CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003500420001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 22, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 January 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ambassador-designate to the United States Men-
shikov states he is personally convinced, as are
Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Bulganin, of the necessity
for improvement in US-USSR relations. He has told
Ambassador Thompson that this identity of views was
apparently the reason for his appointment--a hint that
one of Menshikov's primary assignments is to arrange
high-level bilateral negotiations.
(Page 1)
Vigorous high-level opposition in the East German
Communist party has forced party boss Ulbricht to post-
pone the central committee meeting originally scheduled
for 15 January. Ulbricht's hard-line economic policies--
raising work norms and stepping up collectivization of
farmers and artisans--are being attacked as measures
which will increase unrest rather than production. Al-
though Ulbricht may be forced to make some concessions,
he will probably continue to receive Soviet support to en-
Boni
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sure his dominant position.
The USSR is now suggesting a nuclear-free zone
throughout the Middle East to include specifically the
Baghdad Pact area. The 21 January TASS statement is
timed to influence any discussions on strengthening the
northern-tier concept in the Baghdad, conference starting
Monday. (Page 2) (MAP)
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Communist China and the USSR.
(Page 4)
Frustration in Japan over US trade policy and its
application to Japanese imports has become acute as
a result of recent recommendations by the US Tariff
Commission. Ambassador MacArthur in Tokyo states
that a series of restrictive actions can cause major
damage to the US position in Japan and will aid those
forces in Japan pressing for indiscriminate trade with
Defense Minister Azm.
The Egyptian and Syrian governments probably will
announce formally in the;.near future plans to open negotia-
tions for Syrian-Egyptian union under a federal constitu-
tion. The target date for completion of a draft constitu-
tion is said to be August 1958, prior to Syria's scheduled
parliamentary elections. Should serious negotiations be
undertaken, they would be arduous because of widely dif-
ferent economic and political conditions in the two coun-
tries. Nasir will presumably continue his efforts to re-
move Syrian Army Chief of Staff Bizri and neutralize
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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The resignation of Turkish Defense Minister Semi
Ergin and his replacement by Etem Menderes, minister
of public works and close confidant of Prime Minister Ad-
nan Menderes, on 19 January is probably a repercussion
of the alleged plans for an army-led coup d'etat which led
to the recent arrest of at least nine army officers. This
cabinet shift may foreshadow some further changes in the
Turkish military command structure.
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disorders are likely.
III. THE WEST
The large plurality won in Guatemala's 19 January
election by rightist presidential candidate Ydigoras has
presented the congress and the army with a dilemma.
Congress., which is constitutionally charged with choos-
ing between the two top runners, contains a strong anti-
Ydigoras majority. If it refuses to name Ydigoras pres-
ident after it convenes on 24 January, serious public
oust him to check the mounting civilian opposition.
(Page 7)
continues, the military now backing Perez may decide to
* The position of Venezuelan President Perez is threat-
ened by a general strike which began in Caracas on 21 Jan-
uary. Street rioting has resulted in 33 deaths, many in-
jured, and about 1,000 arrests. A state of siege has been
declared and further violence may be expected. If the strike
Recent trade negotiations between the Soviet Union and
several Latin American countries reflect increased Latin
American interest in Soviet bloc trade. I I Page 8)
22 Jan 58 DAILY BRIEF
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THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Menshikov Stresses Importance of Bilateral Talks
To Improve Soviet-American Relations
Soviet Ambassador -designate to the United States
Mikhail.Menshikov told Ambassador Thompson on 20
January that he is personally convinced, as are Khru-
shchev, Mikoyan, and Bulganin, that it is essential to
improve. Soviet-American relations, He expressed
the belief that this identity of views was apparently
the reason for his appointment. He stressed the im-
portance of contacts between
top leaders and of taking some
small steps toward improving
relations.
Menshikov's remarks sug-
gest that one of his major aims
will be to arrange high-level
bilateral negotiations. He sug-
gested that even if no specific
problem were taken up, con-
tacts between leaders would be
more useful than a large sum=
mit conference. Soviet offi-
cials during the past two months
have privately urged direct talks,
and Premier Bulganin's recent
letters asserted that the USSR "always welcomes" bilateral
consultations. Thompson considers that Menshikov's close
relationship with Mikoyan over a period of years could give
him more influence in Moscow than his predecessor.
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Soviet Statement on Baghdad. Pact Council Meeting
The TASS statement of 21 January on the forthcom-
ing session of the Baghdad. Pact council in Ankara is
another step in Moscow's campaign to charge the United
States with the responsibility for blocking an East-West
detente. The statement is intended to forestall any moves
to establish American missile bases in the Middle East
and. to underline the USSR's posture as the champion of
Arab nationalism and neutralism.
Charging that the Ankara meeting will be a "continu-
ation" of the recent NATO heads of government conference
in Paris, TASS asserted that the United States will attempt
to force Baghdad Pact members to accept American bases
for nuclear and rocket weapons. It warned that alleged
American plans to unite the Baghdad Pact and SEATO with
NATO would expose the members of these alliances to the
"flames of missiles and atomic war" should a conflict break
out in another part of the world.
TASS attempted to create the impression of a cleavage
between Turkey, Britain and the United States, on the one
hand, and. Iraq, Iran and Pakistan on the other. Turkey,
along with the United States, was the main target. TASS
warned that the stationing of nuclear weapons and rocket
bases in Turkey "would be a great threat to the people of
the Middle East:'
In line with Moscow's recent proposals to extend the
Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe to
cover the Scandinavian countries, Italy and Albania, TASS
declared that the Middle East should also become a "zone
of peace free of nuclear and rocket weapons:' Neutralist
elements in the Middle East probably will receive this pro-
posal with enthusiasm, while pro-Western leaders will have
difficulty in opposing it publicly.
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Japan Alarmed by US Trade Restrictions
Ambassador MacArthur reports that frustration in
Japan over US trade policy and its application to Jap-
anese imports has become acute as a result of recent
recommendations by the US Tariff Commission for in-
creased. rates on certain Japanese commodities. He
warns that more restrictions can cause major damage
to the US position in Japan, prompt many pro-American
Japanese to re-examine critically the economic benefits
derived. from continued. close association with the US,
and assist those forces pressing for indiscriminate trade
with Communist China and, the USSR.
Japanese producers in other industries which depend.
upon the American market will regard the US decision as
an indication of the treatment Japanese products generally
will receive in the future.
Japan's trade deficit with the US was approximately
$500,000,000 in 1956 and about $900,000,000 for the first
ten months of 1957. These deficits have been offset to a
considerable extent by dollar earnings from US forces in
Japan, but these receipts are being reduced as US forces
withdraw.
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III. THE WEST
The Post-Election Situation in Guatemala
The 19 January elections in Guatemala have produced
a potentially explosive situation. Unofficial returns give
rightist Ydigoras a clear plurality, while centrist Cruz
Salazar appears second, and leftist Mendez Montenegro
trails.
The Congress, which meets on 24 January, is consti-
tutionally charged. with choosing between the two leading
candidates when there is no majority vote. The controlling
moderates in Congress are strongly opposed to Ydigoras
and may choose Cruz Salazar instead if he is clearly in sec-
ond place. The Congress may, on the other hand, simply
dissolve, thus inviting a military coup. Some influential
army officers intensely dislike Ydigoras.
Ydigoras announced on 20 January that he expects Con-
gress to select him and. implied that, if it does not, his sup-
porters will resort to mob action. Earlier, he threatened
"civil war" if robbed, of victory. The Communist-infiltrated
Revolutionary party also declared on 20 January that Ydigoras
should be named by Congress. F_ I
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Venezuelan General Strike Threatens Position
Of President Perez
The position of Venezuelan President Perez is threat-
ened by a general strike which began in Caracas on 21 Jan-
uary. The chief sponsor of the strike appears to be the
Junta Patriotica which is composed. of various civilian ele-
ments opposing Perez.
street rioting has resulted in 33 deaths, many injured,
an estimated 1,000 arrests, and considerable property
damage. The government has declared, a state of. siege and.
called out troops to check the violence which police and
national guard have apparently been unable to control.
The protest movement has widespread, support from.
a large number of prominent Venezuelans, the press stu-
dents and some worker groups.
Perez has moved decisively to bolster his authority
since the revolt of 1-2 January and the cabinet shake-up
dictated to him by the armed forces on 10 January. His
control over the realigned military, however, remains un-
certain. Division within the military and. the rapid. changes
in top command positions and in the government have appar-
ently confused all ranks of officers, who are probably watch-
ing the trend of the power struggle before fully committing
their support.
If the strike and violence continue, the military now
backing Perez may oust him in order to conciliate the mount-
ing civilian opposition.
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Soviet Commercial Negotiations in Latin America
A semiofficial $30,000,000 barter agreement between
Colombia and the USSR, involving coffee from Colombia in
exchange for agricultural machinery and possibly wheat
from the USSR, appears to have reached the final stages
of negotiation. In a press interview in Bogota, the two So-
viet commercial agents negotiating the coffee contract stated
that the USSR could sell Colombia industrial and, precision
machinery, chemicals, and primary materials on long-term
credit at a rate of 2 or 3 percent.
Deteriorating economic conditions in Argentina and the
depressed prices of primary products such as Colombian
coffee and Chilean copper have led to a growing interest by
these countries in the recently intensified Soviet bloc eco-
nomic offensive in Latin America. Chile is considering the
sale of 15,000 metric tons of copper wire worth $10,000,000
to the USSR. Argentina has just sent a trade mission to the
bloc seeking electronic and petroleum industry equipment to
be purchased, with the approximately $30,000,000 trade sur-
plus with the bloc. The Brazilian cabinet is considering its
policy toward recent Soviet bloc overtures for increased
trade. In Uruguay, the Soviet Embassy is attempting to pro-
mote a barter agreement involving Uruguayan meat in ex-
change for Soviet trucks and agricultural machinery.
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DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice-President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under-Secretary of State
The Counselor
The Deputy Under-Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under-Secretary for Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DAILY BRIEF
22 January 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
high-level bilateral negotiations.
(Page 1)
Ambassador-designate to the United States Men-
shikov states he is personally convinced, as are
Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Bulganin, of the necessity
for improvement in US-USSR relations. He has told
Ambassador Thompson that this identity of views was
apparently the reason for his appointment--a hint that
one of Menshikov's primary assignments is to arrange
The USSR is now suggesting a nuclear-free zone
throughout the Middle East to include specifically the
Baghdad Pact area. The 21 January TASS statement is
timed to influence any discussions on strengthening the
northern-tier concept in the Baghdad conference starting
Monday. (Page 2) (MAP)
ee-nse Minister Azm.
The Egyptian and Syrian governments probably will
announce formally in the;.near future plans to open negotia-
tions for Syrian- Egyptian union under a federal constitu-
tion. The target date for completion of a draft constitu-
tion is said to be August 1958, prior to Syria's scheduled
parliamentary elections. Should serious negotiations be
undertaken, they would be arduous because of widely dif-
ferent economic and political conditions in the two coun-
tries. Nasir will presumably continue his efforts to re-
move Syrian Army Chief of Staff Bizri and neutralize
The large plurality won in Guatemala's 19 January
election by rightist presidential candidate Ydigoras has
presented the congress and the army with a dilemma.
Congress, which is constitutionally charged with choos-
ing between the two top runners, contains a strong anti-
Ydigoras majority. If it refuses to name Ydigoras pres-
ident after it convenes on 24 January, serious public
disorders are likely. (Page 6)
oust him to check the mounting civilian opposition.
(Page 7)
continues, the military now backing Perez may decide to
t The position of Venezuelan President Perez is threat-
ened by a general strike which began in Caracas on 21 Jan-
uary. Street rioting has resulted in 33 deaths, many in-
jured, and about 1,000 arrests. A state of siege has been
declared and further violence may be expected. If the strike
ApprRm rtReddesa f1QOS W[)PV19 3 D b 6
several Latin American countries reflect increased Latin
American interest in Soviet bloc trade. I ](Page 8
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