CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000600140001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 20, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CO WflDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 20
OCI NO. 8198/55
20 October 1955
/4 ,
OOC`UMENr. NO..
NG CHANGE IN CLASS. El
Q DECLASSIFIED
Ctn. CHANGED. To:
NEXT REVtE W DATE:
DATE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 1955
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE:. ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
There seems to be little likelihood of any new Soviet moves
toward German unity at t>ie foreign ministers' meeting, and a
member of the Soviet Presidium has cautioned against judging the
success of the conference on this issue alone. The USSR will
probably insist, as it has in the past,, that establishment of a
European security system is a primary prerequisite to German
unification. With respect to European security, the USSR may
accept some features of Western security plans for its own two-
stage security program.
EGYPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . , 4 . . . FY .. . Page 2
Egypt last week week appeared to be well on the way to re-
gaining its dominant position among the Arab powers which it lost
last spring as a result of the Turkish--Iraqi pact and its own
subsequent failure to secure a military alignment with Saudi
Arabia. The Nasr government, ?noreover, continues to exploit
the arms agreement with the Soviet bloc not only to strengthen
Egypt's position among the other Arab powers, but also to estab-
lish Egypt as a key neutral between East and West. Among deve7.-
opments during the past week were: (1) The Arab foreign minis-
ters, concluding a conference in Cairo, for the most part expressed
themselves in favor of doing business with the USSR; (2) the
USSR and Egypt announced a Soviet offer of assistance in building
the Aswan Jam; and (3) quasi-official Egyptian sources spread
rumors that a second Asian-African conference would be held -
during the coming year in Cairo.
SAAR REFERENDUM. . . . . . . . A 7 . _ . . . . Page 4
Most observers expect that the Saar statute, which would
give the Saar territory "European" status, will be rejected when
the population of the area goes to the polls on 23 October. Paris
has publicly insisted that rejection of the statute will mean auto-
matic return of the territory to French control. The German gov-
ernment is reported to favor an interim solution under which the
West European Union Council would retain control over the area in
ease the statute is rejectpd. The British Foreign Office is con-
sidering~ a similar plan.
Page 5
A heavy majority in favor of Premier Diem is considered
certain in the 23 October referendum to choose between Diem and
Bao Dai as chief of state,
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The Soviet Scene: The spotlight has temporarily switched from
oscow to he Crimea, where Secretary Khrushchev and Pre-
mier Bulganin have been vacationing. Recently most of the
other top leaders of party, government, and armed forces
joined them, ostensibly to attend a celebration honoring
the city of Sevastopol, but probably to take part in policy
conferences. . . . . . . ... . . . . Page 1
USSR Tries to Mollif French on North African Issue: Since the
French expresso their resentment of the Soviet vote on the
Algerian issue in the UN by canceling the Faure-Pinay trip
to Moscow, the USSR has been trying to heal the breach.
The USSR has emphasized that it is interested in having the
French retain their position in North Africa, because it
learned in Indochina that when the French move out of an
area the Americans move in. I . . . . . Page 2 25X1
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French Morocco: The four-member Council of the Throne installed
in-R-ab-aif-oA 17 October is not likely to find a way out of
the two-year-old Moroccan impasse. Istiglal, the foremost
nationalist organization, refuses to participate in the
government now being formed, thereby depriving it of a truly
representative character. The military situation in north-
east Morocco remains grave. F__ I . . . . . Page 3
Premier Faure Wins Respite: The Frencb National Assembly's 308-
254 o obeer accepting the government's Algerian
program probably assures Premier ]Faure's tenure through the
Geneva conference. However, he no longer has the confi-
dence of the majority of the deputies.
. . . . . . . . Page 4
Israel's Political Situation: The delay by the Israeli parlia-
ment in accepting the coalition Prime Minister-designate
Ben-Gurion has proposed as the basis of his government
offers leaders of the dominant Mapai labor party an oppor-
tunity to continue negotiations in an attempt to form a
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more pro-Western cabinet. I I. . . . . . Page 4 25X1
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Afghan-Pakistani Dis ute: Despite previous Afghan threats,
t ere were no disturbances on 14 October when Pakistan
merged the Pushtoon areas into a single province with West
Pakistan.
. . . . . . . Page 5
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October without achieving any significant progress toward
a settlement. The.Pathets, however, successfully avoided
a final break and apparently are in a good position to pro-
long further the inconclusive negotiations which first
began between the two parties last Januarys age 9 25X1
Leading Indonesian Parties Maneuver for Political Allies: The
USSR Plans Long--`r ange Flights to Antarctica: Soviet delegates
to a conference for the International Geophysical Year
(1957-1958) have informally revealed plans to establish
two routes for regular flights to the Soviet Antarctic
base on Knox Coast: . . ? ? a . . . Page 7 25X1
Laos: The talks in Rangoon between Premier Katay and Prince
Souphannouvong, leader of the Pathet Lao, concluded on 13
ndones an National arty s lea 6Ver t e asjum in un-
official election returns has been reduced to less than
one percent as a result of heavy Masjumi majorities in
islands other than Java. The major Moslem parties are
discussing means of strengthening their position, while
the_ right and left wings of the National Party are fight-
ing for party leadership. If the two major Moslem parties
form a united front, they could control an cabinet formed
together with the Nationalists. . . . . Page 10 25X1
Satellite Agricultural Outlook: Agricultural production in
the Eastern European Satellites slhould be better this year
than in any year since 1951, even though the crops can
only be described as fair. Such :improvement as has occurred
is due chiefly to somewhat more favorable weather, and
does not indicate substantial progress in solving agri-
cultural problems. ? o r a . o ? Page 10 25X1
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Page 1
Recent events have made the Middle East of foremost
importance in East-West relations and a subject for discussion
at the foreign ministers' conference. Moscow's decision to
supply Middle East states with arms and Iran's adherence to
the Western-sponsored "northern tier" defense arrangement
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SATELLITES ACT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES . . Page 3
Since the Geneva conference, the European Satellites have
demonstrated a strong interest in improving diplomatic, cultural
and economic relations with the West, and particularly with
the United States. At the same time, they have publicly taken
the position that the United States should reciprocate these
gestures by moderating its "antagonistic" policy toward the
Soviet bloc.
INDIA FACES PROBLEMS IN REORGANIZING STATES ALONG LINGUISTIC
L
170
. . . . . . . . . Page 5
The proposed reorganization of the Indian states along
linguistic lines will create such legal and administrative
problems for the government that New Delhi will probably create
only a few states in the coming year and postpone the complete
reorganization until after the national elections of December
1956.
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Soviet propaganda and
public statements of late have
merely reiterated the Soviet
position on Germany and Euro-
pean security enunciated at
the summit meeting.. Accordirg
to Moscow, West German member-
ship in NATO and the unlikeli-
hood that NATO can be dissolved
at this time make German unity
at present impossible.
This line, most recently
set forth by Presidium member
Suslov in Berlin, includes the
argument that the success of
the forthcoming foreign min-
isters' conference should not
be judged on this issue.
Party Secretary Khrushchev,
in a. recent interview with
Canadian foreign minister
Pearson, said it was dangerous
enough for two thirds of Ger-
many to be in NATO, and asked,
"How could the Soviet Union ac-
cept three thirds of Germany
in NATO?" On these grounds,
Foreign Minister Molotov will
presumably argue at Geneva
that there is no point in dis-
cussing such detailed unifica-
tion questions as German elec-
tions.
The USSR will probably con-
tinue to argue that German
unity should be discussed by
the Germans themselves, and
in line with that insist that
a prerequisite to unity is an
East-West German rapprochement,
beginning with co-operation in
the economic and cultural fields.
There seems little likeli-
hood of any new Soviet offers
for German unity or free all-
German elections at the foreign
ministers' meeting. In the
past the USSR has professed
support for free elections,
even with international super-
vision, but has failed to make
a specific enough offer to con-
vince the West of its sincerity.
Soviet leaders hold that
the primary prerequisite to
German unification is the
establishment of a. European
security system which, by even-
tually replacing NATO, would
remove the major obstacle to
German unity. The West has
consistently held that to be
acceptable, the security system
must be based on a united Ger-
many.
At the summit conference
the Soviet Union proposed a
two-:stage security plan. The
first stage was new and called
for an agreement between NATO
and the Warsaw pact states not
to use force, to consult if
any threat to the peace arose,
and to make no increase in the
size of armed forces stationed
in other European states. Dur-
ing the first stage, existing
commitments to military blocs
need not be abandoned. In the
second stage, however, the full
security organization, first
proposed in February 1954,
would be set up and would re-
place both NATO and the War-
saw pact.
The USSR at that time
sought agreement to the entire
plan? including the fixing of
a, date two or three years hence
when the second stage would go
into effect. Moscow also made
it plain that an ultimate
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objective of the security plan
was the withdrawal of all for-
eign troops from Europe.
The USSR later in the con-
ference offered a proposal under
which most of the features of
the first stage would be adopted
without any commitment to the
second stage or any change in
the status of NATO and the
Warsaw pact. This step would
serve the minimum Soviet ob-
jective of deepening the freeze
on the split of Europe.
More is likely to be heard
about these Soviet plans, as
Moscow seeks to get agreement
on the principles of its program
as a step toward an all-embrac-
ing security plan.
The USSR has reacted
sharply to reports that the
West is planning to offer guar-
antees against any attack by
a united Germany incorporated
in NATO. Khrushchev told the
Canadian foreign minister con-
temptuously that security guar-
antees are only for "small
Egypt last week appeared
to be well on the way to re-
gaining its dominant position
among the Arab powers which it
lost last spring as a result
of the Turkish-Iraqi pact and
its own subsequent failure to
secure a military alignment
with Saudi Arabia. The Nasr
government, moreover, continued
to exploit the arms agreement
with the Soviet bloc not only
to strengthen Egypt's position
among the other Arab powers,
but also to establish Egypt
nations" and that furthermore
the USSR could not put any
faith in assurances by the
three principal Western allies,
since all of them harbor ag-
gressive intentions against
the USSR.
At the summit conference,
however, the USSR did express
interest in Eden's proposal
for a five-power security
pact, suggesting that some
other European powers should
be included at the start with
still others added gradually
thereafter.
The USSR can be expected
to adopt gradually some of
the features of security plans
put forward by the West. One
might be the British sugges-
tion for the creation of a
European zone where troops
would be kept within agreed
limitations and perhaps under
international inspection.
The USSR might offer a similar
plan limited to East and West
German forces, or perhaps in-
cluding all troops in Germany.
as a key neutral between East
and West.
Among developments during
the past week were: (1) The
Arab foreign ministers, con-
cluding a conference in Cairo,
for the most part expressed
themselves ir:.favor..of.doing
business with the USSR; (2) the
USSR and Egypt announced a So-
viet offer of assistance in
building the Aswan dam; and (3)
quasi-official Egyptian sources
encouraged rumors that a second
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Asian-African conference would
be held during the coming year
in Cairo. (See also Part III,
P. 1 . )
Aswan High Dam
For some time it has been
apparent that the USSR was
interested in participating in
at least some phases of Egypt's
TVA-like 1.3-billion-dollar
Sadd-el-Asli Project.
Following the public an-
nouncement of the Soviet offer
to build the Aswan high dam,
the Egyptian ambassador in
Washington said that the USSR
had suggested a 30-year loan
for an unspecified amount at
2-percent interest payable in
Egyptian cotton and rice. The
estimated cost of the dam is
approximately $480,000,000.
Equipment worth $275,000,000
would have to be imported and
Egypt therefore would need this
amount in foreign currency. By
providing equipment and tech-
nical assistance the Soviet
Union can create at Aswan an
enormous monument to Soviet
industry in the Middle East.
The driving ambition of
the Nasr regime to construct
this project, and the frustra-
tions it has experienced in
trying to obtain Western fi-
nancing, provide an ideal op-
portunity for Soviet exploita-
tion. From the Egyptian point
of view, it would be difficult
to refuse an attractive Soviet
offer, especially since it
would be the result of earlier
Egyptian initiative.
In the past two weeks
both Radio Cairo and the Egyp-
tian newspaper Al Ahram have
ri E 0 Y P T
m ~ .Qaaa
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Alexandria ? Part Sa d
*Cairo -
Existing Aswan dam
~A
Proposed Aswan high dam
Expected reservoir area
SAUDI
ARABIA
RED
-SEA
-Wadi Haile
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stated that most of the 29
countries which met at Bandung
consider Cairo the appropriate
location for another Asian-
African conference. Both the
Cairo and Arab Jerusalem radios
have referred to the "coming
conference," and the Egyptian
cabinet has reportedly agreed
to convoke the next meeting
in Cairo in November 1956.
However, of the five
Colombo powers--Burma, Ceylon,
India, Indonesia, and Pakistan
--which sponsored the confer-
ence in Bandung last April and
which were made responsible for
arranging subsequent meetings,
only Ceylon is reported to have
shown interest in another meet-
ing. The Indonesian foreign
minister said last week that
Ceylon's Prime Minister Kotela-
wala had written Nasr suggest-
ing a conference in Cairo in
1956.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Reports on Ceylon's atti-
tude have been conflicting,
however. The London Times of
19 September stated that K'otela-
wala had suggested another meet-
ing of the Colombo powers as
an alternative to a second
Asian-African conference. Ac-
cording to the American charge
in Colombo, the Ceylonese gov-
ernment indicated on 5 October
that it would try to have the
next Asian-African meeting in
Colombo if the troubled situa-
tion in the Arab area did not
make Cairo a suitable place.
The other Colombo powers
are apparently indifferent at
present to suggestions for
SAAR REFERENDUM
Most observers expect that
the Saar statute will be re-
jected in the referendum sched-
uled for 23 October. In voting
against the statute, the Saar-
landers would be rejecting
"European" status under which
they would have local autonomy,
while all foreign and defense
matters would be controlled by
the Western European Union
(WEU).
Spokesmen for the French
government, which apparently
has not given up hope for the
statute, profess to believe
that the still-undecided vote
another Asian-African meeting.
Indonesia's foreign minister
has stated emphatically that
Kotelawala, in writing Nasr
about another gathering, had
acted on his own initiative and
without consulting Indonesia.
The Indian charge in Cairo said
last week that he knew of no
approaches made on this subject,
and commented that he saw no
useful purpose in a new con-
ference at this time since the
Asian-African bloc was already
co-ordinating its efforts
effectively in the UN in the
spirit of Bandung. 25X1
(Prepared jointly
y URA AAD OCI)
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can swing the referendum favor-
ably.
On the other hand, a West
German Foreign Ministry official
has returned from a survey~in
the Saar with the impression
that a "sinking ship" atmos-
phere prevails, and that the
pro-French Saar premier,
Johannes Hoffmann, is being
deserted by his former politi-
cal allies in the government.
The German Saarbund, a
West German organization cam-
paigning against the statute,
publicly demanded on 18 October
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
that rejection of the statute
be followed not by reimposition
of French control, but by an
interim solution provided by
the WEU, with the pro-German
parties in the Saar retaining
their freedom and legal status.
This is reported to be the
private position of Adenauer's
Christian Democratic Union and
is similar to a plan being con-
sidered by the British Foreign
Office. Paris, however, has
publicly insisted that rejec-
tion of the statute will mean
VIETNAM REFERENDUM
The Diem government is
confidently proceeding with
preparations for the referendum
on 23 October to depose Bao
Dai, disdainful of last-ditch
efforts by the dissident Viet-
namese clique in Paris to
thwart this move. All Viet-
namese over 18 registered in
the recent census will be eli-
gible to cast a, secret ballot
choosing between Diem and Bao
Da.i for the post of chief of
state. A decision favorable
to Diem is considered certain.
In Paris, Bao Da.i announced
on 18 October that he was dis-
missing Diem from office to
prevent the latter's "dicta-
torial regime" from leading
the Vietnamese further "along
a path which can lead only to
division, war, and possibly
world-wide conflict." Earlier,
on 13 October, Bao Dai appealed
to Britain, France, the United
States, Russia, and India to
refrain from supporting Diem's
referendum action. It also
appears that Bao Dal will
shortly appoint a "government-
in-exile," drawing from the am-
ple ranks of disgruntled
automatic return of the territory
to French control.
The WEU Council, meanwhile,
has decided to retain control
of the Saar in any event for
the period it considers neces-
sary for verifying the vote.
It has also decided to leave
open for the time being the
question of the extent of duties
of the WEUJ commission supervis-
ing the referendum so that it
can make use of the commission
gencies arise.
in a flexible manner if
Vietnamese politicians in France.
The Vietnamese government has
unofficially warned that if
France does not resist such a.
move on Bao Dai's part, it will
be considered a "hostile act."
These "paper actions" by
the chief of state will not
deter Diem's hand, but are well
suited for utilization by the
Viet Minh in its continuing
campaign to overthrow the pre-
mier. The Viet Minh has labeled
the referendum plan a. "farce"
and has called on all Viet-
namese to join with the "Father-
land Front" in opposing it.
The referendum is the
first move of the three-step
program to put the government
on a. solid legal and popular
base. It will be followed by
adoption of a constitution and
establishment of a. representa-
tive assembly. Diem's purpose
is not only to silence internal
critics of his one-man rule but
to parry international pressure
for observance of the Geneva
unification schedule.
Faced with an impasse in
attempts to open formal military
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
talks with the French in Paris,
Diem has recalled his ministe-
rial mission to assist in the
fast-changing political situa-
tion at home. On the matter
of negotiations, each side ac-
cuses the other of "stalling,"
although it appears that stiff
bargaining terms of each party
actually precluded early agree-
ment. The French Expeditionary
Corps is now down to 37,500,
and, according to its commander,
it will be down to 30,000 by
Decenber. He reports continu-
ing pressure from Paris for the
return of technical ersonnel.
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The Soviet Scene
The spotlight has tempo-
rarily switched from Moscow to
the Crimea., where party sec-
retary Khrushchev and Premier
Bulganin have been combining
conferences and public appear-
ances with a month-long vaca.tiori.
Recently they were joined by
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan
(returning from his vacation in
Yugoslavia.), by Minister of
State Farms I. A. Benediktov,
and by V. V. Matskevich, who on
17 October was appointed min-
ister of agriculture, filling
a post left vacant for six
months. Matskevich, as deputy
minister of agriculture, headed
the Soviet farm delegation that
toured the United States this
summer. American expert Ros-
well Garst spent a full day in
the Crimea. discussing the Sovi-
et prograx,i to expand corn pro-
duction. Garst also became the
first known foreigner to be
introduced to a, member of Khru-
shchev's family, when he dined
with Khrushchev's daughter
during his Crimean sojourn.
The agricultural experts
having departed, Marshal Zhukov,
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, and
Ukrainian party boss Kirichenko
were next to arrive. On 13 Oc-
tober this new group, along
with Khrushchev, Bulganin and
Mikoyan, inspected the Black
Sea. Fleet at Sevastopol. Later
the same day, K. E. Voroshilov,
chairman of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet, joined the
group in order to present the
Order of the Red Banner to the
city of Sevastopol in commemo-
ration of the 100th anniversary
of its defense in the Crimean
War and similar defensive feats
during World War II.
The anniversary ceremonies
provided Voroshilov with the
opportunity to boast of the
various steps the USSR has
undertaken to preserve the
Geneva. spirit, and supplied
Khrushchev with a convenient
forum for thumping, in typical
fashion, for more industrial
and agricultural output and
less complacency.
The gathering of most of
the top leaders of party, gov-
ernment, and armed forces sug-
gests that the Sevastopol cele-
bration was merely an adjunct
to policy conferences. In ad-
dition, it is noteworthy that
Khrushchev received considera-
ble personal publicity in
connection with the Sevastopol
ceremonies, and that he pref-
aced his remarks there with
the statement that he was
speaking not only in the name
of the party central committee
but also in the name of the
party presidium. This is the
first suggestion that Khru-
shchev may be working to alter
the collegial appearance of the
top party organization.
Meanwhile, from Moscow--
where the everyday workings of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 1955
the Soviet government have ap-
parently been under the experi-
enced hand of L. M. Kaganovich--
there were suggestions that
new ideological pronouncements
may be forthcoming, perhaps at
the 20th Party Congress in Feb-
ruary. According to,the Amer-
ican military attachd in Moscow,
the same Kommunist editorial
which slappedotov also
called for a new official party
history, covering.the period
since the publication of the
so-called Short Course in 1938.
USSR Tries to Mollify French
On North African Issue
Since the French expressed
their resentment of the Soviet
vote on the Algerian issue in
the UN by canceling the Faure-
Pinay trip to Moscow, the USSR
has been trying to heal the
breach without renouncing its
anticolonial policy.
A Soviet diplomat recently
told a French official that
Faure had been ill-advised to
cancel his visit, since he
would have returned from Mosco'
"not dissatisfied." By way of
clarification, he said the North
African issue could have been
discussed in Moscow. He said
the USSR was interested in hav-
ing the French retain their
position in North Africa, hav-
ing learned in Indochina that
when the French move out of an
area the Americans move in.
The Soviet diplomat called
particular attention to Khrush-
chev's statement on 3 October
that the solution of the North
African problem can be found
by taking into consideration the
national. interests of the peoples
of the French Union. Khrushchev
also emphasized Soviet sympathy r
efforts toward national liberation.
Another significant break
with the old regime was inau-
gurated this month: Soviet tele-
vision viewers began to see the
results of the exchange of tele-
vision newsreels with the United
States. According to the Lit-
erary Gazette, the first pro-
gramusing American subject
matter included the recent big
fire at Whiting, Indiana, the
lumberjack celebration at Cherry
Springs, Pennsylvania, the floods
in the eastern United States,
water skiing at Lakeland Florida,
and cowboy rodeos. 25X1
French Communist leader
Thorez in a speech on 10 Octo-
ber called for negotiation with
the national leaders in North
Africa to achieve the-
.independ-ence of Morocco, Algeria, and
Tunisia within the French Union,
noting that the right to leave
the union carries no obligation
to do so. He also stated that
France had lost its influence
in Indochina to the United'
States because in 1946 it re-
fused Ho Chi Minh's offer to
have Vietnam become a member of
the :French Union.
Although the Soviet Union
will continue to preach'the
national liberation of colonial
people, it will probably steer
clear of any direct support of
the North African nationalists
and,'like Ho, give lip service
to the French Union while watch-
ing it fall apart. Moscow prob-
ably considers that North Afri-
can events are moving at such
a pace that open Soviet support
for the nationalist movements
is superfluous and would unneces-
sarily increase French distrust
of Soviet "conciliation"--a
policy enjoying top Soviet pri-
ority at present.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Soviet Union, however,
is by no means willing to see
the French indefinitely main-
tain their position in North
Africa and co-operate with Ameri-
can base programs. It may antic-
French Morocco
The 4-member Council of
the Throne installed in Rabat
on 17 August to serve in the
absence of a sultan is not
likely to lessen tension or
solve the two-year-old Moroccan
impasse.
The foremost Moroccan na-
tionalist organization, Istiq-
lal, considers the council as
formed a violation of the agree-
ment reached with Premier Faure
at Aix-les Bains in August,
and refuses to participate in
the government now being formed,
thereby depriving it of a
truly representative character.
Under the Aix-les-Bains agree-
ment, the Throne Council was to
have only one member instead
of two in addition to the grand
vizier and a representative
of former sultan Mohamed ben
Youssef.
Despite Istiglal's initial
negative reaction, a protector-
ates ministry spokesman in Paris
has voiced optimism that the
party will participate in the
government after it has con-
sulted with Ben Youssef. The
former sultan is now expected
to arrive in France from his
enforced exile on Madagascar
in about a month.
The much smaller and less
important nationalist party,
the Democratic Party of Inde-
pendence, is expected to join
the new government. This party,
interests.
ipate that one effect of Orbit
arms shipments to Egypt will be
the eventual supplying of second-
hand Egyptian arms to the North
African nationalists, a develop-
ment fully in line with Soviet
which was not banned in 1952,
as was Istiqlal., is reported
to be swamped with membership
applications, all from prospec-
tive applicants for government
posts.
The organization of reac-
tionary settlers, the Presence
Fran,caise, has denounced the
establishment of the Throne
Council as a violation of its
much-publicized agreement with
Resident General Boyer de 1-a-
tour.F7
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Meanwhile, the military
situation in northeast Morocco
remains grave. France has
accused Spain of permitting
Berber tribesmen to launch at-
tacks from Spanish Morocco,
claiming that as late as 14
October,French troops were fired
on from across the border.
France has also implied that
the Spanish zone has furnished
the attackers with recruits,
equipment, supplies, and medi-
cal facilities.
Information released by
the French regarding captured
or surrendered arms indicates
that the tribesmen are surpris-
ingly well equipped. Many of
the captured arms have been
identified as part of those taken
by tribesmen in their initial
attack on French military ou osts
in early October. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Premier Faure Wins Respite
The French National As-
sembly's 308-254 vote of 18
October accepting the govern-
ment's Algerian program prob-
ably assures Premier Faure's
tenure through the Geneva con-
ference. However, he no longer
has the confidence of the major-
ity of the deputies, many of
whom stressed their votes were
prompted by fear of a cabinet
crisis and its threat to
France's international position.
The vote more nearly ap-
proached Faure's original
majority than did the approval
on 9 October of his Moroccan
policy. Most of the conserva-
tive deputies who deserted him
on the earlier decision backed
him on 18 October, apparently
largely because of Foreign Min-
ister Pinay's urging? Over
three quarters of the Gaullist
Social Republicans persisted
in their opposition, however,
and both Communist and Social-
ist blocs voted against.
Faure, with the Geneva
meeting impending, will now
probably be unable to super-
vise closely the implementation
of his North African reform
programs. In any event, he is
unlikely to move rapidly enough
to satisfy his leftist critics,
and his right-wing opponents
will be eager to exploit nation-
alist obstructionism in both
Morocco and Algeria,
Israel's Political Situation
The delay by the Israeli
parliament in accepting the
coalition Prime Minister-des-
ignate Ben-Gurion has proposed
as the basis of his government
offers leaders of the dominant
Since he no longer com-
mands a majority in the as-
sembly, Faure's downfall is only
a matter of time. Any issue
could be a pretext, and two
touchy problems are in prospect:
he will soon be obliged to seek
assembly approval of additional
budgetary funds, and large-
scale labor unrest is develop-
ing.
Nevertheless, many deputies
are still reluctant to provoke
a government crisis which might
hasten elections or open the
way for a premier less accept-
able generally than Faure. The
left does not want to assume
responsibility so late in the
life of the present assembly,
and the right is unwilling to
see Mendes-France either become
premier himself or be in a posi-
tion to attack a government more
conservative than Faure's.
for elections.
Elections must under pres-
ent :Law be held by June 1956.
Should Faure fall, the dif-
ficulty in obtaining assembly
approval of a new premier might
result in an impasse which would
force an earlier dissolution of
the assembly. Furthermore,
there is general dissatisfaction
with the current electoral law,
which most parties want to al-
ter, although for different
reasons. The parties also want
time to form electoral alliances,
and the winter months are tradi-
tionally considered unsuitable
Mapai labor party an opportunity
to continue negotiations in an
attempt to form a. more pro-
Western cabinet. The delay has
been caused by Ben-Gurion's ill-
ness, which has prevented him
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presenting his government to
parliament. In the meantime,
the caretaker government of
Prime Minister Sharett con-
tinues to administer the
country.
Ben-Gurion's coalition
consists of the Mapai, two
leftist labor groups, and a
rightest liberal party. The
three labor parties generally
agree on economic issues, but
differ on foreign policy.
These differences appar-
ently have not been reduced
despite the grave situation
Israel faces as a result of
the Egyptian-Soviet bloc arms
deals. While Israeli officials
seek additional arms and se-
curity guarantees from the
West, particularly the United
States, spokesmen for the two
leftist labor parties declare
that Israel should seek arms
aid from the Soviet bloc, fol-
low a policy of neutrality,
and not form any alliance with
the United States.
A coalition with such dif-
fering opinions probably cannot
function smoothly during the
current critical period. Amer-
ican diplomats believe Mapai
is disturbed by its partner-
ship with the left. The re-
prieve offered by Ben--Gurion's
illness may, therefore, be
used by Israeli leaders to
change the complexion of the
coalition.
Israel's continued pressure
for Western military aid may
require bringing the rightist
General Zionist Party into the
coalition to offset the neu-
tralist policies of the leftist
labor parties. Sharett, ac-
cording to American diplomats
realizes that the leftist
parties are likely to oppose
attempts to obtain military
assistance from the United
States. The General Zionists
have attacked Sharett less
frequently than Ben-Gurion,
and should the latter resign
because of ill-health, condi-
tions might be favorable for
General Zionist participation
in a coalition under Sharett.
25X1
Afghan-PakistaniDispute
Despite previous Afghan
threats, there were no dis-
turbances on 14 October when
Pakistan merged the Pushtoon
areas into a "one-unit" prov-
ince of West Pakistan.
The Afghan charge in
Karachi was recalled in protest
and Pakistan in turn withdrew
its ambassador from Kabul, but
diplomatic relations between
the two countries continue.
Afghanistan continues to
seek Western support for its
demands for an independent Push-
toonistan, but activities of
Afghan cabinet ministers in
Czechoslovakia, Western Europe,
and Egypt as well as at home
suggest that Kabul may be pri-
marily interested in extracting
additional economic and politi-
cal aid from both the United
of neutrality.
States and the Soviet bloc,
while maintaining its policy
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
USSR Plans Long-Range
Flights to AntarF-ti-c-a,
Soviet delegates to a
conference of the Special Com-
mittee for the International
Geophysical Year (1957-1958),
held in Brussels from 8 to 14
September 1955, informally re-
vealed plans to establish two
routes for regular flights to
the Soviet Antarctic base on
Knox Coast. One route would
run over the African continent,
the other via India and Aus-
tralia..
Diplomatic negotiations
are under way to obtain rights
to operate Soviet four-engine
aircraft of unspecified types
over Turkey, Egypt, Kenya., the
Union of South Africa, India.
and Australia., and to land at
Singapore. No other inter-
mediate layover points have
been indicated.
The entire air operation
will be under I. T. Spirin,
the :Leading Soviet Arctic navi-
gator, whose experiences in
polar navigation date back to
the ]Papa.nin expedition of 1937,
and who is now professor of
polar navigation in the Voro-
shilov Military Air Academy.
Flights to the Antarctic
would permit the USSR to com-
plement polar flying experi-
ence gained in the Arctic and
give Soviet air crews their
first transoceanic experience.
The world-wide scientific
endeavor in the Antarctic
would afford the USSR an op-
portunity to conduct inter-
continental flights with-
out inviting criticism of
war-?,aming. It is expected
that the aircraft used would
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLI SUMMARY
Possible Soviet
/Air Routes to Antarctica
be only nominally civilian,
since the USSR has no four-
engine civil transport.
Diplomatic hurdles will
be encountered in obtaining air
rights and landing privileges,
since the USSR is not a member
of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO). So-
viet efforts, first at the Ant-
arctic conference in Paris in
July 1955 and again in Brussels,
to establish the principle of
exchange use of landing facil-
ities by promoting a resolution
on mutual exchange use of air
bases, ports, etc., on or near
Antarctica, may have been in
anticipation of these difficul-
ties.
Failure to establish this
principle, however, probably
would not deter the Soviet del-
gates from flaking persuasive
use of the arguments that the
flights will be undertaken by
civil aircraft and will be en-
gaged solely in a peaceful
world-wide scientific mission
in the interest of all man-
kind.
Should the USSR join ICAO,
which would oblige the USSR to
permit other nations to conduct
civil air flights in the USSR,
the problem of air rights and
landing privileges would be
eliminated. At present the
USSR appears more interested
in joining ICAO than it has
in the past.
The establishment of air
routes from Moscow to the Knox
Coast involves air distances
of about 9,000 nautical miles.
Routes may finally be decided
on the basis of logistic con-
siderations, propaganda ad-
vantages and diplomatic com-
plexities.
The African-Indian Ocean
route has the advantage of the
shortest ocean legs, but it
would require clearances from
Turkey, Egypt, Anglo-Egyptian
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 1955
Sudan, United. Kingdom, Pelgium,
and the Union of South A_-ica.
The ocean hop from Cale Town
could be reduced by 1,000 nau-
tical miles if French clearance
to land at Kerguelen Island were
obtained. The India-Singapore-
Australia route would offer some
The talks in Rangoon be-
tween Premier Katay and Prince
Souphannouvong, leader of the
Pathet Lao, concluded on 13
October without achieving any
significant progress toward a
settlement. The Pathets, how-
ever, successfully avoided a
final break and apparently are
in a good position to prolong
further the inconclusive nego-
tiations which first began be-
tween the two parties last Jan-
uaryin northern Laos.
Discussions regarding the
vital issues of restoration of
government control over the
northern provinces of Sam Neua
and Phong Saly and Pathet par-
ticipation in national elections
were unproductive, despite fresh
concessions offered by Katay.
Lack of achievement notwith-
standing, Katay came away from
Rangoon impressed with Souphan-
nouvong's cordiality and pro-
fessing to believe that a settle-
ment with the Pathets is still
possible, although not probable.
The Indian chairman of the
International Control Commission
is even more optimistic. He
has stated that the Rangoon
Leading Indonesian Parties
Maneuver for Political Allies
The Indonesion National
Party's lead over the Masjumi
in unofficial election returns
has been reduced to less than
PART II
propaganda advantages, and pos-
sibly lesser diplomatic comple.x-
i.ties. This route could be com-
plicated,. however, .by British
and Australian refusal of air
and facility.rights,..,in which
cast? a Tong ocean. hop would be
(Pre-pared by OqR),
required.
meeting':was "65-percent suc-
cessful" and is pressing for
an immediate resumption of
talks in Vientiane.'
The chief result of the
Rangoon talks is.that the
Pathets stalled any settlement
while escaping the onus of
causing a,breakdown in negotia-
tions, and also gained prestige
by meeting on a virtually equal
footing with. the government in
a neutral country. Katay has
indicated a willingness to ex-
tend the deadline for agreement
on national elections from 10
to 31 October, and the Indian
control commission chairman
apparently favors an extension
to 12 November as proposed by
the Pathets
It remains clearly appar-
ent that the Communists have
no intention of giving up their
toehold in Laos in the foresee-
able future except on terms
which would greatly facilitate
the expansion of their influence.
one percent. The.change in
relative strengths is the re-
sult of heavy Masjumi majori-
ties in areas other than Java.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 195:5
Parliamentary seats are so
allocated in Indonesia that the
Masjumi's majority in non-
Javanese areas may ensure it a
number of seats equal to or
greater than that of the Nation-
al Party.
Latest returns show the
National Party with 25.0 per-
cent of the total vote, the
Masjumi with 24.9 percent, the
Nahdlatul,Ulama with 21.4, and
the Communist Party with 19;6.
Minor parties account for the
remainder.
Returns are still coming
in from remote areas, and prep-
arations are getting under way
for conducting elections in
areas which were bypassed on
29 September because of dissi-
dence or lack of preparations.
Both the National Party
and the Masjumi apparently are
trying to line Up political
allies. A Masjumi spokesman
has told the American ambas-
sador that discussions toward
close co-operation among Moslem
parties are "actively under
way." These parties include
the Masjumi, the Nahdlatul Ulama,
Satellite Agricultural Outlook
.Agricultural production in
the Eastern European Satellites
should be better this year than
in any year since 1951, even
though the.,crops can only be
described as,fair. Such im-
provement as has occurred is
due chiefly to somewhat more
favorable weather and does not
indicate substantial progress
in solving agricultural prob.-
lems. While the Satellites can
expect a food supply situation
slightly better than that of
1954-55, they will still have
to import meat, fats, and oils,
the Indonesian Islamic League,
and probably any other small
Moslem organizations which sur-
vived the elections.
A report that the "nation-
alist political parties". are
considering -a merger may, mean
that the National Party hopes
to gather around itself small
nonreligious parties.
alists.
The composition of the
next cabinet will be signifi-
cantly influenced by the out-
come of the Moslem party dis-
cussions and by the results of
a reported factional struggle
within the National Party for
party leadership. The National
Party struggle is between right
and :Left factions and the out-
come will probably determine
the extent of subsequent co-
operation with the Masjumi.
Should the left faction, which
reportedly is favored by Presi-
dent Sukarno, win party leader-
ship, formation of a Nationalist,-
Masjumi coalition would become
much more difficult. Should
the two major Moslem parties
develop a united front, they
could dominate any three-party
cabinet formed with the Nation-
and=-e;ceot for Rumania and
Bulgaria--will continue to be
net importers of grain.
.Dry weather in the latter
part of August enabled the Sat-
ellites to avoid serious losses
threatened by heavy rain over
most of Eastern Europe during
the latter half of July and the
first. part of August. These
rains endangered the small
grains--wheat, rye,.barley,
and oats--which should have
been harvested during this pe-
riod, but had a beneficial
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October
effect,on the potato, sugar
beet, oilseed, corn, and hay
crops.
Grain production in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia will
be only slightly better than
1954' below-normal level, but
a more substantial increase
seems likely in Poland. The
increases are not expected to
be large enough to meet the
domestic requirements of these
countries, which will remain
net importers of grain in 1956.
The potato, sugar beet, and hay
crops should equal or exceed
1954 production in all three
countries--except for the po-
tato crop in Poland--and the
better hay crop should result
in an improvement in the live-
stock fodder base.
The present prospects of
the southern Satellite area
appear slightly more favorable
than last year. This is due
chiefly to a sizable increase
in the production of grain in
Rumania, a result of expanded
acreage and larger yields.
Little change is expected in
the output of grain in Albania,
and Bulgaria, and only a moderate
increase is expected in Hungary,
but the production of corn,
sugar beets, and potatoes.in
all southern Satellites except
Albania should exceed 1954
levels.
While an improvement in
the food supply for 1955-56
is expected in Rumania and
probably in Bulgaria, little
or no change is expected in
Hungary and Albania. The
failure of grain production
to increase enough to make
Hungary an exporting country a-
gain is particularly serious,
as Hungary is already heavily
in debt for grain purchased
following last year's drought,.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 1555
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Recent events have made the
Middle East of foremost impor-
tance in East-West relations and
a subject for discussion at the
foreign ministers' conference.
Moscow's decision to supply
Middle East states with arms
and Iran's adherence to the
Western-sponsored "northern
tier" defense arrangement will
alter the balance of power in
the area. Shipment of Commu-
nist arms to the area undercuts
the West's tripartite agreement
of 1950. Iran's adherence to
the Baghdad pact closes the
gap in the "northern tier"
arrangement and finalizes a
Western defense scheme that the
USSR has repeatedly protested
against as a threat to its
security.
Reaction to Turkish-Iraqi Pact
Moscow's recent steps in
the. Middle East may have re-
sulted from the conclusion of
the Western-sponsored Turkish-
Iraqi pact last February.
There are indications that
the USSR shortly thereafter
made offers of aid to Syria.
Approaches to Saudi Arabia,
Libya, possibly Yemen, and espe-
cially Egypt, for closer ties
with the Soviet bloc indicated
that Moscow was approaching the
most anti-Western of the Arab
League states as candidates for
a neutralist bloc in which Egypt,
with Soviet bloc aid would be
the dominant force.
By thus hurdling the north-
ern tier, the USSR apparently
hoped to preserve opportunities
for expanding its influence
to the south.
The Soviet Union will
probably make every effort to
prevent the participants in
the Baghdad pact from becoming.
effective links in the northern
tier chain. Thus, despite its
immediate reaction against Iran's
adherence to the pact, the USSR
problably will avoid a long-term
hostile policy lest it push
Tehran even closer to the West.
Moscow probably will try to
convince Iran--the weakest and
most strategically located of
the northern tier states--that
the Communist threat has disap-
peared and that added expendi-
tures for protection against a
nonexistent enemy would be
wasted.
Afghanistan, which has re-
cently reiterated its willing-
ness to participate in Middle
East defense planning, may re-
ceive offers from the USSR in
addition to the economic aid
it is already receiving. The
American embassy in Kabul be-
lieves the Egyptians, with or
without the connivance of the
USSR, may be using the prospect
of receiving Communist arms to
dissuade Afghanistan from join-
ing the northern tier states.
A favorable climate for further
Soviet penetration exists in
view of Kabul's continuing bad
feeling toward Karachi and its
dissatisfaction with the nature
of American aid.
Effect on Tripartite Agreement
The introduction of Com-
munist arms into Arab arsenals
nullifies the objectives of the
tripartite agreement of 1950
between Great Britain, France
and the United States. The
agreement, which was aimed at
promoting peace and stability
in the area, includes a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
declaration of opposition to
an arms race between the Arab
states and Israel.
The French ambassador in
London told Foreign Minister
Macmillan on 11 October that
in view of the Soviet arms of-
fer, France now is willing to
relax the arms embargo against
Syria and Egypt if the United
States and the United Kingdom
will do the same. Israel has
already begun to press the
United States to match the So-
viet arms offers to the Arabs.
Great Britain, which has
specific military commitments
with Egypt, Jordan and Iraq,
as well as general obligations
under the Baghdad pact, regards
Soviet moves--especially the
offer of arms--as a serious
threat to its own position.
Prime Minister Eden stated on 9
September that the risk of war
in the area has been intensi-
fied, and intimated that the
Western powers should seek an
agreement with the USSR to halt
the arms race.
The British have reaffirmed
their support of the tripartite
declaration of 1950, and have
approached Nasr in Cairo to
emphasize the dangers of his
acceptance of the Soviet offer.
Britain's recent encourage-
ment of Iraq's Prime Minister
Nuri Said to adopt "a more for-
ward policy" in Syria suggests
that the Foreign Office now
intends to strengthen its sup-
port of Iraq as a counterbalance
to Egyptian and Soviet influ-
ence among the Arab nations.
According to the British
ambassador in Tripoli, Britain
may be preparing to give Libya
more arms assistance than it
has in the past.
In the case of the French,
the present Soviet policy will
have unfavorable implications.
French policy in the area has
been motivated by a desire to
preserve weak disunited states
amenable to French pressures.
France is particularly sensitive
to any changes affecting the
status of Syria. Its policy
toward the other Arab states,
particularly Egypt, is primarily
conditioned by its attitudes to-
ward North African affairs.
Paris will have to face the pos-
sibility that Soviet arms ship-
ments, especially to Egypt, will
resu:Lt in additional arms be-
coming available to North African
nationalists.
Foreign Ministers' Meeting
There have been several
indications that the USSR may
broach the subject of the Mid-
dle East with the Western powers,
possibly at the foreign min-
isters' meeting this month.
Bulganin and Molotov have
publicly indicated the impor-
tance the USSR attaches to main-
taining neutrality in the area
and have stated that Moscow not
only will respect such a course
but is prepared, in conjunction
with other countries, to partic-
ipate in a guarantee of this
neutrality. 7- 7
If Moscow does elect to
broach the subject at this time,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 1955
it may offer the West the al-
ternative of participating in
an agreement with the USSR which
would guarantee the neutrality
of the area, or of facing a con-
tinuation of the Soviet offensive
in competition with the Western
powers.
Moscow probably believes
that it stands to train in eit4ee
case. 25X1
SATELLITES ACT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES
Since the Geneva confer-
ence, the European Satellites
have demonstrated a strong in-
terest in improving diplomatic,
cultural, and economic rela-
tions with the West, and par-
ticularly with the United States.
At the same time, they have
publicly taken the position
that the United States should
reciprocate these gestures by
moderating its "antagonistic"
policy toward the Soviet bloc.
the American charge d'affaires
in Bucharest on 23 September
that -the Rumanian government
was considering granting long-
denied visas to a number of the
371 American citizens and dual
nationals in Rumania.
Professor Mihai Rosianu,
deputy minister of culture and
a member of the Workers Part
central committee, mentioned 25X1
25X1
These actions undoubtedly
stem from a desire to impress
the West with the Soviet bloc's
adherence to the "Geneva spir-
it," and are intended to re-
duce Western opposition to the
Eastern European regimes. The
Satellites probably also hope
that "normalizing" relations
with the United States will
permit them to increase trade
with the West, obtain American
trade credits, and benefit from
American technical and economic
experience by developing an
exchange of technical delega-
tions and information with the
United States.
Moves on Outstanding Problems
Rumania is apparently pre-
paring to take steps to settle
some long-standing problems
which have been a major factor
in its poor relations with the
United States. Rumanian deputy
foreign minister Preoteasa told
that the United States Informa-
tion Service reading room,
closed by Rumanian action in
1950, might be reopened. He
admitted that Rumania and the
United States might be "equally
at fault" for the poor rela-
tions between the two countries,
and said his government would
welcome visits by prominent
Americans in all fields. This
latter gesture apparently was
made in hopes of sharing Amer-
ican technical experience.
Hungary, Poland, and Czecho-
slovakia have also proposed -nego-
tiating outstanding problems.
Hungary's suggestion that each
side submit a list of questions
it wished to negotiate was ap-
parently made to facilitate
obtaining long-term credits for
the purchase of American food-
stuffs and consumer goods.
Hungarian trade officials have
unofficially approached Ameri-
can businessmen on this subject
in recent months.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Poland and Czechoslovakia
have indicated a willingness
to negotiate the settlement of
long-standing American claims
for compensation for national-
ized property and postwar loans
and surplus property sales. An
official of the Polish Foreign
Ministry recently told the Amer-
ican ambassador in Warsaw that
he hoped the "relaxation" brought
about by the Geneva conference
would result in a reduction in
American trade barriers and so
permit Poland to use exports to
pay its debts to the United
States.
Reception of Western Visitors
While there has been no
consistent Satellite policy to-
ward visiting American senators
and congressmen, newsmen and
businessmen, several of them
have been received and inter-
viewed by certain high-level
Satellite leaders. The Com-
munists have tried to use such
meetings to further their aim
of strengthening relations with
the United States.
Hungarian party leader
Rakosi joined Premier Hegedus
in granting an unprecedented
hour-long interview to Senator
Estes Kefauver on 19 September
during which he frankly spoke
of outstanding difficulties and
expressed the hope that these
could be settled and trade ex-
panded.
In early September, three
American senators were given the
"red-carpet" treatment by Pol-
ish authorities and permitted
to visit parts of Poland hither-
to inaccessible to Westerners.
A Polish Foreign Ministry of-
ficial proposed to the American
ambassador in August that an
American newsman be permanently
assigned to Warsaw. There has
been no permanent American news
correspondent in Eastern Europe
since the arrest of William
Oatis in 1951.
The Rumanian president and
the foreign minister received
four American senators and
congressmen in September and
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conducted them on tours of
collective farms and factories.
Propaganda
Anti-American propaganda
in the Satellite press and-
radio broadcasts has remained
at a low level since the sharp
reduction at the beginning of
the Geneva conference. On
25 September, the official Hun-
garian party newspaper published
the text of the congratulatory
telegram sent by the Hungarian
minister of foreign affairs to
Secretary of State Dulles on
the tenth anniversary of the
re--establishment of diplomatic
relations. The government
also issued a circular instruc-
tion to the chiefs of its dip-
lornatic missions abroad di-
recting them to deliver copies
of the telegram personally to
their local American colleagues.
The Satellites have con-
tinued, however, to accuse the
United States publicly of main-
taining an "antagonistic" policy
of restricting trade with Eastern
Europe, of preventing Hungary,
Rumania, and Bulgaria from
entering the United Nations, of
interfering in internal Sat-
ellite affairs, of maintaining
relations with "treacherous"
Satellite refugee organizations,
and of continuing to flood the
Satellites with anti-Communist
propaganda.
The Hungarian government
has been particularly persist-
ent. in its official protests
to the United States for its
efforts to force Hungary to
stop harassing the American
25X1
 INDIA FACES PROBLEMS IN REORGANIZING STATES ALONG LINGUISTIC LINES
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 1955
GOA~
(Port.? J
)RAOLSh
BC a~;f'a
(y '11~.llffi~~
EIV .. bst,!'2 L i1
. I N D I A
The proposed reorganiza-
tion of the Indian states along
linguistic lines will create
such legal and administrative
problems for the government that
New Delhi will probably create
only a few states in the coming
year and postpone the complete
reorganization until after the
national elections of December
1956.
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DAMAO BOMBAY
(Port.) ,aNAGAR-AVELI
(Port.) L
The Proposal
The States' Reorganization
Commission has recommended the
reorganization of the existing
27 states into 16 of equal con-
stitutional status and the con-
tinuation of three small areas
as centrally administered units.
The proposal meets the demands
of most of the language groups
INDIA
PROPOSED NEW STATES
Proposed boundary
(by the States' Reorganization Commission)
Present boundary
O MILES 4(?0
H
SIKKIM
(PROTECTORATE)
N A
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and would simplify the admin-
istration of the country and
reduce costs. Prime Minister
Nehru has said he considers the
fulfillment of the plan a test
of Congress Party as well as
national discipline.
The states which might not
present much difficulty are
three of the four major states
of India--Uttar Pradesh, West
Bengal and Madras--which would
undergo little change of bound-
ary. Bombay, the fourth major
state, which is to include both
Gujerati and Marathi-speaking
peoples, to the disappointment
of the latter, is under the
firm control of Morarji Desai.
Since he is one of India's
ablest administrators, there
should be little trouble in in-
corporating Bombay's new areas.
The legal and administra-
tive hurdles involved in effect-
ing the reorganization before
the elections are formidable.
Several changes in the Indian
constitution will be-necessary
to overcome legal problems.
Administrative complications
include a reapportionment of
the states' assets and liabili-
ties, reorganization of the
civil service and of the judi-
ciary, a reassessment of schemEs
for the second Five-Year Plan,
which commences in April 1956,
and a new delimitation of elec-
tion constituencies.
In addition, the reshuffle
might necessitate reorganization
of most of the Congress Party's
provincial committees, causing
rivalries for office among pres-
ent job holders. It would also
complicate evaluating the suc-
cess of the first Five-Year
Plan under the present state
setups and would change the
programs and financial targets
of the states under the second
Five-Year Plan. This would
hamper the search for funds
for the second plan and cause
a major orientation in think-
ing on the role of the states
in the plan.
The gains accruing to the
government if the reorganization
is carried out before the elec-
tions do not appear to outweigh
the difficulties and confusion
such a reorganization would
produce.
The Naga tribesmen of Assam
and the Sikhs of the Punjab,
both of whom have been agitat-
ing for autonomy, can be ex-
pected to cause further trouble.
The, people of the small state
of Coorg in sDuth India were
overwhelmingly against being
included in the new state of
Karnataka, and some disorders
may occur in that region. The
commission's report recognizes
that the former Communist strong-
hold of Telengana, in eastern
Hyderabad, should not be united
with Andhra, where the Commu-
nists are also strong, until
after the 1961 elections. Telen-
gana will, therefore, remain
all that is left of the present
Hyderabad state.
The Congress Party is at
present engrossed in revitaliz-
ing its own organization in
preparation for the elections
And is also occupied with the
second Five-Year Plan. There-
fore, carrying out the states'
reorganization recommendations
would add new burdens to a
government already heavily
burdened in a pre-election year.
The government is emphasiz-
ing quick implementation of the
commission's report for the ef-
fect this would have on public
opinion. Actually, New Delhi
is more likely to create only
a few. of the "safest" new states
prior to the elections and to
delay complete enactment until
after the 1956 elections.
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CONF.IDHTIA
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