CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 10, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFI
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COPY NO. 56
OCI NO. 1011/60
10 March 1960
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
!MAC
r0CLIMENT NO 9
CHANGE IN CLASS. El
State Department review
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 March 1960
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Moscow has combined expressions of optimism over the
summit conference with intensified efforts to increase
pressure for Western concessions on Germany and Berlin.
Khrushchev said in a speech on 5 March that he will enter
the forthcoming negotiations in "full readiness" to find
solutions to disputed issues. At the same time, Soviet
bloc spokesmen are privately fostering confusion and un-
certainty regarding the timing of a separate peace treaty
with East Germany if no agreement is reached. Moscow
continued its efforts to isolate and discredit Bonn by
sending notes on 4 March to West Germany and the three
Western powers protesting recent Spanish - West German
25X1 military talks.
25X1
THE DE GAULLE - KHRUSHCHEV TALKS
Both De Gaulle and Kbrushchev probably look on their
talks beginning 15 March primarily as an opportunity to
size each other up and impress the other with his firm
adherence to established positions. Both have policy com-
mitments which sharply reduce the likelihood of any French-
Soviet "deal." De Gaulle, who sees the meeting as an occa-
sion to assert France's authority as a European leader,
can be expected to maintain his "hard line" on Berlin and
Germany, while at the same time probing for opportunities
to lessen East-West tensions. Kbrushchev, who has been
making a persistent effort to create a favorable atmosphere
for his visit, will probably avoid serious bargaining on
specific issues, but try to impress De Gaulle with Soviet
determination to reach a settlement on Berlin and Germany.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
The military postures of the UAR and Israel have been
further relaxed, but their intensive propaganda war con-
tinues, with UAR media making bitter charges of Western
complicity with Israel. The UAR and Jordan are engaged in
a public quarrel over creation of a Palestine "state" and
army; Nasir has called the Jordanian Government a puppet
of the "imperialist powers." In Iraq, increased criticism
of the Qasim regime by Communist newspapers may lead to
further government action to undercut the orthodox faction
25X1 of the party.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 March 1960
PART I (continued)
CARIBBEAN TENSIONS Page 7
Anti-American feeling over the explosion in Havana
harbor is being whipped up by Castro and the Cuban press
and radio to such a level that even a minor incident now
could cause an outbreak of violence against US personnel
and property. The US Embassy sees no hope of e tahliqhincr
satisfactory relations with a Castro government.
In the Dominican Republic, the
beleaguered Trujillo regime faces a further deterioration
in its relations with the Roman Catholic hierarchy.
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
DE GAULLE'S ALGERIAN POLICY Page 1
The amplification of De Gaulle's views on Algeria,
made during and after his 3-5 March visit to the area,
suggests he has become pessimistic over prospects for an
early cease-fire. While he has not significantly altered
the self-determination policy, some of his forthright
statements have irritated extremists on both sides in
France and disturbed many moderates. Among the Algerian
rebels, his statements will tend to strengthen the posi-
tion of those leaders, particularly among field commanders,
who have long questioned his good faith.
25X1
25X1
THE IMPACT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S TRIP TO ASIA Page 1
Khrushchev's trip to India, Burma, Indonesia, and
Afghanistan, despite the bloc's enthusiastic evaluations,
apparently fell short of Soviet expectations, and Khru-
shchev's behavior on the journey may have reflected his
disappointment with the unenthusiastic public response.
Although his aggressive, tactless conduct irritated many
neutralist leaders during the trip, Kbrushchev left behind
some agreements for new credits and promises of further
economic aid. The joint communiqu?signed at each stop
supported some of Moscow's propaganda and policy positions
and provide some justification for Soviet claims of suc-
25X1 cess.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 March 1960
PART II (continued)
EAST GERMAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS Page 3
East Germany has announced that the Guinean ambassa-
dor to Moscow on 5 March presented his credentials to
President Pieck, an act which would constitute the first
legal recognition East Germany has received from a non-
Communist country. If Guinea confirms this action, its
lead may be followed by other countries unless West Germany
deters them. Such recognition would be used by Moscow to
support its claim that there are two sovereign German
25X1 states.
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS CONTINUE TO WORSEN
The Soviet Union, unsuccessful in its year-old diplo-
matic and propaganda pressure campaign to make Iran modify
its pro-Western policies, is taking measures to expand its
subversive potential inside Iran, and has recently launched
increasingly vicious propaganda attacks on the Shah's re-
gime. Iranian officials are concerned over these develop-
25X1 ments Officially, rela-
tions are at a stanastiii, witn moscow continuing to demand
that Iran give a guarantee against foreign military bases
of all types, while the Shah refuses to go beyond his offer
of a ban on foreign missile bases.
25X1
GOMULKA ADAMANT ON LABOR SPEED-UP
Page 5
Party First Secretary Gomulka's speech of 2 March, in
a climate of rising discontent among Polish industrial
workers, reaffirmed his regime's "tightening up" policy.
His explanation of the need for a reform of labor practices
probably failed in its purpose of calming the workers,
whose hopes for a rising standard of living have been
shaken by increasing food prices, layoffs of surplus work-
ers, and the prospect of harder work and less pay.
Page 6
NEW SOVIET UNIVERSITY FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS
The Soviet press is propagandizing Khrushchev's pro-
posal for a "Soviet University of People's Friendship"
as an example of support for the people of underdeveloped
countries. The scheme will provide a focus for propaganda
exploitation of the USSR's scholarship program for foreign
students and serve to isolate them from the realities of
Soviet life, thereby avoiding the unfavorable impression
many foreigners now receive at a number of schools through-
25X1 out the USSR.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 March 1960
PART II (continued)
COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS Page 9
Prospects are generally favorable for a material
reduction of the 12- to 15-year transitional period of
the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market).
EEC officials consider economic conditions propitious for
expediting tariff cuts, and they have had considerable
support from businessmen and from the French Government,
which for political reasons is anxious to consolidate the
community. Strongest opposition has come from the low-
tariff countries--especially the Netherlands?which are
reluctant to accentuate the differences between the EEC
and the Outer Seven. 25X1
UAR SEEKS EXPANDED INFLUENCE IN HORN OF AFRICA Page 10
The reported UAR offer of a large annual subsidy to
Somalia, if confirmed, could lead to a long period of un-
rest and even violence in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's
Christian rulers, uncertain of the loyalty of the large
Moslem minority, can be expected to react vigorously to
any move by the UAR to expand its influence in the Somali-
25X1 lands, which Ethiopia regards as its own preserve.
25X1
POLITICAL UNREST IN UGANDA Page 11
London's endorsement of a moderate increase in African
representation in the legislature of its East African pro-
tectorate of Uganda has failed to satisfy African nationa-
lists and has stimulated apprehension among tribal leaders,
who fear any centralization of government which might less-
en their own prestige. Some modifications in the announced
British program appear likely.
GUINEA
Guinea's increasing ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc
probably reflect President Sekou Tourd's belief that a
?noncommitted" nation can safely have economic and diplo-
matic relations with any friendly state. Continuing mis-
trust of Paris and inability to reach agreement on techni-
cal assistance led to the announcement on 1 March that
Guinea would leave the French monetary zone and create
both its own currency and national bank. Simultaneously,
Guinea signed a technical cooperation agreement with the
USSR outlining a three-year aid program within the frame-
work of the $35,000,000 credit agreement of last summer.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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PART II (continued)
AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONS WORSEN
Kabul has recently put Pakistan's diplomatic personnel
under surveillance and arrested some of the embassy's local
employees, Rawalpindi is countering with harassment of
Afghan personnel and with a proposal that Afghan tribesmen
be allowed to vote on whether they wish to join Pakistan.
If these tactics continue', both countries may withdraw
their ambassadors.
INDONESIA
The Indonesian Parliament adjourned quietly on 7
March following its abrupt "dismissal" by President
Sukarno two days earlier. Sukarno has called a 16 March
conference to consider plans for a new body which will
include the approximately 260 members of the recent parlia-
ment and 294 regional and functional representatives,
appointed by Sukarno. Sukarno leaves in early April on
his annual world tour, which this year will include visits
to Iraq and the UAR, Eastern Europe, Africa, Cuba, and
unofficial stops in Puerto Rico and San Francisco. 1
Page 13
Page 14
THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The South Korean Liberal party is using intensified
political repression to assure a landslide victory for
President Rhee and his running mate Yi Ki-pung on 15 March.
Following the election, the government may relax political
pressures as a sop to foreign criticism. The Liberals'
plans, however, may envisage the destruction of the opposi-
tion Democratic party, a move which in the long run would
probably force growing antiadministration sentiment into
subversive channels.
Page 15
JAPANESE-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT
Japan and the USSR have concluded a three-year trade
agreement calling for an exchange of $210,000,000 worth
of commodities each way with the understanding that the
USSR can defer payment for some purchases in Japan. The
1960 total trade turnover under the new agreement would
double the 1959 figure of approximately $62,400,000 and
would constitute about 2 percent of Japan's total trade
volume. The large and rapid expansion of Soviet crude-
oil marketing in Japan is causing serious concern among
American suppliers.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 March 1960
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
BU
. LGARIA'S "LEAP FORWARD" . Page 1
The extensive Bulgarian administrative reorganization
and economic drive, designed to "build socialism" as rap-
idly as possible, has resulted in increased production,
but at the expense of some dislocations, confusion in the
party, and increasing apathy among the people. Failure to
reach last year's ambitious economic goals has prompted
the formulation of more realistic plans and has stimulated
further administrative and personnel changes. There is
no indication that the Bulgarian program, drawing from
both Soviet and Chinese models, will be scrapped or that
25X1 party leader Zhivkov's position is threatened.
25X1
AFGHANISTAN'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION Page 4
Afghan Prime Minister Daud is pressing ahead with the
modernization of the army, increasing its size and improv-
ing its training and equipment. Determined to develop
Afghanistan's economy and introduce social reforms, Daud
apparently expects to rely heavily on the army for support
against any tribal opposition or conservative religious
resistance to his programs. As the army becomes aware of
its increasing importance as a means of controlling the
country, it could become a threat to the rule of the
royal family; at present, Daud is believed to have firm
control over the army.
SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA . . Page 8
The Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which
opens in Geneva on 17 March, will seek international agree-
ment on two questions that have occasioned much recent
friction among various countries, particularly between
Britain and Iceland: the extent of a country's territorial
sea and the jurisdiction of coastal states over nearby
fishing. The principal objective of Western, and particu-
larly NATO, countries is to reach agreement on a narrow
territorial sea of not more than six miles.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 March 1960
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Moscow has combined ex-
pressions of optimism over the
summit conference with efforts
to increase pressure for West-
ern concessions. Khrushchev,
in a speech on 5 March after
returning from his Asian trip,
said he intends to enter the
forthcoming talks in "full
readiness to seek out, together
with other states, ways to a
solution of disputed issues."
On 7 March, a Pravda editorial
echoed this sentiment by claim-
ing that the meeting would be
held in a "very favorable at-
mosphere" as a result of Khru-
shchev's "successful" Asian
tour.
Soviet bloc officials are
attempting privately to create
a strong impression that some
decisive action may be taken
on a separate peace treaty with
East Germany if the summit
meeting does not produce an
agreement. These officials
have given Western sources con-
flicting versions on the timing
of such action in order to ob-
scure Soviet intentions and in-
crease pressure for Western
concessions.
The counselor of the So-
viet Embassy in Paris assured
an American official that the
USSR had no intention of sign-
ing a separate treaty prior to
President Eisenhower's visit
in June. His statement implied,
however, that the West might ex-
pect some action after the
visit. A Soviet official in-
/if the summit
talks failed, the USSR would
proceed with a separate treaty
and denied that such a course
would be postponed until after
June.1
\Soviet
officials have sought to inten-
sify pressure for concessions
and stimulate fear of a private
understanding between the USSR
and the United States. The So-
viet ambassador to Bonn warned
Free Democratic party leaders
that Germany would "disappear
entirely" if Bonn persisted in
its present hostility to the
USSR and obstructionist policy
on Berlin. He said the West
Germans did not realize that the
USSR and the United States had
reached a "large measure of
agreement through diplomatic
channels," and that Bonn would
be "well advised" to take this
new situation into account.
Moscow is stepping up its
efforts to portray the Bonn gov-
ernment as an increasingly dan-
gerous obstacle to an East-West
agreement. The Soviet official
bS
Government fails to realize Ade-
nauer is moving to sabotage an
East-West agreement by exaggerat-
ing such issues as the high-al-
titude flights to Berlin and
the new documents for Allied
Military Liaison missions--docu-
ments bearing the name "German
Democratic Republic."
Moscow climaxed a two-week
propaganda campaign against the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAR1
10 March 1960
West German - Spanish military
talks with notes on 4 March to
the three Western powers and
Bonn protesting the talks as a
violation of Allied agreements
on Germany. The notes implied
that an understanding between
the USSR and the three Western
powers could be reached, pro-
vided Bonn does not disrupt
the "certain relaxation of ten-
sion" which Moscow claims has
taken place. Timing the aotes
to secure maximum impact before
Khrushchev's visit to France
and Adenauer's trip to the
United States, Moscow apparently
hopes to focus increased atten-
tion on the need for a German
settlement. The notes will al-
so provide a background for
Khrushchev to renew appeals for
restrictions on German military
power during his visit to France.
Western Position
A high official in the
West German Foreign Ministry
has privately affirmed that
Bonn favors a return to the
basic Western plan of 14 May
1959 in order to discourage a
disposition in "certain quar-
ters" to offer additional com-
promises on Berlin. The offi-
cial considers the present oc-
cupation rights the safest basis
for continued Allied presence
in the city and fears that an
"interim agreement" for Berlin
would ultimately undermine the
confidence of the city.
The official believes that
Khrushchev is unwilling to take
any steps involving the risk
of war and will therefore move
cautiously on the question of
a separate peace treaty with
East Germany. In his opinion,
however, the Western powers
face a major test in how they
react to the Soviet pressures
PART I
aimed at creating an atmosphere
of crisis in order to intimidate
and disunite them.
Speaking at a party rally
in Berlin on 5 March, Social
Democratic party (SPD) chairman
011enhauer, replying to recent
Soviet propaganda tactics, stated
it was time for Moscow to "stop
hoping" that the SPD ever would
become a promoter of Soviet pol-
icies. He added that there was
no purpose in considering pro-
posals for negotiations emanat-
ing from the East German "nominees
of Moscow." He did, however,
endorse military withdrawal from
both parts of Germany as a prop-
er approach to the question of
German reunification.
Nuclear Test Talks
The Soviet delegation has
moved to increase pressure for
agreement in principle to a
fixed quota for inspecting pos-
sible nuclear explosions. It
warned on 2 March that the USSR
would revert to its insistence
on a veto over inspections if
the United States continued
its opposition to the quota
concept.
In response to qualified
Western acceptance of the tem-
porary standards for identifying
and inspecting suspected ex-
plosions, as set forth in the
Soviet proposal of 16 February,
Soviet delegate Tsarapkin re-
jected negotiating separate ele-
ments in the Soviet plan, in-
sisting that it must be regarded
as a "unified whole." He stated
that the West must accept the
other major points of the Soviet
plan--a comprehensive treaty
banning all tests and the inspec-
tions-quota concept.
In raising the possibility
of returning to a demand for a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 March 1960
veto and emphasizing that the
"real issue" r?ained acceptance
of the quota Moscow apparent-
ly hopes tz gain Western ac-
ceptance,* the quota prin-
ciple wythout indicating a
spec4tc level of inspections.
THE DE GAULLE--
Both De Gaulle and Khru-
shchev probably look on their
talks beginning 15 March pri-
marily as an opportunity to
size each other up and impress
the other with his firm adher-
ence to established positions.
Both have policy commitments
which sharply reduce the like-
lihood of any French-Soviet
"deal." De Gaulle will use
the visit to further recogni-
tion of France as a major power
and as the spokesman for West-
ern Europe. He can be expected
to maintain his "hard line" on
Berlin and Germany, while at
the same time probing for op-
portunities to lessen East-West
tensions.
Khrushchev, who has been
making a persistent effort to
create a favorable atmosphere
for his visit, will probably
avoid serious bargaining on
specific issues but try to
impress De Gaulle with Soviet
determination to reach a settle-
ment on Berlin and Germany.
Although Moscow's concil-
iatory attitude toward French
policy in Algeria is frequent-
ly tied to De Gaulle's implied
recognition of the Oder-Neisse
boundary in speculation on the
possibility of a French-Soviet
"deal," it is unlikely that
either leader is willing or able
to make any significant con-
cessions.
PART I
The USSR claims inspections must
be based on a "rational polit-
ical compromise," unrelated to
the number of estimated seismic
events occurring q.nnually.
(Concurred in 25X1
by OSI)
KHRUSHCHEV TALKS
De Gaulle sees no present
advantage for France in changing
the status quo in Central Europe,
and his opposition to disarma-
ment proposals which would re-
strict France's development as
a nuclear power will probably
lead him to emphasize the prob-
lem of lessening East-West ten-
sions, a topic he feels is more
"negotiable." De Gaulle is un-
likely to agree to anything
which would weaken France's
close ties with Bonn, ties on
which he bases his hope for A
strong West European bloc led
by France.
Khrushchev appears deter-
mined to maintain pressure for
a German settlement based on
a peace treaty with both Ger-
man states. He will probably
use De Gaulle's remarks on the
Oder-Neisse to press for a re-
affirmation of this in a joint
communiqu?In dealing with
Berlin, Khrushchev will attempt
to combine a strong stand on
the need for revising the city's
status with a flexible approach
as to the procedure for achiev-
ing this. He may, as the Soviet
ambassador did on 21 October,
assure De Gaulle privately that
if the heads of government
agreed in principle on Berlin,
the question could then be re-
ferred to the foreign ministers.
Khrushchev probably wi'l
also seek confirmation of Foreign
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 March 1960
Minister Couve de Murville's
statement last May at Geneva
that the government of West
Berlin "has no direct link"
with that of West Germany, nor
is the city part of its ter-
ritory. De Gaulle will prob-
ably seek to avoid reiteration
of Couve de Murville's state-
ment and continue to press the
established tactical position
that Berlin cannot be consid-
ered apart from a general Ger-
man settlement.
While Khrushchev reported-
ly hopes to avoid a discussion
of Algeria, if De Gaulle agrees
to reaffirm his remarks on the
Oder-Neisse line the Soviet
leader may agree to renew his
endorsement of De Gaulle's Al-
gerian program and his acknowl-
edgment of the historic ties
between France and North Africa.
The final communiqu?ay thus
give the impression of a "deal."
De Gaulle is keenly in-
terested in encouraging Moscow
to cooperate with the West in
line with his belief that social
changes in the USSR and pres-
sures from Communist China will
eventually lead to the Soviet
Union's "return" to the West.
On his recent tour of soutl., rn
France, he said a "productive
detente" is necessary between
East and West leading to "peace
within an equilibrium." "We
are not there yet," the French
President said, but "we have
started out on the road to it."
De Gaulle is certain to raise
his proposals for a joint East-
West economic aid program for
less developed countries and
for agreement on noninterven-
tion in the affairs of other
countries.
Khrushchev's prospective
visit to Africa probably height-
ens De Gaulle's concern over
Communist infiltration in an
area he views so vital to France's
aspirations as a world power.
De Gaulle may hope to get some
Soviet acknowledgment of France's
pre-eminent position in North
and Central Afric.54,--Pikriait, has
been perturbed by Peipiitg.tA in-
terest in Africa, and De Gaulle
may believe he can exploit wt
he considers serious differenees
growing between Peiping and Mos=
co-1 to get a Soviet statement
which might curb Peiping.
De Gaulle's concern with
Africa and the Peiping "threat
to white men," including the
Russians, may make him suscep-
tible to the argument that
French recognition and will-
ingness to accept Peiping in the
United Nations would serve as
a form of control. Peiping's
recognition of the Algerian rebel
government will probably con-
tinue, however, to be a decisive
obstacle to such a policy in
Paris.
De Gaulle and Foreign Min-
ister Couve de Murville have
publicly implied that in the
long run France hopes to exert
a moderating influence in the
Western alliance and that it ex-
pects to be able to do so in-
creasingly as it acquires a nu-
clear weapons capability. De
Gaulle's determination to achieve
a national nuclear weapons capa-
bility has also been suggested
as providing an "opening" for
Moscow. Former Finance Minis-
ter Antoine Pinay said prior to
the first French nuclear test
that he did not "completely"
rule out acceptance by De Gaulle
of Soviet aid for France's nu-
clear program, although he felt
the French President would prefer
to have France become a nuclear
power by its own efforts.
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Such Soviet assistance
would seriously complicate the
USSR's position, both in Africa
and Asia as well as with its
bloc allies, from whom it is
believed thus far to have with-
held such weapons. Moscow may,
however, be willing to acknowl-
edge France's nuclear power
-Status by concluding an agree-
ment for exchanges of informa-
tion on the peaceful applica-
tion of atomic energy, and may
hold out the possibility of
joint projects in this field.
The USSR wants to include top-
level scientists in Khrushchev's
delegation, and plans are being
made to step up scientific ex-
changes under the French-So-
viet cultural agreement.
MIDDLE EAST
UAR -Israel
The possibility of hostil-
ities between the UAR and Israel
appears to have receded further
during the past week, with some
major UAR military units re-
ported leaving the Sinai Penin-
sula. Units of the Syrian Army
reportedly have also been with-
drawn from the Syrian-Israeli
border. An early termination
of the UAR military alert seems
probable. The Israeli armed
forces appear equally relaxed.
The intensive propaganda
war has not abated, however,
and the UAR's press and radio,
taking the lead from Nasir's
25X1
The French Communist par-
ty (PCF) continues to whip up
public enthusiasm for the Khru-
shchev visit, but former Premier
Edgar Faure--unlike Socialist
leader Guy Mollet and French
rightists--doubts the visit
will significantly redound to
the strength of the PCF. Faure
believes that curiosity will
lead French people to turn out
in large numbers to seek Khru-
shchev, but their political
opinions will remain unaf-
fected. He believes the per-
sonality of Khrushchev will
amuse the average French-
man and perhaps attract a
certain amount of sympathy,
but it will not command
respect or admiration.
HIGHLIGHTS
speeches in Syria, continue to
charge the West with complicity
with Israel and bitterly attack
Israeli Prime Minister Ben-
Gurion's visit to the United
States.
25X1
Nasir has repeatedly de-
nounced the recent Western re-
affirmation of the 1950 Tripartite
Declaration guaranteeing Israeli
and Arab borders. The UAR Pres-
ident's most vicious assaults,
however, were directed against
the Ben-Gurion visit, during
which the Israeli prime minis-
ter received an honorcl.y law
degree from Brandeis University.
Speaking in Damascus on 4 March,
Nasir stated: "Let them give
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the war criminal an honorary
degree in laws; this shows us
the true value of laws and hu-
man rights in America."
The Israeli press has openly
presented the visit as one of
great political importance,
probably adding to UAR and gen-
eral Arab concern over American
intentions in the area.
Jordan -UAR
Nasir is also joined in a
propaganda battle with King
Husayn and the Jordanian regime
over the Palestine issue. This
verbal duel developed in its
most recent form following the
February meetings in Cairo of
the Arab League Council. The
league was unable to agree on
a UAR proposal for the creation
of a Palestine "entity" and
army because of Jordanian op-
position. Nasir's plan is
similar to one by Qasim. Husayn
objects to such proposals be-
cause they tend to undermine
his control over the West Bank
area of Jordan, formerly part
of Palestine, and promote
separatist feelings among the
Palestinian two thirds of Jor-
dan's population.
Husayn struck back in a
radio speech on 1 March in which
he denounced those "in some
Arab quarters" who have at-
tempted to exploit the Palestine
issue at Jordan's expense, Nasir
took the speech as a personal
attack and ordered UAR prop-
aganda organs to retaliate.
He himself asserted in Damascus
on 7 March, "The Amman rulers
have yielded themselves to
American and British imperial-
ism to work against the Arab
nation."
PART I
Middle East Drought
Severe drought for the
third year in succession within
the "Fertile Crescent" is
threatening the loss of Jordna's
entire grain crop and has
brought similar, but less crit-
ical, crop conditions to Israel.
Cumulative rainfall in Jordan
is the lowest on record and, with
many springs drying up and
cisterns and reservoirs far be-
low normal, a severe shortage
of potable water is imminent.
Jordanian Prime Minister Majali
on 2 March issued a defense order
requisitioning all water re-
sources in the Amman area. Water
in Amman now is being shut off
in the daytime, a practice not
made necessary until August of
last year.
Jordanian officials and the
public are becoming panicky. It
has been estimated that if no
rain falls, perhaps one third
of Jordan's 1,500,000 people
will be desperately short of
water by midsummer.
Drought conditions are also
prevailing in southern Syria,
and over most of Lebanon rain-
fall has been less than half of
normal. Rainfall in northern
Syria is below minimal needs,
and in southern Iraq it has
been sparse, with water avail-
able for irrigation very low.
Complicating the drought in
the Levant area is the annual
locust threat. Although it is
too early in the season to esti-
mate potential locust damage,
large swarms have been observed
in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Lebanon. Swarms are reported
to have flown from Jordan to
southern Syria and Israel.
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The locust threat extends as
far as Libya; in the province
of Fezzan, most crops have al-
ready been destroyed. Lesser
damage occurred in the coastal
regions of Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica. The Desert Locust
Information Center in London
states that infestation may
spread to Israel, Iraq, Kuwait,
and possibly Syria and Turkey.
Jordan is likely to ask
for emergency aid soon, and re-
quests from Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, and Libya may be forth-
coming. Israeli Minister of
Agriculture Dayan, who is pres-
ently in the United States for
an Israeli bond drive, intends
to discuss possible drought
relief with Secretary of Agri-
culture Benson.
Iraq
The Iraqi political scene
during the past week has been
characterized by continued and
increasingly critical attacks
on the government by the Com-
munist press. Charges have been
leveled that the Qasim regime
is ridden with corruption and
working against the objectives
of the revolution, and that
"activities directed against
the people...who supported the
revolution" are being guided by
authorities high in the govern-
ment. The Ministry of Interior
is accused of keeping "faithful
citizens languishing in dun-
geons" and, in refusing to li-
cense the orthodox Communists,
Cuba
of violating the law on polit-
ical parties.
Apparently fearing that
the Qasim regime may attempt
to lay the blame for poor crops
on the Communist-dominated
agrarian reform organizations,
the party press has begun a cam-
paign against "highly placed
officials" in charge of the
reform. In addition, the
Communist press, declaring
thaJ, 'combating Communism deo-
sti.;:ys the economy," asserts
that anti-Communist national-
ists are responsible for de-
teriorating economic condi-
tions.
The anniversary of the sup-
pression of last year's Mosul
revolt has been seized on by
the Communists to reiterate de-
mands that the Communist-domi-
nated Popular Resistance Forces,
now dissolved, be reactivated
in order to help Qasim "crush
more such plots."
The orthodox Communists
accompanied this press campaign
with a direct appeal to Qasim
on 8 March to overrule the min-
ister of interior and license
their party. These aggressive
activities may lead to a fur-
ther crackdown on them.
UAR subversive activities
against the Qasim regime are
continuing, although there is
no indication of an imminent
move to unseat Qasim.
CARIBBEAN TENSIONS
Anti-American feeling is
being whipped up to such a
frenzy by Castro and the
Cuban press and radio that
even a minor incident now
could cause an outbreak of
violence against US personnel
and property. The US Embassy
sees no hope that the United
States will be able to estab-
lish a satisfactory relation-
ship with a Cuban government
dominated by Castro or his
close associates.
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Even Cubans who previous-
ly were cool to Castro's anti-
American diatribes seem in-
creasingly resentful of the
United States. Castro's charge
of US complicity in the de-
struction on 4 March of the
French vessel delivering mili-
tary equipment ?to his govern-
ment follows months of offi-
cially inspired attacks on the
United States for the continu-
ing airplane raids on Cuban
sugar fields.
Illustrative of the vit-
riol, Radio Mambi, the most
vicious of the government-con-
trolled stations, commenting
on President Eisenhower's trip
to South America, claimed its
purpose was to form a politi-
cal cordon in Latin America to
isolate Cuba and called the
President "slavery's spokesman,
the champion of the threatening
atom bomb...who had the effron-
25X1 tery to talk of democracy to
exploited peoples...."
25X1
PART I
The Dominican Republic
In the Dominican Republic,
the beleaguered Trujillo regime
faces a further deterioration
in its relations with the Roman
Catholic Church. The local
church hierarchy reacted on 7
March to continuing political
arrests by issuing the second
pastoral letter within five
weeks exhorting Trujillo to
release prisoners. The second
letter called attention to a
recent message from Pope John
extending moral support to the
Dominican bishops for censuring
the dictator's violation of
human rights.
The church has also ex-
communicated high officials,
including the governor, in the
province of La Vega for attempt-
ing to interfere with the read-
ing of the first letter. The
opposition, heartened by the
strong church stand, will be
further encouraged as news of
the incident, unpublished in
the country, is passed by word
of mouth. There is already a
noticeable spread of unrest
from upper and professional
classes to those of lower so-
cial strata. The armed forces
still appear to be loyal to
Trujillo
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PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
DE GAULLE'S ALGERIAN POLICY
The amplification of De
Gaulle's views on Algeria,made
during and after his 3-5 March
visit to the area, suggests he
has become pessimistic over
prospects for an early cease-
fire, although he has not sig-
nificantly altered his earlier
self-determination policy.
De Gaulle's remarks to
army units in Algeria and the
Ministry of Information state-
ment on 7 March add up to the
view that the French President
envisages an autonomous Al-
geria with close ties to France
as the only sensible solution.
He believes Algerians will
choose this alternative, but
says they can expect to exer-
cise their choice only after a
long period of pacification.
His flat rejection of the
rightist concept of a "French
Algeria" and his warning that
Algerian independence would
lead to chaos and partition
will irritate extremists on
both sides. Many moderates,
such as Socialist party leader
Mollet, are disturbed by his
emphasis on military pacifica-
tion.
De Gaulle reiterated his
offer to negotiate a cease-
fire with National Liberation
Front (FLN) representatives,
but his unwillingness to per-
mit rebel forces to retain
their arms may have prompted
the reported departure of the
FLN emissary said to have been
in Paris last week.
Recent French statements
will tend to discredit moderate
rebel elements who viewed De
Gaulle's self-determination
proposals as a possible basis
for a settlement, and to
strengthen those rebel intran-
sigents who have long questioned
his good faith. The rebels will
probably seek new means to "in-
ternationalize" the war and to
dramatize their ability to con-
tinue the fight. They are
likely to use increased terror-
ism to remind Algerian Moslems
of the danger inherent in any
cooperation with De Gaulle. The
rebels retain a capability for
assassination which may prove
an effective deterrent to the
emergence of any "third force"
in Algeria.
De Gaulle's remarks to the
army stressed that French offi-
cers must realize they have
global missions beyond Algeria.
By combining apparent conces-
sions on the conduct of the Al-
gerian war with a promise of re-
furbished prestige for the French
Army in the future, he evident-
ly hopes to align the army solid- 25X1
ly behind his attempts to increase
French influence in international
affairs.
THE IMPACT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S TRIP TO ASIA
Khrushchev, in an hour-
long speech in Moscow on 5
March covering his trip to
India, Burma, Indonesia, and
Afghanistan,emphasized the
"warmth" with which he was re-
ceived and the "fruitful dis-
cussions" that were held. Never-
theless, he seemed to have had
some reservations, and mentioned
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the rigors and "not infrequent-
ly heated disputes" of the
journey.
While Moscow radio burbled
that the trip bad put Khrushchev
Lt a position to speak for Asian
well as Communist nations at
the summit, the trip was not in
7 fact an overwhelming success
for the Soviet Union. The over-
all public response obviously
did not measure up to expecta-
tions. Khrushchev received his
largest welcome in Kabul, where
his public reception in the
center of the city was about
equal to that accorded Presi-
dent Eisenhower. In the out-
lying areas, however, the pub-
lic was distinctly apathetic,
and the attendance and reac-
tion at Ghazi Stadium appeared
forced and without spontaneity
or enthusiasm.
In the other countries,
the response ranged from cool
to moderate, even in Communist
strongholds such as Surabaya,
Indonesia. Khrushchev was de-
scribed on much of the trip as
glum, dispirited, and irri-
table--apparently reflecting
his dissapointment with the
reception.
Throughout the trip,
Khrushchev took a forceful
line in both his public and
private talks and apparently
irritated his hosts by his
thoughtlessness, by boasts of
Soviet achievements, by blunt
sermons on the virtues of Com-
munism, and by criticisms of
local practices. In India,
President Prasad and other
leaders were put out by Khru-
shchev's preaching to the In-
dian Parliament the value of
a one-party system and by im-
promptu lectures on the superi-
ority of Soviet farmingmethods.
The biggest clash came in
Indonesia, Foreign Minister
Subandrio told the American
ambassador there was almost
constant bickering between
President Sukarno and Khru-
shchev. He quoted Sukarno as
saying, "I didn't invite this
man here to be insulted by
him." At one point, Sukarno
told Subandrio, "You take over,
I can't stand another minute
of this." When Sukarno ex-
pressed no interest in detailed
economic figures, Khrushchev
told him, "You are no social-
ist. Socialism consists of
figures, figures, figures."
"You are a robot," Sukarno re-
torted.
In reply to Khrushchev's
charge that Indonesia's pur-
chase of Lockheed Electras in-
stead of Russian Ilyushins did
not befit a "socialist," Su-
karno countered that he was
buying what he considered best
suited for Indonesia. Despite
these clashes, Sukarno and the
Indonesians found Khrushchev
impressive and described him
as a man of great ability.
In Afghanistan, there was
reported wrangling over the
texts of the agreements that
were signed. The signing of
the cultural agreement was
postponed six times, although
the press and photographers
were called in each time to re-
cord it and Gromyko was on hand
four times. The Afghans wanted
the accord signed by persons on
the Cultural Affairs Ministry
level, but Khrushchev inSisted
on signing it himself, thus
forcing Prime Minister Daud to
sign as well. The final joint
communique itself was not
signed until 10:45 on the night
before Khrushchev's departure.
At the departure ceremo-
nies,Daud appeared distinctly
unhappy and somewhat angry,and
he stood aloOf from Khrushchev.
Khrushchev spoke of nothing but
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the weather, and his parting
words to the King were, "Don't
be worried; all these diffi-
culties will be straightened
out.
Resentment toward Khru-
shchev's conduct, however, did
not prevent acceptance of large
grants of aid or the signature
in each country of joint state-
ments supporting Soviet propa-
ganda and policy positions. In
India, Khrushchev signed the
previously worked-out aid agree-
ment for $375,000,000 and
arranged for Soviet assistance
in Indian atomic energy develop-
ment, but the only firm new
offer of aid was made to Indo-
nesia. According to Subandrio,
Khrushchev was prepared to give
the Indonesians as much as
$500,000,000, but Sukarno re-
quested only $250,000,000.
Agreement on this figure was
reached after less than five
minutes of discussion.
In Afghanistan, Khrushchev
promised continued economic aid,
and a Soviet gift of 50,000 tons
of wheat was announced the day
of his departure. The most
significant development was
the wholehearted endorsement--
both in the communiqu?nd in
Khrushchev's speech on his re-
turn to Moscow--of the Afghan
position on the Pushtoonistan
issue.
The recent aggressive ac-
tivities of the Chinese Commu-
nists loomed large in the back-
ground of the trip. Subandrio
EAST GERMAN
noted that while in Indonesia
Khrushchev displayed a real
fear that, as a result of Chi-
nese actions, Indonesia would
reject its policy of nonalign-
ment. He returned time and
again to this theme, attempt-
ing to dissuade Indonesian
leaders from what in his mind
was a decision on their part to
swing to the West.
Although Khrushchev's fail-
ure to discuss the Sino-Indian
border dispute publicly while
in India caused some dissatis-
faction among Indian press and
parliamentary leaders, the gov-
ernment could not have expected
him to support India against
his ally. Khrushchev's talks
with Nehru apparently were more
harmonious than those with
other leaders, and he returned
to Calcutta en route from Indo-
nesia to Afghanistan to hold
further talks with him.
Peiping, still at odds
with Moscow on foreign policy
tactics, at first appeared to
find no solace in Khrushchev's
visit to countries with which
it is engaged in disputes. Through-
out the trip,Chinese propaganda
media were virtually silent.
Since its conclusion, however,
three editorials have appeared
stressing that the trip improved
relations between the bloc and
these countries, and that it
created a favorable atmosphere.
The Chinese leaders may hope to
be able to exploit this atmos-
phere in talks Chou En-lai will
hold in India.
DIPLOMATIC RELATTONS
East Germany has announced
that the Guinean ambassador to
Moscow on 5 March presented
his credentials to President
Pieck, an act which would con-
stitute the first legal recog-
nition East Germany has re-
ceived from a non-Communist
country. If Guinea confirms
this action, its lead may be
followed by other countries in
Africa, Asia, and even Western
Europe, unless West Germany is
able to deter them. Further
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-
UNION OF SOVIET SOCiALMT RKPUML IC*
5X1
CANADA
MONGOLIA _
UNITIEDSTATES
MEXICO
10 MARCH 1960
CHINA
rZ,
30987
,Kryl/11lLA
COLOMBIA
BRA.-
movcco
ALGERIA
PAN.,
A A ? 0 ScE,15 IslkoN
Non-Bloc countries which recognize East Germany
Non-Bloc countries in which East Germany maintains trade offices
* East German Consulate General
AUSTRALIA
recognition would greatly en-
hance East Germany's prestige
on the eve of the summit meet-
ing and would be used by Mos-
cow to support its claim that
there are two Germanys. (See
item on Guinea on page 12.)
Guinea's action will test
West Germany's policy of re-
fusing to have diplomatic rela-
tions with any country other
than the USSR which recognizes
the East German regime. Bonn
has recalled its ambassador to
Conakry pending clarification
of whether the Guinean envoy's
call on Pieck actually con-
stituted recognition. If so,
Bonn must take some strong ac-
tion--a diplomatic break, termi-
nation of economic aid, or both
--if its policy of "one legiti-
mate German government" is not
to be undermined.
The West German cabinet
on 9 March authorized Foreign
Minister Von Brentano to break
off diplomatic and economic
ties with Guinea unless that
natior promptly_ indicates that
it has not extended diplomatic
recognition to the East German
regime. West Germany's immedi-
ate break in diplomatic rela-
tions after Yugoslavia recognized
East Germany in 1957 restrained
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a number of independent, neutral-
ist states from following Bel-
grade's example at that time.
West German public opinion is
divided on the issue, however,
some elements fearing Bonn's
isolation from Africa and the
entire neutral bloc. East Ger-
man media are playing up the
new Guinean ambassador's refer-
ences to East German "independ-
ence" and Sekou Toure's "pro-
found gratitude" for the re-
gime's friendship. A high-level
East German trade union delega-
tion recently arrived in Ghana
to open an industrial exhibit,
and plans to proceed to Togo.
Guinea's move will encour-
age East Germany in its campaign
for recognition.'
/Asian neutralist countries
have been reluctant to take
steps toward recognizing the
Ulbricht regime, attributing
this to strong West German
counteraction.
Foreign Trade Minister
Heinrich Rau's conduct in Ran-
goon during his recent Far East-
ern tour was so tactless that
Burma canceled plans to par-
ticipate in the Leipzig fair.
Indian Prime Minister Nehru
has made it clear to East Ger-
man representatives that he has
no intention of granting rec-
ognition before the summit
meeting. Nevertheless, there
are strong pressures on the
Asian neutralists to accord at
least de facto recognition.
In the Middle East, the
UAR last September gave East
Germany permission to raise its
trade mission to the status
of consulate general, but it
expressly withheld diplomatic
recognition. Encouraged by
success in Guinea, the East
Germans are likely to make new
approaches to Nasir and will
probably also pressure Iraq to
the same end.
In Cuba, the director of
the East German State Bank signed
a one-year trade agreement on 3
March calling for the establish-
ment of commercial representa-
tion in both countries. The
East Germans are already boast-
ing about the impending estab-
lishment of the first Latin
American trade mission on their
territory, the Cuban mission
called for by the new agreement.
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS CONTINUE TO WORSEN -
The Soviet Union, unsuc-
cessful in its year-old cam-
paign of diplomatic and prop-
aganda pressure to force Iran
to modify its pro-Western
policies, now is trying to
develop a subversive potential
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Mosoow has given its prop-
aganda to Iran a new twist
through broadcasts designed
to arouse the Shah's Suspicion
of his close associates in the
government and of the sup-
port which his regime enjoys
from Iran's allies. Radio
Moscow on 7 March repeated
"foreign press reports" that
during President Eisenhower's
visit to Turkey in December,
President Menderes gave him a
list of influential Iranians,
including military figures,
who are allegedly "preparing
a coup d'etat."
GOMULKA ADAMANT
In a climate of rising dis
content among Polish industrial
workers, party leader Gomulka
tried in a speech on 2 March
to calm the workers and make
more palatable the reforms of
industrial labor practices now
under way. The speech probably
did neither. Gomulka indicated
determination to continue his
program, which relies on in-
creased labor productivity for
almost all the planned increase
The broadcast claimed
Turkish officials tried to
convince the President that
the Shah's regime is unstable
and that "other persons must
in time replace the Shah."
Radio Moscow also claimed
that leaflets are being dis-
tributed in Tehran and other
Iranian cities urging Iranian
citizens to "overthrow the
rotten and perfidious- Pahlavi
dynasty."
The Soviet clandestine
station "National Voice of
Iran," in recent broadcasts
to Iran, alleged that General
Bakhtiar, chief of SAVAK, and
General Nasiri, head of the
Royal Guard, are engaged in
competitive plotting against
the Shah, and it accused Bakh-
iar of seeking support from
the United States.
Official relations between
Moscow and Tehran remain at a
standstill, with the USSR con-
tinuing to demand that the Ira-
nian Government give a guarantee
against the establishment of
foreign military bases of all
types on its territory, while
the Shah refuses to go beyond
his offer of a ban on long-
and medium-range missile bases.
ON LABOR SPEED-UP
of 7.5 percent in industrial
output for 1960. If the workers
had expected that strikes and
threats of strikes against cuts
in take-home pay would bring
about some relaxation of the
new hard line, they were dis-
appointed.
Gomulka acknowledged the
hostility of many workers to
the program of work-norm revi-
sion--in effect since the last
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quarter of 1959--but he asserted
that most workers were backing
the regime's measures. He ad-
mitted that wages were declin-
ing, however, and his remarks
indicated that a considerable
proportion of the industrial
workers had been affected.
Workers, Gomulka charged,
are lowering productivity in
the hope that this will reduce
the norms, or at least forestall
an increase. He made it clear
that in order to maintain even
the present wage rates, workers
would have to improve their
qualifications. "If you know
less, you earn less." He then
announced that the new price
List for piecework in all build-
ing enterprises would be intro-
duced on 15 April, reducing pay
rates by 6 percent.
Gomulka accused industry
of bribery, fraud, waste, theft,
lack of organizational sense,
and ill will.
He also admitted the op-
position of management to the
wage reforms, and accused plant
administrators of hiding their
own dislike by emphasizing
worker opposition and of "ap-
proaching norm review like a
dog approaching a hedgehog."
He said that management has
been unable to fulfill plans
without inflating the wage
fund; he held out a gloomy
prospect for 1960, inasmuch as
the industrial plan is to per-
mit no increase in the wage
fund during the year.
When the regime began to
"tighten up" in October by up-
ping meat prices and the cost
of living, urban workers showed
their dismay by brushes with
the authorities in Bygoszcz,
Chorzow, Gdansk, Olzstyn, Posnan,
Szczecin, Walbrzych, and Warsaw.
At first these were limited
strikes or informal group pro-
tests more indicative of the
high state of tension than of
any organized defiance. In re-
action to the increasing regime
pressure on the workers, however,
strikes have recently been re-
ported from Czestochowa, Koszalin,
Lodz, and Poznan, and have prob-
ably occurred in other areas as
well. Such reactions indicate
that the regime may have over-
estimated the effectiveness of
its plan to restore worker dis-
cipline by discharging surplus
personnel. The expectation had
been that fear of dismissal would
discourage any recalcitrance on
the part of the remaining workers
who were not laid off.
The regime may in fact have
stand-by plans for some easing
of pressure on the workers if it
feels that the reaction is getting
out of hand. If so, timing could
be crucial. Indications so far
this year are that 1960 is to
be the most difficult year for
Poland and Gomulka since his
return to power in 1956.
(Prepared by
25X1
NEW SOVIET UNIVERSITY FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS
The Soviet press has de-
scribed in glowing detail the
government's plan to establish
a University of People's Friend-
ship for foreign students. First
announced by Khrushchev on 21
February, the scheme is extolled
as another example of the con-
cern of the Soviet people for
"their brothers" in underdeveloped
areas and as an example of "the
systematic support by the USSR
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10 March 1960
for all those struggling for
freedom and national independ-
ence."
The university apparently
is to be established primarily
for students from Asia, Africa,
and Latin America and will
accept students sent by their
own governments as well as re-
cipients of Soviet scholarships.
About 500 are to be admitted in
1960, but the USSR, it is said,
is preparing eventually to ac-
cept from 3,000 to 4,000 annual-
ly. The course of study will be
from four to five years, but a
preliminary course of one
to three years will also be
offered for the benefit of able
but poorly prepared students.
This preparatory course,
unlike anything offered in the
West, should have considerable
appeal in areas lacking an
extensive formal educational
system. Soviet scholarships,
moreover, are generous, covering
not only all expenses for the
four to five years, but also the
cost of travel to and from the
USSR.
The university will have
the advantage for propaganda
of consolidating and highlight-
ing the hitherto haphazard So-
viet scholarship program for
underdeveloped countries. So-
viet educational aid offers to
Asian and African countries for
the most part have been unilat-
eral, one-time offers at irreg-
ular intervals. Some have been
made under the terms of official
agreements; others, such as the
25 scholarships offered in Jan-
uary to African youths, have
been sponsored by various Soviet
"friendship" societies. Approx-
imately 800 students from Asia
and Africa are believed to be
studying in the USSR, although
not all are on Soviet scholar-
ships.
The regime probably is also
interested in isolating foreign
students from the realities of
Soviet life, hoping thereby to
enhance their vulnerability to
indoctrination. Apparently in
recognition of the difficulties
encountered by foreign students
in adjusting to the Soviet scene,
Moscow University last September
established special courses for
"orientation in the Soviet cul-
ture and way of life," as well
as for Russian-language training
for foreign students of all
nationalities, including those
from other bloc countries. The
further separation of foreign
students in a special univer-
sity and the extension of these
special courses to a full four=
to five-year program will add
to their isolation.
African and Asian students
have already expressed resent-
ment of the security restrictions
and the paucity of contacts with
the public while attending Soviet
universities. According to the
American Embassy in Moscow, the
announcement of the new university
has already produced some un-
favorable reactions. Students
from Africa and the Near East
and some Asian diplomats are
reported to regard it as a form
of further discrimination
against them. Some Latin
Americans are also said to
question the Soviet decision
to group them with the Asians
and Africans.
(Concurred in by 051)
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COMMON MARKET
Despite the delicate po-
litical and economic issues in-
volved, prospests are general-
ly favorable PJr a major reduc-
tiP,Ai'timetable of the
Fx:opean Economic Community
!EEC or Common Market). Under
the schedule set forth in the
1957 Rome treaty, the customs
and economic union of the six
member countries is to be ac-
complished in three four-year
stages--which could be pro-
longed to a total of 15 years.
This maximum transitional pe-
riod may ultimately be cut in
half, however, if measures now
under consideration are adopted.
EEC officials, impressed
by the ease with which the in-
itial 10-percent tariff cut
and quota adjustments have been
absorbed by the mem-
ber countries, want
to take advantage of
the present prosper-
25X1 ity to hasten the
dismantling of eco-
nomic boundaries.
They are supported
by the traditionally
"pro-European" cir-
cles, who are hope-
ful of attaining a
"point of no return"
in the integration
process, and by a
surprising number of
businessmen who have
discovered that the
larger market of the
EEC is a challenge
rather than a ca-
tastrophe.
Under the plan
announced by the EEC
Commission on 3 March,
the EEC countries
would double the 10-
percent tariff re-
ductions they are
scheduled to grant
each other next July
DEVELOPMENTS
and in December 1961--thus ef-
fecting a 50-percent reduction
in internal EEC tariffs by the
end of the first four-year
stage. To facilitate the ear-
lier introduction of the pro-
jected common tariff against
nonmembers, the proposed ex-
ternal tariffs would be reduced
provisionally by 20 percent,
and the first moves toward put-
ting them into effect would be
taken in July.
Other aspects of the Com-
mon Market--such as the aboli-
tion of industrial quotas and
the coordination of trade, so-
cial, and agricultural policies
--would also be accelerated, and
proposals would be considered at
a later date for shortening the
EEC's second and third stages.
TIMETABLE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
(COMMON MARKET)
DATE
TARIFF CUTS
l PERCENT)
QUOTA ENLARGEMENTS
(PERCENT)
TOTAL
MINIMUM
EACH PRODUCT
TOTAL
MINIMUM
EACH PRODUCT
1959 JAN 1
10
10
20
10
1960 JAN 1
?
_
20
10
JUL 1
10
5
_
?
1961 JAN 1
?
?
20
10
DEC 31
10
5
_
?
STAGE
BY END OF STAGE 1: Total tariff cuts by product must be at
1
least 25%; export duties and export quotas must be abolished
within the Community; common external tariff to be applied in
those cases where existing duty is no more thari 15% higher or
lower than common tariff. This stage may be prolonged if the
EEC Council does not unanimously decide to end it.
1962 JAN 1
?
?
20
10
1963 JAN 1
?
? ,
20
10
JUL 1
10
5
1964 JAN 1
?
?
20
10
STAGE
DEC 31
10
5
?
?
2
1965 JAN 1
?
_
20
10
DEC 31
10
5
_
?
BY END OF STAGE 2: Total tariff cu s by product must be at
least 5(. This stage may be prolonged only by unanimous
vote of the Council.
1966 JAN 1
20 10
1967 JAN 1
(ACTING ON COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL,
20 10
DEC 31
COUNCIL FIXES RATE OF REMAINING
TARIFF CUTS DURING STAGE 3)
IALL QUOTAS
BOX Of PRODUCTION)
AT LEAST
1968 JAN 1
20
1
10
STAGE
1969 JAN 1
?
_
20
10
3
DEC 31
TO ZERO
TO ZERO
ABOLITION Of QUOTA RESTRICTIONS
BY END OF STAGE 3: All internal tariff and quota restrictions Co
free movement of goods, men, services, and capital to be removed.
Common external tariff to be applied. This stage may be prolonged
only by unanimous vote of the Council; total transition period may
not be prolonged by more than three years.
002093
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The commission's plan will
probably encounter reservations,
particularly from low-tariff
nations like the Netherlands,
which have been loath to ap-
prove an early introduction of
the EEC's common external tar-
iff lest this increase Dutch
production costs and aggravate
the competition between the EEC
and the Outer Seven. Paris,
however, has seemed for politi-
cal reasons increasingly anx-
iousto consolidate the EEC as
a unit and regards the imposi-
tion of the common tariff as an
essential part of the process.
The commission's proposals go
some way to meet the French
thesis, but also offer the Dutch
the more liberal and outward-
looking Common Market for which
they have been pressing.
UAR SEEKS EXPANDED INFLUENCE IN HORN OF AFRICA
The UAR has offered the
Italian trust territory of
Somalia an annual subsidy of
about $7,000,000 as well as a
gift of arms
I So-
malia, which is scheduled to
achieve independence on 1 July,
probably would accept such an
offer, because Western sources
have not promised all the for-
eign financial assistance it
needs for both budgetary and
developmental requirements.
Somalia's aggressive neighbor,
Ethiopia, regards the Horn of
East Africa as its own preserve;
it can be expected to react
vigorously when it learns of
UAR assistance to the UN trust
territory.
Heretofore, Cairo has sup-
ported Somali opposition groups
and frequently called govern-
ment party leaders "lackeys" of
the Italian colonial administra-
tion. Cairo, despite the prob-
able damage to its relations
with Ethiopia, now apparently
hopes to ingratiate itself with
the present Somali Government,
which announced plans last month
to establish a 5,000-man army.
Prime Minister Issa, in a
recent conversation which ap-
parently was intended to reach
the American consul general in
Mogadiscio, stated that he had
deferred a reply to Cairo's
offer of last July to train
and equip a Somali army but
that the time "has now come"
to accept the offer.
Ethiopia's ruling Amharic
clique, which is Christian, has
long viewed with suspicion the
numerous Moslem peoples who
nearly surround the empire.
Addis Ababa, uncertain of the
loyalty of its own large Moslem
minority, regards as a direct
threat to its territorial integ-
rity any plan which might en-
courage unification of the di-
verse Moslem Somali tribesmen
under a "Greater Somali" state
or which might strengthen one
of the existing Somaliland
territories.
Moreover, Ethiopia is dis-
turbed over recent developments
in the British Somaliland pro-
tectorate. London permitted
the Somalis in its protectorate
last month to form a native-
controlled government following
the territory's first general
elections. The protectorate's
extreme nationalist, Cairo-
supported, coalition group, which
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10 March 1960
won a landslide victory, is
expected to demand immediate
independence and press for early
talks with representatives from
Somalia regarding a unification
agreement.
This action, which will
further embitter relations along
the largely undemarcated frontiers
separating Ethiopia from the
Somalilands, probably will prompt
Addis Ababa to renew its charge
made a year ago that London is
conspiring with Somalia to
establish a "Greater Somalia"
in the Commonwealth.
25X1
SUDAN
FR. SO
LAND Gulf of Aden
Pout
Ads Ababa*
ETHIOPIA
?."
Lake
AM
malitand
SOMALIA.
Mogadiscio
MeNDA-
URiTNIN
Us hm f
TANGANYIKA
30993
Chisimelo
10 MARCH 1960
POLITICAL UNREST IN UGANDA
London's endorsement of a
moderate increase in African
representation in the legisla-
ture of its East African pro-
tectorate of Uganda has failed
to satisfy African nationalists
and tribal leaders. National-
ists are incensed that the
British program does not pro-
vide for responsible govern-
ment and an African prime min-
ister. Tribal rulers, on the
C2:7
Bender Beila
/AIWA
(,)CE,4
other hand, fear that the trend
in Uganda is toward a strong
central government which will
involve a reduction in their
own status.
The present foment stems
in part from publication of the
report of the Wild Committee, a
group formed in 1958 to make
recommendations concerning the
future political structure of
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10 March 1960
Tiganda. The committee endorsed
the concept of early independ-
ence, and called for legisla-
tive elections by universal
suffrage and the creation of a
cabinet with an African prime
minister. Its recommendations,
if adopted, would have inaugu-
rated in Uganda a program even
more liberal than that imple-
mented in Tanganyika, where,
unlike Uganda, African senti-
ment is largely unified behind
a single independence group.
The committee's recommen-
dations were opposed by Uganda'
feudalistic local rulers, led
by the king of the protector-
ate's most important province,
3aganda. While the king has
indicated that he no longer
anticipates independence apart
from the remainder of the pro-
tectorate, and that he would
settle for a high degree of
autonomy within an independent
Uganda, he continues to boycott
the protectorate's legislature.
The attitude of such tradi-
tional rulers appears to have
contributed to the announcement
on 22 February of a program for
Uganda considerably less sweep-
ing than that endorsed by the
Wild Committee. Nationalists
strongly attacked the program,
particularly those provisions
which delay legislative elec-
tions until 1961 and stipulate
that cabinet ministers will
not have to be chosen from the
African-dominated legislature.
One nationalist spokesman ob-
served that since Britain "has
not respected African opinion,"
Uganda nationalists have no
obligation to settle for less
than full independence. Na-
tionalists and tribal leaders
are attempting to submerge
their differences whenever pos-
sible, however, and British of-
ficials have emphasized that
the Uganda program is subject
to revision.
Political problems in
Uganda are heightened by ten-
sions stemming from sociologi-
cal factors. A year-old Afri-
can boycott of non-African goods
continues, and has brought a
worsening of relations between
the African and Asian communi-
ties. African protests against
tribal tax levies in the Bukedi
District cost at least 15 lives
during January and February,
and British authorities still
regard the district as a "dis-
turbed area."
GUINEA
Guinea's increasing ties
with the Sino-Soviet bloc--
closer than those of any other
tropical African nation--have
been emphasized by Conakry's
abrupt severance of ties with
the French monetary zone, by
its adoption of a development
plan aimed at a state-con-
trolled economy, andby its agree-
ment with Moscow to begin
using the $35,000,000 Soviet
line of credit extended last
August. Conakry's ambassador
to Moscow has been conferring
with the East German regime,
and the bloc claims that dip-
lomatic relations have been
established. Guinea is also
apparently considering accredi-
tation of an ambassador to
North Vietnam. (See item on
East Germany on page 3.)
These actions probably re-
flect President Sekou Tour6's
belief that a "noncommitted"
nation can safely have economic
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1.0 March 1960
and diplomatic relations with
any friendly state.
Continuing mistrust of
Paris and inability aftera year
of fitful negotiations to reach
agreement on French technical
assistance led Conakry to an-
nounce on I March that it would
leave the French monetary zone
and create both its own currency
and national bank. The unbacked
currency is likely to have
little appeal to Western in-
vestors and traders; as a re-
sult, Guinea may seek still
closer ties with the bloc.
Toure has assured the largest
Western enterprise in Guinea--
the US-controlled Fria alumina
combine--that its European em-
ployees can send their savings
back to France. Fria's finan-
cial experts nevertheless are
deeply concerned over the long-
er range situation.
Guinea on 1 March signed a
technical cooperation agree-
ment with the Soviet Union out-
lining a three-year program of
aid within the framework of
the $35,000,000 credit agree-
ment. Most of the projects
are of a showy nature--a 25,-
000-seat stadium, a 1,500-stu-
dent polytechnical institute,
AFGHAN-PAKISTANI
Afghan-Pakistani relations
have deteriorated markedly
since Pakistan decided in mid-
January to intensify its re-
plies to Afghanistan's strong-
ly worded propaganda attacks
in the Pushtoonistan dispute.
Rawalpindi apparently has con-
cluded that if it is not to
appear weak in the eyes of its
own Pushtoon citizens--a minor-
ity of approximately one tenth
of its 85,000,000 people--and
if it is to persuade Kabul to
adopt a more conciliatory line,
it must make a show of "firm-
ness" while holding out the
alternative of friendly coop-
eration.
a cement factory, and several
factories for the processing
of raw materials. In addition,
Soviet technicians will aid in
the reconstruction of Guinea's
main railroad and airport, in
geological exploration, and in
agricultural improvements--
such as mechanization and the
creation of a state rice farm
as a pilot project.
In the 17 months since
Guinea became independent, the
Sino-Soviet bloc has achieved
significant influence there.
Seven Communist nations, in-
cluding Peiping, are represented
at Conakry, or are about to be.
Cultural ties have been strength-
ened through exchange visits
by officials and the presence
of 100 Guinean students behind
the iron curtain.
Barter agreements with the
bloc account for almost 60 per-
cent of Guinea's trade. In ad-
dition, Czechs, East Germans,
and Poles are active in many
fields--agriculture, communi-
cations, construction, and
transportation. There are al-
ready at least 100 bloc advisers
in Guinea, and Peiping report-
edly may soon send 400 techni-
cians and laborers to aid in
agricultural projects.
RELATIONS WORSEN
25X1
Pakistan's radio counter-
attacks have accused the "Af-
ghan rulers" of "flattering
their Communist masters" and
of "sucking the blood of Push-
toons," who number about 5,000,-
000 of Afghanistan's 10,0000000-
12,000,000 population. Foreign
Minister Qadir has also an-
nounced that Pakistan would
now demand a plebiscite to de-
termine whether Pushtoon tribes-
men living in Afghanistan wish
to join Pakistan.
The members of the Afghan
royal family are taking these
attacks personally and are re-
acting strongly. Kabul recently
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10 March 1960
put Pakistan's diplomatic person-
nel under surveillance and ar-
rested some of the em:y's
local employees. Rawalpindi is
countering with a campaign of
its own against the two Afghan
consulates in Pakistan; it in-
tends to begin harassing the
Afghan Embassy shortly unless
Kabul calls off its campaign.
If these tactics continue, both
countries may withdraw their
ambassadors and reduce their
embassy staffs to the caretaker
level.
Afghanistan has also threat-
ened that if Pakistani aircraft
continue to fly over "occupied
Pushtoonistan"--that is Pushtoon
tribal territory within Pakistan--
Kabul will be forced to act and
Rawalpindi will have to suffer
the consequences.
In the joint Afghan-Soviet
communique issued on 5 March
at the end of Khrushchev's four-
day visit to Kabul, the Soviet
premier endorsed the Afghan
position that the Pushtoons
should enjoy "self-determina-
tion" under the terms of the
United Nations Charter. In the
most explicit support by the
USSR to date, Khrushchev public-
ly declared on his return to
Moscow that "our sympathies in
this question are...on the side
of Afghanistan." An Afghan-
Soviet cultural agreement and
a Soviet gift of 50,000 tons
of wheat, announced on 4 and 5
March, are also probably in-
tended as timely indications of
Soviet support.
Meanwhile, the Afghan Gov-
ernment is adopting a cooler at-
titude toward the West, apparent-
ly reflecting the opinion in
Kabul that the United States in
particular should be able to
exercise some control over Pak-
istani propaganda. Foreign Min-
ister Naim recently complained
in a press interview that Presi-
dent Eisenhower's visit to Kabul
last December had not resulted
in any greater understanding by
the West of Afghan problems.
Radio Kabul's propaganda has be-
gun to attack CENTO and SEATO,
through which Pakistan is allied
to the West.
INDONESIA
President Sukarno's abrupt
dissolution of the Indonesian
Parliament on 5 March, "in the
interests of guided democracy,"
apparently resulted from his ir-
ritation over the legislature's
efforts to preserve its former
power and his apprehension over
possible parliamentary actions
during his world tour, which
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-10 March 1960
begins in early April. Apparent-
ly Sukarno was specifically con-
cerned over parliamentary criti-
cism of the 1960 budget and the
strong possibility that the leg-
islature would insist,on,clitting'
it.
SukarWs action is pre-
sumed to htve had the strong
support of the army, whose share
of the budget amounts to almost
40 percent. Parliament did not
resist the President's action,
and held only a token session
before finally adjourning on 7
March.
At the same time that he
dismissed Parliament, Sukarno
promised its "recomposition in
the near future" within the
terms of the reinstituted 1945
constitution, which considerably
strengthens executive powers at
the expense of the Parliament.
According to a presidential de-
cree issued in January, the
next Parliament--or Provisional
People's Congress--will be com-
posed of the approximately 260
members of the recent body plus
294 regional and functional
representatives appointed by
Sukarno.
Sukarno has already invited
nationalist, Communist, and MoS-..
lem party leaders to a conference?
beginning 16 March, apparently
to discuss the apportionment of
the appointed members of the
new body, First Minister Djuanda,
however, has stated that he does
not know whether the new Parlia-
ment can be established before
Sukarno leaves on his trip.
Sukarno's annual tour takes
him this year to Iraq, Yugosla-
via, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary,
Austria, Egypt, Guinea, Tunisia,
Morocco, Portugal, Puerto Rico,
Cuba, and the United States,
with possible visits to the
USSR, Japan, and Hong Kong. The
visits to Puerto Rico and San
Francisco will be unofficial.
Sukarno had hoped to visit Ghana,
but.villInot do so, inasmuCh ,as Prime
Minister Nkrumah will be engaged
on the dates convenient to Sukarno.
The five-day stay in Cuba will be
the longest of those definitely
scheduled during his trip.
THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Intensified political re-
pression is the principal means
by which the South Korean Lib-
eral party is planning to assure
a landslide victory for Presi-
dent Rhee and his running mate
Yi Ki-pun g in the 15 March elec-
tion. Rhee's age--84--and the
poor health of Yi--who can
stand unassisted for only a few
minutes and speaks with great
difficulty--prevents any exten-
sive campaigning by either candi-
date,
The death of Democratic
presidential candidate Cho Pyong-
ok at Walter Reed Hospital on
15 February left Rhee unopposed
for the presidency. To be legal-
ly elected, however, he must re-
ceive at least one third--about
3,470,000--of the registered
vote. Cho's name, which will
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
-10 March 1960
remain on the ballot, might
attract a large sympathy vote.
The real contest is be-
tween Yi Ki-pung and Democratic
leader Chang Myon, who defeated
Yi for the vice presidency in
1956. Two pro-Rhee vice-presi-
dential candidates from minor
parties appear unlikely to af-
fect the election outcome ap-
preciably.
Beginning with repressive
legislation forced through the
National Assembly on 24 Decem-
ber 1958 by Rhee's majority
Liberal party, the administra-
tion has pursued a policy of
extending government control
down to the lowest village
level.
Recent by-elections for
the national legislature have
provided a preview of govern-
ment rigging tactics. Local
Liberal officials marched
voters to the polls, organized
the voting by groups of three
or more voters at one time,
and "encouraged" the display
of marked ballots. Large num-
bers of police and persons
wearing Liberal party arm bands
were stationed outside the poll-
PART II
ing places to intimidate the
voters.
25X1
Following the election, the
government may plan a relaxa-
tion of repressive pressures as
a sop to foreign criticism.
Pre as licenses may be abolished,
and the Kyonghyang Sinmum--
South Korea's second largest
newspaper, which was suppressed
last April for criticizing the
government--may be permitted
to resume publication.
Administration strategy,how-
ever,appears to be largely con-
trolled by the powerful Liberal
"hard faction." This group's long-
range plans may envisage destruc-
tion of the Democratic party, a
realignment of political forces,
and the creation of a subsidized
opposition. Over the long run,
the opposition, if denied normal
channels for expressing growing
ant iadministration sentiment,
would probably be forced into sub-
versive activityj
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10 March 1960
JAPANESE-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT
Japan and,the USSR haVe con-
cluded a three-year trade agree-
nent which provides for an ex-
change of $210,000,000 worth of
commodities each way and incor-
.76
3.
JAPANESE TRADE WITH
1956 9(2
MILLION DOLLARS
t3
12.3
23.0
274 (3.0)
22.1
62.5
40.2(4.0)
39.4
62.4)16.4)
ED MMUS
IAMOITS
RED FIGURES
INDICATE DEFICIT
62.5
terms similar to those granted
Moscow by Western European
countries, a further agreement
on detailed arrangements may
prove difficult to reach.
THE USSR
porates a scheme for deferring
Soviet payment, up to an unspeci-
fied amount, for purchases in
Japan. The agreement supplants
the annual pacts under which
the two countries have traded
since December 1956.
The trade target is not
binding on either country, and
in the case of Japan the actual
transactions must be negotiated
by industrial companies and
trading firms on a commercial
basis. The established target
for 1960--a total turnover of
$125,000,000--doubles the 1959
performance. It would consti-
tute about 2 percent of Japan's
total trade volume.
Despite balanced trade pro-
visions in previous agreements,
Japan has not reached its ex-
port goals and has experienced
a growing deficit. Tokyo hopes
that the deferred-payments schemes,
to be financed by the government-
sponsored Export-Import Bank,
will rectify the imbalance.
Although Tokyo has agreed in
principle to extend credit on
125.0)0)
10 MARCH 1160
Fulfillment of
the new trade agree-
ment would result in
large increases in
Soviet exports of
crude oil, timber,
coal, and potash and
would expand Japanese
exports of chemical
plants, ships, rolling
stock, and other in-
dustrial equipment.
The large and rapid
expansion of Soviet
crude-oil marketing in Japan,
which began in late 1958, is
causing concern among American
suppliers, who fear that their
own sales may be affected ad-
versely.
There is some basis for
such concern. Japanese Govern-
ment officials have acknowl-
edged that one million tons of
Soviet crude oil, mostly from
the Black Sea area and competi-
tively priced, will be purchased
in 1960. This is a tenfold in-
crease over 1959. Thus.far, at
least one Japanese petroleum
firm has signed a long-term pur-
chase agreement with the USSR.
Moreover, the Japanese hope ulti-
mately to reduce foreign exchange
expenditures for petroleum by
exploiting their concession in
the Persian Gulf, where a large
oil deposit recently was tapped,
and through a prospective agree-
ment with Indonesia for develop-
ing and sharing oil resources
in Sumatra.
(Concurred in by ORB)
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10 aufth,1960
PAW" rrr
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
BULGARIA'S "LEAP 'FORWARD"
The political and economic
administration that has emerged
in Bulgaria over the past year
has drawn primarily on Soviet
expe'rience?but has also bor-
rowed heavily from the spirit
and elan of the Chinese Commu-
nist "leap forward."
The Bulgarian leap forward
is more than just a program
for rapid economic development.
The effort has involved a de-
centralization of the party
and government apparatuses
and numerous reforms and re-
organizations which have, at
least in theory, reflected the
country's "socialist base."
The most important polit-
ico-administrative units es-
tablished by the Bulgarian pro-
gram are the 30 okrugs (dis-
tricts), which resemble the
Soviet sovnarkhozy in their
control over most industries.
But these districts also have
--as the sovnarkhozy do not--
responsibility over all "po-
litical, cultural, and eco-
nomic life"--including agri-
culture--within their juris-
dictions. The basic agricul-
tural unit is the collective
farm, which in Bulgaria,
through amalgamation, is con-
siderably larger than the
average size of collectives
elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
The decision to embark on
such an ambitious program--
probably made between June and
September 1958--was based on
several considerations. As
a reflection of their Stalinist
background, Bulgarian leaders
were perhaps overly anxious to
emulate the Soviet drive to
"build socialism and Communism.
Sofia was also aware that Com-
munist China had embarked on
an extremely ambitious plan of
its own. There is also evi-
ft
deuce that, through decentral-
ization and a reduction in the
size of the bureaucracy, the
regime hoped to alleviate
criticism of the bureaucracy
by the party's rank and file.
Major Features of the Leap
The Bulgarian leap called
for overly ambitious economic
targets for 1959-65. The plan
for 1959 called for a 34-per-
cent increase in national in-
come over 1958, about a 50-
percent increase in capital in-
Bulgaripa Exhor ation on "Great Leap Forward"
"Hurry, my allotted time has been shortene
Sturshel (Sofia)
vestment, a 27.8-percent in-
crease in industrial production,
and a 73.9-percent increase in ag-
riculture--a downgrading of the
original goal ofa 100-percent
increase proposed by party First
Secretary Zhivkov in November 1958.
Another feature has been
the merging of collective farms
into larger units, ostensibly
to provide more efficient use
of new agricultural machinery.
The "voluntary" merger of ap-
proximately 3,400 farms began
in October 1958 and was com-
pleted by mid-December when
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10 March 1960
the number of amalgamated
collectives totaled only 625.
Almost immediately thereafter,
however, a limited reversal
was ordered. By March 1959
the largest and most unwieldy
collectives had been broken
into smaller units, and the
total number of collectives
increased to 975. This re-
versal may have been designed
not only to correct the inevi-
table "excesses" but to dis-
avow any intent of copying the
Chinese "communalization" of
agriculture.
Between January and March
1959, the state's system of ad-
ministrative and economic man-
agement was reorganized. The
country's 12 districts plus
Sofia City and 113 okoliyas
(counties) were abolished,
and 30 "administrative-economic"
districts were created. The
basic administrative units
under the district became the
opshtinas, areas which general-
ly coincide territorially with
the merged collective farms.
Most of the "economic" minis-
tries were dissolved, with many
of their functions going to
the district people's councils.
A small number of committees
and commissions, which were to
exercise certain of the planning
and supervisory duties of the
dissolved ministries, were set
up in the Council of Ministers.
The economic program was
to be accomplished primarily
by the use of existing "inter-
nalreserves," including full-
scale mobilization of labor.
One aim of the reorganization
of the administrative apparatus
was to release white-collar
workers for "productive" jobs.
More intense utilization of
plants and equipment was intro-
duced by establishing 24-hour
shifts in industry. Collectiv-
ized peasants were organized
for off-season mass-labor proj-
ects, such as land reclamation
and irrigation.
The Record
most part, below plan and hardly
constituted a "leap forward,"
there is no doubt significant
economic achievements were at-
tained. Gross industrial pro-
duction rose about 25 percent,
investment about 50 percent,
and additions to industrial em-
ployment were double those of
1958. The most drastic under-
fulfillment of plan goals oc-
curred in agricultural produc-
tion, which increased only 10-
20 percent over the previous
year, compared with the goal of
73.9 percent. Improvements
were recorded, however, includ-
ing stepped-up programs in irri-
gation and reclamation and much
greater supplies of fertilizers
and machinery. These accomplish-
ments, which probably would not
have occurred without the pres-
sures of the "leap," will aid
future advances.
A serious problem has
been the failure of the reor-
ganized state and administrative
bodies to live up to expecta-
tions. This resulted in part
from the great pressures placed
on them by the regime to meet
economic goals, and in part
from the confusion and dislocation
arising out of the reorganiza-
tion itself. These weaknesses
have been continuously criticized
by the regime, and several na-
tional conferences have been
held to discuss shortcomings
and make recommendations and
limited personnel changes.
Internal distribution has
been one of the greatest head-
aches for the state adminis-
tration. A major portion of
the responsibility for this
under the reorganization falls
to the district trading enter-
prises, which are subordinate
to the people's councils. Fail-
ures by several industrial enter-
prises have been attributed to
bottlenecks in supplying raw
and semifinished materials.
Distribution of consumer goods,
particularly food, has also
failed on several occasions,
with severe shortages resulting.
While the economic accom- Perhaps the most important
plishmentsof 1959 were, for the shortcoming has been the failure
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10.March.1960
of the party and government
apparatus to maintain the high
level of popular enthusiasm
necessary to meet the economic
targets. Although local party
and government bodies suc-
ceeded in supplying enough
peasants to meet 1959 irriga-
tion and reclamation targets,
this year's work reportedly
is behind schedule, largely be-
cause of the failure of the
local bodies to overcome in-
creasing peasant apathy. Only
a small number of the peasants
available were reported at
such work during December and
January.
Sofia apparently did not
succeed in convincing the
peasants that the mergers of
late 1958 were either desirable
or necessary. The regime is
still faced with opposition
from members of the wealthier
collectives who are opposed
to mergers with poorer farms,
fearing a lowering of their
income. In the industrial
sector, a revision of the
norm and wage scale which is
slated to begin this summer
has caused concern among
workers, who fear higher norms
and reduced take-home pay.
Party Problems
The party apparatus is
viewed as the key to the suc-
cess of the leap, inasmuch as
the lower party organs--specif-
ically the district and area
committees--are charged with
directing the daily work of
the economic and state bodies
on these levels. Party leader
Zhivkov's criticisms of these
organs at the 12 January con-
ference on local party problems
attest to the difficulties en-
countered in making the adjust-
ment to greater local party
responsibilities.
Zhivkov revealed that
qualified officials often were
transferred through jealousy,
that continuity of leadership
was frequently lacking in the
districts, and that the problems
of nepotism, embezzlement, and
theft still existed. He re-
buked those officials who, look-
ing back to an earlier system,
shun responsibility and rely
excessively on the next higher
body for direction, and he de-
nounced others for creating
small administrative empires
or bureaucracies--the very
evils supposedly to be elimi-
nated by the reforms.
Another important problem
facing the leadership is the
need to win a greater degree
of acceptance for the leap
from the party's rank and file.
Many party officials in the
winter of 1958-59 felt that the
reorganizations did not go far
enough, and A few may have de-
sired to establish Chinese-type
communes. These officials were
quickly reined in, although
some such sentiment probably
still exists.
Far more dangerous, because
it was more widespread, was the
feeling that the leap--in its
economic terms--was unfeasible
for Bulgaria's capabilities.
Zhivkov warned against this at-
titude in a speech in November
1958 and in his "theses" of
January 1959. In March, Minis-
ter of Trade Boris Taskov was
ousted from the politburo and
central committee for "doubt-
ing." The July issue Of the
central committee's theoretical
monthly Novo Vreme fulminated
against doubters andviolations
of collectivity, but no purge
ensued.
The campaign in the first
half of 1959 may thus have been
in the nature of a program to
discourage those of little
faith and to prevent them from
mounting an organized, effec-
tive opposition within the par-
ty to Zhivkov's leap. While
the regime apparently has been
successful to that extent,
many party members very likely
continue to harbor doubts and
may feel their views justified
by the shortcomings of the leap
last year.
Future Trends
Current developments in-
dicate that economic acceleration
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10 March 1960
is to continue during 1960 but
on a more realistic scale than
in 1959. Gross industrial
production, for example, is
slated to rise about 15 percent,
capital investment about 24
percent, and agriculture 32
percent, Internal propaganda
during recent months, contrary
to that of a year ago, has not
stressed the phrase "leap for-
ward."
The regime evidently plans
to maintain the organizational
structures established during
the past year, but both economic
and organizational weaknesses
will continue to require re-
assessment and refinement of
the program.
Underfulfillment of the
1959 plan evidently did not no-
tably affect the stability of
the regime or Zhivkov's position.
Since the fulfillment of the
1960 agricultural plan is pos-
sible only with optimum weather
conditions, and other goals are
ambitious, the regime may have
difficulty in achieving some
of its 1960 targets. Failure
to realize economic goals for
the second year may lead the
regime to seek political scape-
goats and to make additional
changes. Although elements in
the party have resisted Zhivkov's
call for a "great leap," the
Bulgarian leader benefits from
Khrushchev's personal endorsement,
and a crystallization of opposi-
tion elements seems unlikely.
(Jointly prepared
with ORR)
AFGHANISTAN'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION
Afghan Prime Minister Daud
is pressing ahead with the mod-
ernization of the army, increas-
ing its size and improving its
training and equipment. Deter-
mined to develop Afghanistan's
economy and introduce social
reforms, Daud apparently expects
to rely heavily on the army for
support against any tribal op-
position or conservative reli-
gious resistance to his programs.
As the army becomes aware of its
increasing importance as a means
of controlling the country, it
could become the chief threat to
the rule of the royal family. At
present Daud apparently has firm
control over the army, although
his direct contacts with mili-
tary personnel probably have de-
creased since he became prime
minister.
Need for Stronger Army
Daud is determined to mod-
ernize his country, apparently
believing national progress is
vital for the maintenance of
independence. He apparently
fears that if he allowed Afghan-
istan to progress at the slow
rate acceptable to the power-
ful tribal and conservative
religious elements, the country
would be unable to resist the
encroachments of its more pro-
gressive neighbors.
In addition, Daud probably
believes that the position of
the royal family within Afghani-
stan can be preserved only if
the family takes the lead in in-
troducing improved standards
of living. As the strongest
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10 March 1960
personality within the family,
Daud is determined to remain
in the vanguard of Afghanistan's
intelligentsia in the apparent
hope that he can divert the
forces which have ousted other
monarchies in Asia. Daud be-
came prime minister in 1953 and
embarked on a program of econom-
ic and social development under
his strengthened authoritarian
government.
During the first years of
his regime, however, Daud did
not have the power to override
strong opposition and had to
proceed cautiously, withdrawing
a new tax when it was strongly
resisted, or slowing down his
efforts to abolish the veil for
women when resentment began to
mount. The prime minister,
however, now apparently
feels strong enough to sup-
press such resistance. This
was demonstrated last December
in the Kandahar riots against
more liberal treatment for
women. when he crushed the
dissidence with tanks and troops.
While Daud may postpone
his reform timetable for certain
areas so as to prevent the rise
of too much resistance at any
one time, he has moved more
troops into troubled areas and
they have been ordered to make
periodic displays of strength.
The prime minister probably
feels that any marked retreat
from his position would be taken
as a sign of weakness.
The government is building
roads into tribal territory
to strengthen its authority there.
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10 March 1960
It also apparently intends to
extend conscription to tribes
which have hitherto been exempt.
These programs may particularly
arouse the Pushtoon tribes liv-
ing near the Pakistani border
and put Daud's government and
army to more severe tests than
in the recent past.
Army Enlarged
From a total strength of
about 44,000 officers and men
in 1957, the army has been in-
creased to about 54,000. The
training of officers has been
accelerated; the number of tem-
porary officers is being in-
Improved Training
Afghan Army officers appar-
ently feel they are making prog-
ress on the principal need at
the present time--improving the
quality of the army forces. They
believe more up-to-date methods
are being taught by the Soviet
instructors in Afghan military
schoole than by the Turkish
military mission that had-been
the chief source of foreign
military training in the coun-
try before 1956.
A training program in moun-
tain warfare has been established
to meet the requirements imposed
by the rugged terrain.
Some esprit de corps is
apparent for the first
time,and troops now
march smartly and
handle tracked and
wheeled vehicles com-
petently.
creased by assigning tenth-
grade students from civilian
schools to officer-training
schools; and the terms of non-
commissioned officers have been
extended to an 11-year minimum.
Enlisted personnel originally
drafted for a two-year period
are not being released--at least
until the present tribal trou-
bles have subsided. The size of
the annual class of new draftees
has apparently been increased.
Considerable pressure is
likely to be felt over the next
decade for a still larger army
because relations with Pakistan
are likely to remain strained
over the Pushtoonistan problem,
local resistance to governmental
authority will probably remain
a major problem, and the army
itself is likely to become more
influential in government policy
making.
The extension of
terms of service for
noncommissioned offi-
cers and drafted per-
sonnel points up the increasing
need for more highly trained men
to serve for long periods of
time to make good use of the
modern weapons received under
the 1956 Afghan-Soviet military
assistance agreement. The next
step may be officially to extend
the terms of service required of
conscripted soldiers or possibly
to replace the conscription sys-
tem with a professional army.
The establishment of a
professional army, which re-
lies on volunteers, probably
will have to await a further
increase in the military's
prestige. The army has had
difficulty getting high-cali-
ber officer material. En-
listed personnel have been con-
scripted mainly from the less mar-
tial ethnic groups--Hazaras, Tad-
jiks,and Uzbeks--rather than from
the more pugnacious Pushtoon
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10 March 1960
tribesmen. Traditionally poorly
trained, poorly disciplined, and
poorly paid, they have enjoyed
little esteem in the public eye.
The army's prestige is likely
to rise as it learns to use its
new weapons, continues to look
disciplined and smart, and dem-
onstrates its improved fighting
qualities against rioters and
recalcitrant tribes.
Potential Threat
As the army gains strength,
it may acquire new importance
in the internal power structure
of Afghanistan. In the past,
a few powerful Pushtoon tribes
could prevent the army from
taking over and running the
government. The relative
strength of the tribes is de-
clining as the army's grows.
Daud, by increasing his depend-
ence on army support, becomes
more vulnerable to any army
attempt to dislodge or dominate
him.
At present Daud's firm
control of the army appears to
be based largely on his knowl-
edge of the officer corps, with
which he tries to maintain con-
tacts. With the apparatus of
a police state at his disposal,
Daud is prepared to move firmly
at the first si of dan er
Nevertheless, Daud, a for-
merarmy officer, probably has
been unable to maintain as close
contact with his officers since
he became prime minister. Many
may have more extensive contacts
with Soviet military assistance
personnel than Daud is aware of.
The apparently proper be-
havior of Soviet military in-
structors and technicians work-
ing in Afghanistan may also have
led Daud to become overconfident
with regard to the danger of
Soviet military influence in
the Afghan Army. Such overcon-
fidence--in addition to Afghan
dependence on the USSR for spare
parts, ammunition, fuel supplies,
and additional weapons--could
help Moscow increase its influ-
ence within the Afghan Army over
the next few years.
In addition, Daud must be
alert to the long-term danger
of an alliance between the grow-
ing middle class and intelligent-
sia and modern-minded officers,
produced by the new training
programs, who may come to resent
the control wielded over the
army by an "obsolete" royal
family. As more civilian and
military people go abroad for
training and as education be-
comes more commonplace, the
intelligentsia will be enlarged.
A dictator by temperament, Daud
is more likely to try to check
any spread of political liberalism
by authoritarian methods than
he is to accommodate it by giv-
ing more power to the govern-
mental bodies that already exist
under the country's supposedly
constitutional monarchy. I
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10 March 1960
SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The Second UN Conference
on the Law of the Sea, which
opens in Geneva on 17 March,
will seek international agree-
ment on two questions that
have occasioned much recent
friction between Britain and
Iceland as well as among other
countries: the extent of a
country's territorial sea and
the jurisdiction of coastal
states over nearby fishing.
The overriding objective of
Western, and particularly NATO,
countries to achieve agreement
on a narrow territorial sea
may force some of them to sac-
rifice traditional foreign
fishing rights to the juris-
diction of the coastal states.
1958 Conference
The 1958 Law of the Sea
Conference was the first of
various meetings in a broad UN
program to bring about the
codification and development
of international law. Agree-
ment was reached on four con-
ventions which covered a wide
range of subjects, including
jurisdiction over the terri-
torial sea, the high seas, and
the continental shelf; the con-
servation of living resources
of the high seas; and rights
of landlocked countries.
The conference failed,
however, to reach agreement on
the extent of the territorial
sea and the jurisdiction of
coastal states over nearby
fishing. A substantial group,
consisting chiefly of the So-
viet and Arab blocs and cer-
tain Latin American states,
supported the adoption of a
12-mile territorial sea limit--
in some cases an even wider
area. The United States and
Britain--which have held to a
three-mile limit--broke prece-
dent by proposing a six-mile
limit, but failed to bring
about an agreement.
The conference then recom-
mended that a second confer-
ence be convened devoted ex-
clusively to the two remaining
issues. The 13th UN General
Assembly scheduled the confer-
ence for early 1960.
Territorial Sea
Western, and
particularly
NATO, countries
territorial sea.
favor a narrow
In recent years, however,
almost 40 nations have claimed
a territorial sea broader than
three miles, some 20 claiming
a minimum of 12 miles and
others six or four. Some of
these claims have been prompted
by a desire to show independ-
ence of the three-mile concept
--which is associated with
colonial days--and to assure
exclusive control over a broader
fishing zone. Arab countries
have come to favor a 12-mile
limit, hoping to use such a
limit to justify closing the
Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli use.
The Soviet bloc has generally
held that for it a 12-mile
zone is required but that each
nation should itself decide how
far its territorial sea should
extend up to the 12-mile limit.
Fishery Limits
The issue of fishery
limits is essentially one of
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finding a compromise between
the legitimate but competing
interests of the "coastal"
states and the "fishing"
states. Within the terri-
torial sea itself, whatever
its width, the coastal state
has exclusive fishing rights.
Some coastal states have been
pressing for a wider territo-
rial sea which would extend
their exclusive fishing rights
and terminate those of other
states.
Some fishing states have
for generations conducted ex-
tensive fishing operations off
foreign shores. These states,
seeking to continue these op-
erations, have supported a
narrow territorial sea and
have rejected the claims of
coastal states to jurisdiction
over fishing in zones contigu-
ous to the territorial sea.
Proposals Before Conference
Two proposals recognizing
a 12-mile territorial sea are
before the conference. One
calls outright for a 12-mile
territorial sea. The other
leaves to the option of a
coastal state the breadth of
territorial sea it claims up
to 12 miles from its coast.
Neither proposal seems likely
to get the necessary two-thirds
majority support.
Countries which favor a
narrow territorial sea have
put forth several proposals
which would limit the terri-
torial sea to six miles but
provide for an additional six
miles of fishing rights of
varying degrees.
A Canadian formula setting
a six-mile territorial sea with
an additional six miles of ex-
clusive fishing rights has con-
siderable appeal to states such
as Iceland which wish to end
foreign fishing near their
shores. This six-plus-six for-
mula as presented is strongly
opposed by Western European
and certain other fishing states.
Canada has indicated it would
modify its proposal to account
for traditional fishing patterns
by adding that separate bi-
lateral agreements could be
negotiated between states fish-
ing in the same waters.
The United States and most
Western European states favor
a formula of six-plus-six
qualified to allow continuation
of "historic" fishing at a
level not above that prevailing
in a preconference base period.
This formula would not satisfy
the demands of certain Asian-
African and Latin American
states, and would probably not
receive two-thirds support.
Since it would be likely to be
received more favorably than
any of the other proposals,
the United States and Britain
are prepared to compromise
further in an effort to get
conference agreement and pre-
serve a narrow territorial sea.
Their revised formula, in
addition to a territorial sea
of six miles, would establish
a six-mile contiguous fishery
zone in which foreign fishing
rights would terminate after a
number of years--the number to
be negotiated and agreed at
the conference. During this
period foreign fishing could
be continued by the same coun-
tries, at the same general
level, in the same general
areas, and for the same gen-
eral classes of fish as dur-
ing a preconference base period
such as 1953 to 1957. This
compromise may prove to have
the best and possibly only
chance for two-thirds approval
at the conference.
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