CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005700020004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 3, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Christian Democracy in Latin America
Secret
N2 38
3 March 1967
No. 0279/67A
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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the Sep-
tember 1964 Chilean presidential election led many to
hope that Christian Democracy would develop signifi-
cantly throughout Latin America, competing with Com-
munism on ideological grounds and offering an alterna-
tive, democratic route to social and economic progress.
No such trend has yet developed. The Christian
Democratic movement's appeal is to students and middLe
class, a relatively small percentage of the population
in most Latin American countries. Its concepts of
basic social reform and the dignity of the human person
may appeal to the workers, but they still cast their
vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable
of the established parties that have an immediate chance
of governing.
The movement's progress is likely to be hampered
by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor or-
ganizations to compete against the entrenched posi-
tions of other political movements.
Current Balance Sheet
The Christian Democratic
movement is generally agreed to
be of current political signifi-
cance in only four Latin American
countries--Chile, Peru, Venezuela,
and El Salvador.
In only one of these--Chile--
is the Christian Democratic Party
(PDC) the governing party. Frei's
solid victory in the 1964 presi-
dential election was followed by
an even more impressive showing
in the March 1965 congressional
election. However, the party's
reform program has run into dif-
ficulty in the upper house of
Congress, which is still con-
trolled by the opposition; no
progress has been made in weaken-
ing Marxist domination of the
urban labor force; and Frei's
moderation has been increasingly
challenged by the left wing of
his own party, which may capture
control in the next two or three
years.
The only other Christian
Democratic party with a claim to
a role in government is the one
in Peru. It was brought into a
pre-election coalition by the
dominant Popular Action Party
in 1963 and, although it gained
only four percent of the votes,
it holds two cabinet posts. Its
voting strength has been weakened
recently by the defection of a
dissident faction which formed a
separate Popular Christian Party.
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JH IAN C~EMQc L I AME ICI
Country with active Christian Democratic Party
O Country with weak Christian Democratic Party
0 Country without Christian Democratic Party
EDUARDO FREI
President of Chile,
Latin America's Christian Democratic leader.
RAFAEL CALDERA
Venezuelan presidential aspirant and
number-two Latin American Christian Democrat
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Venezuela's Christian Demo-
crats (COPEI) have strong hopes
of duplicating the victory of the
Chilean party in 1968 and appear
to have narrowed the gap between
their 22 percent of the elector-
ate in 1963 and the governing
Democratic Action's 32 percent.
COPEI Secretary General Rafael
Caldera, one of the few Latin
American CD leaders of interna-
tional stature, is expected to
be the party's standard bearer
in his fourth try for the presi-
dency. He has recently come out
in favor of a politically expe-
dient move to the right, thus
filling the vacuum of the center-
right of the Venezuelan political
spectrum and opening new sources
of support.
In El Salvador, the PDC
garnered 31.2 percent of the
votes in the March 1966 legisla-
tive election and one of its
leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte,
retained the mayoralty of San
Salvador. In less than six years
the PDC has become the leading
opposition party. It has little
chance of capturing the presi-
dency in 1967, but should be a
strong contender by 1972, with
Notre Dame - educated Mayor
Duarte the likely candidate.
Applying even the most gen-
erous criteria to the judgment
of potential, there are not more
than four other CD parties--in
the Dominican Republic, Panama,
Brazil, and Guatemala--that might
develop as moderately important
forces over the next five years.
The Dominican Revolutionary
Social Christian Party (PRSC),
led by Coanabo Javier, has aban-
doned, at least for the time being,
the irresponsible policies it
adopted after the April 1965 re-
volt and has moved toward the po-
litical center. The party has
made its opposition to the Bala-
guer government clear, but has
also indicated that it intends to
operate within bounds acceptable
to the President. The PRSC hopes
that this moderate line will in-
crease its following and enable
it to improve on the poor showing
it made in the 1966 elections.
The party has developed a small
but talented cadre, primarily
from the university ranks.
The Panamanian PDC was reg-
istered some five years ago and
polled only 3.1 percent of the
votes in 1964. Although it con-
tinues a minuscule party, it has
made significant organizational
strides and its philosophy of
social justice gives it roots
lacked by most Panamanian parties,
which are largely personalistic
or tied to financial interests.
The PDC is currently negotiating
with the mass-based Panamenista
Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's
largest--in hopes of forming a
coalition for the May 1968 elec-
tions. The CDs have offered to
provide the Panamenistas with
much-needed administrative skills
in return for a share of the as-
sembly seats in the next election.
A long-range goal would be to
acquire support within Arias'
party and inherit his mass fol-
lowing when he passes from he
scene.
The Brazilian PDC polled
only four percent of the vote in
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1962, but the party had signifi-
cant strength in three important
south-central states (Parana,
Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like
all other Brazilian parties, it
was abolished during a political
reorganization under the Castello
Branco administration. Most of
its members then affiliated with
the progovernment ARENA party
and campaigned under its banner
in the November 1966 congressional
elections. It is unlikely that
there will be any significant ex-
pansion in the number of politi-
cal. parties--the new Brazilian
constitution sets down stringent
standards that virtually eliminate
the possibility of a repetition
of the former proliferation of
parties. The former PDC has made
no attempt to reconstitute itself,
but its former members will prob-
ably join with like-minded con-
gressmen to pursue policies con-
sistent with Christian Democratic
ideology.
The Guatemalan PDC was only
recently recognized as .a legally
as some streng in ETM
youth and student movement and
some growth potential among the
campesinos who make up more than
half the population. Current
direction of the party leaves much
to be desired; its leader, Rene de
Leon, appears honest, but he has
little organizational flair or
popular appeal. With more vigo-
rous leadership and the develop-
ment of a middle-echelon cadre,
the party might develop signifi-
ca.ntly--particularly if the in-
cumbent Revolutionary Party (PR)
administration fails to resolve
basic problems confronting it.
The remaining nine Chris-
tian Democratic parties--in Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, and Uruguay--show scant
promise of developing into forces
of national importance over the
next five years. Leadership of
even modest stature exists only
in Argentina (Salvador Alende,
Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia
(Remo di Natale).
Party Youth Wings
As with all political groups
in Latin America, the vast major-
ity of CD party militants come
from student organizations in the
local universities. In most
countries of the hemisphere, CD
voting strength on the campus is
much greater than the political
strength of the parent party.
A few examples illustrate this
point: In Panama, the party
polled 3.1 percent of the national
vote in 1964 (and probably would
poll not more than. 5 percent to-
day), but its university youth
got 12.8 percent in the January
1966 campus election and 24.4
percent in January 1967. The
Dominican PRSC received 5.4 per-
cent of the vote in 1962 (and its
present strength could well be
lower because of internal divi-
sions and leadership conflicts),
but its youth wing on the campus
garnered 40.2 percent of the
vote in May 1966. In Venezuela,
COPEI polled 22 percent of the
vote in 1963; .its student wing on
the campus of Central University,
however, polled 40.2 percent of
the vote in 1966.
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Several CD leaders, most
notably Frei in Chile and Caldera
in Venezuela, have expressed con-
siderable concern over the grow-
ing radicalization of party youth
wings. In several countries the
positions assumed by CD youth
groups (or important wings) are
almost indistinguishable from
those of pro-Communist youth ele-
ments. In Venezuela, the wing
of the COPEI youth headed by
Marta Sosa is so "far out" it
has earned the sobriquet "the
Astronauts."
In Panama, the
dominant wing of the CD youth has
assumed positions at least as
radical as the Communists. And
in the Dominican Republic the
Social Christian group in the Na-
tional University, while differ-
entiating itself from the Commu-
nist students on certain issues,
has frequently taken a parallel
line.
The great concern of respon-
sible party leaders is that these
students, as they progress from
campus to parent party, will swell
the ranks of the radical wings
and push the parties further left.
Other observers, however, expect
the "hotheads" to mellow once
they participate directly in
party life and cope with hard
political reality. Both views
can be defended. Some mellowing
is inevitable, but in the past
ten years the demand for revolu-
tionary (even convulsive) change
has mushroomed--and among the
youth the cry has assumed much
greater proportions.
The Labor Arm
A major influence in tae
development of the Christian
Democratic movement will be the
actions and attitudes of its
labor organization, the Latin
American Confederation of Chris-
tian Trade Unionists (CLASC;.
So far, as an organized force, it
has been a dismal failure except
among the campesinos. Its orly
impact and sole purpose up t.c
this time has been as a political
action instrument with primary
appeal to the working classes.
In this role, it has earned a
reputation for independent action
and irresponsibility that has re-
flected negatively on the whole
movement despite CLASC's vigorous
claims that it is not subservient
to the Christian Democratic po-
litical leaders.
In spite of the apparent
differences between CLASC and
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the CD movement, a closer and
more formal relationship appears
to be in the offing. Last April,
officials of CLASC who are also
officers of the Christian Demo-
cratic parties met in Montevideo
to arrange closer coordination
between the two groups. To ac-
complish this goal, they proposed
that both the CD party labor de-
partments and CLASC be granted
formal representation in the
Christian Democratic Organiza-
tion of America (ODCA), the re-
gional grouping formed in 1949.
The plan has not yet been
implemented, but eventual ODCA
approval appears likely. Closer
CLASC identification with the CD
political movement may have an
adverse effect on CD youth
wings, which--being further left
than their parent parties--have
identified more closely with
CLASC's revolutionary image.
Since the first of the year,
CLASC has intensified its ef-
forts to create its own youth
groups and appears to have made
some progress, especially in
Central America.
The Role of ODCA
In its 17 years of existence,
ODCA has not evolved beyond a
sort of fraternity held together
more by negative factors such as
hostility to the US, to capital-
ism, and to the oligarchies, than
by any basic agreement among its
members on doctrine or principles.
Moreover, the individual parties
have made very clear that they
will fight any effort--whether
impose standards
and controls that will impinge
on their freedom of action.
In general, ODCA takes a
slightly less hostile line on
US policies than that of its
member parties. This probably
results from the influence of
its president, Rafael Caldera of
Venezuela. The organization's
two vice presidents are Hector
Cornejo Chavez of Peru and Rene
De Leon of Guatemala. Tomas Reyes
Vicuna of Chile is its secretary
general.
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Only in Central America has
there been any move toward a
more cohesive unit geared to area
problems. A smaller regional.
group, the Christian Democratic
Union of Central America, was or-
ganized last July. It now has
five member parties, in Guatemala,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
and Panama, and a sixth may be 25X1
formed in Honduras.
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The modest progress made by
the Christian Democratic movement
in the past two and a half years
suggests that its development
will be much slower and less ex-
tensive than many anticipated in
the first flush of enthusiasm
following the Frei victory.
One major problem is its
failure to reach the lower so-
cial classes and to develop a
significant worker base. Its
strength in the universities
and its ability to compete with
Communist groups on the campus
create unfounded optimism. The
"inspirational" approach that
attracts the college student
has no comparable appeal among
the inadequately educated lower
classes.
Neither does a victory for
one party seem likely to have
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any major effect on the fortunes
of another. What appears to
emerge from CD gains or losses
in recent elections is rather
solid evidence that the national
parties will sink or swim on the
basis of their own leadership
abilities, organizational talents,
and approach to local issues. In-
ternational events count for lit-
tle, and the influence of ODCA
and the successful CD parties for
even less.
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