CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 4, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-009220100002000 D
CO FIDENTIAII
COPY NO. I8
OCR NO. 6114/56
4 October 1956
DOCUMENT NO-
L
No CHANGE INS LASS.
C7 RECL&,SV
CLASS. GHANGEO TOi
NEXT RE ILEW DATE:
REVIEWER
;)-ATE!.
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
25X1
OOw DthT1At~
25X1
25X1
AIB.CIIIVAL
"-Z RETUJ
vas,
77
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
 Approved For-?elease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927000020001-0
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
 CONFIDLN I IAL
jr Approved For Release 2005/02/1 9-00927A0 00020001-0
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Discussions now under way in the Crimea between
President Tito of Yugoslavia and leaders of the Soviet
Union probably are an attempt to find at least a
temporary solution to problems in Soviet-Yugoslav re-
lations which have been developing this summer and
which stem from fundamentally opposed concepts concerning
the doctrine of "independent roads to socialism.',' Soviet
leaders apparently feel that they must either modify
their soft line toward the Satellites or risk loss of
their hegemony in Eastern Europe. Tito would be reluc-
tant to accept any trend toward tighter controls.
SUEZ DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
In the UN Security Council debate beginning 5 October,
Britain and France hope to obtain substantial backing
for a Suez settlement along the lines of the 18-nation
plan for international control. Six of the 11 council
members, including Iran, support the Suez Canal Users'
Association and can be expected to support the inter-'
national control principle. The position of the other
three non-Communist members--China, Peru, and Cuba--
remains in doubt. The USSR will probably veto any
Western resolution providing for international control:
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION .
-. . . . . . . . . Page 5
Tension has remained high along the Arab-Israeli
borders since the Israeli attack on Jordan on 25 Sep-
tember. Iraq thus 'far has done little'in.response to
Jordan's request for aid. Egypt has made some prop-
aganda gains out of the situation by rushing small arms
25X1
i
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 9271000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
POLISH DRIVE FOR INDEPENDENCE
CONTINUES UNCHECKED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Despite indications that the USSR is attempting to
slow the pace of liberalization in the Satellites,
Poland shows no sign of altering its course of seeking
increased internal freedoms and independence from the
Kremlin. This policy has been a factor in the conduct
of the Poznan trials, which generally have been open
and free, partly because of the influence of Western
public opinion.
PROSPECTS FOR HATOYAMA VISIT
TO MOSCOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Japanese prime minister Hatoyama plans to go to
Moscow on 6 October in the hope of restoring diplomatic
relations between Japan and the USSR without a formal
peace treaty. While the USSR has agreed to continue
negotiations for a peace treaty including a territorial
settlement after relations are renewed, this is un-
likely to placate Hatoyama's opponents, and they may
break away from the government party on the grounds
that Japan's territorial claims have been sacrificed.
ii
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
THE WEEK IN BRI$F
Approved For Release 20
25X1
 Approved For Release 20~ R"kk0927L0A1000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 October 1956
PORTUGAL STALLS
AZORES BASES AGREEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Portugal is stalling on negotiations for renewal
of the Azores bases agreement, which expires at the end
of 1956. Portuguese leaders excuse the delay by ex-
pressing concern over a possible change in the American
attitude on colonialism, particularly Goa, and by
pointing to the shifting defense picture in Western
Europe.
THE TANGIER CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The Moroccan government has called a nine-power
conference for 8 October to end the international
regime in Tangier. The eight foreign governments which
have administered Tangier--France, Spain, Britain,
Italy, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the
United States--seek to retain an international organ-
ization of some sort to protect their economic interests
in the area.
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
An upsurge of terrorism in Algeria during September
has strengthened the hand of those critics of the French
military program who feel immediate political action by
Paris is necessary to save the French position in
Algeria.
DISTURBANCES LIKELY IN CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The Cuban government is alert to the possibility of
revolutionary activity in the near future. President
Batista probably no longer enjoys the solid support of
the army, but there are as yet no signs of widespread
SOVIET PLANS
FOR AN EARTH SATELLITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Soviet representatives at two recent international
scientific meetings tended to be noncommittal on the USSR U
plans for an earth satellite. This reticence, which
contrasts with previous announcements, may mean that
the Soviet Union has decided to avoid international
commitments which would require it to reveal its
techniques in the guided missile field, or merely that
a detailed announcement is to be held off until a
successful launching is more certain. Estimates give
the USSR the capability to launch a small earth
satellite successfully by early 1957.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For Release 2005/02/1 CIA-RD-P79-00927A
k CRE T 20 000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 October 1956
NEW SOVIET YOUTH SQUADS
COMBAT CRIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The reactivation ofo,Soviet Communist Youth League
(Komsomol) "light cavalry" squads in the Odessa Oblast
of the Ukraine, announced on 23 September, highlights
the serious problem of law enforcement in the USSR.
One of the major functions of these units presumably
will be to engage in surprise raids on places of
amusement or public assembly to deal with acts of
"hooliganism" and crime.
COMMUNIST CHINA
INCREASES UNIVERSITY ENROLLMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
In an effort to increase the supply of technical
personnel, Peiping has almost doubled new enrollments
in institutions of higher learning and prohibited
industry and administrative organizations from re-
cruiting middle school graduates capable of university
work. The program is a 180-degree turn from the 1955
policy of encouraging students to discontinue their
schooling and join the labor force.
TRANSPORT PROBLEMS
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Rail congestion and traffic tie-ups in Communist
China during the past month have slowed freight movement
and in some areas have temporarily reduced indust-rial
output.
EAST GERMAN SHIPPING
TO BY-PASS WEST GERMANY
A new East German canal under construction since
April will link the Elbe River and the Baltic Sea and
permit diversion to the East German ports of Wismar and
Rostock of shipping which now must pass through West
Germany. The new canal will parallel the existing
Elbe-Trave canal running from the Elbe to the port of
Luebeck in West Germany, and is further evidence that
the East German regime envisages a long-term division
SECRET
iv
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Page 12
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/1$ VR 79-00927AQe 1000020001-0
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
COMPOSITION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S
GOVERNING BODIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The composition of the Chinese Communist Party's
governing bodies, as revealed at the party's eighth
congress, confirms that Mao Tse-tung continues to dominate
the party. The proceedings at the congress also pro-
vided nearly conclusive evidence that Liu Shao-chi and
Chou En-tai have retained the second and third positions,
and that Teng Hs$aa=b1nff has ned the top handful of
party leaders.
PROBLEMS FACING THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . Page 4
The Bundestag session that opened on 27 September
will serve largely as a sounding board for the 1957
national elections in West Germany. Each party will
seek to extract the utmost in political benefit from
controversies over reunification, rearmament and
European integration. Chancellor Adenauer's popularity
has waned somewhat,and his Christian Democratic Party is
on the defensive. He may feel forced to accept com-
promises incompatible with his previous strong pro-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
GREECE AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM
The Greek government and the opposition are antie-
ipating a major crisis in November, which they expect
to follow a decision by the UN General Assembly on
whether or not to consider the Cyprus issue. Prime
Minister Karamanlis is believed to be canvassing possible
courses of action to meet the test, which is bound to
.come no matter what the assembly decides, while opposition
leaders are co-operating in a campaign to overthrow him
and force new elections.
Page 6
SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENTS.. . . . . . . Page 7
Recent indications point to intensified Soviet
interest in biological warfare. The USSR's defensive
capability in this field is restricted by deficiencies
in sanitation, public health and crop protection. The
Soviet Union is probably attempting to acquire a
capability adequate for retaliation in kind against a
BW attack.
SECRET
v
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
25X1
 Approved For tease 2005/02/1,5E1'R79-00927!"000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 October 1956
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/4-: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved FQLaplease 2005/0N
flff P79-009201000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV TALKS
Discussions now under way
in the Crimea between Presi-
dent Tito of Yugoslavia and
leaders of the Soviet union
probably are an attempt` to
find at least a temporary solu-
tion to problems in Soviet-Yugo-
slav relations, which stem from
fundamentally opposed concepts
concerning the doctrine of
"independent roads to social-
ism.'
Background of the Dispute
Although Tito's distrust
of the USSR was not completely
overcome during his visit to
Moscow last June, his present
suspicions are primarily the
result of a series of events
which occurred during the
summer months.
Despite their initial
public concurrence with the
Soviet line--a line which has
since been reversed--Yugoslav
officials apparently were dis-
turbed at the harsh Soviet re-
action to the Poznan riots in
Poland. The Yugoslavs have
been equally concerned over
the apparent change since June
in Soviet propaganda concern-
ing international Communist re-
lations. Tito's concept of
genuinely "independent roads
to socialism," ostensibly ac-
cepted by the Soviet leaders
in June, has, in essence, been
contradicted by Moscow's sub-
sequent emphasis on interna-
tional Communist unity and by
its outright criticism of
"national Communism."
The related Soviet change
in attitude toward the Satel-
lites in general, however,ap-
pears to have been the major
area of friction. The USSR
this summer warned the Satel-
lites that limits to the
liberalization programs--pro-
grams which apparently have
been actively encouraged by
Yugoslavia--had been trans-
gressed. Marshal Bulganin
visited Poland in July and
cautioned a Warsaw audience
that "antiparty" tendencies
were afoot and must be halted.
The Polish press, Bulganin
claimed, exhibited such trends.
In addition Bulganin stated--
contrary to the official Polish
view--that the Poznan riots were
instigated by Western imperial-
ist agents to exploit such un-
healthy situations.
As an apparent follow-up
to this form of warning, the
central committee of the Soviet
Communist Party on 3 September
sent a letter to the Satellites,
admonishing them that the USSR,
not 'Yugoslavia, is the correct
model to follow in building
socialism. According to this
letter, the Yugoslav concept
of the "independent roads to
socialism" thesis is incorrect
and is not to be accepted by
the Satellites.
Already upset by these
developments, the Yugoslavs
received an additional jolt
in early September from what
they considered to be un-
warranted Soviet interference
in their internal affairs.
Yugoslavia this summer had
placed on trial for treason a
number of former Yugoslav party
officials who had defected to
the East after the Yugoslav-
Cominform break in 1948. Soviet
and Satellite press coverage of
these trials, considered in
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 5
 Approved Felease 2005/0~11rc1[C.l P79-00901000020001-0
Belgrade to be unfriendly in
tone and misleading in substance,
was publicly attacked by the
Yugoslavs as being "Cominform-
ist -inspired," and as a direct
attack on the Tito regime.
The Soviet Dilemma
There may be differences
among the Soviet leaders cone
cerning Khrushchev's over-all
liberalization policies, but
the hierarchy probably is un-
animous in the opinion that
some form of action must now be
taken to strengthen Soviet con-
trol over Poland and Hungary,
to halt the trend in those
countries toward overdemocrati-
zation and independence. It
was evidently considered advis-
able to make these impending
changes known to Tito.
Although presumably taken
immediately to heart in Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Rumania,
Bulgaria and Albania, Soviet
warnings to the Satellites this
summer were apparently largely
ignored in Hungary and actively
resisted in Poland, reactions
which must have produced pro-
found shock in Moscow. The de-
mocratization trend in Hungary
has accelerated during the past
month and, according to the
American legation in Budapest,
the situation is dangerously
close to getting out of hand.
Poland's internal democratiza-
tion program has gone ahead
without visible pause; the re-
gime is apparently encouraging
a new and decidedly more inde-
pendent view of Poland's rela-
tions with the USSR and, simul-
taneously, a closer and more
favorable look at both Yugoslav
independence and economic
practices.
The USSR is faced with a
dilemma of major proportions
by these developments in the
Satellites. The decision to
adopt a tougher attitude to-
ward at least Poland and Hun-
gary will, if it is to be suc-
cessfully implemented, threaten
the efficacy of the USSR's
general foreign policy line of
relaxation and peaceful coex-
istence. Failure to act deci-
sively, on the other hand, might
inevitably lead to a not-too-
distant choice between military
intervention or a loss of control
over some of the Satellites.
Tito's Trip
Tito's sudden trip to the
USSR on 27 September, following
eight days of conversations with
Soviet party first secretary
Khrushchev in Yugoslavia, was
reportedly the result of an
urgent, last-minute decision.
According to Yugoslav officials,
Khrushchev's attitude, as re-
vealed during talks at Brioni,
was uncompromising and reflected
an almost complete reversal of
earlier Soviet pronouncements
concerning both Yugoslavia and
the Satellites. Tito reportedly
threatened to make the whole
dispute public; this allegedly
was countered by Khrushchev
with his invitation for Tito to
visit the USSR and to hold talks
with other Soviet leaders.
Tito's acceptance apparently
was predicated on his belief that
every feasible effort must be
made to preserve the Soviet
"new look" toward his own country
and the Satellites. Before
reaching any kind of agreement
with the USSR, Tito, at a mini-
mum, would.,probably insist that
the USSR assure him of its
genuine. acceptance of the legit-
imacy of Yugoslavia's independent
Communist role and withdraw
its recent warnings to the
Satellites that Yugoslavia is
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 5
 --Approved ForrWease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092777801000020001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
not a model for these countries
to follgow,
The Soviet leaders, for
their part, presumably invited
Tito to the Crimea in order
to persuade him that a "get-
tough" policy toward at least
two of the Satellites, Poland
and Hungary, is absolutely
necessary if Communist power
in those countries is to be
preserved. Implementation of
this new policy would be made
doubly difficult if it were
actively resisted by Yugoslavia,
whose prestige and influence
in Poland and Hungary has grown
.considerably during recent
months. Yugoslav support for
a somewhat harder policy in
these countries, on the other
hand, might soften the appear-
ance of a reversion to Stalinism
and might also, by facilitating
the Soviet task., reduce the
harshness of the new measures,
If the USSR proposes--as
some press reports allege--that
some new form of international
Communist organization be formed
with Yugoslavia as a member,
Tito would probably resist such
a plan. He believes he can
exert his ideas and influence
most effectively through bi-
lateral relations with other
Communist parties, rather than
through an organization which
the most powerful member, the 25X1
USSR, u dominate.
25X1
In the UN Security Council
debate beginning 5 October,
Britain and France hope to ob-
tain substantial backing for
a .Suez settlement along the
lines of the 18-nation plan
for international control.
Six council members, including
Iran, support the Suez Canal
Users' Association (SCUA) and
can be expected to support the
.principle of international rule.
The position of the other three
non-Communist members,-- China,
Peru, and Cuba-- remain in
doubt. The USSR will probably
veto any Western resolution
providing for international
control.
Foreign Minister Shepilov,
who arrived at the UN on 3
October, told reporters that
the West's "hot-headed and im-
practical projects" were no way
to a solution of the Suez dis-
pute. He added that the Security
Council debate could achieve
"serious progress," if the par-
ticipants displayed the necessary
"realism, mutual understanding
and trust."
Moscow will probably rely
on the Egyptians to defend
their own case effectively. The
Soviet delegation will work very
closely with the Egyptian
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 5
 Approved FQ&&elease 2005/ 4t jDP79-0092 601000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
delegation for a co-ordinated
approach, at the same time
keeping the door open to other
means of negotiation. Moscow's
propaganda continues to men-
tion, though with reduced em-
phasJs, . a six-power conference
and the Egyptian proposal for
a 45-nation conference, as the
best means for a solution to
the Suez dispute.
Egyptian Position
The Egyptians have sent
a strong delegation to the UN
debate amid many indications
that they hope the debate will
provide a setting for negotia-
tions leading to an acceptable
settlement. This apparent de-
sire for negotiations is not
accompanied, however, by any
indication that Egypt's posi-
tion on the canal problem has
shifted. Egyptian spokesmen
still insist that Egypt must
control and operate the canal.
Cairo is willing to negotiate
on details concerning inter-
national rights of canal
transit.
Canal operations have
generally proceeded smoothly.
On 2 October, two British
ships had accidents which
caused minor traffic delays.
Press reports from Port Said
state that the first Soviet
pilot guided a vessel in the
canal on the same day. Seven
other Soviet pilots reportedly
have passed their qualifying
examinations.
Canal authorities now
claim to have a force of over
200 pilots either on duty or
in training. If this claim
is true, the Egyptian admin-
istration has about the same
number of pilots as the old
Suez Canal Company just before
nationalization, although not
all the present pilots can
handle large vessels.
British and French Position
The possibility that force
will be employed to resolve the
dispute seems to have receded.
Prime Minister Eden and Premier
Mollet have agreed that military
action would be resorted to only
in the event of almost total
interruption in canal traffic
or of developments in Egypt
which would convince British
public opinion of the necessity
for military action.
the canal.
While 15 of the 18 nations
that backed the earlier West-
ern plan for international con-
trol have formally joined SCUA,
there is no agreement on how
to bring Nasr to accept inter-
national control. London
evidently has come to believe
that the users should send a
maximum volume of ships through
the canal, while withholding
tolls as much as possible, to
test Egypt's ability to operate
25X1
25X1
25X1
SECRET
0927A0010000Page -0 of 5
PART I Approved For Release OF IOMMEDIATEC~4'~~
9
 Approved Foc. (ease 2005/Q2 tAffDP79-0092T,p,9'01000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 October 1956
25X1
Tension has remained high
along the Arab-Israeli borders
since the Israeli attack on
Jordan on 25 September. After
much debate and queries to
Britain and the United States,
Iraq appears to have decided
to do little or nothing for
the time being about Jordan's
request for aid. The Egyptians,
however, have made some propa-
ganda gains out of the situa-
tion by expediting small arms
and ammunition to Jordan by air.
The Jordanian foreign
minister's mission to Baghdad
appears to have foundered on
Iraq's reluctance to risk
provoking Israel or to give
away any of its own hard-won
equipment. Although Iraqi
premier Nuri Said rejected at
once Jordan's request for a
division of Iraqi troops, he
did indicate he would like to
establish a military supply
base in Jordan and possibly to
send a "guard force" to look
after Iraqi materiel. The
Iraqi chief of staff, however,
has indicated that no Iraqi
troops will be sent to Jordan
until there has been an agree-
ment with Amman on joint mili-
tary planning. This proviso
in itself would be likely to
postpone any Iraqi troop
movement indefinitely.
SECRET
Cairo was apparently
spurred to at least token action
by reports of the Jordanian
appeal to Iraq. Ambassador
Mallory reported that Egyptian
transport planes circled Amman
ostentatiously before landing
their cargoes of arms. Press
reports in addition indicated
that still another meeting of
Arab military chiefs was held
in Cairo to consider helping
Jordan, and Radio Cairo helped
Jordan's King Hussain out by
asserting that in the 25 Sep-
tember raid, 200 Israelis had
been found dead--shot in the
back, because they were fleeing
the fury of Jordan's defenders.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 5
 . Approved For,$,glease 2005/02I'L4I~R-FDP79-00927,4@1000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 October 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
POLISH DRIVE FOR INDEPENDENCE
CONTINUES.UNCHECKED
Despite indications that
the USSR is attempting to slow
the pace of liberalization in
the Satellites, Poland shows no
sign of altering its course of
seeking increased internal free-
doms and independence of the
Kremlin. The Polish press has
published blunt criticism of.
,Soviet-Polish relations, the
leading Polish party newspaper
has reprinted statements hail-
.ing Yugoslav independence, and
various groups continue to urge
the adoption of further reforms.
The Polish drive for in-
dependence appears to be sup-
ported primarily by a relatively
small portion of Polish society
consisting of party members,
intellectuals and writers; it
does not appear to have wide
public participation. Contin-
uation of the drive for liber-
alization at its present pace,
however, may serve to spur the
generally quiescent Polish
public to take an active part
in future developments.
Demands for-Change
Numerous articles and radio
broadcasts have advocated the
Yugoslav practice of establish-
ing workers' councils with
power to run the factories
with a minimum of interference
from the authorities. Factories
run by.such councils would
have wide latitude in purchasing
raw materials, planning produc-
tion, and marketing the finished
product, particularly as regards
sales abroad. One prominent
Polish economist has gone so
far as to advocate reliance on
a market economy to guide the
production of locally run
factories.
The single-list election
system was attacked in a 25
September article in Glos Pracy,
organ of the Trade Union
Federation, which called for a
change in the law to permit the
nomination of at least twice as
many candidates as there are
seats in the Sejm. The trade
union paper has not been a lead-
ing critic of the regime in the
past, which suggests that the
idea of election reform may
have originated with the govern-
ment. Such a change would not
mean loss of control by the
regime, as the candidates would
still be selected by the Com-
munist-controlled national
front, but it.would allow the
people to reject those candi-
dates they regarded as least
capable of representing their
interests.
Poznan Trials
The regime's liberaliza-
tioft policy has influenced the
conduct of the Poznan trials,
which generally have been open
.and free, in response in part
at least to the pressure of
Western public opinion. Show
trials in the past have tended
to place the necessity for
internal security and control
above the advantage of creating
a favorable impression.
The prosecution has admit-
ted that the confessions of the
defendants were secured by means
of secret police strong-arm
methods, and the court has
invalidated them as evidence.
Defense counsels have elioited
admissions from prosecution
witnesses that out of fear of
police beatings they told the
court what their examiners had
told them to say.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 13
 . Approved FoNWease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927 01000020001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMf
4 October 1956
The judges have allowed the
accused considerable freedom to
describe the-background of the
riots, including the use of
anti-Russian slogans. Several
Western newspapermen, lawyers
and diplomatic observers have
been present at the trials and
have conversed freely with de-
fense attorneys. The defendants
are enjoying the fairest trial
yet witnessed in a Communist
country, although not. all the 25X1
procedural safeguards of Western
judicial procedure have been
available to them.
PROSPECTS FOR HATOYAMA VISIT
TO MOSCOW
Japanese prime minister
Hatoyama now plans to go, to
Moscow on 6 October in the
hope of obtaining a quick a-
greement to'normalize relations
between Japan and the USSR.
25X1
25X1 Moscow removed
a major ,obstacle to the prime
minister's trip by agreeing to
a renewal of relations without
a formal peace treaty on the
basis of five points previously
advanced by Japan, to which was
added the stipulation that
negotiations on the territorial
problem would continue follow-
ing the restoration of diplo-
matic ties.
Under the proposed agree-
ment, the USSR and Japan would
end the state of war, exchange
ambassadors, and implement the
fisheries pact. The USSR would
repatriate.the Japanese citi-
zens it has held since the end
of the war and would support
Japan's admission to the UN.
Even opponents of Hatoyama
within the ruling Liberal-
Democratic Party apparently
consider his visit to Moscow
inevitable. While they still
oppose his mission, their
primary tactic now is directed
toward obtaining a pledge that
the Japanese delegation will
insist on the immediate return
to Japan of Shikotan and the
Habomai Islands, an"act the
USSR has previously made con-
tingent on the conclusion of a
peace treaty.
Some Japanese Foreign-Min-
istry officials believe that
Hatoyama's chief lieutenant,
Minister of Agriculture and
Forestry Kano, who will ac-
company the prime minister, will
agree to this stipulation in
Tokyo, but will maneuver as he
pleases in Moscow. They do not
expect the Japanese mission to
succeed. in obtaining a concession
from Moscow on the territorial
dispute, and they believe Kono
expects to win credit for nor-
malizing relations while leaving
to others the onus of subse-
quently losing the southern
Kuriis.
Former prime minister
Yoshida feels he could rally
a large body of public opinion
in opposition to Hatoyama's
policies toward the Soviet
Union. A Moscow settlement un-
reasonably adverse to Japan
might well cause the Yoshida
faction to withdraw from the
government party in the hope
that the former prime minister's
faction would ride to power
under a new conservative a-
lignment by exploiting the
sacrifice of vital Japanese
interests and territorial
claims.
25X1
SECRET
PART II Approved For Release /R2/AJD%WJg190927A001000020001VRge 2 Of 13
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
 Approved FoK.BwIease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-009270401000020001-0
SECRET
PORTUGAL STALLS ,
AZORES BASES AGREEMENT
Portugal is stalling on
negotiations for renewal of the
1951 Azores bases.agreement, due
to expire at the end of 1956.
Portuguese leaders excuse the
delay by expressing concern over
a possible change in the American
attitude on the colonial issue,
particularly Goa, and by point-
ing to the shifting defense pic-
ture in Western Europe.
Technical annexes with new
provisions for American air
transit- facilities in the'Azores
were approved by the Portuguese
military in August, following
almost a year of negotiation.,.
The major changes include per-
mission to set up and operate
an early warning system, to
station an American intercep-
tor day-fighter squadron, and
to increase the number of
American personnel on the islands.
These provisions are, however,
subject to the approval of
Foreign Minister. Cunha and
Prime Minister Salazar in the
course of negotiations for a
renewal of the over-all defense
agreement.
Ambassador Bonbright be-
lieves the Portuguese are hold-
ing out on the Azores bases
agreement to the last moment
as the only weapon at their
disposal to "keep the US honest"
in relation to Goa. Both Cunha
The Moroccan government
has called a nine-power con-
ference for 8 Octobere to abro-
gate the international regime
installed in Tangier by the
1923 statute. Morocco hopes to
end foreign domination of the
city's government which has ex-
isted since the eighteenth
century.
and Defense Minister Santos
Costa have admitted that the
government was stalling, but
both expressed the. hope that
an agreement would be reached
by mid-November. They cited
"the uncertainties of Ameri-
can policy in an election
year" and the possibility that
the colonial issue may be in-
jected into the election cam-
paign. They are particularly
worried about President Eisen--
hower's renewed invitation to
Nehru to visit the US and what
the US may do or say on Goa.
Prime Minister Salazar
believes the threat of war in
Europe is receding. The Portu-
guese are watching closely the
current developments regard-
ing the American base in Ice-
land and the signs of increas-
ing emphasis on the use of
nuclear weapons in the defense
of Western Europe.
Lisbon probably will con-
tinue to refuse to extend
American rights in the Azores
for the duration of NATO.
Since Portugal succeeded in
limiting the 1951 agreement
to a five-year period, it is
almost certain to insist on a
similar limitation in a new
agreement.
The eight foreign govern-
ments involved--France, Spain,
Britain, Italy,. Portugal, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and the
United States-seek to retain
an international organization
of some sort to protect the
heavy concentration of foreign
population and financial and
communications installations
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 13
 Approved Forease 2005/0c8:~LAIkDP79-009211000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in Tangier. The
most that is hoped
for is that the Mor-
occan government
? will create a free
port and a free
trade zone and main-
tain Tangier's free
money market and
banking facilities,
Some powers,
particularly-Spain,
want a Moroccan
pledge never to per-
mit any form of mil-
itary installation
in Tangier, 1. The
Moroccans would con-
sider such a request
a derogation of
0 Vejer de la Frontera
_tBarbate
ar -C 1=
bo Trefe l
C
U
,
p
a
)
K
Algeciras TBR
Punta & (U K)
Europa
their sovereignty and might
be antagonized by the sugges-
tion.
1Arclla
The greatest boon to Tan-
gier's lagging economy would
be to continue the free money
market. This, however, is'
likely to be opposed by France,
which considers the free ex-
change system of Tangier
injurious to the stability of
the franc. Retention of the
free market will depend in
large part on French-Moroccan
financial negotiations now
under way in Paris.
The Moroccan government
is. apparently unprepared and
is.totally inexperienced in
conducting an internationAl
conference. Its bargaining
strength will lie primarily in
strong nationalist demands for
reincorporation of Tangier into
Morocco, the desire of the
An upsurge of terrorism
in Algeria during September
has strengthened the hand of
those critics of the Mollet-
Lacoste military program who
MILES 25
I I 1 1 1
eight powers to retain Moroccan
good will, and potential dis-
agreements among the eight,
25X1
In spite of recent concil-
iatory statements by the Moroc-
can foreign minister, the
Moroccans may attempt to ab-
rogate the 1906 Act of Algeciras,_
which is the basis for the
1923 statute and existing.
limitations on customs duties.
The financially distressed
Rabat government would like to
increase its revenue,
Such a demand would again
invite the attention of the
Soviet Union, which as suc-
cessor to Czarist Russia con-
siders itself a signatory of
the 1906 act, The USSR in-
quired of Paris and Rabat in
September why it was not in-
vited to the 8 October con-
ference,
San Roque i~
feel immediate political action
by Paris is necessary to save
the French position in Algeria.
Many liberal Frenchmen
in Algeria are less.optimistic
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 13
 Approved For cease 2005/022 c k- DP79-0092 ' 1000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 October 1956
about the situation than re-
siding minister Robert Lacoste.
They maintain that the security
situation has greatly worsened
in the last six months despite
the tremendous build-up of
French forces. They point to
the spread of rebel activity
into new areas and the multi-
plication of attacks against
persons and property, especial-
ly in urban areas such as
Algiers.
Some responsible officials
in Paris are also gloomy over
the military Picture. These
officials admitted privately
last month that the "pacifica-
tion" claimed for certain areas
was considered temporary and
meant only that French control
had been re-established for
the daylight hours. They
acknowledged that reports they
had received indicated that
90 percent of the Moslem pop-
ulation is now infected with
the concept of Algerian in-
dependence.
Developments in the guer-
rilla conflict during September
appear to sustain these more
pessimistic appraisals of the
situation. Urban and rural
terrorism, economic sabotage,
and ambushes of Small military"
detachments apparently increas-
ed as compared with the two
preceding months, while at the
same time the total area re-
garded as "insecure" expanded,
especially in the west.
Terrorist acts reached a new
high in Algiers, the capital,
during the last week of the
month. On 1 October, Lacoste
warned that the rebels had
received instructions to
?t{~NIUH
IAHARA
Geuta(sp.) Oran
Melilla ce An
Insecure area
Principal area of rebel activity since 1 September
9_ 100 240. 3510 400
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART IT NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 13
 Approved Fo . (ease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092 01000020001-0
SECRET
maintain a "climate of terror"
during October and could be .
expected to step up their effort
to widen the breach between
the settlers and the Moslems.
On the political front,
Lacoste has persuaded the
French cabinet to defer defini-
tion of a new status for Algeria
pending further developments
in the Suez crisis. Mollet
still expects to propose a new
Algerian regime to the National
Assembly sometime before the
end of October.. This plan is
virtually certain to fall short
of recognizing Algerian inde-
pendence and is therefore un-
likely either to provide a
basis for fruitful negotia-
tions with nationalist leaders
or, if imposed., to gain any
substantial measure of support
from the Moslems of Algeria.
25X1
DISTURBANCES LIKELY IN CUBA
An increasing number of
reports have claimed that rev-
olutionary activity in Cuba
is planned in the near future;
and disturbances therefore
seem likely,
Batista probably no longer
enjoys the solid support of
the army,'which is a deter-
.mining factor in the situation,
and there is some evidence of
dissatisfaction, particularly
among the younger officers.
The American embassy
states that a movement led by
determined military personnel,
relying on surprise and general
apathy, might be successful.
25X1
is pose a ha 25X1
current conspiracies in Cuba
are related to activities of
exiles, including Fidel Castro,
whose "26 of July Movement"
is also active in Cuba and
was purportedly contacted recent-
ly by Cuban Communists.
There are as yet. no signs
of widespread civilian unrest.
The comparatively prosperous
population appears generally
apathetic toward the political
situation, and a movement
relying principally on civil-
ian support would probably
have little chance of success.
Discontent, however, was
heightened by the government's
decision to hold partial elec-
tions in 1957 in the face.of
opposition demands for general
elections as soon as possible.
Increasing resistance was
indicated by the Barquin'con-
spiracy and an abortive civil-
ianassault on an important
military garrison a short time
later.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 13
 Approved For. Lease 2005/0l4 RDP79-00927 1000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET PLANS
FOR AN EARTH SATELLITE
Soviet representatives
at two recent international
scientific meetings tended to
be noncommittal on the USSR's
plans for an earth. satellite.
This reticence, which contrasts
with previous announcements,
may mean that the Soviet Union
has decided to avoid inter-
national commitments which
would require it to reveal its
techniques in the guided missile
field, or merely that a de-
tailed announcement is to be
held off until a successful
launching is more certain.
Estimates give the USSR the
capability to launch a small
earth satellite successfully
by early 1957.
At a meeting of scientists
organizing plans for the Inter-
national Geophysical Year (IGY)
at Barcelona from 10 to 15
September, the Soviet repre-
sentative commented vaguely
that "Russia is studying the
launching of an artificial
satellite by means of rockets."
Previous information had indi-
catedthat the USSR would dis-
cuss its earth satellite plans
in detail at Barcelona. At an
international astronautical
meeting in Rome later last month,
the Soviet delegation similarly
made no formal announcement of
an earth satellite program,al-
though it did propose inform-
ally that the USSR and the
United States pool their knowl-
edge on the subject. In
addition, the leading Soviet
scientist in the field, L. 1.
Sedov, commented at the Rome
meeting, "I guess the United
States is ahead, on the whole,
of all the countries."
The successful launching of
an earth satellite requires
solving many of the same
scientific and engineering
problems encountered in the
development of a long-range
ballistics missile, with the
added requirement of a long-
life Hower supply. Because
the Soviet Union has shown a
high capability in the guided
missile field, earlier announce-
inents of plans to launch a
satellite appeared feasible.
On 16 April 1955, the USSR
announced the formation of a
Permanent Interagency Commis-
sion fcr Interplanetary Communi-
cations. This organization,
composed of scientists whose
competence in such fields as
astrophysics and nuclear.energy
is internationally recognized,
was given the task of organizing
work on an automatic laboratory
for scientific research in
cosmic space. In August 1955,
shortly after the United States
announced plans to launch a
satellite, Sedov, the chairman
of this commission, revealed
that the USSR had similar plans.
A month later, Khrushchev
boasted to West Germany's Chan-
cellor Adenauer, who was then in
Moscow, that the USSR was ahead
of America in the building of
space satellites, In January
1956, Professor G. I. Pokrovsky,
reportedly a member of the Inter-
planetary. Communications Com-
mission, stated in a Soviet
newspaper that the Soviet Union
would launch an artificial
tellite in 1956 by a method
different from the three-stage
rocket launching procedure on
which American plans are based.
While attending a Jet Pro-
pulsion Congress in West Germany
in 'ehruary 1956, Soviet scien-
tists reportedly stated that the
USSR planned to launch 12 to 14
satellites in their program.
The scientists stated that mal-
.function of components and errors
in calculation were expected
and that they would be satisfied
if 50 percent of the vehicles
launched attained their cal-
culated orbit. Such a program
would be comparable to the
American program. 25X1
Prepared by 051)
(Concurred in by.ORR)
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART I I NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 13
 Approved F 0,elease 2005 (0 NEIgkRDP79-0092 001000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 October 1956
NEW SOVIET YOUTH SQUADS
COMBAT CRIME
The reactivation of So-
viet Communist Youth League
(Komsomol) "light cavalry"
squads in the Odessa Oblast of
the Ukraine, announced on 23
September, highlights the seri-
ous problem of law enforcement
in the USSR. One of the major
functions of these units pre-
sumably.will be to engage in
surprise raids on places of
amusement of public assembly to
deal with acts of "hooliganism"
and crime.
So-called "light cavalry"
units of the Komsomol were first
formed about 1928 for the pur-
pose of aiding party and state
organs in eliminating "bureau-
cratism" in economic enterprises.
Their principal function evi-
dently consisted of flying
raids, undertaken jointly with
special commissions of the
COMMUNIST CHINA
INCREASES UNIVERSITY ENROLLMENT
In an effort to increase
the supply of trained technical
personnel, Peiping has almost
doubled new enrollments in
institutions of higher learning.
The regime has gone so far as
to direct industry and adminis-
trative organizations to release
employees to study for college
entrance examinations and to
prohibit them from recruiting
middle school graduates
eligible for university study.
A need for greater enroll-
ment in institutions of
higher. ?1earning-was first ex-
pressed by Chou En-lai at a
meeting of the party's central
committee in January4 Two weeks
later, Peiping announced that
a 12-year education program was
being drawn up to provide
Workers and Peasants Inspection,
designed to expose shortcomings
in factories or on collective
farms. After having served its
purpose as a "major form of mass
control and criticism from be-
low," the "light ca v/airy" was
abolished in the mid-1930's.
During the past two years,
Soviet youth has been called
upon more and more frequently
to aid the militia (ordinary
police) in the struggle against
crime and delinquency. The
Odessa campaign is reportedly
patterned on the successful
one launched in Leningrad two
years ago. The organization of
the "light cavalry" in Odessa
Oblast appears designed to
glamorize militia assistance
activity and extend it to
include rural areas.
1,000,000 highly trained per-
sonnel of college professor,
engineer, and medical doctor
caliber.
In April, the government
announced a goal of 170,000
new college students for this
fall, despite.the fact that
only 140,000 middle school.
graduates were expected to
take college entrance examina-
tions. The deficit was to be
made up by government workers,
discharged servicemen, Overseas
Chinese and industrial workers.
Candidates for the examinations
from industry and government
were to be released from their
.duties three'months before the
examinations to afford them
time for study. Government
organizations, furthermore,
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA- D ET0927A00100002000~Oge 10 of 13
PART I I NOTES AND CO
 Approved Fo Iease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-009 &1000020001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU RY
4 October 1956
were directed not to hire :stu-
dents who passed the college
entrance examinations.
Peiping's announcement on
1 Septeiykber that 180,000 new
students--nearly twice the 1955
figure--began the academic year,
showed that these emergency
measures achieved their immedi-
ate objective. However, the
basic problem of a shortage of
qualified middle school
graduates to fill college en-
rollment quotas remains to be
solved.
The regime itself is. partly
responsible for this shortage
through its past encouragement
of students to join the labor
force As recently as July
1955, the minister of education,
Chang Hsi-Jo, affirmed the
government's position that
primary and junior middle school
graduates should be encouraged
to enter the labor force, in
TRANSPORT PROBLEMS
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Rail congestion and traf-
fic tie-ups in widely. separated
localities in 'Communist China
,in the past month have slowed
freight movement and in some
areas have temporarily reduced
industrial output. In his 18
September speech at the Chi-
nese Communist Party Congress,
Chou En-Lai stated that the
preseit transport situation
was "tense." Wang Shan-tou,
director of the State Council's
transport . planning office, in
his speech before the congress
said that Chinese transport in
1956 was being required to
.carry a freight volume which
originally had been planned for
1957 and that "contradictions"
the belief that only a small
portion of them could aspire
to further education. With
this sanction of the govern-
ment, peasants took their
children from school in order
to increase family incomes,
and "mass diecontinu.ations" of
studies reached 50 percent in
some areas. At this year's
session of the National
People's Congress, however,
Chang criticized peasants for
the practice, saying it would
seriously hinder the state's
development of higher education
and national construction
projects.
Continued use of this year's
emergency measures will,probably
be necessary to enable the
regime to attain the 1962 enroll-
ment goal of 850,040 set in the
recently announced Second Five-
Year Plan, a figure more than
double this year's total enroll-
ment in institutions of higher
learning; 25X1
(Concurred by ORR and OSI
between transport capacity and
transport volume were appearing.
China's rail construction
and repair program,. although
extensive, has barely kept
pace with the country's general
economic growth, and the in-
creasing requirements of in-
dustry and mining have period-
ically resulted in transport
bottlenecks. For the past
several years official announce-
ments and editorials have re-
peatedly pointed out that the
volume of rail traffic was
approaching the capacity of
the railway system. During
August and September a com-
bination of circumstances
produced several-bottlenecks.
SECRET
PART I IApproved For Release. 2 OTES_ 2 : V& 7.'500927A00100002000 ge 11 of 13
 Approved FoZoWease 2005/0201 tCIA:.F3pP79-009 1000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Han9cho
Extensive repair work on
the Lanchou and Chengtu lines
west to Pao-chi caused con-
siderable congestion in that
city.
EAST GERMAN SHIPPING
TO BY-PASS WEST GERMANY
A new East German canal
under construction since April
will link the Elbe River and
Baltic Sea and permit diversion
to the East German ports of
Wismar and Rostock of shipping
which now must pass through
West Germany, Since purely
economic considerations do not
seem to justify construction
of the canal, the project is
further evidence that the East
German regime envisages a long-
term division of Germany. The
new canal will parallel the
existing Elbe-Trave canal run-
ning from the Elbe to the port
of Luebeck in West Germany.
Both East German and
Czechoslovak shipping will be
SECRET
7
i ion,
heavy rains following
typhoon Wanda early
in August caused nu-
merous washouts and
local tie-ups in the
North China provinces
of Honan, Shantung,
Hopeh, and Anhwei.
Since Chinese
railroads are opera-
ting at a point close to capac-
ity, such local congestion will
probably reoccur frequently.:
In the future a larger pro-
portion of rail investment
apparently will have to be
devoted to improvement of
existing lines and facilities
rather than to new construction.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Releas 20 5 0 /14 : CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0 4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page of 13
 Approved Far Release elease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092ZAf 1000020001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
able to by-pass West Germany
via the new canal, which is
to be completed by 1960. In
1955, about 2,500,000 tons of
such trade passed through the
West German port of Hamburg,
and the possibility of losing
this business has.caused some
consternation in Hamburg
commercial circles. Luebeck,
another West German port, is
also involved in this trade.
The projected canal will be
73 miles long and will be able
to accommodate vessels of
1,000 gross tons. It will
cost about four percent of the
total funds East Germany plans
to spend on construction during
the current five-year plane
In addition, port facilities
at Wismar and Rostock, which
handled 4,500,000 tons of
freight in 1955 as compared
with 1,000,000 tons annually
before World War II, are now
being expanded to provide for
the further increase in
freight expected when the canal
is finished.
Critically short supplies
of construction materials and
manpower for construction will
,SECRET
EAST GERMANY
International boundary ----Existing canal
Limit oT Soviet occupation New canal link to
be constructed
4 OCTOBER 1956
probably necessitate a substan-
tial diversion of construction
material from other sectors of
the economy in order to complete
the canal within the plan period.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 13
 Approved Fc r$eJ ase 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00922 Q 1000020001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, SUMMARY
4 October 1956
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
COMPOSITION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S GOVERNING BODIES
The composition of the
Chinese Communist Party's govern-
ing bodies, as revealed at the
party's eighth congress, con-
firms that Mao Tse-tung con-
tinues to dominate the party.
The proceedings at the congress
also provided nearly conclusive
evidence that Liu Shao-chi
and Chou En-lai have retained
the second and third positions,
and that Teng Hsiao-ping has
joined the top handful of party
leaders.
Mao has been the undis-
puted leader of the party since
1935. Liu has been his prin-
cipal lieutenant and his main
spokesman in party affairs
since 1945. Chou has been
premier of the Peiping regime
since 1949 and has been con-
sistently ranked third by Pei-
ping since 1953. Teng, secretary
general of the central com-
mittee, joined the politburo
only in 1954.
Mao is to remain chair-
man of the central committee
and its politburo. Liu is to
be the senior vice chairman,
with Chou next in line. These
three leaders are to be the
top three members of the
politburo's new standing
committee. Teng is to be a
member of the standing com-
mittee, and is the new head of
the central committee's secre-
tariat.
Standing Committee
The new six-man standing
committee., which also includes
two party leaders--Chu Te and
Chen Yun--who for years have
been formally ranked fourth
and fifth, will probably come
to be the center of power in
the party and regime. The com-
mittee is similar in composi-
tion to the party's old secre-
tariat, which had evidently been
discharging the wide powers of
the politburo between meetings.
Mao may turn over the direction
of the committee to Liu Shao-
chi, who apparently directed
the party meetings which pre-
ceded the congress and part
of the congress itself.
The new secretariat,
under Teng, probably will
be confined to its constitu-
tional role of directing the
routine work of the central
committee. Teng's post will
thus be similar to his previous
office of secretary general.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of
 Approved F,QLJaplease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-OO9ZW1000020001-0
SECRET
4 October 1956
The central committee al-
so elected a 21-man control
commission which will probably
retain its predecessor's func-
tion of broad supervisory
authority over the party. The
new body contains no major.
figures, however, and like the
old commission will be unable
to take action against members
of the central committee.
The politburo has been
enlarged from 13 members to
17 full and six non-voting
members. Eighteen of the 23
occupy key posts in the party
and regime. The politburo has
retained four of Mao's old
comrades who no longer seem to
be important figures: Chu Te,
Lin Po-chu, Tung Pi-wu, and
Lin Piao, who is
evidently too ill
for any work. One
of the ten new mem-
bers, Liu Po-cheng,
appears to owe his
politburo post to
prestige gained as
a military leader
many years ago.
Two of the key
figures on the polit-
buro are Liu Shao-
chi's deputies on
the government body
which supervises
Chou En-lai's State
Council (cabinet).
These are Peng Chen,
who is also mayor and
party boss of Pei-
ping, and Lo Jung-
huan, who concur-
rently directs the
political officer
system in the armed
forces.
Eight important
members of the new
politburo.are vice
premiers in the
government under
Chou En-lei. In
addition to Teng
Hsiao-ping, they
are: senior vice
premier Chen Yun,
an ?economic.specialist; Peng
Te-huai,.minister of defense
and the regime's top military
man; Ho Lung and Chen I, one-
time military leaders who have
been utility men for Chou; Li
Fu-chun,. long-range planning
.director; Li Hsien-nien,.a
top economic co-ordinator; and
alternate member Ulanfu, boss
of Inner Mongolia.
The other alternate mem-
bers are: Cheng Wen-tien,
Chou's senior deputy foreign
minister; Lu Ting-i, director
of the party's propaganda de-
partment; Chen Po-ta, one of
Lu's deputies and a longtime
spokesman for Mao Tse-tung;
Po I-po who directs the re-
gime's annual economic plan-
ning; and Kang Sheng, long
reported as the party's
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION
1955 0 1956
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
( 68 Members)
MAO TSE-TUNG Chairman
TENG HSIAO-PING
Secretary General
POLITBURO
MAO TSE-TUNG Chairman
Members
LIU SHAG-CHI
CHOU EN-LAI
CHU TE
CHEN YUN
KANG SHENG
PENG CHEN
TUNG PI-WU
LIN PO-CHU
CHANG WEN-TIEN
PENG TE-HUAI
LIN PIAO
TENG HSIAO-PING
SECRETARIAT
MAO TSE-TUNG Chairman
Secretaries
LIU SHAO-CHI CHU TE
CHOU EN-LAI CHEN YUN
SECRETARY GENERAL'S OFFICE
Liu Lan-tao Dep Sec Gen
Ma Ming-fang Dep Sec Gen
Sung Jen-chiung Dap Sec Gen
Tan Chen-lin Dep Sec Gen
Yang Shang-kun Dep Sec Gen
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
( 170 Members)
MAO TSE-TUNG Chairman
LIU SHAO-CHI
CHOU EN-LAI
CHU TE
CHEN YUN
Vice Chairman
Vice Chairman
Vice Chairman
Vice Chairman
LIU SHAO-CHI Vice Chairman
CHOU EN-LAI Vice Chairman
CHU TE Vice Chairman
CHEN YUN Vice Chairman
TENG HSIAO-PING PENG CHEN
PENG TE-HUAI
LIN PIAO LO JUNG-HUAN
LIU PO-CHENG
LIN PO-CHU CHEN I
HO LUNG
TUNG PI-WU LI FU-CHUN
LI HSIEN-NIEN
ULANFU LU TING-I
KANG SHENG
CHANG WEN-TIEN CHEN PO-TA
PO I-PO
MAO TSE-TUNG
LIU SHAG-CHI
CHOU EN-LAI
CHU TE
CHEN YUN
TENG HSIAO-PING
SECRETARIAT
Secretaries
TENG HSIAO-PING
Tan Cheng.
PENG CHEN
Huang Ko-cheng
Wang Chia-hsiang
Li' Hsueh-feng
Tan Chen-lin
Alternate Secretaries
Infu Lan-tao
Yang Shang-kun
Hu Chiao-mu
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART T I T PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 8
25X1
 SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 October 1956
Approved F4V.Zoease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0093iA001000020001-0
secret police chief. Kang's
decline from sixth to twenty-
second place on the politburo
may reflect either the recent
Soviet practice of excluding
the secret police chief from
the inner circle, or a failure
by Kang's apparatus in the
Kao-Jao "conspiracy" against
other party leaders in 1954.
Central Committee
The new central committee,
which has more than twice the
membership of its predecessor,
is likely to be little more
important as a body. Although
the committee will probably
meet much more often than in
the past, its function will
continue to be essentially
that of approving the policy
decisions taken by a small
group of politburo members.
The new central committee
includes the great majority
of the actual leaders of the
party, government and military
establishment. Several persons
have been left out, however,
whose posts would seem to
justify their membership, and
many have been named simply as
a reward for past performances
or in deference to ethnic and
professional groups.
The composition of the
committee is more significant
as a reflection of the rela-
tive power positions of the
top leaders. Mao's friends
and proteges occupy more slots
than those of any other leader.
However, Liu, Chou, Teng and
Peng Te-huai are well repre-
sented. Lesser numbers of
proteges of most other members
of the politburo can also be
identified.
Su Yu, the regime's chief
of staff who has been out of
the news for months, was elected
to the new committee but ranks
several slots below his deputy,
Chen Keng, who has been identi-
fied as "acting" chief of staff.
Chou Shih-ti, commander of the
air defense forces which were
slighted in Peng Te-huai's
speech on military affairs,
.was not elected to the commit-
tee, and another man has just
been identified by a Communist
newspaper as holding Chou's
post.
Almost all of the polit-
buro members, and most of the
97 full members of the new
central committee have records--
in terms of residence, journeys,
writings or liaison work--which
indicate strong bonds with the
Soviet Union. Although Mao and
his principal lieutenants are
not Soviet puppets, as were
certain earlier party leaders,
they can be expected to view
the maintenance of the Sino-
Soviet alliance, in Liu Shao-
chi's words, as the party's
"supreme international duty."
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 8
 Approved Fgx.Rplease 2005/02/1 CIIA-RD 79-009W4M1000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY :.SUMMARY
The Bundestag session that
opened on 27 September will
serve largely as a sounding
board for the 1957 national
elections in West Germany.
Every issue will be debated
not so much on its merits as
for its effect on the voters,
and each party will seek to ex-
tract the utmost in political
benefit from controversies.
over reunification, rearmament
and European integration.
Chancellor Adenauer's
popularity has waned somewhat,
as recent public opinion polls
have indicated, and his Chris-
tian Democratic Party is con-
sequently on the defensive.
He will find it increasingly
difficult to get his way in
legislative matters and may
have to accept compromises in-
compatible with his previous
strong'prb-Western stand.
The chancellor has already
started the fight to retain
command of the situation. On
the basis of his meeting of
29 September with Premier Mol-
let, Adenauer is playing up
the prospects of a Saar settle-
ment favorable for West Ger-
many, and in a speech in Brus-
sels on 25 September he advo-
cated a new and looser concept
of European unity.
German unification remains
the primary concern of the
Bonn government. Adenauer is
under heavy attack on this is-
sue for inflexibility and in-
action. The chancellor hopes
to meet the growing criticism
on this score, not by any shift
of policy, but by a continued
exchange of notes with Moscow.
The USSR has not yet re-
plied'officially to Bonn's
note of 7 September asking for
an exchange of ideas and re-
iterating its demands for free
all-German elections and free-
dom for a united Germany to
join any alliance. Over the
coming months Adenauer may find
himself more isolated in his
own party on the freedom-of-
alliance stand.
The Adenauer government
must also move to meet opposi-
tion charges that it deliber-
ately keeps Bonn-Moscow rela-
tions frigid. Bonn officials
virtually ignored Soviet ambas-
sador Zorin, who has not been
replaced since his recall in
July. Bonn's ambassador to
Moscow will remain in the Feder-
al" Republic for several months
undergoing medical treatment.
Pressure to improve this state
of affairs, and to adopt a more
liberal policy on trade and
cultural relations with the
USSR, is likely in parliament
and the press.
As a move in this direction
and against Adenauer's wishes,.
his party has decided to join
all other parties in accepting
a Soviet invitation to send.
a Bundestag delegation to Mos-
cow.
The government will meet
increasing demands for a more
radical change of policy toward
the European Satellites. Even
coalition members see little
merit in Bonn's refusal to es-
tablish diplomatic relations
because the Satellites have
recognized East Germany. None-
theless, the government is
fearful that if it gives in on
this score, it will encourage
the recognition of the Soviet-
zone regime by other free world
states.
While all parties agree
that ambassadors should not be
exchanged with East Germany,
the government will have to
make some concession to repeated
demands for a more positive
attitude toward interzonal con-
tacts. Many West Germans are
genuinely worried that a, formid -
able cultural gulf is being
created which will enormously
complicate a future unification.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 8
 Approved RQL&Iease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00S274,p01000020001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 October 1956
Rearmament
Another matter on a par
with unification and equally
explosive as the election ap-
proaches is that of rearmament.
Although the build-up of the
army, navy and air force is
already well launched, the pub-
lic remains apathetic or skep-
tical of the utility of the
program in an atomic age.
Adenauer must convince the
West Germans that rearmament
as presently planned is neces-
sary, and, at the same time,
satisfy NATO that the program
is adequate to Western defense
needs.
To meet the widespread
antipathy to conscription, the
government decided on 27 Sep-
tember to make the draft term
12 instead of 18 months. This
decision precipitated a.special
session of the North Atlantic
Council, which expressed con-
cern and asked for reconsidera-
tion. The government, however,
is not likely to consider any
change politically possible
and is in some doubt about the
feasibility of initiating con-
scription before the September
1957 election.
The shortened draft term
has even added to the govern-
ment's domestic difficulties
because the Defense Ministry
now plans to recruit 70,000
additional volunteers and pro-
vide added pay incentives cost-
ing $190,000,000--a plan likely
to be fought by Finance Mini-
ster Schaeffer. He is already
unhappy over the government's
intention to reduce taxes and
increase social benefits in
an effort to win votes.
Adenauer is particularly
critical of the reported in-
tention of the United States
and Britain to shift their
strategic emphasis from con-
ventional to atomic weapons
and reduce their ground forces
in Europe. Not only have these
reports caused Germans to
question Adenauer's plans for
a 400,000-man army, but they
are giving rise to demand for
an army supplied with atomic
weapons.
Despite these complications,
the recruiting of volunteers
has continued at a high rate
in recent weeks, and the De-
fense Ministry insists that it
will meet its goal of 96,000
men in uniform by the end of
1956. The complete build-up,
however, seems certain to be
stretched out beyond the pro-
jected three to four years.
European Co-operation
To divert attention from
his inability to do much about,
German unification, Adenauer
intends to push for progress
in West European co-operation.
A major, obstacle to French-
German co-operation was removed
on 29 September when Adenauer
and Mollet agreed on the terms
of a Saar settlement which will
transfer the area to Germany
on 1 January 1957. This will
add the votes of the Saarlanders
in next year's election. If
Luxembourg objections can be
met, Adenauer will have an agree-
ment on the canalization of the
Moselle to push through a some-
what unwilling parliament this
fall.
Adenauer's principal in-
terest in the field of integra-
tion now is a mechanism for co-
ordinating the policies of Euro-
pean nations, partly to increase
Germany's voice in world affairs.
He cites the Suez crisis as il-
lustrating this need. In Brus-
sels on 25 September, the chan-
cellor called for a new political
organization open to all European
countries and having as broad a
field of activity as possible.
To make British membership pos-
sible, he turned his back on
"perfectionism," and said the
new organization need not be
entirely supranational.
His new approach is an ap-
peal to Europe to stand more
squarely on its own feet and for
European states to co-ordinate
their actions in an organization
in which the US is not a member.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 8
25X1
 Approved, 4W,.2elease 2005/0;9fiCR&iFDP79-096WC001000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Greek government and
the opposition are anticipat-
ing a major crisis in November,
which they expect to follow a
decision by the UN General
Assembly on whether or not to
consider the Cyprus issue.
Prime Minister Karamanlis is be-
lieved to be canvassing possible
courses of action to meet the
test, which is bound to come no
matter what the assembly decides,
while opposition leaders are
co-operating in a campaign to
overthrow him and force new
elections.
Possible Government Actions
Karamanlis continues to
hope for American support con-
cerning the Cyprus issue in the
UN, if not ultimately on a sub-
stantive decision, at least on
the inscription issue. He be-
lieves such support would en-
able him to surmount the coming
challenge even if Greece were
eventually defeated and might
substantially increase his
support in parliament. In
anticipation of possible UN
rejection of the Cyprus item,
opposition circles and the
press are speculating on a
wide range of courses Karamanlis
might adopt: (1) the resignation
of his government to permit the
formation of an opposition
coalition government; (2) a call
for new elections to seek a new
mandate for his regime; (3) the
convocation of a crown council
which, under the king's chair-
manship, would determine future
Greek policy on Cyprus; (4) the
severing of diplomatic relations
with Britain or Turkey, or both;
and (5) the imposition of a
personal dictatorship based on
palace and army support.
Karamanlis will probably
do everything in his power to
retain his position by con-
stitutional means. He has out-
lined for the'progovernment
press a domestic propaganda
line regarding the appeal to
the UN on Cyprus which assumes
that his government need not
resign if defeated in the UN.
If his government seems in danger
of falling, he may take
dramatic steps--breaking rela-
tions with Britain or Turkey,
or both--to appease Greek popu-
lar opinion.
Oposition Moves
Opposition leaders are
rumored to be rebuilding the
Popular Front coalition, which
won a plurality of the vote in
the February 1956 elections.
The'Communist-front United Demo-
cratic Left, the fellow-travel-
ing Democratic Party of the
Working People, the left-of-
center National Progressive
Union of the Center, and the
centrist Liberal Party are
widely believed to have agreed
to form a new front under the
leadership of Liberal Party
chief George Papandreou.
Presumably, the long-standing
rivalry between Papandreou and
Liberal Democratic Union head
Sophocles Venizelos is re-
sponsible for the absence from
the front thus far of the
latter's party.
In an apparent attempt to
neutralize the palace, which
has consistently supported
Karamanlis, opposition leaders
have been co-operating in a
press campaign to expose dubious
business and political activities
among members of the court, and
a left-wing opposition deputy
has lodged a parliamentary
interpellation concerning the
palace and secret government
funds, which will probably cause
difficulties for the government
when parliament reconvenes on
15 October.
It is widely believed
in government circles that
neither the opposition, the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001000020001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 8
 Approved F"lease 20051021$k 'EP79-009 4001000020001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Communists, nor Britain wants
the Cyprus issue solved. The
opposition appears convinced
that this issue will cause
Karamanlis' downfall. Cyprus
has also increasingly embit-
tered Greek-British and Greek-
Turkish relations, causing the
virtual demise of the Balkan
alliance and seriously weaken-
ing NATO unity in the eastern
Mediterranean. Government
leaders profess not to under-
stand the British attitude,
since they feel any succeeding
government in Athens would
necessarily be less moderate
on the Cyprus question and
more inclined to reckless ac-
Lion.
Prospects
Karamanlis' government prob-
ably has a better chance than
any successor government, under
present circumstances, of ad-
hering to a firmly pro-Western
stand. Any successor would
likely be a weak coalition of
conflicting factions which,
while nominally nationalist,
would be susceptible to Com-
munist influence and might
lead eventually to dictatorship
of either the right or the left.
Karamanlis' position at the
moment is relatively secure,
although it might be dangerously
weakened by any incident involv-
ing Britain or Turkey.
25X1
25X1
SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENTS
Recent indications point
to intensified Soviet interest
in biological warfare. The
USSR's defensive capability is
restricted by deficiencies in
sanitation, public health and
crop protection. The Soviet
Union is probably attempting
to acquire a capability ade-
quate for retaliation in kind
against a BW attack,
Recent Developments
The USSR in 1955 was for
the first time instructing its
troops in the defensive prob-
lems posed by biological
warfare as well as nuclear and
chemical warfare weapons. i
Soviet references to bio-
logical warfare in the past
were usually contained in propa-
ganda statements charging other
nations with using this "un-
lawful" weans of warfare. How-
ever, Soviet defense minister
Zhukov in addressing the 20th
party congress in February
stated: "If a war is unleashed
in the future, it will be char-
acterized by a mass use of air
power, various types of rocket
weapons, and various means of
mass destruction such as atomic,
thermonuclear, chemical and
bacteriological weapons." This
is the first known statement by
a high-level official to give
bacteriological warfare a role
in Soviet military planning.
The Geneva Convention of
1924, ratified by the USSR, not
only prohibits the use of bac-
teriological warfare, but does
not permit its use in retalia-
tion as it does in the case of
chemical warfare. The USSR has
declared that it will not be
bound by the latter restriction.
The tenor of Soviet defensive
doctrine is to treat BW as an
expected form of attack.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01000020001-0