CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700120001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 2, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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IDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN CLASS" LJ
f DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
2 February 1956
CONFIDENTIAL
State Department review completed
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COPY NO. 9
OCI NO. 0056/56
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION _ AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The 'Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY.SUMMARY
2 February 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
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BULGANIN-EISENHOWER.EXCHANGE . . . . . . . . . Page 1
As of 1 February, the President's reply to
Bulganin's note had not been published in the Soviet
Union. Bulganin's proposal described by Moscow radio
on 29 January as the "Geneva spirit in action," appears
to have been conceived as a move to persuade world
opinion that the USSR is upholding the Geneva spirit,
while the United States is opposing Soviet efforts to
relax tensions and improve relations with the West.
Soviet foreign minister Molotov's remark in Prague
on 28 January, that he could not understand how anyone
could reject a friendship treaty, probably indicates
the line Moscow will take on President Eisenhower's
THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . .
reply.
The French assembly's 420-71 vote investing Guy
Mollet is a recognition that a long delay in forming a
cabinet would be fruitless since no enduring majority
can be formed in the present parliament. Mollet is
considered an interim premier by all except his own
Socialists,but the strategy he has announced of con-
centrating on a limited number of issues may compensate
for the lack of a stable majority for any long-range
program, and may enable him to retain power much longer
than anticipated.
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION .
The military build-up of Israel and the Arab states
has not slackened. While it is probable that neither
side intends to launch major hostilities in the immediate
25X1 future,
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Israelis might lead Tel Aviv eventually to take uni-
lateral military action against one or more of its
neighboring Arab states.
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2 February 1956
SOVTr.T BLOC MAY MAKE ISSUE
OF AIR-SPACE VIOLATIONS , .
Page 4
There were signs last week that the USSR may plan
to make an issue of alleged violations of Soviet and
Satellite territory by American aircraft and balloons.
This would be in line with the principal theme of
Soviet propaganda in recent months that the United
States is attempting to bury the Geneva spirit.
USSR Suggests Quick Settlement With Japan: The four-
point Soviet proposal to Japan, reported by the
Japanese press on 27 January, is the USSR's first
direct attempt to obtain a settlement with the
Japanese along the lines of the agreement reached
with West Germany last summer. The approach appar-
ently was designed to strengthen pressures within
the Hatoyama government to force a speedy settle-
ment,
Warsaw Pact Conference: The recent meeting in Prague
of the poi.I a consultative committee of the
Warsaw pact apparently was staged primarily to im-
press the West with the unity and strength of the
Soviet bloc and to provide a platform for the
reiteration of Soviet attitudes toward such ques-
tions as European security and the German problem.
East Germany was formally enrolled as a full con-
sultative and military member, and two permanent
organizations--attached to the political committee--
were established with representatives from all
member states: (1) a standing committee to draft
recommendations or questions of foreign policy;
(2) a joint secretariat. F_ I . . . Paget
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Personnel Shifts in the USSR: The recent appointment
o N.P. Dudorov to rep ace S.N. Kruglov as the
Soviet Union's internal affairs minister and the
appointment of N.A. Yasnov, former mayor of Moscow,
as premier of the Russian republic (RSFSR), are the
latest in the series of personnel changes apparently
effected by Khrushchev in order to increase his
control of the party's central. committee on the eve
of the 20th Party Congress, . . . Page 3 25X1
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2 February 1956
USSR Announces Fulfillment of 1955 Plan: The Soviet
economy grew at about the same rate in 1955 as in
1954 and substantially fulfilled plans for its
growth both for 1955 and for the Fifth Five-Year
Plan. The situation of the consumer; however, im-
proved less in 1955 than in any of the previous
four years. . . . . . . . Page 4
Informal Soviet Boasts Exaggerate Economic Prospects:
In informal conversations at diplomatic receptions,
top Soviet leaders have recently made exaggerated
claims about the economic prospects of the USSR.
Although the substantial economic growth charted
in the Sixth Five-Year Plan is likely to be
achieved in most respects, these informal claims
by Khrushchev, Kaganovich and Saburov concerned
agricultural provisions of the plan not likely
to be carried out fully or rapid rates of devel-
opment not even contemplated in the plan. This
unrealistic show of optimism probably was intended
to impress non-Communist countries, particularly
in underdeveloped areas, with the strength of the
Soviet system and its ability to match the West
in economic competition. I I. . . Page
Shinsuke Kishi Slated for Prime Minister of Japan:
Shinsuke -is i s expected by influential Japanese
political leaders to succeed Ichiro Hatoyama as
the next prime minister of Japan. He believes
Japan should co-operate with the United States,
but he will seek by tough bargaining to gain terms
most advantageous to Japan.
Burma-China Border Conference Scheduled: Burma has
invited local Ci-inese Communist o ficials in
Yunnan to attend a conference to be held in early
February ostensibly to draft regulations regarding
movements of the border peoples across the frontier.
Its main purpose, however, probably is to impress
Peiping with Burma's determination to maintain
sovereignty over its border areas in impending
boundary negotiations in Peiping.
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2 February 1956
Chou. En-tai Requests Conference on Indochina: Chou En-
Mims request for a new conference on Indochina
apparently marks the beginning of a considerably
expanded. Communist diplomatic and propaganda effort
to force a new approach to the question of Vietnamts
unification. The Communists may hope for a deal
whereby a postponement of all-Vietnam elections
would be accepted in return for agreement on greater
economic co-operation between the two zones and
neutralization of the area as a whole. The setting
of a date for assembly elections in the south
(4 March) has brought an intensification of Viet
Minh propaganda attacks. I. . . . . Page 8 25X1
Afghanistan: Both Afghanistan and the USSR are quickly
moving toward detailed planning for use of the
$100,000,000 Soviet credit. The Afghans are now
apparently willing to consider Soviet construction
projects in the south as well as other parts of
the country. Relations with Pakistan. remain un-
changed' preparations are being made for the meet-
ing in May between King Zahir Shah and Pakistan's
Governor. General Mirza.
. Page 9 25X1
North Africa: Rebel activities have been stepped
up considerably in French Morocco and remain
at a high level in Algeria. Agitation con-
tinues in Spanish Morocco, where Spain has an-
nounced a reform of the government is impending.
In Tunisia, the government has acted to sup-
press the activities of nationalist extremist'
Salah ben Youssef.
. . ? . . . . Page 11 25X1
Greek Elections: The prospects of Prime Minister
Karamanlis' party in the 19 February Greek
parliamentary elections depend largely on whether
the opposition Communist-controlled Popular Front
can maintain its cohesion.
. Page 13 25X1
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Cyprus: The apparent lessening of Archbishop Makarios'
opposition to Britain's latest formula for a
provisional settlement of the Cyprus issue is not
likely to hasten a permanent solution. Agreement
on the formula would merely be a temporary truce
in the continuing struggle over the union of Cyprus
with Greece.
Eas t
Germans Try
to Halt Flow of Refugees: The East
German government is taking new psychological
measures to stem the continuing exodus from East
Germany. The flow of refugees into West Berlin
alone has averaged 3,500 a week since Christmas.
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Guatemalan Government Faces Domestic Opposition: A
snake-up in top Guatemalan army positions was
capped on 28 January with the arrest of the former
chief of staff on the charge of implication in an
antigovernment plot. Public dissatisfaction with
the regime continues, and there is a possibility
that important urban middle-class and labor groups
may become alienated.
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE PARTY CONGRESS IN THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM . . Page
The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, scheduled to convene on 14 February,
will be used by the regime for presenting its definitive
report on foreign and domestic policy and the current
status of the party. Authoritative pronouncements on
ideological questions will probably also be included.
In addition, the congress will elect a new central
committee, the membership of which will actually have
been decided beforehand by higher authority. The
composition of the central committee will register the
results of political maneuvering behind-the scenes and
indicate the standing of the various leaders.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 February 1956
GROWTH OF TRANSPORT AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES IN EAST
CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?> Page 4
The Chinese Communists are continuing work on a
long-term plan, initiated in 1953, to overcome the
isolation of the East China coastal region opposite
Taiwan. Principal elements in this plan are a new road
net and a railroad. The road net has been finished and
the railroad may be completed by the end of this year.
An increase in coastal shipping, which has also been
noted, means that the Communists have improved their
capabilities to lay in supplies for military operations
and to support jet aircraft activity on the new air-
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ANTI-WESTERN ELEMENTS IN SYRIA . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
A small energetic grouping of nationalists,
Communists and other leftists in Syria is capitalizing
on divisions and lack of drive among "old guard"
politicians to establish practical control over the
country's foreign policy. As a result, any Syrian
government operating under present conditions is likely
to pursue an anti-Western, anti-Baghdad pact po:Licy,
and will probably continue to align itself with Egypt
and Saudi Arabia. It will also probably become in-
creasingly receptive to Soviet overtures.
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CHILE'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Chile's long-continued inflation, which has been
the cause of extensive strikes in the copper industry
and elsewhere, is the result of a serious imbalance in
the economy. This imbalance stems in part from the
country's dependence on copper and nitrate exports and
in part from the efforts of successive governments to
reduce this dependence by encouraging industrial self-
sufficiency. The Ibanez government, though persistently
handicapped by its ineptness in dealing with an un-
friendly legislature, has in the past two years made
some progress in attacking the basic problem, and last
month won narrow congressional approval for the first
step of its new anti-inflation program.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 February 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
BULGANIN-EISENHOWER EXCHANGE
As of 1 February, the
President's reply to Prime
Minister Bulganin's note had
not been published in the So-
viet Union.. Bulganin's pro-
posal, described by Moscow
radio on 29 January as the
"Geneva spirit in action,"
appears to have been conceived
as a move to persuade world
opinion that the USSR is up-
holding the Geneva spirit while
the United States is opposing
Soviet efforts to relax ten-
sions and improve relations
with the West. Foreign Minister
Molotov's remark in Prague on
28 January that he could not
understand how anyone could
reject a. friendship treaty
probably indicates the line
Moscow will take on President
Eisenhower's reply.
Ambassador Bohlen has
suggested that the Soviet lead-
ers are withholding publication
of the President's reply until
its effect can be offset by
another message from Bulganin,
or at least until the line to
be followed in editorial and
other comment has been deter-
mined. The Moscow press and
radio have begun to prepare the
Russian people. Moscow radio
has commented that American
"unwillingness to accept the
proposal has caused profound
disillusionment among the sup-
porters of peace and a relaxa-
tion of international tension.
The intent of Bulganin's
proposal was evident both in
the content of the letter and
the draft treaty and in the
elaborately staged and highly
publicized manner in which it
was delivered to the President.
If the Soviet leaders had desired
to open serious bilateral ne-
gotiations with the United
States, they would almost cer-
tainly have first made cautious
soundings of Washington's
attitude.
They were probably confident
that,'whether the proposal was
accepted or rejected, the USSR
would be widely credited with
having taken a bold initiative
of far-reaching importance to
overcome the impediments in US-
USSR relations which Bulganin
portrayed as the principal
barrier to the settlement of the
fundamental political issues
which have divided the world
since the end of World War II.
Moscow will probably try
to use the exchange of letters
to discredit American policies,
hoping to divide the United
States from its allies, and to
sow distrust of America in the
many medium and small powers
which the USSR is trying to
persuade to adopt a neutral
course in international affairs.
A Czech English-language
broadcast on 29 January declared
that "it must be clear to anyone
that a state which rejects a
treaty of friendship with an-
other state must be intending
to carry out an exactly opposite
policy, a policy of enmity and
disagreement." Bulga.nin, the
broadcast said, "has now put the
American President's sincerity
to the test.... Eisenhower
failed in this test."
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2 February 1956
THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT
The French National.As-
sembly's 420-71 vote investing
Guy Mollet as premier on 31
January is a recognition that
a. prolonged crisis would be
fruitless, since no real ma-
jority canbe formed in the
present parliament.
Mallet is considered an
interim premier by all except
his own Socialist Party. The
Communists are backing him as
a, step toward a popular front,
while many right-center deputies
are backing him in order to
block a, popular front. The
M41endes-France Radicals, mean-
while, support him with an eye
to their own future leadership
of a more broadly based center
coalition.
The nature of Mollet's
support has led many observers
to believe his government will
last no more than three or four
months. Nevertheless, the wide
margin of support implied by
the investiture vote and his
announced strategy of concen-
trating on a limited number of
issues may compensate for the
lack of a stable majority for
any long-range program, and may
permit him to retain power much
longer.
In the last assembly,
several cabinets formed with a
short life expectancy lasted
longer than others launched
with more promising prospects,
and particularly in the past
two years the tendency has been
toward longer tenure. This
has been partly due to public
disapproval of frequent and
prolonged crises, but also to
the dexterity with which such
PART I
premiers as Faure and Mendes-
France shifted majorities on
successive issues.
Mallet's immediate concern
is Algeria, for which most
Frenchmen agree some new politi-
cal relationship must be worked
out quickly. As soon as he
presents concrete solutions for
the problems he has outlined,
however, the opposition both
in France and in Algeria will
crystallize.
He has so far limited him-
self to generalizations which
suggest he will try the approach
Mendes-France used in Tunisia
in 1954 to win a, cessation of
violence Mollet has not
revealed how he plans to assure
representative elections and
still safeguard the interests
of the French minority, or on
what basis the proposed Algerian
representatives would be em-
powered to negotiate with
France.
If Mollet succeeds in
negotiating a quick Algerian
settlement, he will probably
try to broaden his support by
pressing for French participa-
tion in the proposed European
atomic energy pool (EURATOM),
since there is considerable
backing among right-center
elements for this aspect of
European integration. In the
meantime, the Communists will
probably redouble their of
forts, to disrupt any rapproche-
ment between the Republican
Front and the right-center
bloc, particularly by pressing
the church-school issue.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 February 1956
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ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
The military build-up of
Israel and the Arab states has
not slackened. While it is prob-
able that neither side intends
to launch major hostilities in
the immediate future,F__ 7~
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fusal to provide arms to the
Israelis might lead Tel Aviv
eventually to take unilateral
military action against one or
more of its neighboring Arab
states.
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A relatively large move-
ment of Egyptian armor toward
eastern Sinai has been observed
and the equipment moved ap
parently included at least 21
Soviet T-34 tanks, F_ I
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Major Sar- 25X1
raj, leader of the dominant
younger officer group in the
Syrian army, has stated that
the army is "not at all satis-
fied" with the UN censure of
Israel for the attack across
Lake Tiberias last December and
will be satisfied only.with
the disappearance of Israel.
Sarraj asserted that the Arabs
are now stronger than Israel
and that the time to fight
would come sooner than the West
thought. On 28 January, Prime
Minister Ghazzi warned that if
Israel resumes work on diverting
water resources near the Syrian
border, it would be "the begin-
ning of war."
UN secretary general Ham-
marskjold believes that the
next few months may offer a
better opportunity to settle the
Arab-Israeli problem than might
arise later on. Hammerskjold
told the American embassy in
Karachi that his trip to the
Middle East had led him to be-
lieve that both Nasr and the
Israeli leaders want peace.
In his view, however, Nasr
now wants peace but may not seek
a settlement when Egypt becomes
stronger, while Israel., strong
in the short run, is interested
in a settlement in the long run.
The secretary general feels a
settlement imposed by the West
could not be accepted by the
weak Arab governments and doubts
their ability in any case to con-
trol the Palestine refugees.
Hammerskjold's opinion also sup-
ports the Syrian prime minister's
statement that Syria would fight
if Israel resumed its water
diversion projects.
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2 February 1956
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SOVIET BLOC MAY MAKE ISSUE
OF 'AIR`: SPACE VIOLATIONS
There were signs last week
that the USSR may plan to make
a major international issue of
alleged violations of Soviet
and Satellite territory by
American aircraft and balloons.
The Soviet leaders may believe
that moves to expose alleged
American violations of bloc air
space would strengthen their
current campaign to embarrass
the United States with its
allies and to discredit American
policies and intentions in the
eyes of Asian and African gov-
ernments.
Such moves, which might
even include another aircraft
"incident," would be in line
with the principal theme of
Soviet propaganda in recent
months that the United States
is attempting to bury the Geneva
spirit and to renew the cold war.
Soviet and Satellite propa-
ganda. since mid-January suggests
that the bloc may be preparing
to make an international issue
of the Radio Free Europe bal-
loon operation on the ground
that it involves hazards to air
navigation.
The Czech government is
taking the lead by stepping up
its campaign against RFE follow-
ing the crash of a. Czech air-
liner on 18 January. On 21
January, Prague moved to "inter-
nationalize" this issue by
requesting the International
Civil Aviation Organization to
take immediate steps to remove
the danger to air transport
caused by these balloon flights.
A possible Soviet diplomatic
protest to the West German gov-
ernment was foreshadowed in
Pravda's 24 January remark that
anti now, the West German
authorities have taken no meas-?
ures to stop such activities."
In addition to a diplomatic
st to Bonn
is possible a e and
the Satellites will move to
place on legal record a docu-
mented claim against the United
States and may even press this
claim in the United Nations,
showing exhibits of recovered
balloons and aircraft parts.
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2 February 1956
The British ambassador in
Manila told Ambassador Ferguson
on 29 January that he had "heard"
that Moscow would carry the bal-
loons issue to the United Na-
tions Security Council. On 28
States to drift over Czechoslo-
vakia carried instruments for
reconnaissance, and the East
German premier's press office
announced on 31 January that
several American-made balloons
January, C olitburo member carrying equipment for high-al-
titude aerial photography have
been "rendered harmless" over
Czechs now had proof that the East German territory.
balloons released by the United
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 February 1956
USSR Suggests
Quick Settlement WI.th Japan
The four-point Soviet pro-
posal to Japan, reported by the
Japanese press on 27 January,
is the USSR's first direct at-
tempt to obtain a settlement
with the Japanese along the
lines of the agreement reached
with West Germany last summer.
The approach apparently was
designed to strengthen pressures
within the Hatoyama, government
to force a speedy settlement.
The Soviet proposal, which
was turned down by Prime Min-
ister Hatoyania in a speech be-
fore the Diet on 30 January,
provides for unilateral Soviet
action to terminate the state
of war, repatriation of Japa-w
nesePOaY's, establishment of
diplomatic relations, and
postponement of other more
controversial questions.
The Soviet terms cited
directly reflect party chief
Khrushchev's views on Japanese-
Soviet relations as expressed
to a. Japanese parliamentary
delegation in Moscow last Sep-
tember. Acceptance of these
proposals would have reduced
Japan's bargaining power in
its claims for former Japanese
territory in the Kurils area,
now occupied by the Soviet
Union.
The proposal was made to
HHa.toyama through his informal
adviser on foreign affairs,
Harata Sugihara. In bypassing
the Japanese Foreign Ministry
and the diplomatic negotiations
now being conducted in London,
the USSR indicated its pref-
erence for dealing with the
premier, who is more inclined
toward a cneedv settlement.
The proposal for a unilat-
eral Soviet termination of the
state of war, regarded by the
USSR as a necessary first step
to normalization of relations,
may have been calculated to
increase the pressure on
Hatoyama to act. It is also an
indication of the Soviet desire
to get results in the negotia-
tions. The USSR has often ex-
pressed impatience with what
it considers unreasonable
Japanese obduracyr.
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political supporters o a quick
treaty undoubtedly also expect
that Soviet concessions will
enable them to present the
treaty as a victory which will
enhance conservative prospects
in the June election for mem-
bers in the Japanese upper house..
both sides are aware of
the critical role Japanese pub-
lic opinion has played in
shaping the negotiations. Pub-
lic opinion reacted against the
"early settlement" trial balloon
Hatoyama released in a. press
conference last week, and ap-
parently ..prompted his
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
22February 1956
endorsement of Japan?s policy
of firmness before the Diet on
30 January. While Hatoyama un-
doubtedly favors a qud ck:7agree-
ment for restoration of rela-
Warsaw Pact Conference
The recent two-day meeting
in Prague of the political con-
sultative committee of the War-
saw pact apparently was staged
primarily to impress the West
with the unity, and strength of
the Soviet bloc and to provide
a platform for the reiteration
of Soviet attitudes on such ques-
tions as European security and
the German problem.
The committee, which an-
nounced few accomplishments of
a substantive nature, formally
enrolled East Germany into the
organization as a full consul-
tative and military partner,
a move which was deferred last
May by the pact congress in
Warsaw. The new East German
defense minister was made one
of the deputy commanders of the
unified armed forces, and pro-
visions were made for.the in-
clusion of East German contin-
gents in the forces of the com-
bined command.
Major speeches at the meet-
ing were relatively moderate in
tone, again asserting a need
for a European collective secu-
rity system, re-emphasizing bloc
friendship for Yugoslavia,
Greece, Turkey and the Asian
and African countries, and
charging that threats to peace
are posed by NATO and the re-
militarization of West Germany.
The committee also discussed
the desirability of limiting
the size and armaments of the
armed forces in both East and
West Germany and of creating
at least a partially demili-
tarized zone in central Europe.
Both of these proposals had been
advanced by Soviet foreign fbin-
ister Molotov in Geneva last
November.
tions with+.Moi?cowi strong ele-
ments in i his. patty! oppose a soft
policy toward the Orbit and they
will probably prevent any pre-
cipitate action. 25X1
The final communique issued
on 28 January stated that the
committee had resolved organi-
zational questions concerning
the "activities of the joint
armed forces," assigned by the
signatories of the Warsaw
treaty to the joint command
under Marshal Konev, These
matters may have included the
allocation and stationing of
bloc troops.
Formal actions by the War-
saw pact members could be used
as legal justification for the
retention of troops in Hungary
and Rumania and possibly for
the future movement of Soviet
forces into Bulgaria and Czecho-
slovakia. Some of the Satel-
lites reportedly have already
allocated portions of their armed
forces to the unified command.
The communique also re-
vealed the establishment of two
auxiliary bodies,. which will be
located in Moscow, attached to
the political committee; a
standing committee to draft
"recommendations on questions
of foreign policy," and a joint
secretariat, headed by Soviet
general Antonov, consisting of
permanent representatives from
all member States. In addition,
it was decided to hold meetings
of the political consultative
committee at least twice a
year and to elect a chairman,
who will be chosen successively
from the signatory nations,
once a year. Albanian premier
Shehu was elected as the. first
chairman. This system was pre-
sumably'adopted in order to
avoid appearances of complete
domination of the pact by the
USSR.
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2 February 1956
Personnel Shifts in the USSR
The recent appointment of
N. P. Dudorov to replace S. N.
Kruglov as the Soviet Union's
internal affairs minister and
the "resignation" on 24 Jan-
uary of A. M. Puzanov as pre-
mier of the Russian Republic
(RSFSR) and his, replacement by
M. A. Yasnov, erstwhile mayor
of Moscow, are the latest in
the series of personnel changes
apparently effected by Khrush-
chev in order to increase his
control of the party's central
committee on the eve of the
20th Party Congress. Khrush-
chev's hand can also be seen
in the replacement of N. A.
Shatalin and N. I. Gusarov as
party bosses in the Primorye
Krai and Tula Oblast respec'
tively,positions which prob-
ably carry a slot on the cen-
tral committee.
No reasons were given for
Kruglov's dismissal, but
nancialand production diffi-
culties within his ministry may
have been at least partly respon-
sible.
Dudorov rose to promi
nencein the Moscow City party
organization and became a dep-
uty mayor under Yasnov at a
time when Khrushchev as Moscow
Oblast party boss presumably
controlled personnel appoint-
ments in the capital. When
Khrushchev reorganized the
party's central committee ap-
paratus in 1954 and early 1955,
Dudorov was picked to head the
central committee's newly cre-
ated construction department.
Puzanov's resignation was
accepted at the closing session
of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.
His "request" for release con-
tains the same "motives" and in
some cases the same wording
found in Malenkov's "resig-
nation" last February. Like
Malenkov, he was assigned a
lower post in the government.
Yasnov, the new RSFSR
premier, has had a long as-
sociation with Khrushchev. He
"distinguished himself as an
organizer in the reconstruction
of Moscow City" in the 1930's
when Khrushchev was a Moscow
party secretary. When Khrush-
chev returned from the Ukraine
to become Moscow Oblast party
boss, Yasnov was immediately
made mayor of Moscow, the job
once held by N. A. Bulganin.
Yasnov is already a full
member of the central commit-
tee. The new Moscow mayor will
probably be N. I. Bobrovnikov,
Yasnov's first deputy since
1950 and probably a supporter
of Khrushchev. Bobrovnikov
would thus be in line for a
position on the central commit-
tee.
Both Shatalin and Busarov
were replaced by first secre-
taries transferred from other
RSFSR oblasts who will presum-
ably retain their central com-
mittee status. Shatalin, long
a Malenkov supporter, had been
demoted in March 1955 from all-
Union party secretary to the
Primorye post, apparently a
short stop on his way to polit-
ical oblivion. Gusarov may
have incurred Khrushchev's
enmity as long ago as 1946 when
as an inspector of the central
committee he sharply criticized
the Ukrainian central committee,
then headed by Khrushchev, for
"serious shortcomings" in the
selection, allocation and train-
ing of party and government
personnel..
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY:.-SUMMARY
2 February 1956
USSR Announces Fulfillment
Of Plan
The Soviet economy grew at
about the same rate in 1955. as
in 1954 and substantially ful-
filled plans for its growth both
for 1955 and for the Fifth Five-
Year Plan. The 1955 report of
the Central Statistical Admin-
istration issued on 29 January
confirms earlier indications of
a marked unevenness of growth
and shows that heavy industry
and agriculture still hold pri-
ority. The situation of the
consumer improved less in 1955
than in any of the previous
four years..
Percent Increases
1955 Over 1950
1National Income 11 10 64
Industry 13 12 (80)
Producer Goods .(13) (16) 84
Consumer Goods (12) (8) 71
Investment 15 6 unknown
Productivity of In-
dustrial Labor Force 7 8 50
Retail Trade Turn-
over 18 5 100
Production of Selected
Producer Goods
Coal
Oil
11 76
9 62
13 51
12 19
11 13
Mineral Fertilizers 16
Production of Selected
Consumer Goods
85
80
88
Fish 14 9 83
-- Meat 9 3 100
Butter 2 18 76
Canned Goods 16 18 122
6 6 61
( ) estimated
aa: LLtest Plan goals shown
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Gross industrial product
increased by 12 percent in 1955,
as against 13 percent the pre-
vious year. The 1955 plan was
overfulfilled by about 3 per-
cent and the original Fifth
Five-Year Plan as a whole by
about 9 percent. In the Fifth
Five-Year Plan period Soviet
industrial production grew 70
percent in terms comparable to
US growth of about 23 percent.
Soviet industrial production
grew from 21 percent of US pro-
duction in 1950 to 28 percent
in 1956.
AW11 ECONOMIC PROGRESS
72
65
50
87
83
75
(57)
62
36
104
52
61
No figures were
released for the growth
of heavy industry and
light industry sepa-
rately, but the 1955
report suggests that
the rate of growth of
heavy industry in 1955
may have been almost
twice that of light
industry. Planned
goals, both for the
single year and the
five-year period, were
overfulfilled for
steel, oil, and elec-
tric power, though
not for coal and pi6
iron. It appears
likely that invest-
ment in 1955 was only
6 percent greater than
in 1954, and was large-
ly directed toward
the completion of
projects initiated
in earlier years--a
normal practice in
the last year of a.
Five-Year Plan period.
Rates of increase
in the output of the
most important food-
stuffs and manufac-
tured consumer goods.
remained stationary
or diminished in 1955.
Dairy products, canned
goods, hosiery, and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 . February 1956
pianos were the only exceptions.
It is apparent from data in the
1955 report that even the pre-
Malenkovo?plans,iforvmany., ford-
stuffs and items of clothing
were underfulfilled by con-
siderable margins.
Despite drought conditions
in the "new lands," the-harvest,
except for cotton and potatoes',
was considerably above 1954.
However, both the grain harvest
and livestock population were
far below Fifth Five-Year Plan
goals,
Consumer welfare improved
less in 1955 than in any of the
previous four years, State and
co-operative retail trade, in
comparable prices, increased by
only 5 percent over 1954, one
half of the rise recorded in
1952, the next smallest for the
Informal Soviet Boasts
Exaggerate Economic Prospects
In informal conversations a
at diplomatic receptions,, top
Soviet leaders have recently
made a number of exaggerated
claims about the economic.pros-
pects of the USSR.. Although
the substantial economic growth
charted in the new Sixth Five-
Year Plan (1956=1960_); is likely
to be achieved in most respects,
these informal claims by Khru-
shchev, Kaganovich and Saburov
concerned agricultural provi
sions of the plan not, likely to
be carried out fully or'rapid
rates of development'not even
contemplated in the plan.
This startling and un
realistic show of optimism prob-
ably was intended to ? impress
non-Communist countries;, partic-
usl,a in underdeveloped, a?reas,?
with the strength of the 'Soviet
system and its ability'to match
the West in economic comp'eti-
tion,
PART I I
five-year period. With the
important exceptions of milk
and milk produce, eggs and
vegetables, announced sales
increases were lower than in
1954--in most cases, consider-
ably lower., There was improve-
ment in the last half of the
year, when the effects of a
good harvest began to be felt.
The total income of
workers and employees rose by
only 3 percent, little more
than the increase in numbers,
and that of peasants by 7
percent, whereas in 1954 the.
income,of both groups rose
11 percent. Since there was
no retail price reduction in
1955 it is apparent that
workers' living standards
barely maintained their 1954
level. I
1 01
Khrushchev,. at a "jovial"
reception on 26 January, stated
that the. Sixth Five-Year Plan
goals for agriculture would be,
met. He c1.aimed that the 1960
milk and meat goals. would be
met within two years and that
those for grain.. would be
attained before the end of the
five-year period. Fulfillment
of the milk plan, which calls
for nearly doubling production,
would be impossible in two years.
Doubling, of meat production, as
scheduled in the Sixth Five-Year
Plan, is impossible in two years
and even in five, The yearly
increase'for the past five years
has not . exceeded about 3 per-
cent.. Fulfillment of the grain
goal is equally unlikely.
At another reception the
same day., Saburov allegedly
stated that the working day
will be reduced from eight to
seven hours, This seems
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY.
2 February 1956
completely inconsistent with
Sixth Five-Year Plan demands
for a. considerable increase in
output, in view of the fact
that the growth rate of the So-
viet labor supply is temporarily
declining. His claim that So-
viet total and per capita pro-
duction will catch up with US
output in the, foreseeable future
is equally illusory.
Even though at present
rates of growth the USSR will
increase its industrial produc-
tion from one fourth to two
fifths of US output between 1955
and 1960, the absolute gap be-
tween US and Soviet total indus-
trial output will be slightly
greater in 1960 than at present.
Khrushchev and Ka.ganovich
also added some comments on
Soviet economic policy appar-
ently designed more to impress
Shinsuke Kishi Slated
For Prime Minister o Japan
Shinsuke;Kishi is expect-
ed by influental Japanese
political leaders to succeed
Ichiro Hatoyama. as the next
prime minister of Japan. Kishi,
now secretary of the conserva-
tive Liberal-Democratic Party,
was the leading promoter of the
successful conservative merger
of November 1955. By careful
.maneuvers he has maintained a
broad base of support among
the various party factions.
Kishi has always been a
strong contender. His pros-
pects for elevation to: the top
governmental position were
advanced by the death on 28
January of Taketora Ogata,
former deputy prime minister
and president of the defunct
Liberal Party, who was the
leading candidate. Present
plans apparently envisage the
election of Hatoyama, as head
of the Liberal-Democratic Party
and his continuation as prime
underdeveloped countries than
to guide Soviet administra-
tors. Despite the continuing
castigation by the Soviet press
of persons advocating a. rate
of growth for light industry
approaching that of heavy
industry, even in the future,
Khrushchev forecast a rate
for light industry in excess
of that for heavy within two
or three Five-Year Plans.
Kaganovich allegedly
stated that a transfer of pow-
er to local governments and
authorities--in order to in-
crease individual initiative
and private property--was the
central tendency of the new
plan. This tendency. is not
.readily apparent from the draft
of the plan. Pre- 25X1
pared by ORR)
minister while Kishi is groomed
for the succession.
Possibly following the
upper house elections in June,
and in any case no later than
October, Hatoyama is expected
to retire, and Kishi will then
assume the mantle as party and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2_-,February 1956
government chief. This may
depend, however, on the success-
ful conclusion of the negotia-
tions with the USSR in London,
which Hatoyama ardently desires
to assure his niche in history.
Kishi was a leading par-
ticipant in Japan's economic
venture in Manchuria. He later
became commerce and industry
minister under Tojo and sub-
sequently was minister of muni-
tions. Following the surrender,
Kishi was imprisoned for two
years as a war crimes suspect.
He is now a leading advocate of
rearmament, constitutional re-
vision, and a controlled econ-
omy. In addition, he has
called for the adoption of
Burma-Chin, Border Conference
Scheduled
The Burmese government
will hold a conference on be-
half of border peoples early
this month to which local
Chinese Communist officials.
from Yunnan Province have
been invited. It will be held
at Lweje, near the Chinese
border in north Burma.
Premier Nu may visit the
conference, and the Burmese
home minister will be there. to
exhort the border peoples "to
live in peace." Discussions,
will be conducted by local
officials on both sides of
the border.
The purpose of the con-
ference, as outlined to the
press by U Nu, is.to devise
procedures for regulating move-
ments across the frontier and
to discuss the maintenance of
law and order in general. An
underlying motivation, however,
is probably Burma's desire to
impress Peiping with its deter-
mination to maintain sovereignty
over its border areas. Some of
strong measures to combat
Communist internal subversion.
Kishi maintains that
Japan's survival depends on the
maintenance of the closest
possible economic and political
ties with the United States.
He emphasizes, however, that
Japan must achieve an independ-
dnt'; equal relationship with
.the United..States and be free
to decide its own destiny..
Kishi at 59 is one of the
younger. conservative leaders
and, while ruthless and cal-
culating., is capable of demon-
strating strong, decisive,
intelligent leadership.
BURMA
2 FEBRUARY 1956
my/ undemarcated boundary
io/m/wo indefinite boundary
100
m_i _
miles
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 February 1956
these areas have been claimed
by past Chinese governments but
appear on Communist maps as part
of China. Burma, may organize
"spontaneous" demonstrations of
loyalty by the nearly 3,000
tribal chiefs who are expected
to participate in the conference.
Despite the increasingly
close Sino-Burmese ties of the
past two years, Burma's 1,000-
mile frontier with Communist
China continues to be a source
of serious concern to Rangoon.
There have been frequent Chi-
nese incursions into the Bur-
mese Wa States, one of the
areas in dispute. Peiping has
Chou En-lai Requests
Conference on,ln-d-o-cTina
Chou En-lai's letter of
26 January to the foreign
ministers of Great Britain and
the USSR requesting that a new
conference on Indochina be
convened apparently marks the
beginning of a considerably
expanded diplomatic and propa.-
ganda effort by the Communists
to force a new approach to the
question of Vietnamese unifica-
tion. Chou proposed that in
addition to the 1954 Geneva
powers, India, Canada, and Po-
land, whose representatives
constitute the International
Control Commission in Indo-
china, should participate in a
new conference.
According to the British
Foreign Office, a Polish truce
official in Vietnam has hinted
that the Communists' objectives
at a conference would include
a postponement of the elections
for unification (which the
given no indication of aband-
oning efforts to subvert the
various hill peoples on the
Burma side of the border.
The questions of settling
the frontier between Yunnan and
the northern part of the Kachin
State and marking the border of,.
the Wa States apparently will
not be discussed at the confer-
ence.. They are to be taken up
by the Burmese ambassador on
his return to Peiping from home
leave. Rangoon doubtless hopes,
however, that the meeting will 25X1
strengthen its bargaining po-
sition in what promise to be
difficult negotiations.
original Geneva terms set for
July 1956), the establishment
of close economic relations
between the two zones of Viet-
nam, "neutralization," and
new terms of reference for the
Control Commission. The Polish
official implied that failure
to convene the conference would
bring an intensification of the
Viet Minh's subversive activi-
ties in South Vietnam.
Chou's proposal is ex-
pected to receive strong In-
dian support. France may also
favor it as an opportunity to
divest itself of responsibilities
it is no longer capable of
carrying out. Prince Sihanouk
of Cambodia. would probably wel-
come a new conference as an
opportunity to re-enter the in-
ternational limelight. The
British are believed cool to
Chou's proposal; they have
cited the need to get the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 ,February 1956
views of all concerned before
taking action.
Meanwhile, the official
scheduling of the national.
assembly elections in South
Vietnam for 4 March has brought
new intensity to Viet Minh
propaganda attacks on-the Diem
government. Hanoi radio re-.
peatedly calls on the.Viet-
namese people to unite to.
smash Diem's "illegal and
Machiavellian plot" to hold
"unilateral" elections. How-
ever, by stating at the same.
time that "even if a.nati.onal
assembly is formed, our com-
patriots in the south would,
resolutely oppose ity" the
Viet Minh virtually concedes
its inability to prevent the
elections.
Soviet propaganda treat-
ment of South Vietnam's forth-
coming assembly elections has
thus far been perfunctory. An
intensification of propaganda
on this subject throughodtt.,-the
Communist world would un,,;, l'doubtedly be,-linked to-strong
support for Chou En-Las's call
for a new conference.
Afghanistan
Both Afghan-istati and the
USSR are quickly moving toward
detailed planning for use of
the $100,000,000 Soviet! credit.
The Afghans are now apparently
willing to consider Soviet_
construction projects in the
While the Viet Minh is
obviously not relying solely
on its clandestine organiza-
tion in the south to achieve
its objectives there., the
efforts to strengthen this or-
ganization continues to have
a high priority. This effort
includes a campaign to develop
a guerrilla potential, to win
the sympathy of the population,
to infiltrate government organs
and political parties, and to
make alliances with antigovern-
ment groups.
troops
The Viet Minh has scored
considerable success by its
co-operation with the Hoa Hao
rebels since last fall. An
improvement in the rebels' com-
bat effectiveness has been
noted, and in a clash in mid-
January the Vietnamese army
suffered its heavist casual-
ties in any single action since
the end of the Indochina war--
61 killed and missing. An
estimated 600 Viet Minh polit-
ical and military advisers
are now serving with Hoa Hao
forces of. approximately 3,800.
In a new campaign against
these forces,. widely dispersed
in the southwest, the Vietnamese
army is deploying some 45,000
south as well as other parts
of the country. Relations with
Pakistan remain unchanged; prep-
arations are being made for the
meeting in May between King
Zahir Shah and Pakistan's
Governor General Mirza.
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AfGHAf11STRf1
The Afghan-Soviet credit
agreement which was signed in
Kabul on 28 January provides
for a 30-year loan at 2 per-
cent, according to Moscow
press reports. The Afghans
are to draw equal amounts of
the $100,000,000 each year
for the first 22 years and re-
pay the whole in the last
eight years.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Development Projects Suggested For Soviet
e Irrigation development
Dam and machinery
Electrical plant
Auto repair shop
2 February 1956
\I 1 MtlFM1Ui
Laghman
.tlP l- ` A M M U
~'jcnnrei , ~,wv
AND
ai Pa..
PAK
U. S. S. ~. Rl m ?1
J -??^'L 1 , / q , , f C H I N AJ
TEHEN4n \ "'~!." ~r~ L'
OPAL
oc~xi ^ ~
Road development and construction:
a. Kabul-Kandahar (est. cost: $7,680,000)
b. Kabul-Pakistan border (est. cost: $4,950,000)
c. Salang road (est. cost: $1,674,000)
d. Kabul-Jabal us Saraj (est. cost: $1,434,302)
e. Kandahar-Pakistan border (est. cost: $1,712,000)
SECRET
Consideration
ineral development:
a. Oil (est. cost: $2,700,000)
? b. Sulphur (est, cost: $470,000)
c. Salt (est. cost: $175,000)
d. Coal (est. cost: $1,770,000)
4 e. Lapis lazuli (est. cost: $75,000)
Multi-purpose community project
i Airport (est. cost: $2,500,000)
New aircraft (est. cost: $2,000,000)
Laboratory
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 February 1956
If the entire $100,000,000
Soviet credit is applied to the
newly announced Afghan Five-
Year Plan, F_ 7
I _J the USSR will play a
large role in execution of the
plan.
The arrival of the Soviet
negotiating mission, led by the
deputy chief of the Chief
Directorate for Economic Re-
lations of the USSR, was re-
portedly unexpected and suggests
the USSR is moving quickly
to obtain maximum advantage
from its '.loan..
ments, although the government
still insists no strings are
attached.
25X1
the USSR has requested 25X1
visas for 300 Soviet technicians
to survey individual projects.
The American embassy in Kabul,
however, reports that the Af-
ghans are beginning to chafe
at Soviet pressure and at the
conditions insisted on by the
USSR for specific project agree-
25X1
A report that traffic is
moving freely through Peshawar
in Pakistan and a. statement by
Afghan foreign minister Naim
that Kabul might be willing to
resume regular shipments through
Pakistan if Karachi pledged not
to impose restrictions on traf-
fic in instances short of war,
suggests that a possibility
still exists for eventual settle-
ment of part of the Pakistani-
Afghan quarrel through nego-
tiations. 25X1
Berber tribes, which have
been in rebellion in north-
eastern Morocco since 1 October,
recently stepped up their at-
tacks in an apparent effort to
surround the important communi-
cations center of Taza. On 28
January an unusually large
band of about 300 rebels en-
gaged a. Foreign Legion battalion
north of Taza and some 40
rebels and 20 Legionnaires were
slain. This increased activity
may be an effort to intensify
pressure on France as the date
approaches for the commencement
of Moroccan-French negotiations,
which are still expected to get
under way on 15 February.
The rivalry between the
major nationalist party,Istiglal,
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2 February 19'56
A_ S P A I N
P 7_N-RIEA
~pAN~sH.Melilla
~? MOgoc o/
Taza+,~Cfujda
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1 Marrakech
F R E N C H
M O R O C C O
IFNI
SPANISH
SAHARA
and the smaller French-backed
Shoura party erupted in a brawl
on 23 January. Four members of
the Shoura party were killed
and about 30 injured. Possibly
as a result of this incident,
these two parties, together
with the Wahda party and the
Spanish Moroccan Islah party,
have announced the establish-
ment of a "Committee on Con-
ciliation and Union" to arbi-
trate interparty disputes.
Meanwhile, both Moroccan
and French officials have re-
acted favorably'to'the announce-
ment on 26 January that the
United States will relinquish
its extraterritorial rights in
Morocco.
Rebel activities continue
in eastern Algeria and may be
stepped up in order to exert
pressure on the new French
government for a more favorable
settlement with the Algerians.
The announcement by French pre-
mier Guy Mollet before his
investiture that he would
appoint General Georges Catroux
Algiers Constantine.
as minister resident in Algiers
to replace Governor General
Soustelle has been strongly
protested by the rightist press
in France and vigorously opposed
by the conservative settlers in
Algeria. These groups argue
that Catroux negotiated France's
departure from Syria and was
Premier Faure's emissary to the
Moroccan sultan when the sultan
was in exile in Madagascar. His
appointment to Algeria, there-
fore, in their view would fore-
shadow relinquishment of France's
control over Algeria.
In the face of a stepped-
up terrorist campaign, the
Tunisian government finally
acted on 27 January to suppress
the subversive activities of
nationalist extremist Salah ben
Youssef.
The government's action may
hamper Ben Youssef's immediate
potential for creating disorders,
but his popularity is likely to
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2 February 1956
remain high as long as the
government fails to alleviate
the Tunisian economic crisis.
Agitation continues in
Spanish Morocco, where Spain
has announced an impending re-
form of the government. F_
Greek Elections
The prospects of Prime
Minister Karamanlis' party on
19 February depend largely on
whether the recently formed
Popular Front, the membership
of which ranges-from the Com-
munist-front EDA to a number
of respected center party lead-
ers, can maintain its cohesion.
Karamanlis has some im-
portant advantages. He con-
trols the government, the new
election law was designed to
benefit his party, and he pre-
sents the only real alternative
to Communist influence in the
government. The American con-
sul general in Salonika reports
that the prime minister's recent
campaigning in northern Greece
was well received. Karamanlis'
attacks on the Popular Front as
a "new EAM"--a reference to the
Communist-controlled party that
fought the government during
the guerrilla war--may have put
the front on the defensive.
The apparent discomfiture
of some center leaders at find-
ing themselves allied with EDA
suggests that the Popular Front
may not hold together until the
elections. Some center party
leaders are resisting leftist
attempts to-increase their
representation on the front's
electoral slate. The feeling
is widespread in leftist par-
ties that Sophocles Venizelos,
leader of the Liberal Demo-
cratic Union, has a secret
agreement with Karamanlis to
abandon the front after the
elections and join the prime
minister in forming a new
government.
the front should suffer
substantial defections, and if
Karamanlis is successful in dis-
sociating himself from the gen-
erally unpopular social record
of the Greek Rally, he might
gain a comfortable majority.
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2 February 1956
Cyprus
The apparent lessening of
Archbishop Makarios' opposition
to Britain's latest formula for
a provisional settlement of the
Cyprus issue is not likely to
hasten a permanent solution.
Agreement on the formula would
merely be a temporary truce in
the continuing struggle over the
union of Cyprus with Greece.
Makarios told the American
consul in Nicosia on 30 January
that the British formula was now
acceptable. However, he intends
to demand Britain's acceptance of
certain principles to be included
n the constitution for Cyprus
as a condition of his agreement
on the formula. Among these
principles are representation
according to population; vesting
of all executive and judicial
authority, except over foreign
affairs and defense, in the
legislature; and relegation of
the governor to a role as "con-
stitutional monarch" without
veto power.
These demands suggest that
Makarios is preparing a basis
,or subsequent repudiation of
any settlement. Ambassador
Cannon in Athens has learned
East Germans Try to Halt Flow
7Re ogees
The East German government
is taking new psychological meas-
ures to stem the continuing
exodus from East Germany. It
has just held a show trial, end-
ing on