SOVIET POLICY IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006900050003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 28, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Soviet Policy in Africa South of the Sahara
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28 February 1969
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Soviet policy in sub-Saharan Africa since the fall of Khrushchev has focused increasingly
on broadening and strengthening state-level relations in a long-range effort to replace Western
influence. The application of this policy has been flexible and selective and has led to an
accelerating tempo of Soviet activity, including cultural and economic delegations, bilateral
diplomatic agreements, and expanded aid programs. In many cases, these have been at
African initiative. Nevertheless, Africa continues to be a low priority area in Soviet global
policy.
Although the Soviet Union has established a presence throughout Africa and a position
of influence in a few countries, its record is mixed. The number and scale of setbacks is large.
On the other hand, in Nigeria, one of the two major areas of current Soviet activity, Moscow
has used the civil war to establish a stronger position. Prolongation of that war, combined
with rising domestic pressures on the government, may open the way to further Soviet gains.
In the Horn, the other area of primary current interest, Soviet policies are closely tied to the
Middle East situation. Although there are substantial obstacles. to the execution of Soviet
policies in the Horn, its geographic importance makes ii "a'
subject of considerable and
the three Portuguese colonies, but its aid is limited. Only three Communist parties in the
Mounting nationalism in the sub-Sahara is forcing the Soviets to be more cautious
about interfering in internal African affairs. Moscow still supports liberation movements in
The breakdown of colonial ties in the 1950s
and the deluge of newly independent states after
1960 offered the Soviet Union a clear opportunity
to extend its influence in Africa. As early as 1956,
Premier Khrushchev set out a broad policy aimed
at strengthening Soviet ties with underdeveloped
areas. Among other things, he promised aid with
no strings attached.
As Khrushchev's policy was implemented dur-
ing the early 1960s, the Soviet position in Africa
grew steadily despite several humiliating setbacks
when ham-handed tactics often. resulted in the
exposure of meddling in African internal affairs.
Special Report
Between 1958 and 1968, the number of Soviet
diplomatic missions in the sub-Sahara increased
from three to 26, and in many cases they were
heavily over-staffed, presumably to facilitate po-
litical activity and increase local contacts. Soviet
economic aid rose from virtually nothing in 1958
to a cumulative total of over $600 million by
1968. Soviet military aid extensions now stand at
about $133 million.
The overthrow of Khrushchev in 1964 sig-
naled a shift of emphasis in Moscow's African
policy. Support for radical regimes and ad-
venturistic underground activity was diminished,
and more cautious, long-range approaches were
adopted.
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NIGER
MEY-
NIGERIA
UNITED
ARAB
REPUBLIC
CENTRAL
AFRICAN REPUBLIC
ANGOLA
`ZAMBIA
/SOMALIA
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Moscow has long believed that students are
good targets for long-term Soviet activity, and
thousands have had the opportunity to receive
academic training in the USSR. The number of
African students going to the Soviet Union has
grown from 75 during 1956-59 to 950 in 1967;
there are currently more than 5,000 in the coun-
try, some of whom will stay more than four years
as others have done in the past. Despite numerous
problems, Moscow will continue to cultivate Af-
rican students, counting heavily on their eventual
sympathy for the USSR.
During the past several years, Chinese activ-
ity has pushed Moscow toward greater involve-
ment in the sub-Sahara. The Soviets are no more,
and perhaps less, willing to abandon the field to
Peking than. to the West, and the result has been
bitter Sino-Soviet rivalry in some countries. The
USSR probably also wants to demonstrate its
world-wide involvement as a great power, to reap
the propaganda value of aiding newly liberated
states, and to build the Soviet image as a progres-
sive and cooperative ally.
WEST AFR][CA
Moscow has devoted considerable attention
to West Africa since 1960 but has gained little for
its efforts. Chronic defects of Soviet African pol-
icy have manifested themselves in this area and
Soviet miscalculations have brought major politi-
cal and economic setbacks.
Nigeria One of the few bright spots from Mos-
cow's viewpoint is Nigeria. Moscow has rec-
ognized Nigeria as a large, important country and
seems willing to undertake a long-term campaign
to establish influence there. It has provided Ni-
geria with a generous supply of military aid and
has thus far avoided the overbearing behavior that
it has shown elsewhere in Africa. The strength-
ening of the Soviet position in so short a time
Special Report -3
must be counted as a success and as a mark of the
growing sophistication of Soviet African policy.
The civil war afforded Moscow the op-
portunity to gain a foothold in a conservative,
pro-Western country and, in mid-1967 after
months of backing and filling, Moscow came
down on the side of the federal military govern-
ment. When the Western powers refused to sell
arms to Lagos, Nigeria turned to the USSR, which
has since provided military supplies valued at
more than $14 million. The Soviets have also won
permission to station a defense attache in Lagos,
the first such in sub-Saharan Africa.
The Soviets have also moved toward in-
creased economic ties with Nigeria, as demon-
strated by the general economic agreement signed
last November, which sets the stage for future
Soviet-aided projects. This agreement, in addition
to the recurrent offer of a $56 million credit,
provides further evidence that Moscow seeks a
long-term role in Nigeria.
There are major obstacles, however, to the
spread of Soviet influence in Nigeria. One is the
xenophobia that has gripped the country as a side
effect of the civil war. Another is General Gowon,
head of the government, who seems clearly aware
of the political dangers posed by dependence on
large Soviet arms deliveries. As the war drags on,
however, pressures on Gowon to accept more
Soviet aid will probably mount. Gowon also be-
lieves in Nigeria's strong attachment to the Brit-
ish-a further curb on Soviet influence.
Ghana If Nigeria has been a recent success, how-
ever, Ghana has been a major disappointment for
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the Soviets. As recently as late 1965, Soviet influ-
ence in Ghana was strong, even though President
Nkrumah was hardly considered a reliable ally. He
had allowed numerous Soviet advisers into the
country and had accepted substantial Soviet aid.
Ghana became a major staging base for African
revolutionary and subversive movements, most of
which had Soviet support. In February 1966, how-
ever, the army overthrew Nkrumah and one result
was the forced withdrawal of all Soviet tech-
nicians and advisers, leaving only a handful of
diplomatic personnel behind. Moscow's influence
thus was erased in a single stroke in a vivid dem-
onstration of the dangers of overidentifying with
a single leader in politically unstable Africa.
Moscow patiently bided its time until early
in 1968, when a slow but perceptible improve-
ment in relations set in. Nevertheless, Accra has.
continued to suspect the Kremlin of providing
clandestine aid to ousted president Nkrumah.
These suspicions reached a climax last October
when two Soviet trawlers were seized in Ghanaian
Although Moscow has shown considerable
restraint in the face of this indignity, there is
mounting evidence that Soviet patience is growing
thin, and more serious action may be taken if the
ships are not, released soon. The unprecedented
visit to West African waters by a small group of
Soviet naval ships in mid-February may be an
effort by Moscow to apply pressure on Accra.
Mali Mali was another of the radical states in
which the Soviets took an early interest. Never-
theless, by 1965 Soviet aid programs had run into
serious difficulty-chiefly high costs and problems
with delivery schedules-and Bamako was becom-
ing increasingly infatuated with Chinese revolu-
Special Report
tionary concepts. Chinese influence grew in Mali,
and for the first time in sub-Saharan Africa, Mos-
cow tailored its aid to meet a Chinese challenge.
Though monumental economic problems
forced it to turn to France for financial assistance
in mid-1967, Bamako still supported both China
and the USSR in international matters while con-
tinuing to seek economic aid from both. At the
same time, President Modibo Keita attempted to
foster more doctrinaire socialism internally. Mali's
open endorsement of the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was unique in sub-
Saharan Africa.
In November, however, a military coup
ousted Keita. Although diplomatic relations with
the USSR have remained intact, one of the new
regime's first acts was to reverse publicly Mali's
stand an the. events in C'7 hoslova ia7-
Having
gained some experience in such trying cir-
cumstances, Moscow has refrained from attacks
on the new government and for the present seems
content just to hang on.
Guinea Guinea remains the only country in West
Africa where the Soviets have sustained a position
of influence throughout the troubled past few
years. The influx of Soviet aid and advisers
shortly after Guinea declared its independence
and after France abruptly withdrew its support in
1958 gave Moscow an excellent opportunity to
expand its influence. Relations were seriously
damaged for some time, however, by the ex-
posure of an allegedly Soviet-inspired plot in 1961.
Although it welcomes Soviet assistance, Conakry
has kept a wary eye out for any new attempts to
interfere in Guinean internal affairs.
President Toure has regularly supported
Moscow in the international arena, particularly on
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Vietnam. Ties between Guinea and the USSR
have been further enhanced by Toure's belief
that, with Soviet aid, Guinea. can serve as a pat-
tern for the radicalization of Africa.
Despite the closeness of the two countries as
"fraternal socialist states," the USSR's influence
in Guinea is limited by a virulent brand of nation-
alism. Unlike its past experiences with radical
African states, however, Moscow's position in
Conak:ry seems fairly secure as long as radical
elements dominate the regime. This is a result, in
part, of the long range, low-key approach that
Moscow has followed. In addition, the Soviets
have apparently tried to avoid staking their future
relations with Guinea on Toure alone by cultivat-
ing ties with other officials in Conakry and by
widening their contacts as much as possible.
reduction in the Soviet Embassy staff and Da-
homey may follow suit. Virtually all the govern-
ments regard the Soviets with a wary eye and
keep even formal diplomatic contacts to a min-
imum.
EAST AFRICA AND THE HORN
It seems probable that Moscow's policies in
East Africa and the Horn are more closely tied to
its Middle East policy than to purely African
affairs. Having a phalanx of friendly and neutral
states in the area would considerably lessen Soviet
difficulties in establishing and maintaining a more
or less permanent naval presence in the Indian
Ocean.
Ethiopia A major obstacle to Soviet influence in
the Horn is Ethiopia, and current Soviet policy is
The Other West African States In the other coun-
tries of West Africa, the Soviets have been re-
ceived with sus icion and hostility. The 1966
L-L roug home to most govern-
ments t e anger of becoming too deeply en-
twined. with Moscow. Confronted with such feel-
ings, nearly all recent Soviet efforts in West Africa
have been of an official nature. In the last year,
there has been a parade of cultural, economic,
and technical delegations, and diplomatic rela-
tions have been established with all but Gabon
and Niger; an agreement with the latter seems
close at hand.
Nevertheless, Soviet efforts to build good
will in West Africa, even on an official basis, have
encountered obstacles. Eight of the governments,
for example, expressly condemned the invasion of
Czechoslovakia and only one approved. Articles
in the Soviet press critical of the Ivory Coast's
close ties with the West have led to an exchange
of hitter recriminations with Abidjan, and raised
threats of a break. Togo recently forced a drastic
Special Report
e soviets ave us iar -
gress in the face of Haile Selassie's opposition and
his long friendship for the West.
Moscow, in one of its widely assorted at-
tempts to accomplish its objectives, has tried to
get Addis Ababa to accept arms, but the only
tangible result thus far has been Ethiopia's pur-
chase of several Soviet helicopters. More extensive
Soviet offers of military aid have been flatly re-
fused, and of nearly $102 million in proffered
economic aid, only about $18 million has been
used. At the same time, Moscow has kept the
pressure on Addis Ababa by providing extensive
military equipment to both Somalia and the Su-
dan, Ethiopia's traditional adversaries in the
Horn.
Moscow's failure to accomplish anything ap-
pears to have resulted in a shift in its approach,
which now seems to lean toward greater involve-
ment in Ethiopian economic development wher-
ever possible. Meanwhile, the Soviets are waiting
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for the Emperor to die in the hope that his
successor will be more interested in nonalign-
ment-and Soviet aid.
Somali Republic In all of East Africa, Moscow's
position is probably strongest in the Somali Re-
public, which has received over $64 million in
Soviet economic and military aid. Moscow has
become the Somalis' prime source of arms and
has thus gained a sympathetic ear among military
leaders. In recent years, however, Somalia's civil-
ian leadership has sought to avoid over-
dependence on the USSR for economic and mili-
tary aid, and Soviet motives are now viewed with
some skepticism. Somali President Scermarche,
for example, has charged that the Soviets pushed
the Arabs into war in June 1967 purely to profit
from the results, and that the USSR was con-
cerned only with achieving a dominant position in
the Middle East. He also has expressed fears that
the Soviets will gain a military base in Aden and
then penetrate the Red Sea and Indian Ocean
areas.
Prime Minister Egal's efforts to keep Soviet
activities within bounds and to redress the imbal-
ance in Somali foreign relations have been poorly
received in Moscow. His campaign for a detente
with Kenya and Ethiopia has also been disturbing
to the Soviets. Although Moscow does not seem
to want open war in the Horn and, in fact, has
restrained Somalia on occasion, a state of con-
tinuing armed confrontation and turmoil would
probably best serve Soviet purposes. Meanwhile,
further Soviet aid to Somalia will continue to
hinder its efforts to improve ties with Kenya and
Ethiopia.
Kenya and Uganda In Kenya, President Jomo
Kenyatta has checkmated all Soviet efforts to
develop a strong position. Political ties are min-
imal and offers of economic aid ba- been -
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Special Report -7
The USSR's position in Uganda appears
largely dependent on the policies of President
Obote, despite Soviet arms aid. Although Uganda
has accepted the aid, there are few, if any, of-
ficials who sympathize ideologically with the
USSR and Soviet influence in the military and
security service (chief recipients of Soviet aid)
seems to be carefully controlled. The Soviets are
presumably interested in Uganda mainly because
of their difficulties in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Tan-
zania.
Tanzania Moscow has made little progress in Tan-
zania despite that country's close ties to the Com-
munist world. Terms and quantities of Soviet
military and economic aid have been far less gen-
erous than Peking's. As a result, Moscow's assis-
tance programs have never really gotten off the
ground and the Chinese have attained a much
more influential position.
Numerous irritants have beset Soviet-
Tanzanian relations since 1964, not the least of
which has been President Nyerere's belief that
Moscow has supported his political foes. Rela-
tions have also been troubled by Moscow's deci-
sion to back the federal government in Nigeria
and by Tanzania's recognition of Biafra.I
With current ties disturbed by such thorny prob-
lems, Moscow is presently in no position to try to
compete with Peking for Nyerere's favor.
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CENTRAL AFRICA: THE CONGO
Moscow's interest in Central Africa is limited
chiefly to the two Congos, Kinshasa and Brazza-
ville. Congo (K) is perhaps the most outstanding
example in sub-Saharan Africa of the shift in
Moscow's policy away from active interference in
internal affairs and toward more cautious cultiva.
tion of official relationships. In the early 1960s,
the Soviets sought to establish a firm advisory
position. in the Congo's central government, but
they consistently overplayed their hand. By late
1963, they had already been expelled from the
country twice.
Moscow supplied aid to Congolese rebel
groups during the Simba rebellion in 1964-65. At
this time, there was reportedly much friction and
mutual undercutting in the rebel groups among
the Soviets, Chinese, and Cubans, each trying to
elbow the others out of the picture. Soviet sup-
port for the rebels began to decrease in late 1965
when the rebellion collapsed.
Diplomatic relations were restored for the
third time in December 1967, and the Soviets this
time have been careful to avoid activity that
might further heighten Con clese suspicions and
result in a third ex ulsion.
ong-range ovie e o s are irec ee
mat y at students and the new generation of
intellectuals.
Moscow continues to regard Congo (B) as
being on the "correct path of noncapitalist devel.-
opment" and therefore worthy of special Soviet
attention, even though the major portion of the
economy remains in private hands. At present,
Moscow's opportunity to expand its influence
further seems good, but competition with the
Chinese will remain an important concern.
SOUTHERN AFRICA: ZAMBIA
Soviet interest in southern Africa focuses
mainly on Zambia, the only country in the area
with which the USSR has diplomatic relations.
Zambia has cautiously expanded contacts with
Communist countries-chiefly Czechoslovakia,
the USSR, and China-during the last several
years. The main causes of President Kaunda's
turning to the Communist countries for economic
and technical assistance have been his opposition
to white rule in southern Africa and the West's
failure to act decisively against Rhodesia. Hoping
to take advantage of this opportunity, Moscow
has tried to gain the confidence of Zambian lead-
ers and gradually increase its influence among
labor unions and students. Soviet efforts, how-
ever, are hindered by Kaunda's wariness of Soviet
motives, as well as the strong position of the
West.
Other than Zambia, Moscow has no official
presence in southern Africa. Most of the Soviet
effort in this area is related to support of various
liberation movements aimed at the Portuguese
colonies, Rhodesia, and South Africa.
The chief characteristic of Soviet policy in
Congo (B) seems to be a willingness to cooperate
with the Brazzaville government rather than with
more extreme leftist elements. The Soviets have
worked closely with the regular military in Congo
(B), a ;policy that appears to have paid off now
that the army is more or less on top. The present
head of government, Major Ngouabi, seems fairly
solicitous of Soviet requests.
Special Report
SOVIET AID TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
As the USSR concentrates on widening its
official presence in Africa, aid to liberation move-
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MOSCOW AND AFRICAN COMMUNISM
Moscow recognizes five Communist parties
in the sub-Sahara, three of which-the Sudanese,
South African, and Nigerian-receive limited So-
viet financial assistance.
The Soviet Union, having recognized early
that nationalism was the dominant political force
in Africa, has placed little emphasis on the devel-
opment of Communist parties there. As a result,
the USSR has been willing to support anti-
Western radical movements (and even conserva-
Special Report
tive governments) throughout Africa, often to the
exclusion and detriment of local Communist
forces. Moscow has attempted to justify this ideo-
logical transgression with the concept of "revolu-
tionary democracy," which is applied to radical
regimes believed to be on a so-called noncapitalist
path of development.
Whatever ideological peace of mind this ra-
tionalization has permitted Moscow has been se-
riously disturbed in practice by a series of coups
and by the instability characteristic of the more
radical sub-Saharan governments. These difficul-
ties have apparently led to a reappraisal of the
concept, and it may be discarded entirely. Recent
articles in the Soviet press have attacked the peas-
ant and petty bourgeois nature of radical African
regimes and have assailed their failure to adopt
the tenets of "scientific socialism." Nevertheless,
declining Soviet interest in the concept of revolu-
tionary democracy probably does not mean new
Soviet emphasis on supporting local Communist
parties, but more likely the further decline of
ideology as a factor in the conduct of Soviet
affairs on the continent.
OUTLOOK
To realize its twin objectives of expanding
the official Soviet position and undermining West-
ern influence, the Soviet Union has committed
itself to a cautious, long-range program of image
building. This campaign encompasses a variety of
economic and military aid agreements, legions of
delegations boosting Soviet-African friendship,
and a web of educational and cultural agreements.
The results have been mixed, but the course ap-
pears set-Moscow has opted for the safer, slower
path of building its position on a base broad
enough to survive the vagaries of African politics.
The relatively few authoritative statements
of Moscow's view of Africa reveal not only a
realistic and accurate assessment of development
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prospects and the conservative expectations of
the USSR, but also that the sub-Sahara is likely to
remain an area of relatively low priority. Two
principles seem sure to guide Soviet policy in the
future: flexibility and selectivity. Moscow has ap-
parently finally realized that African politics will
be unsettled for some time, and that this will
require flexibility of commitment in the Kremlin.
They have also learned that all of Africa is not
about to fall to them like an overripe plum and
they will therefore be increasingly selective in
their choice of tar ets.
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