GENERAL CRITIQUE OF YUGOSLAV POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A003200390010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 8, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
CO"ID'NT-UL
DATE OF INFO.
Yugoslavia
General Critique of Yugoslav
Political Situation
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brutally suppressed.
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of .Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO.
REFERENCES
$ Jan. 1954
14
Stability of the Tito Regime?
At the present time and under the current set of circumstances, the Tito
regime is backed solidly by the police and the army. His. security forces
exercise complete control-over the population in all parts of the country
and any organized uprising has not the slightest chance of success 'With
American aid bolstering the Yugoslav economy, not even passive' resistance
is possible for a long period of time; and a threat to the regime from
the anti-camImnist masses, is unthinkable as long as Tito enjoys this'
Western support.
2. There are today only two in, though persistent, threats to the Tito
regime'. one is the possibility of a "palace revolution" by those Who
have so far been successful in disguising their real feelings and main-
taining superficial loyalty to Tito. Tito understands the nature of
this threat and from -hat direction it may come. Thus the vigilance
of his security forces is mainly directed against the Cominform and its
potential exponents. Such exponents, if detected, or'exposed by provo-
cation, are immediately eliminated from influential positions or
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3. As l6hg as Tito enjoys Western support, the rank-and-file of his Party have
no i?ee.soii to fear for their privileged positions, and the potential "palace
rev olutio.ries" have little chance ' to- win them over; for the security
organs will ateiy with Tito and successfully control the situation in the
army mind inthe Party. However, if Western help were discontinued and the
very er$.stence of: the regime once more became dependent on Moscow, the
potential obn piratoiri' vohl d have a better chance to capture the remainder
of the Party-for''theiseives and for Moscow. Under such conditions the
sec&ity-organs would lose theii? grip on the Party cadres, and a'."pala:ce
revolution"would `b;ecome' almost a certainty. Tito and his clique` xould be
eliminated. Should Tito?s` elimination be impossible, i~ or some reason. or
anoCherq'a'schism iii' the Par`t* and a civil war would surely follow. 'Once
real6 t to 6Yme ` le .'.meide, Tito' and his anti-Cominform group would probably
cdmisnd a large part'of the lower Party cadres, and for a while also a
laro .pe.,rt'of the general populace, especially if the West intervenes
s6tively, or until the danger from the Comsini'orm group had been removed.
However should Moscow intervene actively and on a large-scale, Tito
would have no chance for -%nrvival.
The second danger facing the Tito regime is the recent development of
friendl.iei. r oelati6ns between Moscow and Tito. Since the bulk of the Yugo-
slav,Party desires a rapprochement with the Kremlin, it may well happen
tY at' Moeco ' to extending a friendly band in order to push the Party
cadres into.some provocative action against the West with the end result
that Western support is killed and Yugoslavia made dependent on~~sscow.
The Trieste question might provide a basis for such action.
his clique would be liquidated while the popula-
Tit
o ans
this happen,
tion would either remain passive or be pushed into some desperate action
against the pro-Soviet regime, hoping for active Western intervention.
The key question revolves around the Soviet attitude and actions, for the
Soviet Union took the initiative in expelling Tito from the Cominforu.
The final step, therefore, belongs to.the Soviets; re-consolidation with
Yugoslavia as it presently exists, or liquidation of Tito and his clique.
6. There is no question about Tito's ability to make friends. Nis wartime
mysticisms and his post-war propaganda have definitely left a residue of
some sympathy or admiration for him as a personality. Further, he ban
often found ways to show his disapproval of some of his own regime's
unpopular administrative measures, with the result that people often
wonder whether Tito himself is not after-all may a benevolent person
surrounded by common cr' inale who terrorize and exploit the populace
behind his back. Following the Tito-Cominform break in 1948, Tito's
personal position in the eyes of the common man in Yugoslavia increased.
His stature increased until he gave a speech in Kraljevo in 1952 in
which he brushed away all allegations that he might be abandoning a
strict communist line by identifying himself completely the
(eo rty.
After the Coninform break, the imprisonment
reactionaries) continued along with the persecution of Cominformi.sts.
At the same time, however, people felt that with increasing Western
economic and military assistance, the political and. economic system in
Yugoslavia should have softened. But at Kral.ievo Tito uttered threats
against reactionaries who dared raise their beads and threatened the
opposition with a second great purge, worse than the one in 1944-46.
Consecguently, if the Yugoslav people in general ever respected Tito as
a national hero and as a person with the welfare of his people in mind,
he proved amply that he is and remains a communist dictator who offers
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no hope for a brighter future to the suffering population. Today the Yugo-
slav populace consider Tito directly responsible for all hardship brought
upon them by the regime... In fact, with respect to the actions of the U ,
Tito Is held directly responsible and not his Minister of the, Interior
Rankovic .
Mulffir Attitudes and Resistance
,7. Eatred against and opposition to the regime is prevalent throughout the
country. Tito?-a e tic$ent control is least effective iu the Repi blic of
Serbia. -This is due iat?gei.y `to the patriotic feeling, -pa ssion, Patriarchic
social structure, and rebel.. tradition of the Serbs. In times of strife,
the regime will "fame its toughest problem of control in Serbia because of
the Serbs? indomitable spirit-of freedom.
8. ' the basin of logical reasoning, however; the most -widely organized
opposition in a time of great crisis would arise in Slovenia because of
the X11-kao sense of organization and realism possessed by the Slovenes.
Against the successful resistance in Slovenia
P iity a prolonged,
- ?assib
is "the Eepublic a well-developed system of communications and its geograph-
ical position along the path of aggression.
n the wild fighting between
9. Tito 1s s Montenegro becaus-e In
Satter suffered heavy losaes
coimhuiis' nationalists during.-au
'ue', g . use Titorewarded his Montenegrin followers with the high positions
and beca ,
is ' his' admiiii tration. However, it must be remembered that pro-Russian
sentiments - used to be strongest in Montenegro.
10. BOB axi e,~Hceg , is equally amenable to control due to the terribly
suppressed standards of life and urgent need for food and shelter existing
in this area. For a, handful of "something" the regime can impose its
authority among the populace of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
11. The most anti-comeiunist social class is the peasantry throughout the country.
With the dissolution of collectives, Party control over the peasant em-sses
will become more tenuous. The few independent artisans are also staunch
anti-communists. On the other hand, factories, collective enterprises, and
the new voluntary cooperatives, represent Tt'occupational strong-points
in the country, as did once the German garrisons.
12. Another important factor to be considered when assessing Tito?s internal
position is that of national ity. The present regime has inherited the
pre-war distrust among the var34us Yugoslav peoples, a distrust which
during the war was aroused to peaks of hatred and desire for annihilation.
the cot u ists used this mutual hatred during the war their so rceed
of recruitment. After the war, the regime continually preached and
unity and brotherhood among Yugoslav peoples. By adopting this policy
definite merits mist be credited to the regime. The hatred between Serbs
and Croats has been reduced partly by mess-,"a taken by the regime and
partly by the common distress suffered by Yugoslavs of all ethnic origins.
However, the national problem of Yugoslavia has been solved by the regime
only temporarily. It might break out again some time in the near future
during a time of national crisis.
13. The average well-educated Yugoslav believes that his liberation from the
communist yoke can come. only through scar or foreign intervention. The
the
Yugoslav people in general desire war also because they view it asu ee
only means of their liberation from communism, but the general pop
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is tired, demoralized, apathetic, and expects aid from abroad. There are
many signs of impatience, however, and many people are inclined to 'fi_Jit
rather than suffer indefinitely. Assistance through war is expected par-
tio9ularly from the United States, while Britain is considered guilty of
treason by the Yugoslav masses.
14. Yugoslav people in general view war as inevitable partly because they cannot
wait a longer for liberation, and partly because they view with optimism
the enormous efforts made by America in the armament race,, They believe
that this war material mast be put to use or sated, and they are convinced
that the United States will not allow a tremendous vantage of economic
resources and allow its rivals to reach a position of equality in the field
of technology.. Thus they expect the United States to launch a preventive
war in order to save herself and the. rest of humanity from final disaster.
15. Regarding Yugoslav-Soviet relations, the people are cognizant of the possi-
bility of a rapprochement and the dangers of such action. A realignment
with the Kremlin would expose the populace not only to Tito ? s limited power
but to that of the entire Soviet orbit. People in general, however, do
not,believe that a return to the Soviet orbit is possible as long as Tito
asad'his clique are in power. The widespread feeling that Tito represents
the les'sak'of two evils helped Tito and his regime considerably during
the last economic orisii, When a decisive peasant effort could have com-
pletely undermined the regime. American aid to the regime and its demoral-
izing effects on the general populace also .precluded any positive action
at that time.
16. Nora-communist Yugoslavs would accept any return to the Soviet orbit with
fear, and,,disillusionmenat. In the present situation the masses must suffer
the Tito ?eg me. its representatives but they are still able to f id
Pd '
ways to ?eaista Popular resistance or passive resistance, especially
among the peasants, has already produced some fruits, and the regime ;Etas
been' forced to ma'am, concessions 'in many areas'. This, together with the
material aid from the West, had made the situation much better.. The
terror has grova less acute; the police have been paying more attention
to possible activities of pro-Soviet sympathizers, and their attention
bas been divided bietreeen "the reaction" and Ceminform followers. Thus
non-communists in the middle have not had to bear the entire burden of
the police state. Another important factor to be considered in this connec-
tion is that the terror has been limited to Yugoslavia?s borders, that is
to say that there is now no possibility for the regime to dispose of
whole sections of the population by sending them to Siberia. However,
although Tito needs some evidence of popular support in his disputes with
the last and the West., the masses will never be a decisive factor in a
possible rapprochement with Moscow. *1 masses have no power 1.thout
foreign help or plans.
17. At the moment there exists no organized resistance in Yugoslavia; there
are not even any potential organized resistance groups.
the form of a spirit and willingness to stand up when the proper time has
comes'. Foreign intervention would assure any chance of success which
iividual leaders or groups might have. The present Western attitude of
helping Tito has greatly disorientated potential opposition groups and
has definitely postponed the appearance of any. In the event of war or
foreign intervention, however, resistance groups would spring up all over
the country. These groups would be bound together by one common denomin-
atorp hatred against the communists. Joint organized action with a.
common operational objective could be imposed only from the outsideo It
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is commonly expected that the territory liberated by the Allies would stay
occupied for a considerable period of time, but it would be a grave mistake
to allow either German or Italian troops to act as so-called liberators or
occupiers. The American army is viewed by the general populace as the
wear?o
preferred occupational force in the event of
18 In the event of liberation and occupation by American forces, anti-coamnanist
Yugoslavs would advance the following alterative to the Tito regime: a
temporary administrative composed of the liberation organs and such poli-
tical organizations that have a positive following in the populace. Oppo-
sition. would be advan,_ted by the old political groups, if still in existence,
or groups which maintained a more car less passive but anti-communist atti-
tude. As soon as p)ossible, under the supervision of the occupying forces,
free elections should be organized yin order to produce a genuine popular
ththe eeoldfpoli~~al
reppresentative form of government. Collaboration with
parties in Yugoslavia would probably prove
followers of the Peasant Party leader Mm ek in Croatia, clericals in Slovenia,
and monarchists in Serbia,, the old parties have lost all contact with
reality in communist Yugoslavia.
19 After the fall, of c c unism in !ugosle.vie.q all ethnic groups will be (occu-
pied in attempts to eradicate everything connected with communism. This
urgent desire viil keep rational vanity intact for a short period of time
The accumulated hatred of communism will provide sufficient time for the
liberating fo c es to prevent excesses and establish a new order and audkin-
istration before the consequences of ethnic differences become acute ".once:
d in._ t te`r.,, however, these differences will appear once ageain, especially
because o+f a previous dispersion of portions of ethnic groups o The post-
war emigrate,, a :th all their mutual distrust and hatred accumulated during
the wa~r and 'the' ldiig period of exile, should be prevented from becoming
influential 'before order has been thoroughly enforced and a new' democratic
system f irm yr 0atabitsehed o The liberating armor should not be guilty of
bringing these "old sinners" back to Yugoslavia on its bayonets.
206 E the general, pcpulae* would act in the event of war and large-scale
guerrillas. action. led by Tito depends largely on the nature of this guer-
rilla ,, if it were directed against the Soviets, the populace would
probably support the ' guerrillas, or at least would be successfully forced
into such saapport. This support would last until a Soviet victory a rgeared
positive. At, this moment nobody would risk exposure to the Soviets by
supporting a lost cause a Thus in choosing between Tito and the Soviets,
the general populace would favor Tito as "the lesser evil until the
chances for h1e success appear dead. Should Tito receive Western support..
the pp ,, a would probably support any guerrilla action against the
Soviets, in the hope that by so doing the country might be ridded of
communism MI-together. Such help would in reality be aid to the West;, not
to the Tito clique, and would be so viewed by those who supported Tito.
The Union lam, ats - lee Orientation and Factions
21. The entire Party will remain solidly behind Tito as long as he gives' evi-
dence of being firmly in power and as long as he manages to keep out of direct
conflict with the Zaast or the West, Conflict with either the West or the
East would expose differences in the Party, because the most important
o
incentive for coatanuiist followers in Yugoslavia is to stay in power e and toot
retain their lucrative posts- This incentive to remain loyal
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regime would be severely strained should war occur; too mach' uncertainty
would be prevalent and too many Party members would be choosing one side
or the other in an attempt to escape from being on the losing team.
22. Tito?s personal guard can be considered completely loyal; they are selected
for this reason. The regular army cadres are also personally loyal to Tito.
This does not include,.however, the reserve personnel who would make the bulk
of the army in the event of mobilization.
23. The old communist cadres, those who have been communists for a period of
time longer than they have known Tito as a leader',: or who have grown
together with Tito under Moscow. influence, are loyal td.the communist cause
.rather than to Tito as an individual.. Many of these men are disillusioned
.and have been put aside or liquidated. This kind of communist will be
against Tito in the event of a showdown, with the Kremlin. They' will remain
'with Tito only as long as Moscow does not intervene directly. An outstand-
ing men ber of : this faction is Edvard Kardeli and his follovers . It is
inc.onceivabe.Vthat these people would march against Moscow; although the
hest might conclude that they are ready to do so because of their "present
"O'lowning". Even now, the break with Moscow is for these people a natter
- of personal and doctrinal diitre,se which they hope will not last forever.
Rowever, as-long as Moeaow does not intervene directly, this faction will
remain ostensibly. loyal to Tito because the members of it can thereby
retain their decisive roles in the regime by which they 'are able to t,ecnre
e,nd:ma;intain communism in Yugoslavia.
240 The relatively new. members of the Party, those springing from other ideo-
logical ranks or'those who because of their service to Tito have been
placed in lucrative positions, represent some fifty to seventy-five per-
cent of the Party... They are opportunists, and in the event of a crisis
will side with the winning party. Until then they will maintain their
undecided, vacillating attitude. They will commit themselves only after
the final issue has become certain or clear. A typical figure in this
group is Air Force General Ulepic. There is a large percentage of this
younger group, however, who have grown up ideologically not. so much under
communism but under Tito and his system. If such young communists do not
fall'directly under some hostile leadership., they can bb' considered loyal
to Tito.
25? Should Tito decide to accept a rapprochement, with Moscow, the Party would
produce very few rebels, much lessen orga? Zed faction opposing,such a
move, Only a few officials such as General.Arbrozicl and others dis-
illusioned with communism might go underground or search for some other
alternative. Kardeli and his clique are most probably the decisive factor
in the Party?s attitude tci rd Moscow.
26. As for the. Party hierarchy, following the "big five": Tito, Kardol'j,
Rankovic, Djilas, and Pija4 the following members must be viewed as
top-ranking: Koea Popovic, eko Dapcevic, Vukmsnovic-Tempo, Peter
Stabbolie, Mijalki Todorovic, Frank Leskosek, Vladimir Bakaric, and
Bozo Jovanovic. In this second level should also be included all
members of the Federal and Republic Executive Councils because their
official positions areVased on their Party standings.
27. In-the event of Tito's normal death, his normal successor would'be 1ardeli.
Under these circumstances, Kardeli would probably receive the solid backing
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of t1i party, ffactions.. He-has sufficient authority and enough good rela-
ti with other iaaportant Party members to succeed Tito without instigating
a palace revolt.. Re ovic and Dapccevic, based on their respective positions
as head of the MM and the army, would also have a good chance of succeeding
Tito However., their positions would ?be based only on fear and blood for
they are not regarded highly by their Party colleagues, not to speak of the
general populace. Moreover, their capabilities on the political level are
virtuei y nonn.exiatent.. Djilas, as the PartPy's theoretician, appears better
prepared and more acceptable than either Rankovic or Dapeevic, but he could
exclude Hardelj only by receiving the backing of these two men. Should Tito
be forced from power by the Cominformtsts of the Soviets, his personal clique
would probaby fall with him. In such a case, Boca Popovic or Dapeevic
would be 1i4 successors, unless the Soviets were to impose someone like
Rokossovski in Jugoslavia.
Reliability of the Party in the Event of War
28. An attack from the East by the Satellites only would find the Party cadres
virtually sold in their support for the regime. Prestige factors would
dictate &, solid fro nt; and the Party could probably successfully employ
nationalist slogans against the Bulgarians ant the Hungarians It.eould
also successfully appeal to the younger Party cadres and mount.aometbing
like a pa riotic resistance against the aggressor. The Party would thus
-remain eopact,., unless some heavy military defeat was suffere;ly, Should
thia occur,, Soviet bloc. propaganda o'v'oid cause the older cadres to defect
to the East, the opportunists to melt away., and the younger cadres to be
uselep.s l y se:eri t:i;ca9d ..
29. However, n :.isolated attack from the Zast without Soviet intervention is
practically inconceivable* Under the more likely circumstance of direct
Soviet aesistance, the alter Party cadres would try to get rid of Tito
and his .clique' and the tortunists.. The younger communist class would
probably resi:et as long as Tito is with them and until the first grave defeat;
then everything would disintegrate. Western intervention would increase the
resistance of the younger cadres, but without direct military help on a
large scale resistance would be impossible. It is also questionable how
the older,, thoroughly communist groups would regard direct aid from the
West in view of its various implications and possible donsequences following
the fighting. In any event the Party would remain united only until the
foreign.intervention brings about a showdown. Only peace can pave the Yugo-
slav c at etx ture given its present.lcomposition and attitudes. Tito
and his ep ing comrades are actually walking on the razor?s edge; his posi-
tion is wear and delicate and demands great ability.
teeny Poliez
It my well be that the Party cadres feel more at ease with the coercive
methods, such as continuous threatenings, blackmail, obligatory self-
criticism, etc., are mitigated or discarded. However, the time elapsed
since the Sixth Party C&Wess in Horember 1952 is too short to pass
Judgment on the final effect of the new Party approach to government.
Party menbers are still regimented in strict discipline and obedience.
And it is doubtf%)I that the Party leaders will ever allow their me ers
to relax under an "educational approach" to the masses; the fear of
punishment must always be present for those who deal directly with the
populace'and popular organizations.
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31. Further, the educational methods will have little effect in recruit; new
Party members. It is too late now. In the past persons were practicallyforced to join the Party or lose their positions. Promotions have aa.iaays
been connected with Party membership. The attitudes of the general popu-
lace have c} gedo Party members are no longer respected, though'.tb y are
still hated, and they are no longer feared as before, except in higher
levels. People are now more prone to disapprove of Party members, they
have stalr;ted to criticize and if possible oppose them. The public blames
them openly for prevailing conditions in all areas. many Party members in
unimportant posts are ashamed of their membership, but they cannot resign
because this would mean certain personal disaster.
32. With the, softening of Party policies to arm;. the messes, which cannot be
readily attributed to any specific individuals but-only to the" failure, of
other means of government., people are more reluctant; to partft
in
publli,F.,~,
:a}e irage; they will not voluntarily listen to the Same, old stuff
with th
ey had been "blessed" so abundantly in the past. But to
neutral hookers even the smaller attendances resulting from less coercion
will register a better impression.
The Yugoslav Arm~-
33. The.peacetime strength of the army is approximately 140,000, including
J' and' militia, plus a relatively high number of officers, about 60,000
including tom; officers; The total never exceeds 200,000."..exeept.duri ;
periods of.mo ilization. Official figures on army strength are merely
propagandab,-Thus ~ high number of officers is explained by the fact that
almost all Party officials, even when not in service, hold officer nark
as
a reiard for their past service. References to armies, corps, and
divisions,in~the ariy and the air force have no real meaning or'consis
tency. These desigbations serve to impress foreigners. In addition,
their "existence" provide lucrative posts for old communists with parti-
san eXperience -9aho are incapable of commanding large, organized units
34. The. higher echelons of the Yugoslav army are composed of either old
revolutionaries who obtained their present ranks during or after the last
war as reward for their loyalty, or of former 'regular army officers of
the pre-wear regime who joined the partisans' during the last war. Those
in the first group acquired their military abilities in the Spanish
Civil War end as officers under Tito in Yugoslavia during the Second
World Wgyv Their military' knowledge has been Improved by short courses
in the Soviet union or in special schools in pest-war Yugoslavia. Their
ability to handle the complex problems .of modern war is inadequate. In
regular warfare they will prove failures like the old Soviet marsbars.
The ipe1 officers in this first group are Peko Dapeevic, Xosta lljadj,
Koca opovicp Ivan GBOsnjak, Kupresanin, and Bosko Siljegovic. Their
veluq for-Tito 100 far more in their political reliability then in
their professional capabilities.
35. The former rylists comprise a number of capable persons who distinguished
themselves irs tie pr?e-war period, during the war joined Tito and eventually
the Party. They bad adequate pre-war training, gathered some experience in
guerrilla warfare, and received some training or "gleichsehaltung" in some
Soviet schools or courses. The most prominent members of this groups are
Generals Mibieal Apootolski, Velimir Terzic, Zdenko Dlepic, Bozo Lazarevic
(Deputy Commander of the Yugoslav Air Force), and Vlado Metetich (Air Force
Commander in Sarajevo), and staff officers like General Ko2b2, General
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Tomac ;(fnu), ffisanic3, (fnu),. and'Colonels Babic (fnu), Djuric (feu), etc
These regulars, however, are either too old or their jump from pre war?
field grade rank to the highest echelon left a serious vacuum in their
ability to '.handle higher staff problems.
36. These pre-war officers will alv .ys. remain a political liability for they
are op ortuniste.. The .me..jority of this group if given the choice between
Tito and Moscow would lean toward Moscow for reasons of opportunism..
They believe that the Soviet Union is already far beyond the revolutionary
period and needs (experts rather than revolutionaries lacking professional
backgrounds. Thus they assume that they would have better opportunities
under a'prnfeasional Soviet army than in Tito In revolutionary system.
37? The fighting` core of the army is composed of officers and NCO?s solidly'
B t en at the re lmental
e
l
38.
a. u
v 8
trained in .the post wear academies and acho+o
level the "sinecura system" begins and a few months or weeks of . special
officers cannot be counted on to p=~vv ear a .
tra,inin fo ? such commanding
solid knoaw haw required by a large-scale war.
There is no such thing in Yugoslavia as army cliques or "personal groups-
Amy cliques, or even social gatherings, not sponsored
" of officers
,ti
.
on
strictly along Party lines, would be suspected and the participants dis-
persed to far away garrisons, or in more serious cases) iame4ietely suppressed.
To yFy,ac thereyhave been no pro-Comiuform officers arrested during
the'' last ~'fev.'.years..
39. It to fairly vaeII. eetabliehed that in the event of an isolated satellite
attack the arm$.would stand its ground, at least until the.first major
defeat.,. Bdwever9..no prolonged resistance is possible unless some foreign
power provides ammunition, fuel, and spare parts. Local production is,
far from sufficient to support event a limited war.. In the more likely
event of & largee-scale war with-the Soviet orbit, the army cannot be
considered: reliable owing to its ideological disharmony. One must keep
in mine the following facts: the army is commanded by communists, the
officers it the middle echelons are for the most part opportunists,
younger post-war educated officers are trained in the spirit of Titoism
and are imbued with nationalism, and, finally, the masses who will enter
the army in the event of large-scale mobilisation are mostly peasants
or other anti-communists.
40. The disharmony produced by a communist officer corps and an anti-communist
base will in any case present a serious problem. Against the West, the
base Vo ,fot be reliable, against the Bast the higher consaanding echelons
not only e a grave threat but a positive danger. Since the organisation
and authority of the coaaeanding communists is absolute, there is a great
danger that defeating higher commanders could take along with them whole
units to the East. The opportunits would hold out until an initial?'disaster
occurred and then would join the victors. The younger permanent cadres and
the post liar officers would probably follow Tito loyally, but the broad
recruit masees would fight without enthusiasm or remain passive,. looking
for the first opportunity to disappear..
41. The active, participation of the American army in the defense of Tito would
raise enormously the fighting spirit of the younger classes,. It bight even
furnish enoughinducetilent to the opportunists to throw their lot in with
.Tito, and'it could be expected that the broad peasant masses would fight
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with decision in the presence of American troops in the hope that ultimately
an American. victory would mean the : end of communism in Yugoslavia. However,
the active participation of American forces might induce anti-cookuni.st
soldiers to'desert their units and attempt to join American units, such a
situation wopld create MOM political problems. Moreover, owing to the
ever present possibility of defection to the Soviets, American units should
always keep is mind their own protection on their flanks and secure'their
retreat and co ,nication lines. Also, among. the Yugoslav liaison officers
in American units one can expect to find potential Soviet spies.
42. For domestic,k,well as foreign consumption, the war plan of the Yugoslav
army is to riot et along the borders with locally available troops, and
then to; launch a large counter-attack. However, conditions for mobilization,
concentration, strategic deployment and solid logistic preparation are poor.
Therefore, even in the case of an isolated satellite attack, the attackers
would. be.,so, far advanced in time and preparations that any massive offensive
action launched by them is bound to have initial success. In. the event of
anoffe*sive from ?Bulgaria, the Vardar Valley can be easily reached and
the line tc ~3a7loaisa cut. A large-scale attack with direct Soviet assist-
ance wouuld, preclude the possibility of a successful defense of the Belgrade-
Iis-Salonika line without timely and large-scale Allied support,..
43. Consequently,. fo ;t uns of prestige and fear of dangerous developments
in his Party aid ;e army, Tito must by,aaa. means avoid any initial major
disaster.. except for a very favorable situation with Allied support,
a successful defense of the borders is a bad risk from Tito's standpoint.
Defenee-,ia.,prepared interior mountain zones offers a such better chance
a wou7,d sea4la e..,,m+~re time for effective allied assistance.
44. There, a e az'y.p'rerarations taking place in various mountain areas, the
R.og ,?loveuia; the Lika, etc. This building of army depots, military
railways of ';.;zerrow gauge, the creation of forbidden zones all lead to, the
eoncluei.on tbet the main effort in the case of a large scale war will. be
made ?in the an with final gravitation to Bosnia.
Edrvgrd Kardelj and Yugoslav Foreign Policy
45. Kardelj s influence on the conduct of Yugoslav foreign policy is almost
ibsolute. He dominates all elements in the Yugoslav Government concerned
with the for*tion of foreign policy: the ARvisory Council, Institute for
Foreign Research, headed by Stanoys Simic and Sava Kosnovic, and the Informa-
tion Servige'in the Foreign Ministry. Tito's role is merely to proclaim the
decisions prepared in the appropriate organs under 1Kardelj'e direction.
This is generally true in other areas of gpvernment as well; Tito acts
merely as the Party's megaphone. Koca Popovic can act independently only
in routine mt?t+ers ,p and . is Kardel4's executive hand. During .the, last war
I. was able to observe the most frie relations between: iKar`del4 and
Kooa Popovic, and.it is my opinion +at'Popovic was appointed Foreign
Minister at the explicit request cf -ltardeij
a6. Ail communications and orders between Belgrade and republican organs in
Slovenia go through Karde'lj?s personal cabinet. The regime in Slovenia
isconsidered'by the population to be stricter than in the other Republics.
The peasants ?in.Slovenia complain that they have to hear more burdens than
those in Croatia; this situation is attributed to Ksrdeljte t+rutal,
sectarian nature".
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)7. Tha,suppression of all legal opposition in'Yugoslavia following the war was
ezig&neered by Kard.el j o
4+8. Any sudden or rude changes in Yugoslav' foreign policy can be attributed to
Kardelj'0a brutal, Sadistic, vindictive, and unapproachable nature., Tito,
on the other band., "'is felt to be more polite and calm; a person with whom
one can. defend opposite views. It Is my belief that the nosiy and brutal
reaction of Yugoslavia on Trieste can be b mad on Kardel.j, and that, Tito
could not help but agree to this extreme reaction once it haid begun.
49. In-their joint public appearences one can usually see Kardelj gesticulating
with Tito in a didactical me-naei. Kardelj always tries to impress onlookers
with-.the. fact that he, in contrast to other Yugoslav officials who show
their servility to Tito, is on the same level.
50. In 198 Kardelj apparently gave his full support to Tito at.the time of the
C?siiniform Resolution. Last year, hOirever, following the change in adminis-
ions' ino Ae tnlited States, Kardell'began sending feelers to Moscow
With out e knowledge. At least this is the view commonly held in
higher Yugoslav commuhist 'circles. As. a result, Tito has been facet with
an accomplished fact and has been .forced to agree with this policy of
establishta g closek relations with Moscow because of its great popularity
among the, old communists.
Soviet -Yugooalav ;Relations
51. A.genuine, ?omciliatory appktach by the new Soviet regime would be accepted
by the thiion :Of-.Co*iuniete'with the greatest enthusiasm. The present leader-
ship of the Party might have some doubts about the sincerity of any Soviet
inducement and fear-for their personal welfare, for it is doubtul that Tito
and his clique want ever trust Moscow. However, they would either be
forced , to p.ccept""s Soviet offer or would be subverted by the reminder of
the Party which feels that a reconciliation with the Kremlin would end the
confusion of being a communist against communism and pro-West without being
Western. The current goad relations with Greece and Turkey would quite
naturally be sacrificed should Moscow?e offers by accepted.
Y gosla.OOfficis Sympathetic to Return to Moscow
52. In principle all Yugoslav communists are sympathetic to the re-establishment
of intimate retions with Moscow, especially the new, Soviet regime., because
they all know that their very existence as communist bosses of Yugoslavia
is conceiva'kale only as long as the Soviets protect communism and communist
regimes throughout the world.
53. Assuming the unwillingness of the top five in the Yugoslav Party to ii8k
their necks by accepting a Soviet offer:, there remain many officials,, even
in higher levels, who have always carefully avoided exposing themselves
as radical'anti-Soviets. On the contrary, they have been known as pro-
Soviet to the bone and have been careful not to burn all their bridges.
Men in this group include Koca Popovic, Vukmanovic-Tempo, Kupreeaniuj,
Terzic, Frank 'Leis iosek, Miha Marinko, Zdenko Ulepic, etc. Although there
is no direct evidence that either I,eskosek or Dapeevic are more pro-
Soviet than they are pro-Tito, they are suspect because of their passive
attitudes during 19148.
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5. The mast-prominent person with,a pro=Soviet.record is Koca Popovic, despite
his present: and past positions. Before the Comini'orm'break he was sunder- the
direct`' influence of Soviet organs in Yugoslavia, and was the -officer. who,
fo3 .owi ig Soviet requests, was responsible for laying mines in Albanian
waters. which resulted in the damage of some British ships..
55- It ' .s - geaier?ally belteved 'that Kardel j himself is one of those who have pro-
Cominfatz sentiments." However, he Is'-inO of those directly'responsjble for
the' bs ak th *466w. Whether this paradoxical situation is part of his
play for power remains to be seen.
56. Vukmsnovic-,l'empc ? vacillated considerably and tended toward Moscow for a
w&1ie during the summer of 1918. At that'time he was political and per-
6ona1 dire'ctbi? - in the 'Ministry of Defense. From that position he was
demoted and pdt into " another which'Wass not commensurate with his high
iawatc,q Iii ' 19+9 it was reported that he bad been completely "rehabilitated"
which cleared the way for his present assignment.
57. Milan Kupreeanin and ?eko DLpcevic have been reported as urgently advocating
rapprochement with the Iremlin in. the interests of the Yugoslav army, which
they contend can be properly developed only with Soviet assistance.
58. Zdenko'Uleic.Air.Force Chief of Staff, attended Soviet schools in 1944
and .i945, but was never seen by other'comrades in the USSR at that time.
In fast, he frequented'NKVD courses, according to the chief Soviet instruc-
tor in the Soviet mission at Zemun, General Obraskov.
59. General Tereic'.'israt the moment in retirement, but this is due more to his
personal quarreling with Peko Dapcevic than-to his known pro Russian feelings.
Religious!8ersecution in Yugoslavia
60. The church is -tot free, for the regime is doing all it can to restrict
religious practices. This,policy is one of the chief sources of resent-
ment and b&tred against the regime. Church services are well attended
as a sign of protest against the regime and its policy of persecution.
In Slovenia the old li`lerals, who ' before the war refused to waste ,their
time in church, have become assiduous churchgoers. They too regard
church attendance as a form of protest. Even members of the Party go
clandestinely to church to receive the sacraments.
61. The church hierarchies. of all three of the principal religions in Yugo-
slaviaare solid in their stand against religious persecution. The
Orthodox identify themselves with the Catholics in the fight against
suppression of religion. Among the lower clergy the regime has succeeded
in organizing some pro-regime groups, but the priests belong not so much
for ideological reasons as for reasons of life, freedom, and bread.. Only
in the regianets organizations of Orthodox priests can one.'find approval
of the regime's policy toward the Vatican.
62. The lower Moslem clergy is more dominated by the regime than the others.,
The reason for this lies largely in the low oducadetW level of Moslem
priests, their miserable life, and nationalistic and racial animosities.
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63.
The ,j t3a<
rasa ile'
b"eehase
noeta ee
irP?ssater
men-have '1~e+gn, appoi:a~rted' c ssare in the political field "and "bane taken
a litingto thes-41 e AAeca ?es. Younger Party mez era who have attended
tec a~aical 1-0100. er a,nd c 'vp eau are wttbotat practical experience and for
many years to' come sail not be able to assume-the role -of efficient
aeifsargersi T~ius the Part `has been farted to append upon non eonists,
though with , liittle appreciable results.
64. Ihemever a in industry to a eon-Party - me*er a Party a~sa er lit
6'.
,
65.
zns,ti$ted to
s oft.ce caantrol. In euc t=ees tbe
part miitn is the
ee b x s he Ycafrtea no responsibility for production. The
non''=c ; o c;i l 'have all his -doe sic Ie a proved by the Party
' 3~11ia ears t up responsibility. Consequently, experts `vtth.
110 t shun 8ositiaaas where their succeis' will be largely
c+n
dependent. an the questionable Cooperation of the Party man at his side.
Thea:entire industrial problem has been one vicious dilemma with no exit.
At"_the present time merry old hands are being approached by the regime
with 'era to asanage their old enterprises. But these old engineers and..
==gore art generally reluctant to accept such positions because they
are unfamiliar with the new system.
66. The person primarily respponbible for this incredible chaos in the Tu. oelav
postwkr.eoonosy is the late Boris Kidric, an unsuccessful "student but, a
fanatic es4 pt and assiduous worker. His assistant was Vlajko' Begovic,
a pr.,ofesaional " revolutionary and an unknown quantity in the economic field.
The new economic dictator, Vukmanovic-Tempo, has less understanding of
economic rntters than Kidric poaaeesed, and Kidric could at least learn
from his er,pie. Attached to this inexperienced halt wit remains the
same Begovic . tho, had proven- such a failure with Yidric.
68.
The. Tito oes .nform :Rift and the Cases of Rebraa a and gudovie
The Tito-C. pa Lot, rift originated in the different approach to '`political
and econc- v of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; it vas not the
result of- 'a personal prestig, quarrel between Tito and Stalin. Moscow
wanted" the _ d a phicatt$o "of ' Soviet methods in Yugoslavian, b#, ,Tito
his control according to'the local situation..' Moscow
wanted tp espy y
wanted' the onist party to remain apart from other progressive forces
which a supposed to be relegated to a subordinate category. Tito
eanneeig th bodyb Yras _,cue"te" the eraeeated with comsitkough un1.sts. he saw to it U p+
~'.~Y - Moscow watrtto
to be clef of state and of the party, as well,, but Tito wanted to head,
the national front, too, in order to attract support frog abroad.
t
Moscow
favored
could not v
25XI
Ccgx re e in Zagreb "set forth-the principle . that g+Mrs
w lb d bs'-aelected an the basis of their skills and
y 7 ms grship . The Party was forced, in this decision
at lack _ of experts iia the Party Itself. Among old
well annihilate the class which produced the largest.
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69. The argiineaits between Belgrade and Moscow went on for months before the
actual' break'. However, Tito did not expect the Cominform to publicly
condemn him without attempting to reach a compromise; so, nothing was
left for hiss to do'but to fight back. He lost no time in eliminating
p?te itially `drangerous, men like Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Zu jovic, and
let* maw others 'like Arso Jovanovic.
70. liebr ng*s oppoeition to Tito was based primarily on realistic rather than
idehIql grounde Kebrang, as chief of Yugoslavia's industry, opposed
Tito's plan''or.rapid industrialization, and in this respect his ideas
coincided with those of.Moscow. Thus in opposing the unrealistic indus-
triiilizationi: of.'Yugosla is Hebrang contributed to the popular resistance
ehgondiered agaiiiet the ettreme economic measures adopted by the regime.
Thin-is:-Why he vain dangerous and had to die. Zujovic's case was quite
d,p bp" f.e:ren`d.~ His argument with Tito was strictly limited to Cowinioran
rd ems Zu ovicv possessed an ;exuberant character and used to shout
ogre l7 apinst Tito's policy toward the Kremlin. Since he represented
a threat to 'they Tito regime in the form of one whom Moscow might select
as a' iuceeiscr to Tito, he was removed. I*ter, when the rift betveeu
Moscow end Belgrade'was judged incurable, Zu.ovic with his pro-Soviet
feelings no=longer"~repreitented a serious threat to the Tito regime,
since they general populace was anti-communist. Thus he was eventually
given' the chance to repent in public and was set free.
The Case of Blagjoe Meekovic
71. 19esk?via, although a prominent Serb communist, has always been a lonely
man in the Party without a following or a clique of his own. He bas
always been...pr y=Soviet. Following the Cominform break, Heekovic's
attitude vast equivocal, and he used to question the wisdom of the Party
leadership ''in causing the ,break with Moscow. His communist ideology
has never been questioned. His downfall can be definitely attributed
to his pro-Soviet feelings and behavior.
25X1 Comments
1.,. Probably General Vladimir Amdbrozic, who was chief of civil aviation
and reportedly Chairman of the Physical Culture Committee and member
-of the Pan-Slav Cce ittee before the Cominform break.
Possibly reference to General Igidija Vjekoslav Kolb, currently mili-
te.ry secretary to Defense Minister Gosnjak.
Probably reference to Major General Vjekoslav Klisanic.
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