CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Publication Date:
March 29, 1956
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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CONFIDENTIAL C olCd
~ICURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
COPY NO. 19
Oct NO. 1775/56
29 March 1956
Document tic. ------- _3---------------------
Clizu 'a. CE3 r r+1 le: TS S 'V
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Auth.: IMF 70-3 25X1
Date: -I--- By:
no ular, j[s in Lis. LJ
Q Dec ,ii EJ r r
i INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL IN
ENCE
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIG
DIA and DOS
review(s)
completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEQY F5TM3rARY I" 'L
29 March 1956
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Arab and Israeli diplomatic attention is focused
on the resolution now before the UN Security Council.
Reactions to the resolution from both sides have been
unfavorable. The Arabs have obtained a delay in Security
Council consideration of the resolution which calls for
an inspection trip by the UN secretary general.,
THE LONDON DISARMAMENT TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The disarmament plan submitted by Soviet delegate
Gromyko at the UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting on
27 March contains elements of both the Anglo-French
"working paper" and the American proposals for limited
"confidence-building" measures. While the proposal also
draws on the Soviet plan of 10 May 1955, it omits earlier
demands for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear
weapons. However, Moscow's position on inspection and
control remains unchanged. In contrast to last May's
proposal, wide latitude is left for negotiations,
apparently in the hope of exploiting any divergences
among the Western powers.
COMMUNISTS PUBLISH LINE
FOR ATTACK ON STALIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The division of Stalin's career into two phases,
as in the official newspapers of the Soviet and Polish
Communist Parties, makes it possible for the Soviet
leaders to dissociate themselves from the excesses of
,the purge era without cutting the ground out from under
their own Stalinist industrial and agricultural-policies.
Two of the principal objectives of the campaign appear
to be the revitalization of the bureaucracy and the dis-
crediting of the one-man rule concept.
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MIKOYAN IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . ? Page 4
Mikoyan's visit to Karachi and statements by Soviet
leaders in Moscow are further steps in the Soviet Union's
campaign to pry Pakistan away from its political and
economic ties with the West. His meeting with Prime
Minister Nehru on 26 March came shortly after Nehru had
termed the developments at the recent Soviet party
congress a "welcome change."
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Terrorism continues throughout widely scattered
regions of Algeria. The Moroccan government has taken
over defense and security functions from the French, and
its position has been strengthened by the apparent ending
of the Rif rebellion. However, Moroccan resistance
leaders reportedly plan to resume fighting if French
troops now in Morocco are transferred to Algeria. In
Tunisia, victory of the National Front in the 25 March
election has placed moderate, Western-oriented leaders
in the forefront of future negotiations with the French.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Jordan Moving Toward Egyptian Camp: The trend in Jordan
is toward closer ties with Egypt, Syria and Saudi
Arabia, and more distant relations with Iraq and Page 1
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Yugoslav Reaction to Developments in the USSR: The
Yugoslavs regard the Soviet-leadership's attack on
Stalin as an outright condemnation of the earlier
Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia and expect further
broad changes in both Soviet internal and foreign
policy. This view will tend to lead Yugoslavia to
develop closer relations with the Soviet bloc,
although there may be some moderation of this attitude
if the pace of change, particularly in the Satellites, age 2
does not continue as the Yugoslavs hope. 25X1
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29 March 1956
Prospects for the Mollet Government: Many political
observers, including the American embassy in Paris,
believe that Premier Mollet's government can remain
in power until autumn unless the French position in
Algeria collapses. Conflict on economic and social
policy is beginning to appear, however, between the
Socialist and Radical Socialist members of the v'rro d
West German Rearmament Lagging: There seems little
prospect t at the West German arms build-up can be
achieved in the three to four years originally
planned. With a national election scheduled for
1957, political opposition to conscription seems to
be growing, and there has been a definite shift in
official interest from the military aspect of NATO
to the development of a political and economic
program to check Soviet expansion.
Page 5 25X1
New Aircraft Industry for East Germany: Party boss
a ter ric t announce on arch that East
Germany had just assembled its first civil transport
aircraft. Development of an East German aircraft
industry began in 1953, was interrupted after the
June riots, and was not resumed until early 1954.
East Germany will probably concentrate on civil air-
craft, but may eventually produce military types
in support of the newly formalized armed forces. Page 6
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sino-Soviet Bloc Sets Up Joint Nuclear Research Institute:
Political and scient f c delegates from eleven Sino-
Soviet bloc countries--all except North Vietnam--
met in Moscow from 20 to 26 March and organized a
new Joint Nuclear Physics Research Institute. The
Soviet Union has announced that it will make available
for inclusion in the new institute two of its most
important nuclear research facilities. Page 7
? ? ? a ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Shanghai Shipyards Building Naval Vessels: The=naval
construction program at Shanghai, undertaken with
Soviet assistance and guidance, has progressed to
the point where submarines and a destroyer`-type
vessel may be under construction in two separate Page $
yards. . . . . . . . . ? ? . ? ? .
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29 March 1956
Japanese Incensed by Soviet Fishing Restrictions: The
announcement by the USSR on 21 March of a unilateral
plan to restrict fishing in the seas north of Japan
provoked an immediate adverse Japanese reaction.
The Japanese consider the move a Soviet pressure
tactic to force them to acquiesce to Moscow's terms
for a peace treaty. Tokyo's apparent determination
not to consider treaty concessions until the USSR
offers a new compromise on the territorial problem
has been strengthened by the Soviet move. However,
powerful fishing interests may still influence Tokyo
to soften its stand. . . . . Page 9 25X1
South Vietnam: The dissolution of the French High Command
in n ochina may be imminent. The unwillingness of
the South Vietnamese legally to assume France's
responsibility for the cease-fire agreement leaves
undetermined the future administration of the armistice
in Vietnam. The British are trying to persuade the
Diem government to commit itself to de facto compliance
in order that a .modus vivendi may be worked out.
. . . Page 11
The Philippines: Philippine congressional and press
circles, encouraged by local business interests,
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age 13 25X1
Growing Tension in Bolivia: The Bolivian government's
declaration of a general alert in early March
indicates its increasing concern over reports that
exile groups, aided by dissidents in the army, are
planning a coup. The government can probably contain
any revolutionary attempts by the poorly organized
opposition. F_ 1 . . . . . . . . . Page 14
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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THE TREND AWAY FROM ARMS STANDARDIZATION IN LATIN
AMERICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The progress of arms standardization in Latin
America, long an important policy objective of the United
States, has been seriously challenged in recent years
by substantial Latin American purchases of air force and
navy equipment from Western Europe. In recent months,
the Soviet. bloc has attempted to exploit the Latin
American arms market as one facet of its intensified
activities in the area.
ICELAND'S GROWING DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET BLOC TRADE . . . Page 9
During the past three years, Iceland's foreign trade
has been increasingly oriented toward the Soviet bloc, and
in 1955, the USSR replaced the United States as Iceland's
leading market. Political repercussions of, these develop-
ments may begin to appear in the June parliamentary
elections, which will involve such issues as the island's
glowing economic difficulties and the status of-the American-
manned NATO air base at Keflavik.
INCREASED AUTHORITY OF SOVIET MILITARY COMMANDERS . . . Page 11
The USSR has in recent years revised its approach to
maintaining the political reliability of the officers and
men in the armed forces. As the number of party members
among unit commanders has increased and the level.of
political indoctrination has risen, the authority of the
commanders has been strengthened and that of political
officers reduced. This policy, of which Defense Minister
Zhukov has long been an.outspoken advocate, is reflected
in the selection of professional rather than political
officers to represent the military on the newly elected
party central committee and in recent high-level promotions
which have favored the professional soldier.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMERY
29 March 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
Arab and Israeli diplomatic
attention is focused on the
resolution now before the UN
Security Council. Reactions
to the resolution from both
sides have been unfavorable.
The Arabs have obtained a delay
in Security Council considera-
tion of the resolution, which
calls for an inspection trip
by the UN secretary general.
The Israelis, while they
have gone along with Western
suggestions regarding the Secu-
rity Counc i l proposals, have made
it clear they expect nothing
useful to emerge from the UN
and regard the submission of
the resolution as a device to
postpone a decision on their
request for arms from the West.
Israeli military prepara-
tions are being steadily stepped
up. Very large concentrations
of troops and equipment were
observed last week in the Ne-
gev area around Beersheba. An
Israeli Foreign Ministry offi-
cial has stated that the eco-
nomic dislocation resulting
THE LONDON DISARMAMENT TALKS
Soviet delegate Gromyko,
after bluntly rejecting the
Anglo-French proposal at the
27 March meeting in London of
the UN Disarmament Subcommittee,
submitted a, plan apparently
from a full war economy will be
felt in Israel soon.
The general Arab attitude
appears to be one of intense
suspicion of any Western ini-
tiative at this time. The Arabs
seem anxious to give the impres-
sion that the USSR will support
their interests. So far the
USSR's performance appears to
have justified Arab hopes. So-
viet UN delegate Sobolev sup-
ported the Arabs' demand that
they be allowed to speak in the
Security Council meeting, and al-
so backed the Arab request for
postponement of consideration
of the American proposal.
The Egyptian press has
termed the American proposal a.
symptom of confusion among the
British, French, and Americans,
as well as an admission that
these powers have tacitly ad-
mitted they are no longer the
sole arbiters of the Near East.
There has been no signifi-
cant shift in Arab military dis-
positions. F_ I 25X1
intended as the USSR's "syn-
thesis" of the varying approaches
of the subcommittee members to
the disarmament problem. The
plan contains elements of both
the Anglo-French "working paper"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 March 1956
and the American proposals for
limited "confidence-building"
measures and draws as well from
the original Soviet plan of 10
May 1955. In contrast to that
plan, the new proposal leaves
-wide latitude for negotiations
by which Moscow probably hopes
to sharpen any divergences among
the Western powers.
The Soviet proposal depart-
ed most significantly from the
10 May plan in that it fails
to provide for the prohibition
and destruction of nuclear weap-
ons. It concentrates on con-
ventional armaments and armed
forces. Thr preamble of the
plan maintains that it would
assist in reaching an "indis-
pensable" agreement on banning
nuclear weapons, but the plan
itself calls only for a reduc-
tion of conventional armaments.
and armed forces.
As outlined by Gromyko,
the first stage of the three-year
plan provides for a. freeze on
conventional armaments, armed
forces and military budgets at
the level of 31 December 1955,
the freeze to be accomplished in
three months. The powers would
then begin to reduce their con-
ventional armaments to a degree
"commensurate with the lsvel
of armed forces" envisaged in
the Anglo-French and Soviet pro-
posals of May 1955--1,000,000
to 1,500,000 men for the United
States, the USSR, and China',
650,000 for Britain and France.
The rate of annual reductions
is to be the subject of a supple-
mentary agreement.
The new Soviet plan does
not alter Moscow's position on-
the cardinal problem of inspec-
tion and control. It provides
for an international control or-
gan and ground-control posts,
and also for examination at a
later date of the question of
using aerial photography "as
one of the methods of control."
Gromyko also proposed the
establishment in Europe of a
"zone of limitation and inspec-
tion of armaments" to include
both parts of Germany "as well
as their neighboring states."
Nuclear weapons would be pro-
hibited and foreign military
forces would be limited in this
zone.
Moscow probably expects
that its plan will be unacceptable
to the Western powers. This
is suggested by Gromyko's pro-
posal at the end of his speech
that independent of reaching
any disarmament agreement, the
powers should adopt the three
"partial measures" outlined by
Khrushchev in his speech to
the Soviet 20th Party Congress.
These were immediate cessation of
thermonuclear weapons tests, pro-
hibition of atomic weapons on
German territory, and a 15-
percent reduction in military
budget allocations.
The British and French dele-
gates have attempted throughout
the subcommittee meetings to
minimize any difference between
their joint plan and the Ameri-
can position.
French delegate Jules Moch
presented the British-French
plan at the opening meeting of
the subcommittee on 19 March in
the form of a "working paper," thus
indicating that the French posi-
tion on disarmament is not so
rigid as had been supposed.
Moch's subsequent statements in
the subcommittee, while reflect-
ing his preoccupation with
bridging the gap between East and
West on disarmament, have been
restrained. Moch believes the
Soviet proposal represents a
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29 March 1956
marked change in the Soviet
position. He is particularly
concerned over the fact that
the USSR separated nuclear from
conventional disarmament, appar-
ently in order to continue the
nuclear armaments race while
implementing conventional re-
ductions,
COMMUNISTS PUBLISH LINE
FOR ATTACK ON STALIN
On 27 and 28 March, Pravda,
the organ of the Soviet Commu-
nist Party, and its Polish
counterpart, Trybuna Ludu, pub-
licly aired for the first time
the Soviet regime's indictment
of Stalin. The two long edi-
torials, which provide an offi-
cial explanation of the reasons
behind the anti-Stalin drive,
presumably lay down an authori-
tative line for domestic and
foreign Communists.
Both newspapers take the
same tack, but of the two, the
Polish organ provides a fuller
statement of particulars and
deals more candidly with the
questions raised by deflation
of the Stalin myth.
Like Pravda, Trybuna Ludu
divides Stalin's career nto -
two phases. In the first decade
after the Revolution, it asserts,
there was still a degree of
collectivity in the Soviet party
and Stalin made genuine contri-
butions to the consolidation
and development of the Soviet
system. He was successful in
dealing with serious heresies
within the party and in launch-
ing the five year plans and
agricultural collectivization,
but these very achievements
brought him great prestige and
and popularity. Building on
British delegate Anthony
Nutting, in noting that the
Soviet plan does not address ii-
self to control of nuclear pro-
duction, weapons, or materials,
described the proposal as "mys-
tifying and disappointing,"
and a, retreat from the earlier
Soviet position.
these he consciously created the
"cult of the individual."
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Thereafter, from the early
thirties onward, Stalin's rule
was a prolonged aberration which
produced "profound distortions,
damage and crimes." As Stalin's
self-adulation grew, he began
-~;o ignore the collective will
of the party and to rely more
and more on the state security
organs for support. His "morbid
suspiciousness and his growing
despotism," caused him, in
effect, to pdt the Soviet govern-
ment at war against the nation,
He came to identify disagreement
with espionage and sabotage and
many "honest people" were made
victims of his repression.
Where were the other leaders
of the,Soviet party in the mean-
time, Trybuna Ludu asks. It
answers tTFa_tat the outset Sta.-
lin's real abilities were need-
ed and the danger's .of his domina-
tion were not yye~"appa.rent.
Later, when't4o USSR became em-
battled by foreign enemies, oppo-
sition to Stalin would have
risked the.. destruction of the
Soviet state. After that, "under
conditions of fanaticism and
terror against any attempt at
opposition... how could a strug-
gle against the cult of Stalin
be real and effective?"
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The line now laid down
attempts to lift the onus of
Stalin's extremism from his
successors. In order not to
cut the ground out from under
its own Stalinist industrial
and agricultural policies and
in order to explain why the
party entrusted power to Stalin
originally, when it still had
a choice, the present regime
has stopped short of complete
repudiation of Stalin's record.
The indictment of Stalin
admits frankly that under the
influence of police terror and
the myth of his infallibility,
"petrification" and unthinking
subservience became widespread
in all areas of Soviet life and
are now acting as a. brake on
progress. It is probable,
therefore, that a, real need to
stimulate broader initiative
at all levels and to encourage
honest competence in the
Mikoyan's visit to Karachi
and statements by Soviet leaders
in Moscow are further steps in
the Soviet campaign to pry
Pakistan away from its politi-
cal and economic ties with the
West. Mikoyan took advantage
of Pakistan's Republic Day cele-
bration on 23 March to salute
Pakistani independence as po-
tentially expanding the "zone
of peace." He suggested that
Pakistan should replace its
membership in the Baghdad pact
and SEATO with adherence to
the "five principles."
In a meeting with Prime
Minister Cha.udry Mohamad Ali,
governing apparatus is an im-
portant factor in the deglorifi-
cation of Stalin.
The campaign is also de-
signed, according to the Pravda
editorial, "to preclude any
possibility of a, revival of
the cult of the individual in
one or another form,"--that
is, to prevent re-establishment
of one-man dictatorship.
The charges so far set
forth against Stalin follow
the general line reportedly
taken by Khrushchev- at a secret
session of the 20th Party Con-
gress, but are less complete.
The campaign is "a big and dif-
ficult job," the Pravda edi-
torial asserts, and "t ere is
no place for hurry or haste."
A fuller but gradual elabora-
tion of Stalin's'%'-rimes" can
therefore be expected.
Mikoyan strongly attacked the
Baghdad pact and SEATO, and
said that the USSR was deter-
mined to maintain the "neutral-
ity" of Afghanistan. He spoke
confidently of Soviet strength,
emphasizing that the USSR feared
no power or combination of
powers and that the USSR was de-
termined "to break" the pacts
directed against it. Mikoyan
apparently has made it clear,
however, that Pakistan's with-
drawa.l from its Western commit-
ments is not an essential con-
dition for Soviet assistance
and friendship.
Mikoyan, Prime Minister
All and the Pakistani minister
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of commerce reportedly had long
discussions on trade, but Mikoy-
a.n apparently made no specific
offers. A Soviet delegation
of trade specialists is sched-
uled to arrive in Pakistan
shortly, and any specific offers
probably will be made at that 1.
time.
Mikoyan's conversations in
Karachi were supported in Mos-
cow by Foreign Minister Molotov's
hint that the USSR might be will-
ing to construct a, steel mill
for Pakistan along the lines
of the Soviet project in Bhilai,
India. The Soviet press and
radio have repeated Bulganin's
6 February offer of Soviet
assistance in developing atomic
energy for peaceful purposes.
Mikoya.n indicated that Bul-
ganin and Khrushchev would be
pleased to come to Pakistan
if invited. He side-stepped
the more controversial aspects
of the Kashmir question, and
made no statements such as
Bulganin and Khrushchev did
in India. last December.directly
favoring the Indian position.
Mikoyan apparently made a
good impression on the Paki-
stanis. His invitation to the
Pakistani parliament to send
a delegation to the USSR this
year reportedly was accepted.
President Mirza has commented
that "a change" has come over
the Russians during the last
two months--"They used to be
very cold. Now they are very
warm."
Mikoyan's three-hour meet-
ing with Prime Minister Nehru
on 26 March could scarcely have
been better timed. Nehru has
met with each of the Western
Big Three foreign ministers
during the past three weeks.
Nenru, more than any non-
Communist leader, has empha-
sized his belief that the
present Soviet regime is con-
siderably different from
the old. He termed the reso-
lutions of the Soviet 20th
Party Congress a "welcome
change," and expressed the
conviction that Moscow has
abandoned the use of force as
a means of expanding its
influence.
Mikoyan is well qualified
to convince Nehru that this
thesis is correct. Mikoya.n
strongly attacked the "cult
of the individual" during the
recent Soviet party congress--
a role probably appreciated by
Nehru, who associates Stalin
with the worst aspects of
Communism.
Mikoyan presumably sought
to expand Soviet trade and
cultural ties with India during
his meetings with the Indian
president, vice president, and
the ministers of commerce and
industries, finance, education,
home and natural resources.
In view of recent Indian ac-
ceptance of the Soviet steel
mill project at Bhilai, the
USSR may try to find another
"show project" to sponsor in
India..
According to press reports
from New Delhi on 28 March,
Mikoyan has offered to train
workers and supply equipment
for an oil industry in India.
He also said the USSR was
willing to buy Indian goods
and raw materials with money
from Soviet goods sold to
India "to avoid laying a
burden on India's trade and
payments balance."
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Mikoyan was to leave New
Delhi on 29 March for Rangoon
via Calcutta.. His subsequent
itinerary includes North Viet-
nam, Communist China., and
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
Algeria.
Terrorism continues
throughout widely scattered
regions, and the rebels'
strength may be increased as
a result of developments in
Morocco. However, the mayor
or Algiers, Jacques Chevallier,
believes the strong stand taken
by French minister Robert
Lacoste has carried him beyond
the peak of tension and the
chances of controlling the
situation are improving.
Lacoste, himself, recently told
the American consul general
in Algiers that the main danger
of a massive outbreak in
Algeria now lies with the
settlers of European origin.
Lacoste indicated that he
was firmly determined to curb
the activities of the French
rightists, and he achieved an
initial success with the settler
groups when he persuaded them
to call off a strike of govern-
ment employees which had been
scheduled for 21 March.
The Moroccan government
has taken over defense and
security functions from the
French as provided for in the
2 March agreement with France,
and its position has been
strengthened by the apparent
ending of the Rif rebellion.
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Outer Mongolia. One uncon-
firmed press report suggested
that Mikoyan might dlso stop in
Cambodia.. (See Part III, p.1
for background information on
Mikoyan)
On 22 March, the sultan
appointed Ahmed Guedira as
minister of national defense
to organize a Moroccan army
of 20,000 men. Creation of
the Defense Ministry may have
been rushed because of reports
that many rebel leaders were
recruiting heavily in the
mountain areas in order to win
high rank for themselves in
the new national army. The ap-
pointment of Mohamect Laghza.oui
to the security post is singu-
larly unpalatable to France in
view of his long record of
uncompromising opposition.
The apparent ending of the
Rif rebellion is likely to in-
crease rebel strength in
western Algeria. The Moroccan
rebels will probably surrender
only a. token number of arms.
The sultan
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also strongly supported
Algerian independence during
the audience with Ambassador
Dillon on 24 March.
The National Front's suc-
cess in winning all 98 seato
in constituent assembly elec-
tions of 25 March will permit
moderate, Western-oriented
followers of Habib Bourghiba
to draft a Tunisian constitu-
tion and to play a. larger
role in further negotiations
with France. The Communists
won slightly more than 1 per-
cent of the vote. The appeal
of extremist Sa.lah ben Youssef
for a boycott of the election
seems to have had no appre-
niable effect on the balloting.
These
considered
elections
a defeat
may be
for
-
Egyptian influence.
F
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 March 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
Jordan Moving
'toward Egypt an Camp
The trend in Jordan is to-
ward closer ties with Egypt,
Syria, and Saudi Arabia, and
more distant relations with
Iraq and Britain.
The precise nature of the
understanding arrived at by
the Jordanian and Syrian chiefs
of staff during their meeting
on 23 March is not known, al-
though press reports from
Damascus state that a "united-
frontier agreement," ostensibly
aimed at Israel, was signed.
The military staff meeting
may have been held without the
full approval of Jordan's King
Hussain and possibly without
that of Prime Minister Rifai.
Rifai failed to meet with
Syrian prime minister Ghazzi on
24 March, giving the excuse that
he was to meet with Hussain at
the time. Foreign Minister
Khalidi, known for his strong
nationalist and Anti-British
attitudes, took Rifai's place.
The Iraqi-Jordanian staff
talks which were scheduled for
last week did not take place.
Jordanian army leaders report-
edly claimed they were too busy
with talks concerning the
future status of British offi-
cers with the Arab Legion.
The maneuvers in Jordan
appear to involve at least three
principal groups. Hussain and
his immediate supporters still
seem to be trying to walk a
tightrope between Egypt and
Iraq. Rifai seems to be
closer to the king's position
than to the pro-Egyptian posi-
tion of the "Free Officers
Movement," although he prob-
ably feels the need for more
gestures toward Egypt than the
king does. Rumors of Rifai's
resignation are already cir-
culating.
A second group is the con-
servative faction among the
"Free Officers." This faction,
headed by Colonel Hiyari, new
commander of the Legion's
first, and at present only,
division, is reported favorably
inclined toward Iraq and not
unfriendly toward Britain.
As divisional commander, Hiyari
outranks many of the more ex-
treme "Free Officers," but he
could be put out of a job by
a proposed reorganization of
the Legion, which would elimi-
nate the Legion's divisional
command. Hiyari is, however,
one of the army's "big three,"
who are reported to be meeting
daily to decide new army as-
signments and policies.
Another member of this tri-
umvirate is Colonel Sadiq
Shara, who inder the regime of
British general Glubb, re-
portedly was slated along with
Hiyari for an important command
post.
The third faction is the
left wing of the "Free Officers,"
led by Lt. Col. All Nuwar, who
is also the third member of
the army's "big three." Nuwar's
rise has been very rapid since
Glubb's departure. From aide-
de-camp to Hussain he has
moved to brigade commander and
this week to assistant chief
of staff for operations. He
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 March 1956
told Ambassador Mallory on 24
March, "a.nything is preferable
to the intolerable degradation
we have suffered at the hands
of the West during the past
eight years."
The recent events in Jor-
dan suggest that among these
factions the preponderance of
strength is Nuwar's. The king
appears to have little strength
with the British going or gone,
and the fillip given his waning
popularity by his dismissal of
Glubb is disappearing fast.
Jordan's civilian politicians
are notorious for their weak-
ness; they never had any au-
thority over the army. The
only group to whom they could
possibly appeal against army
actions, the Palestinian popu-
lation of West Jordan, has long
been hostile to the political
leadership in Amman. This leaves
Yugoslav Reaction
To Developments in the USSR
The Yugoslavs regard the
Soviet leadership's attack on
Stalin as an outright condem-
nation of the earlier Soviet
policy toward Yugoslavia and
expect further broad changes
in both Soviet internal and
foreign policy. They are very
pleased with Khrushchev's re-
ported secret statement that
the reason Stalin was not able
to eliminate Tito was that "the
entire country was behind Tito
and his cause was a, justified
one."
Vice President Kardelj,
number-two man in the Yugoslav
regime, told Ambassador Riddle-
berger that while he had expect-
ed changes, he was "astounded"
by the magnitude and tempo in-
dicated by Khrushchev's condem-
nation. He, like oth.:, Yugoslav
officials, said he had no
only the Hiyari faction in the
"Free Officers Movement" to
oppose Nuwar.
Foreign intervention to
support moderate elements does
not appear likely. Britain,
having been forced to accept the
transformation of its officer
corps commanding the Legion
into a loosely organized mission
with as yet undefined func-
tions, is clearly on the de-
fensive. Iraq does not appear
to be in a much better situa-
tion in regard to Jordan.
Iraqi intervention would be
tagged immediately as operating
on behalf of Western imperial-
ism, and in any event, the
Iraqi leaders are probably un-
willing to move unless an
indigenous Jordanian movement
with some substance called for
their support.
foreknowledge that Khrushchev
would attack Stalin so strongly.
The top Soviet leaders defended
Stalin during their visit to
Belgrade last May and blamed
Beria for the sins the Yugo-
slavs were attributing to Stalin.
The Yugoslavs are convinced
that the attack on Stalin was
so strong that an attack on the
entire Stalin system must in-
evitably follow. They believe
that Khrushchev and Bulganin
must have felt in a. strong po-
sition to take this action in
the face of what the Yugoslavs
consider latent Stalinist op-
position within Soviet ranks.
They believe the Soviet leaders
will introduce far-reaching
internal changes and eventually
will modify Soviet foreign
policy.
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As evidence that such
changes have begun, they cite
their conviction that the USSR
has rehabilitated 6,000 to 7,000
persons, that a Soviet commis-
sion is working on thousands
of other cases with the same
end in view, and that a. number
of ''NKVD personnel" have been
imprisoned. They believe that
Khrushchev's speech forecast
a large degree of "decentraliza-
tion" of authority and reflects
the beginning of the "democra-
tization" of the Soviet system,
with many changes to follow
inevitably.
The Yugoslavs are inter-
preting these developments from
a Communist rather than a West-
ern point of view. For example,
they have already hailed the
recent "recommendations" by the
Soviet government to the col-
lective farms as further steps
in "socialist democracy." The
West has found little "democ-
racy" here and instead views
these decisions as aimed a-
gainst kolkhoz members'
private plots.
The Yugoslav leaders do
not yet claim to see much of
the new Soviet policy reflect-
ed in the Satellites. They be-
lieve the time is now propitious
for a, loosening of Soviet con-
trol, but are cautious when it
comes to predicting when any
real freedom might develop.
They claim to see some liberal-
ization of policy in Poland
and Czechoslovakia., where the
Yugoslav Communist Party has
made contact with the Communist
Parties, but admit to being puz-
zled by events in Hungary. How-
ever, one Yugoslav official
stated his firm belief that one
way or another, Rakosi would
have to go as he would be
unable to survive in this new
climate.
The Yugoslavs believe the
USSR is sincere in desiring
improved relations with foreign
"socialist" movements. They
even claim that the'Soviet
Union is in the process of ac-
cepting "evolutionary socialism"
for advanced countries--attain-
ment of an eventual Marxist
society without revolution or
a Communist take-over of power--
even though Mikoyan reiterated
the Soviet condemnation of this
at the 20t1 Congress as "fruit-
less" reformism.
The Yugoslavs feel that
the West should take advantage
of the opportunities presented
by the 20th Congress for im-
proving East-West relations.
Without citing evidence, Yugo-
slav officials insist that the
USSR is now willing to reach
accommodations in such fields
as East-West contacts, dis-
armament and trade.
Tito and his colleagues
undoubtedly believe that they
still have a missionary role
in effecting further changes
in the Sjno-Soviet bloc, since
they feel that the USSR has al-
ready adopted some Yugoslav
ideas. Yugoslav optimism about
changes in Moscow now appears
sufficient to lead Tito to take
greater chances in developing
closer relations with the bloc,
although there may be some
moderation of this attitude
if the pace of change, particu-
larly in the Satellites, does
not continue as the Yugoslavs
hope.
The closer relations will
probably be mainly bilateral,
both on a, country and a party
basis, since the Yugoslav criti-
cism of "bloc mentality" will
continue to be directed at the
Cominform and such organizations
as the World Federation of Trade
Unions as they are presently
constituted.
Ambassador Riddleberger
notes that the evolution of
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29 March 1956
Soviet policy will have to go
a long way before Belgrade will
weaken its ties with the West.
The Yugoslavs continue to make
efforts to keep the Balkan pact
viable. They are maintaining
their economic links with the
West, seeking Western loans for
industrial development, and
continuing attempts to improve
their relationship with European
Mollet Government's Prospects
Many political observers,
including the American embassy
in Paris, believe that Premier
Mollet's government can remain
in power until autumn unless
the French position in Algeria
collapses.
Mullet's position would
also be weakened, however, if
the crisis gave evidence of
being resolved in favor of French
interests. Conflict on economic
and social policy is already
beginning to appear between the
Socialist and Radical Socialist
members of the coalition; and
the right center which has sup-
ported Mollet largely because
of the emergency in North Af-
rica, would then feel free to
attack his policies.
Because of the reluctance
to overthrow the government
during the Algerian crisis,
Mollet's policy has had the
support of all the major par-
ties except the Poujadists.
His plan for a renewed mili-
tary effort coupled with reform
has met with general public fa-
vor, and Foreign Minister
Pineau's "new independent" for-
eign policy has also proved
popular, despite some caution-
ary comment from the right cen-
ter that maintenance of the At-
lantic alliance must be the
dominant consideration.
organizations like CEEC. Yugo-
slav leaders claim that they
are evaluating the Soviet changes
cautiously and looking, as is
the West, for deeds to match the
Soviet words. They believe, how-
ever, that public expression of
a "wait-and-see" attitude would
serve no useful purpose and that
the USSR needs encouragement in
its new course. F_ 7 25X1
There are indications,
however, that questions of eco-
nomic and social policy are
causing dissension within the
cabinet. Mendes-France, whose
supporters are increasingly
restive over his being thrust
into the background, is now re-
ported in sharp disagreement
with the premier over revision
of the old-age pension fund.
Mendes-France believes Mollet's
program will have an inflation-
ary effect and has reaffirmed
his position that financial aus-
terity is necessary to offset
rising expenditures stemming
from the Algerian crisis and
increases in food prices caused
by the severe winter.
Mollet's.position is that
promises of social reform must
be kept to avoid losing the
confidence of the workers.
While the extension of paid va-
cations and reduction in wage-
zone differentials have tended
to quiet labor's demands, labor
still expects a wage rise this
spring. If the Communist-dom-
inated General Labor Confedera-
tion decides to exploit this
situation, labor disturbances
may result with a consequent
parliamentary crisis.
Rightist opposition to
Mollet has been temporarily al-
layed by his relatively moder-
ate economic policy under the
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guidance of Finance Minister
Ramadier who, although a So-
cialist, favors orthodox fi-
nancial methods.
Marked deterioration. of
the French situation in
Algeria would produce an
immediate right-center re-
action against Mollet. The
West German Rearmament Lagging
There seems little prospect
that the West German arms build-
up can be achieved in the three
to four years planned. With
national elections.scheduled for
the fall of 1957, political op-
position to conscription seems
to be growing, and there has
been a definite shift in of-
ficial interest from the military
aspect of NATO to the develop-
ment of a political and economic
program to check Soviet expan-
sion.
The needed constitutional
amendments and the basic "Sol-
diers Law" have already passed
parliament, leaving the con-
scription law as the remaining
major obstacle to prompt re-
armament. This law has been
introduced into the Bundesrat,
or upper house, which recom-
mended on 24 March that the
period of service for draftees
be reduced from 18 to 12 months.
NATO authorities consider this
period insufficient for ade-
quate military training.
Nevertheless, many prom-
inent military experts in
Chancellor Adenauer's party
and in the opposition Free
Democratic Party have already
come out for the shorter period.
The Social Democratic press has
gone so far as to abandon its
traditional opposition to pro-
fessional armies and has joined
those who advocate a volunteer
Poujadists, who are reportedly
trying to maintain pressure
on the government by develop-
ing veterans and youth organi-
zations to press for all-out
military suppression in Algeria,
could be expected to lend
their support to such a move.
25X1
professional force rather than
conscription prior to the 1957
elections. The Defense Ministry,
however, estimates that con-
scription will be required by
the spring of 1957 if West Ger-
man rearmament is to keep to
its present time schedule.
The Defense Ministry has
still not developed firm plans
for the establishment of Ger-
many's armed forces. Closely
related, time-phased plans are
still incomplete for the ac-
quisition of land, construction
of installations, recruitment
of personnel, training of units,
and procurement of equipment.
These shortcomings may cause
delays in the over-all build-
up which will be difficult to
make up later. Such delays
may also accentuate the finan-
cial and economic problems antic-
ipated during the crucial third
year of the build-up.
It appears politically
impossible to secure any in-
crease in the military budget
until after next year's elec-
tions and equally impossible
for financial reasons to double
the budget in the following
year to make up the resulting
gap in expenditures. Although
Adeiauer has repeatedly stated
tnat West Germany will rearm
according to schedule, he now
insists that more money must
be .spent for social reform
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 March 1956
purposes than on rearmament
in order to assure his party's
victory in the 1957 elections.
His Christian Democratic Union
has in the past few days intro-
duced bills in parliament call-
ing for tax cuts and greater
social benefits.
This government approach
is paralleled by a public
attitude increasingly skep-
tical of the utility of
New Aircraft Industry for
East Germany
.East German party first
secretary Walter Ulbricht an-
nounced on 24 March that East
Germany had just assembled a
civil transport aircraft which
would be test-flown"in a few
days. Earlier reports had
shown that the VEB Industrie-
werk in Dresden was assembling
a CRATE (IL-14) two-engine,
propeller-driven transport from
parts received from the USSR.
Parts for two other I1-14's
have so far been received from
the USSR.
In 1954, East Germany
began to establish a complex
in cities around Dresden as a
nucleus for the new industry.
Subassemblies and components
for IL-14's will be produced
at Dresden, Leipzig, and Schkeu-
ditz, and engines at Carl
Marx Stadt (Chemnitz). Final
assembly will take place at
Dresden-Klotzsche, where ex-
tensive plant construction is
now under way. Series produc-
tion of these aircraft, using
components produced in East
Germany, could begin in 1956.
By 1958, the industry is to
employ 15,000 workers.
conventional arms .,in an
atomic age. West Germans,
losing their fear that a
Soviet military attack is
likely, are coming to place
less faith in trying to check
the USSR by conventional
military means than by eco-
nomic development programs,
particularly in the Middle
East and other regions where
German industrialists are
anxious to establish a foot-
hold.
Extensive research and
development is being carried
on at Pirna-Sonnenstein, con-
centrating on a jet transport.
German engineers had worked
on this project in the USSR.
Ulbricht also told party mem-
bers that a jet aircraft was
being developed.
In 1952 and 1953, a com-
plex centered in Dessau was
being set up to manufacture
the MIG-15. This project was
abandoned, however, after the
June riots in 1953.
Shortages of skilled
personnel and high quality
material must be overcome
before any significant air-
craft production can be a-
chieved, but there is no
reason why East Germany can-
not have an industry com-
parable to'that of Czechoslova-
kia, which now produces jet
fighters. As the new mili-
tary program for East Germany
develops, the industry may
move from transport to mili-
tary types,, Pre-
pared by ORR)
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29 March 1956
Sino-Soviet Bloc Sets Up Joint;
Nuclear Research Institute
Political and scientific
delegates from Albania, Bul-
garia, Communist China, Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Mongolia, North Korea, Poland,
Rumania, and the Soviet Union
met in Moscow from 20 to 26
March and organized a new Joint
Nuclear Physics Research Insti-
tute.
Other research installa-
tions to be set up in the Joint
Nuclear Research Institute in-
clude a laboratory of theo-
retical physics with a com-
puting department and electronic
computing machines,`a labora-
tory of neutron physics with
an experimental nuclear re-
actor, and an accelerator for
The Soviet Union has
announced that it will make
available for inclusion in the
new institute two of its most
important nuclear research
facilities: the Institute of
Nuclear Problems with its 680,-
000,000-electron-volt synchro-
cyclotron and the Electro-
physical Laboratory, where the
world's largest particle ac-
celerator is now nearing com-
pletion. This is a ten-billion-
electron-volt proton synchro-
tron with a magnet which weighs
36,000 tons and has an over-a].1
diameter of 183 feet. When
completed, it will permit
Soviet bloc scientists to con-
duct experiments now impossible
in the West.
the acceleration of multi-
charged ions of various ele-
ments.
The announced purpose of
the new institute is to in-
crease the co-operation of the
member countries in theoretical
and experimental nuclear re-
search in order to solve the
most important problems of con-
temporary physics and expand
the possibilities of peaceful
application of nuclear energy.
The conference elected the
noted Soviet nuclear physicist
Professor D. I. Blokhintsev as
director of the new institute
and named Polish scientist
Professor Marian Danysz and
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19 March 1956
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IMPROVEMENTS ON
HUTUNG SHIPYARDS
under cgnstructron
Old Moller on newJslipway
Engineering Works ~
Area
/HUTUNG
SHIPYARDS
~Vlnternational Dockyard
ootung point Boatyards
25X1
s
Drydocks
'*'-At least three more
slipways have been added
in this area since 1950
SECRET
Czech scientist Professor
Vaclov Votruba as deputy di-
rectors.
The conference immediately
sent an invitation to North
Vietnam, the one bloc country
not represented, to join the
new institute. It also gave
Shanghai Shipyards
Building-Naval Vessels
The naVal construction
program at Shanghai, undertaken
with Soviet assistance and
guidance, has involved at least
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : Cl
PART II NOTES AND +
the director the responsibility
for examining the question of
inviting other states to take
part in the work of the in-
stitute and to submit proposals
to this effect to the govern-
ments of the member countries.
(Prepared
jointly with OSI)
two shipyards--Kiangnan Naval
Yard and Hutung Shipyard, former-
ly the Moller Engineering
Works. Submarines may be under
PJ JT8927A000800030001pge
MAJOR SHANGHAI SHIPYARDS
iousin Engineering and
Shipbuilding Works
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construction at Kia.ngnan; a
destroyer-type vessel is re-
portedly being built at Hutung.
The construction has prob-
ably been directed by the Soviet
shipbuilding advisers
25X1
25X1
Kia.ngna.n had been building
large river and coastal commer-
cial craft in 1954, and until
early 1955. Preparations for
major naval work roba.bl began
about April 1955,
1 At eas
25X1
Japanese Incensed
By Soviet sing Restrictions
The announcement by the
USSR on 21 March of a unilat-
eral plan to restrict fishing
in the seas north of Japan
provoked an immediate adverse
Japanese reaction. The Japan-
ese consider the move a Soviet
pressure tactic to force them
to acquiesce to Moscow's terms
ve slipways have been added;
a creek bed has been diverted
to create a new boat basin
and possibly a 600-foot dry-
dock; many new engineering
shops have been added; and
"thousands of coolies" are
reported to be engage in ex-
cavation and masonry work ad-
jacent to the present facili-
ties. (Pre-
pared jointly with ORR)
for a peace treaty. Tokyo's
apparent determination not to
consider treaty concessions
until the USSR offered a new
compromise on the territorial
problem has been strengthened
by the Soviet move. However,
powerful fishing interests may
still influence Tokyo to soften
its stand.
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100 120 140
29 MARCH 1956 I
Communist China
Private Fishing
Agreement
EAST
CHINA
STATUTE' MILES
500
` Vptur AEste tion 7a i
Fishing under erms of Nor
Fleheriel Convention
RESTRICTIONS ON JAPANESE FISHING ACTIVITIES
The Japanese were quick
to note that the Soviet re-
strictions followed closely
the indefinite suspension of
the negotiations at London for
a peace treaty. The Japanese
press has criticized the Soviet
action as "outrageous," "un-
warranted," and contrary to
Soviet protestations of peace-
ful intentions.
Moscow intends to limit
salmon fishing for the period
15 May to 15 September in an
area which covers the Okhotsk
Sea, the western part of the
Bering Sea, and the northwest
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Pacific. The total catch will
be restricted to 25,000,000
salmon, and fishing in the
area will be permitted only
under Soviet license.
The American embassy in
Moscow believes the Soviet
action is designed to create
a bargaining asset for the
USSR, which the Japanese are
given two months to think over.
The threat to Japanese interests
is considerable since the fish-
ing industry had plans to send
19 fishing fleets, five more
than last year, to the area--
which has traditionally pro-
vided 90 percent of Japan's
salmon catch--and tentatively
expected to take 100,000,000
salmon and trout.
The strong political con-
nections of the Japanese fish-
ing interests were evident in
the prompt protest which Japa-
nese chief negotiator Matsumoto
made to Soviet ambassador
Malik in London. Matsumoto
called attention to the ne-
gotiators' previous agreement
to avoid disputes over fishing
in the open seas, and noted
that the matter was one for
international discussion.
Malik said he had no authority
to discuss the prGblem and
suggested the issue be taken
up with the "Soviet embassy"
in Tokyo. Matsumoto rejected
this on the grounds the Soviet
mission was not recognized by
the Japanese government and
therefore no matters could be
officially discussed.
Tokyo has advanced the
possibility that an interim
agreement between the USSR
and Japan on fishing in the
affected waters could solve
the present impasse. There
is also a good possibility
that should official efforts
fail to produce a settlement,
Japanese fishing interests
will seek government permission
to negotiate a private fish-
eries agreement similar to that
with Communist China.
The Japanese have long
been irritated by the restric-
tions imposed on their fishing
activities, such as the Rhee
line, the American nuclear
tests, and Australian restric-
tions on pearl shelf fishing.
They feel that the free world
has not supported Japan ade-
quately in its attempts to
maintain its prewar fisheries
grounds. 25X1
The dissolution of the
French military, high command
in Indochina may be imminent.
The unwillingness of the South
Vietnamese legally to assume
France's responsibility for the
cease-fire agreement leaves
undetermined the future admin-
istration of the armistice in
Vietnam. India, as chairman
of the tnree-nation Internation-
al Control Commission, feels
strongly that some agreed legal
basis for the commission, which
now acts under Geneva terms
signed by the French High Com-
mand in Indochina, must be
arrived at before France re-
linquishes its present responsi-
bilities.
While India has written
off Vietnamese unification
elections in July as "impos-
sible," it is apparently will-
ing to continue its truce role
provided something can be
''patched up." Britain, as one
of the Geneva co-chairmen (the
USSR. is the other), is
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particularly concerned. It
fares discussion of the issue
with the Soviet leaders during
their mid-April visit to London.
The British are trying to
persuade the Diem government
to commit itself to practical
compliance with the cease-fire
agreement so a modus vivendi can
be worked out wi cu bill; R iissia-is.
They are asking that South
Vietnam pledge its support of
the concept of free elections
to unify Vietnam at some future
date, and of its intent to
respect the truce and support
the International Control Com-
mission. In addition they are
asking South Vietnam to declare
it will neither join military
alliances nor permit foreign
bases on its territory.
Vietnamese-French nego-
tiations in Saigon on the
problem have bogged down in
preliminary talks on military
matters. Although both sides
apparently are willing to give
de facto co-operation to the
armistice and the control com-
mission, mutual suspicion and
divergent views on side issues
are resulting in an impasse
similar to that which occurred
in Paris last summer when
negotiations on transfer of
command never got off the
ground.
Despite the scheduled
complete withdrawal of French
forces from Vietnam by 30 June
at the request of South Vietnam
the Vietnamese would like to
work out an arrangement whereby
the French would retain suf-
ficient resources to continue
logistic support of the truce
commission. However, the
Vietnamese are hesitating to
state clearly their position on
this issue for fear the French
will seek concessions in terms
of military installations or
economic privileges in return
for their assistance. Unless
the Vietnamese make a counter-
proposal, France intends public-
ly to abandon its legal responsi-
bilities upon dissolution of its
high command, presently sched-
uled for 28 April..
Although the Diem govern-
ment would like to retain the
International Control Commis-
sion indefinitely as a deter-
rent to Viet Minh aggression
and has agreed to make a dec-
laration expressing willing-
ness -co co-operate with and
support this body, Diem's
determination to avoid any
implication of leg.:.i respon-
sibility under the Geneva
terms may result in a declara-
tion less forthright than en-
visaged by the British, and
possibly unsatisfactory to
Communist and Indian eyes.
An indication of Communist
views on this matter is re-
vealed in the opinion expressed
recently by the Polish truce
commissioner implying that the
only acceptable solutions
would be for Diem to accept
the full responsibilities of
succession, for the Geneva
powers to revise the original
Geneva terms at a new confer-
ence, or for representatives
of North and South Vietnam to
meet in consultations.
Unless a suitable compro-
mise is worked out in the forth-
coming talks with the British,
the Communists will undoubtedly
renew their demands for a
second Geneva conference, as
proposed by Chou En-lai last
January. To bolster its case,
Britain is pressing the French
to retain their high command
in Indochina until 30 June.
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The Philippines
Highly critical attitudes
toward American policies have
recently been displayed in
Philippine congressional, busi
ness, and press circle
Much of the present anti-
Americanism is undoubtedly
stimulated by the sugar indus-
try and tobacco interests. The
sugar industry, long one of the
most powerful pressure groups
in the Philippines, has lately
seen its advice on fiscal policy
rejected by the president and
thus has its own motive for
attacking his pro American
policies. It has publicized
reports that the American Con-
gress intends to reduce the
quota for Philippine sugar if
Manila reduces its imports of
American tobacco, and has claim-
ed that the Philippines was
discriminated against in the
recent increases of the Ameri-
can sugar quotas.
These charges have been
accompanied by criticism of
alleged "strings" attached to
American aid and of "meddling"
American advisers, who are said
to seek to perpetuate a colo-
nial economic relationship.
The majority leader of the
Philippine House of Representa-
tives recently charged that
American policies had created
"economic chaos" in the country.
At the same time, Philip-
pine nationalism, long sensitive
to the American position re-
garding ownership of United
States military bases in the
islands, has been aroused by
recent incidents involving
mineral rights and jurisdic-
tion over Philippine citizens
residing on the bases.
Specific exclusion of Guam,
where many Filipinos are em-
ployed, from wage legislation
now pending in the United
States Congress is widely
viewed in the Philippines as 25X1
racial discrimination.
The anti-American pro-
nouncements of certain Filipino,
politicians have in the past
notably failed to influence
the Philippine masses. Senator
Recto's ultranationalistic cam-
paign proved relatively unsuccess-
ful in last November's election,
but it probably abetted an
already growing nationalism
among politically aware:: Fili-
pinos. Recto's attacks on the
wisdom of close ties with the
United States undoubtedly helped
to foster the receptiveness
with which Cambodian premier
Sihanouk's recent speech de-
fending neutralism was greeted
in the Philippine congress.
Most Philippine leaders
are fully aware of their eco-
nomic and military dependence
on the United States, but are
increasingly inclined to be-
believe that their dependence
is taken for granted. There
appears to be a growing feeling
that threats rather than friend-
ship will bring them the benefits
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to which they feel their close
relationship entitles them.
In this connection, they fre-
quently cite the substantial
American aid extended to neu-
trals or to Japan, a former
enemy.
Growing. Tension in Bolivia
The Bolivian government's
declaration of a general
alert
in early March indicates
its
increasing
concern
over
reports
that exile
groups,
aided
by
dissidents
in the
army,
are
planning a
coup.
The govern-
ment can probably contain
any revolutionary attempts by
the poorly organized opposition
so long as the ruling party--
the Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR) --itself remains
intact.
The revolutionary group
is probably spearheaded by the
Coalition of Anti-Communist
Parties, organized in Chile in
March 1954 for the purpose of
overthrowing the MNR, and
including representatives of
all dissident groups in
Bolivia except the Communist
Party and an equally strong
Trotskyite party. The dominant
group in the coalition, which
has termed the MNR "terror-
istic" and "Communist," is
the extreme rightist Bolivian
Socialist Falange.
The coalition can probably
count on support among elements
of the army, which was defeated
by the MNR in the revolution of
April 1952 and has since been
partially replaced by the
armed workers militia. The
coalition is, however, by no
means united.
The approach of the presi-
dential and congressional elec-
tions, reportedly scheduled for
3 June, may be a factor stimulat-
ing the prorevolutionary
groups. The MNR is the only
party which has so far named
candidates for president and
vice president, and President
Paz Estenssoro is reported to
have said that the opposition
parties would probably receive
only about 10 percent of the
vote. He attributes the prepa-
rations for a coup to an opposi-
tion desire to bloc the elec-
tions so as to avoid being dis-
credited.
The approach of the elec-
tions may also stimulate con-
siderable jockeying for position
among the various factions of
the MNR. Hitherto the various
factions have been kept in line
by the generally moderate Paz,
but Paz has announced his re-
tirement from active politics
with the end of his presiden-
tial term.
His successor as the
strong man of the party will
be Juan Lechin, head of the
powerful workers confederation
but holder of no government
office, whose political opinions
are unknown. Since many of the
MNR's leaders are Marxist
oriented, despite the party's
consistently anti-Communist
position, opposition groups may
be counting on splits develop-
ing in the MNR with Paz' ap-
proaching retirement.
Another factor making for
instability is the new infla-
tionary spiral, set off by the
25 February wage decree, which
has caused much unrest among
various groups throughout the
country. Some army elements
have openly expressed their dis-
pleasure with their low pay
and lack of prestige. The
teachers, always a potent polit-
ical force in Bolivia, are
maki,:g new salary demands.
Railroad workers and some of
the miners, one of the strongest
groups supporting the MNR,
are in a state of agitation.
O
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25X6
THE TREND AWAY FROM ARMS STANDARDIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA
The progress of arms
standardization in Latin Ameri-
ca, long an important policy
objective of the United States,
has been seriously challenged
in recent years by substantial
Latin American purchases of
military equipment from Western
Europe. In recent months, the
Soviet bloc has attempted to
exploit the Latin American arms
market as one facet of its in-
tensified activities in the
area.
Deterrents to Standardization
Lack of money: Standardi-
zation of Latin American arms
on US models is a logical cor--
ollary to hemisphere defense
plans. A basic deterrent, how-
ever, is the financial inability
of most countries in the area
to lay out sufficient dollar
exchange to replace quickly
their accumulation of non-US
materiel, some of which dates
back almost a century and re-
flects years of German, Italian
and other Western European in-
fluence. Also, the almost
chronic political instability
in these countries and the fre-
quent use of the armed forces
as an instrument in politics
have to some extent encouraged
governments and opposition ele-
ments to acquire arms wherever,
whenever and however they can.
Modernization preferred:
Modern equipment is desired by
these countries, and there ap-
parently is a general feeling
among Latin American leaders
that modernization is more
important than standardization.
They consider themselves
threatened principally by proxi-
mity of potentially hostile
countries and internal revolu-
tions. Most of them probably
do not see the Soviet threat
as imminent, and feel that even
in the event of war, their role
in hemispheric defense would
of necessity be limited. Thus
modernization with its atten-
dant effect on service morale
and favorable propaganda ef-
fects on local and national
prestige is often a deciding
factor in new military
purchases.
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Barter arrangement: Par-
ticularly attractive to the Latin
American countries are barter
arrangements by which their
surplus raw materials can be
exchanged for military equip-
ment. Brazil's exchange of
15,000 tons of cotton for British
jets in 1953 is an example of
this type of transaction.
Argentina: Argentina in
1947 purchased a. considerable
number of European aircraft,
including 100 British Gloster
Chile has in the past re-
portedly bartered minerals for
British jet planes. Argentina
is currently reported interested
in the purchase of modern air-
craft from non-US sources in
view of the low prices, long
terms of payment and barter
possibilities. Latin American
countries are particularly
desirous of obtaining jet air-
craft, although jets, in the
opinion of US experts, are
generally too high-priced and
hard to maintain for most of
these countries, and are also
not so well suited to hemispheric
defense needs as conventional-
type equipment.
Return to European sources:
The return in recent years to -
the European arms sources which
supplied much of the area's mili-
tary needs before World War II
has been prompted by promotion
efforts of European officials
and industrialists offering
favorable credit terms and by
an inability of Latin American
countries to obtain desired
American materiel, which they
probably would prefer. Some
dissatisfaction with the type
of equipment available from
the US under the MDAP program
is a contributing factor.
Aircraft From Europe
Argentina, Brazil, Vene-
zuela and the Dominican Repub-
lic have been the largest buyers
of European aircraft, but several
other countries are also making
purchases abroad. Their pur-
chases reflect interest pri-
marily in jet aircraft.
Meteors, 30 Avro Lincoln bombers,
and 45 G-b5 Fiat fighters. By
1949 it had acquired additional
aircraft, including 15 Lancaster
bombers, 50 Dove (De Haviland)
transports, and 100 Percival
Prentice trainers. Recently,
Argentina purchased 10 Viking
transports from Britain and
light aircraft and helicopters
from France. About 45 percent
of Argentina's piston aircraft
is of non-US make.
Brazil: Brazil, whose air
force had been equipped only
with American planes, acquired
60 Meteor MK VIII and 10 Meteor
MK VII jet fighter aircraft
and trainers from Britain in
1952. No recent non-US acquisi-
tions, however, have been re-
ported.
Venezuela: Venezuela, which
does not have a dollar shortage,
contracted in July 1955 for
22 Venom (De Haviland) jet
fighters from Britain to use
deposits which had been made
on Comets. Prior to 1954, this
country acquired from Britain
17 Vampire MK 5 (De Haviland)
jet fighters, six Canberra jet
light bombers, and one Vampire
DH-115 jet trainer. With the
addition of 22 American F-86's,
however, the percentage of
British equipment in the Vene-
zuelan air force will remain
about 30 percent.
Dominican Republic: The
Dominican Republik, which nad
purchased 15 British aircraft
in 1948 and American F-51's
from Sweden in 1953, has re-
ceived 10 of 25 Vampire jets
purchased in Sweden in late
1955.
Peru: The breakdown of
standardization in Peru was
signaled by the recent arrival
of the first of 16 Hunter
(Hawker) supersonic jet fighters
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aircraft bought from Britain.
An order has been placed for
eight Canberra jet bombers, Mark
VIII. Only two of Peru's piston
aircraft are of non-US make.
Ecuador: Ecuador took de-
livery in 1955 of 12 Meteor MK
VIII jet aircraft and six Can-
berra, jet bombers from Britain.
Negota.tions were completed in
early 1956 for the purchase by
Colombia of six Canadian-built
F-86 aircraft.
Uruguay and Nicaragua:
Uruguay acquired in December
1954 10 Chipmunk (De Haviland)
trainers from Britain and re-
portedly is expect"ngthe de-
livery of six more. Nicaragua
has been rumored several times
in the past year to be con-
sidering the purchase of jet
aircraft from Europe.
Officers and enlisted men
of the air forces of those coun-
tries which have purchased
foreign aircraft have received
flight and maintenance training
either in Europe or in their
respective countries by various
missions.
Naval Equipment from Europe
The trend away from stand-
ardization along US naval lines,
begun in1950, has also become
more pronounced.
Venezuela received three
British destroyers in 1954 and
early 1956, and contracts call
for six Italian coastal de-
stroyers and a 3,000-ton French
transport. The country's naval
chief is reported seeking addi-
tional equipment in the UK.
'ra.zil: Brazil has con-
tra.cte or 10 Dutch escorts
and four Japanese transports.
Twenty-eight LCVP Japanese
landing craft and six small
Dutch patrol craft were de-
livered to this country in
1955.
Argentina: Argentina. has
expressed interest in acquiring
an American aircraft carrier
or a carrier from any other
source. Since 1950, Argentina
has obtained an oiler from
Britain, six transports from
Italy and Canada, and a. German
icebreaker.
Colombia: Colombia ob-
tained a light cargo ship from
the Netherlands in 1951 and a
buoy tender from Sweden in 1955.
Two Holland-class destroyers
from Sweden will reportedly be
delivered in 1957.
Ecuador and Chile: Ecuador
has taken delivery of two Brit-
ish Hunt-class destroyers.
Chile has ordered two British
destroyers, an icebreaker from
West Germany and a French
oiler.
Army Materiel from Europe
With the exception of
Venezuela, the American repub-
lics have purchased comparative-
ly little non-US army materiel.
Venezuela purchased 40 French
tanks in 1954, making its auto-
motive equipment about 30
percent European. Argentina.
in the immediate postwar pe-
riod purchased British tanks,
Bren gun carriers, Canadian
trucks and Swedish Bofors (40-
mm AA). Guatemala is relying
almost exclusively for its in-
dividual and crew-served weap-
ons on equipment received ii.
the famous Alf hem shipment from
Poland in May 1954. Peru,
Colombia., Brazil and El Salva-
dor have purchased smaller
quantities of arms and ammuni-
tion from Europe.
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29 March 1956
Soviet Bloc Activity
While the major portion of
non-US standard materiel pur-
chased by these countries has
been European air and naval
equipment, there are definite
signs that the Soviet bloc is
attempting to exploit the Latin
American arms market as part of
its current'offensive to expand
ties with the area.. Thus far,
however, bloc activity in this
field has apparently been fo-
cused mainly on Argentina and
Ecuador, although Czechoslovakia
reportedly has offered military
equipment to other countries,
including Brazil. The bloc may
well attempt to barter arms
with Latin American countries
having surpluses of agricul-
tural commodities.
Argentina.: Argentina,
purchased in February Czech five-
passenger Aero-45's, the first
sale of aircraft by Czechoslo-
vakia in Latin America since
the war. The purchase fol-
lowed a renewal of conversa-
tions between the two coun-
tries regarding the purchase
of Czech arms at prices re-
ported considerably lower than
those offered by Britain and
the United States.
The sale could be the prel-
ude. to negotiations for further
acquisitions from the bloc,
particularly since Argentina
seems anxious to obtain jet air-
craft for its surplus raw ma-
terials. The USSR reportedly has
offered to sell FAGOTS (MIG-15's)
SECRET
and "heavy" bombers to Argentina
under terms described as very
attractive, although the
"heavy" bombers would more
likely be IL-28's, a light jet
bomber.which the USSR is selling
to Egypt. In mid-February an
Argentine air force official
denied this report, stating
he believed the USSR had spread
the story to test Argentine
reaction but would make an
offer within 90 days. On 29
February, the American air
a.ttachd in Buenos Aires re-
ported that Soviet MIG's had
been included among recent of-
fers and are among those planes
being considered for purchase
by Argentina.
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ICELAND'S GROWING DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET BLOC TRADE
During the past three years
Iceland's foreign trade has
been increasingly oriented to-
ward the Soviet bloc, and in
1955, the USSR replaced the
United States as Iceland's
leading market. Political re-
percussions of these develop-
ments may begin to appear in
the upcoming parliamentary
elections, which will involve
such issues as the island's
growing economic difficulties
and the status of the American-
manned NATO air base : t Keflavi1--
Iceland's chief source of
dollar income.
Exports to the Bloc
Iceland's rising exports
to the Soviet bloc, which
,multiplied fivefold between
1952 and 1955, derive mainly
from Iceland's increasing mar-
;'ieting difficulties in the fre
%vorld. During this same period
Iceland's exports to the United
States, for example, fell over
50 percent,
The high cost of Iceland's
fish and fish products, which
comprise over 95 percent of
the country's exports, has for
some time put Iceland at a
disadvantage in its principal
=free world markets--the United
States, Britain and various
countries of the European
continent. In 1952, moreover,
.1!ritish commercial interests
closed the United Kingdom ma.r-
uet,to Icelandic fresh fish in
retaliation for Iceland's uni-
lateral extension of its terri-
torial waters and exclusion of
3ritish fishing boats from
these waters. This was a seri-
ous blow to Iceland's trade
since in 1951 British purchases
of fresh fish amounted to
$4,600,000.
Iceland met its loss of
trade with Britain partly by
expanding its frozen fish in-
dustry to absorb the unsold
fresh fish and partly by seeking
new markets elsewhere, includ-
ing the Soviet bloc. Soviet
purchases of frozen fish
markedly increased, reaching a
total of 24,000 tons in 1955,
by which time the USSR had re-
placed the United States as the
largest single purchaser of
Icelandic goods. In that year,
also, Czechoslovakia and East
Germany together purchased an
additional 8,700 tons,
The USSR has recently
agreed to accept 8,000 tons
more than the 20,000 already
specified in its 1956 trade
agreement with Iceland. The
new agreement also provides
for purchases of 15,000 tons of
salted herring, a 50-percent
increase over 1954.
The settlement of the
territorial waters dispute with
Britain, which may be post-
poned because of Iceland's up-
coming elections, would bring
little immediate change in the
island's general export pattern:
it would take some time for
Iceland to re-establish itself
in the fresh-fish market;
furthermore, Iceland has in-
vested in additional freezing
units to handle the fish pre-
viously sold fresh.
Imports from the Bloc
To obtain payment for
these exports, Iceland has
simultaneously expanded its im-
ports from the bloc, which now
provide more than 22 percent
of Iceland's total. Imports
from the USSR are still sub-
stantially exceeded by those
from the United States, but
in certain basic products the
bloc has now become Iceland's
principal supplier. In 1955,
Iceland received over two
thirds of its petroleum imports
from the USSR and over 75 per-
cent of its coal and coke re-
quirements from Poland.
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Moreover, the 1956 Soviet-
Icelandic trade agreement pro-
vides for an increase in fuel
oil, diesel oil and gasoline
deliveries to Iceland from
237,000 metric tons in 1955 to
270,000 metric tons this year.
There are widespread rumors
that the Russians have offered
credits equivalent to over
$6,000,000 to finance the
establishment of an oil distri-
bution system in Iceland. This
transformer stations at a
cost of $1,600,000 payable
over five years in and
fish products. According to
the American embassy at Rey-
kjavik,, Iceland' s political
leasers would be under strong
pressure to accept a loan from
any bloc country that offered
to help construct a projected
new Sog River plant, urgently
needed by 1958 to avert a
power shortage in Reykjavik.
4 E ,r 1 FGN TRADE
~INL 1Cj p6LLA15
could mean the elimination of
Western distribution companies.
The Icelandic State Electrical
Authority has stated that
domestic ::fir lus :i.n p rovid e only
25X1
the
regi i-^cs.
The new
agreement
also
about 15-20
parcent of
provides for
of increased
Iceland's
quantities
import
of iron
$7,300,000
the
project
goods and coal, and it includes
lumber (8,500 standards) and
50,000 tons of cement. Im-
ports of Soviet cement should
cease ,G@ForIsec5/cOaS? : CI
pletion of a domestic plant
being financed by Denmark with
Political Rep3rc_acsioas
Many Icelanders are dis-
turbed b this growing depend-
-R~e~-49rR2i~QdBsg oc, re-
membering that in 1948 the
Russians abruptly terminated
Approved For Release 2005/4SM.'R!- DP79-00927A000800030001-2
ambassador Muccio recently re-
ported that unless alternative
markets were cultivated, this
economic dependence might con-
tinue to increase and in the
long run might bring ominous
political developments.
The bloc trade drive has
been conducted with consider-
able promotional activity, in-
cluding an elaborate trade
exhibit in Reykjavik last
summer. It has been accom-
panied by an extensive cul-
tural exchange program which
has had a positive effect
among Icelanders, many of whom
are convinced that easing world
tensions have made close ties
with the United States less
necessary.
The trade situation will
undoubtedly be injected into
the parliamentary elections
to be held the last Sunday in
June. One measure likely to
be urged by Iceland's sizable
group of pro-Communists is
still greater reliance on
trade with the bloc, as an
alternative to devaluation of
the currency.
The American-manned and-
constructed NATO base at Kef-
lavik will also be a leading,
if not the most important,
election issue. The base has
for some time been widely un-
popular on nationalistic grounds.
However, last year the $13,500,-
000 brought in by the base more
than counterbalanced Iceland's
visible trade deficit of $11,-
500,000 with the United States.
In fact, most Icelandic
leaders probably do not wish
to liquidate the base but only
to achieve the withdrawal of
American troops. In this man-
ner, Iceland would still, it
is hoped, continue to receive
substantial dollar revenues
for maintaining and guarding
the base installations. Never-
theless, the growing bloc trade
has put Iceland's Communists
in a position to argue that the
country now has an attractive
economic alternative to its ties
with the United States.
Concurred in by ORR)
INCREASED AUTHORITY OF SOVIET MILITARY COMMANDERS
The USSR has revised its
approach to maintaining the po-
litical reliability of officers
and men in the armed forces in
the last few years. The author-
ity of the Soviet commander al-
ways has been subject to polit-
ical control, varying in inten-
sity as primary emphasis shifted
to either political reliability
or military effectiveness.
In contrast with the paral-
lel system of counterintelligence
controls
a are de-
signed to check on and prevent
antiregime activity in the mili-
tary establishment, the polit-
ical indoctrination system is
a positive conditioning in-
fluence aimed primarily at in-
stilling sound Communist pre-
cepts in the minds of officers
and men in the armed services.
As indoctrination with
approved Communist politicai
theories has spread, and as the
demands of modern warfare for
combat efficiency have increased,
unit commanders have been given
greater authority and the in-
fluence of political officers
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assigned to military units has
declined. Defense Minister
Zhukov, recently elected
candidate member of the party
presidium, has long been an
outspoken advocate of this
policy of encouraging pro-
fessionalism in the armed serv-
ices:.. Morale and combat effi-
ciency have improved under this
system, which will presumably
last as long as the Communist
Party continues to have con-
fidence in the political relict-
bility of the r aed forces.
The changed situation has
been shown in the selection of
officers with purely profes-
sional military .experience
rather than political officers
as military representatives on
the newly elected central com-
mittee. Recent promotions in
the armed services seem also
to have favored competent pro-
fessional officers, whereas
under Stalin political officers
often rose to high rank more
rapidly.
History of Political Control
When the Red Army was
formed in 1918, command and
combat authority were divided
between the political commissar
and the military officer, many
of whom were ex-Czarist office--L.-
The obvious deficiencies in
military operations during the
civil war led to the introduc-
tion of limited one-man control
of army units in 1925. The
alleged uncovering of the mili-
tary conspiracy of Tukachevski
brought the reintroduction of
the commissar system. in 1937.
The commissar was gives: equal
authority with the commander;
he countersigned all oiders
and supervised all disciplinary
measures. This dualism of
command was held primarily
responsible for the Finnish
debacle and it led prominent
military officers to speak out
publicly against the system.
In August 1940 the com-
missar was replaced by the
political deputy, subordinate
it military matters to the
military commander but in
political matters answerable
only to the Main Political
Administration--an organ of
the Defense Ministry and, more
significantly, of the Communist
Party central corm..ttee.
In July 1941, however, less
than a month after the German
attack, the commissar system
was reintroduced as a direct
result of widespread desertions
and low morale in the Soviet
army. Commissars were assigned
to all units, with responsibili-
ties equal to military com-
manders, and with orders to
shoot any commander who showed
signs of defeatism or cowardice.
The commissar's authority far
exceeded that of line officers
of equal rank.
Within 15 months military
considerations overrode politi-
cal demands; the serious
Soviet military reverses during
the summer of 1942 w r e followed
by the abolition of the com-
missar system. Former com-
missars, reduced to political
deputies, no longer had any
control over military decisions,
but as informers they could
jeopardize the position of the
military commander, affect his
promotion or demotion, and
exert --~.n indirect military con-
trol through him.
Recent Changes
There are some inrjicatio:-.s
that the political deputies are
being removed from echelons
lower than regiment.. Recent
changes give the company com-
mander primary responsibility
for political/military trainin,
including morale, discipline
and combat readiness. In
carrying out these duties he
has the assistance of the pla-
toon leader and the party
group.
Since the fall of 1955,
political study groups have
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been formed on the platoon level
and platoon leaders made re-
sponsible for political as well
as military training of their
units. Under a party structure
reorganization of 1954, a com-
pany party group, consisting of
three to five party members,
supports the commander in his
political training duties and
receives assignments from him.
A system for voluntary
individual study of party matters
has been introduced, replacing
the seminar-lecture method of
the political officer. A
majority of Soviet officers are
engaged in this program, and
among the enlisted men, it has
been expanded to the point
where one third of all their
political training will be
accomplished in this manner.
Status of Political Officers
With the increased author-
ity of the unit commander, the
prestige of the political
officers has-diminished. In
the central committee elected
in 1939, 19 percent of the
military representatives came
from the political organs of
the Soviet armed forces. This
percentage fell to 16 in 1941,
to 7.6 in 1952, and to zero in
the central committee elected
in February. Officer promotions
also reveal the reduced stature
of the political officer. Since
Stalin's death, 43 professional
military officers have been
promoted to colonel general or
above bu.t no high-ranking polit-
ical.- officers were promoted to
such rank during this period.
.The reduced-influence of
the-political officer may be
offset to some extent, however,
by the fact that a majority of
the commanders are party members
as well as the possible increase
in party membership among the
lower ranks, particularly among
the platoon leaders. Approxi-
mately 15 percent of the armed
forces are either full or candi-
date members of the party,
judging by the number of mili-
tary delegates sent to the
recent party congress. Member-
ship in the armed forces would
thus represent about 8 percent
of the total Communist Party
membership in the USSR.
Continued Friction
Although the authority of
the commander has recently
been strengthened, there are
hints of the old rivalry be-
tween the military and politi-
cal officers. It is in the
differentiation between mili-
tary and political matters that
the greatest area of disagree-
ment arises. The military
considers morale and discipline
strictly military matters which
cannot be separated from om-
bat efficiency and combat
readiness, and for this reason
has always maintained that
authority cannot be shared.
A Red Star editorial of
July 19Z-4-r-6-ported: "The com-
mander is the full master of
his ship or unit and he must
not be afraid to take responsi-
bility for his decisions. At
the same time, he would not go
to the other extreme and con-
sider the advice of his chief
of staff or deputy for political
affairs, for example, as an
infringement on his authority.
The further strengthening of
the singleness of command places
difficult problems before the
political deputies. They must
guard the commander's author-
ity "
Defense Minister Zhukov
in addressing the Moscow Mili-
tary.District party conference
in January 1956,condemned criti-
cism of commanders at party meet-
ings, and said, "Our task is.
to strengthen the authority of
the commanders in every way and
to support commanding officers
and generals."
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