CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001200100001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 23, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
~Ea~Rfi
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
g UMEN1 NO, _.:.----
NO CHANGE IN CL ASS, f~
C3 L1ECLASSIFtED
Ga.As's? GHANGEO TO:
AtiTTt W 7a'
23 May 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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COPY NO. 17
OCI NO.2689/57
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE FRENCH CABINET CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The urgency of the financial question over which Premier
Mollet fell on 21 May places the French assembly under con-
siderable pressure to approve a new cabinet quickly. Never-
theless, the complete absence of any clear alternative to
Mollet's 16-month-old minority government ma result in a
prolonged cabinet crisis.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
INDONESIA .
Page 1
Tension remains high in the non-Javanese provinces
of Indonesia, while central government officials in
Djakarta are sharpI nd my divided on how to end
provincial di ection. Prime Minister Djuanda has ad-
vocated a more conciliatory policy than Sukarno's and, as
a result, has been publicly opposed by his own deputy prime
minister and in one instance overruled by the army chief
of staff.
THE SUEZ ISSUE . . s . Page 2
The UN Security Council debate on Suez ended on 21 May
without any action, but the council remains seized of the
question. Israel may soon test canal passage, and could do
so with little or no advance notice.
THE SYRIAN SITUATION . . . . . 0 . . , a . . . , , . . Page 03
Two weeks after the rightist defeat in the parlia-
mentary by-elections, political events in Syria show
further encroachment by leftists in the government and
army. The country remains in a state of limited martial
law, and open criticism of the government may soon be
silenced. Foreign and domestic policy follow extreme
leftist lines, and attacks on the United'States are in-
creasing in frequency and bitterness.
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ADENAUER'S WASHINGTON VISIT . . . . . .., . . . . . . . . Page 4
Chancellor Adenauer is scheduled to begin his Washing-
ton talks on 27 May at a time when West Germany is in the
midst of a lively debate over disarmament and European
security arrangements. The approaching Bundestag elec-
tions will make Adenauer unusually eager to demonstrate
an identity of views with American leaders, since the
opposition Social Democratic Party would exploit any
SOVIET THREATS AGAINST ATOMIC ARMS FOR. WEST GERMANY . . . Page a
The USSR's diplomatic warnings to Bonn that grave
consequences are inherent in arming West German forces
with nuclear weapons apparently are being supplemented
by, planted reports that Moscow will not tolerate such a
move and is prepared to take military action to prevent
it. These warnings, taking advantage of the nuclear
arms controversy in West Germany, have been accompanied
by hints that the USSR would make concessions on reuni-
fication if Bonn would withdraw from NATO. The Soviet
Union made similar threats of military action in late
1954,, when it was trying to block ratification of the
Paris agreements bringing West Germany into NATO.
GOMULKA GAINS SUPPORT AT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING . . . . Page 6
The Polish Communist central committee closed its
ninth session on 18 May with a resolution reaffirming
Gomulka's "October" program and the principles of Polish
independence within the Soviet bloc enunciated in Gomulka's
15 May keynote speech. Although deep factional cleavages
within the party have not been healed, Gomulka's firm
policy statement, after six months of uncertainties and
lack of control at the lower party levels, will probably
win substantial support from the broad mass of hitherto
uncommitted party functionaries.
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SOVIET-MONGOLIAN ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The Soviet-Mongolian communique issued in Moscow on
14 May itemizing new Soviet aid to Outer Mongolia marks
another step in Moscow's policy of maintaining a major voice
in Mongolian affairs while avoiding the appearance of direct
control typical of the Stalin era. Moscow has agreed to
turn over control of the petroleum industry and mineral ex-
ploitation and to provide financial assistance for Mongolia's
three-year plan, which begins next year. Peiping apparently
is not contesting the continued dependence of Outer Mengolia
on Soviet economic assistance and has hailed the agreements
as indicating the existence of a "new equality and mutual
"
assistance
between a large and small country.
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23 May 1957
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NORTH VIETNAM'S LAND REFORM POLICY MISCARRIES . . . . . . Page 9
The North Vietnam government's vacillating land re-
form policy is creating dissatisfaction and confusion
among the peasantry. The regime is welshing on its
promises to restore to small independent peasants land
taken away from them during.the land reform campaign of
1954-56. Some members of the party district and village
committees have resigned in protest over this zigzag
policy. Catholics, a large minority in North Vietnam, are
among the most vocal critics.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . -a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Premier Souvanna Phouma probably will remain in office
and will be given a fresh opportunity to settle the Pathet
Lao problem. Souvanna is planning to make the Pathets a
"take-it-or-leave-it" offer of a coalition government in
return for promises of submission to the royal govern-
ment's authority. The Pathets are unlikely to give these
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guarantees, but will probably seek to prolong ne
in order-to further their subversive activities. 25X1
THE SITUATION IN HAITI . . , . . Page 10
A military government seized power in Haiti on 21 May
but may have difficulty maintaining control, particularly
if there is a general strike. Despite an early announce-
ment that the army unanimously supports the chief of staff,
who engineered the bloodless coup, a serious rift may exist
ARGENTINA CONCERNED OVER PERON'S ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . Page 11
Argentina's provisional government believes that Peron,
now in Venezuela, is a threat to its stability as long as
he remains in the hemisphere, but efforts to have him ousted
have failed. Peronista exiles, especially in the five coun-
tries neighboring Argentina, are engaged in propaganda
beamed at Ar entina
eanw e, a new upsurge in army dissen-
sion
as resu a in the arrest of the arm commander in
chief and 20 officers.
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BURMESE GOVERNMENT MAY NEGOTIATE WITH INSURGENT
COMMUNISTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Despite continued official insistence on uncon-
ditional surrender of the insurgent Burma Communist Party,
the Burmese government is reported divided on the question
of a settlement. It seems only a question of time before
some kind of negotations are begun. The campaign of the
insurgent Communists to achieve legal status is being
supported by other Communist groups and pro-Communist mem-
bers of the Burmese parliament.
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FOOD SHORTAGE POSES THREAT TO EAST PAK[STAN GOVERNMENT . . Page 14
Rapidly rising food prices in East Pakistan in recent
weeks have endangered the provincial government, which is
led by the eastern branch of Prime Minister Subrawardy's
Awami League. A similar food crisis in 1956 was an impor-
tant factor in the downfall of the previous East Pakistan
government, and a repetition could threaten Suhrawardy's
central government coalition. The central government is
unlikely to secure the rice it needs from Southeast Asia,
and may make an urgent request for additional American
assistance. F-- I
CYPRUS 00006 . . . 000*** Page 14
Greece continues to seek American intervention to break
the deadlock over Cyprus and hopes continued quiet on the
island will induce the British to reopen negotiations with
Archbishop Makarios. Britain hopes discussions on the inter-
national status of Cyprus will be initiated within the NATO
framework before it begins negotiations with the Cypriots on
self-government. NATO's Secretary General Spaak has already
begun informal consultations with the permanent represent-
atives of Britain, Greece, and Turkey.
NEW ITALIAN CABINET . . . . . . . . . . . .
. Page 15
The Christian Democratic minority government of Adone
Zoli may depend on the "benevolent abstention" of some of
the small parties when it seeks parliamentary confirmation
on 29 May, but its chances are at present rated fairly good.
Zoli reportedly is working out a program that might give
his government more than "caretaker" status.
JAPANESE CONSERVATIVES PLAN CRACKDOWN ON LEFTIST LABOR
UNION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, under the guidance
of Prime Minister Kishi's cabinet, is planning a new labor pro-
gram which would curb the political power of the leftist Japan
General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo), but would also "include
"
progressive" features designed to have wide popular appeal.
h
T
e government has strong popular support,for its program.
SGT
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23 May 1957
SOUTH KOREAN ARMED FORCES COMMAND CHANGES . . . . . . . . Page 17
The sweeping command changes in the South Korean
armed forces recently announced by President Rhee were
probably initiated to reduce factionalism, to improve
morale and efficiency, and to assure delivery.of the mili-
taryvote to the Liberal Party in the 1958 assembly elec-
tions. The changes are not likely to affect the combat
capability of the armed forces and do not foreshadow
preparations for a "march north."
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE USSR . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Soviet leaders, moving away from the arbitrariness
of the Stalin era, are attempting, by encouraging public
discussion, to enlist popular support for the solution of
complex and pressing domestic problems. Since 1953, when
a public examination of "contradictions" in Soviet society
was officially sanctioned, these discussions have been
marked by increasing boldness and candlor, culminating this
year in a frank airing of domestic problems and short-
comings in the Soviet Communist Party press. In order to
keep these discussions under control, the regime finds it
necessary continually o redefine the limits of criticism.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
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DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN SPAIN
. . . . Page 3
The severe inflation in Spain is causing increasing
dissatisfaction with Franco's regime even among the groups
that have supported him in the past. The Falange has been
weakened by disaffection within its ranks, and elements of
the church are moving to dissociate themselves from the
regime. In view of his skill in playing one group against
another and his ability to suppress overt opposition, Franco
probably is in no immediate danger. However, his position
is less secure than in the past.
MAO TSE-TUNG'S UNPUBLISHED SPEECHES
Mao Tse-tung, in two speeches on :27 February and 12
March, which have not yet been published, stated in Marxist
terms that differences or "contradictions" existed in China
between the populace and the Communist leaders which might
lead to strife if left to be handled by bureaucratic means.
He emphasized that these differences were reconcilable and
advocated persuasion rather. than force to resolve them.
Moscow will find Mao's doctrines generally acceptable, al-
though Soviet leaders have some reservations about their
application. Polish leader Gomulka has endorsed the doc-
trines but has made clear'that he i d mit their appli-
cation in Poland.
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEE]KLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
THE FRENCH CABINET CRISIS
The urgency of the finan-
cial question over which Premier
Mollet fell on 21 May places
the French assembly under con-
siderable pressure to approve
a new cabinet quickly. Never-
theless the complete absence
of any clear alternative.to
Mollet's 16-month-old minority
government may result in a pro-
longed cabinet crisis.
President Coty's consulta-
tions with party leaders for a
successor are complicated by
the fragmented nature of the
National Assembly, which gives
Mollet's 100 Socialist deputies
virtually a veto power on any
new coalition. There are re-
ports that the Socialists hope
for a long crisis which might
facilitate Mollet's eventual
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FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
PARTY STRENGTH IN LEGISLATURE
PROGRESSIVES
(1 VACANCY)
return with a broadened coali-
tion. The Independent-Peasant
bloc heartened by its success
in recent by-elections and its
improved tactical position in
the assembly--has added to the
pressure by calling for a non-
Communist National Union govern-
ment and by claiming that it
could block the formation of a
new government.
France's worsening finan-
cial situation and the continu-
ing Algerian problem, however,
create counterpressures for a
speedy solution to the cabinet
crisis. The country's liquid
assets are almost exhausted,
and early assembly approval is
needed to release Bank of France
gold and dollar reserves. New
taxes and budgetary economies
SOCIAL
REPUBLICANS
74 INDEPENDENTS
POPULAR 87 PEASANTS POUJADISTS
REPUBLICANS
INDEPENDENTS
AND SOCIAL 39 UNAFFILIATED
ACTION
PEASANTS
52
36
$
ENT
~ONFF~L
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45 13;13
RADICAL
SOCIALISTs
t
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N 0
O IIUIZ
X I-10
IN IH
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I I
OVERSEAS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
are essential, but the assembly
will prefer goals limited to
getting "France?s house in or-
der"' before external aid is re-
quested.
These pressures could lead
the assembly to decide on an
interim premier. Outgoing Min-
ister of Justice Francois Mit-
terrand and ex-premier Rend
Pleven, both of the small Re-
sistance Union Party, are now
spoken of as possible.eariy
compromise choices. Their
parity has worked with both the
Independents and the Socialists,
and on the Algerian issue both
have adopted a position which
could be expected to have broad
support.
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_ Y 0*M?iR Yf T i AL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
NOTES AND COMMENTS'
Tension remains high in
the non-Javanese provinces of
Indonesia, while central gov-
ernment officials in Djakarta
are sharply and openly divided
on how to end provincial dis-
affection.
In his first appearance
before parliament since he as-
sumed office in April, Prime
Minister Djuanda stated on 17
May that relations with the
provinces must be readjusted,
and that he intends to meet
provincial demands as far as
is possible. Having just
visited East Indonesia, Djuanda
advised against the removal of
the area commander, Lt. Col.
Samual, as unlikely to improve
the situation,
j INDOCHINA
SOUT
SUMATSiA
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Disaffected provinces
Provinces under central government
L 24474
Djuanda's deputy prime
minister, Hardi of the National
Party, declared the same day,
however, that he did not favor
compromise with the provinces.
On 18 May, the army announced
the relief of Samual, on orders
of Chief of Staff Iasution.
Although President Sukarno did
not become publicly involved in
either issue, he undoubtedly
approved the actions of both
Hardi and Nasution.
Samual is unlikely to obey
the order relieving him and re-
portedly has stated that he would
arrest Nasution if he should
come to East Indonesia. More-
over, the Nasution-Djuanda dis-
pute over Samual will be inter-
preted in the provinces as proof
CONFIDENTIAL
tom'
HAI.MAHFRA
1 t
EAST INDONESIA
Western
New Guinea
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
that conciliatory forces in
Djakarta are in the minority,
and that Djuanda will be over-
ruled whenever his policies
conflict with -Sukarno's..
In Central Sumatra, a
series of public gatherings
held to honor several distin-
guished visitors--including
former vice president Hatta,
Masjumi chairman Natsir, and
police chief Sukanto--have
highlighted regional determina-
tion to maintain an autonomous
position. The greatest enthu-
siasm was noted at a rally
honoring Hatta. Hatta strongly
supported provincial demands
and warned Djakarta that pre-
vailing political strife could
lead to anarchy. He tempered
his support, however, by
stating that regional activity
was not "separatist" in nature
but was a movement aimed at "the
development of the whole Indo-
The UN Security Council
debate on Suez ended on 21 May
without any action, but the
council remains seized of the
question. Israel may soon test
canal passage, and could do so
with little or no advance.notice.
French foreign minister
Pineau expressed gratification
at the course of the two-day
debate on Egypt's canal declara-
tion, called at France's re-
quest. Without introducing any
resolution that might have
strained other members' sup-
port of France, Pineau gained
general reaffirmation of the
French view that Egypt's declara-
tion is inadequate.
The parliamentary defeat
of the Mollet government, whose
leaders felt committed to main-
tain France's intransigent
policy toward.. Egypt, may open
the way to early French resump-
PART II
nesiLan archipelago." Hatta's
support probably will be used
by Sumatran leaders in an ef-
fort to promote a return to
"federalism. "
Meanwhile, the central
government's increasing economic
difficulties have stimulated
rumors of rupiah devaluation.
Inflation has been a chronic
problem in Indonesia, but has
become noticeably worse in re-
cent: months, with money in cir-
culation having reached the
highest recorded level since
independence. Contributing to
the government's economic woes
are decreased revenue resulting
from the establishment of di-
rect, trade between outlying
provinces and foreign ports and
a greatly increased budgetary
deficit caused by the recent al-
location-of funds for economic
develo ment in the provinces.
tion of use of the canal. Any
candidate for premier who an-
nounced himself favorable to
such a policy would attract sup-
port, particularly from the
right. Even before Mollet's
fall, French shipping companies
reportedly were planning on the
assumption that the boycott
would be rescinded after the
Security Council debate.
Mollet's defeat appears
also to have reduced prospects
for all-out French support of
any Israeli effort to send a
ship through the canal.
Britain is following up
its agreement with Egypt on
payment for use of the canal
with wider economic talks be-
ginning 23 May--a development
which is being exploited by a
press-and-wbispering campaign
begun in normally anti-Western
quarters in Beirut to suggest
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
that a general British-Egyptian
rapprochement is taking place
at the expense of the United
States and France. British
officials in the past week have
indicated no hurry to re-
establish diplomatic relations
with Cairo, and say that London
hopes to negotiate a long-term
settlement with "an Egyptian
government," but not now.
The Israelis are continu-
ing their psychological war-
fare campaign on the Suez is-
sue. Although Israeli ambassa-
dor Eban last week stated offi-
cially that Israel had no
present plans for making a test
of its right to use the canal,
the Israeli embassy in Paris
is briefing selected corre
,spondents to tiie effect that a
ship is now being readied for
such a test. Israel is trying
by these means to keep this
question of its rights alive,
and possibly also to provoke
Egypt into making a bellicose
gesture or statement which
would give the Israelis a dip-
lomatic advantage.
Israel appears to be pur-
suing somewhat similar tactics
with regard to a test of the
Tiran Strait. and the Gulf of
Aqaba. Press reports, origi-
nating with Israeli sources,
have alleged that the Israeli-
flag vessel Atlit, which is
en route to Eilat around Africa,
left Djibouti in French Somali-
land on 20 May. Lloyd's, how-
ever, has reported that the ves-
sel only left Durban, South
Africa, on 18 May, and it is
now estimated that the Atlit
will not arrive at Eilat until
between 7 and 17 June.
The Egyptians have made
no clear public statement as
to what their response to
Israeli test attempts would be.
Egypt
apparently is still relying on
the Saudis to meet the Israeli
challenge on the Aqaba issue,
since no statements on this
have appeared. If the Saudis
allow an Israeli ship to pass
the Tiran Strait, Nasr might
seek to use this fact to
damage Saud's standing in
Aralb eyes.
Two weeks after the right-
ist defeat in the parliamentary
by-elections, political.. events
in Syria show further encroach-
ment by leftists in the govern-
ment and army, the American
embassy in Damascus reports.
The country remains under a
state of limited martial law,
and open criticism of the gov-
ernment may soon be silenced.
Pro-Western and moderate ele-
ments are continually losing
ground to the leftist Baath
and Communist forces. Foreign
and domestic policy follow ex-
treme leftist lines.,and attacks
on the United States are increas-
ing in frequency and bitterness.
The Soviet Union is constantly
being promoted as the protector
in military, economic, and polit-
ical affairs.
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Transfers and proposed trans-
fers of army officers, some of 25X1
there for training in Moscow, have
increased tension within political
and army circles.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
The disorganized but vocal
opposition continues its strong
criticism of government policy,
to':little avail. The conserva-
tives have .fallen back on their
old tendency to blame their
election defeat'on external
circumstances rather than their
own lack of unity and organiza-
tion. The Nationalist Party is
split into-rightist and leftist
factions and has suffered the
loss of several leaders who have
resigned from the party in dis-
gust. The acceptance of an
invitation by Sheik Mustafa
Sibai, Moslem Brotherhood lead-
er and defeated rightist candi-
date, to visit Moscow is an in-
dication of Soviet influence.
Visits by conservative leaders
to Cairo show the extent of
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Egyptian prestige.
ADENAUER'S WASHINGTON VISIT
Chancellor Adenauer is
scheduled to begin his Washing-
ton talks on 27 May at a time
when West Germany is in the
midst of a lively debate over
disarmament and European secu- --
rtty arrangements and when many
Germans believe American policy
toward Europe is undergoing a
change. The approaching Bun-
destag elections will make Ade-
nauer unusually eager to demon-
strato an identity of views
with American leaders, since
the opposition Social Democratic
Party (SPD) would exploit any
appearance of differences.
The West Germans have been
agitated by press reports that
Washington plans a demilitarized
zone "from France to Estonia"
without German unification.
These reports moved the SPD to
charge that Adenauer's policies
were "thoroughly compromised"
and would collapse. Even after
Secretary Dulles' press state-
ment on 14 May opposing any
military arrangement in Europe
based on Germany?s partition,
only Adenauer's Christian Dem-
ocratic Union (CDC) was osten-
sibly convinced that no Amer-
ican policy change.was in pros-
pect.
While Adenauer and other
Bonn officials steadily in-
sisted that a general disarma-
ment agreement must include
provisions for unification,
their attitude has not crystal-
lized in respect to limited
agreement. On 15 May the chan-
cellor endorsed the idea of a
"test tube" arms inspection area
in :Europe, referred to by Pres-
ident Eisenhower on 8 May, but
emphasized that Soviet forces
in :East Germany should come
under such inspection.
In general, Adenauer evi-
dently believes that the West
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23 May 1957
Germans regard the Soviet po-
sition on German matters as
so hopeless that they will de-
mand no major shift in Western
policy. Responding to what
seems to be a public demand
for "reasonable flexibility,
however, Adenauer has twice
recently offered to renounce
military use of the East .zone
upon German unification.
German public opinion con-
tinues to give Adenauer trouble
on the question of nuclear weap-
ons for the Bundeswehr. The.
latest opinion poll shows that
72 percent of the people are
opposed to its having such
weapons and 77 percent are op-
posed to the stationing of atomic
weapons in',the Federal Republic.
While in the period before the
election the government will
emphasize its desire for dis-
armament, it probably holds to
its public position of early
spring that eventually the
Bundeswehr must have atomic
arms if other "fourth powers"
do.
SOVIET THREATS AGAINST ATOMIC
The USSR's diplomatic
warnings to Bonn that grave
consequences are inherent in
arming West German forces with
nuclear weapons apparently are
being supplemented by planted
reports that Moscow will not
tolerate such a move and is
prepared to take military action
to prevent it. These warnings,
taking advantage of the nuclear
arms controversy in West Germany,
have been accompanied by pri-
vate hints that the USSR would
make concessions on reunifica-
tion if Bonn would withdraw
from NATO.
The planted reports are
intended to reinforce the warn-
ings in Moscow's 27 April note
to Bonn that arming the BundesL
wehr with nuclear weapons would
expose West Germany to a
"terrible danger," would strike
an "irreparable blow" at re-
unification prospects, and
would trigger an atomic arms
race in Europe in which the
Soviet bloc would take "appro-
priate measures" to strengthen
its defenses.
These activities are remi-
niscent of the Communist decep-
tion campaign in late 1954 de-
signed to block ratification of
the Paris agreements which
brought West Germany into NATO.
At that time, Moscow sought to
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arouse public alarm in Western
Europe by circulating reports
and rumors of imminent Soviet
military action and general war.
While the immediate aim
might be to forestall atomic
armament of the new West German
forces, the USSR may also seek
to exploit both Germany's basic
revulsion at the prospect of
nuclear warfare and its desire
for reunification, to further
the standing Soviet objective
of increasing popular opposition
to German membership in NATO.
Moscow has continued to hint
that it is preparing new pro-
posals which will open the way
to reunification.
Warsaw pact without demanding
dissolution of NATO or the with-
drawal of NATO forces from Ger-
many, if West Germany would
leave NATO and restrict itself
to greatly limited forces with
only. conventional. weapons. West
Germany
cou preserve its connections
with the West. The USSR, under
this plan, would withdraw all
but a token force from East
Germany and push for German
reunification on the basis of
the latest East German proposal
for a German federation.
411011ows
ie
generai ine taken by Alexandr
Alexandrov, first secretary of
the Soviet embassy in Bonn, in
talks with West German politi-
cians last February and March
in which he hinted that Moscow
might propose that the four
powers call on the two German
governments to announce their
readiness to withdraw from the
Warsaw pact and NATO and con-
sult on drafting an all-German
constitution.
GOMULKA GAINS SUPPORT AT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING
The Polish Communist cen-
tral committee closed its ninth
session on 18 May with a resolu-
tion reaffirming Gomulka's
"October" program and the princi-
ples of Polish independence with-
in the Soviet bloc enunciated in
Gomulka's 15 May.keynote speech.
Although the deep factional
cleavageswithin`.the party have
not been healed, Gomulka's
statement of a firm policy,
after six months of uncertain-
ties and lack of control at
the lower party levels, will
probably win him substantial
support from the broad mass of
uncommitted party functionaries.
The final resolution, while
clearly demanding full respect
for Poland's national sovereignty
and its own forms of building
socialism, specifically renounced
"national Communism" and pledged
no revival of bourgeois charac-
teristics. It also expressly
reaffirmed Poland's ties with
the Soviet Union and branded
as "false pretense" those
claiLms voiced by members of the
Stalinist Natolin faction that
"the policy of the party leads
to the weakening of the alliance
with the USSR."
Although the resolution
contained strong denunciation
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23 May 1957
of extremist views on both
sides, it cited liberal tenden-
cies as representing the great-
est danger to socialism. Party
members guilty of either fac-
tionalism or the public expres-
sion of opposition to party
policies were warned that they
could be expelled for such
activity.
Franciszek Mazur--hitherto
regarded as a leader of the
Stalinist wing--reportedly pro-
vided one of the dramatic mo-
ments of the meeting by pro-
claiming his loyalty to Gomulka's
October program. This move,
coupled with broad Soviet public-
ity given to Gomulka's keynote
speech, suggest Soviet endorse-
ment of Gomulka's continued
leadership of the Polish party.
Mazur's gesture reportedly fol-
lowed a bitter factional strug-
gle in which Gomulka was sup-
ported by former party chief
Ochab, and in which virtually
every aspect of the October
program came under criticism
by the Natolinists.
Two of Gomulka's closest
collaborators, Zenon Kliszko and
politburo member Jerzy Morawski,
were nominated for secretaryships
in the central committee. The
Natolin faction apparently did
not even attempt a nomination
of one of their number. Ochab
was relieved from his post as
secretary,fr.eeing him to concen-
trate his efforts on ;the keSr.tasks
of agricultural reforms. His
removal does not appear to have
been a demotion.
A special resolution con-
demning past security police
activities placed the responsi-
bility for them on former
politburo member Jakub Berman
and former security minister
Stanislaw Radkiewicz and ousted
both from the party, though it
stated that neither of them was
aware of these excesses. The
real blame was leveled at former
Security Ministry officials,
including Swiatlo.
policies.
Gomulka has probably,strength-
ened his position by winning
broader support from the center"
of the party. The extremist
wings within the party, however,
probably continue strongly to
oppose his program. A party
congress has been called for
December, and Gomulka will
probably take strong measures
prior to the meeting against
anyone who openly opposes his
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The Soviet-Mongolian com-
muniqud'`issued in Moscow on 14
May itemizing new Soviet aid
to Outer Mongolia marks another.
step in Moscow's policy of
maintaining a major voice in
Mongolian. affairs while avoiding
the appearance of direct control
typical of the Stalin era. At
the same time, it apparently
attempts to. bolster Outer Mon-
golia's claim to UN membership
as a fully sovereign state.
Moscow has agreed to turn
over control of the petroleum
industry and the mineral ex-
ploitationcompany and to pro-
vide 200,000,000 rubles in
financial assistance for Mon-
golia's three-year plan, which
begins next year. Peiping, which
has hailed the agreements as in-
dicating the existence ofa "new
equality and mutual assistance"
between a large and small coun-
try, apparently is not contest-
ing the continued dependence
of Outer Mongolia on Soviet
economic assistance.
The communique notes that
Moscow had already made avail-
able to Outer Mongolia 900,000-
000 rubles ($225,000,000 at the
official exchange rate) in the
past ten years, and had turned
over to it control of its bank-
ing apparatus and certain rail-.
road facilities.
Although China in recent
years has increased its partici-
pation in the development of
Outer Mongolia's economy, it
has contributed considerably
less than the USSR. The only
loan Peiping is known to have
extended, announced in August
1956, consists of the equivalent
of $40,000,000 and covers the
years 1956-59. The money is
being used to build small in-
dustrial plants, and,according
to Ulan Bator radio, "thousands
of Chinese workers" are giving
direct assistance in the de-
velopment of industry and agri-
culture.
Communist China's improved
standing in Outer Mongolia is
indicated by the recent reshuf-
fling of Mongolia's representa-
tion in Peiping. The former
Mongolian ambassador has been
recalled to Ulan Bator to take
up the post of vice minister
of foreign affairs. The new
ambassador is a man of consider-
ably more prestige and was
previously a vice premier.
While there may be some
truth in rumors that the Chinese
Communist leaders are disturbed
over the continued dependence
of Outer Mongolia on Soviet
economic assistance, Peiping
is not in a position to contest
Soviet predominance in the coun-
try at this time. Actually,
Peiping has a genuine interest
in seeing economic development
take place in Outer Mongolia
and has praised Soviet efforts
along these lines. The Chinese
apparently co-operated with
the Russians and Mongolians in
planning and achieving the rapid
completion of the Trans-Mon-
golian Railroad, which has
shortened the Moscow-Peiping
run by 715 miles, facilitating
Sino-Soviet trade. The Chinese
Communists continue to support
the Kremlin's efforts,to portray
Outer Mongolia as a sovereign
state. F- I (Con-
curred in by ORR)
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23 May 1957
NORTH VIETNAM'S LAND REFORM POLICY MISCARRIES
The North Vietnam govern-
ment's vacillating land reform
policy is creating dissatis-
faction and confusion among
the peasantry. The regime is
welshing on its promises to
restore to small independent
peasants land taken away from
them during the land reform cam-
paign of 1954-56. Some mem-
bers of the party district and
village committees have re-
signed in protest over this
zigzag policy.
As a result of popular re-
vulsion against the violence
and other excesses of party
workers in the land reform:
campaign, an "error-correction"
program was inaugurated last
fall. The party workers' bias
in favor of the poorest peas-
ants.~ during land reform had
led to the dispossession not
only of the larger landowners
but also of many peasants own-
ing and tilling small sections
of land who were misclassified
as landlords. At the same
time, estimates of normal crop
yields had been set unreason;
ably high to increase the-tax
burden on the peasants. Many
of the party workers themselves
became unsympathetic to party
directives and were expelled
from the party for failing to
display the requisite zeal:
Hanoi's efforts beginning
last fall to correct the situa-
tion did not have the desired
effect of relaxing tensions in
the countryside. The main ob-
stacle was resentment on the
part of the'poor.peasants' who
received land in the original
land reform program. The Hanoi
party press last month noted
that "individuals who were
awarded land during agrarian
reform" and participated in
the denunciation of landholders
are afraid that they now must
give up part of their property.
Faced with the possibil-
ity of losing support of the
poor, peasants, the Hanoi regime
has shifted ground again and
has begun to renege on its
"error-correction" campaign.
In February the restoration of
property to former owners was
ordered suspended, and today
the regime is emphasizing the
need to "rely completely on the
poor peasants" in determining
the reclassification of land-
lorcls--a development which will
presumably preserve for the
poor peasants most of their
gains under land reform.
This new shift in land
policy has evoked renewed crit-
icism of the regime from the
dispossessed small landowners
who had hoped to get their
property back. Catholics, a
large minority in North Viet-
nam, appear to be among the
most vocal critics. After
several riots occurred last
gall, principally instigated
by Catholics in rural areas,
Hanoi pursued a policy of con-
ciliation toward the Catholics.
Now, however, individual priests
are being denounced in the press,
and the church is accused of
"engaging in political activi-
ties prejudicial to the policy
of the state and the laws of
the country."
Although Hanoi would prob-
ably like to scrap its error-
correction program entirely,
the regime sees a political need
to appease small landowners and
so is continuing the program
in name at least. It is in- 25X1
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about the effect of its Poli-
cies on rural morale.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
LAOS
The preponderance of evi-
dence indicates that there will
be no early government crisis
in Laos and.that Premier Souvan-
na Phouma will be given afresh
opportunity to settle the Pathbt is
Lao problem, This development
is due primarily to the fact
that no Other Laotian political
leader is capable of mustering
sufficient support in the Na-
tional Assembly to replace
Souvanna:
Souvanna, who is display-
ing renewed confidence, is pre-
paring to reveal to thbe. recently
reconvened'National Assembly.a
"new" plan for a "final" round
of negotiations aimed at a
settlement with the Pathet Lao.
He has indicated that hbc~in-
tends to make a "take-it-or-
leave-it" offer of a coalition
government in return for firm
guarantees of Pathet submission
to central authority.
The prospects are that the
assembly, anxious for peace and
unity, will,support Souvanna's
"new" approach.. The deputies,
however, seem to be increasingly
aware of the-
Communist-orienta-tion of the Pathet ' Lao and prob-
ably will resist beingrstaLmpeddd
into a "give-away."settlement.,
The Pathets are likely to
seize on any offer from Souvanna
as an opportunity to prolong
negotiations' and to further
their subversive activities.
They are most unlikely to give
the guarantees demanded by
Vientiane, unless they can
negotiate a substitution of
language sufficiently vague to
satisfy the form but not the
substance of the government's
demands. They may, however,
abandon their insistence that
Laos immediately accept Chinese
Communist aid as evidence of
the royal government's neu-
trality.
Meanwhile, the Pathets,
backed by Peiping. and Hanoi
broadcasts, have opened a strong
propaganda campaign to shift
blame for the continued divi-
sioix )6f t'the'couhtrr)on" American
interference. Pathet Lao lead-
er Prince Souphannouvong, in a
recent interview in Vientiane,
justified Pathet demands for
far-reaching concessions by the
government on the grounds that
American domination of Laos
.is s6 strong that protective
ara s ire essent
1.
A military government
seized power in Haiti on 21 May
but may have difficulty main-
taining control, Despite an
early announcement that tl~be Barmy
unanimously supports chief of
staff Brigadier General Leon
Cantave, who engineered the
bloodless coup, the American
embassy in Port-au-Prince re-
ports that a serious rift may
exist in the general staff.
When Cantave issued his com-
muni,qud dissolving the governing
executive council, most senior
colonels failed to sign the
document, and a group of young
officers armed with tommyguns
reportedly intimidated them
with a show of strength.
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23 May 1957
In a conversation with US
ambassador Drew on 22 May,
Cantave claimed that the failure
of the senior colonels to sign
the communique and their sub-
sequent resignation from the
army resulted from the fact
that they are mulattoes in,a
predominantly Negro army.
Another threat is a pos-
sible general strike. Many
HAITI
Atlantic Ocean
NAHAMA
as saA1os
shops closed in Port-au-Prince
on 21 May, and an unconfirmed
report states that shops may
also be closed in the provinces.
Louis Dejoie and Daniel Fignole,
presidential candidates who
were the real powers behind the
executive council, may have iii--
stigated the strike. Both have'':
been instrumental in calling
successful general strikes in
ARGENTINA CONCERNED OVER PERON'S ACTIVITIES
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blacks, i'ncludi'ng the army, and the
mulatto minority. F7 I
Argentina's provisional
government believes that former
dictator Juan Peron is a threat
to its stability as long as he
remains in the hemisphere, but
efforts to have him ousted from
the Americas have failed. Ar-
gentina's cool treatment of
the past. An apparently spon-,
taneous strike against Cantave
occurred early in May.
Cantave has proclaimed that
the army will enforce military
rule until a provisional presi-
dent is chosen who can guarantee
"free and honest" elections. If
-elections are held--they have
been postponed three times--
they will probably be neither
free nor honest. Both
.., ~9 Cantave and Clement
Jumelle, the presi-
Hart, dential candidate he
Gonaives
St. Marc
',. DOMINICAN
seems to favor, are
believed to have ac-
quired considerable
wealth during the re-
gime of ex-president
Paul E. Magloire and
to be interested in
controlling Haiti's 25X1
government to protect
their fortunes.
Despite the
threats to his posi-
tion, Cantave is re
ported in control of
Port-au-Prince. His
soldiers are patrolling the
streets enforcing a curfew and
maintaining order, and the city
is reported quiet. Ambassador
Drew reports, however, that
Cantave is in an emotional state
and appears scared,. Cantave
predicted to Ambassador Drew
that if a general strike forces
his ouster, Haiti will be thrown
into a civil war between the
Venezuela, now host to Peron,
has contributed to this failure.
The regime has also failed to
persuade foreign governments to
turn over to it Peron's assets
abroad, which can be used to
finance revolutionary planning
and activities.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMRV.
23 May 1957
Peron apparently has large
sums of money available.for
propaganda and subversive.ac-
tivities, and he reportedly:
f eels confident of returning to
Argentina. Pedro Estrada, chief
of Venezuela's... security, told
Ambassador McIntosh.on 23.April
that Peron is still a powerful
individual and has under his
control a "tremendous organiza-
tion," adding that more,news-
papers throughout Latin America were "controlled by or favorable
to Peron than one would imagine."
After a recent talk with
Peron, Est.rada,told McIntosh
that he was convinced the Aram-
buru government would fall and
that Peron, even if he does not
return to Argentina himself,
will be successful in. putting
a man of his selection in the
presidency. This opinion,.. plus
Peron's financial resources may
account in part for Venzuela's
refusal to oust him.
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In the five countries bor-
dering Argentina, Peronista
exiles are engaged in various
types of activity aimed at under-
mining the Arambur' regime.
This includes operating clan-
destine radios as well as ship-,.._
ping propaganda. materials into
Argentina.
thus suggesting- 1F- I
Peronistas in Chile have
been urging Peron, , to visit there,
I I"something 25X1
big was hatching" among the
exiles in. Chile. President
Ihn.riez, having granted temporary
asylum to Six prominent Peronistas
who: escaped from an Argentine
prison.last March, told Ambas-
srdcor Lyon on 6 May that the
question of . Pe.ron's entry had
ari sen, but said he hoped to
.avoid admitting him.
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23 May 19 57
Meanwhile, in a separate
development, a new upsurge in
army dissension has been high-
lighted by the replacement of
the war minister and the arrest
on 22 May of the army commander
in chief and some 20 other of-
ficers. Major points of army
dissension reportedly include
the man chosen as the new war
minister, the program for re-
organization of the army, and
the plans for holding elections
to a constituent assembly prior
to national elections.
The air minister issued on
22 May a strongly ;worded order
of the day ordering air force
members to tend to their jobs
and .stay out of politics. The
navy is reported quietly back-
ing Aramburu, but trying to ap-
pear completely removed from
the army quarrel in an effort to
prevent it from deteriorating in-
to open revolt.
BURMESE GOVERNMENT MAY NEGOTIATE WITH INSURGENT COMMUNISTS
Despite continued official
insistence on unconditional sur-
render of the insurgent Burma
Communist Party (BCP), the Bur-
inese government is reportedly
divided on the question of a
settlement.
Over the past six months,
insurgent Communist Party chair-
man Thakin Than Tun has sent
a number of widely publicized
letters to key government fig-
ures, urging an end to the
"civil war" so that "progres-
sive" forces could work to-
gether to promote Burma's de-.
velopment. Earlier letters in
the series, while couched in
conciliatory terms, sought to
create the'impression that the
BCP was dealing from a position
of strength, and implicitly,
placed the onus for continua-
tion of the conflict on the
government.
In the most recent letter,
dated 10 May and addressed to
the home minister, the BCP
lowered the price for a settle-
ment, suggesting that peace
could be achieved if the govern-
rent dropped the word "surrender"
and replaced it with the word
"amnesty."
Other Communist groups
have given support to the BCP's
peace campaign through the
medium of the Internal Peace
Organization, a front group
apparently created to propa-
gandize insurgent peace feelers.
It is- .headed by Thakin Kodaw
Hmai:ng, a recipient of the
Stalin "peace" prize who, as
Burma's "grand old man of
letteers, " has frequently served
the Communists well as a front.
Large crowds at many of the In-
ternal Peace Organization's
rallies.attest to growing pop-
ular discontent over the lack
.of any real security in all but
the tew largest towns in Burma.
The principal opposition
to the government in parliament--
members of the Communist-domi-
h ated National United Front--
is danducting a well-organized
campaign to publicize the issue
and bring popular opinion to
bear on the government. The
appealing arguments of this
group stand in sharp contrast
to the government's weak rebut-
tals?
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23 May 19 57'
government will offer less
harsh terms which will be ac-
ceptable to the insurgents.
The supreme commander of the
armed forces is said to be
prepared to resign if this
should occur. In view of its
inability to suppress the in-
surrection militarily, the
army is in a poor position to
argue against peace negotia-
tions, and it seems only a
question of time before the
government consents to sit
down with BCP representatives
in an effort to devise a
formula permitting the insur-
gents to surrender with mini-
mum loss of face.
25X1
FOOD SHORTAGE POSES THREAT TO EAST PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT
Rapidly rising food prices
in East Pakistan in recent weeks
have endangered the provincial
government, which is led by the
eastern branch of Prime Min-
ister Suhrawardy's Awami League.
A similar food shortage in 1956
was an important factor in the
downfall of the previous East
Pakistan government,. and a
repetition could threaten
Suhrawardy's central government
coalition. The central govern-
ment, unlikely to secure the
rice it needs from Southeast
Asia, may make an urgent re-
quest for additional American
assistance.
While the activities of
speculators have contributed
to the 30-percent increase
since mid-April in the price
of rice, the basic cause is
the failure to secure adequate
imports. The East Pakistan
government, lulled by a good
winter rice crop, did not ask
the central government to pro-
CYPRUS
Greek and Greek Cypriot
leaders, seeking ways to break
the stalemate over Cyprus, con-
tinue to solicit American in-
tervention. Foreign Minister
_Averoff told Ambassador Allen
on 20 May that Greece and Arch-
bishop Makarios could accept
vide sufficient imports. The
central government has not
secured even the inadequate
amounts requested,. and although
it now claims to have commit-
ments for the amounts needed,
it is still only negotiating
for most of these supplies.
.Suhrawardy has charged that
rumors spread by, pro-Communists
and speculators are behind the
price rises and has ordered the
central government to send ex-
tra shipments to the area. He.
has also threatened to have the
army patrol the border between
East Pakistan and India to re-
duce the widespread smuggling
of rice to India. Meanwhile,
the provincial government has
introduced modified rationing.
These actions are not likely
to halt the rising prices, how-
ever, since additional imports
of several hundred thousand tons
are needed to. meet the minimum
requirements.
independence for Cyprus guaran-
teed by a 20-year international
treaty, although such a solu-
tion would have to be proposed
and supported by "others."
Makarios reportedly in-
tends to leave Athens soon on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 19 57
an "enlightenment!'.'..missioti .)to
Scandinavia and then plans to
proceed to the United States in
time for the opening of the UN
General Assembly session next
fall. Athens probably hopes
that continued peace on Cyprus
will lead to an invitation for
Makarios to negotiate in Lon-
don. However, the British are
not likely to receive Makarios
except as part of a delegation
of representatives of the vari-
ous communities on Cyprus--
Greek, Turkish and perhaps
Maronite and Armenian. The
British Ambassador in Athens
told his American colleague on
17 May that his government
would not be pleased if Makarios
arrived in London uninvited.
Nevertheless, he added, it would
have to talk to him.
Although London has not
yet officially indicated any
departure from its previous in-
tention to retain bases on Cy-
prus regardless of its eventual
disposition, Governor Harding
said on 6 May that Britain is
reassessing the strategic value
of the island.
Britain hopes discussions
on the international status of
Cyprus will be initiated. within
the NATO framework before it
begins negotiations with the
Cypriots on self-government.
NATO's Secretary General Spaak
has already begun informal con-
sultations with the permanent
representatives of Britain,
Greece and Turkey. Britain is
prepared to.proceed with the
partition of the island if Greece
and Turkey cannot reach an agree-
ment with London on another solu-
tion of the problem.
According to the British
ambassador in Athens, London
would prefer that Makarios
meanwhile continue to "stew in
his own juice in Athens." How-
ever, the American ambassador
believes any view that Makarios'
influence is declining reflects
wishful thinking, induced part-
ly by Greek opposition politi-
cians in contact with the Brit-
ish embassy who are disgruntled
over their failure to gain
Makarios' support for their
own ends.
The reported "ultimatum" to
Britain on 20 May by the polit-
ical. arm of EOKA probably rep-
resents a Greek Cypriot effort
to hasten British action regard-
ing new negotiations. It may
also foreshadow some kind of
civil disobedience cam aign.
The Christian Democratic
minority government of Adone
Zoli may depend on the "benev-
olent abstention" of some of
the small parties when it seeks
parliamentary confirmation on
29 May, but its chances of con-
firmation are at present rated
fairly good. Zoli reportedly
is working out a program that
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23 May 1957
might give his government more
than "caretaker" status.
Zoli seems to have empha-
sized technical competence in
making his cabinet choices, in-
cluding one nonparliamentary
member without any party affil-
iation. The appointments show
a delicate balance among the
factions within the Christian
Democratic Party.
Zo.li has scheduled his ap-
pearance, before parliament for
next week, presumably to pro-
vide time to resolve internal
party disagreements over the
government program. He intends
to tackle the problems now be-
fore parliament as well as
others he considers urgent. Re-
portedly, however, Zoli has en-
countered some opposition to a
program which would give his
government more than the care-
taker functions to which the
right wing of his own party
would like to limit him.
Though the Democratic So-
cialists, who precipitated the
crisis by withdrawing their 1'
votes, have indicated that they
will oppose a one-party govern-
ment, the American embassy in
Rome on 22 May still expected
the government to win confirma-
tion. Preliminary estimates
give Zoli a victory in the Sen-
ate,,and 'from 274 to 334 favor-
able votes out of a possible 590
in the Chamber of Deputies, with
enough abstentions in either
case to ensure confirmation.
If only the 265 Christian Demo-
crats support him, however, the
possibility of a new crisis is
heightened. The debate is ex-
pected to last about a week.
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JAPAN CONSERVATIVES PLAN CRACKDOWN ON LEFTIST LABOR
Japan's ruling Liberal-
Democratic Party, under the
guidance of Prime Minister Ki-
shi's cabinet, is planning a
new labor program which would
curb the political power of. the
leftist Japan General Council
of Trade Unions (Sohyo), but
would also include "progressive"
features designed to have wide
popular appeal. The program
provides for strengthening the
penalties for illegal activities
by Sohyo's 3,000,000 members,
particularly strikes by public
corporation employees. The
government has the support of
business, the press, and the
general public, all of which
resent Sohyo's ability to stage
strikes and violent demonstra-
tions at will and with virtual
impunity.
The Liberal-Democratic Party
has formed a labor policy com-
mittee to draft a program which
will be submitted to the Diet
for legislative approval next
fall. The committee apparently
contemplates some curtailment
of the checkoff system, under
which union dues are deducted
in advance from salaries. This
has been one of the principal
sources of funds used by Sohyo
for political struggles in sup-
port of the Socialist Party.
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23 May 1957
The prospective program also
would authorize the levying of
fines and jail sentences for
leaders of strikes against
public corporations. Such
strikes are already illegal but
punishable only by worker dis-
charges, suspensions and repri-
mands. The legislation would
also make public corporation
unions responsible for finan-
cial losses caused by their
strikes.
In the field of "progres-
sive" legislation, the Liberal-
Democrats are likely to study
the implications of minimum
wage legislation. This has be-
come an important issue in Japan
which the Socialists have ex-
ploited to some advantage. The
conservatives are under pres-
sure to take action on the
matter, but are opposed by small
and medium-size businesses
which generally would be unable
to absorb the increased cost.
Nevertheless, the party feels
obliged to make a start in this
direction, in principle if not
in practice.
Sohyo, working through the
Socialist Party, can be expected
to fight against restrictions of
its power and has threatened to
follow up its nationwide strikes
of ]L1-12 May with further strikes
in June. However, the conserva-
tive parliamentary majority, the
widespread belief that Sohyo is
overstepping its bounds, and
evidence that leftist labor
solidarity is breaking down in
the face of government actions
and threats, suggest that the
cabinet's program can be enacted
successfully.
President Syngman Rhee an-
nounced on 18 May the most
sweeping changes yet made in
South Korea's armed forces high
command. General Paek Son-yop,
the commander of the first field
army, was appointed chief of
staff, and Lt. Gen. Yu Chae-hung,
the former vice chief of staff,
was assigned to be chairman of
the joint chiefs of staff. The
latter post is of less importance
in the South Korean army estab-
lishment. The command of the
first army, which includes the
bulk of the combat forces sta-
tioned along the truce line,
went to a relative unknown, Lt.
Gen. Song Yo-chang, a former
corps commander.
Rhee probably had several
motives in making the changes,
including a desire to stamp out
factionalism in the services and
to assure his Liberal Party the
military vote in the 1958 assem-
bly elections. He may also be-
lieve that by making room for
promotions and introducing new
blood into command positions, he
can improve morale and efficiency.
The president very likely
hopes that the removal of Gen-
erals Yi Hyong-kun and Chong
I1-kwon--the former chief of
staff and chairman of the joint
chiefs of staff respectively--
will eliminate the bitter rival-
ries which have plagued the South
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23 May 1957
Korean armed forces. In the
past, cliques have tended to
settle around the personalities
of these two officers, each of
whom. has attempted to place
his supporters in key positions
and win personal control over
the services. Their removal
may reduce factionalism only
temporarily, however.
As First Army commander,
Paek ordered his troops to sup-
port the Liberal Party ticket
during the 1956 presidential
elections, and Rhee probably ex-
pects him to do the same in 1955.
Pae]k will be the only full gen-
eral holding a command position,
and Rhee may plan to release
him following the elections in
line with his reported intention
to retire all four-star generals.
nese Communists.
These command changes will
probably not affect the combat
capability of the armed forces.
Paek has been chief of staff
before and is considered a compe-
tent officer, as are Yu and Song.
None of the three is known to
be a supporter of Rhee's dream
of a unilateral "march north"
against the North Korean and Chi-
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23 May 1957
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
"There was a time
when it appeared that on-
ly one creative mind could
solve all the problems
for everyone. The col-
lective intellect de-
prived of trust was at
times left unwanted,
without work, Very many
members of the older gen-
eration, alas, forgot
what they had once known,
while the younger genera-
tion could not even be-
gin to think independ-
ently without hackneyed
quotations and parrot-
ing. But the time has
come to dispense with
this sad legacy of our
recent past."
So stated S. Strumilin,
the foremost Soviet economic
theoretician, in an article
published last December, de-
scribing the stultifying ef-
fects of Stalinism on the So-
viet professions.
The creation of a polit-
ical and social climate for
SOVIET VIEW OF "SELF - CRITICISM" AMONG BUREAUCRATS
--FROM KROKODIL, 10 APRIL 1957
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May 1957
the development of public dis-
cussion has been one of the
principal domestic goals of
the post-Stalin regime, By
appealing to reason and re-
treating from the arbitrariness
of the Stalin era, the Soviet
leaders are attempting to en-
list active popular support for
the solution of complex and
pressing domestic problems.
Since 1953, when Soviet
citizens were officially per-
mitted to examine "contradic-
tions" in their society, public
discussion has been marked by
increasing boldness and candor,
culminating this year in ex-
tremely frank discussions of
domestic problems and short-
comings in the Soviet Commu-
nist Party press. The regime
finds it necessary, however,
continually to redefine the
limits of these.discussions
lest they conflict with its
interests.
Public discussion. under
Stalin was stifled by fear of
the ubiquitous secret police,
particularly after the great
purges of the late 30's, and
by official insistence on a
facade of social harmony and
economic prosperity. The live-
ly debates of the 20's over
serious domestic issues gave
Way to stagnant conformism.
Following World War II,
the Soviet regime, faced with
the difficult task of reimpos:-
ing the"strict ideological con-
trol relaxed during the war,
sought to gain support for'its
policies by encouraging public
discussion. Although conducted
within strict limits set by the
regime, discussion in this
period, both in the party and
in the professions, was con-
siderably more candid than
after mid-1948.
Zhdanov, Stalin's spokes-
man for ideological pur.ity'in
this period, made the unpre-
cedented assertion that there
was a "conflict of contradic-
tions" (a euphemism for impor-
tanit unresolved problems) in
the USSR and that it could be
resolved primarily by "criticism
and self-criticism." This,
Zhdanov maintained, constituted
the principal dynamic element,
the "moving force," in Soviet
society, distinguishing it from
capitalist society in which
coercion and "class struggle"
were said to prevail.
This early postwar campaign
to ensure ideological control
through discussion and persua-
sion failed, however, largely
because of passive resistance
to the regime's demands for
economic austerity and intel-
lectual conformity. As a re-
sult, from mid-1948 on, Stalin
found it necessary to revert
increasingly to his traditional
policy of terror. After 1948,
the purge of "cosmopolitan"
intellectuals, the decapita-
tion of the Leningrad party
organization and the transfer
by force of "alien" people from
the border areas of the USSR'
poisoned the atmosphere of
public discussion. During
Stalin's last years the Soviet
people were in effect officially
forbidden to see, hear, or speak
evi]L about their domestic life.
Since Stalin's death and
the purge of secret police
chief Beria, the Soviet leaders
have attempted to stimulate
pub]Lic discussions of important
domestic problems, again with-
in strict limits defined by
the regime. The convocation,
on E6 fairly regular basis, of
plenary sessions of the party
central committee has served
not only to reactivate the
party as the leading political
institution in the Soviet state
but also to focus national at-
tention on such outstanding
problems as agricultural pro
dut,tioa, icidustrial moderniza-
tion, and, more recently, eco-
nomic decentralization.
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23 May 1957'
The regime has also spon-
sored numerous professional
meetings, published many new
professional journals, and lib-
eralized some of the security
procedures in the professions.
These measures, which have
helped to reduce some of the
barriers within and between
professional groups, were de-
signed to elicit professional
know-how and public support for
the solution of national prob-
lems.
Since 1954, when Zhdanov's
dictum on the role of "criticism
and self-criticism" as the
"moving force" in Soviet society
was revived intact, Soviet in-
tellectuals have been examining
domestic "contradictions" with
increasing boldness and candor.
Despite their use of Marxist
jargon, these intellectuals have
directed fairly pointed criticism
at Soviet domestic life, some
of them skirting perilously
close to heresy.
Beginning in the spring of
1955, for example, some Soviet
intellectuals intimated that
low living standards were an
important source of such so-
called "survivals of capitalism"
in the USSR as the anti-Soviet
attitudes of the population.
Others have held that differ-
ences do exist within and be-
tween Soviet social groups, and
that, although they are not
"antagonistic" nor comparable
to the "class struggle" said to
exist under capitalism, they
can lead to serious conflicts
of interest if they are not
promptly recognized and dealt
with by the party leaders.
Although Soviet intellec-
tuals have stressed in their
public discussions the essen-
tial harmony between the Soviet
regime and people, they have
warned that toleration of "mis-
takes" in policy can damage
Soviet social stability. The
glossing over of real "contra-
dictions" in Soviet society in
Stalin's time, according to
these intellectuals, disarmed
Soviet cadres and left them ill-
equipped to deal with the press-
ing problems of the day. They
have candidly asserted that
failure to recognize and struggle
with existing domestic problems
could weaken the USSR.
Since De=Stalinization
The reaction to de-Stalin-
ization by elements within the
Soviet party and population,
as well as the events in Poland
and Hungary last fall, appears
further to have brought home
to the Soviet leaders some of
the glaring inadequacies in
their domestic education and
indoctrination program. After
their initial reaction to
the Polish and. Hungarian de-
velopments--the tightening of
controls, the warnings against
subversion, and the increased
calls for vigilance--the So-
viet leaders seem to have
recognized that repressive
words and deeds were inadequate
to cope with real popular
grievances. The more candid
and realistic. treatment this
year of domestic problems in
the Communist Party press in-
dicates that the Soviet leaders
believe that in the long run
they can better control, and
even reduce, popular dissatis-
faction by'providing a legiti-
mate avenue for public expres-
sion in the state-controlled
organs of public communication.
By admitting publicly that
the USSR is a good deal less
than perfect, the Soviet lead-
ers are attempting to identi-
fy themselves with the inter-
ests and aspirations of the
population at large. By per-
mittting popular grievances
to be aired, as they were
at the February Supreme Soviet
meeting, the regime hopes to
steal the thunder from the so-
called "politically immature"
or "demagogic" elements in the
population and to'convince the
masses that it is seriously at-
tempting to improve their
material welfare.
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23 May 19 57'
The difficulties Soviet
leaders face in controlling
discussion within the Commu-
nist Party itself were re-
cently revealed by the party
journal Kommunist, which
admitted the existence of
"contradictions" within the
party. Although these "con-
tradictions" were said to take
the form of "controversies"
between "like-minded persons
over the best ways and means
of solving the tasks facing
the party," the brunt of
Kommunist's criticism was
directed against party mem-
bers who had attacked party
policies and the party apparatus.
By admitting the existence of
"contradictions" within the
party and by criticizing "po-
litically immature" party mem-
bers, the regime is attempting
to direct discussion within
the party along desired lines
and warn the "hostile" deviators
of the potential dangers of
their behavior.
The efforts of Stalin's suc-
cessors to develop professional
and popular support by limiting
the role of coercion in Soviet
public life derive from a recog-
nition that Stalin's methods
were both dangerous and unproduc-
tive over the long run. Stalin.-
ism had produced in the Soviet
system a complex of internal
disorders, none of which was
fatal but which together threat-
ened to retard seriously the
growth of Soviet national power.
The Soviet leaders have
had,to appeal in some measure
to the public, primarily be-
cause their efforts to diagnose
the real condition of Soviet
society and remedy its disorders
have been obscured and hindered
by widespread public apathy and
inarticulateness. If these
measures should fail, the regime
would be faced with the prospect
of reverting to terrorism ~;with'.all
its negative consequences,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S g
23 May 1957
DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN SPAIN
The severe inflation in
Spain is causing increasing dis-
satisfaction with Franco's re-
gime even among the groups that
have supported him in the past.
The regime is in no immediate
danger, but the deterioration
in its position seems likely to
continue as the cabinet appointed
three months ago delays coming
to grips with the country's in-
creasingly serious economic
problems.
Economic Difficulties
Spain remains in the grip
of strong inflationary pressures
set off during 1956 by expand-
ing bank credit, extensive def-
icit financing of industrial
development and welfare projects,
and substantial wage increases
without a corresponding rise
in productivity. Unusually
severe winter weather which
damaged citrus and olive crops
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT
MILLIONS
OF
DOLLARS
contributed to the economic
difficulties by depriving Spain
of approximately $100,000,000
in much-needed foreign exchange.
Spain entered 1957 with an
estimated dollar reserve of
only $20,000,000--less than a
fifth of its holdings 14 months
before--and the cost of living
increased 12.5 percent from
November 1956 to March 1957.
Within the past few weeks a
shortage of wheat has become
a serious problem, and the gov-
ernment has pressed the United
States for emergency shipments
of 500,000 metric tons of wheat
before 30 June as an alternative
to drawing on scarce foreign
exchange. The new crop is ex-
pected to fall a million tons
short of the country's annual
consumption, and Spain is seek-
ing still more American surplus
wheat by mid-1958, to be paid
for in pesetas. Nevertheless,
1955
OCT
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23 May 1957
in a speech on 17 March, Franco
referred to the economic crisis
as "a small difficulty," and,
except for seeking more Ameri-
can aid, he has since taken no
action suggesting a graver view
of the problem.
The only important step
taken since the cabinet shake-
up of 25 February is the re-
placement of the multiple for-
eign exchange system by a single
import-export rate for the peseta
in order to increase Spanish
exports to dollar markets and
reduce the large trade deficit.
Various anti-inflationary
measures still under discussion
include the encouragement of
foreign capital participation
in Spanish enterprises, the es-
tablishment of an interminis-
terial committee to examine
expenditures, and reductions in
the level of new debt issues in
Bank of Spain credits to govern-
ment organizations and in capi-
tal allocated,to government-
operated industry.
Franco has three possible
courses of action. He can elect
to do nothing, in which case
present inflationary trends will
continue; he can introduce a
policy of retrenchment to combat
inflation, taking the risk of
further alienating the still
powerful Falange; or he can fol-
low a policy of big spending
which, while stilling worker
discontent temporarily, would
ultimately contribute to infla-
tion and further estrange labor
as well as influential conserva-
tive elements of his support.
Disaffection in the Falange
Franco is reluctant to
adopt a policy of retrenchment,
chiefly because he does not wish
to face a showdown with the
Falange--Spain's only legal
political party and an important
source of the regime's stability.
The Falange has long sought--
without much success--to develop
strong labor support, and it
would suffer a critical blow
from a reduction in government
spending for social and welfare
projects accompanied by rigid
wage controls under conditions
of rapidly rising prices. As
it is, the economic crisis has
been responsible for increasing
disaffection in the Falange.
Franco set the Falange back
severely last winter when he
rejected drafts of laws which
would have ensured its position
in Spain's political life. The
church, the army, and business
and landowning interests have
long opposed the Falange's ef-
forts to consolidate its posi-
tion, and Franco has always
been careful to prevent any
element of his support from be-
coming too powerful. Many
Falangists believe that the
party, though formally retain-
ing its position in the 25
February cabinet reshuffle, ac-
tually lost further ground.
An internal crisis in the
Falange is apparent in the
number of resignations tendered
by minor party officeholders in
recent weeks. Resignations have
been noted particularly in Va-
lencia, where many Falangists
reportedly fear that the long
delay in naming a civil governor
may mean the army and church
have been successful in bring-
ing about a separation of the
functions of the provincial
head of the Falange from those
of the civil governor. Franco's
reduced support is most apparent
among the party "old shirts"--
pre-Civil War members--whose
mainstays in the cabinet have
been replaced by considerably
less important narty fi or?roc
Other Falangists, notably
the poet Dionisio Ridruejo,have
left the movement in the past
year or so and are trying to
organize opposition parties of
the left. The American embassy
believes that if Franco gives
the "old shirts" further cause
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 May.1957
to question his intentions, a
mass secession from the party
may develop.
Conservative Discontent
The various groups balanced
against the Falange in Franco's
cabinet fear the Falange's
"leftist tendencies" and some
of them would be further dis-
turbed by a government big-
spending program. The economic
crisis will also increase their
concern over Franco's decreasing
popularity and his failure to
provide for a successor.
Business interests are
dissatisfied with rising costs
of production, and elements of
the church are moving to dis-
sociate themselves from the
regime. Among the military.
IariLes
grossly na equate
Popular Unrest
General unrest over the
cost of living was evidenced by
the transportation boycotts in
January and February following
a fare increase in Barcelona
and Madrid. Since the cabinet
reshuffle, it has been seen in
a slowdown strike of coal min-
ers in Oviedo in March. Con-
tinued restrictions on freedom
of expression have intensified 25X1
student hostility and dissatis-
faction among intellectuals.
their interests.
With his long-practiced
ski:Ll at playing one group
agaiLnst another and his still
unquestioned ability to sup-
press overt hostility to his
regime, Franco is in no im-
mediate danger. His position,
however, is less secure, and
the deteriorating economic
situation may spur many who,
now support him to look
elsewhere for a champion of
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23 May 19 57
MAO TSE-TUNG'S UNPUBLISHED SPEECHES
On 27 February Mao Tse-
tung delivered an address before
the Supreme State Conference
on "The Correct Handling of
Contradictions Within the Ranks
of the People." The Supreme
State Conference is a gathering
of China's top officials con-
vened at irregular intervals
to hear Mao set new lines for
Peiping's major policies. Fol-
lowing the conference, Mao
spoke on the same subject at
the National Conference on
Propaganda Work on 12 March.
Mao's remarks have not
publish
Chinese press is carrying-ex-
tensive commentaries on Mao's
analysis. From these com-
mentaries, the following emerge
as Mao's key points:
(1) Mao distinguished be-
tween two types of contradic-
tions, i.e., antagonistic con-
tradictions "between us and
the enemy" (which are irrec-
oncilable) and nonantagonistic
contradictions (which are ad-
justable). Cautioning that
the latter could become an-
tagonistic if badly handled,
he stressed the need for per-
suasion rather than force in
mollifying malcontents. He
noted that China's present con-
tradictions were largely antag-
onistic; for example, the con-
tradiction between the people's
demand for higher incomes and
the economic conditions that
thwart this demand. There are
also contradictions between
the military and the populace,
between military officers and
enlisted men, between peasants
and workers, between co-opera-
tives and peasants, and between
government organs of upper and
lower levels. Above all, Mao
addressed himself to the con-
tradiction between the people
and the leaders.
(2) In discussing remedies,
Mao stressed the urgency of cor-
recting bureaucratic methods of
leadership. In accordance with
his recommendations, the party's
central committee has called
for a program to rectify bureau-
cratic habits among officials,
who have been directed to gain
new insights into local problems
by establishing direct contact
with the populace. Party, gov-
ernment and military officials
have been urged to engage in
manual labor "among the masses,"
adopt a self-critical attitude,
and permit the populace to ex-
press their opinions "boldly
and freely."
(3) Mao warned against
the errors of dogmatism and
doctrinairism and strongly re-
affirmed his policy to "let all
flowers bloom and diverse schools
of thought contend."
Mao's remarks on this
point were critical of tight
Soviet control over the arts, 125X1
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ac :e ao reportedly at- 25X1
a playwright for oppos-
ing the "all flowers" concept,
observing that the playwright's
views had been published by the
Russians. "Birds of a feather
flock together," Mao is said
to have observed wryly.
Mao the fol-
lowing examples of popular dis-
affection, which he interpreted
as examples of nonantagonistic
contradictions:
(1) A planned march on the
capital by students dissatisfied
with the employment offered them
after graduation. They were
dissuaded by Mao's offer to re-
ceive a delegation in his of-
fice.
(2) Student strikes at
the Universities of Chengtu and
Chungking.
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(3) A march by dissatisfied
cadres from Chengting toward
Peiping to present their griev-
ances to Mao. They were per-
suaded to turn back. The method
reportedly recommended by Mao
for resolving internal contra-
dictions was the method of
patient persuasion and ideo-
logical re-education rather
than crude or "administrative"
methods.
Mao reportedly analyzed
two kinds of democracy, One
was "big. democracy," which
meant strikes, demonstrations
and other strong manifestations
of the popular will.. The other
was "little democracy," which
meant all forms of argument,
negotiation and discussion.
Within the ranks of the people,
"little democracy" was normal-
ly correct, but nevertheless
there might sometimes be scope
and need for "big democracy."
The deputy director of the
party's propaganda department
stated on 7 May that the Chi-
nese populace had the "right to
demonstrate &Ad strike" and
that "no leaders of strikes
should be penalized."
In Poland, Mao's views have
been hailed by the liberal Com-
munists as support of their de-
mands for complete freedom of
discussion and dissent, and the
trade union newspaper Glos
Pracy keyed Mao's remas on
"allflowers" to a denuncia-
tion of local "Stalinists;"
At the recent Polish party
plenum, Gomulka endorsed Mao's
doctrines, including the "all
flowers" thesis. At the same
time, he made clear he would
limit the application of this
doctrine in Poland when he at-
tacked the liberal Communist
"revisionists" who endanger the
regime by advocating or tolerat-
ing_ anti-Communist views.
The Soviet leaders will
probably react to Mao's speeches
with mixed emotions. Part of
Mao's thesis, particularly his
view on contradictions, is gen-
erally in line with long-held
Soviet views on this subject
(See Part III, p.1), and a key
Chinese editorial in Mao's
analysis of contradictions was
reprinted in Pravda in April.
The Soviet leaders appar-
ently considered the Chinese
editorial in harmony with their
own campaign against bureaucrat-
ic practices in the Soviet ad-
ministrative structure. They
may also have intended, in
taking note of a major pronounce-
ment by Mao, to emphasize the
close ties which exist between
Moscow and Peiping.
Mao's theory of "big democ-
racy,"' with its implied accept-
ance of the right to strike,
however, will probably be dis-
tasteful to Moscow at a time
it is experiencing troubles
with labor unrest. Even more
disagreeable to the Kremlin
would be Mao's alleged slap at
Soviet cultural policy contained
in the "birds of a feather"
reference.
Actually, Mao's thesis of
contradictions within a social-
ist society is no great de-
parture from Soviet theory,
which has also drawn a sharp
line between "antagonistic" and
"nonantagonistic" contradictions.
Chinese commentaries ' on the
speech do. not support the in-
ference made by some Western
observers that Mao held the
"system" gives rise to insoluble
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problems between the party and
the populace. Like Soviet the-
orists, the Chinese writers
insist that the socialist system
is "correct." The Chinese, how-
ever, have given greater empha-
sis than the Russians to the
theme that, even with the best
"system," all Communist parties
are fallible, and all must be
vigilant to keep their mistakes
from becoming widespread and
lasting.
Mao's purpose in making
the speech is to be found in
his apparent determination to
apply to Communist China the
lessons of unrest in Poland and
Hungary. His preoccupation with
the contradiction between the
people and their leaders sug-
gests that he saw some parellels
between popular unrest in East-
ern Europe and the state of
morale in China, and supports
other reliable evidence of
growing alienation of the Chi-
ese populace from the leader-
ship.
The Communist Party line is
a notoriously shifting guide to
action, but for the present,
Mao's speech would appear to
assure a "soft" approach by
Peiping's leaders to China's
internal problems. With respect
to intrabloc relations, Mao's
prestige is such that few Com-
munist leaders will dismiss
lightly his appeal to avoid the
use of force except as a measure
of last resort. While the USSR
is probably annoyed at the anti-
Soviet overtones being read in-
to Mao's speech, Mao is far
from aligning himself With`..
hostile;..oritics of Kremlin.'.
policies. When force must be
applied, as it had to be in Hun-
gary, Mao provides Moscow with
a ready rationale in the thesis::
that repressive measures are
justified against groups who
cause nonantagonistic, contra-
dictions to take on an antag-
onistic, or "enem " form.
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