CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003700310001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 5, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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5 June 1958
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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CLASS. CHANGED TO.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5 June 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-France: Moscow's caution regarding the
French situation appears to be based on a desire to keep
the way open for a deal with De Gaulle should the oppor-
tunity arise. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
Indicated to the American and French ambassadors in
Moscow that the USSR was perplexed about developments
in France and about what line Soviet policy should take.
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan told the West German am-
bassador that the Soviet Union was not concerned about
De Gaulle's coming to power because his eventual failure
. would pave the way for the Communists.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Government forces have moved to counter
new rebel activity in the Biqa Valley area and in Tripoli,
and further military action is expected. Syri
determined to keep the fight-
ressing hard to send reinforce-
ments into a anon with or without the consent of Lebanese
Indonesia: The Indonesian National party (PNI), the
largest non-Communist group in Java with the largest repre-
sentation in the cabinet, within the last week openly attacked
the Communist party (PKI) for the first time. A PNI state-
ment of 27 May denounced the Communists' overt domestic
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political tactics. A statement by the East Java branch of
the PNI on 3 June charged that the Communists' "dissolve-
25X1 SEATO campaign" indicated that the PKi was an instrument
UL a foreign power.
'\ q
S SION
MEN,
Tunisia-France: Prospects for a settlement of French-
Tunisian difficulties remain uncertain, De Gaulle's note of
2 June to Bourguiba was cooler but more precise than the
general's note to the King of Morocco, and Bourguiba's gloom
probably has not been dispelled. Bourguiba has told the Amer-
scan ambassador that he is not optimistic about his relations
with the new French government. He still insists on the
evacuation of French troops, and desires that the American-
British good offices remain available.
(Page 4)
III. THE WEST
De Gaulle's position on NATO: De Gaulle is making a
major effort to reassure France's allies, especially the United
States, about the soundness of his relationship to NATO. So-
eialist Minister of State Mollet is reported to have been as-
signed to follow foreign affairs, "in particular relations with
the Anglo-Saxon countries." President Coty's chief civilian
adviser is optimistic that France will be a "solid though
probably difficult" ally in NATO. Points on which difficulties
can be expected include De Gaulle's known desire for a greater
5 June 58 DAILY BRIEF ii
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 French role in military planning and his probable intention
to speed up France's attainment of an independent nuclear
weapons capability.
INMENNININ
*De Gaulle's position on Algeria: De Gaulle's 4 June
,promise of political equality to Algerian Moslems, a logical
extension of the public professions of the Algiers civilian
and military junta, actually runs counter to the increasingly
apparent opposition of the extremists to any real change
in the status quo in Algeria. E
De Gaulle's long-range plans ria Involve some form
of autonomy and federation with France, ajpblicy which is
anathema to extremists, and it is unlikely that he intended
this address as a final policy guide. De Gaulle's promise,
if accompanied by an honest implementation of franchise
laws, might induce the uncommitted majority of the 9,000,-
000 Moslems to adopt a more cooperative attitude toward
France, but is not likely to find support among Moslem ex-
tremists. The FLN rebel leadership, which considers his
speech "no basis whatsoever for a reconciliation," will con-
tinue to fight for recognition of Algeria's right to independ-
ence. Morocco and Tunisia will probably adopt a cautious
if not distrustful, attitude toward De Gaulle's proposal.
Italy: Recent indications are that the Democratic So-
cialists intend to reject any Christian Democratic overtures
to join a coalition, pending clarification of the prospects of
Socialist reunification. Such a refusal would appear to assure
continuation of a minority - all - Christian Democratic gov-
ernment, since the other allies of the former center coali-
tion cannot form a jajority by themselves.
(Page 6)
5 June 58
DAILY BRIEF
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Tripoli
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Beirut
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Bayt ad Din*
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ISRAEL
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~' . Damascus
Y R I A
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UNCLASSIFIED
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L. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
No Back-up Material
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Crisis in Lebanon
Government security forces have moved to counter new
rebel activity in the Tripoli area, and rebel attacks on the
city are expected. Sporadic clashes continue in the Bina
Valley
e rut g the night
of 3-4 June. The following day, more bombs were set off,
and Lebanese Army troops fought a three-hour battle with
insurgents in the city's main Moslem quarter. The in-
creased bombings by rebel extremists probably. reflect an
attempt to promote instability and to maintain
of the rebellion pending new opposition moves
the momentum
While the military situation re sentially in a
stalemate, Syria[ trivin to
maintain
- anagover
in northern and southern T,Ahnnnn 1nrl i?
nment
+1,n a;-
groups rem- n
-
5 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Despite possible Arab League and UN Security Council
efforts to settle the crisis in Lebanon, the buildup of UAR-
supported rebel forces suggests that the opposition, or at
least the UAR, wants a solution of the crisis by force rather
than by political compromise. A Cairo radiobroadcast on
3 June quoted Lebanese opposition leader Jumblatt to the
effect that the antigovernment forces sought "a united com-
mand, coordination of action, and a permanent revolution
council, because these will expedite the end of the crisis
in Lebanon." Although the words may not be Jumblatt`s,
they suggest that Cairo seeks to sustain and control the
rebellion until its political objective of removing Chamoun
from power is accomplished. The American Embassy in
Beirut also reports that the opposition is becoming more
articulate in advocating elections to install a new pro-UAR
parliament whichw.ouldchoose Chamoun?s successor.
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Indonesian National Party Attacks Communists
The central board of the Indonesian National party,
which cooperated with the Communist party in the 1955
parliamentary elections, for the first time has openly at-
tacked the Communists, an action which has been followed
by an even stronger denunciation by the party's provincial
branch in East Java. The National party is the largest non-
Communist party in Java and the largest group represented
in the cabinet.
On 27 May, the National party central board issued a
press statement which, although not naming the Communists,.
was clearly directed against them. It accused them of "ex-
ploiting every possible opportunity as a field of agitation aimed
at acquiring political ends." The East Java branch reaffirmed
the central board's statement on 3 June and added that the Com-
munist party's "dissolve -SEATO campaign" was an indication
that the Communists were an instrument of a foreign power.
The statement declared that the dissolution of SEATO was not
an internal affair of Indonesia. It further branded the Com-
munist party as a traitor to the goal of revolution and cited
open Communist rebellion at Madiun, Central Java, in 1948,
and the use of Communist-dominated village guard units in
a minor insurrection in North Sumatra in October 1957. The
American Embassy in Djakarta comments that this is the first
time an Indonesian party has been willing to state publicly that
SEATO is of no concern to Indonesia.
The Communists have replaced the National party in the
last two years as the largest party in Java., and the Nationalists
have also largely lost the personal backing of President Su-
karno. With general elections scheduled for 1959, the Na-
tionalists face a battle for survival as a major party.
On the military side, the army announced that Dj ,ilolo
on Halmahera Island was captured on 3 June and that the
500 dissidents there were "destroyed."
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Outlook for Tunisian-French Relations
Prospects for a settlement of French-Tunisian difficul-
ties remain uncertain despite De Gaulle's note of 2 June to
Bourguiba, which was notably cooler than his message to
the King of Morocco and probably has not dispelled Bour-
guiba's gloom. The Tunisian press criticized De Gaulle's
statement that he intended settling "present difficulties"
for failing to specify that this settlement would include
early French evacuation from Tunisia. The Tunisians ap-
parently believe that De Gaulle's principal aim is less to
renew talks than to eliminate Anglo-American good offices.
In his reply to the De Gaulle note, Bourguiba stated
that Tunisia was anxious to "eliminate the major obstacles"
and stressed the need for a mutually satisfactory settle-
ment. He told the American ambassador on 2 June that he
nevertheless was not optimistic about future French-Tunisian
relations. He still insists on the evacuation of French troops
and desires that Anglo-American good offices remain avail-
able.
On 30 May, Tunisia rejected a French proposal, said
to have had De Gaulle's concurrence, for the evacuation of
most of the 9,000 French troops outside the Bizerte base
and the negotiation before 1 July of an agreement on Bizerte.
The Tunisians suggested instead that the timetable for
evacuation be reduced to two months and cover all forces,
including those at Bizerte, and the evacuation of radar out-
posts. They stiptylated that there be no connection between
the negotiation of a provisional solution for Bizerte and the
evacuation timetable, and asked for a Tunisian observer at
Bizerte. They rejected the idea of neutral observers at
southern airfields, but said they would reconsider this de-
cision if Anglo-American good offices were continued and
the neutral observers reported to the American and British
embassies in Tunis in accordance with the 15 March ggod
officproposals.
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III. THE WEST
France
General de Gaulle is making a major effort to reas-
sure France's allies, particularly the United States, that
he intends to respect the NATO alliance.
He is reported to have asked Socialist Minister of
State Guy Mollet to advise on foreign relations, "in par-
ticular relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries," and to
have assigned Etienne Manach, a diplomat well and favora-
bly known to the US Embassy, as Moilet's assistant on
matters which "would largely involve Americans." General
Paul Ely's reappointment. as chief of staff, though primari-
ly a move toward healing the break between the government
and the French Army, is also reassuring at the military
level of the alliance in view of Ely's firmly pro-NATO po-
sition. According to an aide, De Gaulle hopes to visit
all the NATO members in the autumn.
President Coty's chief civil adviser, who claims to
have conducted the preinvestiture soundings of De Gaulle's
views on NATO on behalf of political party leaders, is op-
timistic that France will be a "solid though probably diffi-
cult" ally in NATO.
Some of the difficulties which can be expected include
De Gaulle's known desire for a greater French role in mili-
tary planning. The appointment to the cabinet and presuma-
bly to a top Defense Ministry post of Pierre Guillaumat, ad-
ministrator general of the French Atomic Energy Commis-
sariat, indicates De Gaulle's probable intention to expedite
France's already well-advanced program to develop its own
nuclear weapons.
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The Italian Political and Economic Situation
Italy's Democratic Socialists in their newspaper La
Giustizia on 3 June dashed any Christian Democratic hopes
for a coalition pending clarification of the prospects for re-
unification with the Nenni Socialists. Continuation of the
past year's minority Christian Democratic government seems al-
most certain since the former allies of the center coalition
do not together have the seats necessary to form a majority.
S
uch a government, according to the American Embassy,
would have difficulty dealing with the serious economic prob-
lems which may face it in the next few months.
Despite the generally rapid recovery and growth of the
Italian economy since the end of the war, basic problems
such as paucity of natural resources, widespread unemploy-
ment, and the underdeveloped south remain. To these prob-
lems has been added a contraction in the rate of industrial
expansion, which at present stems largely from internal
causes such as lower public expenditures, declining housing
activity, and excess industrial capacity in certain sectors.
This trend may soon be accentuated by a reduction in Italy's
exports and income from tourism and emigrant remittances
as a result of depressed conditions in other countries.
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