CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700100001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 19, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO. 19
CONrID NT'A4 OCI NO. 0054/56
19 January 1956
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
I
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN _CLASS.
r ? DECL . -
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW D
ATE
;
AUT
REVIEWER:
T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
.OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
FI NTIAL
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 January 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SOVIET SIXTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The draft directives for the Soviet Sixth Five-Year
Plan (1956-1960) continue to place primary stress on the
growth of heavy industry. By .defining. the USSR's "main
economic task" as surpassing the United States in per
capita production, the directives project this economic
policy well beyond 1960. The new plan will strengthen
the USSR's military potential but precludes any rapid
improvement in living standards. Overfulfillment of
the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-55) has raised Soviet
industrial output from about one fifth that of the US
to over one quarter. Fulfillment of the new goals for
industry, which are believed to be within Soviet capa-
bilities, will make Soviet production nearly two fifths as
large as US production in 1960.
EAST GERMANY
FORMALIZES ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The formalization of East Germany's armed forces and
defense ministry on 18 January makes East Germany eligible
for full membership in the Soviet bloc's joint.com-
mand under the Warsaw pact and removes a conspicuous
flaw in East Germany's claim to sovereignty. East Ger-
many already has substantial military forces under a function-
ing defense establishment, and this action merely changes
the designation of these forces. No immediate large in-
crease in strength seems to be planned.
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19 January 1956
FRENCH GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The uncompromising positions of all the major French
political parties will probably be maintained during the
first stages of the crisis which will develop next week
when Premier Faure resigns and the new assembly undertakes
the search for a government. A minority Republican Front
cabinet dependent on Communist support still seems likely,
but the Communists may yet see more propaganda value in
forcing Mendes-France to rely on the Faure-Pinay bloc.
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Sporadic patrol skirmishes occurred on the Arab-
Israeli borders last week. On the diplomatic front,
the Arabs and the Israelis appeared to be marking time
pending the outcome of the Syrian complaint to the UN
Security Council. Israel continued to express urgency
over its requests for arms from the West. 25X1
JORDAN . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Isolated disturbances continue to be reported in
Jordan, and new rioting may break out should the govern-
ment announce that it refuses to accept Arab aid to replace
the British subsidy.
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19 January 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet Bloc Relations With Latin America: Premier Bulganin's
offer on 16 January to establis iplomatic and economic
relations with any Latin American country is the Soviet
Union's most important policy statement on Latin America
to date. Latin American interest in bloc markets has
been stimulated by increases in Soviet bloc deliveries
of industrial goods and petroleum products in return
for agricultural products. I I . . . . . . Page 1 . 25X1
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Yugoslav-Soviet Economic Co-operation: The increased economic
and tee nica co-operation env sioned in the Yugoslav-
Soviet accord signed in Moscow on 1 September 1955 is be-
coming a reality. Since mid-December, the USSR and
Yugoslavia have concluded agreements on scientific and
technical co-operation, on Soviet assistance in devel-
oping Yugoslav industrial enterprises, and for an in-
creased level of trade for 1956. In addition, a draft
agreement has been announced on Soviet nuclear assist-
ance to Yugoslavia. I I . . . . . . . . . Page
Soviet Advisers and Technicians in Afghanistan: The Afghan
government has apparently decided to accept Soviet
bloc economic consultants and technical personnel for
projects requiring their protracted presence in Afghan-
istan.. This may enable the USSR to exert a powerful
influence over Afghan economic policy and to develop an
Page 3 25X1
Communists Silence "Clandestine" Radio Stations: The
Communists Have suspended clandestine propaganda broad-
casts to Greece, Japan, France and French North Africa
within the past three months, probably because the
broadcasting interfered with the USSR's diplomatic
objectives in these areas. In addition, the Soviet
leaders may have calculated that suspension of their own
broadcasts would strengthen their position prior to any
representation they may make to the West regarding broad-
casts to the Soviet bloc. . . . . . . Page 4 25X1
Berlin Situation: East Germany and the Soviet Union have
concluded an agreement providing for full control over
Allied traffic to Berlin by the East German border police.
East Berlin youth and party leaders reportedly met last
month to plan for "more a igger" riots in West Berlin
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 USSR Party Congresses: Evidence to date suggests that the
20th all-Union Communist Party Congress, scheduled for
14 February 1956, will convene as planned.
19 January 1956
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Burma: Rangoon and Moscow both appear to be moving rapidly
to carry out the USSR's agreement to assist in Burma's
development. I I. . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
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New Egyptian Constitution: The Egyptian constitution as
announced by Prime Minister Nasr on 16 January pro-
vides for a powerful executive and postpones decision
on the extent of popular participation in the election
of a legislature--national assembly--at least until
next June. The president not only has power to dis-
solve the national assembly to be elected under laws
not yet announced, but the assembly cannot amend the
budget without the executive's approval.
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North Africa: In Algeria, French military measures remain
nneffective as terrorism spreads. A general insur-
rection is possible unless Paris initiates drastic
political reforms. Meanwhile, Tunisian extremist
Salah ben Youssef has declared an "o ,en war" on the
moderate government 25X1
25X1 The Spanish
government declared on 13 January that it would grant
self-government to Morocco while reserving Spanish
rights vis-a-vis France. I I . . . . . . Page 9 25X1
Indonesia: The opponents of the Indonesian cabinet, led by
the National Party and the Communists and encouraged by
President Sukarno, have succeeded in virtually isolating
the moderate Masjumi which heads the cabinet. Sukarno
has instigated the resignation of two Moslem parties
from the government, one of which is the importana
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The NU's defection presumably
spells defeat to the Masjumi's hopes that it could form
an alliance with the NU and thereby be in a strong
bargaining position in negotiations for a successor
cabinet.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY .
19 January 1956
Greek Elections: The formation of a Popular Front on
18 January for the Greek elections gives a Communist-
front party its first strong voice in Greek politics
in several years. The front may offer a serious
challenge to Prime Minister Karamanlis' National
Radical Union (ERE) in next month "s elections. A less
broadly based front decisively defeated the Greek
Rally in the municipal elections of November 1954.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Cyprus: Two meetings between Cypriot archbishop Makarios
and British governor Harding in the past ten days
have increased the possibility of a provisional
settlement of the Cyprus issue in the next few weeks.
Harding has been summoned to London for 'urgent con-
sultations. F_ I . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Finnish Presidential Election: Complete returns from the
Finnish presidential election of 16-17 January give
the Agrarian. Party's candidate, Prime Minister Kekkonen,
88 electoral votes, and the Social Democratic nominee,
K. A. Fagerholm, 74 out of a total of 300. Because both
have far less than the 151 votes needed in the electoral
college balloting on 15 February, the next few weeks will
see considerable bargaining among the parties.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
. .Page 12
SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
With the approach of the annual meeting of the foreign
ministers of SEATO's member countries in Karachi on 6 March,
member and nonmember nations in the treaty area are ex-
pressing a variety of views, mostly critical, on the organi-
zation. Some hope, however, to use SEATO to get more
American aid. Communist ,spokesme_n, while ostensibly uncon-
cerned over SEATO's present military status, seem neverthe-
less worried over its potential.
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19 January 1956
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN NORTHWEST CHINA . . . . . Page
Peiping's announcement on 29 December that construction
will begin in 1956 on a 930-mile railroad from Lanchou to
Tsinghai adds new emphasis to the Chinese oil and mineral-
ogical development program initiated on a large scale during
1955. Permanent settlement of the remote western province's
Tsaidam Basin by thousands of Chinese, who will outnumber
the indigenous popula.tion,.has already begun. The development
of this province and concurrent Chinese expansion of influence
in neighboring Tibet has increasingly important strategic
implications.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 January 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SOVIET SIXTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN
The draft directives for
the Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan
(1956-60) which will be pre-
sented to the 20th Party Con-
gress continue to place prima-
ry stress on the growth of
heavy industry. By defining
the USSR's "main economic task"
as surpassing the United States
in per capita. production, the
directives project this eco-
nomic policy well beyond 1960.
The new plan will strengthen
the USSR's military potential
but precludes any rapid improve-
ment in living standards.
Overfulfillment of the
Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-55)
has raised Soviet industrial
output from about one fifth
that of the US to over one
quarter. Fulfillment of the
new goals for industry, which
are believed to be within So-
viet capabilities, will make
Soviet production nearly two
fifths as large as US produc-
tion in 1960.
Heavy Industry
The Sixth Five-Year Plan,
like all past plans, grants
clear priority to the growth
of heavy industry. A recent
issue of Kommunist, the of-
ficial ideological journal, re-
affirms this policy in a state-
ment attacking "right-wing re-
visionist babblings of certain
economists concerning the possi-
bility ... of fixing identical
or even faster rates of develop-
ment for light industry."
The new plan calls for an
increase in gross output for
heavy industry of 70 percent
over 1955, compared with 60
percent for light industry.
Actual achievements in 1951-55
were 91 and 76 percent re-
spectively. Output of the ma-
chinery industries is to con-
tinue to increase faster than
the output of heavy industry as
a whole, while basic metallurgy
will grow at a somewhat slower
rate. Production of locomotives,
rolling stock, trucks, tractors
and machine tools is planned to
increase much more rapidly in
the 1956-60 period than in the
past five years.
Energy Sector
The energy sector of the
economy--coal, oil, natural gas,
and electric power--also will
grow at a more rapid.rate than
in 1951-55. The energy pro-
gram will include a highly am-
bitious attempt to construct
nuclear power plants with a.
total capacity of 2,000,000 to
2,500,000 kilowatts. This ob-
jective will require the high-
est priority if it is to be
achieved. Current British plans
call for nuclear power plants
with a total capacity of ap-
proximately 1,500,000 to
2,000,000 kilowatts by about
1964. The US plans to have
800,000 kilowatts of nuclear
capacity by 1960.
Labor Productivity
Success in fulfilling the
plan for heavy industry will
depend primarily on ability to
achieve the planned 50-percent
increase in labor productivity.
Additions to the industrial
labor force in 1956-60 are ex-
pected to be substantially
smaller than during the past
five years. Productivity in-
creases will depend largely on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 January 1956
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL
COMMODITIES US-USSR
HARD COAL
(million mt)
This recurring problem has been
met in the past by drawing labor
from agriculture, a solution
which may not be possible in the
coming period.
CRUDE OIL
(million mt)
ELECTRIC
POWER
(million kwh)
STEEL
(million mt)
PRIMARY
ALUMINUM
(million mt)
SYNTHETIC
RUBBER
(million mt)
CEMENT
(million mt)
MINERAL
FERTILIZER
(million mt)
MACHINE
TOOLS
(thousand
units)
? USSR 1950
? USSR 1955
USSR 1960 (PL 4 H)J
-
US 1955
60117
how successful industry is in
modernizing and re-equipping
plants, in increasing the tech-
nical skills of labor, and in
introducing additional incen-
tives.
Soviet planners appear to
be relying heavily--perhaps un-
realistically--on the role of
'technology and automation in
raising productivity. Fulfill-
ment of the plan for heavy in-
dustry may therefore require
larger additions to the labor
force than current-ly-. Tanned,.
In order to finance the
new plant and equipment,. capital
investments are planned at 990
billion rubles (in 1955 prices),
a 67-percent increase over the
previous five--year period.
Heavy industry will receive an
estimated 60 percent of the to-
tal investment, approximately
the same percentage as during
1951-55. The new investment
program as a whole will limit
the growth of consumption
slightly more than did the last.
Implications for Defense
Continued emphasis on the
development of heavy industry
and increased concern with im-
proved technology will substan-
tially increase the USSR's a-
bility to support current and
potential defense programs. The
sectors of industry highly crit-
ical in the production of mili-
tary end--items, particularly of
complex :.iodern weapons including
guided missiles, are to be de-
veloped almost four times as
rapidly as industrial output as
a whole. These sectors include
(a) instruments for automation,
to be increased 3.5 times; (b)
control and automatic regulating
instruments, 4 times; (c) opti-
cal instruments, 3 times; (d)
radio measuring instruments, 3
times; and (e) capacity for pro-
ducing heat-resistant alloys, 6
times.
Light Industry, Agriculture
There will be a-gradual im-
provement in Soviet living
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 January 1956
standards, but many targets for
light industry and agriculture.,
will not be met. Real income
is planned to grow at a slower
rate than in the last five
years.
The agricultural plan calls
for early completion of the
first phase of the "new lands"
and corn programs. Acreage ex-
pansion will slow down sharply
after 1956 and attention will
turn to increasing yields. This
is to be accomplished by in-
creased supplies of mineral
fertilizer, greater mechaniza-
tion to reduce harvest losses,
more rational planning than was
possible under the rigid Stalin-
ist system, and closer political
control of the farm collectives.
The targets based on these mea.s-
u r--e.,s--an 80-percent increase
in grain production, even great-
er increases in the production
of meat, potatoes, vegetables,
milk, and eggs--appear to be as
unrealistic as earlier agricul-
tural goals. Total farm output,
however, will probably grow.
somewhat-more than in the past
five years.
Collective Farms
Policy toward the col-
lective farmer is mixed. Col-
lective farms are urged to pro-
vide him with fodder for his
private livestock, but new state
farms will be organized in sub-
urban areas to compete with him
for the lucrative
urban markets. The
planned increase in
rural incomes is low-
er than that claimed
for the 1951-55 peri-
od.
Lags in agricul-
ture will continue to
hamper the growth of
light industry, as
1955
1960-GOAL
ABSOLUTE GAIN
ABSOLUTE GAIN
COMMODITY
US USSR
USSR
5th 5-YEAR PLAN
6th 5-YEAR PLAN
LEATHR,IOES
million( 'rs)
575 297
455
87
158
COTTON FABRICS)
(billionlinear maws
9.1 5.9
7.3
2.0
1.4
(WOOLEN FABRICS
million linear meters)
285 250
363
92
113
IYASHNG MACHINES
4240 87
528
87
441
(f and onus)
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the directives admit has been
the case in the past. Basic
consumer industries heavily de-
pendent upon agriculture, such
as processed foods, textiles,
and shoes, are scheduled to
grow at rates far below those
planned for industries producing
items considered luxuries in
the USSR, such as washing ma-
chines and refrigerators.
An ambitious plan to double
state housing construction, if
fulfilled, will increase urban
housing space per person from
four square meters in 1955 to
five square meters in 1960.
The new plan emphasizes
the importance of progress in
basic education to development
of the economy.
By 1960, ten-year educa-
tion is to become virtually
universal. In the training of
specialists, which the USSR is
already turning out in great
numbers, the plan calls for
further acceleration. A 50-
percent increase is scheduled
against a 30- to 35-percent gain
in the old plan. Heavy in-
dustry, construction, and trans-
port will, as always, be favored
in the distribution of specialists,
while agriculture, which re-
ceived priority in this field
in 1954, retains it in the new
plan. (Prepared by
ORR. Concurred in by OSI)
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EAST GERMANY
FORMALIZES ARMED FORCES
The legal formalization
of the East German "people's
army" and defense ministry by
the Volkskammer (parliament)
on 18 January makes East Ger-
many eligible for full member-
ship in the Soviet bloc's joint
command under the Warsaw pact.
This step removes a conspicuous
flaw in East Germany's claim
to sovereignty,a defect which
had been an obvious source of
embarrassment to the regime.
Deputy Premier Stoph
announced to the Volkskammer
that conscription was "not nec-
essary at the present time."
This announcement suggests
that East Germany will defer
a draft until, or sometime
after, West Germany institutes
conscription. Bonn is not ex-
pected to-.make such a move un-
til the summer of 1957 at the
earliest, and may delay the
step until after the elections
in the fall of 1957.
The announcement of an
East German draft at any time,
however, is likely to spur men
of military age to flee to the
West in even greater numbers
than last summer, unless the
government is willing to in-
tensify existing strict se---
curity controls on access to
West Berlin and West Germany.
Even the clear threat of
eventual conscription is likely
to stimulate an increased exodus
to the West.
East Germany already has
substantial military forces
EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES
JANUARY 1956
ARMY
Personnel
100,000
Divisions
7
NAVY
Personnel
11,000
Naval Vessels
93 (minor)
AIR
Personnel
7,000
Aircraft
105
SECURITY FORCES
Interior Troops
10,000
Border Police
30,000
under a functioning defense
establishment, and the formal-
ization is mainly a change in.
designation of these forces.
No immediate rapid increase in
strength seems to be planned.
These armed forces, loosely
disguised as Garrisoned People's
Police (KVP), Sea Police, and
Aero Clubs, have a combined
strength estimated at approxi-
mately 118,000 men. The Sea.
Police and.Aero Clubs are very
small, accounting for only 18,-
000 of this total. Atlhough
enlistment in these military
forces has been voluntary,
harsh recruiting measures have
been necessary to maintain their
strength.
The KVP now has two corps,
and there are indications that
a third corps to be organized
around an independent mechanized
division at Potsdam is in the
planning stage. A report that
100 T34/85 medium tanks were
handed over to a KVP tank regi-
ment at Oranienburg indicates
that equipment may already be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 January 1956
arriving for the planned third
corps.
There is also some evidence
that East Germany is setting
up a system of. reserves which
would put men discharged after
service in the available ca
dres when conscription is im-
posed.
No strong reaction to
East Germany's move is likely
in West Germany, where the
formalization of the East
The uncompromising posi-
tions of all the major French
political parties will prob-
ably be maintained during the
first stages of the crisis which
will develop next week when
Premier Faure resigns and the
new assembly undertakes the
search for a government. A
minority Republican Front cabi-
net dependent on Communist
support still seems likely, but
the Communists may,: yet see more
propaganda value in forcing
Mendes-France to rely on the
Faure-Pinay bloc.
The election of the as-
sembly president should also
provide the first indication of
political alignments in the new
assembly. After the first
ballot, which is usually
scattered among favorite son
candidacies, the lines of divi-
sion between the Mendes-France
and Faure factions will be
clarified. A Republican Front
German military establishment
has long been expected. The
'Nest Germans, however, will re-
gard this step as deepening
the division of Germany and
affording additional evi-
dence that Moscow will not
alter its stand on unifi-
cation. They will-probably
disregard East German premier
Grotewohl's invitation to
hold talks on reducing foreign
military forces in Germany and
promoting,_ a European security
pact.
candidate is the most likely
choice, but reluctance to
accept Communist support may
lead the Republican Front to
vote for the incumbent, Pierre
Schneiter, a member of the
Popular Republican Party (MRP)
who is universally respected
for his impartiality.
The.gap appears.to be widen-
ing between the forces of
Republican Front leaders Guy
Mollet and Pierre Mendes-
France on the one hand and
those of Premier Faure and
Foreign Minister Pinay on the
other. The Republican Front
continues to reject an alliance
of the center, and now seems
ready to depend on the Commu-
nists if enough support is
not forthcoming from the
right-center.
At the Socialist congress
on 15 January, Mallet indicated
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that the Republican Front
would accept Communist or any
other votes but would make
no "deals" to get them. The
congress reaffirmed its in-
sistence on a minority Re-
publican Ftront government with
no concessions to left or to
right. The executive committee
of Mendes-France's Radicals
did likewise on 16 January.
The Communists have been
pressing for a full share in
the government, but they would
probably be glad to settle for
participation in a popular
front without actual control
of any ministerial posts. At
the Communist Party's central
committee meeting on 18 Janu-
ary, Communist leader Duclos is
reported, however, to have cas-
tigated the Republican Front
for its refusal to make a
"deal." It is possible that the
Communists will refuse to sup-
port the Republican Front.
If the Communists are to
be excluded from any voice in
government policy, a rapproche-
ment between the Socialists and
the Popular Republicans is es-
sential, but the strong public
Sporadic patrol skirmishes
occurred on the Arab-Israeli
borders last week. On the dip-
lomatic front, the Arabs and
statements of both groups make
it unlikely at present.
Leaders of the right-center
bloc are reported-ready to
tolerate a minority Republican
Front government. Their re-
luctance to vote for a Republi-
can Front may give the Commu-
nists an opportunity to proffer
unsolicited support for a.Re-
publican Front government and
thereby claim that a popular
front has in fact been formed.
The search for a new gov-
ernment may be prolonged, and
the press is already pointing
out that such a development,
in the face 'of the rapidly de-
teriorating North African situa-
tion and the growing trend to-
ward antiparliamenta.ria.nism,
could benefit only the Commu-
nists and the Poujadists.
The Poujade movement may
not yet have attained its peak.
Poujade plans to run candidates
in Algeria when the postponed
assembly elections are finally
held there, and the American
embassy in Paris comments that
the movement's fascist tenden-
cies may be accentuated as its
influence grows.
the Israelis appeared to be
marking time pending the out-
come of Syria's complaint to
the UN Security Council. Israel
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19 January 1956
continued to express urgency
over its requests for.arms from
the West.
The American embassy in
Tel Aviv believes top Israeli
leaders will place considerable
reliance on a memorandum pre-
pared by British Laborite member
of parliament Richard Crossman
.concerning Egyptian prime minis-
ter Nasr's attitude. According
to this memorandum, portions of
which were shown to the embassy
staff, Nasr told Crossman last
November that Egypt's arms deal
with the Soviet bloc, by strength-
ening Egypt's position, had made
the danger of war more remote
and increased the possibility of
peace talks. In Nasr's view,
only Britain could act as medi-
ator between the Arabs and
Israelis, although he agreed
with Crossman that there could
be no final settlement without
Soviet participation.
On the whole, Nasr's ideas
as cited in the memorandum are
a logical extension of those be
has expressed to Western sources
in the past. Nasr justified
the arms deal, for example, with
the argument that he could ne-
gotiate with Israel only from a
position of strength, and Egyp-
tian propaganda hailed British
prime minister Eden's reference
to the UN 1947 resolutions on
Palestine in his speech last
November as the first instance
of a Western power offering a
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realistic basis for a settle-
ment.
Nasr's reference to the
necessity of Soviet participa-
tion in a final settlement may
reflect merely an opinion that
the USSR would probably claim
the right to be consulted in the
settlement of a problem in which
big-power guarantees will al-
most certainly play a role.
It is also possible, however,
that Nasr envisages calling for
Soviet support of his long-held
view that the West is biased in
favor of Israel.
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25X
The Israeli "preparedness"
program drawn up by Prime Min-
ister Ben-Gurion, calling for
near-wartime austerity, seems
primarily to be a move to
counter domestic critics who
have charged that the govern
ment has been "criminally neg-
ligent" in civil defense prep-
arations.
economy.
Commencement of the
program coincided with the pub-
lication of an emergency com-
mittee report alerting the
country to the possibility
of war. The two together
should serve to help counter
inflationary pressures which
threaten Israel's shaky
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19 January 1956
Isolated disturbances con-
tinue to be reported in Jordan,
and new rioting may break out
should the government announce
that it refuses to accept Arab
aid to replace the British sub-
sidy.
Communists and other
troublemakers are still active,
particularly among the Palestine
refugees in West Jordan. How-
ever, the-property damage and
other financial losses resulting
from the riots seem to have
brought more responsible ele-
ments, even among the groups
opposing the Baghdad pact, to
the view that new outbreaks
should be discouraged.
Jordan's new cabinet ap-
pears to have been received fa-
vorably in Cairo, for the
Egyptian radio on 12 January
asserted that Jordan's govern-
ment and people were at last
united in opposition to "im-
perialist" pacts. The Damascus
radio, however, has continued to
snipe at the Jordanian govern-
ment.
King Hussain is attempting
to stall on a reply to the
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Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi offer to
substitute "Arab" financial
support for the subsidy now
given Jordan by Britain. The
Jordanian foreign minister has
countered with the suggestion
that Lebanon anc1 Iraq be in-
cluded in the group of states
making the offer.
he relative calm
in Jordan may be only temporary.
The question of new parliamenta-
ry elections--the issue which
ostensibly set off the latest
series of riots--has not been
settled, and the American em-
bassy in Amman reported on 13
January, "We are not out of
the woods yet.".
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19 January 1956
Soviet Bloc Relations
With Latin erica
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Premier Bulganin's offer
on 16 January to establish
diplomatic and economic rela-
tions with any Latin American
country is the Soviet Union's
most important policy statement
on Latin America to date. Hun-
gary, taking its cue from the
Kremlin, publicly announced its
desire to increase diplomatic
and trade relations with Latin
America on 18 January. This
appears to be the forerunner
of similar statements by the
rest of the East European
Satellites.
The Soviet Union has diplo-
matic and commercial representa-
tives only in Argen-
tina, Uruguay and
Mexico. Thirteen of
the Latin American
countries maintain
relations with one
or more of the Satel-
ites though there are
only seven Satellite
missions in the area.
Soviet bloc atten-
tion to Latin America
has been increasing
over the past three
years. Diplomatic
missions have been
expanded, and the
USSR has launched a
strong cultural
offensive. Soviet
bloc trade with Latin
America quadrupled in
1954 over 1953, a-
mounting to about
$250,000,000. On the
basis of preliminary
estimates, -trade in
1955 has increased
slightly over 1954.
Soviet trade
offers to Latin
America have been tailored to
local situations. An increase
in Soviet bloc deliveries of
industrial goods and petroleum
products in return for agri-
cultural products appears to
be stimulating greater Latin
American interest in bloc
markets. Uruguay, for example,
while denying any intention of
diplomatic rapprochement with
the bloc, has recently increased
trade contracts with Poland,
East Germany, and Communist
China.
Ambassador Bohlen comments
that the USSR may be expected
to make good on Bulganin's offer
LATIN AMERICAN
REPUBLICS
SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITIES
U.S.S.R. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
SATELLITE DIPLOMATIC MISSION
SOVIET BLOC TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND ARRANGEMENTS
SOVIET BLOC CULTURAL SOCIETIES
))/3 p
Cordob
Valparaiso?, Rosaries
A
1 4jo
Polish minister resident in Mexico has
been accredited to Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador.
A Czech consul reportedly will be sent
to Colombia.
:k;IATAO^
Montevideo
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19 January 1956
if there are any takers in Latin
America, particularly where the
program is limited to certain
types of equipment, technical
assistance, and "exchange of
experience." He notes that the
offer includes items in short
supply in the Soviet Union,
such as timber products and
cellulose paper products, and
items of high priority in the
Soviet internal economy, such
as rolled steel, cement, and
paint.
Last month the Soviet
ambassador and first secretary
in Mexico visited Ecuador and
Peru, their first trip through
Latin America outside of Mex-
ico. Conferring with Ecuadoran
officials, the diplomats offered
to establish diplomatic rely-'
tions, which President Velasco
believed "unnecessary-" I
I _j (Concurred in by
ORR)
Yugoslav-Soviet
Economic Co-operation
The increased economic
and technical co-operation en-
visioned in the Yugoslav-Soviet
accord signed in Moscow on 1
September 1955 is becoming a
reality.
An agreement on scientific-
technical co-operation was
signed in Belgrade on 19 Decem-
ber providing for ',the estab-
lishment of a joint commission
to promote mutual scientific
and technical co-operation and
for the exchange of experts
and students.
A trade agreement for 1956
was signed on 6 January. It
provides for an exchange of at
least $35,000,000 worth of goods
each way, nearly double the 1955
exchange. The commodities listed
are primarily raw materials, as
in 1955. Approximately 12 per-
cent of Yugoslav trade in 1956
will be committed to the USSR,
as compared to 18 percent in
1947, the last full trading
year before Tito's expulsion
from the Cominform. Trade data
through October, however,
showed that Yugoslav-Soviet
trade in 1954 and 1955 had
reached only about 45 percent
of the planned goals.
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On 13 January the USSR
agreed to construct and equip
two artificial fertilizer plants
for Yugoslavia by 1959 and to
rehabilitate three small mines.
A thermoelectric power station
of 100,000-kilowatt capacity
is scheduled to be built in
addition to a nitrogen fertilizer
factory with an annual capacity
of 100,000 tons of ammonia and
a factory with a capacity of
250,000 tons of superphosphate
and 120,000 tons of sulfuric
acid per year. Funds for the
fertilizer complexes presumably
will come from the 2-percent
$120,000,000 credit for agri-
cultural investment 25X1
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19 January 1956
On 3 January it was an-
nounced in Moscow that a draft
agreement had been prepared on
nuclear co-operation. Accord-
ing to the communiqu6 the So-
viet Union will aid Yugoslavia.,
in the construction and equip-
ping of an experimental atomic
reactor, for which it will pro-
vide fissionable materials.
The American embassy in Bel-
grade believes that the signing
of the accord is being delayed
as a "bargaining counter" in
Belgrade's. pursuit of comple-
mentary agreements from the
United States and Britain.
The Yugoslav press states
that agreements regarding the
Soviet Advisers and Technicians
In Afghanistan
The Afghan government has
apparently recently decided to
admit Soviet bloc economic con-
sultants into Afghanistan and
to allow Soviet technical per-
sonnel to hold positions re-
quiring their presence in the
country for a considerable pe-
riod of time. Previously Kabul
has rejected the use of advisers
and limited the stay of most
technicians to a few months.
If this policy has in fact been
reversed, the USSR may soon be
in a. position significantly to
influence Afghan economic pol-
icy and to develop an effective
subversive and propaganda net-
work.
$54,000,000 Soviet credit to
Yugoslavia for raw materials
and the gold or foreign ex-
change credit for $30,000,000
will be signed later this month.
The USSR agreed to grant these
funds in ten-year credits at
2 percent.
All of these accords will
be of considerable assistance
to Yugoslavia in maintaining
its position of economic inde-
pendence between West and East.
Although the increase of trade
with the USSR will involve some
reduction of trade with the
West, the Yugoslavs have said
they are anxious to continue
to trade with the free world
and to work closely with the
inter-European economic co-oper
ation organizations.
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19 January 1956
Afghanistan announced on
17 January that it had signed
an agreement with Czechoslo-
vakia for establishment in
Communists Silence ".Clandestine"
Radio Stations
The Communists have sus-
pended clandestine international
propaganda. broadcast services
to Greece, Japan, France and
French North Africa within the
past three months, probably be-
cause the broadcasting inter-
fered with the USSR's diplomatic
objectives in these areas. In
addition, the Soviet leaders
may have calculated that suspen-
sion of their own broadcasts
would strengthen their position
prior to any representations
they may make to the West re-
garding Radio Free Europe and
other stations broadcasting to
the Soviet bloc.
Communist clandestine radio
activities began to shut down
as world tensions diminished
during 1954, and at present
only two are operating--"Oggi
in Italia." and Radio Espana. In-
dependiente. Suspension of
these two is not unlikely.
Radio Free Greece, which has
helped direct Communist activi-
ties in Greece and Greek commu-
nities in the Near East since
1947, was discontinued on 31
December 1955. Transmission
schedules had been gradually
reduced over a. period of months,
and the time formerly allotted
to it was turned over on 2 Jan-
uary to Radio Espana. Indepen
diente. The shutdown removes
a long-term irritant to the
Afghanistan of a Czech office
to advise the government on in-
dustrial matters. This would
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Communist advisers to be ad-
mitted into the country.
](Concurred in by ORR) X1
Greeks, and may strengthen
leftist claims that the USSR is
sincere in its alleged policy
of noninterference in internal
Greek affairs, particularly
with a. view to the coming
Greek elections.
Similar considerations
probably dictated the suspen-
sion of Radio Free Japan prior
to the resumption of Soviet-
Japanese negotiations on 17
January. On 30 December, this
Japanese Communist Party sta-
tion, which has broadcast from
North China, announced it had
"fulfilled its mission" and
would suspend its broadcasts.
Radio Free Japan had been
broadcasting news of Japan since
1 May 1952, in many cases antici-
pating policy statements of the
Japanese government by one to
ommunists apparently believe
overt and "legal" tactics and
"popular diplomacy" have super-
seded clandestine radio as the
best means of reaching the Jap-
anese and dispelling their pos-
sible reservations with respect
to normalizing relations with
the Sino-Soviet bloc.
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19 January 1956
Two quasi-clandestine oper-
ations sponsored by the Comin-
form and directed against the
French government through overt
transmitters in Czechoslovakia,
Poland and Hungary were suspend-
ed last fall.
The Communist "Home Service"
for France, which had been broad-
casting' two daily programs since
October 1950, was stopped on
24 October. The Arabic-language
program, which began regular
broadcasts from Hungary to
French North Africa on 1 July
1954 as "The Voice of National
Independence and Peace," was
last heard on 23 October.
Berlin Situation
East Germany and the So-
viet Union have concluded an
agreement providing for full
control over Allied traffic to
Berlin, by the East German bor-
der police, according to the
5 January issue of Neue Justiz,
a periodical published by the
East German Ministry of Justice.
The agreement, effective 1 De-
cember, implies that East Ger-
many has jurisdiction over Ameri-
can,, British and French traffic
through East Germany. This
jurisdiction is, however, for
the time being exercised in its
behalf by the USSR.
The article stated that
"for the Allied troops in West
Berlin, nothing has materially
changed in the control of traf-
fic," implying that the three
Western powers' access to Berlin
would continue to be subject to
Soviet control. Nevertheless,
the East Germans on 14 January
canceled clearance for the per-
sonal train of the chief of
the American mission to Berlin,
which was to travel to West
Germany that night, on grounds
of "improper procedure in ob-
taining clearance." This is
the first time the Communists
have interfered with a high
American official's train.
At the same time, clearances
already granted for three Ameri-
can military trains were with-
drawn. A series of telephone
calls to the Soviet embassy and
garrison in East Berlin brought
responses that the USSR had no
competence in the matter or,
lacked knowledge of the incident.
Though clearances were
subsequently granted and trains
were permitted to depart as
originally scheduled, the in-
cidents point up, as they were
probably intended to do, that
the Communists considerthe
Allied position in Berlin to
rest on Soviet sufferance.
Further trouble for West
Berlin is indicated by a meet-
ing of East Berlin youth and
party leaders reportedly held on
13 December to plan fora "more
and bigger'' riots in West Berlin
during 1956, using "alert groups"
(armed civilian squads).
In East Berlin on 15 January,
some 15,000 armed members of
factory "combat groups" and
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19 January, 1956
3,000 armed members of para-
military organizations marched
in a Communist demonstration
opposing "militarism and the
aggressive NATO policy" and
demanding the "right of work-
ers to defend their state."
The largest number of armed
USSR Party Congresses
Evidence to date suggests
that the 20th All-Union Commu-
nist Party Congress, scheduled
for 14 February, will convene
as planned.
Party congresses and con-
ferences are now being held in
the Soviet republics and the
oblasts of the Russian Republic
(RSFSR). Eleven of the repub-
lics which had previously
scheduled congresses for the
latter part of December and
early January apparently post-
poned them to the.latter, half
of January. Congresses of the
other four republics (the
Russian Republic does not hold
a. congress) which were scheduled
to open on 14,..171, 2.0, and 26.
January are apparently being
held on schedule,, as are the
Rangoon and Moscow both
appear to be moving rapidly
to carry out the USSR's agree-
ment la.st month(td)provide-
economic and technical aid to
Burma. in exchange for rice..
The Burmese appear to have ac-
cepted the Soviet offer in good
faith, and the USSR may see an
opportunity to make Burma, a.
showcase for its "competitive
coexistence" campaign.
"combat group" marchers pre-
viously reported was only
4,000. So far, Communist
rioters in West Berlin have
been unarmed, but the use of
the "alert groups?i in East
Berlin suggests the eventual
use of arms in West Berlin
riots.
Oblast conferences in the RSFSR.
The republic congresses and
RSFSR Oblast conferences elect
the delegates to the all-Union
congress.
gresses as well..
Postponement of the 11
republic congresses may have
been caused by the failure of
Soviet planning experts to.
produce the draft Sixth Five-
Yea.r Plan on schedule., since
all congresses which were to
be held before 14 January, the
date the draft plan came out,
were apparently postponed,
while the others appear to be
going along as scheduled. The
new Five-Year Plan was dis-
cussed at the Karelo-Finnish
Party Congress which opened.. on
14 January and will probably be
discussed at the other con-
In Rangoon, Minister of
Industries Kyaw Nyein has dis-
closed that contrary to an
earlier report, Burma. would ac-
cept Soviet assistance in the
establishment of. industrial
enterprises,, as well as for
agricultural and irrigation
projects. Kya.w Nyein, who has
been the most outspokenly anti-
Communist Burmese leader,
justified the, acceptance of
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19 January 1956
extensive Soviet..aid ,on the
ground that Burma.'s socialist
government wa.s politica.lly
a.nd ideologically compelled
to make its development pro-
gram a success. He attacked
the loan policies of the In-
terna.tiona.l Bank in strong
terms, comparing them unfavor-
ably with what .he considered
the USSR's generous offers of
assistance, a.ppa,rently with-
out strings attached.
Kyaw Nyein's changed at-
titude toward Soviet industrial
assistance will remove a.n im-
portant deterrent to the de-
velopment of closer ties be-
tween Burma, and the: Sino-Soviet
bloc. Soviet lea.ders will
have a. further opportunity to
soften him when he and Defense
Minister Ba. Swe visit Moscow
sometime after the Burmese pa.r-
lia.mentary elections in April.
Indonesia,
The?_Ma.sjumi-led Indonesian
cabinet reportedly has decided
to accept the resigna.tion of
two Moslem parties--the Islamic
League (PSII) and the Na.hdla.tul
Ula.ma. (NU). The resigna.tion
of the NU, now a. major party
a,s a. result of the na.tiona.l
elections in September and De-
cember, presumably spells de-
feat to the Ma$jumi's hopes that
the two parties could form a.n
alliance a.nd thereby hold a.
strong bargaining position
against the opposition National
Party in negotiation's for a.
successor coalition cabinet.
Whether the cabinet falls
shortly or mana.ges to stay in
office until the new pa.r;lia.-
ment is seated--in March or
April--depends on whether the
moderate Ma.sjumi ca.n ma.inta.in
the support of its small party
allies, certain of which are
Both Kyaw and Ba. Swe accepted
invitations to visit the USSR
extended by Bulganin when he
was in Rangoon.
Meanwhile, a. Burmese of-
fensive against some 3,000 to
4,000 Chinese Nationalist ir-
regulars disposed along the
Thai border in the southern
Shan States is scheduled to be-
gin la.te this month or in early
February. The Burmese are con-
siderably better prepared than
they were last year, a,nd the
Chinese ma,y seek to avoid com-
bat by crossing over into Laos.
At a.ny rate, the Burmese will
probably gain tighter control
,of the border, which will
make the Na.tiona.lists' re-
sumption of the opium trade
much more difficult after
the campaign season ends.
highly irresponsible. The NU
and PSII are expected to align
themselves with the government's
pa.rlia.menta,ry opposition, there-
by leaving the cabinet with a.
majority of only 11 votes... The
defection of six votes would.
cause the cabinet's collapse.
Pa,rlia,ment is now in session,
and a, vote of confidence can be
called at any time. The Na.tiona.l
Party, which leads the opposi-
tion, on 16 January demanded
the cabinet's resignation.
The defection of the NU
and"PSII, over the issue of
Indonesian-Dutch relations
apparently was instigated by,
President Sukarno. With a.n
eye on future cabinet negotia-
tions, Sukarno a.nd the Na.tiona.a
Party have been: maneuvering for
some time to. prevent the forma-
tion of an alliance between the
Ma,s jumi and the NU. With sma.1.1
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11C.URR T _ INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 January 1956
party allies largely wiped out
by the elections and with the
NU aligning itself with the Na.-
tional Party, the isolation of
the Masjumi appears to be ac-
complished.
The Masjumi, which is
actually a, political federation
rather than a unified party is
further weakened by internal
disunity. It reportedly now
faces possible withdrawal of its
largest member organization?
the Muhammadi jah--a,nd the la,t-
ter's formation of a, new federa-
tion with the??:.NU a.nd the. PSI I .
New Egyptian Constitution
The Egyptian constitution
as announced by Prime Minister
Nasr on 16 January provides for
a powerful executive and post-
pones decision on the extent
of popular participation in
the election of.a legislature
--national assembly--at least
until next June. Officially
inspired press comment on the
document emphasizes that under
the.new arrangements the. pres-?
ident can be called t.o account
by the popular will, but there
is nothing:.in..the document to
make this possible.. The pres-
ident not only has power to
dissolve the national assembly,
which is to be elected sunder': .
laws not yet announced,. but the
assembly.cannot amend the budg-
et without the executive's
approval.
Although thee .announcement
of the new constitution alleged-
ly marks the end.-.of the three-
year transition from a military
to a civilian regime:, a.f.urther
interval of six months apparent-
ly has been allowed to dissolve
the Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil (RCC), Nasr presumably
The isolation and possible
fragmentation of the Masjumi
paves the way for a, National
Party-NU coalition, either
joined by the Communists or
dependent on their parliamentary
support. The latter arrange-
ment prevailed under the All
cabinet (1953-55) and a.p-
pa,rently has the approval of
Sukarno. Sukarno's willing-
ness to see a. leftist govern-
ment return to Indonesia. was
emphasized on 15 January when
he publicly endorsed co-
operation among nationalist,
Marxist.and Moslem elements.
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will seek to use this interval
to weed out those persons in
the council who he feels are
not entirely loyal to him, re-
taining a.hard core of faith-
ful henchmen.
ready has.
There.is nothing in the new
constitution to suggest that the
Nas.r.regime intends to relax its
control in the forseeable fu-
ture. Despite the regime's
propaganda, it. seems doubtful
that the constitution will at-
tract to Nasr much positive pop-
ulacr support beyond what he al-
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19 January 1956
growing influence among both
French a.nd Algerian Moslem
moderates gives considerable
weight to his recommenda.tions.
French military measures
remain ineffective as terrorism
spreads, although the press
reports successes in wiping out
rebel bands. At the same time,
rifts are widening between
moderates and extremists among
both the French settlers and
the Algerian Moslems.
Liberal French settlers
led by Jacques Chevallier, mayor
of Algiers, feel that political
aecenodati'o`n to demands of the
Algerian Moslems will have to
be made before order can be
restored. Nevertheless, Gover-
nor General Soustelle continues
to push his policy of fuller
integration of Algeria, with
France. He is likely to be
repla.ced after the formation
of a. government in Paris.
Meanwhile, extremist French
settlers are demanding drastic
mea.sures to suppress the ter-
rorists and rebels.
Chevallier predicts that
if the present administrative
ma.chinery, which has virtually
collapsed, is not replaced
by "something realistic" with-
in two months, France will be
faced with a general insur-
rection. Some moderate Moslems
give the government only a. month
in which to act.
Chevallier proposes round-
ta.ble ta.lks with representa.tives
from all Algerian and French
groups, including extremists,
to discuss a, form of federation
within a. revised French Union.
Such a plan presupposes removal
of political inequalities a.nd
establishment of a, single elec--
tora.l list., Chevallier is con-
fident that a. cea.se-fire would
follow agreement on his proposal.
While many aspects of his pro-
posal are still tentative, his
PART II
Sa.lah ben Youssef, Tunisian
extremist nationalist, declared
"open war,, this week against
the moderate Tunisian govern-
ment and particularly Neo
Destour president Habib Bour_
ghiba, after the government
banned his proposed "
Thus fa.r, Bourghiba. has
maintained firm control over
the Neo-Destour party a,ppara,tus,
which Ben Youssef seeks to
usurp. The present economic
crisis, however, is a. major
factor in Ben Youssef's favor.
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19 January 1956
SPANISH MOROCCO
The Spanish government
declared on 13 January that it
would grant self-government to
Morocco while reserving Spanish
rights vis-a.-vis France. The
ambiguous declara,tioa probably
was designed to enable.Spa.in to
pose a.s a. sincere a.dvoca.te
of Moroccan aspirations while
again serving notice that it
expects to share in any conces-
sions France obtains in an in-
dependent Morocco. The move
may also be a, gambit to persuade
the Moroccans to press for
Greek Elections
The formation of a Popular
Front on 18 January for the
Greek elections gives a Commu-
nist-front party its first strong.
voice in Greek politics in
several years. The front may
offer a. serious challenge to
Prime Minister Ka.ra.ma.nlis'
National Radical Union (ERE)
in next month's elections. A
less broadly based ' front'.deci-..
sively defeated the Greek Rally
in the municipal elections of
November 19 54 .
In addition,to the Commu-
nist-front EDA, the'front is
composed of six ' center ? a.nd
left-of-center parties, includ-
ing the Liberal Democratic Union
of Sophocles Venizelos., and the
Liberal Party whose chief,
George Pa.pa.ndreox, has report-
edly been promised. the premier-
ship if the front wiis
The announcement of the
coalition's formation states
that EDA would be apportioned
20 of the Popular Fr'ont''s
Spanish participation in forth-
coming negotiations.
Despite these efforts by
Madrid to mend political fences
in Spanish Morocco, the na.tion-
a.lists are dissatisfied with
Spanish policy and probably
will continue to press for full
independence and unification
of all zones of Morocco under
the sultan. The nationalists
will also consider the recent
move to place all political
refugees in Spanish Morocco in
detention camps a.n unfriendly
a.ct attributable to the 10
January meeting between Spanish
high commissioner Garcia-Va.lino
and French resident general
Dubois.
parliamentary seats in the
event of victory. Although the
bargaining which preceded the
announcement almost certainly
gave each party an agreed total
of seats, the front's primary
objective is said to be the
dissolution of the new pa.rlia.-
ment and a. call for new elec-
t.ions under a. changed electoral
system. However, the mutual
rivalries and animosities a-
mong'the party leaders, which
these negotiations have in-
tensified, may cause defections
from the front.
The polarization of Greek
politics, indicated by the gap
between the ERE at one extreme
and the front a.t the other, is
dangerous to Greece, and there
are indications that Ka.rama.nlis
recognizes this,. Karamanlis
may yetcsucceeid in recreating
a, strong liberal opposition par-
t under Venizelos
Such a party pre-
sumably would be composed of the
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19 January 1956
segment of the non-Communist
electorate which opposes Kara.-
ma.nlis and might otherwise ab-
stain from voting or supporting
the front. The influential
owner of the progovernment news-
paper Ka.thimerini, Eleni Vlachou,
says the prime minister's party
organization is "sketchy." She
estimates he will win between
100 and 180 parliamentary seats.
Since
the
new
parliament
will again
have
300
seats,
Cyprus
Two meetings between
Cypriot archbishop Makarios
and British governor Harding
in the past ten days have in-
creased the possibility that a.
provisional settlement of the
Cyprus issue will be reached
in the next few weeks. Harding
has been summoned to London for
consultation with Prime Minister
Eden.
Harding apparently made
minor textual revision of the
formula as a result of his
latest meeting with Makarios.
According to the British am-
bassador in Washington, Hard-
ing has recommended that this
Karamanlis' prospects at pres-
ent seem to depend on whether
he can arouse greater popular
support and on how firmly the
front maintains its coherence.
Should Ka.rama.nlis,fail to win
a, majority and the Popular
Front form a new government,
the possibility would immediate-
ly arise that the ultracon-
servative secret military
society IDEA might move to
overthrow the government and
establish a rig
dictatorship.
constitute the final British
offer. London and Harding
have shown no intention of
making further concessions, and
the renewal of British pres-
sure in Athens suggests they
expect Makarios and the Greek
government ultimately to accept
the formula, substantially as
is.
the present stalemate continues
may lead Ma.karios to accept
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19 January 1956
Brita.in's formula. soon. His
refusal on 13 Ja.nua.ry to commit
himself on using his influence
to combat terrorism ?however,
suggests that he will regard a.
settlement as a. truce during
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Complete returns from the
Finnish presidential election
of 16-17 January give 88 elec-
toral votes to the Agrarian
Pa.rty's candidate, Prime Minim.
ister Kekkonen, and to the
Social Democratic nominee,
K. A. Fa.gerholm,74 out of a.
total of 300. Election requires
151 votes, and the next few
weeks will see considerable ba.r-
ga.ining among the parties in
preparation for the electoral
college balloting on 15 Febru-
ary..
The 57 votes of the Commu-
nist-front SKDL party are likely
to go to Kekkonep, whom the Com=
munists regard as the most
PART II
which his followers ca.n re-
organize for the next phase of
the enosis campaign--i.e.,
demands for immediate self-
determination upon the estab-
lishment of self-government.
acceptable of the non-Communist
contenders. Kekkonen would
still need to find a.dditiona,l
support, however, among the
three small bourgeois parties.
Prior to the election, two of
these parties indicated tha.t
they favored Fa.gerholm rather
tha.n Kekkonen.
In the prospective dead-
lock, the electoral college
might turn for a, compromise to
one of the small non-Communist:
parties' ca.ndida,tes, or to the
85-year-old President Paa.si-
kivi, who has reportedly in-
dicated that he would agree to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 January 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION
With the approach of the
annual meeting of the foreign
ministers of SEATO's member
countries* in Karachi on 6
March, member and nonmember
nations in the treaty area are
expressing a. variety of views,
mostly critical, on the orga:ni-
zation. Some hope, however, to
use SEATO to get more US aid.
Communist spokesmen, while
ostensibly unconcerned over
SEATO's present military status,
seem nevertheless worried over
its potential.
Philippines-Thailand-Pakistan
Philippine ambassador Romulo
recently used the term "paper
facade" in describing his per.-
sona.l views of SEATO, stating
that it had thus far failed to
capture the imagination of Asians.
He contrasted it with the impact
made by Bulga.nin's and Khru-
shchev's trip.
Thailand, while still co-
operating fully on organizational
matters, is believed to have had
its initial hopes disappointed
by the organization's slow devel-
opment. It is in a receptive
mood for measures to strengthen
SEATO and may derive some encour-
agement from the military talks
it is now conducting with Laos.
These talks may ultimately be
brought under SEATO auspices.
Pakistan's interest in
SEATO has probably diminished
somewhat with the advent of the
Baghdad pact, which it feels
offers a more convenient lever
for obtaining economic and mili-
tary aid.
SEATO members now are dis-
cussing organizational changes,
such as the establishment of a
more effective executive body.
There is general agreement
among them on the need for this
to invigorate the pact. The
Philippines, supported by
Pakistan, has proposed greater
attention to the economic
aspects of the treaty, and New
Zealand favors greater economic
aid to the Asian members.
United Kingdom
Britain and France have
from the start pursued a "go-
slow" policy in SEATO. Britaia
has been'reluctant to approve
several projects during the past
year--a communique on the Laotian
situation, public reports on
SEATO's activities, a public
relations office, and a, research
and analysis center. The British
attitude, described by one ob-
server as a desire to keep SEATO
"small, unobtrusive and cheap,"
apparently stems from a. deter-
mination to avoid provoking
Communist China. and the Viet
Minh, and stirring up antipathies
among the nonmember neutralist
nations of the treaty area..
On the question of the
public reports, for example,
Britain's position is that a
detailed analysis of the politi-
cal situation in the Indochina
states should be avoided, as the
Communists could misrepresent
this as a violation of the Geneva
agreements.
The United Kingdom is un-
likely to become enthusiastic
about SEATO unless the present
membership is broadened to in-
clude the important "neutralist"
countries of the area., in partic-
ular Burma. and Indonesia. There
is little prospect that this can
be accomplished, in view of their
distaste for alliances with West-
ern powers and their careful
avoidance of attitudes offensive
to the Communists.
THE PHILIPPINES' THAIILAMD, THEEUN'IITEa KINGDOM
AND THE UNITED STATES.
The French, like the British,
are fearful of disturbing the
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status quo in the area. In ad-
dition, they have little taste
for assuming additional respon-
sibilities in a part of the
world where their influence is
rapidly being phased out.
Burma-Indonesia.
Burma's premier is opposed
to SEATO as a, military bloc
contributing to world tension,
without providing anything of
a. constructive nature to its
underdeveloped Asian partici-
pants. In Indonesia, although
there has been little comment
on SEATO during the past year,
there is no segment of opinion
which favors a deviation from
that country's "independent"
foreign policy.
Nehru has taken the posi-
tion that India's association
would mean a reversal of its
policy of nonalignment, and has
said that SEATO's whole approach
--diplomacy by threat--is not
only wrong but dangerous. During
the recent visit to India of
Bulga.nin and Khrushchev, when
the Soviet leaders made repeated
attacks on the existence of
military blocs, Nehru took the
occasion to note that India,"in
no camp and no military alliance,"
sought only "an alliance based
on good will and co-operation."
Possible New Members
The treaty area. as defined
in the pact now excludes Nation-
alist China, from membership.
Rumors from Taipei that the
Philippines might sponsor it
for membership at the forthcbming
council meeting have been denied
by Philippine foreign minister
Garcia. He told the press,
however, that Taipei could count
on Philippine support if the
proposal arose.. In the unlikely
event that such a move were
made, it would be promptly
vetoed by other members.
The Chinese Nationalist
foreign minister has suggested
that his country, without enjoy-
ing membership status, might
exchange information on anti-
Communist measures with SEATO
under "US auspices."
Ceylon, among the Colombo
powers, would appear to have
the earliest potential for
membership. It might be in-
clined to join the pact if
assurances of substantial Ameri-
can economic aid were made.
The Indochinese states to whom
the treaty's benefits are now
extended by protocol have
varying views on the desirabil-
ity of SEATO membership.
South Vietnam has been
reported eager to join, and
President Diem has remarked
on the necessity of making
SEATO more "organic" to his
country. The government views
SEATO as its main bulwark a-
gainst the threat of Viet Minh
aggression and believes member-
ship would enhance both this
assurance and its own prestige.
Laos has shown a, growing
interest in SEATO. However, it
demonstrated discomfort in re-
8ponse to SEATO initiative last
July in studying-the Pa.thet.
Lao situation. Premier Ka.tay
recently told the press that
Laos was gratified at being
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19 January 1956
under SEATO's protection, and
that the question of its future
membership would have to be de-
cided by the "big powers" in the
light of their interpretation
of the Geneva agreements.
Cambodia is even less in-
clined toward membership now,
satisfied as it is with the
backing of SEATO at no risk to
its development of an outward
appearance of neutrality.
The question of future
membership for the Indochina
states is complicated by the
present members'' varying inter-
pretations of the letter and
spirit of the Geneva agreements.
The present opposition of Britain
and France precludes acceptance
by the required unanimous. vote,
and their sensitivity to Com-
munist and neutralist opposition
in the area is not likely to
diminish in the foreseeable
future.
Communist Views
Communist spokesmen, while
apparently unworried over SEATO's
present military status, seem
nevertheless concerned over its
potential, and lose no opportu-
nity to distort its aims and
activities. The Viet Minh at-
titude toward SEATO, as reflect-
ed in propaganda statements,
has from its inception been
one of hostility.
SEATO is described as
having an aggressive intent
and as "a threat to peace in
Asia and the rest of the
world." Typical is Ho Chi
Minh's statement of 1 January
that "the Southeast Asia ag-
gressive bloc, headed by the
United States," is an "in-
sidious plot of the bellicose
imperialist camp." It is
pictured as an instrument of
the Americans that aims to
pit "Asians against Asians"
and that encourages South
Vietnam to invade the North.
The Viet Minh, backed by
Chinese military power, prob-
ably has no immediate fear of
SEATO's offensive capabilities.
The tenor of the Viet Minh
statements does, however, in-
dicate considerable frustra-
tion at the protocol extending
SEATO protection to non-
Communist Indochina, which in
effect exposes the Viet Minh
to immediate international
reaction to any military action
it might undertake.
Peiping's Tactics
Because the Chinese Com-
munists apparently believe
that SEATO, bolstered by Ameri-
can power, is one of several
obstacles to further Commu-
nist penetration in Southeast
Asia, they have adopted various
measures to prevent its ex-
pansion and to weaken its in-
fluence. Through conspicuous
conciliatory tactics, the Chi-
nese are continuing their ef-
forts to keep additional states
from joining SEATO and to raise
doubts concerning the need for
the organization.
Thus, while Communist
China increases official and
unofficial contacts with SEATO
and nonmember nations, the
regime's propaganda emphasizes
that regional fears of Chinese
Communist aggression and sub-
version are groundless and
that non-Communism does not
necessitate anti-Communism.
Peiping has warned, however,
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19 January 1956
that it could not tolerate any
SEATO involvement in the Pathet
Lao stronghold of northern
Laos, adjacent to its border.
To take any possible ad-
vantage of the desire of neu-
tral nations for a "peaceful"
alternative to SEATO, the Chi-
nese Communists have proposed
a Far Eastern "collective
peace pact," which would in-
clude the United States and
Japan. They apparently hoped
by this maneuver to embarrass
the United States if it re-
fused to join such a pact or
prevent the United States from
giving Far Eastern nations
military aid if it did,
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19 January 1956
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN NORTHWEST CHINA
Peiping's announcement on
29 December that construction
will begin in 1956 on a 930-
mile railroad from Lanchou to
Tsinghai adds new emphasis to
the Chinese oil and mineralog-
ical development program
initiated on a large scale
during 1955 in Tsinghai Prov-
in ce, bordering on Tibet.
Permanent settlement of the
remote western province's
Tsaidam Basin by thousands of
Chinese, who will outnumber
the indigenous population, has
already begun, The development
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19 January 1956
of this province and concurrent
Chinese expansion of influence
in Northwest China and in
neighboring Tibet has increas-
ingly important strategic impli-
cations.
The decision to build the
railroad was probably made
during late 1955 because no
mention of the project was made
in the Five-Year Plan published
last summer. Such a recent
decision would suggest that
the Chinese Communists, in their
intensive nationwide search
for minerals, have found rich
resources in the Tsaidam Basin.
Since the completion of
the main Chinese east-west
Lunghai railway to La.nchou in
October 1952, construction on
three new lines has necessi-
tated the development of a
major rail yard in the growing
Lanchou industrial center.
Locomotive servicing facili-
ties, freight and passenger
stations, and a locomotive
repair plant are being built,
TSIflGHR1
S I K A N G
along with China's first large
modern oil refinery and a, new
oil-drilling equipment plant.
From the Lanchou area,
the extension of the Sinkiang
railroad to the Yumen oilfields
and Sinkiang Province has the
highest construction priority.
The 1955 construction goal was
revised twice and an additional
85 miles of track was laid to
the edge of the Yumen oil basin,
a full year ahead of schedule.
Construction of a new
680-mile trunk route between
Lanchou and Paotou, the future
iron and steel center in Inner
Mongolia, began late in 1954.
Actual tracklaying on a. 15-mile
Hsining
Golmo
-h-FRoilrood
.}- -(.Railroad planned or
under cono-tion
19 JANUARY 1956
Highway ------ Highway, under
construction
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swampy section south of Paotou--
requiring much bridging--began
late in 1955 ahead of plan.
On the La.nchou end., work on a
large Yellow River bridge is
half completed and work con-
tinues on ten tunnels and 19
additional. bridges in the
rugged first 50-mile section
-north of Lanchou. In between,
the line is to traverse the
Tangkoli desert, a difficult
region of shifting sands.
The announcement on 29
December of the survey of the
first 100 miles of a. new 930-
mile Lanchou-Tsingha.i railroad
terminating in the oil-rich
Tsa.idam Basin indicates the
enormity of the rail construc-
tion effort centered at Lanchou.
While a. number of years will
be required for the completion
of these various projects, it
is apparent that the rich oil
and mineral resources in the
area have stimulated a signifi-
cant economic development pro-
gram, bringing into non-Chinese
minority districts large num-
bers of Chinese settlers, a
move which will have lasting
economic and political in-
fluences on the area.
Highways
Essential to any mineral
development program in.Tsinghai
Province is an adequate system
of communications. Construc-
tion of the Tsinghai-Tibet
trunk highway was pressed in
1954. This road gives direct
access to the Tsa.idam, passing
through the former Tibetan-
Mongolian caravansary of Golmo,
which has now become a thriving
Chinese community.
Existing roads in the area
were rebuilt and others newly
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constructed in 1954 and 1955
to permit access to the entire
rim of the Tsaidam Basin, and
to facilitate major supply
shipments from neighboring
provinces. One such road
connects the Yumen oilfield
with Golmo by passing through
the 16,000-foot Humboldt Range.
The urgency with which the
Chinese are pressing this work
is indicated by the recent
arrival of consignments of over
1,000 trucks at Golmo.
Oil and Mining
The mineralogical program
is stated by Peiping to be
primarily concerned with oil,
although important deposits of
coal, lead, borax, manganese,
copper, gold, silver, sulphur
and iron have also been claimed.
Several new mining centers have
sprung up, some obviously con-
cerned with oil extraction',
and others only mentioned by
name without reference to their
activities.
Much of the work is being
accomplished by forced labor
units, comprised of indigenous
Moslems, Mongols and Tibetans,
as well as Chinese from other
parts of the country. A ten-
year provincial immigration
and reclamation plan has been
adopted which provides for a
tripling of Tsinghai's popu-
lation. Peiping claims that
during this winter and spring
26,000 people will migrate to
the province. Communist state-
ments emphasize the rapid
growth of population in west-
ern China since 1950; and
Sining, Tsinghai's capital,
has had a. population increase
of 140 percent to 120,000.
(-Prepared by
ORR)
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