WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006100030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
,A1tCHIV_AL RECORD
RE'i WiN TQm J,
t.C,Zl CY ARCI-HIVES
Secret
48
27 October 1967
No. 0313/67
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(Information as of noon EDT, 26 October 1967)
Far East
VIETNAM
Strikes against Phuc Yen air base caused extensive
damage and should further reduce North Vietnam's
fighter capabilities. Hanoi's massive propaganda
in support of antiwar demonstrations in the US sug-
gests that it believes such protests are an impor-
tant but not determining influence on US policy.
PEKING MODERATES CONTINUE TO PUSH TOWARD NORMALCY
The drive by central authorities to restore normal
conditions continues to meet some resistance from
militant Red Guards, although order has been re-
established in much of the country. The moderating
trend continues to be reflected in foreign policy
as well.
INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN THAILAND
Communist insurgency has increased in several areas
which had been relatively free from such activity
in the past.
KOREAN DMZ INCIDENTS
The rate of North Korean incidents along the Demil-
itarized Zone (DMZ) has declined in recent weeks,
but this relative lull may be short-lived.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 11
JONAH RIDES THE SOVIET NUCLEAR-POWERED ICEBREAKER LENIN 12
The world's first nuclear-powered surface ship has
been plagued by technological problems since it be-
gan operating in 1960.
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USSR CELEBRATES GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY OF BOLSHEVI: REVOLUTION
The jubilee celebrations in Moscow, Leningrad, and
the capitals of the 14 Republics will play up the
achievements of the last five decades as e.ridence of
the effectiveness of Communist rule. The Stress is
expected to be on domestic affairs, historic attain-
ments and national goals, with plaudits tc the mili-
tary establishment and to space accomplislnents.
The average Soviet citizen is approaching the cele-
bration with some degree of cynicism inasnach as
improvements for him have been spotty. Ir the light
of recent events abroad, the Soviet leaders will be
hard pressed to make credible claims of Ccmmunist
successes elsewhere in the world.
CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY LEADERS INDECISIVE ON ECONCAIC REFORM
Economic reform continues to be a source cf dispute
within the regime because of its potentially weaken-
ing effect on the authority of the party znd on the
personal power of party officials.
Middle East - Africa
MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS HEIGHTEN
The destruction caused by Israeli shellin( of the
two refineries at Suez was a major blow t( the Egypt-
ian economy, but may not be enough to sat.sfy the
desire for revenge. Israel may strike ag.inst units
of the Egyptian Navy responsible for sink.ng the de-
stroyer Eilat. The United Nations adopte.. a com-
promise resolution condemning all cease-f re viola-
tions and demanding that both sides prohib_t further
military activities.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY STILL BESETS DAHOMEY
Disputes have erupted between President S,glo's
military government and the army's watchd'g commit-
tee, and the long-standing quarrel between Soglo
and the army chief of staff has intensifi~d.
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NIGERIAN ARMY KEEPS UP THE PRESSURE ON BIAFRA
Action in the Nigerian civil war slowed somewhat
last week, and federal officials again tried to allay
Ibo fears of being massacred. Peace talks have so
far failed to materialize.
INDIA BUYS MORE SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT
Indian officials have agreed to purchase 127 SU-7
fighter-bombers and 12 trainers from the USSR, which
is now the leading supplier of arms to India.
Western Hemisphere
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GUYANESE-VENEZUELAN BORDER DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN
The Guyanese have become alarmed by reports that
Venezuela plans to turn a disputed border island
into a military base and. they may bring the whole
issue before the UN.
ARIAS SEES HIS ELECTION PROSPECTS IN PANAMA IMPROVED
Arnulfo Arias, twice elected president and twice
ousted for authoritarian excesses, expects support
in next May's presidential election from several
parties now in the government coalition.
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PERONISM A DECLINING THREAT IN ARGENTINA
The failure of last week's Peronist deninstrations
to draw much support from even the die-hard leader-
ship of the Peronist movement is a manifestation of
the internal squabbling that has almost destroyed
the movement as a threat to Argentine :,_curity.
CHILEAN LEFTISTS CONTINUE SQUABBLING
Disagreements within and among the leftist parties
is becoming increasingly evident as dek.ate continues
about the efficacy of revolutionary arred struggle
in Chile. This disunity has so far prEvented ef-
fective exploitation of President Frei s troubles
with his own party.
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FAR EAST
South Vietnamese leaders are completing prepa-
rations for the inauguration of the new government
on 31 October. President-elect Thieu will use the
occasion to outline the new government's programs
in the next few months. Although he has been stall-
ing on the matter, Thieu will probably appoint Nguyen
Van Loc--a protege of Vice President - elect Ky--as
prime minister. Thieu also plans to move ahead
quickly in presenting his government's position on
peace negotiations. The exact steps in this process,
however, are still indefinite.
North Vietnamese spokesmen, meanwhile, are ad-
hering inflexibly to their demand for an uncondi-
tional cessation of the bombing as the price for
negotiations. Hanoi welcomed the antiwar demonstra-
tions in the US last weekend, but it is unlikely that
Hanoi believes these actions will have significant
effect on US policy.
The drive to restore normal conditions in China
is encountering some resistance from militant Red
Guard groups and there are continuing signs of ten-
sion and differences within the top leadership. The
moderates led by Chou En-lai, however, appear able
and determined to resist pressures to retreat from
their present course. Their efforts to rebuild the
party and administrative structure were reflected
in a People's Daily editorial stressing the key role
of regular party cadres in forming "provisional
organs of authority" now being established in a num-
berof provinces.
Thailand's insurgency problem appears to be
undergoing significant changes. While government
forces are concentrating their suppression opera-
tions in the main insurgent area in the northeast,
the Communists have increased their activities in
other areas which have been relatively quiet in the
past. The insurgents, moreover, are trying to move
into new areas in the northeast where the government's
presence is limited. F7 I
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VIETNAM
North Vietnam's Air Strength
Strikes against Phuc Yen Air
Base on 24 and 25 October should
further degrade North Vietnam's
fighter capabilities. Extensive
damage to facilities at the field
and probable casualties among
technical personnel may require
at least a temporary shift of
North Vietnam's remaining MIGs
to Hanoi/Gia Lam, the only major
air base left untouched.
The chief obstacle for North
Vietnam in continued large-scale
fighter operations is the threat
of attacks on its air bases. Run-
ways and revetments can be re-
paired in relatively short order,
but electronic equipment, fuel
and ordnance facilities and
trained personnel are not easily
replaced. Hanoi may decide that
maintaining a fighter threat--
which has only accounted for four
percent of all US air losses--is
not worth the effort.
Hanoi's View of Peace Moves
North Vietnam has been turn-
ing out a steady stream of propa-
ganda in support of the current
antiwar demonstrations in the US,.
The tone of the commentary was
set on 20 October by Premier Pham
Van Dong who called the American
demonstrations part of the "com-
mon struggle" by the Vietnamese
people against "US aggression"
in Vietnam. He termed the
protesters "comrades in arms"
with the V.etnamese.
Hanoi s statements, though
plentiful, have not been phrased
to suggest that the North Vietnam-
ese are chinging their basic as-
sessment o: the effectiveness of
such protests. The evidence indi-
cates stroigly that the Vietnamese
Communists still regard antiwar
sentiment :n the US as an impor-
tant, but :ot a determining,-influ-
ence on American policy. US
strategy ii Vietnam, Hanoi appar-
ently estirates, will continue
to be primarily shaped by the mil-
itary and iolitical situation
within South Vietnam.
The pro-Communist journalist
Wilfred Buichett, used by the
North Vietnamese last January to
publicize their formula of "talks
in return for a bombing halt,"
returned fnom Hanoi this week
claiming tat the DRV's position
on negotiations had not changed.
According to Burchett, the lead-
ership is still confident it can
ultimately wear down the US. Like
some other Communist spokesmen in
recent wee}s, Burchett drew a
distinctior between talks which
would follc,a a bombing halt and
be used to clarify the objectives
of both sites, and negotiations
which woulc involve the actual
terms of a settlement.
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age WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Oct 67
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Several DRV officials abroad
have recently made it clear that
the Hanoi leadership now is tak-
ing the position that once talks
are entered into they should be
limited to the discussion of is-
sues between North Vietnam and
the US or to "prediscussions"
in which the agenda and the par-
ticipants in negotiations would
be established. In essence the
Hanoi leaders appear to be saying
that they will demand US agree-
ment to North Vietnam's four
points as the agenda or basis
for settlement before actual ne-
gotiations can begin.
Political Developments
numbers because of their effec-
tive discipline.
The lower house is a more
broadly based body than the Sen-
ate because representation is by
constituency rather than at
large. Local issues and reputa-
tions were paramount factors in
the house election, consequently
future political alignments and
attitudes toward the national
government within the lower house
are difficult to assess and may
take some time to develop. A
strong prDgovernment bloc may
emerge from among the 34 active
or retired military officers and
47 active or retired civil serv-
ants who were elected.
The lower house of the bi-
cameral National Assembly was
elected on 22 October--the final
electoral process to establish a
constitutional government in
South Vietnam. The voter turnout
of about 73 percent of the 5.8
million electorate was, as ex-
pected, lower than in the Sep-
tember presidential race. The
election drew only light opposi-
tion from the Viet Cong.
The new lower house appears
evenly divided in terms of re-
ligious and regional backgrounds.
Of the 137 deputies, 32 were born
in North Vietnam, while the bal-
ance are from the South, includ-
ing 44 from the central Vietnam
provinces of I and II Corps. By
religious affiliation, 35 are
Catholics and 46 are from the
majority Buddhist sect. The
Catholics will probably wield
political influence beyond their
The dispute between the
militant Buddhists and the gov-
ernment remains at an impasse,
with the militants still demand-
ing that the government revoke
the July charter which in effect
recognizes the moderate Buddhist
faction as the legal representa-
tive of the Buddhist church. Com-
plicating the problem is a shift
in the attitude of the moderates,
who are now holding the govern-
ment responsible for settling the
issue. If the issue is unre-
solved after the inauguration of
President Thieu, now only four
days away, it may go to the new
legislature.
South Vietnam Military
US and South Vietnamese
forces reported a series of sharp
encounters with enemy units
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throughout the country this week
as allied sweep operations con-
tinued to penetrate Communist-
held areas. On two occasions,
the enemy made large-scale at-
tacks on allied units which may
have been patrolling near sensi-
tive base areas.
South Vietnamese Army (ARVN)
troops reported killing nearly
200 enemy soldiers last weekend
in a 15-hour battle some nine
miles east of Quang Tri city.
An enemy battalion, probably sub-
ordinate to the North Vietnamese
Army's (NVA) 5th Regiment, made
an early morning attack against
two ARVN battalions bivouacked
near the coast. ARVN losses
were light.
US Army operation in the
Quang Nam - Quang Tin province
border area resulted in numerous
skirmishes throughout the week
with enemy forces identified as
elements of the NVA 2nd Division.
This division has been hit hard
since US Army troops were in-
troduced into the area several
months ago. There is, however,
evidence that Hanoi is continuing
to send reinforcements to the
division via infiltration routes
extending eastward from the A
Shau valley area, apparently in
the belief that the 2nd, even with
reduced offensive capability, can
still tie down substantial numbers
of allied forces.
A battalion of the 272nd
Regiment, Viet Cong 9th Light In-
fantry Division, attacked a South
Vietnamese Civilian Irregular De-
fense Corps unit some 29 miles
north of Saigon in Binh Duong
Province early in the week. The
attackers were repulsed after sev-
eral hours of fighting, leaving
nearly 100 bodies behind. Friendly
losses were light.
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PEKING MODERATES CONTINUE TO PUSH TOG~ARD NORMALCY
The drive by central author-
J L__es to restore normal condi-
tions throughout China entered
its eighth week with, no sign of
abatement. It has continued to
encounter some resistance from
militant Red Guard elements,
the major losers in the current
situation. The army is enforcing
Peking's orders, but as yet has
been unable to eliminate tension.
and suspicion between the mil.i-
tants and more conservative,
locally oriented Red Guard groups.
A People's Daily editorial
of 25 October reproduced a na-
tionwide directive ordering the
immediate opening of all schools
from primary grades through uni-
versity. The aim of the direc-
tive is to get Red Guards off the
streets and into classrooms. It
is not known how widely the order
is being obeyed. The directive
itself is the first on educa-
tional matters published in the
national press since the summer
of 1966.
in a related development,
a People's Daily editorial on
21 October stressed the key role
of regular party cadres in set-
ting up the "provisional organs
of authority" now being formed
in a number of provinces. The
editorial stated that the cadres
should form the "backbone and
core" of these bodies and quoted
a 30-year-old dictum of Mao's on
tiie importance of building a
strong Communist. Party. The
stress on tze role of the cadres
elaborates i theme that has been
prominent far the past month.
The emphasis on the central im-
portance of the party itself,
however, in.roduces a line that
has been ccispicuously absent
from regime propaganda for more
than a year.
Although order has been re-
established in much of the coun-
I try, some uirest continues.
A Shan xhai radiobroadcast
on 19 October reported that num-
bers of pea3ants had entered the
city and "eigaged in struggles
by force," )resumably with Red
Guard elemets.
A broa[cast from Hunan
blamed the inrest there on "ul-
traleftist" elements who have
called the ?rive toward modera-
tion a "rev _sionist" movement.
The broadcast linked these ele-
ments with ehe proscribed "May 16
corps" in P !king--a group that
has been brLnded "ultraleftist"
for its attacks on Chou En-lai
and other 1-aders.
The ar:.y has apparently dealt
with these nd other recent dis-
turbances q.ickly and firmly.,
Red Guards have been allowed
to put up w.ll posters in Peking
again, but hese posters seem
largely con fined to attacks on
disgraced " eftists."
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Peking has made an effort
to paper over differences within
the central leadership, but vari-
ations in emphasis by major
spokesmen have recently been evi-
dent, which probably reflect
basic disagreement on key issues.
Such moderates as Chou En-lai
have stressed the importance of
increasing production and re-es-
tablishing firm administrative
machinery, while such militants
as Kang Sheng have been emphasiz-
ing the "great achievements" of
the Cultural Revolution.
Militant Maoist leaders may
attempt to seize upon the unhap-
piness of the extremist Red
Gaurds in order to revive the
momentum of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Nevertheless, there is no
sign that the moderate sponsors
of Peking's current policies are
under great pressure to retreat
from the current line.
The moderating trend con-
tinues to be reflected in foreign
policy as well. Living condi-
tions for the diplomatic com-
munity in Peking have improved
somewhat, and the Chinese have
apparently instructed local em-
ployees of the embassies to
adopt a more friendly manner.
Although the Chinese continue to
hold some diplomatic "hostages,"
the two remaining Kenyan diplo-
mats in Peking were finally given
permission to leave the country
and arrived in Nairobi on 15 Oc-
tober.
Similarly, the Chinese
yielded to demands of London dock
workers and removed propaganda
banners from a Chinese freighter
in order to get the cargo un-
loaded, a sharp departure from
China's stubborn defiance in
earlier such incidents.
Although relations with
Burma and Indonesia remain at
low ebb, Peking has continued to
avoid diplomatic responses which
would give further offense to
Rangoon or Djakarta.
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INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN THAILQVD
Communist insurgency has in-
creased in several areas which
had been relatively free from
such activity in the past.
In late September, a 10-man
police patrol was wiped out in
Prachuap Khiri Khan Province in
Thailand's mid-south area. This
was the second ambush by insur-
gents in the province in as many
months, and represented the most
successful known Communist attack
against a government unit thus
far in Thailand.
The security of the attack
and the perfunctory response
of security elements in the prov-
ince drew a sharp reaction in
Bangkok. Martial law was imposed.
The army, which has been trying
to gain a stronger hand in the
control and conduct of anti-in-
surgent operations, used the at-
tack as a pretext to take over
direction of counterinsurgency
in the west-central and part of
the mid-south areas.
The ambush in Prachuap Khiri
Khan, together with a less suc-
cessful attack in Rat Buri Prov-
ince just west of Bangkok, and
the first armed propaganda meet-
ing in Phatthalung Province, un-
derline a limited but potentially
serious resurgence of Communist
activity in the west-central and
mid-south regions. Communist
front organizations have been
recruiting iembers in the two
areas for m?ny years. Armed in-
surgent groi:ps, totaling as many
as 600-700 Guerrillas, have been
organized aid have been attempting
THAILAND - A eas of Insurgent Activity
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to establish bases in remote
jungle and mountainous areas.
Although a clear trend has
not yet been established the re-
cent increased activity in the
mid-south may be the forerunner
of a new concerted Communist drive
there. Despite continuing set-
backs and only limited progress
over the years, the Communists
have long viewed the neglected
and isolated mid-south region as
fertile ground for dissident
movements.
The Communists may believe
that, by increasing their opera-
tions in the mid-south and the
north, they can take advantage
of the government's preoccupation
with the northeast. They may
also calculate that intensifying
their activity in these areas
may divert some government pres-
sure from the hard-pressed in-
surgents in the northeast.
The latest compilation of in-
surgent incidents suggests that
the Communists are still reacting
defensively to the government's
increased security presence in
the northeast. The number of
Communist-initiated incidents, as-
sassinations, and armed propa-
ganda meetings, have changed lit-
tle from the over-all pattern es-
tablished during the past year.
A flurry of activity in
Buriram and Sisaket provinces in
September indicates that the
Communists are continuing to
move into new northeastern areas
where the government's presence
is limited. The assassination
of three civilian development
officials in Buriram last week
sug 25X1 gest that the Communists may 25X1
soon turn to more widespread use
of terrorism.
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KOREAN DM7 INCIDENTS
The rate of North Korean in-
cidents along the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) has declined in recent
weeks, but this relative lull may
be short-lived.
Aside from the shelling last
week of a South Korean guard
post---the first Communist use of
heavy mortars and recoilless ri-
fles in the DMZ since the armi-
stice--there has been a noticea-
ble drop in the intensity of Com-
munist harassing activity.
Between 1 September and 22
October 46 firing incidents oc-
curred, compared with a monthly
average of about 78 during June,
July, and August. This decrease
contrasts with last autumn when
Pyongyang took advantage of the
favorable conditions before the
onset of winter to launch its
campaign of harassment against
the UN forces. During the harsh-
est winter months there is usually
a marked drop in all activity
along the DMZ.
The decline of activity may
be related tc the upcoming annual
UN debate of the Korean question.
Moscow is again pressing the
General Asserr:)ly to abolish the
UN Command it South Korea and
may have urged the North Koreans
to cut back ca their harassing
activities at this time. Pyong-
yang may hav? ordered a cutback
in harassing activity to assess
its tactics fallowing the heavy
activity of tie spring and sum-
mer months.
The drop in incidents is
likely to be temporary. There
has been no 1?tup in North Korean
charges that :he continued pres-
ence of US fcr-ces in Korea is a
threat to the peace. On 18 Octo-
ber Pyongyang published a memo-
randum allegiig US preparations
to renew hostilities. The thrust
of the charges suggests that
Pyongyang intends to maintain a
high level of tension in Korea,
while placing the onus on the US.
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EUROPE
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The scenario for the USSR's 50th anniversary
celebrations has begun to unfold
In conjunction with the festivities,
the Soviet party is evidently organizing a program
of political discussions with foreign Communist dele-
gations. Moscow reportedly intends to convene the
visitors in regional groupings for working sessions,
although there probably will be general meetings
of all the "fraternal" parties as well, at least
for form's sake.
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The Latin Americans may come in for special
attention. Moscow eulogized Che Guevara on the
news of his death, but there were signs that it
will use this event to underscore to the Latins the
futility of Castro-Guevara revolutionary tactics.
Moscow's public reaction to the new flare-up
in the Middle East has been stoutly pro-Egyptian.
After seeking UN Security Council condemnation of
Israel, however, the USSR voted for the resolution
obliquely condemning both parties, which accords
with the Soviet interest in maintaining the cease-
fire.
Soviet propaganda, as expected, played last
weekend's protests over the US role in Vietnam
fairly heavily. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the
protests were reported without comment.
In Western Europe, sizable crowds turned out
for the protests. The Amsterdam march attracted
more than 15,000. In West Berlin some 10,000 turned
out for the largest anti-American demonstration ever
to take place there. Smaller, but equally militant,
crowds demonstrated in London and Stockholm.
A sharp division between France and its five
partners in the European Communities over British
membership was evident at this week's Council meet-
ing in Luxembourg. Although Couve de Murville re-
jected the notion that France was "vetoing" negotia-
tions with the British, he maintained that France
considered a UK balance-of-payments equilibrium and
elimination of sterling's international currency
role as "necessary preconditions" to negotiations.
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JON
AH RIDES THE SOVIET NUCLEAR-POWERED ICEBREAKER LENIN
The USSR's showpiece ship--
the nuclear-powered ice breaker
Lenin--probably is going into
a shipyard for major overhaul.
The highly publicized Lenin--
the world's first surface ship
with nuclear propulsion--has
been plagued with technological
difficulties since it began op-
erating in 1960.
The Lenin was seen in a dry
dock in the Murmansk area in the
summer of 1966 and since that time
has been in a small naval base on
the Kola Peninsula. The Soviets
probably have found they cannot re-
pair the ship without moving it
to a major repair facility. The
only shipyard in the Northern
Fleet area capable of handling
both major structural and reactor
problems is the Severodvinsk yard
25X1
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The nuclear powered icebreaker LENIN in April 1960.
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CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY LEADERS INDECISIVE ON ECONOMIC REFORM
Czechoslovakia's economic
reform continues to be a source
of dispute within the regime be-
cause of its potentially weaken-
ing effect on the authority of
the party and on the personal
power of party officials. If
the reform is to proceed beyond
its present stage of temporiza-
tion with little more than pal-
liatives for the economy, it will
have to be accompanied by some
political changes.
Liberals in the leadership
accept the idea that political
and social democratization
paralleling the economic reform
are necessary if basic economic
change is to be accomplished.
Conservatives are opposed to any
further reform. They believe
the political and social liberal-
ization since 1963 has already
gone too far. Party and govern-
ment functionaries in general
are opposed because they fear
for their jobs, since one aspect
25X1
of any genuine economic reform
is reorganizing and streamlining
the bureaucracy.
The majority of the leader-
ship, including party boss Novotny,
recognizes the need to advance
with some form of reform. They
can see no way to do so, however,
without developing an open
split in the party and without
ultimately jeopardizing their
own authority.
The party central committee
is scheduled to meet soon, prob-
ably in November, to discuss the
political aspects of the reform.
This session will shed some
light on the regime's short-run
intentions concerning the eco-
nomic reform, but it is not likely
to come to grips with the key
issue of how political and so-
cial liberalization can be 25X1
worked out without reducing the
party's absolute authority. I __J
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Tensions heightened in the area this week
when several perennial problems flared up.
The shelling of the refineries at Suez--a
devastating blow to the Egyptian economy--may
not satisfy the Israeli desire to avenge the sink-
ing of the destroyer Eilat. Some observers in
Israel believe that the real counterblow will be
delayed until the Egyptians' guard is down..
In Greece, a national holiday on 28 Oc-
tober opens the possibility of some sort of
u e involving some new
civilian ministers may be in the offing. Mean-
while, the junta has retired an additional 200
army officers in its efforts to remove dissi-
dent elements from the armed forces.
In Yemen, the position of the present
republican government under Sallal remains
shaky, but the release of other Yemeni republi-
can leaders from exile in Cairo offers some
hope of a more representative government being
formed. Meanwhile, the Egyptian troop evacua-
tion appears to be proceeding on schedule,
hampered only by a dispute over courtesy flags
flown by Saudi ships participating in moving
troops and equipment.
The mercenaries remain at Bukavu in Congo
(Kinshasa). Press interviews with mercenary leader
Schramme give the impression that he has reneged
on his earlier agreement to leave. Meanwhile,
the International Red Cross, which is in charge
of evacuation plans, has run into several bottle-
necks, partly due to its own cumbersome bureauc-
racy.
The Nigerian civil war continues, but the
action has slowed down somewhat. Federal troops
spent much of last week consolidating their posi-
tionsmand have begun two new advances toward the
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MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS HEIGHTEN
The shelling of the Egyptian
refineries at Suez on 24 October
may not satisfy the Israeli desire
to avenge the sinking of the de-
stroyer Eilat. Some observers
in Israel believe that the real
counterblow will not come until
the Egyptians have dropped their
guard.
to other strikes at targets of
economic significance the Israelis
may also hit at units of the Egyp-
tian Navy responsible for the
sinking of the Eilat, and at
their supporting installations.
The Israeli shelling of the
two refineries at Suez caused
"extensive if not total" damage,
a major blow to the Egyptian
economy. The entire production
facility, capable of turning out
140,000 barrels per day, is out
of commission, at least temporar-
ily. All capacity to produce
bottled gas used for cooking and
heating in many Egyptian homes
has been destroyed. In addition,
up to half the country's oil
storage capacity has been de-
stroyed or damaged, along with
the contents of the tanks.
from the start of construction.
Because petroleum products pro-
vide about two thirds of Egypt's
total energy requirements, a
large share of the remaining in-
dustrial production may be cur-
tailed for at least several months
as a direct result of an oil
shortage.
In order to maintain its
present level of production,
Egypt would have to import about
$5 million of refined products
per month. Damage to the domes-
tic pipeline terminal at Suez
would complicate the problem of
distributing any refined products
Egypt was able to import. Lim-
ited storage capacity will prob-
ably force Egypt to close down
production at the Morgan oil field
in the Gulf of Suez within a few
days.
Damage to other industries
in the Suez area is estimated to
be heavy. One of the industries
which may have been damaged is
the Nasr fertilizer plant at At-
taki which produces about one half
of the country's nitrogenous fer-
tilizer, and damage to it could
seriously affect Egyptian agri-
culture. Other industries in
Suez include a paper mill, power
plants, chemical laboratories, and
food processing facilities.
United Nations
Rebuilding the refineries
could take as long as two years
The Security Council adopted
a compromise resolution condemning
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Gaza, Hebron J O R D A N
'
GA ZA /
/ Dead
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1 /
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all violations of the cease-fire
and demanding that the parties
concerned prohibit all military
activities in the area and co-
operate with the UN Truce Super-
vision Organization (UNTSO). To
strengthen the UN presence in
the area, Secretary General Thant
told the Council that he plans
to increase the size of UNTSO and
to set up more observation posts.
Meanwhile, consultations
continue on a general political
resolution upon which the General
Assembly last summer was unable
to agree. The new crises could
spur the nonpermanent members of
the Council in their efforts to
come up with a resolution which
would call for the appointment
of a special UN representative
to the area. Both the Arabs and
Israelis have indicated they were
willing to accept a UN represen-
tative, but council members have
been unable to agree on general
principles to guide the mediator.
If the Security Council is
unable to take any action on a
general resolution, the president
of the General Assembly will
press ahead with a debate on the
Middle East in that body where
the prospects of any agreed reso-
lution are even poorer.
Soviet Naval Activity
The Egyptian press has an-
nounced that a group of Soviet
warships will arrive in Port
Said on 27 October. At least a
token force of Soviet ships has
remained in Alexandria follow-
ing the departure of the strong
naval force which arrived at
Port Said and Alexandria in early
July. Three Soviet auxiliary
ships are off the small Egyptian
port of Salum.
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POLITICAL INSTABILITY STILL BESETS DAHOMEY
Chronically unstable Dahomey I he is now publicly critical of the
seems destined for another round
of heightened political turmoil.
Disputes have erupted between Pres-
ident Soglo's military government
and the watchdog Military Vigi-
lance Committee (MVC), and the
quarrel between Soglo and army
chief of staff Colonel Alley has
intensified.
The MVC, created earlier this
year as a sop to junior army of-
ficers who demanded a larger role
in the government, has long been
irked by Soglo's unwillingness to
ous og o. majority o e
committee blames the government's
corruption and inaction on civilian
ministers and on the ambivalent
Colonel Alley, who despite his own
disenchantment with Soglo's in-
decisive leadership, has not al-
lowed the MVC to force its will
on the government.
Frictions within the MVC stem
largely from the old regional dif-
ferences that have plagued Dahomey
since it became independent seven
years ago. Northern officers, for
example, complain about the small
number of northerners in the civil
service and demand preferential
treatment to redress the imbalance.
More significantly, northern of-
ficers backed by Alley, early this
month unsuccessfully sought com-
mittee approval to reduce Soglo
to a figurehead president and in-
stall a civilian prime minister.
Alley's personal pique with
Soglo has reached the point where
SECRET
25X1
25)
These latest flare-ups fol-
low the repression of serious
labor unrest last August, and the
discovery of coup plotting in late
September. Basic labor discon- 25X1
tent continues and could result
in antigovernment demonstrations
at any time.
Grll/ of Guinea
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NIGERIAN ARMY KEEPS UP THE PRESSURE ON BIAFRA
Action in the Nigerian civil
war slowed somewhat last week,
and federal officials again tried
to allay Ibo fears of being mas-
sacred. Peace talks have not yet
materialized, and Biafra is con-
tinuing to seek men and equipment
from outside.
Federal troops at Enugu and
Asaba spent last week consolidat-
ing their positions in prepara-
tion for an attack again into the
Ibo heartland. Federal troops
northeast of Enugu began a push
southward toward Nkalagu on 24-25
October, and at least 1,000 fresh
troops have reinforced those that
failed in their initial attempt
to cross the Niger River at Asaba.
In addition, a sizable federal
operation now is under way into
the Rivers State through the maze
of interconnecting waterways lead-
ing from the Mid-West.
The amphibious group which
landed at Calabar on 18 October
easily scattered the meager Bia-
fran defending force, which seems
to have fled north and westward.
The federals may now be prepar-
ing to land at Oron, where there
are road connections to the East
Central State.
The stepped-up federal air
activity against Biafra has prob-
ably been more costly than its
effectiveness would warrant. Al-
though sorties have been flown
throughout Biafra from airfields
at Benin city and Makurdi, two
L-29s have crashed, two more
are crippled, and both jet Pro-
General Gowon continues to
hope to avoid a full-scale occupa-
tion of Iboland. When Radio
Enugu was returned to the federal
network on 21 October, his field
commander there broadcast the
most direct attempt to date to
assuage Ibo fears of being ex-
terminated. The broadcast again
appealed to the Ibos to overthrow
Ojukwu, urged cooperation with
the federal military authorities,
and promised all noncombatants
full protection.
Within Biafra, Ojukwu still
seems to be in essential control
despite earlier signs of turmoil
and dissension within the regime.
Ojukwu has made more cabinet
changes, apparently aimed at
bolstering his support among the
minorities. His regime, however,
faces serious housing and feed-
ing problems because an estimated
several hundred thousand refugees--
including 150,000 from Enugu--
have fled southward.
Ojukwu is also continuing
to seek outside military assist-
ance, including mercenaries and
substantial amounts of rifles.
25X1
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SECRET
25X1
Peace talks, which the Com-
monwealth Secretariat tried to
get started in London last week,
have not yet begun because of
differences over the venue. Bia-
fran representatives did meet
with federal delegates twice last
weekend, but nothing of substance
was discussed. The Biafrans have
been arguing against London as a
site, while the federal represent-
atives now are apparently insist-
ing the talks take place there.
SCENE OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
g
Benue
B C
Nsukka
I
i:.. A "st A
l "6turkDo
.
Benin City
t
Enugu
ci
Umuah
~ r
Aba,
ii Port HarcouRt t
al barl
Oron
Mamfe
11 - S L s6ISo6o
Bonny
State boundary and name
-- Railroad ? Airfield
ae ao
STATUTE MILES
6
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racg
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SECRET
INDIA BUYS MORE SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT
Indian officials, after re-
peated denials, have admitted
privately that they have agreed
to purchase 127 SU-7 fighter-
bomber aircraft and 12 trainers
from the USSR.
The shift from Western to
Soviet equipment that began in
1960 has accelerated rapidly
since the Indo-Pakistani war in
1965 and the USSR is now the
leading supplier of arms to India.
In 1964 India drew up a five-
year plan to modernize and ex-
pand its armed forces. The plan
envisaged major support from the
West, limited Soviet
participa-
tion, and increasing
reliance on
domestically produced
arms. The
war between
Pakistan
and India
resulted in
cutbacks
in Western
deliveries
and delays
in India's
domestic production. Soviet mil-
itary support, however, was not
interrupted.
SECRET
Prior to 1965, the Indians
purchased Soviet transport air-
craft, helicopters, surface-to-
air missiles, a limited number of
MIG-21s, and some light tanks.
Since then, they have ordered
more MIG-21s, medium tanks, sub-
marines, and surface ships. India
ranks third among free world recip-
ients of Soviet arms, with con-
tracts for as much as $700 mil-
lion in Soviet military equipment.
India appears to be adhering
generally to its 1964 defense plan
and seems determined to obtain
arms when and where it chooses.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Che Guevara continues to be a major subject
of interest in Latin America. Both the Cuban
and Bolivian governments have perpetuated the
memory of his capture by declaring 8 October
a national holiday--a day of mourning in Cuba,
the "day of the patriotic revolutionary people"
in Bolivia.
Uruguay's Communist press has blamed the US
for Guevara's death, claiming that US military
and civilian personnel were in charge of the
whole antiguerrilla operation in Bolivia. Other
pro-Moscow Communists throughout Latin America,
however, are emphasizing that Guevara's death
resulted from a series of Cuban errors, and many
of them have privately denounced Castro's strategy
of pushing guerrilla warfare.
Colombian guerrillas who ambushed an army
patrol on 18 October left leaflets claiming they
were participating in "Operation Che Guevara."
Four Venezuelan national guardsmen were killed
in an ambush the same day. Even in Bolivia the
remnants of the guerrilla band have ambushed
Bolivian Army elements three times since Che's
death and killed or wounded several soldiers.
Washington's announcement on the availability
of supersonic US F-5 aircraft brought varied re-
actions. Peru and Brazil, which had already re-
vealed plans to buy French Mirage fighters, stated
that the US offer might not satisfy their needs.
Chile complained that it had already con-
tracted to buy subsonic British fighters at a little
less than the cost of the F-5. Colombia and some
nations with no immediate plans of their own have
criticized the US action as contradicting the arms
limitation statement agreed to by the Western Hemis-
phere presidents at the Punta del Este summit meet-
ing last spring.
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GUYANESE-VENEZUELAN BORDER DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN
An old territorial dispute
has flared up again between Vene-
zuela and Guyana. At issue is
Ankoko Island at the confluence
of the Cuyuni and Wenamu rivers
which form part of their common
border. Venezuela claims the
whole island, but Guyana insists
it is part Guyanese because a
1905 map agreed to by a joint
Venezuelan-British boundary com-
mission shows the border passing
through Ankoko.
The dispute has been quies-
cent for the past several months.
Last week, however, Guyana dis-
covered that Venezuelan President
Leoni had recently made a secret
inspection trip to the island and
Prime Minister Burnham became
alarmed by reports that the Vene-
VENEZUELA-GUYANA BORDER DISPUTE
SECRET
zuelans were planning to turn it
into a military base.
The Venezuelans maintain that
they plan only a small border
outpost
I An-
koko has given Guyana's pro-Commu-
nist opposition a popular issue
to exploit.
Guyana has warned that "any
development of the part of Ankoko
Island which is Guyanese... can
only be regarded as an unfriendly
and provocative act." Burnham
may yet decide to bring the dis-
pute before the United Nations
in order to relieve local pres-
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ARIAS SEES HIS ELECTION PROSPECTS IN PANAMA IMPROVED
Arnulfo Arias, leader of
Panama's largest political party,
the Panamenistas, is counting on
the present break in the eight-
party government coalition to
guarantee him an overwhelming
plurality in next May's presiden-
tial election. Arias is confident
of obtaining support from several
coalition parties that oppose
President Robles' selection of
Finance Minister Samudio to head
the government ticket.
The Panamenista leader hopes
to create a "gigantic National
Unity Front" that would include
some elements of the oligarchy,
the few hundred wealthy families
that control the economy and po-
litical life of Panama. Indeed,
leaders of several of the parties
supported by these families are
considering an alliance with Arias
tha- would broaden the vote-get-
ting power of the mass-based
Panamenistas. Arias has twice
been elected and ousted after only
short periods in the presidency.
In the 196, presidential contest,
Arias was narrowly defeated in
what he charged was a rigged
election. He contends that a much
greater man gin of victory in 1968
will make electoral fudging "prac-
tically imjossible."
s Many r embers of the wealthy
establishmEnt, however, fear the
return of the authoritarian ex-
president ind would go to extremes
to avoid losing their control
over the country. Since presi-
dential candidates are not re-
quired to register with the Elec-
toral Tribinal until 12 January,
a last-mini.te bargain on a com-
promise candidate to unite the
ramshackle administration coali-
tion cannot be ruled out. I
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PERONISM A DECLINING THREAT IN ARGENTINA
The failure of last week's
Peronist demonstrations is a mani-
festation of the internal squab-
bling that has almost destroyed
the movement as a threat to Ar-
gentine security.
Peron's penchant for issuing
contradictory instructions from
his exile in Spain and for play-
ing off one Peronist faction
against another to maintain his
own control has finally reduced
the movement to a loose confeder-
ation of struggling but weak
groupings. He appears to have
alienated almost all the major
leaders of Peronism inside Argen-
tina, thus strengthening the
hand of those who want Peronism
without Peron--the neo-Peronists
led by Augusto Vandor.
Peron has also managed to
sow dissension in the loose union
of orthodox and neo-Peronist labor
unions, which had feuded for more
than a year before agreeing to
bury their differences in the face
of government pressure last
spring. Vandor's neo-Peronists
are already seeking some accom-
modation with the Ongania regime
despite Peron's condemnation of
such activity.
the Peronists.
25X1
25X1
deal with the more tractable of
Despite the great charisma
of the former dictator and the
strong loyalty that his rank-
and-file followers still hold for
him, his fear that commitment to
any one Peronist subordinate
would weaken his own hold over
the movement has led him to shat-
ter, inadvertently but neverthe-
less effectively, what was once
a fairly monolithic structure.
The government will probably take
advantage of this disarray to
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CHILEAN LEFTISTS CONTINUE SQUAIBLING
Jisagreements within and
among the leftist parties in Chile
are becoming increasingly sharp.
The Communist-Socialist Pop-
ular Action Front (FRAP), which
several months ago appeared to be
in an extremely strong political
position, now is seriously weak-
ened. The Communists and Social-
ists have cooperated since 1956,
and both have derived substantial
advantages from the combination.
Recently, however, increasingly
divergent policies, especially
with respect to the efficacy of
armed struggle in Chile, have di-
iuted FRAP's effectiveness.
The Communist Party favors
obtaining power through the elec-
toral process, and fears that
advocacy of armed struggle would
jeopardize its legal status. In
Lhe Socialist party, which gener-
ally has been more extreme than
the Communists, the pro-Peking
group reportedly has become
stronger since Senator Raul Am-
puero pulled out of the party,
taking a third to half its members
with him. His new Popular Social-
ist Party has already issued a
statement declaring that it will
he impossible to achieve social-
ism in Chile by peaceful means as
Long as the country is under the
"imperialist yoke."
Differences have also arisen
over cooperating with other left-
i_st parties. The Communists favor
a broad leftist grouping that
would include the opportunistic
Radical Party, now under leftist
control, but would exclude the ex-
tremist splinter groups. The So-
cialists favor cooperating with
the extremis-.s, but are opposed to
a formal agreement with the Radi-
cals. The Communists widened the
area of disa(reement last month by
extending thEir call for coopera-
tion to include the Christian Dem-
ocratic Parts, now also under left-
ist leadersh_ :).
Leftist disunity comes at an
opportune tin_ for President Frei,
who is faced with serious problems,
including dixision within his own
Christian Denocratic Party. So
far the left ias been unable to
exploit Frei'- problems effectively.
If, however, she Communists and
Socialists rE:urn to their former
level of coop=ration, FRAP will re-
emerge as a p:)werful political
mechanism wits excellent prospects
for the 1969 ,nd 1970 elections.
Some clu:s as to the damage
FRAP has suffered should emerge
next month in the course of the
by-election t: fill the seat of
the Christian Democratic senator
representing iio-Bio, Malleco, and
Cautin provin?es who died in Oc-
tober. The C)mmunists apparently
still hope to persuade the Social-
ists to join hem in supporting a
Radical candii.ate. It is too early
to rule out tie re-emergence of a
strong FRAP b- the time of the
1969 congress anal and the 1970
presidential elections.
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