed both within the Executive
Branch and the Congress.
d. Murphy Commission, which was established by Public Law 92-352
also studied this problem and in its June 1975 report stated:
"Covert Action: A Special Problem. To this point we have
addressed only the intelligence activities of the intelligence
community.
The Commission has considered whether covert action
should any longer be authorized at all. It recognizes that
there are many risks and dangers associated with covert
action. Partly for these reasons the use of covert action in
recent years has markedly declined. ?
But we must live in the world we find, not the world
we might wish. Our adversaries deny themselves no forms
of action which might advance their interests or undercut
ours, as quite recent as well as past events demonstrate.
In many parts of the world a prohibition on our use of covert
action would put the U.S. and those who rely on it at a
dangerous disadvantage..."
. . .Moreover, as we have seen a diffusion of power
among societies, so we are witnessing a diffusion of
authority within societies. Once-accepted goals and values
are increasingly questioned, the authority of established
institutions is challenged, often with outside support, with
the result of frequent changes in regimes throughout the
world. We believe these trends are likely to continue
at least for the near-term future.. "
2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
" ...The World which U.S. foreign policy must address,
and which the organization of the government must be
designed to help it address, will be one of increasing
complexity, interaction, difficulty and danger, but
also one of crucial opportunities..."
II. Issues
Political Action
a. In the early days of the Cold War there was
a consensus by national policy makers, both
within the Congress and the Executive Branch , that
it was essential to confront aggressive Communist
subversive efforts in many areas of the world.
Although these activities have tapered off tremendously
situations in the world still exist where discrete support
can assist our friends against our adversaries in their
contest for control of a foreign nation's political
direction. It would be imprudent for our nation not
to be able to act in such situations and thus forestall
greater difficulties in the future.
b. American policy today is different from when
it was confronting worldwide Communist subversion
in the 1950's or Communist insurgency in the 1960's.
One reason covert action activity has been reduced is the fact
thatmany of the Communist's efforts during those
years were successful. Today in the Washington
Post there is an article by Michael Lecleen and .
Claire Sterling concerning the situation in Italy.
That article makes a very valid point that "If it is.
true, as the Communists claim, that they have
become a democratic party, to whom should the
credit go for this remarkable transformation?
Should it not go in large part to the United States
and to the forces of the Italian center and non-
Communist left who for 30 years opposed a ?
monolithic and Stalinist PCI? Is the "new face" of
Communism in Western Europe not a tribute tp the
success of a policy that is today the object of scorn
and --- unbelievably --- embarrassment in Washington?
3
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
c. A soverign nation must look ahead to changing
circumstances and must be capable of facing new
threats as they develop in the world. In 1924, the
brand new battle ship "Washington" was sunk as
a demonstration of our commitment to disarmament.
It was in the same era that we disbanned intelligence
in the Department of State because "gentlemen do not
read each others mail," and we declined the international
burdens of other league of nations. Some would read our
post World War II history, with all of its costs, as
constituting an improvement over these earlier policies
by avoiding a World War III for 30 years. It was
former Director of CIA Colby who pointed out that it would
be a mistake to deprive our nation of some possible
moderate covert action response to a foreign problem
and-leave us with nothing but a diplomatic protest and
sending the Marines.
d. Assassinations.
There is no need to clutter the Foreign.
Assistance Act with legislation relating to covert
action. As indicated, some eight committees of
Congress, involving some 67 members have been
continuously seized with this subject. An amendment
in this area should not be casually adopted on the
floor without the benefit of their findings. In the
case of assassination, we already know that the
President is committed to legislation which would
make it a criminal penalty for the Government to
engage in the assassination of a foreign leader.
An Executive Order 11905 concerning "United States
Foreign Intelligence Activities" which was issued on
18 February 1976, provides in Section 5, "Restrictions
on Intelligence Activities," (g) "Prohibition of Assassination.
No employee of the United States Government shall engage
in, or conspire to engage in, political assassinations."
e. Control of Covert Actions. Executive Order
11905 also establishes new controls over covert action
and other special operations. It establishes an
Operations Advisory Group" Composed of theAssistant
to the ['resident forNational Security Affairs, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Director of Central Intellig,enoe, and the Chairman
4
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Attorney
General and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget are observers. That
group is to consider and make recommendations
to the President on all proposals for covert
action, submit a periodic review of covert action
to the National Security Council, of which the
President is chairman, and meet formally to
carry out its responsibility to make recommendations
to the President.
f. We operate under a constitutional system which
divides between the Executive and the Congress
authority and responsibility in a number of areas,
including the area of foreign affairs. It is through
this structure that this nation formulates its foreign
policy and Congress has a vital role in that
formulation. However, the President does have
a preeminent role in the implementation and conduct
of foreign relations and the constitutional legitimacy
of his action is not changed if the President carries
out this role "covertly" rather than "overtly", either
directly or through his designated representative.
5
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Ap
March-April 1976
Number 35
ttellivence agencies in a free society
Are they really needed? What are the keys to
continuing reform within a system of checks and balances?
Views by 4 who know intelligence operations intimately,
and a philosopher who ponders the relevance of morality.
Intelligence, Freedom and the Preservation of Both
An editorial, p.2
Intelligence, Morality and Foreign Policy
Sidney Hook, p.3
A nation's safety while searching for its soul
Leo Cherne, p.6
How Margaret Chase Smith Would Monitor the CIA,
Margaret Chase Smith, p.I 1
Should the U.S.Use Covert Action
in the Conduct of Foreign Policy?
Arthur Les ter Jacobs? p. i3
Before Reforming the "Intelligence Community,"
What Questions Must be Asked?
rE
W. Thomas Nichols, p.20
of India ernocracy?
Paul k urtz, p.23
The Helsinki Watch II
Gerald L. Steihel, p.27
Letters: Alexander Lipski, Warren F. Kimball, Oscar I Iandlin, p.26
Cumulative index, Nos. 1-34, with this issue
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
13
representation would be an elder statesman of the stature of Third, I would re_ouire its four aovvnment members to
the late Bernard IAPINWPOIECORITIPAg,qq.005/02/17 : ciATRFFigm9zgoRq lyo-n
finganioru-rmrumAtr8
ikCOUntabilitv for the
actions of those branches of the government they represent.
If these five designated persons could not be trusted as
guardians against misconduct by the CIA, against -
Presidential personal and partisan exploitation of the CIA,
and against the congressional disease of leakage and
partisan exploitation of the CIA in sensational hearings and
exposes, then who could?
The first function 1 would assign to such a commission
would-be to write the charter for the CIA- defining not only
its proper areas of activities but, as well, the proper
relationship between it and the President. the Congress and
other agencies of the government. The commission's second
function would be to police the CIA to insure compliance
with its charter?to police constantly and not sporadically.
Should the U.S. Use Covert Action
in the Conduct of Foreign Policy?
J scoh,
Why did we create, the CIA in the first place? Is secrecy sinister? Can
covert actions make up for mistaken foreign policy? Would our
suspension of covert acts be tantamount to unilateral disarmanient?
Some answers by a senior CIA officer.
by Arthur Lester Jacobs
The question posed for governmental and public
consideration is whether the United States government
should use covert action in the conduct of its foreign policy.
The ambiance of our times is hardly conducive to
objective and sober consideration of this question.
Emotionalism and sensationalism are pandemic. The news
media have been filled with lurid portrayals of poisoned dart
guns, penetration, infiltration, assassination, lacking only,a
sex angle which may yet come. The use of the pejorative
"Department of Dirty Tricks- neither provides facts nor
allows for reasoned discussion.
One would think that any discussion of this question
would have been preceded by the consideration of the
security threats to the United States and whether and what
types of action are desirable to meet those threats. It would
be pertinent, first, to examine the efficacy of various
methods of implementing our foreign policy.
But the opponents of covert action take the draconian
position that we should totally abandon our existing
capability for a variety of moral, legal and political reasons
and dismantle the organization for implementing it. Others
condemn such action in principle but grudgingly concede
that certain circumstances might justify it. while demanding
interdictions in some types of action and stringent
The author was an attorney, civil engineer, tax-division assis-
tant to the Attorney General and member of Treasury's Ex-
cess Profits Tax Council before becoming a career senior of-
ficial in the Central Intelligence Agency, During 19 years in
the CIA he monitored some of its most sensitive operations in
this country and abroad, and negotiated with foreign senior
officials, including the chief of state.
requirements for authorization and control. The more
extreme supporters of covert action oppose any change from
present authorization.
I do not write as an apologist or defender of any past
covert action, be it real, imagined or distorted. At the same
time, I would not, even if permitted, inventory past
achievements of covert action, except to voice my conviction
that they have served the nation well. I do not represent the
CIA or any other agency of government, or any elected or
appointed officer. I write as a private citizen on the use of
covert action as a legitimate means of protecting national
security and implementing our foreign policy, the needs for
reaffirming the validity of that means, and to point out the
dangers of abandoning it.
I share the concern about the possibility of our
government engaging in any unauthorized intervention
abroad, and Particularly in a war. And I am just as
concerned with my civil liberties and those of others because
I know how they have been threatened before. As a retired
intelligence officer, I have no more or less qualification to
speak to the issue before us, which is essentially politie.d.
What I do have is a body of experience in covert action that
may enable me to separate fact from fiction as to its use, its
limitations and its potential for misuse. Arid, if I can
dissipate some common misconceptions and al nv sonic
misgivings and doubts, I will have made a contribution.
Definition of covert action
There is considerable confusion about the terminology of
the various types of -secret operations and their substance.
Such terms as covert operations, clandestine operations,
covert intelligence, secret operations, secret intelligene.
covert action and others- arc being used interchangeably.
11tp-th- 11,111 19-61\,,
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
14
In defining covert action, we can begin by excluding what mak int, elements of our government. (So far as I am are,
May he called, ApprOveld,For Release ig005/021171c ClArROMMA.42660R_Go_020_m, QOM-842d presently without
intelligence gathering may he done openly or secretly, the such authority: and during the time of my association 5,1, Ith
? collection of intelligence w Inch is secret in nature or is such operations. I knew of no covert action without it.) It is
obtained by secret methods is called secret intelligence further postulated that the covert action under discussion is
operations. Conversely, counter-intelligence is the defense that directed solely against foreign forces inimical to
against the collection of and use of our secrets by American interests. Third, it should he agreed that the covert
governments and forces hostile to ours. The distinguishing action agency should be divorced to the maximum extent
characteristic of secret intelligence and counter intelligence possible from ultimate policy making.
operations from. covert action is that the end product is Whether covert action operations could be better
information. managed by the agency responsible, should be controlled
In positive terms, covert action may he defined as acts in- more closely by the policy-making levels of government.
tended to influence events or attitudes in which governmen- should be limited in scope and type, should have closer
tal interest is concealed through secrecy or a visible facade Congressional oversight, could be conducted more
called cover. The end product in any covert action operation economically, should he divorced from secret intelligence
is an act or a series of acts, not information. and counter-intelligence operations?all these are important
Some illustrations of covert action operations may clarify- questions and there is a .wide range of answers to each of
this further. They may range from a one-time publication of them. I lowever, these answers are beyond the scope of this
a news report to the support of a publication over a longer review since we are fundamentally discussing the validity of
period of time. They. can include sabotage and counter a function of government in the long-term- interest of the
sabotage. They embrace psychological warfare against a United States and Americans of future generations. For the
pervasive ideology maintained over a long period of time, or purpose of this discussion, I accept the disability that the
efforts directed to influencing the outcome of a single defeats of covert action operations, real or imagined. are
political event. orphans laid on the doorstep of the Central Intelligence
Covert action may include the support of friendly Agency (Cl/N). and its achievements and successes must re-
apolitical individuals or organizations as well as political main unknown. If the cynicism and distrust generated by
forces. It does not necessarily involve any monetary in- pzv? misuse and abuseof the governmental processes is to
ducements. It usually involves a confidential contact and color our.judgment for the future, all of us can suffer.
access to an individual in a position of influence or political The question we are examining is not new. The
or apolitical power, based on the individual's confidence and Rockefeller Commission report lists ten different official ex-
respect for the judgment and advice of the covert action of- ternal examinations of the functioning of the intelligence
ricer. ? community going hack to 1949, some covering the specific
Covert action is not necessarily concealed from the question before us. It has been debated extensively in private
government of the country where the action is being con- and public forums. and the news media.
ducted, when it is in mutual interest that the operation be In 1974. the Senate considered this question before us and
conducted free from publicity in both countries, as it was in rejected Senator Abourezk's bill. 68 to 17, to bar all covert
Laos, action and the I louse rejected Congressperson Holtzman's
. Covert action can include economic action to acquire bill, 291 to 108. to bar specific political action against
materials vital to our interests and to deny them to those foreign governments. But the Foreign Assistance Act of
governments and forces which could use them against us, 1974 in effect required the President to find that funds ex-
where the acknowledgement of governmental interest could pended in covert operations in foreign countries are Minor-
prejudice the success of either action. tant to the national security and to report a description of
Covert action can include acts which are innocent of such operations to the Senate and House Committee on
themselves when governmental interest is thought to be more Foreign Affairs and the other appropriate Congressional
effective without governmental attribution or a label on committees. The current committee hearings of both houses
them. Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe broadcast for of the Congress arc still in process.
years to the communist world when governmental funds and The most recent in-depth study of the question is that of
guidelines were concealed because to acknowledge them the so-called Murphy Commission, authorized by statute in
would detract from their effectiveness. Both radios now 1972. in which the question of covert action was discussed
broadcast using overt U.S. funding. ?sithin the context of the title of its report, "The Organza-
Covert action can he a force for peace and against violence tion of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.?
-
by disrupting or blocking unconstitutional and violent acts The twelve-person committee consisted of two senators, two
which can be a disservice to our interests, representatives, two from the executive branch, and six from
Covert action can be used positively to engender and sup- oil% ate life. The committee chairman was former /1m-
port organizations, individuals, attitudes and events in hassador Robert D. Murphy and a large staff was headed by
Arndican interests and defensively to neutralize and counter two former senior State Department officers. After t?% o
forces against our interests. years of study and extensive hearings, a report was issued on
In sum, covert action has as great flexibility and variety in June 27, 1975. One salient conclusion was that .
Form and substance as can he devised to meet a given task or Co% ert action should not he abandoned hut should he eruplo)ed
an assigned re uirement %%here such action is dead!. essential to Hull U.S. purposes, and then
q ..
al:tcr careful !ugh lex. el review. I
Most important, in examining past and present critical Leaving aside the interpretation of kk. hat is "clearly
reviews it has been and is postulated that no covert action essential to vital U.S. purposes," I subscribe to that
should he undertaken without the authority of the, policy
reethim a/ /i
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
15
- Why drdlxopcxggh, lizilia ? , 7.,
.........acel2d0d/4:12117q ClAttrilige75M02660R000180011110608,2na king it evident that
there was a need to establish a permanent civilian
first place? intelligence organization, culminated in the organization of
the CIA in 1947.
conclusion. The Murphy Commission report in tutu and the But it was the events that followed World War 11 that
section dealing with covert action merit particular impelled the organization of a covert action arm or our
'consideration because they consider covert action as a government. When first organized in 1947. CIA had only a
function of foreign policy. very limited covert action charter, which was insufficient to
It is in the interest of all of us that the question before us be meet the requirements of the historical situation in wide') we.
resolved by our government quickly after exhaustive inquiry found ourselves. While Russia was fighting for her life on the
and thoughtful study. Prolonged delay in this process can western front during the war, the satellite communist parties
only serveto exacerbate the damage that has been done to in Asni and elsewhere continued a program of clandestine
the covert action. capability . directly and to the national action. But following the victory of World War II the USSR
interests indirectly, some of W h i c h damage may be renewed its goal of communist expansion into Europe. It
irreparable and some of which cannot be corrected bra long expanded its political borders by the absorption of
time. Lithuania. Latvia and Estonia and expanded its political
History of covert ?action hegemony over Eastern Europe into Poland (through a gross
violation of the Lublin agreement), Bulgaria, Rumania,
There is almost a tacit assumption that covert action is of Hungary and East Germany. This. was accomplished with
recent spontaneous origin. A resume or the history of such relative ease in those defeated countries with their war-
operations may dispel this misconception and indicate their ravaged economies. The continuing Soviet military and
potential usefulness in current and future Lvents. civilian presence and, of course, the local communist parties
Covert action is as old as the moment when man first insured de facto control. An attempt at political
believed it desirable to conceal Ilk participation in events. independence or' democratic government in those countries
Covert action by governments is as old as governments for was ruthlessly suppressed. The Soviets tried and failed to
the same reason?It was not invented by the U.S. establish satellite states in Yugoslavia. Greece and Turkey
Government Or CIA:- As early as the fourth century B.C., where they had no military presence, through covert action
the Chinese Sun Tzu. author of the classic "The Art of backing 'dissident and guerrilla movements. The Soviets
War,? wrote basic doctrine on covert action by tried to expand in the Middle East through setting up a
governments.' puppet Republic in Azerbaijan. Perhaps the most sickening
. It is a well developed technique in current use by nations example of expansion of the Soviets was their ruthless
and forces hostile to us. It is also a method used by ? subversion of democratic government in-Czechoslovakia by
democracies allied with or friendly to our own. to protect a combination of political pressure and clandestine action
...w' their own security and to further foreign policy. It is a culminating in the so-called suicide of Jan Masaryk, and the
method employed by Third World governments, absorption or that country within the Communist bloc.
Early in American history, the Continental Congress The Soviet desire for such controlled buffer states is
engaged in covert action in.Bermuda to enlist the support of understandable but not excusable given their methods. The
Bermudan citizens in obtaining gun powder and other war real threat to VVestern interests iind the free world was
materiel for our own revolution.' In the same period we signalled by the organization of the Cominform in 1947, and
engaged in covert paramilitaryaction in providing arms and a large scale covert action campaign to take over Western
otherwise supporting the privateers who were attacking Europe, not only for ideological and political authority over
British shipping. In 1847. President Polk instructed his those countries but also for their natural resources and
consul in Monterey in covert political action to insure that if industrial capability. Soviet efforts were massive at every
California seceded from Mexico it would join the United level: political, through their satellite parties; in
States and not England.'' threats and overt political pressure backed by a wide scale
In World War 1, the German government engaged in covert action program through subversion:. and in labor,
covert attempts to incite the Mexican government against youth, and student organizations through a number of
ours. When this was discovered by the British government communist international front organizations, using local
through secret intelligence in deciphering a telegram to the communist parties and Soviet clandestine agents. Western
German Ambassador in Mexico, the British government Europe was weak and vulnerable to these assaults. The
used this same information brilliantly in a psychological Allies' military presence had been drastically reduced;
warfare campaign designed to involve us in the war. European economies had been wrecked by the war; and vast
Before World War II. both communist and fascist rebuilding programs would have to be completed before
governments engaged in covert paramilitary action in the normal agricultural and industrial life could be restored. The
Spanish Civil War. Before and during World War 11, the democratic political parties had been liquidated during the
Nazi government engaged in an effective covert action occupation, except for those returned from exile. When their
against the Czech and Austrian governments and waged an leaders returned they found their parties fragmented. and
effective campaign of psychological warfare, political without org,anization and resources. France and 1 taly
subversion and black propaganda to demoralize the allied particularly teetered on the brink of communist takeover.
continental powers. The communist- efforts were not limited to Europe.
The American government did not establish a permanent Communist clandestine efforts began in strength in the
OIL nit roc secret foreign intelligence. counter- Middle List ;Ind the 1::.ir East, not ibly in Malaysia, the
intelligence and covert action until alter World War 11. The Philippines and China.
""" 11"1""/ " 'Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
I0
. The first outright Soviet challenge came in the Berlin
blockade in I 948ApplrikviadiFcleilelea,soi286151Q21)Zm_CIA-Gilhg4 i?ooLQ better
event or period as crystallizing American popular and worse than the foreign policy on
political opinion it is my belief that this was rightly viewed as
i
a threat not only to Western Europe. but to the free world which it s predicated.
and the United States. We were the only economically
healthy nation. among the Western allies, and if we were
going to take a stand, this is where it had better begin. We
had not expended our men and resources to defeat the fascist
plan to conquer the free world only to allow that world to be
taken over by the communists. The American response was
marked by a dogged determination not to be forced out of
Berlin as evinced by a remarkable achievement, the Berlin
air lift and, perhaps most important, by Marshall Plan
assistance to Western Europe.
It was felt that these overt efforts were not enough to meet
Soviet clandestine actions all over Europe. In 1948. on the
initiative of the policy making agencies of government.
rather than of CIA. trmechanism was created within CIA to
meet the global clandestine threat and supplement the overt
action of our government. The Soviets were already active in
the field through their own covert action resources to negate
American diplomatic and economic aid. Communist
controlled labor unions tried to. block the unloading of
Marshall Plan supplies at Marseilles. -
The CIA was late in the field and, in the vernacular, had to
play catch-up ball. American covert action officers had to be
trained and deployed in the field. Time was needed to
develop agent resources and begin a program of covert
action to meet and turn back the Soviet effort. Democratic
political structures had to be revived and strengthened and
psychological warfare programs begun to revive the
democratic spirit in Western Europe.
The covert action component of CIA, already strained,
,,vaS also asked overnight to counter the communist
clandestine action along the periMeter of South Asia, and in
North Asia after the outbreak of the Korean War.
Through a combination of diplomatic action, economic
assistroice and covert action, backed by good intelligence,
the communists expansion was arrested. It is conservative
to say that American covert action made a substantial
contribution. Given the age of the covert action component.
the urgency of the requirements levied on it, and its limited
experience, it had made relatively few mistakes and had done
well.
Communist expansion in the Northern Hemisphere
through overt and covert means having been arrested, the
communist powers turned to Africa and Latin America. The
unsuccessful Cuban effort for revolution in Bolivia in 1967
through Che Guevara is a conspicuous example in South
America. The Soviet/Cuban paramilitary effort to
communize southern Africa is evident in Angola.
Covert action in foreign policy
Governmental action between nation-states has tradi-
tionally been conducted by the -heads of-states, directly or
through ambassadors, or through war or threat of war. The
range of the peaceful relationship between states has
broadened in recent years to include economic, technical,
cultural, scientific and peaceful military contacts, but these
still are subsidiary functions of the foreign policy of the
states involved. In the furtherance of national interests with
another state or group of states or the protection of the
?
A
security of the state, the choice remains essentially between
the diplomatic and the military.
War or the threat of war is inherently the undesirable
alternative. it not only has the potential for enlargement to
other states beyond those initially involved, but today it has
the almost unthinkable potential for increase from the level
of conventional weapons to the nuclear. History has taught
us that even a military victory may be Pyrrhic because of the
economic and social disruption. Recent history has also
shown that conventional military force has a limited
capability against guerrilla i,varfare or terrorist action.
Similarly, peaceful diplomatic, action even by a major
political power such as our government has distinct
limitations. Even the most forceful diplomatic
representations can be unproductive and even counter-
productive. This has also been true of the proffer of
economic, technical or military support or the threat of their
withdrawal. Further, where there is no direct or indirect
communication channel between our government and the
foreign state concerned, the use of diplomacy may be
difficult if not impossible.
The choice between force or the threat of force and the
diplomatic channel are almost by definition antithetical
alternatives, both of Which publicly and openly involve the
state. Covert action is not necessarily a complete alternative
to either force or diplomacy, but it may be a complement or
supplement to both. It may provide a flexible optional course
of action with a wide range of mutations in expression which
cannot he fully or completely satisfied by either 'course of
overt action. It is equally fundamental that covert action is -
not necessarily a Weapon of last resort. There may he
international situations that do not lend themselves to any
course of affirmative action, and thegovernment concerned
must await developments to evolve naturally to the point
where no action is needed or desirable, or deteriorate to the
point where affirmative action becomes a matter of national
necessity.
In any case, the use of covert action is no better or worse
than the foreign policy on which it is predicated. Covert
action cannot make permanent positive gains or
permanently neutralize hostile forces unless the foreign
policy involved is enunciated and carried out to back up the
covert action which is authorized.
But where the foreign policy is firm and backed by
governmental action, covert action has a number of
favorable attributes. The techniques employed are not
limited by the methodology and conventionality of overt
action. Covert action can be limited in site and duration to
the requirements of particular situations and are not so
susceptible to the application of Parkinson's Law,
By the same token, and possibly more important, the
covert approach does not involve a public commitment of
the government and its prestige to zi position and a course of
action !mom hich it may be difficult to w ithdraw or reduce
ithout damage. The scope and pace olcovert action may be
enlarged, reduced or terminated as the action develops,
1( eehim 1%
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Covert action is usually more economical in men, money. Secrecy is notsmistet: of itself nor
and materiel t ha rlexciriaargettghigOgtyla. rCIA--RDP78MQ-2660R00080010.,008-Z
less expensive tharnrarTare Witi convention: weapons, and iv itincompatible. with demo-
even large-scale paramilitary undertakings are cheaper than
conventional or unconventional war; Covert non-violent
action is not likely to be more costly than the overt
.diplomatic channel.
There have been instances, and there are likely to be again,
where a government, organization or individual who might
be the recipient of overt U.S. support would find this
unacceptable and unusable because the beneficiaries'
interest Would be prejudiced domestically or in its foreign
relationships by the identifiable U.S. government
connection. The use of the same benefits through covert
channels relieves the beneficiary of this disability and avoids
the visible image of U.S. government intervention. Thus
there may be bilateral agreement of the need to conceal the
U.S. government's interest?in the mutual interest of both.
The inherent limitations in the use of covert action in
effecting a nation's foreign policy have been stated. We
would do well to consider its operational limitations,-as well
as the objections to the use of covert operations as a
legitimate form of governmental action.
At the outset, it must be recognized by the policy makers
of government. that there can be no guarantee that any covert
action which they authorize can be accomplished as planned;
even if it is so accomplished that it will have the desired
effect; and even if the action is accomplished as planned and
has the desired effect, that the cover will stand up and the
governmental interest remain concealed. Even the most
skilled and experienced covert action operators under ideal
conditions can offer no such assurances. The essential
resources are human beings working under conditions of
secrecy or within the limitations of cover, and performance
cannot be predicted mathematically. The results are
intangible and the effect desired is at best a judgment,
subject to human fallibility Also, there are the hostile forces
who will, if aware of the operation and have the capability,
do their best to frustrate the action. But these characteristics
are equally true of overt action, whether they be military or
diplomatic. It would be a brave diplomat who would predict
the outcome of the expression and representation of a
governmental policy. And it is characteristic of most
military commanders to demand an overabundance of men,
money and materiel to support a military action in order to
reduce the inherent risk. There can be no assurance that any
overt action or covert action in our foreign policy will be
executed successfully. These are risks that must be
calculated and then assumed in undertaking such an action,
or rejected because it is felt, the chances and value of the
objective are outweighed hy the risks.
Perhaps the most universal objection to the use of any
covert action is that it is immoral and beneath the dignity of
a nation-state. Implicit within this belief is the Wilsonian
concept of "Open covenants openly arrived at.- However,
there are friendly, neutral and hostile nations who have used
and do use covert channels even in diplomatic action, and it
would he inappropriate for our own nation to moralize and
instruct other nations on how they should conduct their
foreign relationships, even w ith our own government. The
renewal of a working relationship with China was ac-
complished through a secret channel, and it is unlikely that
(irch-, j; 1976/ No. 35
4 ?
cratic government.
China would have consented to begin the negotiations openly
or that it could have been otherwise accomplished.
As has been pointed out, since time immemorial nations
have used covert action to further their interests, and the.
practice prevails today. This is not to say that other nations
believe that the ends justify the means. This is to say that the
means are not considered so pernicious or so meretricious as
to be foresworn, as is .evidenced by the long established
custom and practice of nation-states. The comparison of
covert action with espionage is apt. Covert action is no more
moral or immoral than espionage, and there are few, even to-
day, who would urge the rejection of espionage as a
legitimate means of protecting the seci:rity of the state.
The indictment of covert action as an immoral and un-
acceptable form of governmental action is voiced in another
way: that covert action is meddling in the internal affairs of
other nations, interference we would find unacceptable if
done to our own nation. The naked fact is that nations, in-
cluding our own, do meddle in the affairs of other nations by
overt as well as covert means. We do forcefully meddle in the
internal affairs of other nations which we war on, both dur-
ing and after the war. The victorious state invariably im-
poses ortries to impose its will on the external as well as the
internal affairs of the defeated state, e.g. after the defeat of
Japan we imposed a constitution on that state which
drastically altered its internal structure. "Forceful -
diplomatic representations," a euphemism for pressure.
has been used and will be used by all nation-states (including
our own) on nations we think vulnerable to such pressure in
order to alter their external or internal policies. It has been
plain in recent history that our government has; with public
support, used the proffer of economic, technical and military
support, or denied such support or threatened to withdraw it
in order to shape the domestic and foreign policies of other
nations.
Also, it is self-evident that espionage by its very definition
is meddling in the internal affairs of the nation being spied
on. We face the paradox: a U-2 airplane over the USSR is.
bad; a U-2 over Cuba is good; and the Soviet.and American
satellites over each others' air space is an accepted intrusion.
Another common objection to covert action is that the
policymakers authorizing covert action maintain the secrecy
of such authorization and its implementation. The statement
is true, but the statement begs the question and poses the
dilemma: if the authorization for and conduct of covert ac-
tion is not kept secret, covert action ould not be possible.
This is reasoning in a circle. The need for covert action, and
its concomitant secrecy are the responsibilities of the policy
-making bodies of the government, not of the operating agen-
cies. From the point of_ view of the operational agency,
covert action cannot be undertaken if the secrecy of
governmental interest is not maintained. If this indispen-
sable secrecy is not maintained or is so incompatible with
our democratic process, then we face a world where both our
friends and foes have no such disability.
Secrecy is not sinister of itself nor is it incompatible with
democratic government, provided the secrecy is held to be in
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
18
?
the public interest ? alPoqWr6i4Vidase2ti,liii/Pil: CINAIIMM1621360R0008001 00008-2
and the rights which it guarantees to us citi/ens. ths, the
secrecy of the ballot box is deemed sacred. The secrecy of
grand jury proceedings protects the constitutional rights of
those who might be injured by public exposure of this
pretrial ex parte inquiry. ' Nobody has suggested that the
deliberations of the Supreme Court or the executive sessions
of the Congress and its committees or our contingency war
plans ought to be open to the public. And the need for
secrecy within the Atomic Energy and National Security
agencies is understood and accepted.
In American social mores, secrecy is to be avoided, and it
is believed that our government should have no secret from
its citizens. The paradox is that clandestine services and their
work are essentially devoted to maintaining the security of
our nation and the protection of the citizens' fundamental
rights from those foreign powers which, for ideological or
other reasons, wish to subvert both.
In the words of the Murphy Commission report:
Many dangers are associated %kith covert action. But we must live in
the %%Odd ss e find, not the uorld 'se might uish..Our adversaries deny
themselves no form of action which might advance their interest or
undercut ours. In many parts of the world a prohibition on our use of
covert action would put the U.S. and (-hose who rely on it at a
dangerous disadvantage.
Lastly, we cannot gloss over the potential damage when
covert action operations are compromised and the
- governmental interest exposed. The ultimate question is
whether the achievements of such action warrant that risk.
The risk-versus-gain evaluation is essential in every
foreign policy operation, both overt and covert. As stated
above, diplomatic pressure may be counterproductive, and
many diplomats who have been excessive or inept in their
diplomatic functions have found themselves on their way
home before the end of their .prescribed tours of duty.
Economic pressure may be counterproductive as we learned
in the case of the Aswan Dam loan and in our embargo on
scrap iron and oil to Japan before World War II. Espionage
'operations, however productive, may cause severe damage
to the relationship between the nations involved; as they did
when Khrushchev cancelled the Paris Conference after
Eisenhower refused to apologize for the U-2 shot out of'
Soviet skies.
Obviously, certain types of covert action operations are
potentially damaging if exposed by the target nation. But it
should not be assumed that all covert action operations are
necessarily self-destructive. Covert action operations can
succeed or fail in their objective without exposing
governmental interest. And even in cases where governmen-
tal interest is exposed to the target nation, the very existence
or the cover permits the target nation not to take cognizance
oldie operation if this is in its own interests.
I do not minimize the risk factor. All aspects of any covert
action operation should be carefully weighed: the value of
the objective to the nation; whether there ire any overt
means to attain the same objective; the probability of success
or failure; the costs in terms of men, money and materiel; the
chances of compromise and the political- and other damage
that might result should compromise occur. In that calkiffla-
lion, the covert action agency can evaluate the probability or
technically executing the operation and the risk of com-
promise by accident or hostile counteraction. The remainder
of the calculation is a matter for the determination of the
policy making agencies a government, and not the covert
Present and future need for covert action
Obviously, the world we live in is quite different front the
world in which covert action was organized 27 years ago. But
it is not a better world; it is not a safer world. We have been
through large-scale political, economic, military, and social
changes. Communications have 'shrunk the world to the
point where we can travel on peaceful journeys at supersonic
speeds and can be destroyed by air ships and missiles travel-
ing at the same speed.
In 1948 our government was the only healthy nation in the
free world. We gave of ourselves and our resources to protect
freedom for ourselves and those in the free World who
wanted to become or remain free. We have been through
cold war, hot war, prosperity and depression. At the end of
that period we lace a world in whichthe gap between our
superior military strength and that of our potential adver-
saries has considerably narrowed. Our relative wealth and
economic capability and its superiority over the rest of the
world has shrunk dangerously, as measured by the fact that
our share .of the world GNP has been cut in half, thus
limiting our ability to help ourselves and others. The
monolith that we faced in the cold war has been broken, but
it would be a brave geopolitician who would say that it could
not be restored. Meanwhile, the Chinese and Soviets con-
tinue their separate and competitive campaigns of subver-
sion, most recently in Africa. Soviet support for a com-
munist- take-over in Portugal is of direct concern to our
country.
The number of nation-states in the world has trebled and
the Third World constitutes a new factor replacing the
polarity that existed before. There are supranational forces
such as terrorism and drug traffic, and international com-
binations that never existed before which are inimical to our
national interests.
Our foreign policy must be directed to meet these new
problems. Whether they are all -susceptible of solution by
overt peaceful action is something for the policy makers to
determine. In my belief some of them are not. As I have
pointed put, guerrilla warfare and terrorism are not suscepti-
ble to diplomatic or conventional military or police action.
They threaten the peace of nations directly. involved and, in-
directly, world peace. I do not know whether or what the in-
telligence collectors or the covert action operators are doing
about these threats, hut I hope that the appropriate means
are being considered or employed.
It has been suggested that covert actions endanger
(itente. Evidently, the Soviet and its agent, the KGB, do
not think so. Rut detente is not a fact; it is an evolutionary
movement in an historical process. Our national security is
riot packaged in neat, tight time segments. Even ..vars arc no
longer susceptible to precise dating. The concept of a war
fought by nations against other nations alter formal
declarations, with soldiers crossing national frontiers to fight
other soldiers by an almost chivalric code, has been over-
taken by other forms of armed conflict between nations.
Undeclared wars are fought by "volunteers? in "wars of
national liberation,'" frontiers are crossed by radio waves
from open and clandestine stations; and crossed secretly by
clandestine agents to accomplish by subversion what is im-
politic or impossible by overt means.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2 ice1"tha11%the
To abandon or even suspend the covert action capability is
To
? abandonpkk ai4V giSisk gag ciAtitipsnivoodotictifibsitiobtiori. A
I_ ? / ? nation does not
. a 10 ish the o o tie execu ive because a single in-
action capability is tantamount
to unilateral disarmaMent.
- \\nether and what covert action k desirable and feasible
is beyond my competence, but it, must depend on the judg-
ment of those who have been elected or appointed to exercise
that judgment in our interests. 1f distrust is to paralyze Or
limit our action all of us will suffer. The system has built-in
-checks for those who abuse that trust. The spate of "ex-
posure? by the news media, criminal prosecution and civil
snits, legislative action and public discussion sustain my con-
fidence that no misuse of secret power can do irreparable
harm before it is discovered, and corrective and punitive ac-
tion taken. To withhold that trust because of fear and ap-
prehension is to strip us of our capability to meet threats to
our well-being. No better example of the necessity of placing
that trust in responsible and accountable government of-
ficials is the power in the hands of the President of the
United States over the secret arsenal having the most
destructive force the world has ever known. He can use that
power solely on his judgment and decision because there is
no successful way that we can limit that power and still
protect ourselves against the same potential destructiveness
by hostile forces, against whom ours is a deterrent and
counterforce.
Conclusion
Covert actiou is an appropriate function of government.
Its first mission is the protection of the security of the state.
It offers an optional form of action or supplement to overt
action which is thought to be unacceptable or ineffectual.
The necessary secrecy of such operations is in the public
interest. The scope and methodology of such operations can
be delineated. Management responsibility and accountabili-
ty can be adjusted and specified in the public interest.
The potential for abuse or misuse of covert action is
minimal. It provides no real threat to the constitutional
structure of our government or the rights of its citizenry that
a governmental system of management from within and con-
trol front without the operating agency by the executive and
through legislative oversight would not detect and correct
before any irreparable damage Vi a S done.
cumbent has abused his authority; a municipality does not
abolish its police department because a policeman may have
violated the laws; and a national army is not disbanded in
peacetime.
In the world of today and tomorrow, the retention of the
covert action capability is desirable if not essential, if we are
to survive and further our interests with other nation-states.
We cannot allow the domestic problems of our times to color
our judgment on that need, or so restrict that capability that
it would be ineffectual.
Some of the newly decolonized infant nation states are un-
stable economically as well as politically. Some or the heads
or those states show definite signs or being mentally un-
stable. They represent potential threats to themselves and
their neighbors. And they have shown a disposition to act by
themselves and in concert with others to hold the older and
more developed nation-states hostage to economiC warfare
over natural resources, some of which are essential to the
segurity and well-being of our own country.
The monopoly on nuclear weapons has been broken. The
nations moving into the nuclear field have a potential for
massive destruction to themselves, their neighbors, our own
country and world peace. The supranational forces in
terrorist groups and international drug traffic have bases in
countries which are unwilling or unable to control them. In
all of these new threats to world peace, covert action may he
able to meet these problems independently of oVert action or
to supplement it.
Notes
1. lit ihn. conte?t. lIre Comtnission reeornmended that:.
"Cosert action should mils he :on hori/cd alter collectise eonsideration ?lit, benefits and ricks hs all
ruiii,ihie 401? ?minute,: members. and that:
?Beside, gninting mmliii appros ails, the 41/ Committee should regularl) retie, the sointinuing
propriatenes, actisities ,t111 being pursued.
'P I urr.5l he nrienuleil to require reporting of coscri actton, to the proposed Joint C. ontflinttet: nit
National Securit!.. and to omit IrIs requirement for the personal cerbfication of the Presaticril is to
their IICCCNNIt
2 1- rano.. I )% ()rwin,rml 1.11Fers t;, pre. Nu, . 104:
.1. ?IN:ingrate cscr)thing that Is innid tri stirir opponent', eountr Ins olse the leak,. in onnial
culerlsr1,? and delocr them up to the ,corti 01 their kilo, con nirs mien irtlenin title thou In es crs
,tsti can i se the lirurslr de and e ,ccrahle it I unfit nlitals, cause trouble hs eter!. k 11.11111 their
gotcrilitivnt. spread discord ;Ind quarrel, in the opposing AVnt'alt;1111: tinUflp ,,12.1nlist the ttld.
rlcstrtms iii their means. ill tit. their IA capons. and otiose all the discipline tit their .irtnictl
'Ana, Minn:tile their traelittons and %aim,. he gum:rows iii still riler nit ressards to nit inn
.111t1 .14:0/1110,, Put see rd agents users, hen: :NI:cc I stint unit .tittir promise,. mr'nniri
reap rich rcnard, lire supreme c?s Ocoee is not to ntn no hundred siCtOries nil ti hondred baffle,. the
Ntipt eine es,ellence Is Inn sit tune 1nuiiI tilt:Mit, it iftlnitll 11-.Iting to light thentf.--Stin lint. liii 1-; in
11rip. train.lation Its Samuel 11 ( ruliiuin I tarcinlon Pres...0,1.1.11.; Press. 1 ondon. Int,1
4. Wen n ugur..1r, rcr II urn ri fiti/einnit/ern e. Duck, Sloan & Pearce. N 1 . 1955. p
5. See Ilenr, Merritt SI. risaon, F. tetleffile Ageom ?It .1nInT/(11,1 f SliAn I
Inrc, nrrn Diplontilin: I ilsInnt,. In2.1- Johns Illinknn, IhtlInnutf, 1929. ;nnd Poo- Ntsmn.
Cdott,cster. Nlass Inni, pp 117.19. i67. 77!,. 121-4.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
(before remold/Minn, Feliruar) 17, 1976i
PRESIDFNT
Nat ifflial Security c?nincil
I?
Intelligence Committee] - t tumult tee
Direcior of Cent rol Intelligence .
('IA DIA NSA ST11'. A- 1:11I -r It EA
('IAU RV EN1,12GY RI.SIARCII
I 1 I --1
5, (1510 84 DEVI.I.OPNILNT
/ 1 .
/ A ',.
/ ,
I
.,
ARMY
?Intelligence
?C
chtnt Ire W. ttr,,nrnni Njrhols
?
AIR l'ORCI:
-Intelligence
Cl5pttnitngit:SQ1AnCe
OteflIC.1.1 RAN:On/WM.111,T
Iprap ,1,
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
L11.4 Ur., i) uiuiii
MAY 1976
Approved For Release 2005/02/17; CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Let's ?
Stop Undermining -
the CIA..
If the United States is to continue as a flag-bearer
against totalitarianism, says this former Secretary of
Defense, it must protect and preserve our international
intelligence network
BY MELVIN R. LATRD
-","Ii: AMERICANS are on the
, verge of doing ourselves
7
? ? what our worst enemies
have been unable to do: destroy our
intelligence services.
Last year, Senate .and House com-
mittees began searching investiga-
tions of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The investigators intent
was honorable, and they have
brought to light ? malpractices that
must be curbed. According to Con-
gressional findings and CIA admis-
sions, during the 29 years the CIA
has existed-5947 to 5976?agency
personnel perpetrated the following
questionable acts of domestic espio-
nage: They illegally entered four
homes or offices, tapped the phones
of 27 people, placed five U.S. citizens
under surveillance and infiltrated
ten agents into the anti-war move-
ment. Eor over two decades, they
opened private mail received by
Americans from communist coun-
tries. Additionally, in examining
possible foreign influence on the
anti-war movement, the CIA ac-
cumulated files on approximately
lo,000 American citizens.
The side effects of these investi-
gations, however, have proved
much more harmful to the country
than the ills that Congress sought to
remedy. As CBS commentator Eric
Sevareid recently declared: "We've
had Congressmen breaking solemn
agreements with the Executive by
leaking classified information in the
name of higher laws of their selec-
tion. We have had journalists break-
pp.:41nued
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
ing their word on i kIVERWAF011B41941%0PWPAtliTii ciii.-P.5)78M19)26649AVPsqkfiiqii (1-Nq'igees and
received off the record by leaking it state of war existed between the the President as essential to the na-
to other journalists, which is morally United States and Cuba, the CIA tional interest, have collapsed in the
he same as publishing it themselves. involved itself in unsuccessful plots glare of publicity. For instance, dis-
Nowincl, worsc, we've had zealots pub- to kill Fidel Castro. It also con- closures that the United States has
lishing the names of American in- sidered poisoning Patrice Lumumba used submarines in Soviet territorial
telligence personnel?which, in this of the Republic of the Congo. But waters to monitor Russian weapons
time of terrorists everywhere, in- the prosaic truth, as established by tests have greatly diminished the
creases the risk of kidnapping and the skeptical Senate investigators, is flow of this vital intelligence.
murder. in do this is to commit the that the CIA never assassinated any-
The hemorrhage of secrets is als9
moral equivalent of treason." one anywhere. destroying the CIA's capacity to act
The dubious acts committed by Hemorrhage of Secrets. As the covertly in Western interests. Some-
the CIA have been distorted and CIA's legitimate secret operations times the discreet provision of
magnified, while lurid charges flour- are exposed and its sensitive intelli- money, information, advice and
ished, often without a scintilla of gence-gathering methods irresponsi- other requested help affords the only
substantiation. For example: bly illuminated, our first line of practical means of countering sub-
Allegation: The CIA jeopardized defense against dank ?and our version abroad.'Repeatedly, the So-
public health by conducting bio-- only defense against covert attack viet Union has sought to subvert
logical-warfare experiments in New ---_is becoming increasingly para- other nations by buying control of
-York City subways. Fact: The ly_zed, In foreign parliaments and politicians, bureaucrats, journalists
Army, to assess vulnerability of the press, the feasibility of confidential and trade-union leaders, by sur-
transit system to sabotage, placed collaboration with America has been reptitiously supplying vast sums to
some innocuous powder in a sub- publicly questioned. Some countries build the local communist party into
way, then measured how far it was have stopped confiding in us almost the dominant political force. Plans
wafted down the tunnel. The test entirely for fear their confidences to coriabat such subversion lose all
menaced nobody. The CIA had no will be broken by Congress or the effectiveness if announced. If iclenti-
part in it. press. Individual foreigners who fled, recipients of our assistance for-
Allegation: The CIA placed secret have risked their lives to secretly feit credibility and become instant
informants on the White House staff serve the United States?including targets of venomous attack by corn-
to spy on the Presidency. Its chief agents well placed in the Soviet bloc munists and others.
White House "contact man" for a and the Third World?have quit Record of Success. In an ideal
hue was Alexander P. Butterfield; out of fear of identification. The world, we would need neither intel-
'Tater director of the Federal Aviation difficulty of enlisting reliable new ligence services nor armed forces.
Administration. Fact: Butterfield foreign sources has increased greatly. But we must have both if we are to
never had any connection with the Meanwhile, scores of gifted survive in the real world of 1976,
CIA. For the past 20 years, like other American men and women in the ? which has become very unsafe for
agencies, the CIA, at White House CIA possessing priceless expertise democracy and the United States.
request, has routinely assigned spe- and experience have been disgusted Of the earth's 158 nations, only_39.,
cialists to the Presidential staff, at the pillory with which their presently milmain democratic,
Allegation: The CIA has assassi- patriotism has been rewarded, and representative_ governments and
nate(' foreign leaders and perhaps many have even left. Important in- open societies. Many of the. totaTi-
even some Americans. Fact: More telligence undertakings, approved tarian nations are fanatic in their
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
hostility to freedomPWrPovIi\clifegl-- Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
ca, Our access to many indispensable
threats which did not actual] exist. Through infiltration of variou; ;
? - "
Current efforts to negotiate curtail- terrorist movements, the CIA has
natural resources depends upon
meat of the nuclear-arms race arc aborted numerous plots. On at least
fragile regimes. The co mplex daily
functioning of our society is threat-
possible only because our precise In. two occasions, the CIA has fore-
cued by the phenomenon of inter-
telligence enables us to count every stalled assassins bound for the
national terrorism. Meanwhile, the
Soviet missile, submarine and bomb- United States with orders to kill
Russians?besides their worldwide er, and to monitor Soviet compliance elected public officials. It has also
subversion, finnenting of revolution with the treaties achieved. If we thwarted plans to kill prominent
and support of terrorism?persist in destroy the effectiveness of the CIA, Anie.rican Jews with letter bombs.
an enormous, costly effort to attain we vill destroy with it whatever While Israel's premier Goida Meir
undisputed military supremacy with hope there is of negotiating any was visiting New York- City on ;
which they hope to intimidate the significant disarmament. March 4, 1973, police rushed to busy
West into further retreat. Timely intelligence 'has helped midtown intersections and hauled
avert- war. During the x973 Arab- away two cars with enough Soviet-
To cope with all these threats and
uncertainties, we must keep our-
Israeli conflicts, U.S. intelligence? made explosives to kill everybody
selves continuously and accurately
live agents and technical surveillance within a 100-yard radius. The ter-
informed as to what is happening,
?detected Soviet preparations to rorist explosives were timed to deto-
dispatch troops to the Middle East. nate at noon, when streets would bc
especially in those areas shrouded in
totalitarian secrecy. To repel covert
Thus alerted, we were able to?initiate most crowded. The disaster was pre-
urgent diplomatic and other actions vented because we had advance
aggression, we must resort at times
that persuaded the Russians to forgo warning of it.
to covert methods. President Harry
Truman and Congress recognized military intervention. Shortly before Christmas, 1973, the
this when they created the CIA in
A few years ago, our agents?or CIA learned that six small, hand-
1947. And this unchanged reality _
spies, if you will?ascertained that carried Soviet SA-7 missiles?ex-
has been recognized by every subse-
one non-communist country was tremely accurate against low-flying
quent President?and Congress,
about to attack another. Details can- aircraft?were being smuggled in
not yet be made public. But we Libyan diplomatic pouches to Black ;
except the present one.
Having served first on one of quickly and privately brought the September terrorists in Europe. The I
the Congressional committees that countries together, laid out the facts, terrorists planned to shoot down a I
oversee our intelligence apparatus,
induced them to negotiate. CIA 747 landing in Rome. However, act-
and later as Secretary of Defense,
espionage thus pt:evented a war. jug on CIA intelligence, European
I
am familiar with some of the accom-
Since late r973,-11S. intelligence governments disrupted the operation
plishments of our intelligence serv-
/has given both- Israel and Egypt con- and spared the lives of hundreds of
ices. Consider: siderable sense of security by con- holiday travelers.
During the past 25 ,years, the So-
tinuously showing each what the The CIA has Pustrated COMM It-
viet Union has not developed- a
other is doing militarily. Given nisi ---SUbversion? of other- nations.
.
silTle major new weapon without proof that neither is about to pounce After World War II, the Soviet Un-
our ,notving . well in advance. on the other, the Arabs -and Israelis ion sponsored .a massive clandestine
k _
Without such knowledge, have been willing at least to try to effort to impose communist dicta-
-- we un-
devise a formula for Middle East torships on a weakened Western
told billions preparing to counter
doubtedly would have wasted un-
harmony. Our intelligence has Europe.-Communist operatives, dis-
,bought the necessary time. pcnsing millions of dollars, organ-
synAip.tatd
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Appro4e4ROIRPkalS10:2:00KaitIVRICIA-RDPRI8M6.460R0110110kiki0p628e2
covertly. Military action can succeed
only if understood and endorsed by
the public as well as Congress. How-
ever, if we abandon our capacity to
discreeEly help those who wish to
resist externally inspired subversion
?totalitarianism of either the left or
right?we will reduce ourselves to a
choice of abandoning them entirely
or sending in the Marines.
IN sum: If we allow our intelli-
gence services-to- be rendered impo-
tent, we will signal friend and foe
alike that we lack both the will and
the means to compete with totalitar-
janism. Unable to protect ourselves;
or our friends abroad, America-
"will shrink into isolationism, and
our economy, denied essential for-
eign resources, will shrivel. Then -
we, and certainly our children, will
discover too late that there is no
place to hide from totalitarianism.
As a former Secretary of Defense,
I believe that we should maintain
armed forces stronger than those of
any potential enemy. But without an
cqually strong intelligence service,
our. nation can never be secure. I:
know that. So do our friends- and
antagonists throughout the world.
aid and engender chaos. They in-
filtrated the press, tried to buy elec-
tions. By providing intelligence,
money and counsel, the CIA gave
anti-totalitarian factions a fighting
chance to resist. Given this chance,
the Europeans proceeded - to build
healthy democracies, indispensable
to our own welfare.
During the 196os, with Soviet
backing, Cuba tried to ignite guer-
rilla warfare and violent revolution
in Latin America. While quietly
urging needed social reforms, the
CIA offered Latin Americans the
intelligence and training they needed
to repel Cuban aggression. The
communists were defeated .in Bo-
livia, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay,
Guatemala and the Dominican Re-
public. Much the same pattern was
repeated in sections of Africa where
the Russians sought to establish new
colonies for themselves. In the Mid-
dle East, too, the CIA has repeatedly
aborted Soviet plots to seize control
of Arab nations.
In retrospect, it is obvious that not
all of the covert actions undertaken
by the United States in the past 20
years have been wise or justified. I
strongly believe that we never again
MELVIN R. LAIRD Was a U.S. Congressman
from Wisconsin for x6 years, before serving
as Secretary of Defense horn 1969 to 1973.
11c is now Reader's Digest's senior counsellor
for national and international affairs.
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800100008-2
-;"
?
? 7"-'7". ?
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP78M02560R000800100008-2
x ?
International Advisory Editorial Board:
W.A.C.Adie, Senior Research Fellow in International Relations, -Research School of Pacific
Studies, The Australian National University; Daniel Bell, Professor of Sociology, Harvard;
fa Beloff, Principal, ,University College at - Buckingham ;_,Zbigniew Brzezins.ki, Director,:. .
-