CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000800060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL S?~R?7
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SU
A
Y
Ic
COPY NO. IS
OCR NO. 1778/56
Docs!r t t -I
No Chance En ":s.
GccL~a a :'
Class. C!,r ? t T3 S
ext itevlers ?a.s: 4-1
Auth.: h6 70-3
Date: (. --~ -
19 April 1956
25
By: ----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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IVFI DENIIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
19 April 1956
The military aspects of the Arab-Israeli situation
may recede into the background temporarily as the parties
give primary attention to diplomatic maneuvers. This
shift in emphasis, arising from UN secretary general
Hammarskj.old's= mission, has been reinforced by the
Soviet statement on the situation, which, however, was
received by both the Arabs and Israelis with considerable
official reserve and probably a good deal of private
uneasiness.
Page 1
SOVIET POSITION
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . Page 2
The Soviet Foreign Ministry's announcement on
17 April that Moscow is ready to "contribute with other
states" to the peaceful solution of the unsolved problems
of the Near East is another major bid to gain a great-
power role for the USSR in the .,area`. As a ,result-of
the USSR's extensive arms commitment to Egypt and its
strongly pro-Arab policies during the past year, Moscow
may now be in a position to influence strongly the tactics
employed by the Arabs in their dispute with'Israel.
THE LONDON DISARMAMENT TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . Page 3
The UN disarmament subcommittee meeting in London
has made no measurable progress toward agreement^!. The
Western delegates are united in their opposition to
portions of the Soviet proposal of 27 March. Since
that date, Soviet delegate Gromyko has confined his re-
marks to defending the USSR's proposal and criticizing
the Anglo-French proposal. The subcommittee has scheduled
a meeting for 23 April, during the Bulganin-Khrushchev
visit. F_ I
SACQRTY.
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19 April 1956
MOSCOW ANNOUNCES
END OF COMINFORM
NOTES AND COMMENTS
. . . . . . . . . .
Moscow has announced the dissolution of the Cominform
and the discontinuance of its propaganda periodical. A
Pravda article made it clear that the main objective was
to remove a barrier to Communist co-operation with
Socialist parties. The move is also intended to satisfy
Tito, who was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, and
coincides with the Bulganin-Khr
h
h
us
c
ev visit to Britain.
I -I
YUGOSLAVIA MAY REQUEST
OBSERVER STATUS IN CEMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 1
The Yugoslav government is considering a plan under
which it would apply for observer status in the Soviet
bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) on
the same basis as Yugoslavia's participation in the
Organization, for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).
The Yugoslavs probably feel such a move would facilitate
their trading with Eastern Europe.
CF ,ANGE IN BULGARIAN LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . .
Page 3
The replacement of Bulgarian premier Vulko Chervenkov
by his rival, Anton Yugov, may mark an increase in Soviet
willingness to allow the Eastern European Communist
countries to control their own affairs. He has now been
succeeded by a man who in 1950 barely escaped being ex-
ecuted on"Titoist charges." Moscow probably allowed
Chervenkov to be jettisoned since he was a symbol of
Stalinism both inside Bulgaria and abroad--especially in
Yugoslavia.
SOVIET ANTIAIRCRAFT CAPABILITY
STRENGTHENED
. . . . . Page 4
New equipment is greatly improving the ability of
Soviet ground force units in East Germany to defend
themselves against air attack. The new equipment is
indicative of the high degree of modernization being
attained throughout the Soviet army.
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19 April 1956
KHRUSHCHEV RECRUITS
FOR SIBERIAN INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . Page 5.
Under the Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan, 3,000,000
new workers will be needed in Siberia between now and
1960, the first phase of;a long-range program to
transform the vast central Kazakh-Siberian area into
the industrial heartland of the USSR. Communist Party
secretary Khrushchev last week called for.3Q0,000 to
500,000 volunteers to move to Siberia. The difficulties
already experienced in the "new.lands" settlements
suggest that it may be easier to recruit volunteers for
Siberia than to keep them there.
USSR PUSHES FRIENDSHIP.
WITH INDONESIA . . . . . . . .~.
. ? . o ? ?
The USSR has offered economic aid to Indonesia and
Page 6
has invited President Sukarno and a parliamentary dele-
gation to visit Moscow. The Soviet proposals have been
accepted by Indonesia which probably wishes to demonstrate
the independence of its position by balancing the assist
ance.it has already accepted from the United States.
JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS
The appointment of Minister of Agriculture and
Forestry Kono to head Japan's mission to Moscow to
negotiate a fisheries settlement has aroused apprehension
in_the government party that Prime Minister Hatoyama may
be preparing to soften his government's firm stand against
the.USSR. Kono favors early establishment of relations
with the USSR.
THE BURMESE ELECTIONS
Page 8
Page 9
On 27 April, the first parliamentary elections
since 1952 will be held in Burma. The government
coalition, the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League,
is.,presenting a solid front to a variety of disunited
.opposition groups. There are already 36 AFPFL candidates
Who are running unopposed, and this number will undoubtedly
increase-before election day.
CAMBODIA ? ? ? o . o ? . 'o ? e ? . ? o 0 0
When the fourth congress of. Cabodia's ruling Sangkum
party convenes On 21-22 April, Prince Sihanouk's in-
fluence will probably lead to approval of Soviet and
polish representation in Phnom Penh and to acceptance of
Chinese economic assistance.
Page 10
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19 April 1956
INDIAN-PAKISTANI TENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1.0
Tension between India and Pakistan has increased
following more than a dozen border incidents since mid-
February and Indian prime minister Nehru's recent state-
ments ruling out a plebiscite on Kashmir. War between
the two countries does not appear likely at present, but
New Delhi fears an attack by Pakistan next year.
r- I
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Discussions continue between French officials and
Algerian rebel leaders on terms for a cease-fire-
aIn Morocco, sympathy for. the 'Algerian rebtLls:
may lead to isolated incidents. The '1'uiiisian national-
front cabinet formed by Habib Bourghiba is likely to
adopt a firmer position in relation to France than its
PROSPECTS FOR
THE GREEK GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The vote of confidence won by Greek prime minister
Karamanlis on 11 April may permit his regime to start
its program of economic reforms. Disagreement over how
best to approach the chronic economic problems, however,
as well as over the Cyprus issue and relations with
Turkey, will continue to make the government vulnerable
FRENCH GOVERNMENT
FACES GROWING DIFFICULTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
French premier Mollet has gained cabinet support
on his Algerian policy,at least for the time being, but
now faces a Communist call for nationwide demonstrations
against the call-up of reservists for Algeria and rightist
demands for a greater show of force against the rebels.
Meanwhile, the government's need for new revenues and
labor's agitation for higher wages presentO a new threat
'
to France
s financial stability.
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19 April 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD FRANCE . . . . . . . .
The USSR is making unusual efforts to win the
friendship of the Socialist-led. French government and
to exploit the growing pressure in France for a more
independent role in the Western alliance. While trying
to adhere to its traditional role as the "champion" of
colonial peoples, the USSR has recently expressed new
sympathy for the French position in North Africa,
apparently hoping to obtain in return French co-operation
in other matters. The USSR may try to explore these
questions further with the French when Mollet and Pineau
visit Moscow in May.
Page
RECENT TRENDS IN COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY . . . Page 4
Communist China is pushing its campaign to
"normalize" relations with all countries, conclude
economic agreements which provide for acceptance of
permanent Chinese commercial missions--particularly in
the Middle East--and-; arrange a conference between
Secretary Dulles and Chou En-lai. Peiping, considers
that success along these lines would advance its
announced foreign policy aims of attaining wider diplo-
matic recognition, membership in~the.UN, and the
annexation of Taiwan. The Chinese effort also con-
tributes to the broader Sino-Soviet campaign to
strengthen and enlarge the "zone of neutralism."
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19 April 1956
THE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN: MOTIVES AND-CONSEQUENCES . . Page
The decision to transform the gradual desancti-
ficat1 o.f Stalin into an abrupt degradation was
probably a deliberate one, based on a complex of motives
which made a dramatic move desirable. In carrying out
this decision., however, the Soviet regime faces the'risk
of encouraging freedom of thought and expression beyond
limits it considers desirable and of undermining confidence
in the party's infallibility. It'faces also the difficult
task of stimulating initiative without undermining
discipline, of creating a sense of participation without
giving the right to criticize basic policies, of fostering
scientific progress without opening the door to a dangerous
freedom of thought.
STALEMATE WITH COMMUNISTS CONTINUES IN BRITISH GUIANA . . Page 11
Britain's continued suspension of British Guiana's
constitution, because of the grave security situation
in the.colony, contrasts sharply with the moves being
made in other British Caribbean territories toward
political federation and eventual autonomy. Largely
because\of the lack of any effective leadership among
moderate political. elements in'British Guiana, the
Communist-led Progiessive People's Party is still popular
even though it was forced to relinquish its control of
the government in October 1953 when the constitution' was
suspended. There is little prospect of a break in the
political stalemate.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 April 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
The military aspects of
the Arab-Israeli situation
may recede into the back-
ground temporarily as the par-
ties give primary attention'-
to diplomatic maneuvers.
This shift in emphasis, arising
from UN secretary general
Hammarskjold's mission, has
been reinforced by the Soviet
statement on the situation,
which,however,'was received by
both the Arabs and Israelis with
considerable official reserve
and probably a good deal of
private uneasiness. (See
following article.)
Although the Egyptians
fostered the impression during
Hammarskjold's visit to Cairo'
that they were wholly co-
operative, they appear, in fact,
to have committed themselves to
little or nothing more than
proposals already offered by
Prime Minister Nasr.
The Israelis sought to
broaden the talks beyond the
immediate question of main-
taining the armistice on
Israel's borders, asking
for consideration of Egypt's
refusal to allow them to use
the Suez Canal. However,
Hammarskjold refused to get
entangled in this issue without
the consent of the Egyptians.
The Israelis appear to have
dropped this tactic for the
moment, but they will almost
certainly return to it in any
future discussions, since they
have consistently insisted
that what they seek is a
peace settlement rather than
a mere extension of the
armistice agreement.
Even a reasonably specific
agreement on an immediate cease-
fire may not mark the end of
Hammarskjold's mission. The
secretary general told
Ambassador Lawson in Tel Aviv
on 17 April that he intended
to move on to Beirut, Damascus,
Amman and again Cairo, and that
he might have to make at
least one trip back to New
York before winding up his
efforts. This suggests that
he regards the scope of his
mission as broader than his
achievements so far.
Meanwhile, the Soviet
statement probably is leading
all parties to step carefully
until the full import of the
USSR's move can be assessed.
Initial Israeli press reaction
dismissed the statement as of
little significance, but
almost certainly concealed
genuine concern and interest
as to what the Soviet leaders
really had in mind. The Cairo
press also sought to hide its
uncertainty, taking the unique
line that the United States
and the Soviet Union might be
drawing closer together on
Near Eastern issues leaving
Britain, Cairo's current bete
noire, trying to salvage a
crumbling Baghdad pact.
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19 April 1956
SOVIET POSITION
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE
The Soviet Foreign
Ministry's announcement on
17 April that Moscow is ready
to contribute with other states
to the peaceful solution of
the unsolved problems of the
Near East is another major bid
to gain a great-power role for
the USSR in the Near East.
Foreign Minister Molotov
reportedly has said that the
statement might serve as a
basis for discussion in London
during the Bulganin-Khrushchev
visit. The statement is timed
to encourage a growing con-
viction in France that the
Soviet Union must be included
in any attempt to solve Near
Eastern problems. (See Part III,
p.2.)
Moscow probably regards
the statement as a reply to
President Eisenhower's announce-
ment on 9 April pledging
American aid to any Near
Eastern state that might be
the victim of aggression. It is
evidently intended to give notice
that the USSR will not agree to
any Western action on the Arab-
Israeli dispute except as taken
through the UN Security Council,
where the USSR can use its
pmerogat ives as a permanent mem-
oer to promote its policies in
relation to the Arabs. The
statement asserts that the
Soviet government considers
"illegal and inadmissible"
any attempt to justify "inter-
ference from without" in
the Arab states or the
introduction of foreign
troops into the area.
In its relations with
the Arabs and Israel, Moscow
is continuing to work both
sides of the street,thereby
avoiding the appearance of being
too uncompromisingly pro-Arab.
This year, for the first time,
high-ranking Soviet officials--
Molotov and Mikoyan--attended
the Israeli Independence Day
reception In Moscow on 16 April.
Soviet spokesmen during the past
several months have assured the
Israelis that the USSR has no
hostility toward Israel and
blamed the situation in the
Near East on the Western powers.
Such gestures are not
expected to compromise Moscow's
pro-Arab stand in the Near East,
since the Arabs will probably
interpret them as a restraining?
influence on the Israelis in
the period before arms deliv4-
eries give the Arab states
military superiority in the
area. In any case, Moscow hopes
to pose as the "impartial
mediator" between the two sides
in the forthcoming UN discussions.
Moscow has repeatedly in-
dicated since last summer that
it would like to participate 25X1
in an international conference 25X1
on general problems in the
Near East.
the United States and the 25X1
USSR should first talk about
the situation in the Near East,
and then call for a conference
which would include other
interested powers.
The USSR has made it
clear that it would expect any
major conference to include
all states concerned--specifi-
cally the Arab states, and
possibly India.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 April 1956
Influence on Egypt
As a result of the USSR's
extensive arms commitment to
Egypt and its strongly pro-
Arab policies during the past
year, Moscow may now be in a
position to influence strongly
the tactics employed by the,
Arabs. Moscow probably be-
lieves that in view of Egyptian
premier Nasr's dependence on
Soviet political and military
support, he is not likely to
undertake any large-scale mili-
tary venture without consulting
the USSR.
Moscow does not appear
to be encouraging the Arabs at
present to precipitate hostil-
ities with Israel.
The UN disarmament sub-
committee, whose current ses-
sion in London is now in its
fifth week, has made no meas-
urable progress toward agree-
ment, but the Western delegates
are united in their opposition
to portions of the Soviet pro-
posal of 27 March. Since that
proposal was made, Soviet dele-
gate Gromyko has confined his
remarks to defending it and
criticizing the Anglo-French
proposal.
25X1
equipment.
At the present time, the USSR
probably does not believe it
will have to intervene in the
Near East beyond continuing to
supply the Arab states with po-
litical support and military
The subcommittee now has
before it the Anglo-French plan
presented on 19 March by French
delegate Jules Moch and the So-
viet proposal of 27 March, in
addition to various American
proposals. The subcommittee,
as a whole, is addressing it-
self to these proposals in an
attempt to clarify them. On
12 April the subcommittee mem-
bers held an off-the-record
meeting which, United States
delegate Stassen reports, was
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 April 1956
cordial, but pointed up "Soviet
unwillingness to budge from its
present position."
Western delegates have con-
centrated on those provisions
of the Soviet proposal which
require clarification, such as
the control provisions, force
levels, the lack of any plan for
nuclear reductions, and the pro-
posed special limitations on
troops and weapons in Germany.
British delegate Nutting has re-
jected the proposals regarding
Germany--which could in effect
make the division of Germany
permanent--as having no similar-
ity to the Eden plan announced
at Geneva last year.
To calm West German fears
that progress on disarmament
could delay the reunification
of Germany, both the French and
the British delegates have tried
to make clear that any final
disarmament treaty must assume
a united and free Germany.
French delegate Moch now
is attempting to synthesize all
points of agreement that are
explicitly stated in the various
plans before the subcommittee.
He is particularly disturbed
over the lack of a provision
for nuclear disarmament in the
Soviet plan. Both Moch and
Nutting have privately expressed
the opinion that the Soviet
Union may have reserved announce-
ment of some plan for nuclear
disarmament for the current vis-
it of Khrushchev and Bulganin
to Britain.
Gromyko has insisted that
the USSR has offered a plan to
go ahead on conventional dis-
armament, with nuclear disarma-
ment put aside "for the time
being," primarily in answer to
the West's contention that there
is no foolproof way of eliminat-
ing the nuclear threat.
The subcommittee has sched-
uled a meeting for 23 April,
during the Bulganin-Khrushchev
visit. United States delegate
Stassen believes that this
meeting may be crucial.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 April 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MOSCOW ANNOUNCES
END OF COMINFORM
Moscow has announced the
dissolution of the Cominform
and the discontinuance of its
propaganda. periodical, the
publication of which had been
the main function of the Comin-
form in recent years. Formed
in 1947, the Cominform included
the Communist parties of the
Soviet Union, France, Italy,
and all the Eastern European
Satellites except East Germany
and Albania.
A Pravda article on 18
April made it clear that the
main purpose of this step was
to remove a barrier to Communist
co-operation with Socialist
parties. It said that dissolu-
tion of the Cominform would
help to accomplish the impor-
tant task of "eliminating the
split of the workers' movement
and creating the unity of the
working class."'
Pravda. said that the Com-
munists are ready for "unity of
action" with the Socialists and
co-operation in drafting a com-
mon platform of principles. it
is likely that Socialist parties
particularly in Western Europe,
will be invited to attend var-
ious international conferences
with Communist parties in the
future, and perhaps to join in
one international organization.
The elimination of the
Cominform will be particularly
pleasing to the Yugoslavs, who
were expelled from it in 1948
and who will view this move as
a further vindication of their
anti-Stalin policy. Belgrade
also shares Moscow's interest in
promoting a working arrangement
between Orbit Communists and
Western European Socialists. As
another gesture to Tito's views,
Pravda, implied that the ending
,of the Cominform is designed to
encourage more independent,
national roads to socialism in
the Satellites.
Moscow probably expects
the move will be regarded through-
out the world as further "'proof"
of Soviet willingness to re-
move the causes of international
tension. The step may also
have been timed to improve the
atmosphere for the current visit
of Bulganin and Khrushchev to
Britain.
since, as Khrushchev has
said, the Cominform had not met
since 1949, and has been only a.
propaganda machine since then,
the practical effect of its
dissolution within the Orbit will
be small. It served no essential
purpose in the direction and con-
trol of the international Com-
munist movement.
YUGOSLAVIA MAY.REQUEST
OBSERVER STATUS IN CEMA
The Yugoslav government
is considering a plan under
which it would apply for ob-
server status in the Soviet bloc's
Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CEMA) on the same
basis as Yugoslavia's partici-
pation in the Organization for
European Economic Co-operation
(OEEC). The Yugoslavs probably
feel such a move would facilitate
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 April 1956
their trading with
Eastern Europe.
In publicly an-
nouncing their intent,
they may be ,testng
Western reaction.
They may, of course,
back down if Western
reaction is strong,
as they did earlier
after raising trial
balloons concerning
the recognition of
East Germany and com-
pliance with Battle
Act restrictions on
shipment of strate-
gic goods to the So-
viet bloc.
Borba claimed
on 11 AprI1 that co-
operation with CEMA
would be the greatest
possible Yugoslav con-
tribution to removal.
Economic Assistance (CEMA)
Member of the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
19 APRIL 1956
of the artificial economic parti-
tion of Europe,. 'which i't :des4#ibed
as a hangover from the cold war.
Some difference of opinion on
sending an observer to CEMA is
reported to exist among Yugoslav
economic officials. A majority
reportedly favor the plan, while
a minority believe the "present
political circumstance"--appar-
ently relations with the West--
precludes such a move. Join-
ing CEMA outright is reported
to be?cbmpletely out.of the
question.
Yugoslavia has been gen-
erally pleased with the slowly
increasing multilateral aspect
of its trade within the OEEC
area. Some Yugoslav economists
may feel, however, that any
significant gains in this d'r.ec---
tion will not be possible with-
out seriously affecting the
Yugoslav economy.
Until recently, the Yugo-
slavs have recognized CEMA as
a Soviet-dominated organization
aimed at integrating'the econo-
mies of Eastern Europe--much
too restrictive for Yugoslavia's
own economic development and
trade. In light of statements
at the Soviet 20th Party Con-
gress, however, the Yugoslavs
now say they believe that the
Satellites will increasingly
specialize on the basis of eco-
nomic advantage,and they may
expect that favorable trade
opportunities for Yugoslavia.
would result.
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They may believe that
having an observer with the
agency which co-ordinates intra-
bloc trade and apparently some
of the East-West trade of its
members would enable them to
get away from strictly bilateral
trade, which has been restricted
in several cases by the lack
of acceptable goods on one or
the other side. 25X1
(Concurred in by ORR)
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