CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002400100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1959
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO.
OCI NO. 5012/59
8 October 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
State Department review completed
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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flENT lAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLYSUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PEIPING'S TENTH
ANNIVERSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Developments in connection with Khrushchev's visit
to Peiping for the tenth anniversary of the Chinese regime
suggest that differences in views on foreign policy tac-
tics and ideological matters remain as irritants in the
Sino-Soviet relationship. The Chinese have publicly
hailed Khrushchev's visit to the United States and his
disarmament proposals. However, they apparently have
reservations about the longterm effects of the USSR's
present posture toward the United States. The Chinese
also strongly reaffirm Peiping's position that the commune
will be China's basic social unit after "entering Commu-
nism," despite the Soviet statement that the commune is
"impossible" in the future Communist society. Present
Chinese propaganda acknowledging dependence on the Sino-
Soviet alliance, however, reflects Peiping's desire to
avoid a showdown with Moscow.
SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The situation in Laos continues to be characterized
by skirmishes at widely scattered points throughout the
country and by Communist propaganda and recruitment activ-
ities in the hinterland. Such activity may increase, as
the monsoon rains now are subsiding. Most delegates of
the UN subcommittee, having completed a limited field
survey in northern Laos, are expected to leave shortly,
but a few will probably remain to assure a continuing UN
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS .
. . . . Page 4
Increased factional strife and a wave of arrests of
members of the several Iraqi groups suspected of plotting
against the regime are expected to follow the attempt on
7 October to assassinate Prime Minister Qasim, A new
propaganda battle between the UAR and Jordan may cause
Xing Husayn to decide against meeting with Nasir at a
tripartite conference which King Saud of Saudi Arabia has
been trying to arrange. High-level negotiations in Cairo
between the UAR and Sudan on sharing the Nile waters are
scheduled to begin on 10 October; prospects for agreement
are not bright. The Imam of Yemen, who has reestablished
his dominant political position, now faces a financial
crisis.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
EAST GERMANY CELEBRATES TENTH ANNIVERSARY . . . . . . Page 1
The East German regime, celebrating its tenth year
in power, is using the occasion to emphasize its claim to
status as a full-fledged sovereign state. The Communists,
pointing to their equal representation with West Germany
at the Geneva conference, contend that a turning point
has been reached in the struggle.to reverse the West's
policy of nonrecognition. Soviet Deputy Premier Kozlov
declared in a speech that the West German doctrine that
no country other than the USSR having diplomatic relations
with East Germany shall be recognized by Bonn is beginning
to crumble. The East Germans punctuated their claim to
sovereignty by unfurling a new national flag over the ele-
vated rail installations they control in West Berlin.
BRITAIN' RECEPTIVE TO INCREASING EAST GERMAN VISITS . . . . Page 2
London has been generally receptive to the growing
number of East German officials visiting the United King-
dom to promote the Ulbricht regime's prestige. During the
election campaign the British Government was especially
sensitive to Allied efforts to discourage such travel.
Britain's policy of furthering contacts with East Germany
will be an additional factor clouding relations with Bonn.
ALGERIA-FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
A resurgence of extremist activity by European set-
tlers in Algiers has followed De Gaulle's proposals for
Algerian self-determination. The settlers fear eventual
loss of power and reprisals from the Moslem population.
Rightist opposition will probably attempt to make itself
felt in the French Parliament, which reconvened on 6 October,
but no serious threat to the Debra government is likely.
In Tunis, Algerian rebel leaders appear to be awaiting
world reactions to their reply to De Gaulle and are sensi-
tive to any suggestion that their attitude foreshadows a
capitulation.
FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
France probably now has all the comnnnentc rennirani
for testing a nuclear weapon
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DISARMAMENT - 14TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY . . . . . . . . Page 5
With five separate disarmament items on its agenda,
the UN General Assembly will give precedence to the new
ten-nation disarmament forum. Debate will be long-drawn-
out, particularly during assembly discussion of the USSR's
call for "complete and general disarmament." The Soviet
proposal and the other disarmament items will probably e
referred to the ten--nation group for study.
BELGIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The Belgian Government may be faced with a treasury
crisis which could bring down the Social Christian - Lib-
eral coalition, While a longterm loan from the Belgian
National Bank might stave off the crisis, the bank opposes
such a move on the grounds that the solution to periodic
budget deficits is higher taxation--?a course strongly op-
posed by important elements in the coalition government.
NEW HUNGARIAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1961--65) . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Hungary's economic plan for 1961-65 calls for a
65-70 percent increase in industrial output over 1958 and
a 30-32 percent rise in agricultural production over the
1954-58 average. A respectable rise in per capita real
income is also promised. While targets are generally
realistic, not all programs are likely to be completed on
schedule because of competition for investment resources,
difficulties in raising labor productivity, and problems
in meeting agricultural targets. Some revisions of indi-
vidual goals probably will prove necessary before the end
of the plan period.
RELATIONS BETWEEN CAIRO AND PEIPING DETERIORATE . , , . . Page 8
In providing expatriate Syrian Communist leader
Khalid Bakdash a forum from which to denounce Nasir,
Peiping has shown it will support Mic?d.le Eastern Commu -?
nists despite the increased frictions with the UAR such
a policy was bound to bring. Nasir has recalled the UAR
charge and sent a stiff protest to Peiping. The Chinese,
convinced that Nasir is trying to undermine 2eiping's
standing with the Afro-Asian neutrals, have not yet re-
plied to bitter UAR press attacks.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
TIBETAN BORDER PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Nepal and Pakistan, as well as India, are showing
increasing concern over their border problems with Commu-
nist China. Nehru's recent letter to Chou En --lai insisting
on Chinese evacuation of Longju and other border outposts
probably will result in an impasse in the Sino?-Indian
dispute. Nepal has taken the initiative and requested
the Chinese to "clarify" their stand on the Nepalese-Ti-
betan border. Pakistan has sent troop reinforcements to
its frontier areas adjacent to Sinkiang,
INDIAN LEADERS PLAN TO SPLIT BOMBAY STATE .
. Page 10
Prime Minister Nehru and other Congress party leaders
have reversed their stand and now are planning to partition
Bombay State, India's largest, probably in April 1960, to
forestall an outbreak of violent agitation by linguistic
groups which have long advocated partition. Such agitation
could seriously threaten the Congress party's control of
Bombay, Partition would create many problems, but should
enable the Congress to recover some of its strength in
Bombay by depriving opposition groups of their most im-
portant issue.
SUKARNO AND THE INDONESIAN ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
President Sukarno has recently demonstrated a renewed
concern to balance the army's influence in government by
making concessions to Communist and other leftist politi-
cal forces. Rumors of an impending army cou undoubted)
have played a part in Sukarno's uneasiness.
MALI FEDERATION MOVING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE . . . . . . . . Page 12
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Leaders of the Federation of Mali, made up of the
autonomous French Community republics of Senegal and
Soudan, have begun to implement their local political
commitment to gain juridical independence for Mali at an
early date. They intend to keep this West African area
within the Paris-subsidized Community, which they hope
will be altered so as to include a multinational confeder-
ation. De Gaulle, with his recent emphasis on the Com-
munity's "evolutional character," seems to have accepted
in principle the Mali leaders' cautious approach. 25X1
STATE OF SIEGE ENDS IN BOLIVIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
The recent lifting of the state of siege in Bolivia
marks a temporary bridging at least of the sharp division
between the moderate and left wings of the government
party and suggests that bitter left-wing criticism of the
administration's cooperation with the United States may
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
PART II (continued)
decrease. The approach of the party's presidential nomi-
nating convention in December appears to be a strong
force for party unity.
DOMINICAN POLITICAL SITUATION WORSENS . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Repub-
lic is facing more internal opposition to his regime than
at any time since he came to power in 1930. The Dominican
people, who had become accustomed to the prosperity which
Trujillo brought them, now are restless under the economic
hardships caused by heavy military expenditures during the
past year.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
EXPANSION OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE ANTARCTIC . . . . . Page
The USSR, with bloc participation, is stepping up
its already extensive operations in the Antarctic. Recent
announcements indicate that the fifth Soviet expedition--
which will include East German and possibly Chinese Com-
munist personnel--will seek to establish three new tem.
porary stations, make another attempt to land a party in
western Antarctica, and try to complete a trans-Antarctic
glaciological traverse by mid-1960. Long-range Soviet
plans for Antarctic activity apparently call for increased
whaling operations, the use of the atomic icebreaker Lenin,
and the inauguration of nonstop air service from the USSR.
ULBRICHT REGIME PLANS TRANSFORMATION OF EAST BERLIN . . . Page 4
In connection with East Germany's tenth anniversary
on 7 October, the Ulbricht regime is publicizing ambitious
plans to transform East Berlin into a showplace of German
"socialist culture" and a suitable "national" capital to
rival West Berlin. The program, which forms part of East
Germany's Seven-Year Plan for 1959-65, is also designed
to demonstrate the regime's determination not to permit
East Berlin to become a part of any "free city" of Berlin.
Unless East Germany's financial stringencies can be solved
and its uninspired building methods improved, however,
the new city is likely to be as shoddy as the notorious
Stalinallee housing development.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III (continued)
GHANA AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE . . . . . ... . . . . . . . Page 11
Since 6 March 1957, when Ghana became independent,
Prime Minister Nkrumah's regime has made considerable prog-
ress in consolidating its power at home and in expanding
its influence. Domestic opposition has been largely
stifled and internal stability secured, the economy has
been kept on an even keel, a neutralist course not un-
friendly to the West has been charted, and Accra has
become a focal point of militant pan-Africanism. The
regime has become increasingly more authoritarian, however,
and basic weaknesses are already impeding the progress of
this "model" new African state.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SINO-SOVIET 'RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT
Developments in connec-
tion with Khrushchev's visit
to Peiping for the tenth anni-
versary celebration of the
Chinese regime suggest that
differences in views on for-
eign policy tactics, methods
of "socialist construction,"
and ideological matters remain
as irritants in the Sino-So-
viet relationship. Mao and
Khrushchev, who held several
days of well-publicized talks
during the visit, failed to
issue the customary joint com-
muniqud. It seems probable
that their views differed so
much that compromise language
could not be agreed upon.
While Peiping is apparent-
ly willing to publicly endorse
Khrushchev's visit to the US
and his disarmament proposals,
its foreign and domestic pol-
icies apparently require it to
maintain that the threat of
American "aggression" remains,
In contrast to Soviet state-
ments, Foreign Minister Chen
Yi--in a special article writ-
ten for Izvestia for the Chi-
nese anniversary--complained
that "so far" the United States
has not "repudiated its policy
of aggression and war," as wit-
nessed by its "continuation"
of the cold war, continued con-
struction of foreign military
bases, "active" rearmament of
Japan, and "continuing occupa-
tion of Taiwan."
OF PEIPING'S TENTH ANNIVERSARY
The Chinese leaders ap-
parcntly view their policy to-
ward the United States as re-
quiring tactics significantly
different from those now being
pursued by Khrushchev, That
American hostility to the Pei-
ping regime must be met with
"tension" rather than a dis-
play of "weakness" is a car-
dinal principle of the Chinese
leaders, who have said that the
Khrushchev completely dis-
sociated the USSR from this
line in his statement on leav-
ing Peiping, declaring that
"Communists of the Soviet Union
consider it our sacred duty
and primary task" to end the
cold war and guarantee the
"triumph of the cause of peace."
United States will not change
its policy toward China "of its
own accord." In his Izvestia
article, Chen Yi reaffirmed--the
central theme of Peiping's tac-
tics: "The people of the world
still have to wage long-term
struggles again and again against
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
American imperialism in order
to achieve the relaxation of
international tension."
The Chinese are apprehen-
sive that friendlier US-USSR
relations will prove detrimen
talto their interests, which
are opposed to the maintenance
of the status quo in the Far
East. On the Taiwan and Lao-
tian issues, the Chinese have
directed their principal in-
vective against the United
States as the "aggressor," ap-
parently in the belief that
consistent opposition to Amer-
ican policy will eventually
lead to a reduction of American
influence in the area. This
line probably is also useful
in Peiping's domestic program,
as the Chinese have stated that
"face to face with the American
aggressor, the Chinese people
are forced to intensify their
work wnd build economically
backward China into an advanced,
industrialized, and socialist
power."
Khrushchev's failure dur-
ing the celebrations in Pei-
ping to support publicly the
Chinese on the specific issue
of Taiwan reflects his desire
to avoid issues which run
counter to his posture of peace-
ful coexistence with the United
States. This silence, however,
does not imply repudiation of
Moscow's commitment in September
1958 that any attack on Commu-
nist China would be regarded as
an attack on the USSR.
The Chinese leaders ap-
parently felt the need at a
major regime celebration to
reaffirm their long-term ob-
jectives toward the offshore
islands and Taiwan. Peiping,
however, has shown no disposi-
tion to develop the "liberate
Taiwan" theme into a major
propaganda campaign for the
present. Present Chinese
statements speak of "liberat-
ing" Taiwan "in one way or
another," but imply no sense
of urgency.
Despite the difference in
Sino-Soviet views, Chinese
statements during Khrushchev's
visit suggest that the Chinese
are aware of their dependence
on the USSR and do not wish to
push present differences to the
point of impairing the alliance.
An editorial in People's Daily
on 3 October stated that the
Chinese people regard the
steady strengthening of their
unity with the USSR, "their
great ally," as an important
guarantee of the "prosperity
and strength of their country
as well as their sacred inter-
national duty."
Central committee Secre-
tary General Teng Hsiao-ping,
in an anniversary article for
Pravda, revived Mao's own for-
mulation on the leadership po-
sition of the Soviet Communist
party as well as the Soviet
Government. Teng stated that
"the unity of the socialist
camp headed by the Soviet
Union, and the unity of the"in-
ternational Communist movement
with the Communist party of the
Soviet Union at its center,
form the core of even more ex-
tensive international unity."
Khrushchev's failure to
endorse the communes and eco-
nomic policies connected with
Peiping's "leap forward" shows
that the two leaders were un-
able to find a formula to
bridge their differences and
that these issues will continue
to harass Sino-Soviet relations.
Soviet propagandists are still
attacking the commune concept,
and one -writer has recently
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
stated that the commune is
"impossible" in the future Com-
munist society.
The Chinese leaders, how-
ever, appear deeply committed
to the concept and, in the face
of Soviet and domestic opposi-
tion, are insisting on the
"superiority" of the communes
over the former cooperatives,
Government chairman Liu Shao-
chi and Teng Hsiao-ping have
recently stated that the com-
mune will be the best form of
social organization for the
future "gradual transition to
the Communist society."
As in previous Sino-Soviet
ideological differences over
the past 10 years, the Chinese
are again indicating their de-
termination to manipulate ide-
ology for domestic purposes
and in order to increase their
prestige as a "creative" Marx-
ist party, Liu Shao-chi stated
in his anniversary article for
the October issue of the bloc's
theoretical journal, Problems
of Peace and Socialism, that
although "revolution and con-
struction in China have fea-
tures peculiar to this country,"
it is also "possible that some
of these important special fea-
tures may reappear in some other
countries." Liu concluded, "In
this sense, Chinese experience
is to a certain degree of in-
ternational significance."
Liu avoided Sa.y ,ng . that
the communes and the "leap for-
ward" policy were what he had
in mind, but he apparently felt
that his readers could easily
draw their own conclusions.
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SITUATION IN LAOS
The situation in Laos con-
tinues to be characterized by
small-scale skirmishes at wide-
ly scattered points throughout
the country and by Communist
propaganda and recruitment ac-
tivities in the hinterland.
Such activity may increase, as
the monsoon rains are now sub-
siding.
In Sam Neua Province, the
Laotian Army is attempting to
retake ground lost in the 30
August Communist attacks on a
series of posts along the Nam
Ma River, but the extent of its',
success is unclear.
I capture of
two of these pos s--Muong Het
and Xieng Kho. However, accord-
ing to subsequent press reports,
these posts were once more
abandoned.
Muong Het, at least, is
again definitely in enemy hands.
In the western corner of the
province, a Communist force
which for some weeks has been
threatening the government posi-
tion at Muong Son is reported
to have begun an attempt to
take the post.
In southern Laos, reports
persist of the presence there
of approximately 300 armed Viet-
namese who presumably came from
the Communist-dominated Viet-
namese refugee communities in
northeast Thailand.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
the frontier in very
small groups. In any
event, the Laotian
Army is in a poor po-
sition to counter the
apparently increasing
guerrilla activity in
the south because the
bulk of ;its forces
are deployed in the
northern provinces.
The UN subcom-
mittee has completed
a limited field sur-
vey in Sam Neua and
Luang Prabang. Al-
though UN Secretary
General Hammarskjold
expects the subcom-
mittee to return soon
to New York to draft
its report, he will
probably advise the
delegates' governments
to leave a few repre--
sentatives in Vien-
tiane in order to as-
sure a continuing UN
presence. Some del-
egates are looking
forward to an early
departure from Laos,
but others are will-
ing. to stay on to
try to survey the
forward areas if heli-
/while the refugees
have displayed only limited in-
terest in joining the Communist
insurgents in Laos, as many as
300 may have filtered across
copters can be made avail-
able. A final decision on these
matters will probably be
made shortly at UN head-
uarters in New York. 25X1
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq
A wave of arrests of mem-
bers of groups suspected of
antiregime plotting--pro-UAR
Iraqi Baathists, Iraqi national-
ist elements, and some anti-
Communist army officers--is ex-
pected to follow the unsuccess-
ful attempt on 7 October to
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assassinate Prime Minister
Qasim. Baghdad has remained
quiet, with special security
precautions quickly taken by
the government, army, and police.
The assassination attempt
was made on -7 October
while Qasim was being driven
along Rashid Street in down-
town Baghdad. The identity of
his assailant is unknown; gov-
ernment releases have described
the attacker only as "a sinful
hand" and have not said whether
or not he was apprehended.
The official medical bul-
letins describe Qasim's condi-
tion as "good" and calling for
"no anxiety." They say he was
struck by three bullets in non-
vital parts of the body and suf-
fered only a flesh wound and a
fractured shoulder. Qasim is re-
ported to have emerged from the
hospital where he was taken for
treatment to show himself to
Iraqi crowds and reassure them,
and, a few hours after the
shooting, Radio Baghdad broad-
cast a short recorded Qasim
speech calling for calm and
unity. Qasim, as a martyr who
nearly gave his life in "doing
his duty for the Iraqi people,"
appealed for support from all
Iraqis.
Military Governor and Army
Chief of Staff Abdi,
as
issued the government's bulletins
on the prime minister's condi-
tion and the decrees establish-
ing a curfew in Baghdad and its
suburbs and prohibiting any
gatherings or demonstrations
anywhere in Iraq. At the moment,
with Qasim partially incapacitat-
ed, Abdi appears to be the key
figure in the Iraqi Government.
The assassination attempt
has increased the possibility
of major factional strife in-
side the country. Since the
expected roundup of antiregime
elements will focus on members
of pro-UAR and anti-Communist
nationalist groups, the Iraqi
Communist party is likely to
gain new strength and influence
within the government. The
Communists have already rallied
to Qasim's support, and crowds
are reported to have chanted,
"Long live Qasim; death to
Nasir." If Qasim remains in-
capacitated for any considerable
length of time, clashes between
the various internal factions
are likely, and a breakdown in
public order and control is a
possibility.
A semiofficial Cairo news-
paper has declared that it was
the Iraqi Government's "import
of alien policies" which led to
the attempt on Qasim's life.
The Cairo press alleges that
Baghdad lived through a subse-
quent night of terror, with Com-
munist-controlled Popular Re-
sistance Forces out shooting in
the streets, large numbers of na-
tionalists being arrested, and
"fresh massacres of nationalists"
soon to be expected.
Direct military intervention
by the UAR in Iraq is unlikely
unless the Iraqi Government
loses control and major faction-
al strife takes place,
The recent trend toward
a detente between the UAR and
Jordan has been arrested by a
new propaganda battle between
the two countries. On 30 Sep-
tember, at a time when Cairo
was trying to enlist the sup-
port of other Arab nations for
its new campaign against the
aggressive policies of "imperi-
alist.Red China," an Amman
radio commentary charged that
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it was the UAR which had "opened
the door" to Communism in the
Middle East in the first place.
Cairo's Voice of the Arabs has
subsequently attacked Jordan as
"an opportunist" following "the
orders of imperialists," who
are aligned with Communists
against Arab nationalism.
As a result of the propa-
ganda controversy, Jordan's
King Husayn may decide against
meeting with UAR President Nasir
at a tripartite conference which
King Saud of Saudi Arabia has
been trying to arrange since
his early September talks with
Nasir in Cairo.
New high-level negotiations'
between the United Arab Republic
and the Sudan on sharing the
Nile waters are scheduled to
begin in Cairo on 10 October.
While the chances that agree-
ment will be reached are small,
they appear somewhat better now
than during the past two years,
when each round of discussions
ended with very wide differences
between the two countries' posi-
tions. Negotiation of a solu-
tion is further complicated by
the insistence of the other
riparian states--Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanganyika, for whom Brit-
ain is spokesman, and particu-
larly Ethiopia--that they should
have a voice in any settlement.
The need for a Nile waters
agreement has been dramatized
by Soviet engineers' preparations
to begin construction of the
UAR's Aswan High Dam and by
the Sudanese Government's public
commitment to proceed with its
Roseires Dam project as soon
as the needed credit can be ob-
tained. The World Bank has de-
layed consideration of a $100,-
000,000 loan for the Roseires
Dam pending Sudanese-UAR agree-
ment on distribution of the
Nile waters. With or without
this dam, the Sudan's program
for cotton-acreage expansion
requires a steady increase in
the amount of water diverted
within Sudanese territory for
irrigation purposes.
Completion of the Aswan
High Dam in Egypt would create
a huge reservoir extending up-
river into Sudanese territory
and displacing large numbers of
Sudanese from their homes in the
Wadi Halfa district. Failure to
reach accord and consequent re-
liance on' the 'principle' of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
UAR I
(EGYPT)
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dividing the Nile waters by uni-
lateral grab would quickly
strain UAR-Sudanese relations
to the breaking point.
For months, the UAR has of-
fered blandishment in an effort
to persuade the Sudan to under-
take high-level negotiations and
to convince the Sudanese public
that the Nasir government is
ready and eager to end all UAR-
Sudanese disagreements. The un-
stable Sudanese military govern-
ment, however, remains suspic1E
of Cairo's intentions, fearing
that the UAR will try to blame
it for any failure in negotia-
tions.
Already faced with strong
internal political pressures for
a return to civilian government
and with new plotting by dis-
sident elements in the army of-
ficer corps, the Abboud govern-
ment is anxious to avoid a de-
terioration of relations with
the UAR. Nevertheless, a UAR
propaganda barrage in the wake
of unsuccessful talks would
probably impel Abboud to reply
in kind, in an effort to rally
anti-Egyptian Sudanese public
opinion behind him,
Yemen
The Imam, having re-estab-
lished his personal political
dominance in Yemen, is now
threatened by a growing financial
crisis. The government financial
shortages, which have become
apparent in the lack of
pay for government officials
and the army, are almost certain
to arouse public resentment
against the Imam,
The American charge, re-
porting the consensus of his
Western colleagues in Yemen,
says the Imam needs some $3,000,-
000 to $5,000,000 to "tide him
over." The director general
of the Foreign Ministry is sched-
uled to visit Moscow sometime
this month, at which time the
USSR might seek to improve its
position in Yemen by granting
the Imam some assistance.
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The East German rulers are
using a two-week celebration,
built around the tenth anniver-
sary in power on 7 October, to
point up what they consider
their country's enhanced inter-
national position. This cele-
bration climaxes a persistent
propaganda campaign designed to
show that East Germany is grad-
ually being accepted by the
West as a sovereign state, and
that his development is "in-
evitable," despite West German
efforts to oppose it. The
Ulbricht regime looks on this
occasion as the turning point
in East Germany's progress from
the position of a virtual pariah
among nations to that of a full-
fledged sovereign state.
Soviet First Deputy Pre-
mier Kozlov asserted in a speech
on 6 October that West Ger-
many's "notorious Hallstein
doctrine"--that no country ex-
cept the USSR having diplomatic
relations with East Germany
shall be recognized by Bonn--
is beginning to crumble, He
said Bonn's efforts to pre-
serve "the international iso-
lation of East Germany" have
been in vain. He pointed to
East Germany's participation
in the Geneva conference on an
equal footing with the Bonn
republic as evidence that even
the Western powers have had to
recognize the Communist regime's
existence.
Several speakers casti-
gated West Germany in the usual
vituperative terms, but none-
theless called on Bonn to nego-
tiate with the East Germans
the formation of a committee
or confederation as the first
step to reunification. No new
proposals were made in the
speeches, which dwelt monoto-
nously on East Germany's eco-
nomic achievements during the
ten-year period~.and the over-
whelming popular support en-
joyed by the Communist pro-
grams.
In another move to point
up East Germany's sovereignty,
the new East German flag, the
West German tricolor with a
hammer and compass insignia
superimposed on it, was un-
furled on 6 October over the
West Berlin elevated rail in-
stallations, which remain under
East German control, When
West Berlin police sought to
remove the flags, several
clashes occurred between them
and Communist "workers," the
most serious of which was a
pitched battle between about
80 rail employees and a small
police force at the elevated
repair shops in Gruenewaldo
On 7 October, some 60 East
German flags were still flying
over elevated installations in
West Berlin. The West Berlin
authorities deferred further
action, but an uneasy situation
prevails, exemplified by a West
Berlin trade union leader's
assertion that he may not be
able to restrain the workers
from taking action to remove
the flags. The East Germans
have sent members of the work-
ers' militia to guard at least
some of the elevated installa-
tions in West Berlin.
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BRITAIN RECEPTIVE TO INCREASING EAST GERMAN VISITS
London has been generally
receptive to the growing number
of East German officials visit-
ing the United Kingdom to pro-
mote the prestige of the U1-
bricht regime. The policy
of furthering exchanges with
East Germany will be an
additional factor clouding re-
lations with Bonn.
The Ulbricht regime is ex-
ploiting its tenth anniversary
celebration on 7 October with a
special exhibit which opened in
London on 29 September and will
tour 18 British cities. The
East Berlin symphony orchestra
is appearing in London's Royal
Festival Hall. A special dele-
gation from Dresden is visiting
"sister city" Coventry on in-
vitation of the Laborite lord
mayor.
Although on occasion the
Foreign Office has shown annoy-
ance at Home Office action in
issuing visas, certain Foreign
Office officials have strongly
objected to further Allied ef-
forts to exclude Wieland and the
Dresden delegation in the elec-
tion campaign period. As a gen-
eral principle, the British con-
sider the expansion of trade and
personal contacts compatible
with Western objectives of break-
ing down East-West barriers.
On 1 October the Foreign Office
agreed to discuss with the
United States and France "prin-
ciples and categories" of East
German travel. Knowing Bonn's
hostility toward any seeming
enhancement of East Germany's
status, the British prefer to
postpone discussion with the
Federal Republic.
Visas were also granted to
Deba Wieland, the Russian-born
director of the East German news
agency ADN, to accept an invi-
tation from Reuters, which
opened an East Berlin office
last May, and to Arthur Pieck,
director of the regime's civil
airlines, to attend the annual
Farnborough air show staged by
British plane manufacturers in
September. Pieck is the son of
the East German President. De-
lays by the Allied Travel Office
in West Berlin in granting the
necessary authorization prevent-
6d Pieck's attendance.
Rightist European settlers
are fearful that exercise of
Algerian self-determination as
proposed by President de Gaulle
would leave them at the mercy
of a vengeful Moslem majority,
and this concern has led to a
resurgence of extremist activity
In any event, Britain's
willingness to countenance con-
tinued visits by East Germans is
bound to hamper its already
strained relations with Bonn.
The Labor party is more inclined
than the Conservatives to dis-
regard the Federal Republic and
therefore more favorable to pro-
moting East German contacts.
"Shadow cabinet" members Aneurin
Bevan and George Brown have told
the American Embassy they advo-
cate Western dealings with the
Ulbricht re ime on a de facto
basis.
in Algiers.
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'CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In France the rightist op-
ponents of De Gaulle's program
will attempt to make themselves
heard in Parliament, which re-
convened on 6 October, but no
serious threat to the Debre gov-
ernment from this quarter seems
likely. This belief is borne
out by Debre's decision to per-
mit the National Assembly to
debate the Algerian proposals
following his general policy
statement on 13 October. Indi-
cations of a large assembly ma-
jority may also have influenced
the government's decision to per-
mit the assembly to vote follow-
ing the debate--this would be
the first vote allowed in this
body on a major policy--since
De Gaulle seems anxious to dem-
onstrate general support for
his proposals in order to
strengthen his hand in dealing
with the rebels and to isolate
his rightist critics.
An attempt by two extreme
rightist deputies to organize
a motion of censure failed be-
cause many opposed to the De
Gaulle proposals were unwilling
to sign the motion as required
by the new constitution. Right-
ist hopes of again rallying
military support may have been
revived as a result of a meet-
ing of 700 army reserve officers
in Paris on 27 September. This
meeting passed a resolution
flatly endorsing retention
of "French Algeria," pointed-
ly omitting any reference
to De Gaulle, and declaring
solidarity with the army in
Algeria.
In Tunis, a leading member
25X1
of the Algerian provisional gov-
sa a re e s prefer to wait
for the development of foreign
reaction to.their reply to De
Gaulle before opening conversa-
tions. He alleged that opinion
in France was developing in fa-
vor of the Algerians.
25X1
The Algerian rebels remain
sensitive to any suggestion that
their attitude foreshadows a
capitulation.. Although the
official. rebel newspaper edito-
rially described De Gaulle's Al-
gerian program as having "cor-
rected the disgraces of the
past and opened the door to.Al-
gerian reality," a subsequent
communique stated that while the
rebels were prepared to negotiate
"from strength," the rebel army 25X1
must "harass the enemy and remain
rises."
firm ...until.the sun of liberty
FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
France probably now has
all the components required for
testing a nuclear weapon)
The French Govern-
ment s a stress, however,
25X1
25Xa
on possession of a nuclear weap-
on as an important prestige fac-
tor vis-a-vis the other members 25X1
of the French Community.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
France will ace a -
ficult debate when the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, possibly by late
October, discusses the Moroccan
item opposing the French tests.
Morocco has the support of Af-
rican states bordering the
Sahara and other UN members con-
cerned over the fall-out hazard.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DISARMAMENT - 14TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
UN members' preoccupation
with disarmament and nuclear
testing is highlighted by the
fact that this assembly session
has five separate disarmament
items on its agenda. The as-
sembly's political committee
begins debate next week with
the Soviet proposal for "com-
plete and general disarmament"
as its first item. The chief
Soviet UN delegate has predicted
that this debate would take up
a "month and a half of the 14th
General Assembly's time."
Nevertheless the assembly will
probably refer the Soviet pro-
posal to the recently formed
ten-nation,-disarmament forum
for study.
Although the assembly will
endorse the formation of the
ten-nation disarmament forum of
five Western and five Soviet-
bloc countries organized by the
Big Four, some Latin American
members will be critical because
of the lack of an effective link
with the UN. The USSR has al-
ready begun to exploit this
feeling and the resentment of
other UN members at their ex-
clusion from disarmament
negotiations.
Soviet dele-
gates are assiduously spreading
the story that the United States
wanted the new forum to have no
ties with the UN and that it was
only after the USSR's "heroic
work" that the Big Four's com-
munique provided for any UN
connection. Soviet 'representatives
are also claiming that Moscow
wanted "neutrals" in the new
group but that the United States
insisted on the "five-five"
arrangement.
India again this year has
called for a UN ban on nuclear
testing. Although New Delhi's
proposal will probably be re-
ferred to the ten-nation forum
for consideration, India may
during the course of the debate
request a report from the Geneva
nuclear test conference partici-
pants on the status of the talks,
the progress made, and the re-
maining issues.
Morocco has raised the
question of proposed French
nuclear tests in the Sahara in
an effort to have the UN call
on France to desist. Although
Rabat wants its item handled
separately from other disarma-
ment issues, the assembly will
probably refer the problem to
the new forum also.
Ireland, working closely
with British and American dele-
gates, has agreed to refer its
proposal to prevent wider dis-
semination of nuclear weapons to
the ten-nation forum. The Irish
want those powers, including
France, producing nuclear weapons
to refrain from handing, ~ over the
control of such weapons to any
nation not possessing them. Powers
not now possessing nuclear weapons,.:
under the Irish proposal, would
refrain from manufacturing them.
BELGIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
The Belgian Government is
heading for a financial crisis
which could bring down the
Social Christian - Liberal
coalition of Prime Minister
Eyskens. While a long-term loan
from the Belgian National Bank
might stave off a crisis, the
bank opposes such a move on the
grounds that the solution to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Belgium's periodic budget defi-
cits is higher taxation. Such
a step, however, is opposed
by Liberal party leaders--who
have threatened to leave the
government rather than vote for
a tax increase--and by the con-
servative wing of Eyskens' own
party.
The $180,000,000-$220,000,-
000 deficit is partly a re-
flection of the weak state of
the country's economy. Recovery
from the 1958 recession has been
relatively slower and more
limited in Belgium than elsewhere
in Europe. The economy is beset
with several problems, including
high production costs in manu-
facturing and a serious overpro-
duction crisis in the coal
industry.
The situation created by in-
adequate revenues has been ag-
gravated by the expensive pro-
grams to which the Eyskens gov-
ernment is committed, such as
subsidization of the coal in-
dustry, a school-building pro-
gram, and gradual extension of
a voluntary recruitment plan in
the defense forces. Moreover,
Brussels seems likely for the
first time to have to subsidize
the Congo budget.
Temporary measures to cover
the deficit have been resorted
to in the past and could be
again. The uneasy relationship
between the coalition partners
and the powerful position of the
Socialist opposition, however,
has made it difficult to pare
major expenditure items. The
one exception to this may be
defense, which has tended to be
a politidAl football. During
his recent visit to Washington,
Defense Minister Gilson announced
an increase in defense expendi-
tures, but Finance Minister van
Houtte has stated on several oc-
casions that Gilson's sights are
too high.
Over the longer term, the
only answer to the government's
financial problems would appear
to be a new cabinet and higher
taxation. The Social Christians
and the Liberals are funda-
mentally at odds on economic
issues, as were the Socialists
and the Liberals in the 1954-
1958 coalition. The Social
Christians and the Socialists,
however, might be able to
come to terms on a more real-
istic tax program. The So-
cialists have been gearing
their new program with a
view toward possible par-
ticipation in the next coal-
ition government. It is doubt-
ful, however, that this could
be achieved without new
elections.
NEW HUNGARIAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1961-65)
The Hungarian economic plan
for 1961-65, to be approved at
the November party congress, is
generally realistic. Not all
goals are likely to be achieved,
however, because of probable
difficulties in stretching in-
vestments, raising labor produc-
tivity, and fulfilling the agri-
cultural production target.
Plans include the near-completion
of,. . agricultural :collectiviz .tion, . r
which was advanced so rapidly
during the first part of this
year, and promise about a 3.5-
percent annual rise in per
capita real income during this
and the next six years.
The increase in total in-
dustrial production planned for
1965 over the 1958 level--that
is, a seven-year period--is 65-
70 percent, or 10 percent higher
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
HUNGARY
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION GOALS
FOR 1965
ACTUAL 1958 EI I PLANNED 1965
ELECTRIC
POWER
BILLION KWH
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27-29
F"I
COAL
MILLION
METRIC TONS
CRUDE STEEL
MILLION
METRIC TONS
than indicated during prelim-
inary discussion of the plan.
In both 1958 and 1959 the growth
of industry has been greater
than the annual average neces-
sary to achieve this higher
target. Within industry, out-
put of capital goods is to in-
crease about a third faster than
that of consumer goods.
Several programs are mapped
out for industry. In addition
to developing industrially back-
ward areas, altering still fur-
ther the composition of indus
trial output, and expanding the
raw material and power base, a
reorganization of management is
planned. This reorganization,
an extension of gradual changes
in recent years, is designed to
eliminate superfluous positions
and enlarge the operational con-
trol of lower level officials.
The program will apparently
be similar to that intro-
duced in Czechoslovakia last
year.
F
i
CRUDE OIL
MILLION
METRIC TONS
In agriculture,
the use of artificial
fertilizers,is to be
increased to three
times the present
volume, and the trac-
tor pool is to be ex-
panded by 150 percent.
Other programs, such
as improving irrigation
and crop rotation,
will also be stepped
up with a view to
achieving during the
1961-65 period an aver-
age agricultural pro-
duction 30-32 percent
above the 1954-58
average. While plans
do appear to provide
resources for expand-
ing output, the sched-
uled increase is am-
bitious, in view of
the difficulties in
accelerating the growth
df the agricultural
sector and the push
for collectivization
--now being met with
peasant hostility.
To implement plans for in-
dustrial and agricultural ex-
pansion, investment during the
1961-65 period is to be at least
50 percent higher than during
1956-60. Actual investment fig-
ures appear to provide for a
much larger increase because of
price changes on 1 January 1959
which raised the average value
of capital goods 68 percent.
The planned rise is substantial,
however, especially as part of
the national income must be al-
located to the payment of for-
eign debts, and as the regime
promises to raise per capita
real income 26-29 percent by
1965. Higher national income
is also expected to permit an
increase in material and foreign
exchange reserves.
It is doubtful that even a
50-percent rise in investments
can be stretched to cover all
the programs planned for industry,
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CURRENT-INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
agriculture, and construction.
The reliance on a 37-40 percent
rise in labor productivity for
fulfilling output plans and
allowing wage increases also
seems optimistic. The regime
will probably make various re-
visions of individual goals in
this plan before the end of
1965.
25X1
RELATIONS BETWEEN CAIRO AND PEIPING DETERIORATE
In providing expatriate
Syrian Communist leader Khalid
Bakdash a forum from which to
criticize*Nasir, Peiping has
shown it will support Middle
Eastern Communists despite'the
increased frictions with the
UAR such a policy was bound to
bring. Nasir has recalled the
UAR charge, who had walked out
of the Chinese Communist tenth
anniversary celebration where
Bakdash spoke on 28 September.
A stiff formal protest was
sent to the Chinese Communist
Embassy in Cairo after Ambas-
sador Chen Chia-kang refused to
accept it personally on the
grounds he had no instructions
from Peiping. The UAR also in-
structed its officials to boy-
cott all of Communist China's
anniversary programs,and, in
Damascus, resorted to cordoning
off the reception given by the
Chinese Communist consul,
Closure of'the consular
post in Damascus has been sug-
gested in the UAR press, which
has carried a series of biting
editorials since 29 September
charging Peiping with "political
provocations" against Cairo and
with a "policy of invasion and
domination" aimed at all "hon-
est" neutrals. Citing Peiping's
feuds with Yugoslavia and India
as examples of this "aggres-
sive intent," UAR propaganda is
calling on Afro-Asian nations
to rally behind Cairo and "stand
up against this Chinese trend."
This emphasis supports a recent
report that Nasir, while genuine-
ly irritated with Peiping's
sponsorship of Bakdash, also
feels the incident gives him
an opportunity to strengthen
his position among the neutrals.
Nasir thus is viewed by
Peiping as a threat not only to
Middle Eastern Communism but to
the bloc position among the
Afro-Asian nations--more specif-
ically to Communist China's
own standing in that group.
Peiping has broadcast Bakdash's
speech in Arabic but has not
yet replied directly to Cairo's
propaganda. This suggests a
reluctance to become embroiled
in an acrimonious exchange be-
fore an international audience
rather than any desire to pla-
cote Nasir. If the UAR attacks
continue, however, the Chinese
may feel compelled to meet
Nasir's challenge with equally
abusive counterpropaganda,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Diplomatically,the Chinese
may withdraw their own ambassa-
dor until the situation im-
proves. Peiping could also
enforce its recent demand that
the UAR eliminate its chronic
trade deficit. Peiping could
threaten to reduce its purchases
of Egyptian cotton,which amount-
ed to $35,000,000 last year.
Peiping's disenchantment
with Nasir probably began with
what it considered his lukewarm
support for Communist China's
1958 action in the Taiwan Strait,
especially in view of its own
strong political support for
Cairo during the 1956 Suez cri-
sis. Chinese suspicion that
Nasir's professed friendship
was at best unreliable probably
became conviction in late 1958
when he began his domestic anti-
Communist campaign. Along with
the USSR and other members of
the bloc, Peiping criticized
Cairo and began to side open-
ly with Iraq.
Communist China's attitude
apparently helped stimulate
Cairo's attacks on Peiping dur-
ing its suppression of the
Tibetan revolt. Chinese propa-
,ganda responded until May,
when Peiping attempted to end
the public squabble with India
and the UAR. Cairo has contin-
ued intermittent criticism of
Peiping, however, and since mid-
July the Chinese have replied
periodically. In early Septem-
ber the UAR member of the Afro-
Asian Solidarity Council's Per-
manent Secretariat reportedly
took issue with his Chinese
counterpart over the Sino-In-
dian border controversy. This
move probably was assessed by
Peiping as a deliberate UAR ef- 25X1
fort to embarrass Communist
China and undermine its pres-
tige.
TIBETAN BORDER PROBLEMS
Nepal and Pakistan,as well
as India,are showing increasing
concern over their border prob-
lems with Communist China and
are making efforts to secure
their interests in the Himh.lay-
an mountain range.
Indian Prime Minister Nehru
on 26 September replied in firm
language to Chou En-lai's let-
ter of 8 September. Rejecting
Chinese charges and standing
fast on his previously announced
position, Nehru said that "no
discussion can be fruitful un-
less the outposts now held by
Chinese forces on the Indian
side of the traditional fron-
tier are first evacuated by
them and further threats and
intimidation cease."
In a press conference on
8 October,Nehru added that his
government would not undertake
any military operations to re-
cover the outposts "at this
stage," while efforts were un-
der way on the political level.
New Delhi's insistence on Chi-
nese withdrawal would seem to
leave the situation deadlocked
unless Peiping takes the un-
likely step of evacuating its
troops from Longju outpost in
Assam, which it occupied fore--
ibly on 26 August.
Peiping will probably re-
ply in terms which would not
compromise its claims to terri-
tory in Ladakh and Assam. It is
likely, however, to reiterate
its willingness to negotiate.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
INDIA
8 A Y
O F
8 E N G A L
on "small isolated places
along the border. With both
sides still committed to pre-
vious stands, the possibility
of bilateral negotiations
being arranged in the near fu-
ture seems remote.
B. P. Koirala, prime min-
ister of Nepal, stated on 26
September that he had no illu-
sions about China's intentions
toward Nepal but that he thought
his country has a two-year
grace period before the. Commu-
nists begin exerting real pres-
sure. Koirala remarked there
had been some discussion as to
whether Nepal should take the
initiative in defining the
Nepalese-Tibetan border more
closely or whether to let well
enough alone. Recognizing,
however, that China would do
What it pleased, regardiess of
Nepalese,actions, . the Katmandu
government now. feels there is
Pakistan's concern over
Chinese expansionism, most for-
cibly publicized when President
Ayub suggested to Nehru in
early September that India join
Pakistan in defense of the
subcontinent against China, has
apparently been heightened re-
cently.. Chinese military pa~-
trols.have been reported by
Pakistani officials?since 1950
as crossing from Sinkiang
into the Gilgit Agency in north-
ernmost West Pakistan and oc--
casionally exchanging shots
with Pakistani patrols. The
Pakistanis in the past,treated
these incursions as routine '
matter. Within the last month,
however, Karachi has sent North-
er i Scouts units .to, Gilgit to
strengthen its dontrol over the
border area.
INDIAN LEADERS PLAN TO SPLIT BOMBAY STATE
The recent decision by
India's top Congress party lead-
ers to reverse the stand they
previously had taken against
partitioning Bombay State along
linguistic lines apparently was
prompted by concern that the
Congress' control of Bombay-
India's largest and most ad-
vanced state--would be serious-
ly threatened by the renewal.in
the near future of popular
SECRET
A. R.
little to lose in
forcing the issue.
ndian Border
Whether Peiping
accepts the present
boundary, refuses to
30714 recognize it, or
stalls, the Chinese.
A intentions would be
clarified. Nepalese
delegates to the 1
C:.etober celebrations
in Peiping have been
~y instructed to press
MCA 'V TAIWAN the matter. Peiping
~k KONG as yet has made no
large claim to Nepal-
ese 1 .,
ese territory, but
may not wish to com-
mit itself irrevocably to recog-
nition of the traditional fron-
tier.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
agitation on this issue. By re-
opening the explosive question
of Bombay's status, New Delhi
probably hopes to avert a cam-
paign of violence patterned aft-
er the agitation in Kerala and
to improve the party's position
for the 1962 elections.
Congress leaders are delay-
ing a formal decision to divide
the state, pending consultation
with provincial party chiefs,
but reliable reports indicate
that the reorganization will
take effect next April. Two new
states--which will probably be
called United Maharashtra and
Mahagujarat--will be formed out
of the areas of Bombay where Ma-
rathi and Gujarati, respective-
ly, are the dominant languages.
There seems to be agreement
that Bombay city, the disposi-
tion of which was the main
stumbling block in previous re-
organization plans, will go to
Maharashtra.
First press reports sever-
al weeks ago of the shift in
the Congress position apparent-
ly came as a complete surprise
to local politicians. Most Con-
gress party elements in the
state welcomed the reversal of
policy, although they expressed
some misgivings about the dif-
ficult problems posed by reor-
ganization.
Strong opposition was
voiced, however, by certain Con-
gress leaders in Vidarbha, the
central Indian Marathi-speaking
area which was integrated into
eastern Bombay in 1956. This
group has long promoted its own
separatist movement and resists
inclusion in any "United Maha-
rashtra." The majority of Con-
gress members from Vidarbha in
the national Parliament, how-
ever, has issued a statbment'.sup-
porting a single Marathi-speak-
ing state, thus increasing the
likelihood that New Delhi will
succeed in dissuading the region-
alists from pressing their de-
mands.
Non-Congress elements,
which in both parts of Bombay
are united in powerful linguis
tic-front organizations, out-
wardly endorsed the concession
I4adhy = F,cdesh
(P?`t'~ DANA United Maharr shtra
(Port. -.3. C., --
...~:~ nomoaY
Arabian Sea -:.y (Mara thi-speaking)`
to their position but indicated
some discomfort over the loss
of the Issue.. which. they. have ex-
ploited for years. The Commu-
nist party will be hardest hit,
since the gains it has made in
Bombay have resulted primarily
from manipulation of the lin-
guistic fronts.
In addition to the demands
of Vidarbha, the Congress ex-
ecutive will face many oth-
er problems in splitting the
huge state. Considerable eco-
nomic and administrative dislo-
cation will exist for some
time after the reorganization,
which is likely to retard de-
velopment programs. The new
policy, however, probably will
win back many former Congress
supporters and. ...should - bid-
able the -:,party to :recover
Some ,Of ,, !its strength in
Bombay State.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ' WEEKLY SUMMARY
SUKARNO AND THE INDONESIAN ARMY
Although President Sukarno
continues to support the Indo-
nesian Army, he has recently
demonstrated a renewed concern
to balance the army's influence
in government by making conces-
sions to leftist political for-
ces. These include his decision
to speak at the Communist par-
ty's sixth national congress on
16 September, despite the army's
attempts to minimize publicity
given the meeting. Sukarno has
also established a West Irian
Committee weighted with extreme
nationalists and leftists, which
is likely to obstruct the army's
anti-Communist efforts,
An impending reorganization
of administrative machinery gov-
erning the implementation of
prevailing martial law seems
likely to decrease the powers
of General Nasution, army chief
of staff and defense minister
In promoting these devel-
opments, Sukarno apparently is
motivated by fear that the army
may become, if it is not al-
ready, sufficiently powerful to
overshadow him or to challenge
his own position. Rumors of an
impending army coup, which have
circulated in Djakarta in re-
cent weeks, almost certainly
have played a part in making
Sukarno uneasy. The rumors ap-
pear to have arisen from gener-
al apprehension over army in-
fluence in government, but they
may also have been-promoted by
the Indonesian Communist party,
which has consistently tried to
create dissension between Sukarno
and the army.
An army coup directed at
replacing President Sukarno or
reducing his power appears un-
likely at this time, however,
unless there is extreme provo-
cation. The army itself would
be sharply divided on action a-
gainst Sukarno, and army lead-
ers in Djakarta are aware that
an unsuccessful coup might cause
Sukarno to turn almost exclusive-
ly toward the Communists for
support.
Surrounding the uneasy re-
lations between Sukarno and the
army is a growing atmosphere of
pessimism in government circles.
The return to the 1945 constitu-
tion last July has not facili
tated solutions to the nation's
problems to the extent Sukarno
and others had hoped. The con-
stitutional change has not satis-
fied the demands of Sumatran and
North Celebes dissidents, and
the financial drain imposed by
suppression of guerrilla warfare
continues.
In addition, the 43-member
cabinet is not operating smooth-
ly and appears to have produced
new administrative delays and
frustrations. A change in
regional government precipitated
by the constitution has brought
considerable criticism, and
efforts to restrict Chinese
retail trade have run into
far more resistance than the
government had anticipated.
MALI FEDERATION MOVING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE
Leaders of the Federation
of Mali, made up of the auton-
omous French Community repub-
lics of Senegal and Soudan, have
begun to implement their local
political commitment to gain ju-
ridical independence for Mali
at an early date. They intend
to keep this West African area
within the Paris-subsidized
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'CURRENT -INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Community, which they hope will
be altered so as to include a
multinational confederation.
Mali leaders have publicly
announced and formally commu-
nicated to President de Gaulle
their intention to seek inde-
pendence by invoking an article
of the French constitution per-
mitting a negotiated transfer
to individual Community members
of powers vested in the organi-
zation as a whole. At present
the Community--which in effect
means Paris--is responsible for
foreign policy, defense, econom-
ic and financial policy, justice,
and higher education.
Some younger, radical Sou-
danese elements within the fed-
eration's dominant party have
favored use of the constitu-
tion's more dramatic referendum
procedure to gain Mali's inde-
pendence. The moderate leaders
have declared, however, that
this course, which would presum-
ably lead to Mali's abrupt de-
parture f rom'.'the Community,
would be considered only if the
contemplated negotiations with
France fail. De Gaulle, with
his recent emphasis on the Com-
munity's "evolutional character,"
seems to have accepted in princi-
ple the Mali leaders' cautious
approach.
Mali assembly President Leo-
pold Senghor has told the Ameri-
can Consulate General in Dakar
that the negotiations with France
will probably begin soon after
the meeting of the Community's
Executive Council scheduled for
11 December. New bilateral a-
greements are to be concluded
with France following the proc-
lamation of Mali's independence
--probably during 1960, when the
West African states of Cameroun,
Togo, and Nigeria all are due
to.evolve to sovereign status.
Mali's leaders apparently en-
visage that these agreements will
authorize Paris to assume specif-
ic responsibilities for Mali in
such fields as defense, diplomacy,
and higher education.
Senghor indicated, however,
that Mali intends to seek inter-
national recognition--including
separate UN membership--and to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMA.'Ry
open embassies of its own in
France, the United States, Brit-
ain, neighboring African states,
and, after "a couple of years,"
the USSR. Closer relations
with Guinea are not now contem-
plated despite some internal
pressures in this direction.
Mali's evolution seems cer-
tain to prompt other Community
members to reappraise their po-
sitions vis-a-vis France. The
Malgache Republic (Madagascar),
in particular, is likely to
follow Mali's lead soon. Even
the anti-Mali grouping which
Premier Houphouet-Boigny of the
Ivory Coast formed with Volta,
Niger, and Dahomey will be sub-
ject to new strains. Opposition
forces favoring closer align-
ment with Mali already are
gathering strength at least in
Volta and Dahomey, and in Hou-
phouet's own camp there appears
to be a growing conviction that 25X1
his policy of closer rather than
looser ties with France must
soon be revised.
STATE OF SIEGE ENDS IN BOLIVIA
The lifting of the state
of siege in Bolivia on 30 Sep-
tember suggests that the split
between the moderate and left
wings of the government party,
the Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR),. has been bridged
at least temporarily, as polit-
ical leaders prepare for the
1960 presidential election cam-
paign. Closer cooperation be-
tween the two MNR factions is
likely to result in less criti-
cism by the left wing of the
administration's cooperation
with the United States. The
MNR nominations for president
and vice president--which are
tantamount to election--will be
made at the party convention,
now scheduled to open on 10 De-
cember.
A moderate-left split has
been a persistent feature of the
MNR's seven-year dominance in
Bolivia. In mid-September the
long-standing possibility that
the MNR might break into two po-
litical parties seemed near ful-
fillment. About 100 leaders,
meeting in La Paz with Minister
of Government Guevara, organized
a moderate rightist group called
the "authentic MNR" and issued
formal membership cards. Press
revelations of this activity
caused the executive secretary
of the new group to offer evi-
dence that the left wing under
labor leader Juan Lechin has
also been organized with equal
formality.
After President Siles had
talked with various aspirants
for the 1960 election, including
former President Paz, however,
the MNR's national political com-
mittee on 28 September issued a
communique dissolving "sectors"
and suspending anyone continuing
efforts to organize "fractional
ist groups." Shortly thereafter,
the government signaled the re-
laxation of political tension
by withdrawing the state of siege,
which permits tight control of
public assembly and individual
travel and which has been a fair-
ly normal feature of MNR admin-
istrations.
The compelling reason for
party unity appears to be the
presidential elections. In the
1956 and 1958 elections--the only
elections held with universal
suffrage--the MNF polled 81 per-
cent of the total vote. Thus
nomination as president or vice
president by a united MNR en-
sures electoral victory, whereas
fragmentation of the party would
make the outcome unpredictable.
In Bolivia, unlike many Latin
American countries, party organ- 25X1
ization is more important for
electoral victory than per-
sonal leadership.
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Latin America's toughest
and most durable dictator--Gen-
eralissimo Rafael Trujillo of
the Dominican. Republic--is fac-
ing more internal opposition to
his regime than at any time .
since he came to power in 1930.
The Dominican people, who had
become accustomed to the pros-
perity which Trujillo brought
them, now are showing disillu-
sionment over the economic hard-
ships caused by,heavy military
expenditures made during the
past year. Dissidents are more
active and outspokenly critical
of the regime than at any time
in the past.
Trujillo believes the mil-
itary expenditures--estimated
to have totaled $50,000,000
since January--are necessitated
by the threats of armed inter-
vention by his two bitter en-
emies, Cuban Prime Minister
Fidel Castro and Venezuelan
President Romulo Betancourt.
Cuban- or Venezuelan-based
rebel invasion attempts do not
appear imminent, however.
Trujillo probably faces
more dangerous opposition from
inside the country, where dis-
sidence is growing but is still
largely unorganized. This op-
position is centered in the
professional and middle classes,
which have been severely af-
fected by the economic deterio-
ration. Another small but
growing group of dissidents con-
sists of friends , and relatives
of persons liquidated or perse-
cuted by the regime and of wom-
en victimized by younger mem-
bers of the Trujillo entourage
closely associated with the
dictator's sons.
of diplomatic and military de-
fections abroad during the past
three months are additional in-
dicators of Trujillo's falling
prestige.
Intensive recruiting abroad
for a "foreign legion" by Tru-
jillo agents suggests that the
dictator may doubt the compe-
tence of his army, which suf-
fered heavy casualties during
the. June fighting against in-
surgents. However, many of the
mercenaries already recruited
reportedly are in jail for re-
fusing to fight.
The economic situation is
likely to worsen because of
continued military spending, the
expected decline in foreign ex-
change earnings, and the all-
time low in tourist trade. If
the economic recession continues
to cause more unemployment and
economic distress, resentment
against Trujillo will increase.
A series
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
EXPANSION OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN ANTARCTIC
Recent Soviet announce-
ments indicate not only a note-
worthy expansion of the USSR's
activities in the Antarctic but
a possible broadening of other
bloc countries' activities there
as well. The Soviet fifth ex-
pedition (1959-60) will prob-
ably establish three new tempo-
rary stations, make the USSR's
third attempt to land a party
in western Antarctica, and seek
to complete a trans-Antarctic
glaciological traverse by June
1960. Soviet announcements in-
dicate long-range Antarctic
scientific planning through
1965 by the presidium of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences.
Soviet Operations
The Ob, flagship and four-
season veteran of Soviet Antarc-
tic operations, will sail early
in November. It will be fol-
lowed by a passenger-cargo ves-
sel scheduled to land nearly
160 personnel with supplies and
equipment, including an IL-14
transport, an LI-2 transport,
and a MI-4 helicopter. The Ob,
14b 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40
R EN T INA,._.
SOVIET ANTARCTIC E A ' vFR A
ACTIVITIES FG? "` Fo
? Soviet station
150
Proposed station for 1959 60 Q A ?
Security Zone of the Inter-American Treaty
. _ Sys
-
30
~
of Reciprocal Assistance
!`
:
-
.
- --- '-?0otnTao 9HEnLAN X19.. / a
Glaciological Traverse _ o
CIRCLE
te h
SCUTN
Pro
osed ro
p
u
U URKNFY
ITl# IS , S I5. GEORGIA
t~
~. Alt
t
t
erna
e rou
e ?ELLr$CSIJCUSE
...
160
'~,f,C%~I~.
~Jl itt "~'` !1 ?, 6o O
20
0
Zevodo k IQ
+v1 tit A f o ,~ -. ~'
SOUTH
~ ~u .` l \ Vii/ ` ~ dQU I. GANISW CH
~
^ _
ff
170
\
UNCLAIMED
n
SECTOR
180
SHEtF~~ SOUTH J
DATE LINE
is
aryev 09003800001
azaryev
-- L'TES3r ZEALANI?. 4 yf.-Y- eA~,tFNYO c r'.In ~_r> o. "Pole of
? S me) f!?
170
_
d( 11 ~ Inaccessi ity' -ti
sem \ _ 4
10
AuGK$ANU Vostok
~`
1 0, 4 South Geomagnetic: Pole ~
\ f ! 1
Soveatskayo .' .
MACpuAF E So Ih < // (In ct'rel -'~.,
4
160
~?. , Magnet c Pole
K som Iska a Noe ~a _ __ 4
71
25
Ctkustralia)
Mlrnyy ;, ~..
~
4Dobrowolskitf= -AD-
TASMANIA / (Oasis) ? ~~
0 8 OCTOBER 1959
'
150
~ II ~ / lY "\T -- ', o raises oo.
30
~VSA ILA 30711
X,
140 130 120 110 100 90 60 70 60 50 40
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
after unloading at Mirnyy and
Lazaryev, will proceed to the
western Antarctic, in the area
of the Bellingshausen Sea, for
an attempted landing and geo-
logical studies. If the at-
tempt by sea should fail, a
landing could be made by the
Ob's AN-2 biplane, which has
the necessary range and cargo-
carrying capacity. The total
voyage of the Ob is expected
to last six to seven months.
The three presently func-
tioning year-round Soviet sta-
tions--Mirnyy, Vostok, and
Lazaryev--will continue opera-
tions. On 1 October, an LI-2
made the first flight from
Mirnyy to Lazaryev. One of the
projects of these stations will
be the previously announced at-
tempt at a trans-Antarctic gla-
ciological traverse to be com-
pleted in the Antarctic au-
tumn .(March-June) of 1960. The
last contingent of personnel,
equipment, and supplies for
this project left Mirnyy on
27 September for Komsomolskaya,
a Soviet summer station where
the train for the trans-Antarc-
tic trek will be organized.
The traverse will proceed from
Komsomolskaya to Vostok and, if
possible, Lazaryev, via the US-
operated South Pole Station and
the now inactive Soviet station,
"Pole of Inaccessibility."
From the Lazaryev station,
which eventually is to be ex-
panded to a complement of 25,
the USSR plans "to compile the
first geological map of the
mountains of Queen Maud Land."
Two of the three new sta-
tions to be established will
be set up as aids in the trans-
Antarctic operation, one south
of Lazaryev, and the other near
the Australian Mawson station.
In addition, the Komsomolskaya
and Pole of Inaccessibility
stations will probably function
as auxiliary stations for the
trans-Antarctic traverse'if it
is able to continue toward
Lazaryev.
The third new station may
be set up in the heretofore in-
accessible Bellingshausen area
(in the unclaimed sector), an
objective announced in 1958.
Although this area has to date
defied the most powerful Amer-
ican icebreakers, the Soviet
Union probably feels confident
that the establishment of a sta-
tion there now is feasible as
a result of extensive ice recon-
naissance undertaken in the
vicinity of the Amundsen and
Bellingshausen seas by the Ob
in April 1958 and by the 26-
vessel Slava whaling fleet in
early 1959.
Soviet success in this
project prior to a renewed
American attempt to penetrate
the sector--planned for early
1960--would undoubtedly be
widely exploited by Soviet prop-
aganda. Moreover, establish-
ment and maintenance of such a
station could ultimately chal-
lenge the primacy of American
rights in the unclaimed sector
and cause concern in Chile and
Argentina. It might also cause
some concern to all signatory
powers of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
since a Soviet station in the
unclaimed sector would be near
the outer limit of the security
zone established by that treaty.
Bloc Participation
Among the members of the
fifth Soviet expedition will be
scientists from three other bloc
countries, East Germany and
possibly Communist China plan
to participate for the first
time, Czechoslovakia for the
second., East German participa-
tion may be an attempt to seize
bloc initiative in exploiting
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
German interests built up by
prewar German Antarctic activ-
ities--the Federal Republic
excluded Antarctica from its
IGY and subsequent programs,
Chinese participation would sug-
gest a maneuver to test the sin-
cerity of the anticipated US-
initiated treaty to assure free-
dom of Antarctic research to all
countries. Eighteen Poles will
travel to Antarctica with the
Soviet expedition and 11 will
remain for the winter at the
former Soviet station, Oazis.
Long-Range Plans
Announcements of new whal-
ing ship construction indicate
that the USSR plans to supple-
ment its Slava-fleet operations
in the Antarctic by adding three
new whaling fleets. The Soviet-
skaya Ukraina, a 44,000-ton fac-
tory ship, will begin operations
this season and construction has
begun on a sister ship, the
Sovetskaya Rossiya, The Yuriy
Dolgorukiy, a 40,000-ton factory
ship, is being built in East
Germany. Thus the USSR may
within four to five years have
close to 60 whalers and support
vessels in Antarctic waters ac-
companying these factory ships.
This might lead not only to
Soviet domination of the indus-
try but also to a breakdown in
international controls over it.
In a TASS broadcast of 13
September, Treshnikov, head of
the 1956-57 Antarctic expedi-
tion, issued the first public
statement that the atomic ice-
breaker would be used in the
Antarctic as well as in the
Arctic, Although probably not
intended for use in the coming
season, the Lenin could even-
tually increase the period of
Antarctic operations and would
probably increase their capa-
bilities.
The chairman of the Soviet
Antarctic Commission announced
in July that "Soviet aircraft
will soon make nonstop flights
from Moscow to Mirnyy." Soviet
flights to Antarctica, using
an unspecified four-engine air-
craft, were planned as early as
1955, but subsequent transit
rights via the Cocos Islands
and Perth, obtained from Aus-
tralia by negotiation, were
never exercised. Whether the
Antarctic landing. facilities can
be made adequate for large air-
craft is as yet uncertain.
Soviet motives for such an
undertaking--involving more than
9,000 nautical miles of flight
or 7,600 nautical miles by the
great circle route, well beyond
the estimated commercial range
of any known transport--undoubt-
edly include a desire to increase
the flow of key scientific per-
sonnel and supplies to Antarc-
tica, although cargo space would
be limited because of the fuel
requirements of such a long non-
stop flight. In addition, Soviet
air capabilities would be demon-
strated in a spectacular fashion.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ULBRICHT REGIME PLANS TRANSFORMATION OF EAST BERLIN
In connection with the cel-
ebration of East Germany's tenth
anniversary on 7 October, the
Ulbricht regime is publicizing
ambitious plans to transform
East Berlin into a showplace of
German "socialist culture" and
a suitable "national" capital
to rival West Berlin. The pro-
gram, which forms part of East
Germany's Seven-Year Plan (1959-
65), is also designed to dem-
onstrate the regime's deter-
mination nbt'.to permit East
Berlin to become a part of any
"free city" of Berlin.
Character of East Berlin
The Soviet sector of Ber-
lin presents a sorry contrast
to prosperous West Berlin. Gov-
ernment buildings are shabby,
and the reconstruction of sev-
eral years ago along Stalinal-
lee not only is ugly but fails
to hide the bombed-out quarters
behind the new buildings. Traf-
fic, away from the main arter-
ies, is scanty; streets are
badly lighted and in need of
general modernization. East
Berliners live in cramped
apartments, of which there are
not enough even for the city's
dwindling population of 1,110,-
000. Retail facilities are
scarce, badly stocked, and in-
efficient. Foodstuffs are often
in short supply,
East Berlin nevertheless
holds a leading place in the
country's economic life. Its
per capita consumption of es-
sential foodstuffs and consum-
er goods is considerably in
excess of that of East Germany
as a whole. Industries in East
Berlin provide employment for
most of the local labor force
of more than 611,000 (as against
8,676,000 for all of 'East Germany)
and constitute a major element
in the nationalized industry of
East Germany.
New Government Center
To improve the dismal phys-
ical features of East Berlin, the
Ulbricht regime has consolidated
earlier projects for piecemeal
improvements there and, under a
"great leap forward" slogan, has
planned a sweeping transforma-
tion aimed at developing the
Soviet sector into a rival of
West Berlin.
Major emphasis is to be
given to the complete recon-
struction of the city center.
The Marx-Engels Platz, now a
graveled parade ground, will be
the focus of the rebuilt city,
with government and party head-
quarters located there or near-
by.
The central committee of
the Socialist Unity (Communist)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
FORMER MINISTRY OF FINANCE 1951
party (SED) and the SED dis-
trict organization for East
Berlin have recently moved into
the newly renovated building
formerly occupied by the Min-
istry of Finance on the Wer-
dersche Markt. There, under
heavy guard, all major party
functions will be concentrated
alongside the center of the
government.
Underlining East Germany's
pretensions to sovereignty, the
AAREATER BERLIN
STATUTE MILES
8 OCTOBER 1959
Liebenwal,C(
s "N
Marx-`
Humboldf
Univarsity Engels Plat.
PNetz U'ler aen a"den CENTER, (MITTS)
SECRET
/ JoachhnsthoI
Seven-Year Plan calls
for converting Unter
den Linden into a cen-
ter of diplomatic life,
as it was before World
War II. New build-
ings will be construct-
ed for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry for In-
ternal German Trade,
adjacent to the Par-
iser-Platz,and prac-
tically in the shadow
of the Brandenburg
Gate.
Tourist Center
Friedrichstrasse, in the
city's center, is to be devel-
oped as a major tourist center.
The East German travel agency,
a major hotel, and the East
German airlines headquarters
will be located there.
The regime's program em-
phasizes the intention of mak-
ing the Schoonefeld airport,
located just to the southeast
Embassy SED Central Committ s lding
-- -~en5nallee"
^Neander
-- Quarter
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of East Berlin, a center of
jet service for both East and
West Berlin. Plans include
construction of an 11, 800-foot
runway to accommodate Soviet
TU-114s. Construction of the
runway was inaugurated on 7
March by Communist youth bri-
gades, Construction of the
airport's new rapid transit
(S-Bahn) connection with East
Berlin--scheduled to be com-
pleted between 1962 and 1964--
has not begun.
New "Socialist" Developments
With a view to enlisting
popular support, the regime is
emphasizing its plans to build
extensive housing developments
and construct adequate cultural
and shopping facilities for
East Berliners. Some 77,000
new apartments are promised for
the city, to be completed by
1965, at a cost of approximate-
ly $400,000,000 with a further
$180,000,000 earmarked for re-
construction and beautifica-
tion.
One major redevelopment
scheme centers around Alexan-
derplatz and Strausberger.platz.
This is to include a top-flight
movie house, a new concert hall,
a "workers" theater, and a so-
called All-German Social
"Damn it/ I should have taken a second
look when I picked this apartment....
I worked on this one myself."
Political Center for Popular
Education. In the area will
be a fashion center--obviously
an attempt to compete with West
Berlin's status as a major Ger-
man center of haute couture. Con-
currently, the Leipziger.Strasse
area will become the center of
the printing and publishing in-
dustry.
Plans for rebuilding the
city include reconstruction of
distr. icts near the center--Prenz-
lauer Berg and Friedrichshain--
"Look....one key is for you, the others
are for the repairmen who will probably
have to spend some time in your apart-
ment next year."
SECRET
and,southeast of the
center, the Neander
Quarter is to be pro-
vided with apartments
for 5,000 persons.
Lichtenberg, Weissen-
see, and Pankow are
also slated for even-
tual overhauling,
while Treptow and
Koepenick will re-
ceive more immediate
attention. The plan
emphasizes the devel-
opment of recreational
facilities in East
Berlin and in the
northeastern suburbs
of Bernau, Oranienburg,
Liebenwalde, Joachims-
thai,and Eberswalde.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
The regime has warned East
Berliners that progress in re-
construction will depend on
major progress in the construc-
tion industry, which, however,
is already in the throes of
various difficulties. Suggest-
ing that many more pitfalls lie
ahead, the East German satiri-
cal magazine Eulenspiegel re-
cently lampooned East Berlin's
chief architect for ferry-build-
ing.
Keyed to the October cel-
ebration, the regime has sched-
uled a number of special "vol-
untary" workdays to clear away
rubble and beautify the city.
In Treptow, for example, SED
central committee employees
and local government officials
took up picks and shovels on
12 August to remove debris.
Retail Trade
Regime media are using all
the Communist publicity devices
to convince East Berliners that
their life will be better in
coming years. This campaign is
pointed up by SED boss Ulbricht's
remarks on 13 August that a
number of failures in East Ber-
lin city management had been
discussed by the SED politburo.
Subsequently, a special Neues
Deutschland "brigade" published
a series of articles pointing
out inadequacies in hardware
stores, clothing shops, and gro-
ceries and featured, as a for-
ward step, a self-service gro-
cery.
Such criticism covers a
sharp increase in the tempo of
socialization of private retail
trade. An East Berlin news-
paper reported on 11 September
that there had been a 300-per-
cent increase. in the number of
socialist-type partnership agree-
ments between the government and
private enterprises signed in
the first eight months of 1959
in comparison with 1958.
Cultural Plans
The regime is making every
effort to build up Humboldt
University as a rival to the
Free University of West Berlin
and other West German universi-
ties.. Under the plan, some
$13,000,000 will be earmarked
for reconstruction of its build-
ings and construction of new
institutes and research facil-
ities.
Probably in part to counter
Western charges that the East
German medical profession has
been crippled by the flight of
hundreds of medical men to the
West, the regime is promising
improved medical facilities for
Humboldt University and various
hospitals, including the large
Charitg hospital.
Industrial Center
The investment of over
$500,000,000 for expansion of
East Berlin's industrial capac-
ity constitutes an important
part of the seven-year plan to
make the city a real competitor
with West Berlin. Special em-
phasis is placed on increases
in key industries, as follows:
electro-technical (143 percent),
machine building (125 percent),
and chemical production (77 per-
cent). Certain plants are to
be regrouped and reorganized,
including the Bergmann Bersig
plant, the largest producer of
power-generating equipment in
East Germany. Some of this
construction includes projects
for important industrial hous-
ing--for example, a whole new
area in Friedrichsfelde-Mar-
zahn.
While emphasizing expan-
sion of such key industries,
the regime is also underlining
improvements in consumer goods
producing plants, including a
new furniture factory and ex-
panded and improved garment
factories.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
Discussion by high regime
officials clearly reveals that
these plans are designed to
overcome serious inddequacies
in the city's over-all indus-
trial production performance,
East Berlin party boss Paul
Verner stated in mid-August
that there had been serious
lags in meeting the plan in
the first three months of the
year and that the lags had not
been made good during the next
four months. At the first re-
gional conference for East Ber-
lin, held in late August, Lord
Mayor Friedrich Ebert disclosed
that the city is twelfth in
plan fulfillment among the 15
East German districts, while
the official report for the
first six months of 1959
shows that it registered the
second lowest increase of all
districts.
Improved Transportation
The seven-year plan for
East Berlin calls for three
new bridges over the Spree Riv-
er, street widening, construc-
tion of a new Wilhelm-Pieck-
Ring in the city center, and
fluorescent lighting of some
avenues. Similarly, the whole
public transportation system
is to be gradually improved.
Prospects
The regime will make every
effort to carry out the main
lines of its ambitious program
for East Berlin, although it
probably will fail in many de-
tails. There is no reason to
think that--in the absence of
far-reaching adversities--East
Berlin will not become a more
modern and more attractive city
during the next seven years.
Like all phases of the Sev-
en-Year Plan, however, the plan
for East Berlin depends on
whether the East German economy
succeeds in taking the "giant
leap forward" that the leader-
ship demands. In the event that
financial stringencies and un-
inspired Communist building
methods continue to circumscribe
the rebuilding effort, the new
city is likely to be character-
ized by the same ugly,monotonous,
shoddy construction that marked
the Stalinallee housing develop-
ment. This would be a far cry 25X1
from the well-built,imaginative,
and attractive development in
West Berlin>
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Nor
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Since 6 March 1957, when
Ghana became the first tropical
African state to evolve from
colonial to independent status,
Prime Minister Nkrumah's regime
has made considerable progress
in consolidating its power at
home and in extending its in-
fluence abroad. Domestic oppo-
sition has been largely stifled,
a neutralist course not un-
friendly to the West has been
charted, the economy has been
kept on an even keel, and Accra
has become a focal point of mil-
itant pan-Africanism. Concepts
of Western-style democracy have
suffered, however, and basic
weaknesses are already impeding
the progress of this "model"
African state.
When Britain's former Gold
Coast colony emerged as the
sovereign, Commonwealth state
of Ghana, the specter of civil
war still hung over this West
African land of approximately
5,000,000 largely illiterate
persons. Although Kwame Nkru-
mah's Convention People's party
(CPP)--the Gold Coast's first
genuine mass movement--had al-
ready been in office for six
years, tribal leaders and con-
servative cocoa farmers, espe-
cially in the Ashanti region,
were by no means reconciled to
the modern, unitary, nation-
state which the American-edu"
cated Nkrumah was determined to
create.
Sporadic violence involv-
ing armed adherents of the CPP
and its traditional opponents--
who sought a federal system with
wide regional autonomy--had
flared in 1954 and 1955. On the.
eve of independence in 1957, the
CPP government finally accepted
Britain's compromise constitu-
tion providing for the future
establishment of regional as-
semblies and incorporating "en-
trenched clauses" designed to
safeguard the vital interests of
Nkrumah's foes. However, his
regime, which had been returned
to power in July 1956 with 72 of
104 seats in the legislature,
made no secret of its determina-
tion to alter at the earliest
opportunity the clauses to
which it objected.
Since gaining full control
of Ghana's affairs, Nkrumah and
his cohorts have succeeded in
radically transforming the un-
certain domestic political sit-
uation which prevailed 30 months
ago. Formerly powerful tribal
chiefs, the principal bulwarks
of his opposition and the old
social order, have been politi-
cally neutralized and brought
under control. Tribal institu-
tions which conflict with the
CPP's program to modernize and
centralize Ghana are under heavy
attack and appear to be weaken-
ing.
The overt, organized polit-
ical opposition--which in 1957
combined in the United party
(UP)--seems headed for early
extinction; its parliamentary
strength has already dwindled,
as a result of defections and
lost by-elections, from 32 in
March 1957 to 18. The "en-
trenched clauses" have 'long
since been swept away, as have
practically all constitutional
restraints on the executive au-
thority, which can now amend
the constitution by a simple
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
majority vote in the
legislature. Farmers
and especially or-
ganized labor have
been brought under
increasingly firm
control.
Meanwhile, the
CPP has increased its
legislative strength
to 83 seats and ex-
tended its influence
--once limited large-
ly to southern Ghana
--throughout the coun-
try. To most Ghana-
ians the party ap-
pears to have become
virtually synonymous
with the government
itself.
These develop-
ments have been aided
by favorable economic
conditions, the steady
erosion of the tradi-
tional social struc-
ture, the opposition's
inability to develop
IVORY
COAST
VOLTA
G HAf1A
\Voita (_
PROPOSED DAM~ ? ?
Regional boundary
Road
Railroad
0 .-a
effective leaders or frame a
program capable of attracting
mass support, and the CPP's own
popularity, superior resources,
and more effective organization.
In addition, the regime has not
hesitated to capitalize on its
ability to allocate development
funds nor to harass, intimidate,
and coerce its opponents, espe-
cially through the use of powers
of deportation and preventive
detention.
The latter measure, enacted
in mid-1958, enables the govern-
ment to detain without trial for
up to five years any citizen
suspected of acts prejudicial
to the defense or security of
Ghana. Within the past year
some 40 UP adherents, including
two members of the National As-
sembly, have been imprisoned un-
der this law. The regime has
recently enacted still further
repressive legislation for deal-
ing with its opponents in the
name of state security.
Such measures, coupled with
the government's increasing
tendency to equate all opposi-
tion with disloyalty, if not
treason, endanger the future of
Western democratic concepts in
Ghana. Nevertheless, Nkrumah
has not actually acted uncon-
stitutionally and still pro-
fesses his determination to
maintain free elections. Even
the regional assemblies were
eventually created--and subse-
quently abolished--in accord
with the letter if not the spirit
of the constitution.
Furthermore, evidence is
strong that opposition elements
have in fact been involved in
conspiratorial activity with rev-
olutionary overtones. Also,
some such coercive measures were
probably necessary to hold in
check the powerful centrifugal
forces inherent in Ghana's still
largely tribal society.
Economic Developments
Thanks largely to the gen-
eral buoyancy of the world cocoa
market, to which it is the larg-
est single contributor, Ghana
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
has managed to maintain intact
the stable, Western-oriented
economy inherited from Britain.
Under Nkrumah it continues to
enjoy a balanced budget, a sound
currency, one of the highest per.-
capita incomes in tropical Af-
rica, and--for an underdeveloped
country--a remarkably even dis-
tribution of wealth. Further-
more, its foreign debt is still
insignificant and its sterling
reserves, while somewhat reduced
since independence, amount to ap-
proximately $300,000,000.
So far, however, Nkrumah
has made little real progress
toward lessening the economy's
dependence on cocoa or toward
speeding its slow rate of ex-
pansion in recent years. Per-
capita output, stalled since
1951, apparently dropped in
1958. Over this period public
investment totaled about $350,-
000,000, but was not adequately
supplemented by private invest-
ment of a productive nature.
In this connection, inherent
economic limitations on profit
opportunities in Ghana have in-
hibited the concerted effort
made by the theoretically so-
cialist Nkrumah government to
attract foreign private capital.
Domestic private capital avail-
able for investment remains a
negligible factor.
This reticence of. potential
foreign investors has so far
blocked the proposed $600,000,-
000 Volta River power-aluminum
project to which the regime is
politically committed. Nkrumah
is still hoping':that Western
aluminum interests will make the
scheme eligible for World Bank
support by undertaking to fi-
nance a smelter; if such Western
financing is not forthcoming,
he is likely to look elsewhere.
Kaiser Industries now is explor-
ing prospects of forming a con-
sortium.
Meanwhile, the government
has ,,barked on an ambitious
3eco, Development Plan which
calls for public investment of
$390,000,000 on general develop-
ment and $280,000,000 on hydro-
electric power development over
the five-year period which began
1 July. Like the Volta project,
its full implementation would
require heavy foreign borrowing,
Foreign Affairs
Nkrumah has gained wide
publicity and considerable pres-
tige for himself and Ghana
through his militant activities
on behalf of the "total libera-
tion" of Africa and the pan-Af-
ricanists' ultimate goal of a
United States of Africa. In
quick succession last year he
promoted the first Independent
African States conference, the
proclamation of a "union"--
still largely unimplemented--
with the new state of Guinea,
and the organization of a non-
governmental African "people's"
movement with headquarters in
Accra.
He thus boldly challenged
Cairo's pretensions to African
leadership. However, neither
this rivalry nor Ghana's consid-
erable contacts with Israel has
precluded the development of
friendly personal relations, and,
recently, a tactical working al-
liance between Nkrumah and UAR
President Nasir.
More conservatively inclined
elements--such as President Tub-
man of Liberia and moderate Af-
rican leaders in nearby French
areas and in soon-to-be-inde-
pendent Nigeria--have resented,
and endeavored with increasing
success to frustrate, Nkrumah's
attempts to assert a leadership
role in African affairs.
Among these elements there
was widespread satisfaction when
the Ghanaian premier suffered a
major setback at the West African
"summit" conference attended by
Tubman, Nkrumah, and Guinea's
3ekou Tour6 in Liberia last July.
Nkrumah's program for an immedi-
ate, relatively close union among
existing African states, to which
others would be invited to ad-
here as they became independent,
was rejected in favor of the
more cautious approach toward a
looser association advocated by
Tubman.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 October 1959
On the world stage, Nkru-
mah's proclaimed policy of "po-
sitive neutralism and nonalign
ment" has in practice been gen-
erally sympathetic toward the
West--especially the United
States--and wary of entangle-
ments with the bloc. Largely
as a result of bloc initiatives,
however, Ghana's contacts with
Communist countries have been
increasing since late 1958. East
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslo-
vakia now have permanent trade
delegations in Accra, and in Au-
gust the Soviet Union established
the first bloc diplomatic post
there.
Although Nkrumah has ap-
parently not as yet been offered
any significant long-term eco-
nomic aid by the bloc, Ghana's
development plans will provide
continuing opportunities for
economic penetration--especially
if Western financing does not
materialize in the amounts antic-
ipated. Meanwhile, the growing
numbers of bloc personnel in
Accra will probably attempt to
cultivate indigenous leftists
and pro-Communists, some of whom
occupy high places in the govern-
ment, the CPP, and the labor
movement.
Despite, and to some ex-
tent even because of, its suc-
cesses, the Nkrumah regime suf-
fers from serious weaknesses
and deficiencies which it ap-
pears unable or unwilling to
remedy. Both in the formation
and execution of policy it tends
to be indecisive, impulsive,
arbitrary, and capricious. There
is an increasing tendency to
rely on words rather than ac-
tions and for prestige consid-
erations to become decisive--
as in the decision earlier this
year to create a navy and air
force and add an armored unit
to Ghana's 5,000-man army. Pub-
lic morality is undermined by
the almost certain involvement
of top-echelon officials In
large-scale corruption.
Administrative efficiency
suffers from Nkrumah's growing
preference for personal rule,
from the politicians' distrust
of civil servants, and from
overemphasis on political con-
siderations. Moreover, there
are potentially serious rivalries
and frictions within the over-
centralized CPP, as well as ac-
cumulating evidence that its
basic vitality may be ebbing.
These and other deficien-
cies, aggravated by the removal
of all restraints on the execu-
tive authority and the contin-
ued nonexistence of an informed
and energetic public opinion,
are already a handicap to the
country's progress. In time
they seem certain to result,
assuming the CPP maintains its
unity and monopoly of power,
in a slower rate of social
and economic development and
in decreased prestige and
influence abroad. They could
contribute eventually to the
creation of a powerful new op-
position and to a power strug- 25X1
gle which could undermine Ghana's
present internal stability
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Ghana's African policy has
inevitably impaired, in varying
degrees, its relationships with
the colonial powers, including
Britain. Nevertheless, Nkru-
mah, who was recently appointed
a privy councilor, is expected
to keep Ghana within the Com-
monwealth when he transforms it
from a constitutional monarchy
to a republic, probably in the
near future. Relations with
France have deteriorated espe-
cially sharply in recent months,
as Accra has intensified its
propaganda attacks against the
new French Community and the
French-supported regime in Cam-
eroun, taken a leading role in
the widespread African condemna-
tion of Paris' plans to test
nuclear weapons in the Sahara,
and recognized the Algerian
rebel government.
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~FIDENTt
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