CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 23, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved Fp elease 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-0092 A00700150001-0
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CURRENT
II "ONFIpENT
DOCUMENT NO.
COPY NO. 19
OCI NO. 0059/56
23 February 1956
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.- ^
: DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
ALIT
nAT " EV EWCR: 25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
IFI
DIA and DOS
review(s) completed.
25X1
RETURN TO ARCIU Eui
Wp lrt-,.A- -1 I, ? ~`1f'_` iv-1
t i, i
. sisal a i fLL k Ai,-,4: ,, . L
p
log]
 Approved Fo ,lease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927J~O1 700150001-0
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
 Approved Fo elease 2005/03J7M fifflIDP79-0092,4"00700150001
23 February 1956
B R I E FCODIFIDIENTIA&
THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The formal presentation of "debate- speeches" at
the 20th Soviet Party Congress ended on 20 February
when the congress voted "unanimously" to approve "the
political line and practical activity of the CPSU
central committee.," The speeches generally rein-
forced the. line set by Khrushchev on the successes
of the Communist world, prophesying greater achievements
in the future, and extolling the virtues of collective
leadership.
In announcing that war is no longer "fatalistically
inevitable," FKhrushchev repudiated a dogma laid down
by Lenin and confirmed in a revised form by Stalin.
The present regime has thereby, in effect, established
its right to create binding ideological precepts and
has declared its refusal to be burdened in the
execution of policy by its Stalinist inheritance.
Under the heading of party affairs, Khrushchev
called for the establishment of a bureau under the
central committee of the Soviet Communist Party to
deal with matters concerning the Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic in order to lighten the
administrative load on the top leaders in the party
presidium. Khrushchev also recommended the writing of
a new party history to replace Stalin's 1938 version,
changes in the party rules, and an increase in the size
of the party with stress on quality. He also adjured
the party to transfer more party members to work
directly connected with industrial and agricultural
production.
Premier Bulganin's presentation of the Sixth
Five-Year Plan and remarks on economic affairs by other
leaders, while generally only restatements of familiar
themes, pointed up the most pressing economic problems
faced by the regime in maintaining a rapid rate of
growth of Soviet economic strength.
SE ET
/02/10 CIA
Page 1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005 -RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved ForpWlease 2005/0S/ &ffDP79-00927 Q0700150001-0
23 February 1956
Public utterances of Arab and Israeli leaders
continue to be keyed to the possibility of hostilities
this spring, despite some relaxation of tension following
Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion's statement last week
that plans for the Banat Yacov canal have been "shelved"
in the expectation that Ambassador Johnston would again
visit the area.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 8
Soviet Campaign Against US Balloons Continues: The USSR
has rejected the United States' contention that
balloon flights do not endanger air transport and
has offered to organize exhibitions of captured
American balloons and equipment in Western countries
to prove the validity of Soviet protests. Moscow
is also exploiting the balloon issue to discredit
President Eisenhower's mutual aerial inspection
plan. F_ I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
East Germans May Tighten Border Controls to Cut Refugee
ow: t e_
East German regime has been making plans to seal
off its territory from West Berlin and West
Germany, allegedly in order to improve currency
controls. The real purpose would probably be to
stem the escape of military-age refugees which
continues at a.high rate. The proposed date for
the initiation of these measures reportedly is
1 May. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Struggle Developing Over Successor to Hatoyama:
Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party leaders have
agreed to the election of Prime Minister Hatoyama
to the party presidency in April and to his
remaining in office for three to six months there-
after. The decision has focused the factional
struggle within the party on the choice of its
vice president, who probably will succeed the
prime minister to both the top party and govern-
ment posts. Liberal Party Secretary General
Shinsuke Kishi is the leading contender.
F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
SECRET
ii
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved ForNWease 2005/03/&I4fRDP79-009270700150001-0
23 February 1956
Japan Considering Expanded Relations With Communist China:
The Hatoyama government's intention to place greater
emphasis on relations with Communist China, as re-
ported in the Japanese press, suggests a bid for
popular support of this course. . Page 3 25X1
Communist China to Adopt Latin Alphabet: The Chinese
Communists' proposal to introduce the use of a
Latin alphabet contrasts with the measures taken
by the USSR to replace Latin by Cyrillic scripts in
Central Asia. Peiping justifies the new alphabet
on the "long historical tradition" of Latin letters
in China. The USSR may have exerted no strong
pressures on the Chinese in favor of Cyrillic,
thereby avoiding any charges of "cultural imperi-
alism." . . . . . . ? . . . . s . Page 5
South Vietnam: As the 4 March date for national assembly
elections in South Vietnam approaches, Viet Minh
propaganda is assuming a more threatening tone.
Current indications are that the Viet Minh will
attempt to disrupt the elections by covert means.
Scattered incidents of violence are a possibility.
The Viet Minh may also give support to ex-premier
Than Van Huu leader of the anti-Diem politicians
in Paris
Page 6
Afghanistan: Soviet personnel are said to be moving
intoWfghanistan to begin work under the
$100,000,000 Soviet credit announced by Bulganin
and Khrushchev during their December visit to
Kabul. Primary attention at the moment is
apparently being given to development of trans-
portation facilities, but Moscow reportedly has
also approved an irrigation project and offered
an additional loan of $12,000,000 to an Afghan
government-controlled textile company.
I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greek Election Results: The parliamentary majority
which Greek prime minister Karamanlis won in
the 19 February elections is sizable enough to
permit him some freedom in carrying out the
"progressive" program that he has.promised.
Popular support for his government depends on
his ability to satisfy popular demands for
economic progress and to settle outstanding
international issues in a way satisfactory to
public opinion. . . . . . . . . .
SECRET
iii
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Page 7
Page
 Approved Fo elease 2005/O3~fe i RDP79-009200700150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
French Negotiations in North Africa: The new French
minister residing in Algeria is confronted with
the task of defining a policy in the face of
settler hostility and Algerian Moslem pressure.
Rebel activity remains at a high level, and the
first large-scale desertion of native troops
took place between 19 and 20 February. Negoti-
ations- between France and the Moroccan nation-
alists to work out a new treaty relationship were
25X1 formally opened on 15 February. New Tunisian
negotiations for further concessions will open
soon in Paris. I I . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
25X6
The Peruvian Revolt: The regime of General Odria in
Peru appears to be permanently weakened as a re-
sult of its failure to act decisively against
the Iquitos rebels. Odria's repressive measures
against conservative opposition elements have
alienated large segments of the population.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Salvadoran Presidential Election: El Salvador is
nearing the climax of a long and bitter election
campaign. The presidential.~election is scheduled
for 4 March and there is danger that violence
or a military coup may occur before or shortly
after that time.
SECRET
Page 13
iv
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
THE. WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For lease 2005/02
,MCRAjkDP79-00922 000700150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
25X1
25X1
25X6
SOVIET VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN ECONOMIC
CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev's statement at the 20th Party Congress on
the possibility of an economic crisis in the West reflects
the belief that the USSR can capitalize on any Western
economic difficulties to increase its international
influence. The Soviet leaders may believe that continued
pressure for general disarmament can succeed in reducing
the level of Western arms production and thus remove what
Communist spokesmen have frequently described as an
artificial stimulant forestalling a capitalist depression.
Khrushchev's diagnosis reflects a belief that the West will
inevitably face substantial economic difficulties and that
these may occur soon. He did not commit himself to any
specific timing for such a depression, however, and the
speech of First Deputy Premier Mikoyan later at the congress
suggests even more strongly that the leaders are uncertain
co
ncerning the timing of the crisis they expect in the West.
F_ I
WEST GERMAN POLICY TOWARD EAST GERMANY AND THE USSR . . . Page
West Germany is faced with strong inducements' for
dealing with the Soviet Union and East Germany: the desire
for national unification or, failing this, for contacts
with the East German population; the necessity to cope with
East German demands respecting Berlin access; and a moderate
desire for trade with the East. It has been apparent for
some time that a large proportion of West Germans would
accept neutrality in return for unity, and there is a grow-
ing disposition to deal with the East Germans. Nevertheless,
the Bonn government does not presently appear inclined to
enter unilateral negotiations with Moscow or to recognize
SECRET
Approved For Rele 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
TM WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved Fot elease 2005/0Y iqE-fRDP79-0092 A 00700150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN 1955 . . . . Page 10
Peiping's program for the modernization of its
armed forces made considerable progress in 1955. Now
in possession of a ground force equal in size to that
of the Soviet Union and the world's fourth largest air
force, the Chinese Communists, with continuing and
substantial Soviet assistance, are growing steadily in
military power. Peiping's greatest military priorities
have been devoted to the preparation of offensive and
defensive facilities in the coastal area opposite
Taiwan and the offshore islands.
SECRET
25X1
vi
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For?please 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-009200700150001-0
SECRET
23 February 1956
The formal presentation of
"debate speeches" at the 20th
Party Congress ended on 20
February when the congress voted
unanimously to approve "the
political line and practical
activity of the CPSU Central
Committee."
The speeches generally re-
inforced the line set by Khrush-
chev in his 14 February speech
on the successes of the Commu-
nist world, prophesying greater
achievements in the future, and
extolling the virtues of col-
lective leadership.
Foreign Policy
Foreign Minister Molotov's
speech was largely devoted to
a faithful repetition of the
foreign policy and doctrinal
themes laid down by Khrushchev.
His most notable statement was
an admission that the Foreign
Affairs Ministry had been
guilty of "underestimating the
new possibilities" of the post-
war period and had been criti-
cized for this by the central
committee.
Molotov stressed particularly
the need for flexibility in
foreign policy, the importance
of friendship with non-Socialist
countries which oppose military
blocs, and the importance of
working-class unity between So-
cialist and Communist parties,
suggesting that he was blamed
for dragging his feet in de-
veloping these tactics.
Military Affairs
Defense Minister Marshal
Zhukov asserted that the USSR
is "protected by diverse atomic
and thermonuclear weapons,
powerful rocket-propelled and
jet-propelled armaments of
various types, including long-
range missiles." Mikoyan
stressed that Soviet military
strength is an effective deter-
rent to Western initiation of
war against the Soviet Union.
Stating that there were atomic
and hydrogen bombs in the USSR
as well as in America and that
these could be carried to "any
point of the earth by aircraft
or rockets," Mikoyan warned
that "in the event of American
aggression, hydrogen bombs can
in return fall on American
cities too...." Zhukov also.
noted that Soviet retaliatory
atomic blows would "destroy
millions of lives and immense
wealth in countries which are
America's allies."
Other speakers at the
congress lauded Soviet military
strength while stressing that
it was maintained solely for
defense purposes.
Mikoyan said in his speech
that a serious discrepancy
exists between the supply of
goods and the population's fi-
nancial resources, thus admitting
the existence of inflationary
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pare I of 9
 Approved For tease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-0092740 0700150001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
pressures in the Soviet economy.
His remedy for the situation is
to make further price reductions
only when warranted by an in-
crease in supply relative to
the purchasing power of the
population.
Kaganovich discussed re-
vision of wages and norms,
which he said had been basical-
ly unchanged since 1932. The
revision, which is apparently
proceeding very slowly, will be
aimed at decreasing the propor-
tion of take-home pay received
as bonuses--which now comprises
40 to 60 percent of the total--
by raising basic wages and out-
put norms.
Premier Bulganin's presenta-
tion of the Sixth Five-Year Plan
directives was largely a re-
statement of well-known economic
themes. He gave new investment
data, however, which, compared
with the 1956 budget, show that
a shift of funds from agriculture
to consumer goods industries is
planned to occur in the late
1950's, presumably when higher
agricultural output will re-
quire larger processing capac-
ity in light industry.
Bulganin discarded the
traditional Soviet maxim that
obsolescence of equipment is
peculiar to capitalism and
impossible under Socialism.
His attack on economists hold-
ing to this Marxist view clears
the way for a more realistic
policy of replacing outmoded
machinery-which, under previous
policy, would have remained in
use until it was beyond repair.
Surpassing the United
States in per capita production
remains the "main economic
task" of the USSR, according to
all the speakers who have dealt
with economic affairs.
Ideology
In announcing that war is
no longer "fatalistically in-
evitable," Khrushchev repudiated
a dogma laid down by Lenin and
confirmed in a revised form by
Stalin. The present regime has
thereby, in effect, established
its right to create binding
ideological precepts and de-
clared its refusal to be bur-
dened in the execution of policy
by its Stalinist inheritance.
Since the end of World
War II, there have been many
signs that Communist theoreti-
cians have been uncomfortable
with Lenin's assertion that
war is inevitable as long as
capitalism survives. On the
eve of the last party congress
in 1952, however, Stalin em-
phatically refused to abandon
the doctrine entirely. He
stated: "It is said that Lenin'.s
thesis that imperialism in-
evitably gives birth to wars
should be considered obsolete
since powerful peoples' forces
have now grown up which are
taking a stand in defense of
peace, against a new world war.
This is not correct.... In order
to eliminate the inevitability
of wars, imperialism must be
destroyed."
In denying this view,
Khrushchev has accomplished
two things. He has reoriented
Communist ideology to square
it with a more realistic ap-
praisal of the strategic situa-
tion, acknowledging the dis-
astrous consequences that would
result from general war in the
nuclear age. He has,,further-
more, cleared the decks for a
more vigorous pursuit of the
policy of "competitive peace-
ful coexistence."
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 8
 Approved For-;ease 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-009270 )0700150001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
The denial of "inevitable
war" is probably linked with
another doctrinal revision by
Khrushchev--the assertion that
Communists may win political
power in capitalist countries
through nonviolent means. Both
revisions'seem'.designed to give
Soviet policy the stamp of
respectability and to remove
the suspicion that professions
of peaceful intent are merely
a screen for conspiratorial
activity.
A follow-up speech delivered.
to the .party, congress by pre-
sidium member Mikoyan betrays
Soviet embarrassment on this
last point. He posed the ques-
tion of how long peaceful co-
existence will last, and stated,
"Our enemies interpret it to
mean that we are...allegedly in
favor of spreading Communism to
the whole world by means of war
but that we are supposed not to
be ready this year and want
peaceful coexistence until such
time as we are well prepared
and can attack.....This is slan-
der of our policy."
Mikoyan also questioned
other Stalinist pronouncements.
In speaking of Stalin's
Economic Problems of Socialism
as it pertains to the economy
of contemporary capitalism,
Mikoyan said, "It is doubtful
that we can be helped by it
and it is doubtful whether it
is correct."
Mikoyan was one of the most
vigorous in decrying the cult
of Stalin and praising the bene-
fits of collective leadership.
His remarks suggest that the
rehabilitation of some of the
Old Bolsheviks eliminated by
Stalin in the great purges, of
the 1930's might be undertaken
in the new volume.
Besides the historians,
the philosophers and economists
were also accused of being
"insolvent before the party."
PART I
Again Stalinist distortions
and restrictions were blamed
and a new era of creative
ideological thinking and
objective economic analysis
was called for.
The congress showed that
ideology is now beinr tailored
to fit 'policy, as much as at anytime
in the past. The regime has. demon-
strated that for the moment it
is more interested in creating
a supple,' pragmatic policy than
in preserving traditional dogmas
which hamper its execution.
Party Affairs
Khrushchev on 14 February
called for the establishment
of a bureau under the central
committee of the Soviet Commu-
nist Party (CPSU) to deal with
matters. concerning the Russian
Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic (RSFSR), the writing
of a new party history, changes
in the party rules, and an in-
crease in the size of the party
with the stress on quality.
He also adjured the party to
transfer more party members to
work directly connected with
production.
The organization of a
"Bureau of the CPSU Central
Committee for the RSFSR" is a
logical extension of the or-
ganizational principle first
employed some time ago when
Departments of Agriculture and
of Party Organs were created
"for the RSFSR" in the central
committee apparatus. The new
bureau, according to Khrushchev,
is needed to provide "more con-
crete and efficient leadership"
in the RSFSR, the only Soviet
republic which does not have
a republic party organization.
The new bureau presumably
will correspond to the party
bureaus already existing in the
other 15 republics, but will
differ in the method of its
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST . Page 3 of 8
 Approved For a ease 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A00700150001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
selection, i.e., it will be
"elected" by the all-union
central committee instead of a
republic central committee.
Members will probably be
chosen from among leading Oblast
party leaders and ministers of
the RSFSR. Likely choices in-
clude RSFSR premier Yasnov,
Moscow Oblast party boss Kapito-
nov, Leningrad Oblast party
boss Kozlov, and Moscow city
party chief Furtseva.
The new bureau presumably
is being formed to lighten
the administrative load on the
all-union party presidium,
which heretofore has had the
task of dealing directly with
each of the RSFSR's 78 oblasts,
krais and autonomous republics
as well as with the other 15
republics.
Success of the two depart-
ments "for the RSFSR" ii han-
.dling agricultural and party
organizational matters in the
Russian republic may have been
instrumental in the decision
to create the RSFSR .bureau.
Soviet leaders apparently
prefer this-method of providing;
leadership for the RSFSR to
the organization of a Russian
republic party because the
latter would completely over-
shadow the other republics'
parties and adversely affect
Soviet nationality policy.
Khrushchev also called
for amendments to the party
statutes as rewritten in 1952
to accommodate this and other
organizational changes and
rules of procedure "dictated
by life." One amendment has
already been made necessary
by the expansion of the sec-
retariats of oblast and republic
party committees beginning in
1954,
Other amendments will
permit the republics divided
into oblasts (the Ukraine,
Belorussia, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan) to hold party con-
gresses once every four years
rather than every two years,
modify the time limits for
holding plenary sessions of
party committees, and abolish
local representatives of the
party control committee.
The Kommunist editorial
in September which crit-
icized Molotov's ideological
error called for the writing
of a party history covering
the years since the Short
Course History was wr itt`en
t-K`irushchev, however,
demanded a completely new
textbook "based on historical
facts" and bringing the history
of the party up to date.
The lengthy theses on the
50th anniversary of Bolshevism
in 1953 went a long way in
revising the party history as
contained in the Short Course
History. The theses were too
brief , however, to serve as a
party textbook. A new textbook
is apparently needed to "rewrite'
history to change Stalin's
role in the light of current
emphasis of the virtues of
collective leadership and the
new line on peaceful coexistence
and the nonviolent path to
Communism.
These principles will
probably also be emphasized in
the new party program yet to be
written. The present party
program was written in .1919.
The 18th Party Congress in 1939
scheduled its revision and so
did the 19th congress in 1952.
The war was undoubtedly in-
strumental in the failure of the
1939 program revision committee
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 8
 Approved For W ease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-009270 0700150001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
to perform its function, and
Stalin's death and the result-
ing political reconstruction
probably account for the ab-
sence of a draft program at
this congress. Khrushchev
considers it necessary to co-
ordinate the draft program
with a lonst-range elan for
future cultural and economic
development, so it is prob-
lematical whether a new party
program will be developed by
the time the next congress
meets.
An increase in the size of
the party was demanded, to be
achieved by admitting into
party ranks leading workers,
particularly from the "main
professions, leading collective
farmers and the best portion
of the Soviet intelligentsia."
Such a selective increase in
the party's size would prob-
ably reduce still further the
percentage of party members
drawn from the industrial
proletariat and reinforce
the elite character of the
party.
Khrushchev, however, at
the same time castigated party
leaders for considering "party
work one thing and economic
and state work another." He
insisted that party officials
should study technology,
agronomy, and production.
Furthermore, more Communists
should work directly at pro-
duction. Over 3,000,000 party
members live in rural areas,
but less than half of these,
Khrushchev complained, work
directly on collective farms,
machine-tractor stations
and state farms.
Chronology of the Congress
Tuesday - 14 February
1. Welcoming speech by
N.S. Khrushchev
2. Election of party con-
gress officials.
3. Report of the central
committee by N. S.
Khrushchev.
Wednesday - 15 February
Morning session:
1. Report on party af-
fairs by P. G. Moska-
tov, chairman of the
central auditing com-
mission.
2. Discussion on both
the Khrushchev and
Moskatov speeches
by various regional
party'secretaries,
including A. I.
Kirichenko, party
presidium member and
first secretary of
Ukraine.
Evening session:
1. Further discussion of
Khrushchev and Moska-
tov speeches by var-
ious party secretaries,
including central com-
mittee secretary and
Pravda editor D. T.
Me*_FfTov ,
2. Chinese Communist
greetings to the con-
gress delivered by
Marshal Chu Te, in-
cluding a message from
Mao Tse-tung.
Thursday - 16 February
Morning session:
1. Further discussion of
the Khrushchev and Mos-
katov reports, including
participation by party
presidium member and
central committee sec-
retary M. A. Suslov.
2. Report of the congress
credentials committee
by its chairman, A. H.
Araistov:
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 8
 Approved For eJease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00700150001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
3. Greetings from foreign
Communist parties pre-
sented by Boleslaw
Beirut and Anton No-
votny on behalf of the
Polish and Czech Com-
munists respectively.
Evening session:
the reports, including
a speech by presidium
member A. I. Mikoyan.
Greetings from the East
German Communist Party
by Walter Ulbricht.
1. Further discussion of
party secretaries and
also.speeches by V. M.
Molotov, who discussed
Soviet foreign policy
on standard lines,
and Marshal Zhukov,
who lauded Soviet mili-
tary progress.
2. Greetings by Choe Yong-
kun and Enver Hoxha
for the North Korean
and Albanian Commu-
nists respectively.
Evening session:
1. More discussion of the
reports, including a
speech by party pre-
sidium member L. M.
Kaganovich dealing
mainly with transporta-
tion, labor and wages.
2. Greetings presented by
Truong Chin for the
Vietnamese and Harry
Pollitt for the British
Communists. A letter
of greetings from
Tito was also read to
the congress.
Friday - 17 February
Morning session:
1. Further discussion of
reports as on previous
day.
2. Greetings to the con-
gress from Maurice
Thorez on behalf of
French Communist Party
and Palmiro Togliatti
for the Italian Com-
munist Party.
Evening session:
1. Discussion of the re-
ports, including a
speech by G. M. Malen-
kov which was primarily
a report on the elec-
tric power industry.
2. Greetings to the con-
gress delivered by
Matyas Rakosi on behalf
of the Hungarian Work-
ers Party and Vulko
Chervenkov for the Bul-
garian Workers Party.
Saturday - 18 February
Morning session:
1. Further discussion by
various provincial
Sunday 19 February
The congress recessed!.
for the day. A Kremlin
reception was held for the
delegates, and at night
most of the leaders either
attended the ballet or the
theater.
Monday - 20.February
Morning session:
1. Provincial party lead-
ers continued to dis-
cuss the reports. Par-
ty presidium member
K. E. Voroshilov also
spoke.
2. Greetings from the In-
donesian, Mongolian,
and Finnish Communists
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of8.
 Approved For eease 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A 90700150001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
read by Aidit, Tsen-
denbal, and Aaltonen,
respectively.
Afternoon session:
Reimann; for the
Austrian Communists
by Koplenig, and for
the National Commit-
tee of the Communist
Party of the United
States by Madame
Ekaterina Furtseva,
party boss of the city
of Moscow.
1. The "debate" continued
and finally ended.
"The congress unani-
mously voted to approve
wholly and entirely the
political line and
practical activity of
the CPSU central com-
mittee."
2. The congress set up a
commission under
T'hrushchev to draw
up the congress
resolution of the
central committee
report. The report
of the central .
.auditing commission.
was also adopted.
3. Greetings on be
half of the Spanish
and Argentine Cotn-
munists were read
by D. Ibarrurr! and
V. Codovilla.
Tuesday - 21 February
Morning session:
1. Premier Bulganin de-
livered a four-hour
report on the direc-
tives of the Sixth
Five-Year Plan.
Evening session:
1. Discussion of Bulgan-
in's report, including
a speech by party
secretary Bulyayev.
2. Greetings read on be-
half of the West Ger-
man Communists by Max
Wednesday - 22 February
Morning session:
1. More discussion on
the Five-Year Plan
report. Speeches
delivered by party
presidium member M. G.
Pervukhin and Trade
Union boss N. M.
Shvernik.
2. Greetings delivered
on behalf of the
Syrian and Lebanese
Communists.
Afternoon session:
1. Debate continued
on Bulganin's re-
port, including a
speech by party
presidium member
M. Z. Saburov.
2. Greetings were
read from the Swed-
ish, Cuban and
Chilean Communists.
Thursday - 23 February
1. Five-Year Plan re-
port still debated.
Speech by Deputy
Premier A. N.
Kosygin.
w?t ORR) (Prepared jointly
SECRET
Approved For Rel se 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
(1e IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 7 of p,
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-009?7A0 0700150001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
Public utterances of Arab
and Israeli leaders continue to
be keyed to the possibility of
hostilities this spring,
despite some relaxation of ten-
sion following Israeli prime
minister Ben-Gurion's statement
last week that plans for the
Banat Yacov canal have been
"shelved" in the expectation
that Ambassador Johnston would
again visit the area. The Is-
raeli Foreign Ministry has inter-
preted Ben-Gurion's statement,
which apparently was not co-
ordinated with his cabinet, to
mean that Israel's policy on
Banat Yacov has not changed and
that work on the canal will be-
gin when weather permits--pre-
sumably in April--unless prcg-
ress toward a water settlement
is made.
"War fever" seems particu-
larly acute in Syria. Syrians
reportedly fired on Israeli
fishermen on Lake Tiberias on
23 February. Syria's air force
is in its best condition yet,
with 11 jets and four conven-
tional fighters reported ready
for combat.
While all reports agree
that Egyptian premier Nasr has
warned the Syrians to go slow,
he has made clear that Egypt
will come to Syria's aid if
necessary. Syrian prime minis -
ter.: Ghazzi has indicated that
he recognizes the dangers of
the present state of mind in
Syria and has said that public
opinion must be calmed. Ghazzi's
political position is so weak,
however, that he probably
cannot afford to be less belli-
cose than the army officers on
whom his government is dependent.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian ini-
tiative to resume discussions of
the Johnston plan for development
of the Jordan River seems to have
died a-borning. The Lebanese prime
minister has said no Arab govern-
ment could accept the plan under
present conditions, and Nasr re-
portedly did not raise the issue
during his recent talks with the
Jordanian prime minister. Nasr
later stated that the current
atmosphere is not auspicious for
new talks on the water problem.
needs.
Israel's drive for arms has
been stepped up still further.
Ben-Gurion admitted in a speech
on 16 February that he did not know
whether "friendly countries"
would supply the materiel Israel
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 8 of 8
25X1
 Approved For se 2005/02/$Ec P79-00927A000,700150001-0
i%wsow
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet Campaign Against
V5 Balloons Continues
The USSR followed up its
display of captured American
balloons and equipment at a
press conference in Moscow with
a second note to the United
States on 18 February. The
note repeated earlier charges
that the "real purpose" of the
balloon operations is aerial
photography of Soviet territory,
and rejected the US contention
that the balloons do not en-
danger air transport.
Moscow took note of the
statement in the United States'
note of 8 February that the
American government "will seek
to avoid the launching of ad-
ditional balloons which.. .might
transit the USSR," but, in an
apparent attempt to interpret
this as a stronger commitment,
stated that the United States
had promised to take the "neces-
sary measures to prevent the
further release" of these bal-
loons.
Moscow also offered to
organize exhibitions of captured
balloons in New York, Washing-
ton, London, Paris and else-
where to demonstrate the
"soundness of the assertions
made by the Soviet government."
East Germans May Tighten Border
Contra s to u Refugee ow
Ithe East
German regime has been making
plans to seal off its territory
from West Berlin and West Ger-
many, allegedly in order to
improve currency controls. The
real purpose would probably be
to stem the escape of military-
age refugees, which continues
at a high rate. The proposed
date for the initiation of the
The USSR has also begun to
exploit the balloon issue in a
manner designed to discredit
President Eisenhower's proposal
for mutual aerial inspection.
Pravda and Izvestia last week
accused the United States of
unilaterally implementing the
"open skies" plan to obtain
information about the USSR,
Communist China, and the Satel-
lites. The Soviet delegate to
the UN Disarmament Subcommittee
discussions, scheduled to be
resumed next month, will probably
elaborate on this theme in an
effort to strengthen his case
against the President's plan.
Soviet propaganda has
given more play to the balloon
issue than to any previous
charges of hostile action against
Soviet territory in recent
years. However, the fact that
no mention of the balloons has
yet been made at the party con-
gress suggests that the Soviet
leaders are proceeding cau-
tiously on the issue, and
tends to confirm a remark re-
cently made by a Soviet offi-
cial to a Western diplomat in
Moscow that the USSR did not
intend to build up this matte 5X1
excessively
border control measures re-
portedly is 1 May.
Planned currency controls,
which are to include the regu-
lation of monetary traffic be-
tween East Germany (including
East Berlin) and West Berlin
and the German Federal Republic,
will,
involve sealing the intersector
border in Berlin. In addition,
SECRET
25X1
PART I I Approved For Relege 2005AND0 : CIA-R P 9-00927A000700150001-0
tt~~ COMMENTS Page 1 of 13
 Approved For se 200 , E IA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
25X1
the canals
between the German
Democratic Republic
(GDR) and West Ber-
lin will be closed,
East German employ-
ment in West Berlin
will be banned, and
a crackdown will be
made on illegal mone-
tary practices in
East Berlin.
If increased re-
strictive measures
are imposed, there.
is little likelihood
that there will be
any serious inter-
ference by the Com-
munists with Allied
access to Berlin through East
Germany or Allied rights of
access to East Berlin.
Any closure of the Berlin
border would probably be under-
taken because an intensification
of recruitment is in prospect.
25X1
25X1 While the
East Germans may prefer not to
institute conscription until a
full-scale draft has been start
ect bj West Germany, they will prob-
aki.ly step up their recruitment
for the recently formalized
armed forces in the near future.
The flow of refugees from
East Germany to the West has
continued at an unusually high
rate since the temporary slack-
ing off at Christmas time, de-
spite the abnormally cold weath-
er and the increase in security
measures designed to stem this
exodus. During the week of 3-
9 February the number of refu-
gees entering West Berlin was
2,793. During the whole month
of January, an average of 3,500
refugees per week, including
800 to 900 of military age, en-
tered West Berlin. This is more
..PART II
1ST WEEK
FEB.
60221-3
than double the figure for the
corresponding month of 1955.
Berlin border controls ..
have been supplemented by in-
creasing psychological pres-
sures, such as the recent show
trials of persons accused of
assisting people to escape from
East Germany. Two of the ac-
cused were sentenced to death.
These sentences, however, were
subsequently commuted to life
imprisonment'in the face of
vigorous Western denunciations
of the court's action. Such
backtracking by the-,East`German
government will give a lift. to
popular morale.
25X1
The regime will no. doubt
continue, however, to exert
every psychological and physical
pressure to attempt to prevent
military-age refugees from leav-
ing the country. Since East
Germany, already faced with a
manpower shortage, can hardly
afford to lose approximately
250,000 persons in 1956, as it
did in 1955, it will probably
be obliged to intensify controls
;Oder the western borders, es-
pecially if recruitment for the
armed forces is stepped up.
Approved For. Rele 0 ? CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
7~5/ANI~ COMMENTS
Page 2 of 13
REFUGEES ENTERING WEST BERLIN
25X1
a 1955 - 1956
 Approved ForN$,ejase 2005/02/
.gLP(IjDP79-0092 .700150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
.Struggle Developing Over
Successor to Ha-toyama
Japanese Libera.1-Democratic
Party leaders have agreed to
the election of Prime Minister
Hatoyama to the party presi-
dency in April and to his re-
maining in office for three to
six months thereafter. The
decision has focused the fac-
tional struggle within the
party on the choice of its
vice president, who probably
will succeed the prime minister
in the top party and government
posts. -
Party secretary general
Shinsuke Kishi, an influential
promoter of the recent conserv-
ative merger, appears to have
the best chance to succeed
Hotoyama, but he does not have
his party's unanimous support.
He has long planned that the
party's old guard, as personi-
fied by Ha.toyama, and former
Liberal Party president Ogata,
would forsake active politics
to become senior advisers and
that the young political leaders
would take over the reins of
conservative leadership.
Oga.ta.'s death and Ha.toyama's
unwillingness to step aside
have thwarted these plans.
However, present information
suggests that Kishi still plans
to succeed Ha.toyama.
Conservative old-guard
politicians, fully cognizant
Japan Considering Expanded
'Relations With Communist China
The Hatoyama government's
intention to place greater em-
phasis on relations with Com-
of Kishi's political a.spira-
tions, have recently combined
forces in_an attempt to pre-
serve their authority in the
party and head off his drive
for the party leadership. Led
by Tsuruhei Ma.tsuno, a. member
of the Diet upper house, the
group has constituted itself
a, senior board to be consulted
on all questions of importance
to the party, including the
selection of the party vice
president. It is doubtful,
however, that they will be
able to select from among
their own ranks a candidate
of sufficient stature to win
the party presidency.
The Liberal-Democratic
merger has provided a basis for
stabilizing conservative poli-
tics in Japan, but must still
overcome the handicaps which
have chronically beset the
conservative forces: personal
ambition, the inability of any
faction to dominate the party,
and the unwillingness of all
the factions to compromise.
Whether the younger party lead-
ers will be able to name Ha.to-
yama.'s successor probably will
depend on their ability to rec-
oncile these conflicts and to
agree upon an order of preced-
ence for their succession to
the top posts.
munist China, as reported in the
Japanese press, suggests a bid
for popular support of this
SECRET"
25X1
PART II Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 13
 Approved Forse 2005/02/SEff P79-00927 0000150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
course, and an attempt to es-
tablish Japan's position in
future talks with the United
States.
A 500-page study by the
Foreign Ministry states that
Communist China can no longer
be ignored and that the people
have the utmost trust in Mao
Tse-tung. It also notes that
Japanese talks with Peiping
will almost inevitably follow
the conclusion of the Soviet-
Japanese talks in London.
In concluding that the
Chiang government on Taiwan
is faced with a problem of
deteriorating morale, Japan
may have been influenced by
Peiping's recently stepped-up
campaign to induce defections,
even though there is no avail-
able evidence that high-level
Chinese Nationalist officials
have seriously considered the
offers.
Japan's long-standing de-
sire'for closer relations with
Peiping has been intensified
in recent months by the ex-
pectation of a.relaxation of
the China embargo and by the
desire to move quickly to
establish a foothold in the
China market before Western
European and other nations
capture it. The Japanese dis-
count the effectiveness of
trade sanctions against Communist
PART II
China and are reportedly fear-
ful of losing the China market
permanently unless controls are
relaxed.
Last fall the Hatoyama
government approached the
United States for support of
a proposal that items of partic-
ular .. importance to Sino-Japa-
nese trade be released from
the embargo against Communist
China., Japanese leaders feel
that some such concession is
necessary to relieve domestic
business pressure,
The Japanese government
is considering approval of
the exhibition of embargoed
goods at Japanese trade fairs
scheduled to be held in Com-
munist China next fall. It
points to the division of
opinion in CHINCOM on this
subject as evidence that other
nations may plan to do like-
wise to beat their competitors
to the China, market.
When unofficial Sino-
Japanese talks are held this
spring to renew last year's
unofficial trade and fisheries
agreement, the Hatoyama govern-
ment will have an opportunity
to expand official relations.
Communist China has proposed
government-to-government agree-
ments. Concurred
in by ORR)
SECRET
Approved For ReIe dQ05I022/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 13
25X1
 Approved Fore 2005/02/10 - P79-0092ZAA00000700150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
Communist China to Adopt4
Latin Alphabet
The Chinese Communists'
proposal to introduce the use
of a Latin alphabet contrasts
with the measures taken by the
USSR to replace Latin by
Cyrillic scripts in Central
Asia.
The Latin alphabet has no
special advantages over Cyrillic
for rendering Chinese sounds.
A Chinese Communist predisposi-
tion against Latin seemed indi-
cated in August 1955, when
Peiping authorized the use of
Outer Mongolia's Cyrillic script
by the Mongols in China. Peiping
justified its eventual deter-
mination on Latin letters for
the Chinese language in large
part on the basis of the "long
historical tradition" of Latin
letters in China--a rationali-
zation which must have carried
little weight with Soviet
linguists who had successfully
effected the transition from
Latin to Cyrillic in Soviet
Asia during World War II.
Throughout the 1920's and
most of the 1930's, the USSR
favored the adoption of Latin
rather than Cyrillic script
by its Central Asian minorities.
After 1939, however, the Latin
alphabets of the Tajik, Kirghiz,
Kazakh, and other minority
nationalities in the USSR were
abandoned for Cyrillic scripts
in the course of a general
trend to Russification. In
rationalizing the shift from
Latin to Cyrillic in 1941,
Outer Mongolia deferred to
the USSR by observing that
"the future development of the
country's culture can progress
only through a, strengthening of
fraternal relations with the'
peoples of the Soviet Union
and through a. mastering of their
culture."
Soviet linguists themselves
played a leading role in the
"long historical tradition" by
helping develop a Latin script
which the Chinese Communists
employed to a limited extent
in the 1930's. In at least one
of their border regions, it was
given equal status with Chinese
ideographs as authorized script
for official documents. However,
sometime in the 1940's, soon
after the Soviet Union came to
favor Cyrillic in the Asiatic
USSR, the Chinese Communists
dropped their campaign to pro-
mote the Latin alphabet.
Previous proposals in China.
to introduce an alphabet have
aroused resentment among many
intellectuals, who maintained
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 13
 Approved Fore 2005/02/ P79-00927~_OOO7700150001-0
E -
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
Zhunghua Renmin Gungheguo
in simplified characters, and in Latinized script. English translation:
"The People's Republic of China is led by the working class."
M t.A4
sh gungren giegi lingdau de,
Excerpt from Communist China's constitution in traditional characters
that Chinese culture itself
was endangered by such reforms
in the language. The Communists
this time are endeavoring to
allay these fears by assurances
that the new letters "no longer
hold their identity as letters
of Old Latin, English, or
French. To put it correctly,
their name is 'Chinese letters.'"'
In the meantime, a continuing
campaign to simplify many of
the ideographs indicates that
the traditional script will
continue in use for many years
while the new alphabet is being
popularized.
South Vietnam
As the 4 March date for
national assembly elections in
South Vietnam approaches, Viet
Minh propaganda attacks against
them are assuming a more threat-
ening tone. Hanoi radio, while
conceding that Diem undoubtedly
will win, has called for a
"massive boycott" and stated
that the Vietnamese people will
turn the elections into "a
bloody reply to the Americans
and their lackeys." Current
indications are that the Viet
Minh will attempt to disrupt
the elections by covert means.
Scattered incidents of violence
are a possibility.
Many anti-Communist opposi-
tion groups may abstain from
voting because they consider
the electoral regulations too
restrictive. These groups,
There is no strong evidence
to support the speculation that
the Chinese Communists, in pro-
posing a Latin alphabet, delib-
erately acted contrary to ex-
pressed Soviet wishes. In view
of the strong emotions aroused
by past Chinese debates on
language reform, the USSR may
have exerted no strong pres-
sures in favor of Cyrillic,
hereby avoiding charges of "cul-
tural imperialism." In any event,
Peiping did not, like Soviet
dominated Outer Mongolia, feel
compelled to demonstrate af-
finities with Soviet culture
in choosing a new script.
I I
which include the Cao Dai
political organization, charge
that the amount of power vested
in the presidency will result
in a "powerless" assembly which
will seriously jeopardize the
republic. Although these op-
position groups, in protest,
have decided against formally
running candidates, it appears
that some of them have entered
little-known party members as
independent candidates.
Considerable confusion
still surrounds the candidate
lists, with late changes appar-
ently reflecting the government's
desire to meet any challenge
from the surprisingly many in-
dependent candidates. Govern-
ment-supported candidates, who
include several cabinet members
and other high government
SECRET
Approved For Rele R OHS : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
ROVES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 13
25X1
 Approved Formal ,se 2005/02/ SE( DP79-00927000150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
officials, appear assured of
winning a comfortable majority
of the assembly's 123 seats.
Diem considers it imperative
that a reliable assembly be
elected, for the new legis-
lature's first task will be
to adopt his draft constitution
and thus complete the reorgani-
zation program that began with
the referendum last October dis-
placing Bao Dai as chief of
state.
The still unpublished draft
constitution reportedly grants
overriding authority to the
president, including the power
to dissolve the assembly "in
cases of serious conflict with
the government." Diem has also
announced that an advisory
economic and social council,
composed of farm, labor, busi-
ness and professional repre-
sentatives, will soon be
created to "supplement" the
national assembly. He is said
to feel the creation of such a
council is more important than
a political assembly and will
provide a more realistic ap-
proach to Vietnamese problems.
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese
army has consolidated its posi-
Afghanistan
Soviet personnel are said
to be moving into Afghanistan
to begin work under the $100,-
000,000 Soviet credit announced
by Bulganin and Khrushchev
during their December visit to
Kabul. Primary attention at
the moment is apparently being
given to development of trans-
portation facilities, but
Moscow reportedly has also ap-
proved an irrigation project
and offered an additional loan
tion in the Cao Dai area north
of Saigon and thereby lessened
the possibility of any effective
antigovernment action by Cao
Dai forces not yet integrated
into the army. At the same
time, the Vietnamese army claims
negotiations for the surrender
of the 3,200 Hoa Hao troops
under Tran Van Soai have re-
sulted thus far in the defection
of 2,900, with more surrenders
expected. Although the army's
figure is probably considerably
exaggerated, the surrenders
are a psychological victory for
the government. There has been
no interference in this army
operation by Ba Cut--a more
fanatical Hoa Hao dissident
who controls a force of 2,000-.-
or by the 600 Viet Minh ad-
visers with the Hoa Hao rebels.
A potential threat to the
government lies in the intrigues
of ex-premier Tran Van Huu,
leader of a group of anti-Diem
politicians in Paris.
of $12,000,000 to an Afghan
government-controlled textile
company.
A commission of engineers
--two Afghans, two Afghan-
employed West Germans, and
three Russians--surveyed all
dam and irrigation sites in
the Jalalabad area during the
first week in February,l
_
25X1
F
_J Mi
This commission has 25X1
SECRET-
PART I I Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 13
 Approved For4B,al a 2005/O R 'RDP79-00927 0 0 ,0150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
25X1
25X1
25X1
now supposedly agreed that the
USSR will undertake development
of an irrigation project at
Barikao, about 30 miles from
the Khyber Pass, an area into
which the Russians have not in
the past been allowed. The
chief Soviet engineer, described
as "obviously a military man in
civilian clothing," showed in-
terest in bridge capacities,
road specifications, and the
number of soldiers in block-
houses along the roads.
two new Czech engineers
PFGHA(1ISTAf1
way promptly.
prepared for Soviet engineers,.
and that at least 15 Russians
arrived in Kabul on 15 February.
This suggests that planning on
new projects is getting under
have been employed by the Min-
istry of Public Works, that of-
fices in the ministry are being
Seleded railroad
All-weather road
25X1
a TLHERAN
PAKISTAN
Improvement of the primi-
tive Afghan-Soviet transporta
tion connections apparently has
priority in the developmental
timetable. All road and bridge
blueprints in the Public Works
Ministry are reported to have
been turned over to the Russians
who are to reconstruct roads
and develop gasoline storage
and motor repair facilities in
northern Afghanistan. The
Russians reportedly are to com-
mence work soon on a military
airport 40 miles north of Kabul
and on port facilities on the
Afghan side of the Oxus River
at Qizil Qala, the port of entry
which was opened last year.
Czechoslovakia may be mak-
ing further progress on the
$5,000,000 loan it extended to
Afghanistan in 1954, of which
only $1,500,000 is known to have
been allocated to date. The
SECRET
PART II
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of. 13
 Approved For, sse 2005/02/IQ,L5fiff P79-0092ZA0 7D0150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
Czechs are said to be preparing
to begin work on a dried fruit
plant in Kabul.
The USSR seems to be ex-
ploring new possibilities of
economic penetration through a
reported offer of a $12,000,000
loan to an Afghan textile com-
pany. This apparently is not
a direct government-to-govern-
ment deal, as was the $100,-
000,000 credit, although the
Afghan government owns 51 per-
cent of the textile company
stock.
Greek Election Results
The parliamentary majority
which Greek prime minister Kar-
amanlis won in the 19 February
elections is sizable enough to
permit him some freedom in car-
rying out the "progressive" pro-
gram that he has promised.
Popular support for his govern-
ment depends on his ability to
satisfy popular demands for
economic progress and to settle
outstanding international issues
in a way satisfactory to public
opinion.
Nearly complete returns
indicate that Karamanlis' Na-
tional Radical Union (ERE) will
control at least 161 out of the
300 seats in the new parliament,
compared to the 200 it had in
the final days of the last
parliament. There is some chance
that the prime minister may pick
up one or two additional seats
when the soldier vote is com-
pleted.
Press reports indicate that
three center leaders of the
Popular Front have already
broken away from their alliance
with the Communist-front EDA.
Liberal Party chief Papandreou,
Liberal Democratic Union head
Venizelos, and Populist Party
leader Tsaldaris have announced
that they will support Karaman-
lis on foreign policy matters.
PART II
The presence of Soviet
personnel in Afghan government
offices suggests that the cau-
tion observed by both Afghans
and Russians in their past rela-
tions is breaking down. Public
opinion in Kabul reportedly sup-
ports the government's apparent
willingness to accept most So-
viet offers. However, overly
aggressive Soviet activity
could provoke a slowdown in of-
ficial Afghan co-operation.
(Concurred in
by ORR)
This will involve the addition
of about 75 seats to Karamanlis'
parliamentary strength and should
enable him to resist success-
fully EDA's demands for a neutral
Greece.
The left-wing parties won
about 45 seats in the new
parliament, compared to five in
the previous one. EDA won
about 18 seats and the fellow-
traveling Democratic Party
(DKEL) about 20, apparently the
largest bloc of Communist-con-
trolled deputies in Greek history.
This delegation can probably do
little to obstruct the function-
ing of parliament but it does
give the Communists the respect-
ability they have been seeking
and provides a forum for their
propaganda.
The political future of
Karamanlis probably now depends
on his ability to win popular
confidence--he polled fewer
votes than the Popular Front--
by carrying on a vigorous cam-
paign for economic improvement.
Likewise, he will have to cater
to popular feeling in such emo-
tionally charged issues as the
Cyprus dispute with Britain and
Greek-Turkish relations, al-
though support of the center
leaders will allow him some
latitude.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 13
25X1
25X1
 Approved For 200510ftArRDP79-00700150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
French Negotiations
In North Africa
ALGERIA
Robert Lacoste, the new
French minister residing in
Algeria, appears to be con-
fronted with the practically
impossible task of achieving
an Alger'n settlement. La-
coste indicated to the American
consul general on 16 February
that his principal job is to
see that "Algeria remains
French." Lacoste's attitude
together with the confidence
of French settler extremists
that they have overawed Premier
Mollet suggest that all the
essential political decisions
will not be made.
Leaders among the moderate
Algerian Moslems remain quiet
and are, enjoying the spectacle
of internecine French strife.
Having warned that a government
could expect a reaction within
30 days of its formation if
their minimum aspirations were
not met, these leaders appear
to be biding their time until
2 March. Meanwhile, rebelac-
tivity remains at a high level,
and the first large-scale deser-
tion of native troops in Algeria
took place between 19 and 20
February.
Negotiations to define a
new treaty relationship between
France and Morocco were formally
opened in Paris on 15 February
by the sultan and President Coty.
Because French negotiator's had
not yet been selected, working-
level discussions were postponed
until 22 February. In contrast
with French unpreparedness and
confusion, the Moroccan delega-
tion with a mandate from the
Moroccan people was ready to
press for very hard terms on
national defense, foreign affairs
and economic matters. In his
formal remarks on 15 February,
the sultan stated that Morocco
must first be granted actual
independence before negotiation
of a new treaty which would de-
fine its status of "interdepend-
ence" with France.
Meanwhile, French farmers
in northern Morocco have de-
clared in telegrams to the
French government that they will
abandon their farms because of
the worsening security situation.
Simultaneously, French authori-
ties evacuated about 100 for
estry guards in isolated areas
as well as some 600 French
residents in western Algeria
in the face of renewed rebel
activities by Berber tribesmen.
French-Tunisian negotia-
tions are to reopen on 27 Febru-
ary, according to French offi-
cials in Tunis and Paris. Con-
scious of the fact that Morocco
has been promised independence
while Tunisia was granted limited
autonomy last June, the Tunisian
government on the eve of the
general election scheduled for
25 March is pressing for addi-
tional concessions.
In preparatory discussions
earlier this month, Habib Bour--
ghiba, president of the moderate
nationalist Neo-Destour party,
which is the dominant force in
the present government, indicated
that Tunisia would be satisfied
with a token national army and
some diplomatic representation
abroad. At that time, France
seemed disposed to make such
concessions.
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10. of 13
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
 Approved For ea a 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO00700150001-0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
The Peruvian Revolt
The regime of General Odria
in Peru appears to be permanent-
ly weakened as a result of its
failure to act decisively
against the Iquitos rebels.
Odria's repressive measures
against conservative opposition
elements have alienated large
segments of the population.
25X1 Though the military sit-
uation remains outwardly quiet
25X1
25X1
down the Iquitos rebellion
The superior jungle warfare
training of rebel General Mer-
ino's troops, the limited ra-
tions of both the military and
the civilian populace at Iqui-
tos, and strong distaste for
bombing the city have been re-
ported as deterrents to active
hostilities.
The government finally
dispatched troops on 21 Febru-
ary and, according to American
service atta.ch6s, the rebels in
Iquitos and the forces sent
against them to date are even-
ly matched and only a bloody
battle could decide the out-
c orae ,
Meanwhile, Odria has been
using the revolt as a. pretext
to crack down on all. opposition
forces. By summary arrest of
many prominent conservative
leaders, he apparently has al
iena.ted virtually all rightist
support. Prominent business
elements which were never en-.
thusia.stic about the regime,
though they have fared well
under it, will now probably
be solidly hostile. Should-
Odria. attempt to gain mass
support by turning to the
outlawed leftist but non-Com-
munist APRA party for support,
the army would probably move
against him immediately.
Should Odria succeed in
keeping most of his military
leaders in line, he may over-
ride this latest attempt to
unseat him. However, in order
to maintain the upper hand, he
will probably be forced to rule
openly as a military dictator.
His position, however, had al-
ready been weakened by his mis-
handling of the Arequipa dis-
turbance last December and by a,
growing general belief that he
intends to manipulate the 3
June elections.
SECRET
there is a good
deal of wavering among the
military with regard to what
action should be taken. The
military, as always, holds
the key to future developments,
and until the position of
various generals is ascertained,
it will not be known whether
the government will be supported.
The government itself has
shown an unusual indecisiveness
on what action to take to put
: A T II
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 13
25X1
 Approved FofRg ese 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-0092740000150001-0
23 February 1956
Salvadoran Presidential Election
El Salvador is nearing the
climax of a long and bitter
election campaign. The presi-
dential election is scheduled
for 4 March, and there is
danger that violence or a mili-
tary coup may occur before or
shortly after that time.
The opposition, which
doubts it can win the election,
has consistently attempted to
provoke the government into
taking repressive and unpopu-
la.r measures, apparently in the
hope of providing discontented
army officers with justifica,
tion for seizing the government.
President Osorio, whose
term ends in September, is con-
fident that the administration
has sufficient popular support
to assure the election of his
hand-picked successor, the mod-
erate and capable Lt. Col. Jose
Maria Lemus, who favors close
co-operation with the United
States. Osorio wants to go
down in history as one of the
very few Salvadoran presidents
to complete his term and turn
the office over to a. constitu-
tionally elected successor.
The administration has thus
far shown considerable restraint
in reacting to opposition prov-
ocations,.. Civil liberties
have not been restricted.
Three of the five opposi-
tion'presidential candidates
were. disqualified by the gov-
ernment on technical grounds
on 14 and 15 February. The
leading remaining opposition
candidate, Lt. Col. Rafael Ca.r-
ra.nza Ama.ya, has been described
as nationalistic and a potential
rightist dictator. Though he is
not known to have had close re-
lations.with Communists,he may
now be receiving the support of
Communists who were active in
the political organizations
built up by the three disquali-
fied candidates.
The army is the ultimate
locus of political power in E].
Salvador. Though key army posts
are held by officers loyal to
Osorio, there is political divi-
sion within the army. Ca.rra.nza.
Ama,ya., a. career officer, enjoys
wide backing among the military,
and those officers now backing
Lemus may be doing so out of loy-
alty to Osorio rather than be-
cause they like Lemus.
of officers whom he trusts.
If Osorio should feel he.were
losing army support, he might tzy
to reach an agreement with Car-
ra,nza Amaya. and discard Lemus.
As a. last resort, the president
is believed prepared to stage a 25X1
""preventive coup," leaving an .
interim government in the control
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PII NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 13-
 Approved Forme 2005/i AR&A-RDP79-0092 Q0 0150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN ECONOMIC CRISIS
Khrushchev's remarks at
the 20th Party Congress about
an approaching economic crisis
in the West reflect the belief
that the USSR can capitalize on
any Western economic difficulties
to increase its international
influence. The Soviet leaders
may believe that continued pres-
sure for general disarmament
can succeed in reducing the
level of Western arms produc-
tion and thus remove what Com-
munist spokesmen have frequent-
ly described as an artificial
stimulant forestalling a capi-
talist depression.
Khrushchev's diagnosis
reflects a belief that the West
will inevitably face substan-
tial economic difficulties and
that these may occur soon. He
did not commit himself, however,
to any specific timing for such
a depression.
Khrushchev's Speech
Khrushchev stated that
"today the capitalist world is
approaching the point at which
the stimulating action of many
of the temporary factors is
becoming exhausted." With re-
gard to US industry specifical-
ly, he said, "There is no pros-
pect for a further substantial
increase in production." He
asserted that the stability of
the capitalist economies would
in the future be determined
largely by the situation in the
capitalist world, where "sub-
stantial changes have taken
place in recent years."
that Moscow is calculating that
a depression in the major capi-
talist nations would give the
underdeveloped countries serious
difficulties in selling their
raw materials. The Soviet
Union would doubtless step into
the breach with attractive trade
offers.
First Deputy Premier Mi-
koyan, speaking to the party
congress shortly after Khru-
shchev, praised the latter's
analysis of contemporary capi-
talism, but emphasized the con-
tinuing growth of major Western
economies. His lengthy de-
scription of the weaknesses in.
Soviet analyses of world capi-
talism and his call for more
accurate research shows that
the present leadership is dis-
satisfied with current analyses
of this subject. Mikoyan's
statements suggests that he is
even less certain than Khru-
shchev as.to the timing of.the
crisis the Soviet leaders ex-
pect in the West.
The remarks of Khrushchev
and Mikoyan should be viewed
against the background of Soviet
thought on world capitalism
throughout the postwar period.
In particular, Khrushchev's
references to Western rearmament
as both a stimulant and a poison
reflect the uncertainty and con-
fusion among Soviet economists
since Stalin's death about the
precise economic implications
of a high level of arms pro-
duction.
Background: 1946-1953
Khrushchev's diagnosis of
the world capitalist economy,
which follows that of Soviet
economic specialists, suggests
In the early postwar
years, the length and frequent
bitterness of discussion among
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 14
 Approved Fo Re a se 2005L E(RE1-RDP79-0092 !00.0700150001-0
23 February 1956
Soviet economists on the anal-
ysis of industrial cycle: in
capitalist countries strongly
suggested that this was a sub-
ject of debate among the top
leaders themselves, in their
efforts to estimate the future
relative strength of the Soviet
Union and the United States.
The publication in 1946
of a book on capitalist econ-
omies by Eugene Varga, the
foremost Soviet economist,
touched off an ideological con-
troversy which lasted more than
two years. Although Varga's
prediction that at least ten
years would elapse before a
major economic depression e-
rupted in the West was perhaps
unpalatable to the regime, the
criticism against him was aimed
primarily at his belief that
World War II had brought about
changes in the essential struc-
ture of capitalism.
Varga took the position
that wartime exigencies had
taught capitalist states the
benefits of government plan-
ning and intervention in the
economy, that capitalist states
were becoming more sensitive
to the interests of the working
class and consumers, and that
the war had altered relation-
ships between colonial powers
and their colonies.
This analysis raised a
strong possibility, despite
Varga's own prediction of a
forthcoming Western depression,
that capitalism might escape a
final collapse entirely by
making certain modifications
in its basic structure. Varga's
critics, both professional and
party, were quick to seize on
these heretical propositions,
and he was finally forced to
recant publicly in early 1949.
In October 1952, Stalin
authoritatively set forth the
Soviet view of the capitalist
world economy in his Economic
Problems of Socialism in t e
R. The major prem a of
this analysis was that the
tide of Communist territorial
expansion was ebbing temporarily
as a result of the partial
stabilization and consolidation
of capitalism. Stalin's
emphasis on the internal and
external "contradictions" in
the capitalist world system
placed the development and ag-
gravation of a capitalist eco-
nomic crisis in the indeterminate
future. The tone of the article
was essencially one of "ultimate"
events and of situations in the
contemporary world which would
not continue "forever and ever."
View Since 1953
The main stream of Soviet
thought since 1953 on the capi-
talist world economy had con-
tinued to follow the course
established during Stalin's
last years. Although the
majority of economists followed
the dictates of orthodoxy, sorme,
particularly those of high stand-
ing, skirted along heretical
grounds in their efforts to
report accurately and honestly
the realities of capitalist
economies. Despite criticism
by their colleagues, these men
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 14
 Approved FoQJQJe
a 2005/ R XRDP79-0092 A7 000 7 0150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
did not back down, nor were
they silenced officially.
The book by Varga on capi-
talist economies, published in
August 1953 and acclaimed as an
"outstanding comprehensive work,"
reflected these trends partic-
ularly well since it was mainly
written prior to Stalin's death,
but undoubtedly revised there-
after'. While parroting most of
the stereotyped themes of post-
war official dogma on capitalism,
Varga raised an issue which has
since become the subject of
lively debate and the central
problem of current Soviet thought
on capitalism--the question of
the effects of rearmament on
capitalist economies. .
Varga challenged the
.Stalinist propositions that
rearmament in capitalist states--
as in the USSR where full em-
ployment of resources is planrd
--leads directly and immediate-
ly to a reduction of nonmili-
tary-production and personal
consumption. He declared that
military production under capi-
talism, particularly in the
United States, supplements rath-
er than competes with other in-
dustrial sectors. While other
contemporary Soviet economists
accept the thesis that rearma-
ment leads to a temporary up-
swing in the business cycle,
they denied Varga's view that
military production supplement-
ed industrial- production.
Despite Varga's obvious
heresy, wh is h would negate
the 'theory of the destructive
PART III
consequences of rearmament on
,capitalism, he has not yet been
officially criticized. An open
debate, the first real one in
many years, continues to rage
among Soviet economists:..
Possible Change in Views
The only recent exception
to the failure of Soviet econ-
omists to fix a firm date for
the onset of a new Western cri-
sis was a prediction in Septem
ber 1955 by the economist A.
Bechin that a depression might
begin in the United States "in
a few months."
Writing in the journal
Problems of Economics, Bechin
argued that threebas c factors
had stimulated production and
postponed the beginning of a
major depression in America
since World War II: the main-
tenance of a high level, of
military output, particularly
since 1950; the large overseas
markets available to the United
States after 1945 as a result
of wartime devastation in
Europe; and the.large invest-
ment needs of American industry
which had accumulated during
the war years of maximum em-
phasis on production and min-
imum attention-,to replacement
of worn-out equipment and
facilities.
Bechin concluded that
these special conditions were
coming to apply less and less
to the American economy, and
a depression might begin, even
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 14
 Approved Fc we 2005/02A?CCTf-RDP79-009274AW00150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
"in a few months." While
drawing his predictions in
fairly sharp terms, however,
he ended his article by calling
for further serious investiga-
tion of the subject.
Although Bechin made a
general denial of Varga's
theoretical point that mili-
tary production supplements
rather than reduces total in-
dustrial output, he pursued
the same course in treating
militarization as the Primary
source of postwar American in-
dustrial modernization and
capital expansion.
While he argued that there
was little prospect for expand-
ing American exports and capi-
tal investment in the near fu-
ture, he failed to mention the
future outlook for military
production. Hence, it is
reasonable to infer from Be-
chin's healthy regard for the
stimulating economic effects
of US military production that
he predicated his estimate of
an approaching economic crisis
on the assumption that defense
expenditures would soon decline.
Importance of Foreign Trade
In addition, the heavy
stress placed by Bechin on the
importance of foreign trade to
Western economies indicates a
belief that the capitalist
world market may in the future
become a critical arena, con-
ditioning the development of a
Western economic crisis. The
tour of Khrushchev and Bulganin
through Asia highlights recent
events which suggest that
Stalin's successors are convinced
economic policy can be used to
reduce the areas of Western
influence and even to exacerbate
the internal difficulties in
capitalist economies.
Even though Bechin's views
have not been reiterated in So-
viet propaganda, they appear to
reflect the thinking of in-
fluential elements in the So-
viet hierarchy.
Two previous works by this
author have acted as harbingers
of shifts in Soviet domestic
policies and propaganda. In
April 1953, Bechin intimated
that Marxist theory permitted
a narrowing of the gap between
the growth rate for consumer
industry and heavy industry in
the USSR, four months before
Malenkov's public announcement
of the "new course." In July
1954, six months before the
return to unopposed priority
for heavy industry, he harshly
criticized those economists
who were arguing that the
growth of consumer industry
should exceed that of heavy
industry during the "transition
to Communism."
Although Khrushchev, at
the party congress, failed to
adopt Bechin's specific predic-
tion of the outbreak of the
expected capitalist crisis, his
analysis followed the same
lines as Bechin's. He prob-
ably felt it both unnecessary
and risky to associate himself
publicly with such a specula-
tive pronouncement.
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 14
 Approved Fot- Ieeaase 2005/0 48 PL4 RDP79-00927PQ 0150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
WEST GERMAN POLICY TOWARD EAST GERMANY AND THE USSR
West Germany is faced
with strong inducements for
dealing with the Soviet Union
and East Germany: the desire
for national unification or,
failing this, for contacts with
the East German population;
the necessity to cope with
East German demands respecting
access to Berlin; and a moderate
desire for trade with the East.
It has been apparent for some
time that a large proportion
of West Germans would accept
neutrality in return for unity,
and there is a growing disposi-
tion to deal with the East
Germans. Nevertheless, the
Bonn government does not pres-
ently appear inclined to enter
unilateral negotiations with
Moscow or to recognize East
Germany.
It is the consensus of
all West German political
parties and all sections of
the press that German unifica-
tion is the first order of
public business. The persist-
ence of this theme is apparent
despite the impression left by
the Geneva. foreign ministers'
conference last fall that Mos-
cow will not permit unification
on any terms in the foreseeable
future.
Chancellor Adena.uer warned
the Bundestag in December that
repeated German cries for unifi-
cation were apt to weary the
Allies,,who had other problems.
Nevertheless, on the occasion
of Prime Minister Eden's trip
to Washington, the Bonn govern-
ment was moved to ask once more
that the German problem be kept
at the top of diplomatic
priorities.
There is no doubt, either,
but that Adenauer intends for
Ambassador Haas, when he reaches
Moscow, to explore the unifica-
tion question with Soviet offi-
cials. Adenauer, however,
makes a clear distinction be-
tween exploratory conversations--
which are acceptable under the
terms of the Paris treaties-
a.nd a bilateral "deal" with the
USSR--which is not.
Relations With Moscow
The two men most likely
to succeed Adenauer, if he
should depart from the scene
before the national elections
in the summer of 1957, are
Foreign Minister Heinrich von
Brentano and Finance Minister
Fritz Schaeffer. Both are
strongly pro-Western, are
clos.1.v associated with Ade-
na.uer's. policies, and would
probably head a, government very
similar to Adenauer's. There
is no doubt, however, that
lacking the enormous prestige
which Adenauer enjoys, they
would have more difficulty
coping with superficial offers
from Moscow.
Political rather than
economic considerations are
likely to be controlling in
Bonn's relations with Moscow.
The prospect of unification is
far more compelling than that
of commercial benefits. There
are, to be sure, some vociferous
businessmen who see a: future in
Eastern trade, and business and
industry generally are always
on the lookout for profitable
contracts wicn the East. Most
West German businessmen, how
ever, do not anticipate big
markets in the East, chiefly
because the Orbit record on
exports and payments is poor
and is not expected to improve
materially.
The Bonn coalition dispute
of the past two months was
touched off when Thomas Dehler,
chairman of the coalition Free
Democrats, remarked that Bonn
should negotiate on. unification
with Moscow. Althou;h .DelAlr
later explained that he as-
sumed, of,course, the fullest
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 14
 Approved For,Rel a 2005I &WR -RDP79-00927A 0007JJ0150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
consultation with the Western
powers, who retain authority
in unification matters, Adenauer
was sufficiently disturbed to
demand, and receive, a, renewed
statement of the Free Democrats'
loyalty to the Paris treaties.
The difficulties which the Free
Democrats are giving Adenauer
in North Rhine-Westphalia, do
not arise from a dispute over
foreign policy.
Neutrality
While the West Germans are
not likely to negotiate behind
the backs of the Western powers,
they might be willing to ac-
cept neutrality if agreed on
in Western councils. The op-
position Social Democratic
Party (SPD) has consistently
advocated West German with-
drawal from NATO, and public
opinion polls in 1955 showed a
rising percentage, in fact a
plurality, in favor of with-
drawal if unification could be
achieved in that way.
Nevertheless, neutrality is
not now a burning issue in the
Federal Republic, since even
SPD leaders acknowledge pri-
vately that Moscow would not
consent to German unity on any
terms, because of the effect
it would have on the Satellites.
While patriotic considera-
tions make it impossible for
any speaker in West Germany to-
day to oppose unification,
there is considerable private
awareness of the economic bur-
den that would be placed on
West Germany's prosperity by
amalgamating with the economy
of East Germany.
Relations With East Germany
Though the diplomacy of
1955 closed the door on German
unification, it also intensi-
fied West German interest in
East Germany. Bonn has three
main policies toward East
Germany. First is the policy
of nonrecognition, on the
grounds that the regime of the
German Democratic Republic
(GDR) has no foundation in
popular consent. Second is the
policy of maintaining contact
with the East German people to
bolster morale, preserve cul-
tural unity, and render aid.
Third is the policy of main-
taining interzonal trade be-
cause it is profitable.
If unity is impossible,
many West Germans think rela-.
tions with the East German
population will have to be
stepped up, otherwise a whole
generation of Germans will be
lost to the West.' Moreover,
there is growing sentiment, not
as yet exploited by the politi-
cal parties, that unification
itself might be discussed with
East Germany,. The All-German
Affairs Ministry in Bonn would
like to promote a free inter-
zonal exchange of books, maga-
zines, motion pictures, and
radio programs, but the chances
of East German co-operation
are slim. The exchange of
trade union delegations and
youth groups has not been sa.tis-
.factory to the West Germans
and will probably be approached
more cautiously in the future.
Last November the Federal.
Republic and the GDR agreed on
an all-German team for the 1956
Olympics. The American embassy
commented that the arrangement
appeared in microcosm to be
just the type of rapprochement
advocated by East German lead-
ers.
Bona's best hope of pre-
serving contact, however, lies
in the literally millions of
unorganized interzonal travel-
ers.. To increase the visits
of last Germans, Bonn is con-
sidering a plan to subsidize
railway travel.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of. 14
 Approved For Release 200%FV/ IA-RDP79-002 0700150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
"Technical" Contacts
Apart from cultural con-
tacts, employees of the East
.and West German governments
have for many years met to deal
with mutual problems of inter-
zonal trade, rail and water
traffic, and postal service.
They usually operate, however,
not as governmental officials,
but as "technicians." A Social
Democratic demand during the
Geneva conference for a large-
scale expansion of technical
contacts was voted down by all
other Bonn parties, and Foreign
.Minister Von Brentano has since
taken the position that such
contacts should be enlarged
only where a need for them is
shown.
The minor German Party,
the Refugee Party, and some
elements of the SPD found Molo-
tov's Geneva proposal of an
all-German council attractive,
although they would modify it
to make quite a different in-
strument from that intended by
the Soviet foreign minister.
Molotov suggested a council of
an equal number of West and
East Germans, appointed by their
governments, to deal with all
mutual affairs, including the
preparation of unifications. The
West Germans, however, would
prefer an elected council with
representation according to the
population of the two Germa.nies
(nearly 3 to 1 in favor of the
West).
Bonn's policy of diplomat-
ic aloofness from the East Ger-
man government has seemed to
be in increasing peril over
the past ten months, particu-
larly since Moscow granted the
East Germans a treaty of sov-
ereignty in September. The rea.-
son for this is not any popular
pressure in West Germany to
recognize the East German regimes
but the political leverage which
the latter has through its capa-
bility of harassing West Berlin's
lifelines. The East German
government has already tried to
lure Bonn into ministerial dis-
cussions to protect first truck
and then barge traffic from
West Germany to Berlin. Neither
attempt has been successful, but
Bonn fully expects further
efforts.
Meetings of East and West
German cabinet ministers would
not necessarily be followed by
an exchange of ambassadors, but
Bonn is nevertheless anxious to
avoid ministerial contacts or
any action that would add to the
political prestige of the East
German government. It has, in
fact, threatened political re-
taliation against any non-Orbit
country which might recognize
East Germany.
At the same time, the Bonn
government knows it may be in a.
fairly desperate situation over
Berlin access problems unless it
gets the fullest possible sup-
port from its Western Allies.
For this reason, a joint West
German, AAmerican, British, and
French group has been set up in
Bonn to meet regularly and con-
sider the problems of dealing
with East German pressure. Bonn
is unlikely to take any important
action that has not been ap-
proved by this group.
The Bonn government recog-
nizes, too, that resistance to
the East German maneuvers may
entail economic sacrifice, since
the stoppage or curtailment of
interzonal trade is the most ob-
vious form of counterpressure.
Bonn, however, will resort to
trade curtailment only if hard
pressed, since this counter-
measure, used halfheartedly last
summer in the Berlin truck tolls
case, was ineffective and caused
much dissatisfaction in business
circles.
Despite the complexity of
relations with East Germany and
the desire for unification, there
are no indications that Bonn is
contemplating a special deal with
Moscow, or that it will recog
nize the East German regime.
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 14
 25X6 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
 Approved For Release 20051 t i-RDP79-0092 00150001-0 .
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
25X6
CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN 1955
Peiping's program for the
modernization of its armedforces
made considerable progress in
1955. Now in possession of a
ground force equal in size to
that of the Soviet Union
and the world's fourth largest
a.ir. force, the Chinese-Com-
munists, with continuing and
substantial Soviet assistance,
are..growing in military power.
Peiping's greatest military
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 14
 Approved For BWWe 2005/02/5 'i1DP79-00927AA0000700150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
priorities have been devoted to
the preparation of offensive and
defensive facilities in the
coastal area opposite Taiwan
and the offshore islands.
TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION
23 FEBRUARY 1956
ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIR-
CRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES
MAY BE USABLE BY JETS
4
HANKOW
A4k
HUAINING e
H U P~ E H '- WUHU
NANKIN
KIANGSU
28 CHANGSHA
HENGYANG TROOPS
Q
26
K 'W A N GT U N G
'CANTON CHENGHAI T A W I W PA N
SWATOw 300,000
PENGHU HIAn
,I
xX -
FOO
r-,.
,x
i-
CHANGTING* L
L I
F HENG
-~\ KAOCHI HUIAN
1 UNGCHI CHINGYANG
r k, MACHIANG*
QUEMOY
189,000 Y 77 000
?SHKOU
Hong Kong
22 /
IN_
ort.)
50 100 150
0 50 10,0
1 0
STATUTE MILES
PRIMARY AIRFIELD
CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN
AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY
GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.
-'---!--++- RAILROAD
+t++--1-. t PROPOSED RAILROAD
SECRET
UNKNOWN
-12,000
* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE
OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPER-
ATIONS AT PRESENT.
e%`4JNGSHAN
A W, ,
ILAN
HSINCHU
PWGTUNG )~.
The greatest single factor
in the growth of the air force
from an estimated 1,600 planes
SECONDARY AIRFIELD
AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES
OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE.
RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN
5000 FEET.
I
-Yingtan . _ r 29
WENCHOW 6
y r y JUtan
JF.QCHIENOU*
Napping
-,v-?
CHbW
Growth of Power
MATSUS
18,000
PART III Approved For Ref p5/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
~A~S AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 14
 Approved ForrRRel se 2005/0$EC RDP79-00927AA000 00150001-0
-44W 4W
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 Felbruary 1956
at the outset of 1955 to about
2,150 by the end of the year
derived from the USSR's evacua-
tion of its military forces
from the Port Arthur Naval Base
in May. Some 240 jet fighters
and close to 100 jet light bomb-
ers were transferred to the
Chinese at that time.
It is believed that the
Chinese also received at that
time four submarines, a sub-
marine tender, and about 50
torpedo boats, together with
a few other miscellaneous ves-
sels which had been based at
Port Arthur. Other transfers
of Soviet equipment to the Chi-
nese in 1955 include jet light
bombers, four submarines, two
destroyers and 1.2 subchasers.
Large supplies of avia-
tion fuel and equipment ar-
rived in China throughout the
year. Moreover, the first ap-
pearance of MIG-17 (FRESCO) jet
fighters at Chinese bases and
the conversion of piston fighter
units to jets during 1955 show
that jet fighter shipments to
China have not stopped.
Navy
In line with the navy's
primary mission of coastal de-
fense, the Chinese Communists
seem intent on increasing the
number of their patrol and es-
cort vessels and submarines.
Since 1952, Chinese, shipyards
in Shanghai and Dairen have been
turning out numbers of small,
steel-hulled patrol craft and
landing craft types, and,
I I rigate-type vessels
may be under construction in
Shanghai.
Information is scant on
the extent of Soviet aid to
Chinese ground forces, but the
continued modernization and re-
organization of ground units
clearly indicates that such aid
has not been lacking.
Chinese Communist ground
forces, currently estimated at
about 2,500,000, remained at
about the same level in 1955,
but reorganization and moderni-
zation has resulted in greater
combat efficiency. Widespread
construction and improvement of
road and rail networks in all
areas of China is gradually
helping to overcome the logis-
tical shortcomings and lack of
mobility of Chinese troops.
Peiping during 1955 con-
tinued to move to centralize
authority over its troops in
the field. Previously sub-
ordinate to powerful area com-
manders, armies and divisions
are now under increasing con-
trol from Peiping itself, and
there seems less chance of any
significant army dissidence in
local areas.
A conscription law, first
formulated in late 1954, was
put in full operation in 1955,
and the military forces are
no longer dependent on the old
"volunteer" system. The new
draft program is also aimed at
the establishment of a trained
reserve and an eventual cut in
the size of the standing army.
In the fall of 1955, Peiping
announced a new system of ranks
for the armed forces. Based on
the Soviet system, the rank pro-
gram replaced the old concept
of an army of coequal "revolu-
tionary comrades." Discipline
and control will almost cer-
tainly be enhanced.
Disposition of Power
Ground Forces: The only
known major changes in the
disposition of Chinese army
units in 1955 involved the
withdrawal from North Korea
of four armies and other, small-
er units totaling about 215,000
troops. Ground force strength
in Korea now amounts to about
345,000 as compared to almost
900,000 at the peak of the war.
One of the four armies withdrawn
last year is now located in
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 14
 Approved For,.Ie) a 2005/0i/ PATRDP79-009277AA000007700150001-0
lftw
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
Manchuria.; the locations of
the other three have not yet
been determined.
Infantry strength in the
coastal areas between Canton
and Shanghai, the coastal belt
from which any assaults against
the Nationalists would be
mounted,rem ained substantially
the same. However, the movement
of support and service units to
this area in 1955 has greatly
increased Communist capability
for moves against the Na.tional-
ists.. There are an estimated
610,000 troops in this re ion
and
strength may have been
in recent months.
this
augmented
The Chinese continue to
maintain close to 600,000 troops
in North China. and Manchuria..
These forces are in positions
for a, quick return to Korea. in
the event of a renewal of hos-
tilities there.
Approximately 300,000
troops based in the vast and re-
mote regions cxf the Southwest and
.Lvorthwest Ci. iiia. areas are used
chiefly for agricultural and
construction tasks.
There are about 190,000
troops in units whose locations
are not known.
Naval Forces: Despite the
transfers of submarines and
destroyers from the USSR to
the Chinese, the strength of
the navy remains relatively
insignificant in terms of modern
naval power. Of considerable
importance, however, is the
fact that during 1955, Chinese
Communist naval strength sur-
passed that of the Nationalists.
Their four destroyers and
all 13 of their submarines re-
main at the major naval bases
at Tsingtao and Dairen or Port
Arthur, well to the north of
the Taiwan Strait. The 20-odd
frigates, larger gunboats, and
larger conventional landing
craft are located in the Port
Arthur area.,
Tsingtao,
Shanghai
and Canton.
Only small
coastal
vessels with
extremely
limited
firepower are based at
ports
in the Taiwan
Strait.
The Chinese Communist navy's
employment of its limited force
has been cautious during the past
year. The submarines have been
training in waters in the im-
mediate vicinity of Tsingtao,
and most destroyer training has
been reported in the same area.
Recently, however, two of the
destroyers have made interarea.
voyages to Dairen and Shanghai.
Operations north from Canton
and south from Shanghai have
increased gradually, but Com-
munist ships have refrained from
challenging the Nationalist navy,
and there have been no exchanges
of naval strength between northern
and southern bases.
With the acquisition of
more modern ships and trained
crews, and with continued de-
velopment of better ports and
base facilities in the Taiwan
Strait area, the navy is likely
to assume a, more aggressive role.
It will probably take time to
develop these capabilities, how-
ever. In the immediate future,
offensive action against the Na-
tionalist navy in the Taiwan
Strait will probably involve
the use of torpedo boats, which
the Communists used with sur-
prising success a year ago dur-
ing action around the Ta.chen
Islands.
Air Force: In possession
of close to 1,100 jet fighters--
about half the total strength
of the air and naval air forces
--Peiping has concentrated
chiefly on developing capabili-
ties for a. strong defense of
the mainland. Improved radars
are being placed in. use at
strategic coastal points, and
various intercept tactics have
been tried by fighter units.
The Chinese, despite gradual im-
provement, still exhibit a, lack
of proficiency in air defense,
however.
SECRET
PART I I I Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 13 of 14
 Approved Fo 1 e 2005/0L/ PATRDP79-009207 0150001-0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1956
The Chinese have about 300
jet light bombers, which form
the nucleus of a strong tactical
bombardment force. This bomber
force is backed by about 250
obsolescent piston light bombers
and 10 TU-4 (BULL) B-29 type,
long-range bombers.
The strongest concentration
of air units is in the area.. be-
tween Shanghai and Canton, where
there are now about 870 planes,
including 655 jet fighters,. 100
piston fighters, 65 jet light
bombers, and 50 piston light
bombers. Of the 870, 605 are
based in a quadrangle of bases,
which includes Shanghai, Wuhu,
Chuhsien, and Luchiao. The
jet bombers arrived in this
area for the first time in April
1955, and there was a gradual
increase in jet fighter
strength during the year.
MIG's operate from Luchiao
for combat patrols of the South-
east China. coast as far ,south as
Matsu. For defense of the Swatow
area., the Communists depend on
jet fighter units from Canton.
The region between Swa.tow and
Foochow is not currently defend-
ed by Communist aircraft, and
Nationalist reconnaissance
flights in this area. are ma.ae
regularly. Should the Communists
decide to occupy new airfields,
which have been completed in the
Taiwan Strait area.,, however,
they will be in position to
cover the last gap in coastal
air defenses.
Other significa.nt.c.oncen
trat16ns of Communist air units
are-in Manchuria, where there
are some 360 jet fighters and
about 175 jet light bombers=,
A lesser grouping of,air units,
including jet fighters, is lo-
cated in.area's?-hear Peiping.
Preparations Opposite Taiwan
Having forced the Chinese
Nationalists to evacuate their
forces from the Tachen and
Nanchishan Islands in February
1955, the Communists had elimi-
nated the last Nationalist
strongholds from the Chekiang
coast; and they began emphasiz-?
ing improvement of facilities in
Fukien Province, directly op-
posite Taiwan and the offshore
islands of Matsu and Quemoy.
The most important single
development was the beginning
of construction of some nine
airfields along the coast, all
of them suitable for jet air-
craft operations. Four are
ready for use now, but none is
occupied. Two others in Chek-
iang Province--Chuhsien and
Luchiao--were completed and
occupied by air units.
Another major project is
the construction of Fukien's
first rail-line--from the
Shanghai-Canton line to Amoy.
Eight of the 11 known Chinese
military railway construction
divisions are working on the
line, and it may be completed
this year. Peiping may regard
completion of this line as es-
sential for major military opera-
tions in the area. Essential
improvements to.the.. road ..network
were completed in 1955, and sup-
ply problems have been eased.
More roads are scheduled for con-
struction in Fukien this year.
New and better radars em-
placed at critical points along
the east coast were noted dur-
ing the summer, and MIG's from
Luchiao have recently begun
making patrol sweeps to the
Matsu area in defense against
Nationalist overflights.
There has been a continuous
:increase in' the number of
artillery positions, artillery
weapons, and antiaircraft guns
along the coast, and there has
been considerable effort to
build defensive strongpoints
along the coastal beaches and
on small offshore islands held
by the Communists.
There are no indications
that attacks against the Nation-
alist-held offshore islands are
imminent.
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 14 of 14
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700150001-0