CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000800100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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Ne-
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
COPY NO. 17
OCI NO. 3258/56
17 May 1956
WEEKLY
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F'o Ch2.:{e In ":ass. ^
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CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
REDUCTION IN SOVIET FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The USSR announced on 14 May that a 1,200,000-man cut
would be made in its armed forces by May 1957. This move
reflects a belief that general war is unlikely in the
immediate future and is evidence that Soviet military re-
quirements are being readjusted for the nuclear age. It
also is a major step in the effort by Moscow to convince
the NATO countries that they can safely reduce their de-
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SOVIET-JAPANESE AGREEMENTS .
Page 3
The three agreements reached during the Japanese-
Soviet fishery talks in Moscow increase the likelihood
that normal diplomatic relations between the two countries
will be resumed in the near future. Two of the agree-
ments are conditional on restoration of diplomatic re-
lations. The majority of the Liberal-Democratic Party
in Japan appear to be swinging behind the Hatoyama group's
move for an early peace settlement with the USSR.
CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Egypt's decision, announced on 16 May, to recognize
Communist China follows more than a year of diplomatic,
commercial, and cultural efforts on the part of the
Chinese Communists to establish official relations with
Middle Eastern governments. In recent weeks, Peiping has
quickened the pace of this campaign, dispatching missions
to the Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as Egypt; all of these
have been well received.
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
cations of Western and Soviet intentions.
states over the past week. Both sides are awaiting
developments in the United Nations and further indi-
Minor clashes continued between Israel and the Arab
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17 May 1956
SOUTH KOREAN ELECTION . . . .
South Korea's presidential election has been high-
lighted by a considerable show of opposition strength.
Tension is rising, and rioting may occur if government
in the
M
yon
frauds bring about the defeat of Chang
hotly-contested viceapresidential race.
PART:II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SING-SOVIET BLOC ACCELERATES
DRIVE TO WIN INDONESIA . . . . . . . .
During the last two months, the Sino-Soviet bloc
has launched a co-ordinated effort to develop a
political and economic relationship with Indonesia
similar to that with India and Burma. All Indonesian
political parties are prepared to accept closer relations
with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . ? . . ' . . .
The internal security situation throughout French
North Africa remains
operations have accelerated, and in Morocco, lawlessness
and tension continue to mount.
Page 6
Page 1
Page
PRESSURE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . .
Growing apprehension in France over the Algerian
situation is increasing pressure for a major revision
of the governmental system to provide for a stronger
executive authority. General de Gaulle's renewed interest
in political matters has revived speculation overAhise
possible role in such a revision; but barring a r
blow--such as the loss of Algeria--reform is unlikely.
FUTURE OF THE AUSTRIAN COALITION . . . . . . . . .
As a result of the Austrian elections, the conserv-
ative People's Party and moderate Socialists which have
governed ptofntherpathe last 11 rliamentaryyseatsnthanothey
a larger r percentage
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
have at any time since 1949. The greater gains made by
the People's Party, coming within one seat of an absolute
majority, may make the conservatives less ready to com-
promise with the Socialists and may complicate recon-
stitution of the coalition.
EAST GERMAN RESTRICTIONS
ON WEST BERLIN BARGE TRAFFIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
East Germany is refusing to renew licenses for
barges traveling between West Germany and West Berlin.
As the licenses gradually expire, Bonn will have to
transfer freight to trains and trucks or enter the
ministerial-level talks desired by the East Germans.
FURTHER RELAXATION OF CONTROLS
IN THE SATELLITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
New steps to eliminate or revise some of the more
objectionable aspects of Communist control have recently
been taken by a number of the Satellites. These steps
have included the pardoning of a Hungarian archbishop,
the removal of border obstacles on the Austrian-Hungarian
border, and a reduction in. the strength of Rumanian
security forces.
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USSR EASES WORKING CONDITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The Soviet government has recently issued a series
of decrees intended to ease working conditions and to
rescind more of the coercive measures associated with
the Stalin era. Outstanding among these measures are
a proposal for a new, more generous pension law and a
decree rescinding two of the most onerous wartime
regulations for labor discipline.
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NEW SOVIET INSTITUTE FOUNDED
TO STUDY WORLD ECONOMICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Deputy Premier Mikoyan's complaint at the 20th Party
Congress about the lack of realism in Soviet studies
on capitalism has prodded the Soviet Academy of Science
into forming an institute to study contemporary world
economics. This move may result in a more accurate
appraisafof the economic strengths and weaknesses of
the non-Communist world. 25X1
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17 May 1956
COMMUNIST CHINA
REORGANIZES ECONOMIC MINISTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The reorganization of Communist China's economic
ministries announced by Peiping on 12 May reflects the
growth of the economy and the increasing degree to
which China's government structure follows the Soviet
pattern. No top leaders have been demoted, and there
is no suggestion of any change in the main lines of
Chinese Communist policy.
THAILAND RE-EXAMINING TRADE POLICIES . . . . . . . Page 12
Thai leaders are apparently considering relaxing their
strict controls on trade with Communist countries. Such
a relaxation may be followed by a general modification
of Thailand's anti-Communist orientation.
THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE
INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
. The Indian Communist Party, meeting in.a pre
election.year, attempted at its Fourth Congress to
achieve a semblance of party unity, but failed to over-
come long-standing factionalism. Its election tactics
will apparently concentrate on infiltrating the Congress
Party and developing a united-front movement on specific
issues.
ICELANDIC ELECTION
DOMINATED BY AIR BASE ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Iceland's parliamentary election campaign has
focused on the NATO base at Keflavik. The Conservatives,
the most moderate of the parties on the issue, appear
to be making an impact on the public, but no group is
expected to obtain a majority of the 52 parliamentary
seats at stake. Whatever the outcome of the election on
24 June, the'next government is certain to seek some
changes in the agreement affecting the base.
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE PROTEST IN THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY . . . . . . . Page 1
The Polish regime, faced with intraparty factionalism
and mounting public disregard for official efforts to
limit criticism, has reached the point where it must
decide whether to continue its internal policies inaugu-
rated since the denigration of Stalin or resume the more
rigid policies of the past. Either alternative will
raise new problems for the already harassed Polish
Communist leaders.
LOCAL ELECTIONS IN ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The first major test of Italian political trends
since mid-1953. will occur in the nationwide elections
of provincial and communal councils on 27 and 28 May.
The Christian Democrats and the Nenni Socialists expect
to gain. The results may cast light on the possibility
of a national working alliance between these two at the
expense of the Communist-Socialist unity pact. The
Christian Democrats' prospects will depend in part on
their convincing the electorate of their intention to
carry out reforms such as the 10-year development pro-
gram of the late budget minister Vanoni.
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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE USSR . . . . . . . Page. 10
Since Stalin's death, the Soviet leadership has been
moving cautiously toward legal and judicial reform. Some
of the more onerous restrictions imposed on the individual
during the Stalin era have been removed, and the judicial
powers of the police and military tribunals--including
the special tribunals used in the Great Purge trials of
the Thirties--have been curtailed. Measures have also
been taken to standardize and streamline the cumbersome
system of administering justice. Despite these moves, the
primary function of the law in the Soviet Union clearly
remains unchanged--to promote the aims of the Communist
state rather than to ensure justice for the individual.
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17 May 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
REDUCTION IN SOVIET FORCES
The USSR announced on 14
May that a 1,200,000-man cut
would be made in its armed
forces by May 1957. This move
reflects a belief that general
war is unlikely in the immediate
future and is evidence that So-
viet military requirements are
being readjusted for the nuclear
age.
The Soviet leaders have
recently expressed pessimism
about the prospects for a for-
mal disarmament agreement and,
for the present, will attempt to
exploit the favorable opinion
deriving from their unilateral
action in an effort to induce
the NATO nations to follow the
USSR's initiative. Not only
does this suit Soviet strategic
interests, but it fits in with
the Soviet economists' claim
that the Western nations are
staving off an approaching "eco-
nomic crisis" only by "militari-
zation of the economy and the
arms race."
The announcement was phrased
cryptically as to the precise
cuts envisioned, but it indi-
cates that 63 divisions and in-
dependent brigades, including
three air divisions, would be
demobilized and 375 warships
would be put into reserve. The
manpower cuts include over 30,-
000 men from units stationed in
East Germany. The new reductions
would be in addition to the
strength cut of 640,000 announced
in August 1955.
STRENGTH OF USSR ARMED FORCES
(ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR, EXCLUDING SECURITY FORCES)
WORLD WAR II PEAK
12,500,000
PRESENT TOTAL
11,008,000
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6,800,000
RESERVE
4,208,0
ACTIVE
-1,200
1957
000
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REDUCTION
-640,000 BY MA'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
Effect of Cuts
The two cuts would cause a
drop of about 43 percent in So-
viet armed forces personnel,
which are believed to have to-
taled 4,208,000 before July
1955, exclusive of security
forces. The Soviet army has an
estimated 175 line, 20 artillery
and 70 antiaircraft divisions,
and 95 independent'brigades.
To minimize the effect of
such a strength cut, the So-
viet Union could transfer sup-
port troops to civilian status
without changing their functions
as well as expand military
training for civilians. The
USSR will also retain its
capability for rapid mobiliza-
tion of its trained military
manpower, which, assuming the
reductions, will include some
8,000,000 men.
The Soviet announcement
does not make clear whether the
cut of three air divisions per-
tains to units located in the
Soviet Union or in East Ger-
many. Judging from the number
of identified regiments, So-
viet air forces have an equiva-
lent of some 158 divisions.
The 24th Air Army in East Ger-
many has the equivalent of 12
divisions.
The USSR is credited with
251 major surface vessels, 421
submarines, and over 2,300
minor vessels, such as patrol,
mine and amphibious craft..
Approximately 110 warships are
old or inactive cruisers, de-
stroyers, submarines, and
battleships, which would be
likely candidates for reserve
status. Since 183 new long-
range submarines are'the So-
viet navy's most significant
offensive threat, active sur-
face vessel strength could be
cut considerably without sub-
stantially reducing the Soviet
navy's striking power.
Possible Budget Cut
In terms of military ex-
penditures, the announced cut
of 1,200,000 would permit a
reduction in the military budg-
et of some 19 billion rubles,
almost 20 percent--a sum which
would otherwise be spent on
personnel, maintenance and
operating costs. The military
budget cut forecast in the So-
viet announcement of the man-
power cut will probably be of
about this size, since state-
ments made by Gromyko at the
London disarmament talks and
the budget reduction following
the 640,000-man demobilization
imply that the Soviet leaders
intend to maintain the planned
rate of expenditures for mili-
tary equipment.
Assuming such a reduction,
the funds remaining in the budg-
et, about 84 billion rubles,
would permit an increase of some
30 percent over 1955 in expendi-
ture per man remaining in service,
and the rate of procurement per
man by 1957 would have increased
by two thirds over 1955. The
USSR thus would have adjusted its
military spending to the increased
cost of modern weapons systems.
In terms of the over-all
Soviet economy, the announced
force reduction will facili-
tate overfulfillment of the
Sixth Five-year Plan industrial
targets, primarily by releasing
additional funds for investments
and by allowing a greater in-
crease in the labor force than
planned. (Pre- 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU
17 May 1956
SOVIET-JAPANESE AGREEMENTS
The results of the Soviet-
Japanese fishery talks in Mos-
cow increase the likelihood that
normal diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries will be
restored in the near future.
Japanese chief negotiator
Ichiro Kono left Moscow on 15
May with a provisional one-
year fishing agreement, a ten-
year fishing pact, and a three-
year sea rescue pact. The long-
term pacts are not effective
until diplomatic relations are
restored, and the provisional
agreement is contingent on the
reopening' of the stalled peace
treaty talks prior to the end
of July.
By originally announcing
extremely harsh restrictions
on North Pacific fishing, Mos-
cow was able to make "conces-
sions" on the provisional agree-
ment. Thus the USSR agreed to
raise total fishing quotas
from 55,000 to 65,000 tons this
year,, although Japan alone had
originally planned to catch 80,-
000 tons of fish. Anticipating
trouble on his return to Tokyo,
Kono predicted that fishing
circles in Japan would express
considerable dissatisfaction
with the terms of the agreement.
Soviet Negotiating Tactics
The USSR was apparently
careful throughout the talks
to temper the force behind its
commanding position. In addi-
tion to flattering Kono, the
USSR played on the emotional
Japanese attitude toward the
repatriation issue by volun-
teering to send home 29 war
prisoners, including the com-
mander of the Manchurian army.
However, the talks apparently
had little effect on the other
outstanding issue--sovereignty
over the southern Kurils, on
which the London treaty talks
broke down in March. Bulganin
reportedly restated to Kono the
Soviet territorial claims.
Chief delegate Kono, one
of the leading powers in the
government and a member of the
Hatoyama group favoring early
resumption of relations, was
outspoken in his praise of the
USSR during his time in Moscow.
The success of the talks he
credited to the "understanding
attitude of the Soviet side,"
and he found Marshal Bulganin
a "first-class statesman,"
Japanese Reaction
The first reports that Kona
had reached an agreement with
the USSR created an atmosphere
of relief in Tokyo that a way
out of the present impasse in
the peace treaty negotiations
had been found. Later some
realization of the extent of
Kono's concessions served to
temper the bandwagon mood, but
a majority.of the governing
Liberal-Democratic Party appear
to be swinging behind the move
for an early conclusion of a
peace settlement with the USSR.
Factions in the Liberal-
Democratic Party, however,
have already voiced their dis-
pleasure, and they undoubtedly
will do their utmost to deflate
any effort by Kono to present
his achievement as a diplomatic
triumph. It is unlikely that
they will go so far as to split
the party in opposing ratifica-
tion of the".fishery pacts.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
Kono is now en route home
via the United States and ap-
parently plans to seek Washing-
ton's "understanding" concern-
ing the settlement at Moscow.
CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Egyptian decision to
recognize Communist China, an-
nounced by Cairo after a cabi-
net meeting on 16 May, follows
more than a year of diplomatic
effort by Peiping to establish
official contacts with Middle
Eastern governments. The Egyp-
tian move may well encourage
other Middle East states to ex-
tend recognition to Peiping.
Since March, the Chinese Com-
munists have stepped up their
trade and culture campaign in
the Middle East.
Egypt, called "head of the
Arab states" in Peiping's propa-
ganda, has been the focal point
in Chinese Communist efforts
in the Middle East. At Bandung
last spring, Chou.En-lai worked
to establish a close personal
relationship with Egyptian
premier Nasr. The following
August, a three-year trade agree-
ment between Peiping.and Cairo
was signed which provided for
the exchange of permanent com-
mercial missions. The Chinese
commercial mission in Cairo was
granted diplomatic and cipher
privileges. In November and
December last year, agreements
for the exchange of permanent
commercial.missions were nego-
tiated with Syria and Lebanon.
Trade and Cultural Drive
In March, Peiping stepped
up its trade and culture drive
in the Middle East. A trade
Such understanding, by implying
American approval., would greatly
assist Kono in selling his
mission as a success when he
returns to Tokyo.
delegation headed by Minister
of Trade Yeh Chi-chuang arrived
in Cairo on 17 March for a
three-week visit. In April,
the Chinese Communists opened
a commodity exhibit in Cairo
described by observers as "im-
pressive." Concurrently, a
70-man cultural mission from
Peiping toured major Egyptian
cities, presenting music,.dramat-
i.c,, and dance programs which
received favorable reviews.
From Cairo the trade dele-
gation:went to Khartoum,,where
the Chinese Communist foreign
trade minister and Sudanese
officials concluded negotiations
with a joint communique, issued
on 16 April, expressing agree-
ment to "provisionally encourage
commercial. representation," a
phrase reflecting Peiping's
hopes for a permanent commercial
mission. The trade delegation
was followed to Khartoum by the
Communist cultural mission.
Performances by this group were
well received by Sudanese audi-
ences.
The Communist cultural
delegation then visited Ethiopia.
The American embassy in Addis
Ababa reports that the first
performance by. the group there
was "impressive" and was "well
slanted toward the Ethiopians."
The leader of the cultural dele-
gation was.reportedly granted,
an audience by Emperor Haile
Selassie on 3 May. Peiping radio
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
has quoted the Ethiopian foreign
minister as saying that "pres-
ent cultural contacts are only
the first steps toward the res-
toration of many-sided contacts
between China and Ethiopia."
Chinese Nationalist Efforts
Chinese Nationalist pres-
tigees, never high in the Middle
East, has been declining during
the past six months despite ef-
forts by Taipei to bolster its
position. The Nationalists
have sent a trade delegation to
the Middle East and within re-
cent weeks have attempted,
without success, to establish
diplomatic relations with the
newly independent Sudan.
Until now, the Arab states
have been chary of switching
recognition from Taipei to
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
Minor clashes continued
between Israel and the Arab
states over the past week,
Both sides are awaiting develop-
ments in the United Nations.
The inci4ents--in the Gaza
strip, on Jd+rdan's border, and
at Lake Tiberias--were used by
each side to blame the other
for "breaking the cease-fire"
in order to influence the UN
Security Council and "world
opinion." Initial attempts of
UN truce supervisor General
Burns to implement the agree-
ments on an increase of UN ob-
servers, mobile patrols, and
the establishment of observa-
tion posts were not fruitful.
Peiping in view of the Nation-
alist position in the UN. As
recently represented by the
president of Lebanon, the
Arab position. has been that
recognition of Peiping would
have to be withheld as long as
the Nationalists hold a seat
on the Security Council, "which
deals with the problem of
Israel."
Cairo's decision may,
however, start a movement for
recognition of Peiping by
other Middle East states which
have close relations with
Egypt. Syria is the most likely
country to follow Egypt's lead
in the immediate future, and in-
creased pressure for recogni-
tion of the Chinese Communists
is likely to develop in Lebanon.
Some Sudanese leaders are also
reported favoring such a move.
Apparently in order to
present a "united Arab front"
for possible Security Council
discussions on the Middle East,
the foreign ministers of Egypt,
Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan re-
portedly plan to meet this
week to discuss the Palestine
problem And Secretary General
Hammarskjold's report to the
United Nations.
Israeli foreign minister
Sharett has indicated that
Israeli plans to divert the
Jordan River waters at Banat
Yacov are temporarily in abey-
ance. On the Arab side,
Lebanon, in an effort to re-
move the Banat Yacov issue as
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a source of hostilities, is re-
portedly trying to gain Arab
acceptance of a Lebanese plan
whereby each side would work
on its own separate water de-
velopment projects.
Though there is some evi-
dence of a partial demobiliza-
tion in Israel, major units
there and in the Arab states
remain at or near full strength,
and each side continues to seek
and obtain additional military
equipment.
Jordan, following its
military planning talks with
Egypt, increasingly shows signs
of closer co-operation with the
Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian
bloc. King Hussain stated
that Jordan would probably re-
ceive two squadrons of jet air-
craft, an "appreciable amount,
of artillery, and some tanks 25X1
from Egypt." Egypt can supply
materiel of Western or Soviet
bloc origin.
SOUTH KOREAN ELECTION
South Korea's presiden-
tial election has been charac-
terized by a considerable show
of opposition to the Rhee admin-
istration. Virtually complete
official returns give President
Rhee about 55 percent of the
presidential vote, with the
remainder divided between
leftist Cho Pong-.am and invalid
ballots cast for the late Sin
Ik-hui. In 1952, Rhee received
75 percent of the total vote.
In the closely contested
vice-presidential race, Demo-
crat Chang Myon appeared
headed for a narrow victory
over President R,hee's'running
mate, Yi Ki-pung, and it seemed
unlikely that Yi could overtake
Chang without the perpetration
of large-scale frauds. The
action of the government's Cen-
tral Election Committee in
ceasing to issue returns on 17
May lent credibility to wide-
spread rumors that the voting
will be fixed in order to give
victory to Yi Ki-pung.
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The American embassy re-
ports that tension is moun i
in Seoul and other areas.
In Taeju, 10,000 persons have
already demonstrated against
alleged government frauds.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SINO-SOVIET BLOC ACCELERATES
DRIVE TO WIN INDONESIA
During the last two months,
the Sino-Soviet bloc has made
Indonesia a principal target in
its campaign to develop closer
relations with non-Communist
Asia. The moves appear to be a
co-ordinated effort to develop
a political and economic rela-
tionship with Indonesia similar
to that which already exists
with India and Burma. In addi-
tion, the bloc probably hopes
to improve the position of the
strong Indonesian Communist Par-
ty, hoping that in time it will
be accepted in the government.
In April, the Soviet Union
extended an offer of economic
assistance and invitations to
President Sukarno to visit Mos-
cow and Peiping. Invitations
to outspoken anti-Communists
followed in May. Since the
main theme of Indonesian anti-
Communist propaganda has been
Soviet and Chinese mistreatment
of Moslem minorities, invita-
tions from both China and the
USSR to non-Communist Moslems
may have particularly far-reach-
ing implications.
Ambassador Zhukov, in a
press interview in early May,
offered Soviet technical and edu-
cational training facilities for
Indonesian students and teachers,
recommended stepped-up exchanges
of cultural and sports groups,
and cited Soviet willingness to
co-operate in the peaceful uses
of atomic energy. The USSR has
also invited a special delegation
of parliamentary leaders, the'
minister of education, and a
six-man industrial survey team,
while the Chinese Communists
have invited eight leading
journalists and top officials
of the chamber of commerce.
Indonesian Reaction
The Soviet economic assist-
ance offer has been accepted
"in principle" by the Indonesian
government. Indonesia may be
expected to spell out its eco-
nomic interests within the next
few months, with emphasis prob-
ably being placed on agricul-
ture and power projects.
All Indonesian political
parties are prepared to accept
closer relations with the Sino-
Soviet bloc as part of Indone-
sia's independent foreign policy.
Only a few individuals have
warned against the possibility
of covert activity as a by-prod-
uct.
Indonesia, however, will
probably continue its effort to
balance its foreign policy and,
within the range of its economic
needs, will try to arrange to
receive most of its aid from the
West. iut if Western terms do
not appear satisfactory, and if
the Sino-Soviet bloc tailors its
assistance to Indonesia's needs
as it has offered to do, Indone-
sia will accept increasing amounts
of bloc aid. Con- 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
The internal security sit-
uation throughout French North
Africa remains critical. In
Algeria the guerrilla conflict
has accelerated, and in Morocco
lawlessness and tension con-
tinue to mount.
Algeria
Since 6 May Algerian rebel
bands--reportedly reinforced by
elements from the Moroccan "Army
of Liberation"--have carried on
co-ordinated raids on isolated
French and Moslem farms, small
military outposts, and native
villages in the Oran-Tlemcen
region of western Algeria and
the area north of Constantine in
the east. The sharp fighting in
these and other areas, including
a village only 15 miles from
R A N
lemeen
SPANISH
SAHARA
Algiers, culminated in the
reported liquidation of at
least 500 rebels by 11 May.
There has been no reliable
account of French casualties
over the same period.
Terrorist attacks in
the city of Constantine have
led the French to expect
similar raids in Algiers and
other large cities as part of
the rebel effort to destroy
French morale before the army
reinforcements en route to
North Africa can become ef -
fective.
FRENCH
WEST AFRICA
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17 May 1956
Both Premier Mollet's of-
fice in Paris and Minister
Lacoste in Algiers believe that
the increased French troop
strength, which they maintain
will reach 330,000 by the end
of the month, should begin to
make its weight felt by mid-
June.
French leaders are re-
ported still hopeful that
the military situation can be
restored sufficiently this sum-
mer to permit the implementa-
tion by September of the ex-
tensive reforms planned for
Algeria. French settler ex-
tremists are expected to resist
many of the reforms, but
Lacoste is reported determined
to deal firmly with these ele-
ments. Last week, he took
vigorous action against Euro-
pean university students whose
demonstrations against pro-
posed reforms to assure in-
creased Moslem employment in
the government and its enter-
prises disrupted V-E Day ob-
servances in the capital.
In Morocco, crime and
violence, the bulk of which is
thought to be nonpolitical in
character, has mounted in
recent weeks as lawless Moroc-
can elements have exploited
the confusion accompanying the
PRESSURE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM IN FRANCE
Growing apprehension in
France over the Algerian situa-
tion is increasing-pressure
for a major revision of the
transition from French to Mo-
roccan rule. Public order
has deteriorated throughout
the country, especially in the
former Spanish zone, where the
nationalist Istiglal party is
not yet ready to assume the
security role now virtually
abandoned by Spain.
Meanwhile, French-Moroccan
tension has developed to the
point where many Frenchmen in-
sist that the atmosphere is
worse than that which prevailed
just prior to the massacre of
French civilians at Oued Zem
last August. French residents
and officials are reported
alarmed at the rapid acquisi-
tion of power by the Moroccans,
and French military forces are
smarting under continued harass-
ment by armed Moroccan bands.
On the Moroccan side,
both the irregular "Liberation
Army" and the population in
general are becoming increas-
ingly restive over what Mo-
roccans regard a' French pro-
crastination in turning over
power, especially in the field
of foreign affairs.
The probable early assign-
ment of the sultan's new 15,000-
man army to police duties
throughout Morocco until a reg-
ular constabulary can be formed
may alleviate somewhat the grow-
ing internal security crisis.
The "Liberation Army," however,
will continue to be a potential
threat to the stability of the
new regime until it is disband-
ed or absorbed, preferably on
an individual basis into the
sultan's army.
government system to provide
for a stronger executive au-
thority. General de Gaulle's
renewed interest in political
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17 May 1956
matters has revived speculation
over his possible role in such
a revision; but barring a seri-
ous low--such as the loss of
Algeria--reform is unlikely.
The present constitution,
adopted in 1946, was admittedly
a compromise, and opposition to
it crystallized almost immedi-
ately under De Gaulle. Only
minor revisions have been pos-
sible, however, because the
National Assembly has final ex-
ecutive and legislative author-
ity, and the deputies are loath
to relinquish any prerogatives.
Nevertheless the present impasse
in Algeria. has markedly in-
creased public disillusionment
with the governmental structure
and has given greater urgency
to the desire for drastic re-
vision.
The January 1956 elections
strengthened the forces in the
National Assembly opposed to
parliamentary government and
emphasized the sharp divisions
among the center parties. As a
result, support began to grow
more rapidly for a balance be-
tween the executive and legis-
lative branches. Former pre-
.iiers Antoine Pinay and Edgar
?sure and Popular Republican
leader Pierre-Henri Teitgen
have recently espoused such a
proposal. A special Study Com-
mittee for the Republic, founded
by Foreign Minister Pineau and
including many political, eco-
nomic and labor leaders, has
just published a report favoring
direct election of a president
with real executive powers.
A "Strong Man"
In the meanwhile, the grow-
ing belief that Algeria may be
lost to France is focusing
greater attention on the pos-
sibility of a "strong man" suc-
ceeding Mollet.
General de Gaulle has re-
cently regained his health
and with it his interest in
the national political scene.
His well-known preference for
a strong executive and his na-
tional prestige enhance his
appeal, even to many Socialist
and Radical Socialist leaders
who had previously feared his
authoritarian tendencies. De
Gaulle, however, disclaims any
"personal interest" in remedy-
ing the present "incoherent
situation," and would probably
accept office only in the un-
likely event of a request by
the National Assembly and on
the understanding that a new
constitution would be drafted
before the expiration of the
present legislature.
Many rightists would pre-
fer as premier the ex-Gaullist
Jacques Soustelle, former gov-
ernor general of Algeria.
Soustelle is regarded as more
flexible than De Gaulle and
his recent campaign for full
integration of Algeria with
France has made him more ac-
ceptable to the right.
The hardening Communist
attitude on the government's
Algerian policy may now expose
Mollet to sharper attacks in
the National Assembly from cen-
ter and rightist groups which
have refrained heretofore in
order not to force Mollet to
rely on Communist votes.
Mollet's overthrow in the pres-
ent. situation would in itself
be a serious blow to parliamen-
tary authority, but the real
threat to the regime may still
be from outside the parliament.
A symptom of this threat is a
plan approved by the national
congress of the Poujadist anti-
tax movement. Under this plan,
the Poujadist organization would
itself convene a States General
with the avowed purpose of re-
lacing the National Assembly.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
FUTURE OF THE
AUSTRIAN COALITION
The conservative People's
Party and the moderate Social-
ists which have governed Austria
as a coalition for 11 years now
control a larger percentage of
the popular and parliamentary
vote than at any time since
1949.
The gains made by the two
coalition parties are almost
entirely attributable to the
losses suffered by the extrem-
ists on the left and the right.
The People's Party, by captur-
ing eight of the nine seats
lost by the extreme rightists,
emerged from a long
period of gradual
decline to come with-
in one seat of a
parliamentary major-
ity, which materially
enhances its position
at the expense of the
Socialists.
Coalition Difficulties
This relatively
minor shift may com-
plicate the process of
forming a new govern-
ment, especially be-
cause relations be-
tween the two parties
was the major unspo-
ken issue in the cam-
paign. The elections
were provoked, in
fact, by the Social-
ists, primarily with
the idea of "proving"
that the People's
Party could not govern alone.
The conservatives' gains
are also likely to delay agree-
ment on the issues on which
the campaign was more openly
waged--such as control of the
Austrian defense establishment,
the management of the national-
ized industries, and the dispo-
sition of former German assets.
Tentative understandings were
reached within the coalition
on most of these issues long
ago. They were unpopular with
elements of both parties, how-
ever, and implicitly depended
on the maintenance of a balance
of power between the parties.
How long it will now take
to negotiate new agreements
and hence a new government will
largely depend on how the two
parties interpret their new
positions. A deadlock will
quickly develop if the Social-
ists refuse to go slow on
AUSTRIAN NATION ALRAT
LOWER HOUSE
VOTES-1953 ELECTIONS
reurtes rwait
~
SOCIALIST PARTY
LIBERAL PARTY- - was
(Union of Independents)
4!;,022
LIBERAL PARTY- -was
(Union of Independents)
28,7i3(-32.4)
further nationalization or the
People's Party attempts some
denationalization.
People's Party extremists
might then insist that the
party seek a coalition partner
in the extreme rightist Liberal
(or Freedom) Party, and a new
and difficult phase in Austrian
domestic politics might well ensue.
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17 May 1956
Whether Chancellor Raab
will try to resist the extrem-
ists in his People's Party is
uncertain, but his leadership
in any case now seems unques-
tioned. While there are no
major differences between the
coalition parties on foreign
policy, the chancellor has
seemed more anxious than the
Socialists to avoid giving of-
fense to the USSR; he was cool
to the idea of Austrian admis-
sion to the Council of Europe,
and he seemed relatively blind
to the wider implications of
the abortive Soviet loan to
the province of Lower Austria.
EAST GERMAN RESTRICTIONS
ON WEST BERLIN BARGE TRAFFIC
East Germany is refusing
to renew licenses for barges
traveling between West Germany
and West Berlin. As the licenses
gradually expire, Bonn will have
to transfer freight to trains
an.'l trucks or enter the
These attitudes--probably less
subject to restraint now than
before--could cause difficulties
for the West in the future.
So far as the Communists
are locally concerned, their
future even in a nuisance role
in the Austrian parliament seems
dark. For the first time in the
postwar period their total vote
fell below 5 percent. They re-
tained parliamentary representa-
tion by gaining a single "basic
mandate" in one district of
Vienna--probably by transferring
temporary residents to that area.
Thus they were able to claim
three seats under proportional
representation.
ministerial-level talks desired
by the East Germans.
Ambassador Conant in Bonn
reported on 10 May that no
new permits for Berlin barge
traffic had been countersigned
BONN GOVERNMENT FACES PROBLEM OF REDUCED BARGE TRAFFIC
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17 May 1956
by East German authorities
since August 1955, and that the
East German Transport Ministry
on 27 April had returned 70
West German permit applications
because it had never received
any communication on this sub-
ject from the Bonn Transport
Ministry.
In 1955, barges using the
Mittelland and Elbe canal sys-
tems carried about one quarter
of the supplies for West Berlin.
Refusal to renew permits is part
of the East German program of
harassing Berlin's lifelines to
bring about ministerial-level
conversations between East and
West Germany as a step toward
forcing Bonn's recognition of
the East German government.
In meetings earlier this
year of representatives of the
Bonn government and the West-
ern allies, it was decided to
keep the negotiations on
interzonal barge traffic at a
low administrative level, with
no direct role being played by
the Bonn Transport Ministry.
It was agreed, however, that
if the East Germans objected to
this arrangement, "low-level
ministerial contacts" between
the two transport ministries
would be acceptable.
So far, however, Bonn
has given no evidence that it
plans any contacts with the
East German Transport Ministry.
FURTHER RELAXATION OF CONTROLS
IN THE SATELLITES
New steps to eliminate or
revise some of the more ob-
jectionable aspects of Com-
munist control have recently
been taken by a number of the
Satellites. While some of the
actions support the Soviet bloc
campaign to reduce international
tensions, they also appear de-
signed to provide more substan-
tial proof to the Satellite
peoples that the regimes are
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Rather, with the permits of some
300 barges in the Berlin service
approaching expiration, the
most likely West German response
will be to shift the freight
to trains and possibly trucks.
Though such a change in
freight transit practice would
mean some increase in costs to
West Germany and Western Berlin,
the economic consequences would,
not appear to be serious. Barges
carried 1,650,000 metric tons
of cargo to Berlin in 1955. All
but 300,000 tons could have been
handled at somewhat greater
expense by unused rail and
truck capacity, according to
West German trucking experts
and the Bonn Transport Ministry.
Bonn may encourage the addition
of enough trucks to the Berlin
fleet to carry that quantity.
There is some question as
to whether the East German
authorities will allow West
German barge traffic to "wither
away" to nothing through the
expiration of permits. They
may fear retaliation on the
East German barges that
regularly use the Elbe canal
route to Hamburg. The East
Germans may find some reason
to permit a reduced level
of Western traffic if Bonn
imposes or threatens to impose
limitations on East Germany's
East-West trade channels.
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17 May 1956
abandoning their harsh Stalinist
Policies.
Hungary pardoned Arch-
bishop Groesz on 11 May and
reappointed him to his former
post of chairman of the Bench
of Bishops. This action may
be interpreted by the Hungar-
ian ?eople as the forerunner
of an improvement in church-
state relations.
Groesz, who was sentenced
to life imprisonment in 1951
for conspiracy against the
state, is a church leader who
opposed the regime and survived.
Despite his initial statement
of support for the regime on
12 May, his return may have a
significant effect on, the Hungar-
ian people. One probable
result will be outspoken de-
mands both within and outside
Hungary for the release of
USSR EASES WORKING CONDITIONS
The Soviet government has
recently issued a series of
decrees intended to ease work-
ing conditions and to rescind
some more of the coercive meas-
ures associated with the Stalin
era. Outstanding among these
measures are a. proposal for a
new, more generous pension law
and a decree rescinding two of
the most onerous wartime reg-
ulations on labor discipline.
Cardinal Mindszenty, who is
still regarded by the Vatican
as the primate of Hungary.
Hungary is also removing
mines and barbed wire along
its frontiers with Austria and
Yugoslavia., following an an-
nouncement to this effect on
8 May. While the removal of
the physical barriers is a
symbolically significant move,
the regime's 18,000-man frontier
guard will probably be able
to maintain control along the
borders.
In Rumania, approximately
12,000 civil and security po-
lice have reportedly been dis-
charged recently, a move which
will reduce one of the more ob-
vious pressures on the popula-
tion. This would reduce Ru-
mania.'s police forces by a -
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proximately 10 percent.
These decrees follow
three earlier moves designed
to show the solicitude of the
regime for. the worker--in-
cluding one cutting the work-
week to 46 hours, one increas-
ing maternity leave for work-
ing mothers, and one ordering
radical improvement of restau-
rants, factory canteens and
other public eating places.
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17 May 1956
In addition, according to
a recent report, within the
next 18 months the Soviet
government will cease using
prison labor for outside proj-
ects and will abandon the
practice of deporting Soviet
citizens to distant sections of
the country. A special com-
mission is reported to have
been set up and instructed to
review the sentences of persons
convicted of political, counter-
revolutionary, and antistate
crimes. It is to finish its
work and rehabilitate innocent
persons by next October. Such
a move would be consistent with
other steps already taken to
popularize the regime.
One of the new acts, the
proposed law on state pensions
published on 9 May, is a major
revision of Soviet social legis-
lation.. By bringing pensions
more in line with wages and in-
creasing considerably pension
payments to the lower-paid cat-
egories of workers, it marks an
important concession to a broad
segment of the population.
Popular reaction in Moscow to
the proposal is already re-
ported to be highly favorable.
Under the old system, old-
age pensions were in fact lim-
ited, for the most part, to
300 rubles a month. According
to the new draft, the minimum
will be 300 rubles and the max-
imum 1,200 rubles a month.
Similar increases will be made
in disability pensions and pen-
sions to surviving members of
a worker's family, which here-
tofore have also been limited
close to the 300-ruble mark.
The rates of "unjustly" high
pensions may in certain cases
also be reduced somewhat, as
called for by Khrushchev at the
20th Party Congress.
Worker Controls
Another decree, published
on 8 May, abolished all legal
sanctions against workers for
quitting their jobs vAthout
authorization or being absent
from their work without justi-
fication. Persons sentenced
on these counts under the old
wartime laws are to be freed
and all pending cases are to be
dropped. In the future, labor
problems of this type will be
attacked by means of new eco-
nomic and social pressures on
the worker.
In practice, criminal
penalties for these offenses
were invoked with ever-
decreasing frequency after 1946,
and much of the old law was
negated by an unpublished decree
of July 1951. Nevertheless,
the public annulment of the
decrees is another repudiation
of Stalinist techniques.
by ORR)
(Concurred in
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17 May 1956
NEW SOVIET INSTITUTE FOUNDED
TO STUDY WORLD ECONOMICS
Pravda announced on 24
April`t-Fa-Fathe USSR Academy of
Sciences has established an
"Institute of World Economics
and International Relations."
The institute is to study the
"laws underlying the development
of contemporary capitalism, the
economics and politics of in-
dividual countries, the mutual
relations of the two world
economic systems, capitalist
and socialist, questions con-
nected with the new role of
the countries of Asia in world
economics and politics, and
other topics." The institute
will publish a monthly journal,
Worla Economics and Interna-
t onal Relations .
The USSR Academy of Sci-
ences had decided last August
to set up a special institute
for the study of modern cap-
italism, but this decision was
apparently not implemented un-
til recently, after the prodding
by A. I. Mikoyan at the 20th
Party Congress in February.
Mikoyan then charged that the
Academy's existing Institute
of Economics did not and could
not "cope with a serious study
of the economy in the countries
of socialism and the countries
of capitalism," and he deplored
the liquidation of the old
Institute of World Economy and
World Politics.
The Institute of World
Economy and World Politics had
been formed in 1925. Soviet
economist Eugene Varga served
as its head from 1927 until
1947, when he was removed and
the institute absorbed by the
Institute of Economics, headed
by K. V. Ostrovityanov.
Ostrovitaynov had earlier in
1947 led an attack against Varga,
accusing him of bourgeois re-
formism and lack of realism be-
cause his book Changes in the
Economy of Captia ism as a
Result a e Second World War
imp e a basic changes in
the governments and social
systems of Western countries
had made the total collapse of
world capitalism unlikely for
the indefinite future.
Formation of the new in-
stitute does not appear to
represent a political victory
for Varga vis-a-vis Ostrovit-
yanov. Ostrovityanov was re-
elected a candidate member of
the Communist Party's central
committee in February, whereas
Varga has yet to attain such
a high party position. A
reason behind the creation of
the new institute was put forth
by Mikoyan in a discussion with
Ambassador Bohlen in August
1955. Be admitted that in cer-
tain countries, particularly the
United States, capitalism was
not in reality what it had been
in the days of Karl Marx. Miko-
yan further stated that the So-
viet Union had been mistaken in
the pa: :;t in not studying the
contemporary United States more
seriously, but hoped to rectify
that mistake in the future.
Soviet analysis of capital-
ist economies will remain, of
course, within the conventional
Marxist-Leninist framework, but,
through this institute, will now
be encouraged to strive for a
more realistic and sensible ap-
praisal of the economic strengths
and weaknesses of non-Communist
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COMMUNIST CHINA
REORGANIZES ECONOMIC MINISTRIES
The reorganization of
Communist China's economic min-
istries announced by Peiping
on 12 May reflects the growth
of the economy and the increas-
ing Soviet cast being given
much of China's government struc-
ture. No top leaders have been
demoted, and there is no sugges-
tion of any change in the main
lines of Chinese Communist pol-
icy.
0
facilitate co-ordination be-
tween the two governments.
In accordance with recent
Soviet practice of breaking up
major ministries to create new
ones with more specialized fields
of responsibility, China has
formed three new ministries out
of its old Ministry of Heavy
Industry. In addition, it has
set up a: new Ministry of
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED ECONOMIC
MINISTRIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1952 1953 .1954 1955
? Min. of Heavy Industry ? Min. of Heavy Industry
? 1st Min. of Machine Building
? 2nd Min. of Machine Building
? Min, of Metallurgical Industry
? Min. of Chemical Industry
? Min. of Building Materials Ind.
? 3rd Min. of Machine Building (Abolished)
*Min. of Petroleum Industry
?Min. of Electrical Power Industry
? Min. of Land Reclamation
? Min. of Procurement of Agricultural Products
? Min. of Textile Industry
? Min. of Forestry and
Land Reclamation
China now has placed re-
sponsibility for national eco-
nomic planning, construction,
and technological development
under four economic commissions
and committees. This structure,
which parallels the Soviet mod-
el established during the past
year, may have been set up to
? Min. of Timber Industry
? Min.of City Construction
? Min. of City Services
? National Economic Commission
? National Technological Commission
Power Equipment Industry and
three other ministries to con-
trol the timber, food, and
marine products industries.
There are now 14 industrial min-
istries, as compared with four
in 1951. There are 29 in the
USSR.
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These changes in agencies
controlling China's industriali-
zation are designed to provide
better administration over this
rapidly expanding segment of
the Chinese economy. Further
subdivision of ministries may
be expected as other sectors
of the economy are developed un-
der the Five-Year Plan.
Peiping has also abolished
the Ministries of Local Indus-
try and Third Machine Building,
which were established in Sep-
tember 1954 and April 1955, re-
spectively, to administer govern-
ment plants at the local level
and joint state-private enter-
prises. These ministries pre-
sumably served their usefulness
during the recent drive for so-
cialization, and the enterprises
under their control will now
revert to local control or be
responsible directly to the
ministries in charge of the eco-
nomic areas concerned.
THAILAND
RE-EXAMINING TRADE POLICIES
Thailand has seized on the
recent action of the United
States in easing restrictions
on trade with the USSR and the
East European Satellites to re-
examine the question of contin-
uing Thailand's strict controls
on trade with the Sino-Soviet
bloc. Premier Phibun has al-
ready ordered the Foreign Min-
istry to consider the advisa-'
bility of easing Thailand's em-
bargo on trade with Communist
China, within the limits speci-
fied by the United Nations.
The semicontrolle.d Bangkok
press has been calling for a re-
laxation of all restrictions.
In the past, Thailand has
vigorously suppressed. trade with
the Communist world. All direct
trade with Communist China has
Only former minister of
light industry Chia To-fu ap-
pears to have lost a position
in the shuffle of economic per-
sonnel, but he apparently re-
tains other responsible jobs.
Po I-po, Huang Ching and Wang
Hao-shou have been named to
head, respectively, the impor-
tant National Economic, Techno-.
logical and Construction Commis-
sions, with Li Fu-chun contin-
uing as director of the National
Planning Commission.
Three prominent non-Commu-
nist figures have been appointed
as heads of minor ministries.
These appointments apparently
reflect Peiping's intention
to continue the facade of a
united front in its effort to
draw support from all quarters
for its socialization program.
(Prepared
jointly with ORR)
been prohibited and very little
has been permitted with the
rest of the bloc. These con-
trols have been maintained in
the face of growing trade with
Communist countries on the part
of many of Thailand's neighbors.
Phibun, heretofore the lead-
ing defender of these controls,
is being subjected to increas-
ing pressure to ease them. Bang-
kok's influential Chinese mer-
chants and the local press have
been agitating for direct trade
with Communist China and for
permission to ship rice--Thai-
land's most important export--
to other Communist countries.
Certain high-level Thai offi-
cials, probably including the
powerful police director General
Phao, have also ruaneuvered for
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a relaxation of controls, chief-
ly in anticipation of the prof-
its to be gained through their
quasi-official "influence com-
panies."
The bloc has not hesitated
to encourage such sentiment.
Peiping's radio, whose broad-
casts reach Bangkok, has quoted
with approval Thai editorials
in favor of direct trade. F___7
THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE
INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
The Fourth Congress of the
Indian Communist Party, held be-
tween 19 and 29 April, apparent-
ly failed to eliminate serious
factionalism within the party's
ranks or to resolve basic poli-
cy problems which have plagued
it for the last five years.
The party's line remains one of
limited co-operation with the
Nehru government, though it
hopes in India's national elec-
tions scheduled for early 1957
to replace Nehru with an "al-
ternative" government or at
least to strengthen its posi-
tion at the state level.
Party Factions
There was much dissension
between the three major party
factions during the congress.
The basic struggle was between
the dominant group led by party
general secretary Ajoy Ghosh,
There have been numerous
indications, moreover, that de-
spite a recent reaffirmation of
Thailand's strongly anti-Commu-
nist orientation, Phibun and
other Thai leaders feel Thai-
land's policy is unduly rigid in
the light of the relaxation of
tensions since the Geneva con-
ference. Although there is no
serious challenge to their con-
trol of the government or their
ability to maintain trade controls
with impunity, they may conclude
that a relaxation of trade re-
strictions would be a relatively
innocuous first step toward a
moderation of Thailand's policy
toward Communist countries,
while improving their own polit-
ical and economic positions.
which advocates limited co-op-
eration with the Indian govern-
ment, and the followers of P.C.
Joshi, who favor complete co-
operation with Nehru's social-
istic program. Since Ghosh was
apparently supported by about
300 of the 400-odd convention
delegates and Joshi by only
slightly over 100, the party line
emerging from the congress re-
flects primarily Ghosh's views.
The "violent" or "terrorist"
wing of the party, which has
lost considerable ground during
the past year as the result of
changes in Soviet policy, was
represented by only a few dele-
gates and seems to have had
little influence in policy-mak-
ing.
Party Line
The approved Communist line
is that, while remaining an
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17 May 1956
opposition party, the party will
give "wholehearted" supportito
Nehru's government in its for-
eign policy of defense of peace,
in its efforts to reduce the
dependence of the Indian econ-
omy on imperialism, and in ev-
ery measure taken against "feu-
dal landlords." The Communists,
however, will oppose any con-
cessions by the government to
"foreign capital" and will fight
"antidemocratic" policies which
suppress democratic rights.
They will also bring pressure
on the government to speed the
pace of industrialization.
The prevailing sentiment
among delegates at the congress
was reported to be that the
Indian Communist Party had been
damaged by the Bulganin-Khru-
shchev visit last November, by
the repudiation of Stalin, with
which it does not wholly agree,
and by the dissolution of the
Cominform.
ICELANDIC ELECTION
DOMINATED BY AIR BASE ISSUE
The campaign for Iceland's
parliamentary election of 24
June is increasingly dominated
by the issue of the US-manned
NATO air base at Keflavik. The
Conservatives, which are the
most moderate of the parties on
the issue, appear to be making
an impact on the public, large-
ly through astute attacks on
the Progressives,who insisted
on calling the elections at this
time. No single group, however,
is expected to obtain a major-
ity of the 52 parliamentary
seats at stake, and whatever
government emerges is considered
certain to seek some changes
in the status of the base.
After the Progressives
called for the withdrawal of
American troops from Keflavik
Election Tactics
As a matter of election
tactics, the Communists apparent-
ly intend to try to develop a
united-front movement to strength-
en the party's hold in state gov-
ernments and on the national lev-
el to achieve an "alternative"
government to that of Nehru if
possible. A special effort will.
probably be made to obtain con-
trol of the government of Tra-
vencore-Cochin state.
To achieve their ends, the
Communists seem to be seeking
support from the two socialist
parties and have already attempt-
ed to strengthen their position
in the labor world. The Commu-
nists also apparently intend to
penetrate the Congress Party
organization by supporting "pro-
gressive elements" within. that
party and by drawing certain
Congress members into the united
and forced a general election at
an advanced date, the Conserva-
tive-Progressive coalition gov-
ernment assumed a "caretaker"
status. The Conservatives have
attacked Progressive foreign
minister Gudmundsson for hypoc-
risy in accepting the recent
communique of the NATO foreign
ministers' meeting at Paris to
the effect that the internation-
al situation warrants no relaxa-
tion of the common defense ef-
fort. This, they aasert, reveals
the Progressive stand to be only
an election maneuver.
Though avoiding any direct
defense of the status quo at
Keflavik, the Conservatives are
reported to be successfully
appealing to the voters by em-
phasizing that the base is a
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17 May 1956
real financial and economic
asset to Iceland. In 1955,
Iceland's net dollar earnings
from the base were about $12,-
000,000, almost double dollar
receipts from exports and cov-
ering half Iceland's foreign
exchange trade deficit. The
Progressives are reportedly
disturbed over the American de-
cision to suspend negotiations
on further defense construction
until after the dune elections,
since th?y fear that this move,
When it becomes public, will
strengthen the Conservatives'
argument.
Because of the success
of the Conservative attacks,
there is a growing possibility
that the Progressive members
of the caretaker government may
make some move prior to the
election to implement the Al-
thip's antibase resolution of
28 March. The Communist press
is demanding that the caretaker
government send notes to the
United States and NATO; and
earlier this month Gudmundsson
told the British minister he
might have to do something to
convince the v,iters that the
parliamentary mandate is not
being ignored.
No decisive action is
probable, however; the most
the Progressives are likely to
do is take some preliminary
steps looking toward the post-
election negotiations which all
parties assume will be neces-
jary no matter what the out-
come of the election.
The Communists are cam-
paigning vigorously against
the base under the auspices of
a "Labor Alliance", which in-
cludes the left-wing Social Demo-
crats,-but this group is not
expected to fare any better
than the straight Communist
ticket did in 1953, when it
polled 16.5 percent of the
popular vote and gained seven
seats. The majority of the
Social Democrats are allied with
the Progressives. No group
is at present expected to win
a majority of the 52 seats at
stake.
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17 May 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE PROTEST IN THE POLISH.:COMMUNIST PARTY
The Polish regime, faced
with intraparty factionalism
and mounting public disregard
for official efforts to limit
criticism, has reached the point
where it must decide whether
to continue its present inter-
nal policies or resume the more
rigid policies of the
past. Either alter-
native will raise new
problems for L.he al-
ready harassed Polish
Communist leaders.
Origins of Conflict
Prior to the So-
viet 20th Party Con-
gress, the Polish
political scene had
been relatively stable
on the surface, but
underneath a "liberal
revolt" had been grad-
ually developingy led
by the intelligentsia
and a number of in-
fluential party mem-
bers who had been ag-
itating ever since
the death of Stalin
for a liberalization
of party policy.
During 1954-1955,
a number of writers
began calling for less
ideological control
of the arts. Articles
critical of life under
Communism began to ap-
pear, climaxed in the
summer of 1955 with
the publication by
agitating for liberalization of
party control and a more modern
application of Marxist phi-
losophy.
these "liberals" included about
half of the approximately 200
leading party functionaries
Under. the chestnut trees, children big and small are running,
From half-dismantled scaffolding, they Pull wood to the kitchen.
On the stairs.is the noise of girls' names, diminutives, melodious,
Fifteen-year-old, Prostitutes jump down on the Planks to the cellars,
Their smile is as of lime, they smell of lime,
Next door the radio is playing to the rhythm of a dance in the beyond,
Night is approaching, hooligans are playing at hooligans,
How difficult it is to fall asleep when you are young among the
rustling chestnut trees.
The dreamer Fourier charmingly foretold,
That the seas would flow with lemonade.
And is not lemonade flowing?
They drink sea water,
They cry -
Lemonade! '
They go home stealthily
To vomit,
To vomit.
There are People in Nowa Huta (much Publicized new industrial
Who have never been inside a theater. area in Poland)
There are
There are
There are
There are
There are
There are
There are
Polish apples which the children cannot get,
children scorned by wicked doctors,
boys compelled to lie,
girls compelled to lie,
old wives thrown out of their houses by
exhausted people dying of thrombosis,
People who are slandered and spat on,
There are People who- are robbed on the streets
By ordinary thugs to whom they are trying to give
There are people who are waiting for a little bit
There are People who are waiting for justice,
There are People who have waited for a long time.
the noted Communist poet Adam
Wazyk of his Poem for Adults,
a bitter portrayal =o the deg-.
radation,. of human beings in
Communist Poland.
These views of the writers
reflected the opinions of an
important element of the par-
ty which had been constantly
a legal definition,
of paper,
who make up the Central Party
Aktiv which is used by the
politburo to keep in touch with
affairs within the party.
This group was emboldened
by the new look in Soviet poli-
cy to press the politburo con-
tinuously for the reforms which
it felt were necessary to make
Communism succeed in Poland.
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17.May 1956
Throughout 1955, however,
the politburo, led by a tri-
umvirate consisting of First
Secretary Boleslaw Bierut,
Jakub Berman--the power be-
hind the throne--and economic
czar Hilary Minc, had refused
to meet the"liberal" group.'s
demands, awaiting the out-
come of directives that would
be laid down at the Soviet
party congress. With the
congress' apparent "green
light" for the views of this
"liberal"~ group, the party lead-
ership set about to meet some
of its demands. The party's
problems in channeling and
controlling the new liberal
policy have been accentuated
by the death of Bierut in
March and the illness of Minc.
The personal enmity be-
tween the new first secretary,
Edward.Ochab, a militant Com-
munist who is presumably not
in sympathy with the demands
for greater party "democracy,'
and the remaining member of
the old triumvirate, Berman,
probably was the principal
cause for Berman's dismissal
from his top party and gov-
ernment posts on 6 May. His
dismissal gives the new first
secretary an opportunity to
grasp firmly the reins of
party control, and may serve
to placate the party dissi-
dents, whose support Ochab
must obtain.
Influential members of
the "liberal" element in the
party, however will not
accept Ochab
because of
his evident willingness to
use any means to stop the
process of liberalization.
An additional factor con-
tributing to Ochab's unpopu-
larity is the general belief
within the party that Soviet.
party first secretary Khru-
shchev personally intervened
in Warsaw to assure Ochab's
election as successor to
Bierut.
Future Course of Action
So far Ochab has given
no clear indication as to how
he intends to meet the problem
of mollifying the Polish
people and unmistakably re-
asserting his control in the
party. Under the new ideolo-g-
ical pronouncements and poli-
cy decisions of the Soviet
20th Party Congress, Ochab
has more freedom of maneuver
than his predecessors to
meet the present challenge
to his and the party's au-
thority. Certain of the de-
mands of the dissident party
elements probably will be
met. Within the framework
established at the Soviet
congress, steps can be taken
which will "democratize" the
party.
If Ochab succeeds in re-
establishing a satisfactory
degree of party unity, he
can then move to meet the
problem of the uncontrolled
public demands for greater
internal freedom. Probably
a number of specific changes
will be made which will permit
greater internal freedom and
will prevent malpractices of
the past.
If, however, the palliative
measures serve only to encour-
age additional and more far-
reaching demands by dissident
party elements and'by the people,
the regime will be forced to
crack down and resort to severe
police measures in order to make
people can expect.
it clear that there are very
definite limits to the new
"liberalism" and to what the
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The nationwide election
of provincial and communal
councils on 27-28 May will be
the first major test since 1953
of Italian political trends.
Focusing on local aspects of
national issues, the election
may indicate whether a working
alliance at.a national level is
likely to develop between the
Christian Democrats and the
Nenni Socialists, at the expense
of the Communist-Nenni Socialist
unity of action pact. The
Christian Democrats' showing--
both in these and the national
elections due by 1958--will
as. "Don't vote for those who
voted for him!" In general,
the Christian Democrats are
stressing the progress made
under ten years of national
Christian Democratic govern-
ment and in particular are
poin'ti'ng to the Vanoni'.
P la n, the -.,ten -- -year economic
development program de
signed. by the late budget minis-
.ter.- to reduce unemployment
and increase productivity. The
party is carrying out a grass
roots campaign similar to that
used successfully in the Sicil-
i.a.n regional elections of
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ITALIAN ELECTIONS
1951-1952
LOCAL ELECTIONS
(PARTY STRENGTHS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULAR VOTE)
OTHER RIGHT AND LOCAL
MONARCHISTS
LIBERALS
COMMUNISTS
21,2
x NENNI
SOCIALISTS
CHRISTIAN 11.9
35.8
?9
DEMOCRATS OTHER LEFT
p
DEMOCRATIC
SOCIALISTS
REPUBLICANS
depend in part on their ability
to convince the electorate of
their intentions to carry out
reform programs.
The Campaign
The campaign opened of-
ficially on 15 April, with the
Christian Democrats in the
large cities displaying posters
of Stalin, bearing such captions
LIBERALS
1953
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
NENNI
\SOCJAUSTSJ)
12.7
,r3
DEMOCRATIC
SOCIALISTS
REPUBLICANS
1 OTHER CENTER
1955, and seems generally confi-
dent about its prospects.
The Communists, embarrassed
by Moscow's new line on Stalin,
are reported hopeful the Soviet
Union will come forward with
some kind of economic develop-
ment loan to Italy of the sort
President Gronchi has been seek-
ing from the International Bank.
The Communist campaign has
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COMMUNISTS
22.7
CHRISTIAN
40.7
DEMOCRATS
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17 May 1956
has consisted largely of attacks
on the unpopular new "monopo-
list" front formed by the
industrialists, agricultural-
ists' and merchants' confed-
erations as a kind of economic
lobby. The party is also try-
ing to take credit for some
of the Segni government's reform
Cremona Mantova
Piacenza+ _ _
Nuoro+
Bologna}
La Spezia
Pisa+Florence
denigration.of Stalin to em-
phasize long-standing dif-
ferences between his party
and the Communists.
The smaller government
parties are, on the one hand,
stressing their accomplish-
ments through association with
ITALIAN ELECTIONS
-KEY COMMUNES
+ Center-controlled commune
{ Leftist-controlled commune
measures on the ground that
these could not have been passed
without both Communist and
Nenni socialist support.
Nenni is also stressing
the effectiveness of his parlia-
mentary support of the govern-
ment, but is insisting that no
more social progress can be ex-
pected unless his party--he
does not say the left in gen-
eral--gains strength. He is
also making a point of exploit-
ing the confusion over the
the coalition govern-
ment, and, on the
other, attacking
the Christian Demo-
crats for acting
independently of
their partners.
The election
efforts of the Mon-
archists and the
Neo-Fascists have
aroused little in-
terest.
Party Expectations
The Christian
Democrats are confi-
dent of doing at
least as well as in
the last local (1951-
52) and national
(1953) elections,
and hope to make
gains of from one to
five percent. They
tend to get a smaller
share of the vote in
local than in nation-
al elections. Never-
theless, they are
likely to win votes
from the Monarchist
and Neo-Fascist parr
ties in the south and
retain enough of the
small city councils to give
them control of slightly over
half of Italy's 8,000 communes.
The Nenni Socialists are
expected by independent Italian
observers to make gains also,
and possibly to increase their
1953 vote as much as a third
to give them some 17 percent
of the total. Much of that
gain would be at the expense
of the small anti-Communist
Social Democratic Party. Even
Communist Party leader Togliatti
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17 May 1956
fears that Nenni'will draw
votes from the Communists.
For the Communists, the
same observers predict a loss
of some five percent which
would leave them with less than
22 percent of the total vote.
In the south, where Communist
popularity is based mainly on
promises of a better life eco-
nomically, the party may hold
its own. Losses are anticipated
mainly in the more internation-
ally minded north of Italy, an
area where the party is dis-
oriented by the results of the
Moscow congress and by domestic
strains. In communal adminis-
trations, the Communists have
tended to govern smoothly,~how-
ever, and in Milan and Genoa,
for example, they have attracted
middle-class support. Thus the
Communists hope to retain con-
trol of certain northern cities.
Of the three small center
parties, only the Liberals ex-
pect to gain. The Republicans
fear virtual extinction, and
many Social Democrats believe
they can avoid such a fate them-
selves only by rejoining the
Nenni Socialists. The Monarch-
ists and Neo-Fascists are ex-
pected to show a marked decline.
Postelection Problems
Some Christian Democrats
are already talking about the
possibility of calling nation-
al elections this-year instead
of in 1958, if they show up
well in these elections. The
leaders of the party reportedly
consider this would be a risky
move, however, in view of the
weakness of the party's coali-
tion partners and other prob-
lems facing it.
? The recent canceling of
a provision whereby the group
polling the largest vote re-
ceives extra seats will make
more difficult the formation
of new local governments in
the larger cities. The Chris-
tian Democrats, in particular,
may be forced in a number of
these cities to form coalitions.
In the south,?the Christian
Democrats would probably form
alliances with the rightest
parties, but in certain large
communes in the north, such as
Milan and Turin, there would
be pressure on them to become
allied with the Nenni Social-
ists.
If the center parties did
in fact form local alliances
with the Nenni Socialists and
these worked out well, the ques-
tion ofa Christian Democratic-
Nenni Socialist alliance on a
national level would almost cer-
tainly arise.
For many months, the Chris-
tian Democrats have discussed
the Advisability of some such
"opening to the left." The pro-
ponents of such a move assert
it would both strengthen the
Christian Democrats' political
position and split the Nenni
Socialists from the Communists.
In the latter regard, they point
to the Nenni Socialists' support
of the Vanoni Plan as indicative
of the cleavage already existing
between Nenni and his Communist
allies.
The Vanoni Plan
The Vanoni Plan is a ten-
year development project which
has been described as the Chris-
tian Democrat's most dynamic
weapon against the Communists.
The plan was designed by the
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17 May 1956
late budget minister to curb
Italy's serious unemployment,
increase productivity and di-
minish the present wide gap be-
tween the economies of north
and south Italy.
It would require the in-
vestment of some ten billion
dollars, much of which Italy
hopes to get from American and
other Western sources on the
strength of OEEC's approval of
the plan in principle. Imple-
mentation of even the early
stages of the plan has, however,
been held up so far by the
Christian Democratic Party lead-
ership, which claims to be wor-
ried by the opposition of right-
wing elements within the party
and the lack of American sup-
port.
The Communists were taken
by surprise when the. Christian
Democrats presented the plan
two years ago. They initially
opposed it and finally approved
it only grudgingly, with reser-
vations. The Nenni Socialists,
on the other hand, went on rec-
ord hastily in support of it and
the question arose as to how
they had become so familiar with
it so fast. There was some spec
ulation as to whether the plan
had been discussed with them.
Meanwhile, the general pub-
lic has responded with marked
enthusiasm, and impatience is
growing over the delay in im-
plementation. Even the conserv-
ative. weekly, Twenty-Four Hours,
which serves as spokesman for
industry, came out last month
with an editorial protesting
the government's "attempt to
bury" the plan and indicating
the intention of some conserv-
:ative groups to keep it alive.
Reliable observers believe
the plan has so-much popular
appeal that Nenni's following
might force him into support
of the Christian Democrats if
the latter indicated a real
intention to implement it.
Such an alliance in support of
the plan would leave the Com-
munists in a position of un-
comfortable isolation or un-
happy support.
Meanwhile, Nenni continues,
despite his differences with
the Communists, to reaffirm
publicly his unity-of-action
pact with them and to avoid
making a decison until events,
which are moving in the direc-
tion of a showdown, provide him
with one. Various observers
report that Nenni clearly feels
himself heir to the Communist
Party, but knows he does not
have the strength to claim his
inheritance now. They think
he must first: (1) reinforce
his own party and make sure that
his following is prepared for
a change and (2) take account
of public opinion and show that
he is prepared to play a role
far different from that of re-
cent years.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE USSR
Since Stalin's death Soviet
leaders have been moving cautious-
ly toward legal and judicial
reform. Some of the more oner-
ous restrictions imposed on the
iniividual during the Stalin era
have been removed, and the ju-
dicial powers of the police and
military tribunals have been
curtailed. Measures have also
been taken to standardize and
streamline the cumbersome sys-
tem of administering justice.
Revision of Criminal Code
The present Soviet leader-
ship has renewed the, demand
voiced by Lenin in 1922 for
the establishment of a uniform
code of laws for the Soviet
Union. The codes of the several
union republics, although based
on that of the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic,
contain differences which make
for inequities in the adminis-
tration of justice. Of primary
importance to the regime is a
revision of the RSFSR criminal
code. which wil.'1'bemade applicable
throughout the country, Pre-
sumably the publication of an
all-Union criminal code would
be followed shortly by uniform
civil and procedural codes.
Propaganda media are now stating
that new criminal legislation
may be completed during 1956.
It is evident from propa-
ganda and from the few changes
that have taken place that any
new criminal statutes will pro-
vide more severe punishment for
such serious crimes as treason,
espionage and sabotage. At the
same time, criminal responsibility
for lesser offenses, such as
malfeasance and breaches of the
peace, will be replaced by ad-
ministrative penalties and dis-
ciplinary measures.
Some changes exemplifying
the new trend in criminal legis-
lation have already been made.
In mid-1954, for example, the
death penalty was extended to
cover cases of premeditated
murder. At the same time, the
system of parole, abolished in
1939, was reinstituted. Several
categories of corrective labor
camp inmates were declared eli-
gible for parole, and many
prisoners were evidently re-
leased. Persons guilty of
political crimes were unaf-
fected.
Official insistence on
increased punishment for se-
rious crimes makes it highly
doubtful that the harsh pro-
visions of Article 58 of the
RSFSR criminal code, which
deals with counterrevolutionary
crimes, will be modified. Prior
to the amnesty of September
1955, propaganda reiterating
the necessity for increasingly
stringent penalties for anti-
state activities made clear
the limited application of the
amnesty decree. Only persons
guilty of collaborating with
the enemy during World War II,
and particularly those who had
left the USSR, were pardoned.
Administrative machinery
for performing the basic work
necessary for revising the
criminal code and writing an
all-Union code of laws may al-
ready have been set up. In
April 1956, a section for the
systematization of legislation
was established in the office
of the USSR prosecutor general.
It is likely that this section
is charged with resolving the
differences existing between
the various republic codes and
that, of the RSFSR and recom-
mending any changes necessary
for drafting a USSR code.
Abolition of Special Tribunals
Perhaps the most sensa-
tional aspect of the judicial
reform movement has been the
abolition of the special tribu-
nals which meted out summary
justice during the purges of
1934-38. Following the downfall
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
of Beria in July 1953, the
Special Conference of the MVD
was abolished. Officially em-
powered to sentence counter-
revolutionary elements to exile,
forced labor, or banishment
from the Soviet Union, the
Special Conference in actuality
imposed much more severe pun-
ishments, including the death
sentence.
Although it was frequent-
ly rumored during 1953-56,
public announcement that the
conference had ceased to exist
was delayed until.1956, after
the legal basis for such spe-
dial tribunals had been de-
stroyed by the repeal of two
laws, enacted in 1934 and 1937.
These laws had established ex-
ceptional methods for the in-
vestigation and trial of per-
sons accused of violation of
Article 58 of the RSFSR crim-
nal code. Tried in secret by
special tribunals within ten
days after indictment, the de-
fendants had no right to coun-
sel and no right of appeal.
The death sentence, if. imposed,
was carried out immediately.
Public announcement of the
above developments was accom-
panied by scathing denunciations
of the "trial by confession"
tactics employed by.the'late'
Andrei Vyshinsky, Soviet pub-
lic prosecutor during the purge
era. In the anti-Vyshinsky
campaign, party and government
admitted that many persons had
been accused falsely and that
their guilt had been establish-
ed on the sole basis of confes-
sion. The police apparatus
was accused of extorting ad-
missions of guilt via "improper"
methods of investigation and
questioning of the accused.
The Soviet leaders have
promised that such glaring vio-
lations of Soviet law will not
be permitted in the future.
Both the decree revoking the
1934 and 1937 laws and current
propaganda state that hence-
forth the investigation and
prosecution of antistate crimes
must be guided by "normal judi-
cial standards established by
law."
The Prosecutor's Office
Among the more important
steps taken by the regime to
prevent a recurrence of the
terror of the 1930's have been
a thorough reorganization of
the prosecutor's office and
changes in the court system.
Shortcomings in the of-
fice were acknowledged im-
mediately after the execution
of Beria, when Prosecutor Gen-
eral Rudenko admitted in Pravda
that his office had permitted
violations of the law on the
part of certain government of-
ficials. In early 1955 Pravda
again lashed out at Rudennko
office for its lack of firmness
in halting the "antistate activ-
ities; of some public officials."
The paper demanded that work
be so organized as to make im-
possible the "unfounded arrest
and indictment of citizens."
The functions of the
prosecutor's office as con-
ceived by the present regime
were spelled out in a decree
of the Supreme Soviet published
in June 1955. The office was
made subordinate to the Presi-
dium of the Supreme Soviet rather
than to both the presidium and
the Council of Ministers as
formerly, and was charged with
the responsibility of preventing
false arrest and investigation
of citizens
by the police.
The
decree also
required that
state
prosecutors
have a higher
edu-
cation.
These
provisions were
put
into force
with the reorganiza-
tion of the
central apparatus
of the prosecutor's office in
April of this year. The crea-
tion of a department for super-
vision of investigations by the
organs of state security was
accompanied by the subordination
of "investigators for especially
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
important matters" to the
prosecutor general.
It appears that this lat-
ter move gives Rudenko super-
visory 'powers over the func-
tions of the former "Investi-
gative Unit for Especially Im-
portant Affairs" of the KGB.
If this is the case, the office
of the prosecutor general may
now have certain real, if
limited., powers of controlling
the investigative work performed
by state., se:cur.-ity '.orga:n$
The Court System
Although the court system
has not been basically altered,
the formation, evidently in mid-
1954, of presidia of the re-
public supreme courts and of
oblast and rayon courts is of
some. significance. The presidia
were established in order to
"safeguard" the courts "against
possible mistakes and to elimi-
nate quickly violations of le-
gal procedures." This means,
in effect, that a modified form
of judicial review has been
instituted.
At the instance of pros-
.ecutors. general or of presi-
dents of supreme courts, the
presidia are empowered to re-
view and to reverse the de-
cisions of the courts of the
next lower echelon. The right
to appeal the decisions of low-
er courts was in no way extend-
ed to litigants directly. A-
vailable information indicates
that the only method by which
an appeal can be made by liti-
gants is by privately gaining
the ear of a prosecutor.
Supreme Court chairman
Volin recently indicated to a
visiting delegation of French
'Socialists that certain other
changes in court procedures
will be made. He stated that
drafts to modify investigation
and trial procedures "have been
prepared." While he did not
specify what changes the drafts
recommended, he asserted that
defense attorneys would "soon"
have the right to participate
in investigation procedures
from the point at which charges
are lodged against the accused.
Beyond doubt, the efforts
of the post-Stalin leadership
to eradicate all reminders of
the police terror of Stalin's
day and to establish a facade
of strict legality in its deal-
ings with the individual have
had a markedly favorable effect
on the Soviet population.
The official end of terror
as a means of control, amnesties
and reductions in prison terms,
lightened punishment for mis-
demeanors, and recurrent propa-
ganda calling for ensuring the
rights of the individual Soviet
citizen, have created an atmos-
phere of security against op-
pression previously unknown in
the Soviet Union.
According to public pro-
nouncements, the citizens of
the Soviet Union may expect
further reforms of their judi-
cial system in the near future.
Among these will'be discontinu-
ance of the use of the doctrine
of analogy and the disappearance
of corrective labor camps. Under
the doctrine of analogy, de-
fendants accused ofcrimes'not
specifically enumerated in the
criminal code are sentenced in
accordance with provisions of
the law covering the crime most
closely akin to that committed.
In order to eliminate the doc-
trine of analogy, it will pre-
sumably be necessary to include
several heretofore unspecified
crimes in the revised criminal
code s
With regard to the correc--
tine labor camps, information
thus far available indicates that
no abolition of camps per se is
contemplated. The camps will
evidently be converted into
"work rehabilitation colonies"
having their own industrial
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 May 1956
enterprises. It will be for-
bidden to assign prisoners to
work outside the colonies, and
convicts will not be deported
to places unreasonably distant
from their homes.
Despite the liberaliza-
tion of the Soviet judicial
system as it has evolved thus
far, the fundamental concept
of "socialist legality" has
remained unchanged. The pri-
mary function of the law in the
Soviet Union is clearly to pro- 25X1
mote the aims of the Communist state
rather than to ensure justice
for the individual.
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