CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 16, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For. Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00WJA000 14tlg1-1
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY.
SUMMARY
~o~FIDEN
COPY NO. 19
OCI NO. 0058/56
16 February 1956
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
f
.
. i
DECLASSIFIED
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUV% NR7,
25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25X1
State Department review completed
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
 Approved Folease 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-0092000700140001-1
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/02fgk-XDP79-009A000700140001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 February 1956
NT
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
25X1
KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH
AT THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS . ... . . . . . . . . . . Page I
Confidence in the strength of the Communist world
and in its inevitable triumph over capitalism was the
dominant tone in Khrushchev's six-hour report to the
20th Party Congress on 14 February. The fact that he
spoke authoritatively on a wide range of topics, including
basic doctrinal issues, and the appointment of many of
his proteges to guiding bodies of the congress, reflect
his position as "first among equals" in the Soviet regime.
Khrushchev's speech gave a strong impetus to two of the
major aims of Soviet policy--diplomatic and economic
intervention in the Middle East and South Asia, and the
development of closer relationships with the inter-
national Socialist movement.
USSR ASSERTS VITAL INTEREST
IN MIDDLE EAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Soviet Foreign Ministry, in a statement on
13 February, asserted a vital interest in Middle
Eastern issues and demanded a voice in their settlement.
Referring to the Eisenhower-Eden declaration, the
statement condemned any "independent action" outside
the UN Security Council and without the consent of the
states involved. Such intervention would create
"dangerous friction and tension"' in the area, according
to Moscow.
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The tension over the Banat Yacov canal issue has
relaxed somewhat as a result of actions taken by both
the Arabs and Israel. The retreat by both sides from
positions they had assumed a short time ago suggests
that neither the Arabs, particularly Egypt, nor the
Israelis desire a war now.
25X1
25X1
1
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For Release 2005/02T1~:k-kDP79-0092000700140001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 February 1956
ALGERIAN IMPASSE
THREATENS FRENCH GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The deadlock on Algeria is encouraging right-wing
elements in France who had resigned themselves to
accepting large concessions in Tunisia and Morocco. As
a result, Premier Mollet's position is weakened, and
he will have difficulty postponing divisive internal
issues. Labor is preparing a broad campaign on wage
concessions, and pressure is being renewed in the National
Assembly for an early airing of the church school
question.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet Overtures to European Socialists: Since last fall,
Soviet leaders have made overtures. in one form
or another to at least seven of Europe's Socialist
parties. These overtures are designed to overcome
Socialist opposition to Communist proposals for
"popular fronts" and electoral alliances. The
USSR may also hope to generate American doubts
about the reliability of Socialist-led NATO govern-
ments in France, Norway and Denmark.
Page 1 25X1
25X6
Saar Negotiations'-French and German officials
Are sdhedu a to resume negotiations on the Saar
on 20 February. The French will probably agree
in principle to the eventual political reunion
of the Saar with Germany--provided French economic
interests in the area are protected and Germany
makes certain other economic concessions favoring
SECRET
Page 3
ii
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 SECRET
Approved Fcelease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927000700140001-1
16 February 1956
Spain's Internal Difficulties: The recent riots of
University of Madrid students provoked new re-
pressive measures by the government and occasioned
the removal of the education minister and the
minister-secretary of the Falange. The student
demonstrations and other reported discontent in
Spain suggest Franco will tighten controls and
possibly make further cabinet changes.
Cyprus: Governor Harding responded on 14 February to
archbishop Makarios' conditional acceptance of
Britain's policy statement on Cyprus. Harding
wants to begin discussions soon with all elements
of the Cypriot population on general principles
for a constitution which would establish self-
government. Makarios probably will agree to
proceed with discussions, but is likely in their
course to raise new objections.
Page 3
Page 4 25X1
Indian Congress Party Annual Meeting: The annual
meeting of t e Indian Congress Party between
8 and 12 February demonstrated the intense con-
cern of Nehru and other party leaders with
national unity and economic development and with
the maintenance of world peace. A resolution
on the reorganization of state boundaries showed
that major alterations have occurred in the
party's thinking on the 1inquistic states problem
and that Nehru's plan for dividing India into a
few large states is now party policy. The meeting
was marked by bitter attacks on the Baghdad and
SEATO pacts, suggesting that in the near future
they will become major targets of Indian foreign
-policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Pakistan: Pakistan's response to Soviet premier
Bulganin's recent offer of a trade pact suggests
that the Karachi government may be changing its
policy from one of wholehearted co-operation with
the West to one aimed at making Pakistan the
object of Soviet-Western competition. Internally,
the government has gained a temporary respite
following the breakdown of negotiations aimed at
developing joint opposition to the draft consti-
tution. Karachi may face. a new threat, however,
from a competition for power which seems to be
shaping up within the dominant Moslem League.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
SECRET
iii
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-0092A 00700140001-1
16 February 1956
Indonesia: The Indonesian government's unilateral
abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union
on 13 February has little international signifi-
cance, but may improve the domestic prestige of
the moderate Masjumi party and thereby its chances
of participation in the next cabinet. The cabinet
is also considering. again,for domestic political
purposes, abrogation of the economic-financial
agreements with the Netherlands. The parliament
which was elected in September may be installed in
March, and negotiations for a new cabinet may follow
immediately thereafter.
Soviet-Japanese Negotiations Still Stalled: Both sides
in the Soviet-Japanese talks in London were main-
taining their inflexible positions as of 12
February. On 10 February, Malik reiterated the
Soviet offer to return Shikotan and the Habomais,
but flatly stated that this was the absolute limit
of. Soviet territorial concessions, and that further
Japanese discussion on the southern Kurils would
be regarded as deliberate stalling tactics.
Japanese public opinion remains firm behind a
,strong negotiating policy.
Sino-Soviet Bloc Participation in International Trade
Fairs: The 31no-Soviet bloc has sharply increase is
participation in international trade fairs as
part of the effort to expand economic relations
with non-Communist countries, particularly the
countries of the Middle East, Africa, Southeast
Asia and Latin America. In 1955, the bloc
participated in more international fairs and
exhibitions than in all of the four preceding
years, staging 288 exhibits at 149 fairs in 41
countries at an estimated cost of $38,000,000.
F . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 7 25X1
Page 9 25X1
Page 9
New Moves in Soviet Agriculture: Two new agricultural
decrees and related activities suggest a recent
acceleration in the USSR's long-standing campaign
to establish complete state control over agri-
cultural production and food distribution. These
measures also seek to increase total food output,
but in the past, these two aims have frequently
conflicted, with tighter controls provoking a
fall in production. . . Page 10
SECRET
iv
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 World Federation of Trade Unions Looks for New Location:
Officials of the World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU) will probably protest in the International
Labor Organization and in the UN, the banning of
their organization from Vienna. The WFTU will
probably try to relocate somewhere else outside
the iron curtain, but the opposition of Western
European governments may make this impossible. The
WFTU may therefore settle in Prague.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 February 1956
e foreign ministers of the six European Coal-
Steel Community countries who met in Brussels
Approved Felease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-0092000700140001-1
Foreign. Ministers' Conference on European Integration:
on 11 and 12 February made concessions to France
by deciding to proceed with the EURATOM project
without pressing for anything more than a commit-
ment in principle to the common market, and without
insisting that the military uses of nuclear fuels
be renounced in perpetuity. Organizational
planning generally followed the CSC pattern.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 12
Page 12
Peiping Gives New Attention to Agriculture: Peiping
has announced an overly ambitious p 157n to increase
agricultural production by 150 percent during the
next 12 years, but actual prospects are for 20 or
30 percent in view of concurrent announcements
that industrialization will still come first. The
new emphasis on agriculture, however, should enable
farm output at least to keep up with population
growth. I I. . . . . . . . . . Page 13
New Medium-Range Submarine in Production in USSR: A
new class of medium-range submarine, designated
the "Q-class" for intelligence reference, was
apparently put into series production by the USSR
in 1955, when approximately 10 of these vessels
were constructed by the Sudomekh shipyard in
Leningrad. Of the 108 new submarines of all classes
expected to be built in the USSR in 1956, it is
believed that 18 will be ""Q's".
SECRET
v
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Page 15 25X1
 SECRET
Approved Farelease 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-009200700140001-1
16?February 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
PATTERNS OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE NEAR EAST AND
AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
By the use of the political and economic pressures
of "traditional diplomacy," the USSR has acquired a
great-power voice in the Near East, an area which had
previously been under the exclusive influence of the
West. The USSR has formally served notice that it
expects to exercise great-power prerogratives in the
Near East, and indications are that considerable local
support is. developing for increased Soviet participation
in the affairs of the area.
SPAIN'S FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In recent years, Spain has made little effort to
improve its generally cool relations with Western
European countries but has intensively cultivated
countries in the western hemisphere and the Arab world.
In the past few months, there have been rumors that
Franco might resume diplomatic relations with the USSR
and the Satellites.
Page 4
RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . Page o
Having restored the pre-World War II Chinese rail-
way system, the Communists are concentrating on a vast
new rail-line construction program. The Chinese, by
the early 1960's will have four high-capacity, inter-
national rail links with the USSR and rail service with
all areas of China proper. In the absence of dis-
ruption by external attack, this system will substan-
tially reduce the country's historic vulnerability to
the effects of a sea blockade, and will greatly in-
crease Communist logistic and military capabilities.
25X1
25X1
SECRET
vi
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved F elease 2005/03 /brRDP79-00927000700140001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 February 1956
KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH
AT THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS
Confidence in the strength
of the Communist world and in
the inevitability of its final
triumph oTrer capitalism was
the dominant tone in Khrushchev's
six-hour report to the 20th
Party Congress on 14 February.
The fact that he spoke authorita-
tively on a vast number of top-
ics, and the appointment of many'
of his proteges to guiding
bodies of the congress, reflect
his position as "first among
equals" in the Soviet regime.
Khrushchev's speech gave
a strong impetus to two of the
major aims. of Soviet policy--
diplomatic and economic interven-
tion in the Middle East and
South Asia, and the development
of closer relationships with
the international Socialist move-
ment. He also triumphantly re-
viewed the world situati'n,
claiming, sweeping successes for
Soviet foreign pulicy since
Stalin's death and particularly
since the Khrushchev-Bulganin
regime took over in February
1955.
Foreign Policy.
In his statements on for-
eign policy, Khrushchev announced
some major modifications in
Communist doctrines. He asserted
that the transition to socialism
in certain states could be
.brought about by parliamentary
means rather than through acute
class revolutionary struggle.
This modification will appeal
to both European and Asian So-
cialists and will probably be
followed by a major Soviet ef-
fort to establish and exploit
popular fronts in those areas.
Khrushchev also asserted
that there is no "fatal inevita-
bility" of war, since there
exist "mighty social and politi-
cal forces possessing formidable
neans to prevent the imperialists
from unleashing war." This
change in doctrine probably re-
flects a belief on the part
of Soviet leaders that war in
the nuclear age is no longer a
feasible instrument of national.
policy.
Khrushchev's.grouping of
various states in his conclud-
ing statements on the aims of
Soviet foreign policy reflects
the USSR's estimate of how world
power is aligned and where new
gains in influence can most
easily be made. He groupedInd:a,
Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt and
Syria as states that stand for
peace together with the neutrals,
Finland and Austria. He included
"peace-loving" non-Communist
states of the Afro-Asian area
along with the Sino-Soviet bloc
in a vast "zone of peace" which
plays a decisive role in world
affairs. In another category
he grouped the Western powers,
Western Germany,"Japan, Italy,
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan as
countries with which the USSR
should attempt to improve its
relations.
Khrushchev's remarks con-
tained the first endorsement
of a ban on thermonuclear weap-
ons tests by a top-level Soviet
leader. Otherwise there were
no new proposals on major East-
West issues.. He merely reiter-
ated the well-defined Soviet
positions on disarmament and
collective security in Europe.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700140001-1
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 5
 Approved F lease 2005/OBC -RDP79-009 7? 000700140001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 February 1956
Tie identified collective secu -
rity in Asia as the third major
pruolem to be solved, but did
not spell out any Sino-Soviet
position on it.
The speech re-emphasized
the regime's assurances of
"Socialist legality" and its
determination to maintain "prop-
er control by the party and
government over the work of the
state security agencies." Khru-
shchev's statement on the party
leadership, pointing out that
"the collective is not bound by
personal relations or mutual
advantage," is probably intended
as an assurance that collective
leadership is now a fixture in
the Soviet system.
Khrushchev stated that
Soviet Communist Party member-
ship is now 7,215,030. This
figure corrects the round number
of 8,000,000 he used in a speech
in India last December. The
increase in membership of over
330,000 since the 19th Party
Congress means that the number
of party members is growing pro-
portionally to the growth in
population any. continues to
comprise about 3 percent of tha
total population.
On questions of ideology,
Khrushchev stressed what the
party press has been saying
insistently in recent months--
-that theory cannot be divorced
.from practice. He indicated
that this criticism is directed
against those party members
who complain when they are
"diverted from so-called pure
party work" to the study of
economics and technology. In
short, Khrushchev insists on
a pragmatic approach in party
work, as he did in foreign policy.
Khrushchev mentioned the
"false claim" that the USSR has
"laid only the foundation of
socialism." This appears to have
been a s: