CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000600010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 21, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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-CONFIDENTIAL
irEseltri
COPY NO. lj
OCI NO.6243/55
21 July 1955
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
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DOCUMENT
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 July 1955
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
FORMOSASTRAITS ... OOOOOO OOOOOOO . Page 1
The Formosa Straits have remained quiet for another
week while Peiping has continued to explore the prospects
for bilateral negotiations with the US and for an inter-
national conference on Far Eastern issues.
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA ............ ....
The rioting in Casablanca between L4 and 18 July arose
from the determination of extremists among the French
settlers to prevent Resident General Grandval from carrying
out a liberal policy in French Morocco. Troop reinforce-
ments sent from other parts of Morocco to Casablanca leave
the rest of the country unprotected should the riots spread.
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Communist Propaganda Treatment of the United States: Soviet
propaganda treatment of the United States has recently
become more moderate. Although the Soviet leaders could
be expected to be conciliatory prior to the summit talks,
propaganda pointing out to the Soviet public the merits
of peaceful coexistence with the United States suggests
a longer-term tactic. Asian Communist propaganda,
however, continues critical of the United States.
Page 2
Soviet Central Committee Plenum: The plenum of the Soviet
Communist Party central committee held between 4 and
12 July heard reports on industry and agriculture, and
on the results of the Soviet-Yugoslav talks. The
committee announced appointments to several positions
at the top of the party hierarchy, and selected 14
February 1956 as the date for convening the 20th
Party Congress.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 July 1955
Japan's Relations With the Sino-Soviet Bloc: No substantive
progress was mase at tie a es mee ing between Japanese
and Soviet negotiators in London on 15 July and the
Japanese are resigned to continuing the unprofitable
meetings in the hope that the USSR will eventually
show its hand. As for relations with Communist China,
Japan has officially approached Peiping on the problem'
of repatriating Japanese detainees; trade between the
two countries is being impeded by Communir Chinese in-
sistence on high prices and cash payments
25X1
Construction Speeded on New Fukien Railroad: The Chinese
Communists have stepped up construction work on the
new railroad to the Fukien coast ,possibly enough to
complete it this year. The railroad will greatly
improve the Communists' capabilities to supply the new
airfields and military forces along the coast opposite
Formosa. Page 5 25X1
Vietnam: The riots in Saigon on 20 July, the first anniver-
sary of the Geneva agreement, demonstrate the intensity
of feeling in South Vietnam against carrying out the
Geneva accords. The riots, which began as anti-Communist
demonstrations but then turned against the International
Control Commission, were apparently encouraged by the
government. The International Control Commission states
that the Diem government's attitude is preventing it from
functioning, and jeopardizing the safety of commission
personnel. The commission has decided to request in-
structions from Britain and the USSR, the co-chairmen of
the 1954 Geneva conference. Page 6
Laos: Negotiations between the Laotian government and the
Pathet Lao continue to be unproductive. Unless the
International Control Commission, which now sits in on
the discussions, adopts a stiffer attitude, the Pathets
probably will keep on making impossible demands. Pro-
tracted negotiations will give the Communists time to
build up their strength further in Phong Saly and Sam
Neua.
Page
Cambodia: The International Control Commission in Cambodia
has tentatively taken the position that the US-Cambodian
military aid agreement does not violate the Geneva accords.
25X1
7 25X1
Al,kNI.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 July 1955
Indonesian Crisis: President Sukarno departed on a pilgrimage
to Mecca on 18 July, which will include a state visit
to Egypt, apparently confident that the Indonesian govern-
memt will not fall during his three-week absence.
25X1
Kashmir: India has apparently served notice on Pakistan
that at the talks between Prime Ministers Nehru and
Mohammad All on Kashmir, now scheduled for August,
Pakistan must be prepared either to accept partition
of the state along the present cease-fire line or to
consider failure of the talks a foregone conclusion.
Tensions Mounting Over Cyprus Issue: Greek agreement to
join with Britain and Turkey in a discussion of the
Cyprus problem is no evidence of Greek optimism that
an early or favorable settlement of the dispute is
possible. Athens' decision has brought out the dis-
unity in the Rally government and has intensified
maneuvering for power.
Page 10
Page 11 25X1
Trieste Situation Deteriorates: The dissatisfaction in
Trieste with Rome's inadequate measures for remedying
the territory's depressed economic conditions will
become increasingly serious as the 1956 local elections
approach. Inept Italian methods of administration
have resulted in a prolonged shipyard strike, sup-
ported by both Communist and free unions, which may
be backed by a one-day general strike now scheduled
for 25 July. The Communist Party of the Territory
of Trieste is the party most likely to profit from
popular discontent. Page 12 25X1
Peron's Position Remains Uncertain: Peron's withdrawal
from direct leadership of the Peronista Party and his
announcement on 15 July that further resignations
from party and government positions would be necessary
in order to facilitate needed reorganization are fur-
ther indications of the weakness of the Argentine
regime and suggest that Peron is maintaining himself
only at the tolerance of the military. New rumors
of possible disturbances have increased tensions in
Buenos Aires. Page 13 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 July 1955
Ecuador-Peru Frontier May Flare Up Again: The reported
movement of troops by both Ecuadoi4-and Peru to their-
common border is likely to provoke new incidents and
delay still further the final settlement of the long-
standing boundary dispute between the two countries.
It is possible that each country wants to bring the
border issue to the fore as a diversion from internal
political difficulties.
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
Page 14
The Soviet Theory on the "Inevitability of War": In a world
threatened by nuclear warfare, the Soviet leaders have
gradually transformed the Leninist theory of the'lnevi-
tability of war"into a concept which postulates a con-
tinuing state of tension in the world and foresees the
inevitable end of capitalism, but which no longer re-
quires Soviet theoreticians to proclaim that the Soviet
Union must of necessity become involved in a world con-
flict. Page 1
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25X1
Malayan Elections: Malaya's elections on 27 July will in-
crease the Malayans' legislative and executive responsi-
bility but will not affect Britain's control of foreign
affairs, defense, and finance. The members of the new
Legislative Council, the majority of whom will be popu-
larly elected on the 27th, will probably press for an
amnesty for the Communists and will demand accelerated
progress toward self-government. Page 4 25X1
Economic Implications of Soviet-Afghan Transit Agreement:
Pakistan's denial of transport facilities for Afghan
exports has focused attention on the Soviet Union's
offer of a five-year transit guarantee for Afghan goods.
If denied access to its normal import-export markets for
an extended period of time, Afghanistan might be com-
pelled not only to enter into the transit agreement with
the USSR but also to turn to the USSR as an alternative
source for much of its imports and, to a lesser extent,
as a consumer for its exports. Afghanistan is unlikely
to implement the transit agreement before another round
of talks with Pakistan. Page 7 25X1
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21 July 1955
Arms Sources of North African Nationalists: High French
officials have charged that the Ar-Th. -states, particu-
larly L bva. are arming nationalists in French North
Africa.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 July 1955
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
FORMOSA STRAITS
The Formosa Straits have
remained quiet for another week
while Peiping has continued to
explore the prospects for bi-
lateral negotiations with the
United States and for an inter-
national conference on Far
Eastern issues.
The Chinese Communist Party
People's Daily hinted on 15
July that a continuation of the
military quiet in the Formosa
Straits will depend on whether
progress is being made toward,
or in, negotiations with the
United States on major questions
such as the status
of Formosa. Citing
recent American re-
marks about a de
facto cease-fire in
the Formosa Straits,
the commentary as-
serted that the Ameri-
can secretary of
state believes "it is
best to leave the
Formosa question
alone" and that he
has implied that
Peiping "has practi-
cally accepted a 'two
Chinas' setup and
that negotiations are
therefore no longer
necessary."
The Chinese Com-
munists, publicly
supported by Nehru,
have also been calling
explicitly for an
international con-
ference on Far East-
ern issues. Peiping
has identified the
major issues as those
of Formosa, Korea and
Indochina, and has
PART I
maintained as usual that all
three can be solved if foreign
troops are withdrawn and foreign
military bases abolished. The
Communists may well believe that
an international conference would
present the best opportunity for
bringing political pressure to
bear on the United States on all of
these questions.
The only military action of
the week was an artillery ex-
change in the Quemoy area on 20
July. The Chnese Cannunists are m--
Forte d by the press as firing more
than 200 rounds in the heaviest
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 July 1955
shelling of the year. The shel-
ling was light, however, in
terms of Communist capabilities,
and has not continued. It is
not known whether the barrage
was in retaliation against
Nationalist firing or was in-
tended to be harassing action.
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
The rioting in Casablanca
between 14 and 18 July was
touched off by a bomb explosion
in the European section of the
city during the Bastille Day
celebrations.
confirm the wide-
spread Moroccan belief that
some settlers conspired to
cause the riots, probably to
prevent Resident General Grand-
val from putting into effect a
more liberal policy toward
Morocco.
The official statistics
released on casualties show
more than 60 dead, including
about 50 Moroccans, and several
hundred injured. Unofficial
estimates, however, place the
death toll as high as 2,000.
No estimates are yet available
on property losses.
The imposition of martial
law and the bringing in of
PART I
heavy troop reinforcements have
curtailed rioting in Casablanca,
and the latter measure has left
the rest of Morocco with little
protection. Moroccan national-
ists have been asked to support
Grandval by preventing the
spread of violence, but they
bitterly resent the apparent
collusion between French police,
and some troops and extremist
settlers.
The reinforcements consist
mainly of Senegalese and Foreign
Legion units. The goums (a
Moroccan militia), who are fre-
quently assigned to curb rioting,
have not been used in this in-
stance. This lends credibility
to earlier reports that native
units can no longer be relied on
to quell disorders.
Even though Grandval has
been subjected to considerable
abuse by the rioting Europeans,
including a physical assault, he
is apparently proceeding with the
reorganization of the Moroccan
government. A minority of
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21 July 1955
150,000 EUROPEANS
550,000 MOROCCANS
- NATIVE AREAS -
? RIOT AREAS
settlers, anxious to dissociate
themselves from the violence,
have appealed for calm and ex-
pressed confidence in the resi-
dent general.
PART I
W18-2
25X1
There has been
no information con-
cerning the reaction
in Algeria and Tunisia
to the Casablanca riots.
So far as is known,
the military situa-
tion in eastern Algeria
has not improved ap-
preciably and small
rebel bands continue to elude
capture.
Tunisian nationalists,
while awaiting the completion
of ratification of the agree-
ment granting limited self-
government, which was approved
by the French National Assembly
on 9 July, presumably are con-
tinuing to attempt to formulate
a constitutional basis for the
new Tunisian government.
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21 July 1955
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Communist Propaganda Treatment
Of the United States
Soviet propaganda treat-
ment of the United States has
recently become more moderate.
Although the Soviet leaders
could be expected to be concil-
iatory prior to the summit talks,
propaganda pointing out to the
Soviet public the merits of
peaceful coexistence with the
United States suggests a longer-
term tactic. (See part III,
p. 1, for a discussion of the
Soviet theory on the "inevita-
bility of war.")
Beginning in March, about
the time the USSR first indi-
cated an interest in concluding
the Austrian treaty, the Soviet
press gradually revealed some
change in attitude toward re-
porting United States affairs.
Subsequently the change
became readily discernible in
Soviet coverage relating to
the Geneva conference. The
initial press attitude toward
the talks had been sharply crit-
ical and seemed designed to put
the onus on the United States
if the talks failed. A milder
tone became apparent in'iate
June in the coverage of the
United Nations anniversary cele-
bration and Secretary Dulles'
28 June press conference. It
was emphasized in Moscow's
treatment of President Eisen-
hower's 29 June press confer-
ence, although his references
to the Satellites were strongly
criticized.
The USSR has been urging
wider cultural, technical, and
scientific exchanges with all
countries, particularly with
the United States,,and has
acknowledged the merits of the
cultures and technical accom-
plishments of other nations.
PART II
The revision in the Soviet
attitude toward Western science
actually began a year ago.
Recently, however, it has been
sanctioned by Bulganin and
Khrushchev. Furthermore, even
the domestic American scene has
elicited increasingly favorable
descriptions in the Soviet press.
The USSR continues to crit-
icize specific aspects of Ameri-
can foreign policy. These
include "imperialist" and "ag-
gressive" military groupings
in the Far East, Near East, and
Europe, and American "monopolist
oppression" in Latin America
and elsewhere. This type of
criticism will probably continue
regardless of the outcome of
the Geneva conference. In ad-
dition, Moscow can be expected
to react sharply to Western al-
legations concerning such sen-
sitive subjects as Satellite
independence and Soviet opposi-
tion to German reunification.
Other Soviet bloc and West-
ern Communist media have not
modified their propaganda treat-
ment of the United States to
the same extent as Moscow.
Satellite output reflects SOMD
of Moscow's optimistic report-
ing on the Geneva conference,
but questions United States
sincerity and demands "deeds
instead of words." While it
reflects the particular sensi-
tivity of Satellite leaders to
Western challenges concerning
Eastern Europe, it is a care-
fully balanced pattern which
appears designed to be turned
easily in any direction.
Asian Communist propaganda
remains critical of the United
states. The 18 July Soviet-
Viet Minh communique paralleled
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 July 1955
the Sino-Viet Minh statement, of
7 July in many respects but
Soviet Central Committee Plenum
The plenum of the Soviet
Communist, Party's central com-
mittee? held between 4 and 12
July heard reports on industry
and agriculture and on the re-
sults of the Soviet-Yugoslav
talks. The committee announced
appointments to several posi-
tions at the top of the party
hierarchy, and selected 14 Feb-
ruary 1956 as the date for Con-
vening the 20th Party Congress.
The agenda for the forth-
coming congress is similar to
omitted virulent and specific
attacks on the United States.
the one for the 19th Congress
in October 1952, five months
before Stalin's death. The
main central committee report
is to be delivered by First
Secretary Khrushchev, and the
directives for the new Sixth
Five-Year Plan will be presented
by Premier Bulganin, The con-
gress will also elect a new
central committee.
The tone and content of
the central committee's deci-
sions on industry, issued on
SOVIET TOP PARTY ORGANIZATION
JULY 1955
PARTY
CONGRESS
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT
First Secretary:
KHRUSHCHEV
POSPELOV
ARISTOV *
BELYAYEV *
SHEPILOV *
SUSLOV ?
* New appointments
21 JULY 1955
PART II
PRESIDIUM
KHRUSHCHEV
BULGANTN
KAGANOVICH
MIKOYAN
MOLOTOV
VOROSHILOV
SABUROV
PERVUKHIN
MALENKOV
KIRICHENKO *
SUSLOV *
Candidates:
PONOMARENKO
SHVERNIK ?
50719 2
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21 July 1955
13 July followed closely Premier
Bulganin's report of 4 July,
which was a frank and lengthy
statement of the achievements
of the Soviet industrial economy
and the methods of solving the
problems involved in the con-
tinued rapid growth of the
economy.
The central committee re-
emphasized heavy industry as
the basis for all economic
growth, and implied that it
would continue to receive prior-
ity. It claimed that over-all
industrial goals of the Fifth
Five-Year Plan had been ful-
filled eight months ahead of
schedule.
Bulganin's address was the
most explicit recognition to
date that a high rate of in-
dustrial growth in the future
will depend heavily on a rapid
increase in labor productivity.
He stated that if labor produc-
tivity does not increase more
rapidly than in the past, there
will be a labor shortage. He
admitted, in effect, that the
current agricultural program
will not permit the continued
flow of labor from agriculture
to industry, which has accounted
for approximately half the
growth in industrial production
in the postwar period. The bulk
of Bulganin's address was de-
voted to outlining a program
to solve this problem, primarily
by the large-scale introduction
of the most technologically ad-
vanced capital equipment for
the mechanization and automation
of production.
Bulganin's solution will
require a large investment pro-
gram and will place additional
heavy demands on those machine
tool and instrument industries
essential to the production of
modern weapons systems. A num-
ber of these industries, no-
tably the machine tool and'in-
strument industry and the
PART II
electrical equipment industry,
were castigated by Bulganin
for failure to meet requirements
and for the continued produc-
tion of obsolete equipment.
Bulganin's report strength-
ens the hypothesis 'that the
Soviet leadership believes
continuation of the present
international tensions would
require a level of military
expenditures which might seri-
ously affect the rate of in-
dustrial growth three to five
years hence. It is probable,
therefore, that the USSR
desires to restrict the total
Increase in defense expenditures
for the 1956-60 period to about
15 percent.
Bulganin's report shows
a more realistic attitude to-
ward the economic problems
facing the leadership than was
the case during the Stalin era.
Implementation of his policies
should result in a considerable
improvement in the operation
of the Soviet economy.
The agricultural resolution
of the central committee was re-
markably noncommittal. Over-
fulfillment of the plan on
spring sowing was reported but
with few details. The exhorta-
tion for increased efforts was
well under the usual impassioned
level. The major policies of
increasing the amount of land
under cultivation and the area
planted in corn were not dis-
cussed in detail. Doubt over
the success of this year's
crop, sensitivity over Western
allegations of Soviet economic
weakness, or a desire to re-
frain from calling attention
to the chronic problems of this
part of the Soviet economy
prior to Geneva may have caused
the issuance of this unusually
short and uninformative agricul-
tural resolution.
Khrushchev's report to the
central committee plenum on the
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21 July 1955
results of the Soviet-Yugoslav
talks has not been published.
However, a Pravda editorial an
16 July, which wasprobably
based on this report, stressed
the need for developing closer
Yugoslav-Soviet relations,
Japan's Relations
With the Sino-Soviet Bloc
No substantive progress
was made at the latest meeting
between Japanese and Soviet
negotiators in London on 15
July, and the Japanese are re-
signed to continuing the un-
profitable meetings in the
hope that the USSR will eventu-
ally show its hand. Both sides
appear to be marking time while
they await the results of the
four-power conference at Geneva,
which Soviet negotiator Malik
is attending.
Japanese prime minister
Hatoyama continues to affirm
his conviction that the summit
parley will favorably influence
a settlement between Japan and
the USSR, and that four-power
agreements easing world tensions
might prompt Moscow to return
25X1 Shikotan and the Habomai
Islands to Japan.
As for Japan's relations
with Communist China, Tokyo on
15 July made an official ap-
proach to Peiping on the problem
of repatriating Japanese de-
tainees.
PART II
particularly between the two
Communist parties. It also
emphasized Soviet recognition
of Yugoslav "sovereignty and
equality."
The approach was made via
the Communist Chinese consul
general at Geneva. Japanese
parliamentary vice foreign
minister Sonoda has indicated
to the Diet that Tokyo is will-
ing, if necessary, to send an
official representative to
Peiping for formal negotiations
on repatriation. The Japanese
government has stated its ac-
tion would not involve recogni-
tion of the Peiping regime
since the approach is for purely
humanitarian purposes, and has
cited similar American negotia-
tions as a precedent.
The Japanese claim Peiping
still holds about 7,000 Japa-
nese, including over 1,000 war
prisoners, whose names are
known. They also have requested
the Communist Chinese to account
for 40,000 Japanese who are miss-
ing on the mainland.
Communist Chinese insist-
ence on cash payment for goods,
high prices,and the lack of
financial arrangements are im-
peding trade between Japan and
Communist China. In early July,
Japan transferred the quota to
import 50,000 tons of soybeans
from mainland China to a "global"
basis, primarily because the
Chinese refused a barter deal and
asked a price above that of the
world market.
The plan of the Japan Inter-
national Trade Promotion Associa-
tion (JITPA) to send a trade
mission to Peiping in the near
future also is encountering
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21 July 1955
difficulties. The Diet Men's
League for Promotion of Commu-
nist China Trade is opposing
the sending of a private trade
mission, believing that only
Construction Speeded
On New Fukien Railroad
The Chinese Com-
munists have stepped
up construction on
the new railroad to
the Fukien coast,
possibly enough to
complete it this
year. The railroad
will greatly improve
the Communists' capa-
bilities to supply
the new airfields
and military forces
on the coast oppo-
site Formosa.
The new rail-
road is needed for
adequate logistic
support of any mili-
tary operation
against Formosa, a
consideration which
was probably fore-
most in Peiping's
decision to build
the line. The Fukien
coastal area has
meager economic re-
sources and is sep-
arated from the main
Chinese rail net by
300 to 400 miles of
mountain ranges. In
normal times the
trade between the
Fukien coast and
other areas of China
can move economically
only by sea.
Peiping radio
first reported the
new Fukien railroad
early this month.
The announcement
stated that it was
an important project
of the First Five-
Year Plan (1953-
1957) and that mili-
tary railway units
PART II
a government delegation can
effectively implement the Sino-
Japanese trade agreement that
was concluded in May.I
25X1
Huairnrig.
Yingtan
c HEN?
Kueichi
it
46_
Shaowu?'
3tr Yungan
'Changting
Ningyangl
L.
3%0
Swatm
Chtitisien? r,,$) *MOH
CONSTRUCTION
UNDER WAY
11%
Wangtmk
RIG/AT-OF- WAYCLEARANCE
Chic non
LINE CONSTRUCTION
NOT STARTED
Nanping
N
Fooc..L.wo
RIGI,T OF-WAY
CLEARANCE 0
EXPECTED ROUTE
1
* otr
Amoe
Wen chow
CONSTRUCTION ON THE NEW FUKIEN RAILROAD
go.. 0. New Fukien railroad 21 J111 Y 195 I 0 Jet airfield
?--1?ExMingrailroM I, iv ? Conventional airfield
* Airfield site
14797
MILES
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21 July 1955
were being urged to hasten con-
struction work on the line.
Peiping mentioned only one
line, from Yingtan near Kueichi
on the Chekiang-Kiangsi rail-
road to Amoy, a distance of
350-400 miles.
Vietnam
The riots which broke out
in Saigon on 20 July, the first
anniversary of the Geneva agree-
ment, demonstrate the intensity
of feeling in South Vietnam
against carrying out the Geneva
accords.
Although South Vietnamese
officials may not have intended
that violence break out, there
is little doubt that they were
primarily responsible for in-
stigating the original anti-
Communist demonstrationsd
Construction of the north-
ern section of the Fukien rail-
road, from Yintang to Wangtai,
has evidently been under way
since 1954 and may be nearing
completion. Completion of just
this half of the new railroad
will considerably facilitate
supply movements into the Foo-
chow area, since goods could be
transshipped at Nanping for
movement down the Min River.
In any event, these activi-
ties appear to be designed to
enhance the Diem'regime's
popular support and force the
Control Commission to withdraw
from Saigon.
The commission, meanwhile,
claims that the Diem govern-
ment's attitude is preventing
it from functioning and jeopard-
ize the :S?afety Of commission'
personnel.
French, British and Indian
reaction to the Saigon demon-
strations and riots is bound
to be unfavorable. The French
and British will probably limit
themselves to strong diplomatic
representations and seek Ameri-
can pressure on Diem to prevent
further outbreaks. Although
it seems unlikely that India
will take drastic action, it
has already referred the issue
to the co-chairmen of the 1954
Geneva conference on Indochina.
Prime Minister Nehru has also
callod on the United States to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 July 1955
use its influence on the South
Vietnam government to prevent
any further outbreaks.
Diem is
aware of the gravity of the
situation and is preparing a
statement expressing regret,
promising compensation for prop-
erty losses, and assuring the
maintenance of order in the fu-
ture.
The Communist reaction to
developments in Saigon has been
varied. Viet Minh response to
Diem's election declaration
was quick and sharp. An 18
July broadcast from Hanoi ac-
cused the United States and
France as well as Diem of
"vengefully" seeking to sabo-
tage the Geneva agreement.
The broadcast also interpreted
Diem's statement as a threat
to attack North Vietnam, and
linked it to the Thai request
that the Manila pact council
consider the fighting in Laos,
which was described as a "pro-
vocative attack" by Laotian
government forces.
Viet Minh vice premier
Pham Van Dong subsequently re-
leased a mildly worded Dote--
probably for the record..-to
the Diem government requesting
it to appoint representatives
to enter into pre-electiOn
talks on 20 July as scheduled
by the Geneva agreement. In
Geneva, the Soviet Union has
indicated it will not insist
that these negotiations com-
mence immediately.
There have been indications
that some Viet Minh agents may
have been active among the
demonstrators in Saigon on 20
Laos
Negotiations between the
Laotian government and the Pathet
Lao continue to be unproductive.
Unless the International,'06ntrol
PART II
July. According to an eye-
witness account, however, any
Communist involvement was
limited to the activities of
individuals. Although Hanoi
has not yet commented publicly,
it is expected to exploit the
situation by pointing in con-
trast to its "co-operative"
attitude toward the Control
Commission and "faithful ad-
herence" to the Geneva agreement.
Diem's personal position
continues to be strengthened on
two fronts. Slow progress has
been reported in the fighting
against Ba Cut's Hoa Hao forces
in southwestern Vietnam, al-
though the rebels are making the
most of terrain which is ideal
for defense.
Politically, the anti-
Diem extremists in the Revolu-
tionary CoMmittee \who' openly '
attacked the premier on 7 July
now indicate privately that
they desire to defer a show-
down. It now appears that these
elements succeeded only in iso-
lating themselves from the main
body of the committee, and that
Diem's position is stronger than
ever.
Negotiations with the French
on the position of the chief
French representative in Saigon
and on the French Expeditionary
Corps also appear to be making
headway. Paris appears to be
amenable to a drastic cut in
French forces in Indochina in
accordance with Vietnamese
wishes and agreement has been
reached on the title of France;It
chief representative in Saigon.
Diem was assured that his func- 25X1
tion would be purely diplomatic
Commission, which now sits in ,
On the discussions, adopts
a Stiffer attitude, the
Pathets probably will keep
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 July 1955
on making impossible demands.
Protracted negotiations will
give the Communists time to
build up their strength further
in Phong Saly and Sam Neua.
Negotiations were resumed
on 15 July, but were suspended
almost immediately for another
week because of failure to agree
on an agenda. The Pathet Lao
insisted on discussing the
modification of election pro-
cedures first, while the Laotian
government demanded that the
re-establishment of royal
authority over Phong Saly and
Sam Neua Provinces be given
top priority.
There are indications that
the Indians and Canadians are
losing patience with the Pathet
Lao and may try to have the
problem of the disputed prov-
inces referred to the partici-
pants in the Geneva conference
of 1954 if it is not soon re-
solved by direct negotiations.
Talks looking to 0,- sta-
bilization of the potentially
explosive military situation
in Sam Neua were also incon-
clusive. If the deadlock
Cambodia
The International Control
Commission in Cambodia has ten-
tatively taken the position that
the US-Cambodian military aid
agreement does not violate the
Geneva accords.
The commission has drafted
a resolution indicating that
it accepts the Cambodian govern-
ment's assurance that the aid
agreement does not contravene
the Geneva settlement. The
PART II
continues, the Canadians plan
to propose that the Interna-
tional Commission work out its
own cease-fire formula. The
Polish delegate has indicated
opposition to any plan that is
not extremely favorable to the
Communists.
The Katay government has
reacted unfavorably to Thai-
land's request that the Manila
pact council consider the re-
cent Pathet Lao attack on
Muong Peun. In t strongly
worded communique, it protested
that it had not been consulted
beforehand, that the Thai action
was "untimely," and that Laos
could decide for itself when
its security was in sufficient
jeopardy to warrant outside in-
tervention.
In a subsequent conversa-
tion with the American charge,
Premier Katay, who had appar-
ently cooled off somewhat,
indicated that he might com-
ment favorably on a Manila
pact resolution which empha-
sized Viet Minh interference
rather than Pathet Lao aggres-
sion.
25X1
resolution gives the impression,
however, that the commission
retains doubts about some clauses
in the aid agreement.
Although Nehru was noncom-
mittal on the subject in a re-
cent conversation with Ambas-
sador Cooper, there are indica-
tions that he is in accord with
the views of the commission.
A high official of the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs,
for instance, has stated that
the Cambodian position is fully
acceptable to India.
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21 July 1955
Moreover, the Polish dele-
gate on the commission has in-
dicated that he has been in-
structed to vote "as Nehru di-
rects," He is expected, however,
to .cesist vigorously any attempt
to eliminate from the resolution
reference to the commission's
continuing doubts.
An important factor in-
fluencing the Indians to take a
less critical view of the aid
agreement has undoubtedly been
the growing Cambodian criticism
of the commission. The Indians
al'e extremely sensitive to such
criticism as they regard Cam-
bodia as within India's sphere
of influence. In this regard,
they are certainly aware that a
prominent palace official has
threatened, in the event of an
adverse decision by the com-
mission, to contrast publicly
the text of the Geneva agree-
ment with the "far-fetched"
Indian-Polish interpretations
of the aid agreement.
Indonesian Crisis
President Sukarno departed
on a pilgrimage to Mecca on 18
July apparently confident that
that the Indonesian government
will not fall during his three-
week absence. He will stop for
a state visit in Egypt en route.
PART II
More recently, the Indian
chairman of the commission in-
dicated that he was disturbed
by Prince Sihanouk's public de-
fense of the aid agreement and
pointed remarks about unwanted
advice from foreign diplomats
and international organizations.
Despite his abdication of the
throne, Sihanouk is still the
most influential person in
Cambodian politics and is known
to be anxious to prevent the
commission from playing any part
In the forthcoming national
elections.
Under the circumstances,
thereforeoit would seem to be
In the interest of India to al-
low the matter to rest substan-
tially where it is. An unfa-
vorable decision, or one that
would be interpreted as re-
flecting on Cambodian integrity,
would automatically inject the
issue in the local political
campaign, which could be very
embarrassing to the Indians.
25X1
25X1
Witi 25X1
ree wee ..s n w ci o consider
a new approach and no longer
bound to his past efforts, Su-
karno may be able to maneuver
army leaders into a position
where it will be difficult for
them to regain the initiative.
The army has refused the
government's proposal that Gen-
eral Utoyo be accepted as chief
of staff with the understanding
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21 July 1955
that he resign immediately
afterward. The army is expected
to continue its opposition to
Utoyo, but significant negoti-
ations with the cabinet appar-
ently will await Sukarno's
return.
In an order of the day
issued on 18 July, Colonel Lubis
spoke of the government's use
of the army as a political tool
and of the need for a clear-cut
defense policy. His statement
referred to basic army-govern-
ment differences which assumed
political significance in 1952
and remain unsettled. These
differences, which center on
training and organization, may
be involved in any renewed
negotiations?
.
Kashmir
India has apparently served
notice on Pakistan that at the
talks between Prime Ministers
Nehru and Mohammad All on Kash-
mir, now scheduled for August,
Karachi must be prepared either
to accept partition of the state
along the present cease-fire
line or to consider failure of
the talks a foregone conclusion.
New Delhi's position was
announced by Home Minister Pant
at a press conference on 9 July.
Pant said that although India
had in the past made commitments
regarding a plebiscite in Kash-
mir, the situation had changed
as a result of India's develop-
ment program in the state and
because of Pakistan's "military
alliance" with the United States.
He stated that since Pakistan
had failed for nearly eight years
to agree to reasonable conditions
for a plebiscite, it seemed un-
likely that it would agree to
them in the future.
PART II
Prime Minister All appears
to have decided, on instructions
from Sukarno, to continue in
office unless voted out by par-
liament, which has given no in-
dication of taking such action.
Although one government party
has decided to withdraw from
the cabinet if All fails to re-
turn his mandate, loss of its
support would not deprive All
of a parliamentary majority as
party lines now stand. Should
parliament vote the cabinet out
of office during the next three
weeks, Vice President Hatta
probably would order the All
cabinet to continue as a care-
taker government.
The home minister also ex-
pressed his personal view that
the Kashmiri Constituent Assem-
bly had made a firm decision re-
garding accession to India and
that the "tide cannot be turned."
Pant's remarks are signifi-
cant because they are the first
public utterance by a responsible
government official-that India
does not intend to abide by its
commitment, made to the UN Se-
curity Council, to hold a pleb-
iscite in Kashmir. Nehru in-
directly substantiated Pant's
views in a public speech de-
livered on 16 July following his
return to New Delhi.
Pakistani officialdom im-
mediately sensed the importance
of Pant's statements, and on
14 July the Pakistani high com-
missioner in New Delhi delivered
a note to the Indian Ministry of
ExteTnal Affairs protesting them
and :requesting clarification. To
date, Pakistan has not received
a reply.
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21 July 1955
There is little that Ka-
nuta can do about the situation
in Kashmir. Pant's statement
was made only three days before
Nehru's triumphal return from
his tour of Soviet and Satellite
capitals and only nine days be-
fore the opening of the Big Four
talks at Geneva. They were
therefore well timed to receive
a minimum of international pub-
licity.
The Pakistani government
is deeply involved in intricate
domestic political problems as
Tensions Mounting
Over Cyprus Issue
Greek agreement to join
with Britian and Turkey in a
discussion of the Cyprus prob-
lem is no evidence of Greek
optimism that an early or favor-
able settlement of the dispute
is possible. Athens' decision
has brought out the disunity
in the Rally government of
Prime Minister Papagos and has
intensified maneuvering for
power.
Athens ordered a new ap-
peal for Cypriot self-determina-
tion submitted for inscrip-
tion on the agenda of the UN
General Assembly on 21 July.
This was done on Papagos' di-
rect order as a result of
Britain's setting of 29 August
for the date of the proposed
bilateral conference on the
issue. A Greek information bul-
letin or 19 July pointed out
that the British conference pro-
posal originally had presumed
a date early in August, before
the 20 August deadline for the
submission of items for the
General Assembly's agenda.
Athens accepted the British
invitation despite displeasure
at the inclusion of Turkey,
exclusion of the Cypriots, and
PART II
well as in the dispute with
Afghanistan and is in no posi-
tion to make a strong stand
against India. Its threats to
seek "other means" of settling
the problem if the prime min-
isters' talks in August fail
will probably make no impres-
sion on New Delhi. Pakistan's
sole recourse then would be
to return the issue to the
Security Council. The council's
actions over the past several
years have given India little
reason to fear its censure,
widespread suspicion that the
British gesture was a maneuver
intended to sidetrack another
UN appeal.
According to Deputy Premier
Kanellopoulos, the Greek cabi-
net had with difficulty per-
suaded Prime Minister Papagos
to acquiesce in the face of
almost universal Greek opinion
against acceptance. The Greek
press, representing both govern-
ment and opposition supporters,
continues to attack the con-
ference proposal. Cypriot
Nationalist leader Archbishop
Makarios on 16 July severely
criticized Athens for falling
into a British trap and asserted
that the Cypriot people would
not accept a conference deci-
sion which did not accord with
their rights and aspirations.
On Cyprus, new terrorist
outbreaks followed the promul-
gation by the British governor
of a detention-of-persons law
on 15 July, which gives him
the right to detain in lawful
custody any person he believes
is a member or supporter of
any organization responsible
for acts of violence. The
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21 July 1955
introduction of this law
alarmed the Greek government
and generally increased Greek
and Greek-Cypriot doubts con-
cerning British intentions.
This situation poses se-
vere dangers for the Papagos
government. Any yielding on
the Cyprus question, in the
present excited state of Greek
opinion, might cause the govern-
ment to fall. Ambassador Can-
non believes that the only hope
?of a reasonable Cyprus settle-
ment rests with the present
Greek government; any change
Trieste Situation Deteriorates
The dissatisfaction in
Trieste with Rome's inadequate
measures for remedying the
territory's depressed economic
conditions will become an in-
creasingly serious problem as
the 1956 local elections ap-
proach. Inept Italian methods
of administration have resulted
in a prolonged shipyard strike
supported by both Communist
and non-Communist unions.
The Communist Party of
the Territory of Trieste, which
polled 17.3 percent of the votes
in the 1952 elections, is the
party most likely to profit
from popular discontent.
Although the maladjust-
ment in the Trieste economy
is primarily due to the high
costs in the shipyards and the
loss of the port's Central Euro-
pean customers, business has
declined markedly since the
termination of the Allied Mili-
tary Government. Rome has shown
little interest in Trieste's
problems since taking over in
October 1954, and there is no
reason to believe that the new
Segni government will do any
more than its predecessor.
PART II
would probably bring in a weak
coalition and play into the
hands of extremists on the
issue. The Rally is no longer
united on Cyprus policy and
opposition leaders are compet-
ing for leadership of the Cyp-
riot cause.
The sequence of recent
events, with the increase in
mutual suspicions, makes less
likely any positive results
from the London conference and
suggests that a bitter struggle
over Cyprus may take place in
the UN General Assembly.
Rome has refused to assign
new ships to the Trieste port,
has apparently abandoned plans
for an international conference
on the use of the port, and has
made no adequate follow-through
on the announced 70-billion-lire
(112 million dollars) economic
support plan.
25X1
25X1
The situation is aggrava-
ted by the current strike at the
United Adriatic Shipyards. In
its attempt to "clean up" the
labor situation and qualify the
firm for bidding on American
contracts, the new management
of the Italian government-con-
trolled company arbitrarily
violated established union rights
and provoked united opposition
from the workers.
Trieste trade union leaders
have called a general strike
for 25 July to demonstrate that
the shipyard dispute affects the
vital economic interests of
Trieste.
The relatively weak non-
Communist unions, which have
been subjected to the same re-
strictions as the Communist
union, are currently less able
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21 July 1955
to fight back and will be in
a poorer condition to contest
upcoming shop-steward elections
The local Christian Democratic
Party and the progovernment
center parties have publicly
joined in the criticism of the
firm's management in order to
prevent the Communists from
monopolizing a popular politi-
cal issue.
Apprehensions about inter-
national developments are also
increasing. Fears that Austrian
Peron's Position
Remains Uncertain
Peron's withdrawal from
direct leadership of the Peron-
ista Party and his announcement
on 15 July that resignations
from party and government posi-
tions would be necessary in
order to facilitate needed re-
organization are further indi-
cations of the weakness of the
Argentine regime, and suggest
that Peron is still maintain-
ing himself only at the toler-
ance of the military. New
rumors of possible disturbances
have increased tensions in
Buenos Aires.
Peron told Peronista legis-
lators on 15 July that since
the Peronista revolutionary ob-
jectives had been achieved,
constitutional rights had to
be restored and Peronista meth-
ods and leadership had to be
changed.
In a conversation with Am-
bassador Nufer on 19 July, Peron
answered Nufer's question about
rumors that he might resign
from the presidency by saying
that he was "not reigning for
the time being" and that, in
fact, he did not intend to re-
sign unless his "resignation
proved a sine qua non to the
PART II
neutrality and a YugOslav-So-
viet rapprochement may expose
Trieste to new military dan-
gers may prove a stimulant
to "independentist" and "neu-
tralist" sentiments in tae
territory.
Unless the Rome govern-
ment takes effective steps to
boost business and morale in
Trieste, the situation will
continue to deteriorate and
eventually threaten to under-
mine the Christian Democratic
local administration.
25X1
success of the pacification
movement." He said that if
he resigned it should not be
taken to indicate disillusion-
ment with the turn of events.
At the same time, however,
Peron told Nufer that he con-
sidered his position "very
strong," not only because he
has the "full support" of the
Peronista Party and labor but
also because he can "count
solidly on the army." He said
the government planned to lift
political restrictions and
that the Peronista Party, which
was "stronger than ever," was
determined to bring about paci-
fication of the country. Peron
said he was holding Peronista
organizations "under wraps"
for the time being but at his
"slightist indication" the
General Confederation of Labor
would immediately call a general
strike completely paralyzing ail
activity.
Principal government
"pacification" plans as out-
lined by Peron to Nufer in-
clude lifting the state of
internal warfare and all press
restkictions and revising the
electoral law to give. the
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21 July 1955
opposition more seats in closer
proportion to their votes.
Peron was optimistic about
the pacification move, which
he believed would finally di-
vide the opposition into those
accepting the plan and the
"hardcore irreconcilables," in-
cluding the oligarchy, part of
the Radical Party, and a few
others. He said that generally
those political leaders who .
really represent a party will
go along, although his expres-
sion of regret that Arturo
Frondizi was the strongest Radi-
cal leader suggests that he has
doubt as to Frondizi's inten-
tions.
Thus far only the "Chri-
tian Democratic Movement,"
whose party organization was
Ecuador-Peru Frontier
May PIare Up Again
The reported movement of
troops by both Ecuador and
Peru to their common border
is likely to provoke new inci-
dents and delay still further
the final settlement of the '
long-standing boundary dispute
between the' two Countries.
The present boundary dis-
pute concerns two frontier
areas--Lagartococha and Santi-
ago-Zamora. Because available
geographic data were inaccurate,
the boundary in these areas was
left undemarcated in 1942 and
subject to mediation for final
settlement.
Peru now claims that Ecua-
dor is preparing to attack along
the Loja-Sullana-Paita axis,
probably on 28 July. It states
that Ecuador has moved an MDAP-
supported antiaircraft batta-
lion to Machala and is concen-
trating ground forces in the
PART II
announced on 13 July, has
issued a manifesto endorsing
Peron's call for peaceful "co-
existence" among all political
parties. Factionalism among
Catholic groups as well as the
Radicals, however, is indicated
by a less moderate manifesto
issued on 19 July by a new party
called the "Christian Democratic
Federal Union," which claims it
was established on 21 May 1955.
The latter group's mani-
festo states that pacification
is not possible until the "true
scale of values is recovered
and order restored, which
"requires the departure of men
responsible for subversion
and disorder and general re-
organization of the political
regime."
vicinity of Loja. Furthermore,
the Peruvians charge, Ecuadoran
planes have been overflying
the border, perhaps for purposes
of reconnaissance.
For its part, Peru has
ordered the activation of an
antiaircraft unit and has ased
numerous officers of the First
Anti-Aircraft Group to the First
Light Division in the vicinity
of Tumbes near the border. There
are no other indications of bor-
der troop reinforcements, accord-
ing to the army attach?in Lima.
High-level representatives of
Peruvian air, army and navy
forces have been discussing the
problem.
The American embassy in
Lima has noted a growing concern
in Peruvian government and mili-
tary circles over what they view
as a belligerent attitude on the
part of the Ecuadoran government
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and press. Peruvian
president Odria has
recalled for consul-
tation his ambassadors
to Colombia, Argentina
Brazil, Chile and the
United States. These
last four countries
are charged with me-
diating the boundary
dispute, according
to the 1942 Rio Pro-
tocol, which terminated
the brief war between
Peru and Ecuador in
1941.
Argentina, Bra-
zil, Chile,'arid Col-
ombia, for various'
political and ecoAomic
reasons, all appear
inclined to favor
Ecuaddr.
The movement of
25X1 forces in Ecuador has
not been confirmed.
In the past,the chiefs
of state of both
countries have stirred
up border trouble in
order to distract pub-
lic attention from the
internal political
difficulties in their
21 July 1955
?Qurro
ECUADOR
-TuMpE
MACHAL4
LOJA., SANTIAGO-ZAMORA
*LIMA
ECUADOR
-PERU
21 JULY 1955
100 200 300
STATUTE MILES
respective countries.
At present President
Velasco's hold on the presi-
dency of Ecuador is becoming
increasingly precarious, and
there are indications that
50719-6
Odria may be maneuvering to
perpetuate his regime in power.
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PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE SOVIET THEORY ON THE "INEVITABILITY OF WAR"
The belief that the 3oviet
Union, as the leader of world
Communism, is a beleaguered for-
tress whose security is con-
stantly threatened is deeply
imbedded in Communist thinking.
Until the end of World War II,
this image found theoretical
expression in Lenin's doctrine
of the "inevitability of war."
Aware of the threat of nuclear
warfare, Soviet leaders have
found revision of this doctrine
advisable despite the fact that
it had been regarded as one of
Lenin's "original" contributions
to Marxist science and had be-
'come a cardinal tenet of Com-
munist dogma.
Theory Until End of World War II
When Lenin first proposed
his formula, the Soviet state
had not been established and
there was no "Communist camp."
Following the revolution,
the doctrine came, in practice,
to mean that the Communist and
the capitalist worlds would
sooner or later become locked
In an armed struggle from which
only one system would emerge.
"We are living," Lenin wrote
after the revolution, "not only
in a state but in a system of
states, and the existence of
the Soviet republic side by side
with imperialist states for a
long time is unthinkable. One
or the other must triumph in
the end. And before that end
comes, a series of frightful
clashes between the Soviet re-
public and the bourgeois states
is inevitable."
This became the generally
accepted view, although certain
qualifications were introduced,
which suggested that the con-
sequences for the USSR ?would be
less serious if the war could
be postponed. At the 15th
Party Congress in 1927, for in-
stance, Stalin said:
"We cannot forget the saying
of Lenin to the effect that a
great deal in the matter of our
construction depends on whether
we succeed in delaying war with
the capitalist countries, which
is inevitable but which may be
delayed either until proletarian
revolution ripens in Europe or
until colonial revolutions come
fully to a head, or, finally,
until the capitalists fight among
themselves over the division of
the colonies...."
This pattern of thought
was not basically altered until
the end of World War II. This
war was interpreted in Soviet
theory as an intercapitalist
war and as further proof of the
validity of Lenin's doctrine.
The "war occurred," Stalin said
in February 1946, "as the in-
evitable result of the develop-
ment of world economic and polit-
ical forces on the basis of
contemporary monopolistic capi-
talism. Marxists have more than
once declared that the capitalist
system contains in itself the
elements of general crises and
military conflicts, that in view
of this the development of world
capitalism in our time proceeds
not in a planned and uniform
movement forward, but through a
series of crises and military
catastrophes."
This explanation was simple
enough, but it was certainly in-
complete. The fact was that the
USSR itself had become involved
in a so-called "intercapitalist
war."
The Theory in the Atomic Age
With the advent of nuclear
weapons, the question of whether
the USSR was inevitably to be
involved in a future war far
more destructive than the last
became a theoretical point of
prime importance.
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Soviet theoretician3 had
to face the task of thrashing
out a definitive formulation
on this subject which would
recognize the realities of in-
ternational relations in the
atomic era and provide a guide
to policy and propaganda with-
out conspicuously deviating
from hallowed theory. The prod-
uct of this search was a for-
mulation, provided by Stalin
himself in his Economic Problems
of Socialism in the USSR in
October 1952, which preserved
the letter but violated the
spirit of Lenin's original dogma.
There was at first, how-
ever, a tendency to play with
the idea that perhaps wars in
general were not inevitable.
Soon after World War II, a note
of contingency began to creep
into Soviet pronouncements.
Stalin himself, in an interview
published in Pravda on 17 Feb-
ruary 1951, sfiZiTira willingness
to temporize with the issue.
In answer to a question, he
said he did not consider a new
world war inevitable, "at least
at the present time," but that
it might become so "if the war-
mongers succeed in confusing
the masses of people with false-
hood."
The first attempt to come
to grips with the issue directly
came in an article published in
Problems of Philosophy in Sep-
tember 1951.
Using an argument frequently
brought to bear when doctrinal
revisions are impending, the
author of the article warned
that those who regard Marxist
teaching as a body of inviolable
dogma can "by blindly grabbing
hold of one or another thesis
of Marx relating to a definite
historic epoch, make a very
crude mistake .... With every
new year of postwar development
there takes place a further
change in the relationship of
forces between the camp of peace
supporters and the camp of war-
mongers in favor of the camp of
peace. That is why in contem-
porary historical conditions
it is impossible categorically
to affirm that the coming of a
new world war is inevitable.
The Marxist-Leninist thesis of
the inevitability of wars in an
epoch of imperialism, which was
correct for some historical con-
ditions, cannot be carried over
unconditionally into new histori-
cal conditions."
Stalin's Restatement
This attempt to scrap the
doctrine was authoritatively
rejected in October 1952 by
Stalin in his Economic Problems
of Socialism in the USSR. "It
is said," Stalin asserted, "that
Lenin's thesis that imperialism
inevitably gives birth to wars
should be considered obsolete
since powerful peoples' forces
have now grown up which are-
taking a stand in defense of
peace, against a new world war.
This is not correct." The peace
movement, Stalin argued, can
prevent a particular war, can
result in the "temporary pres-
ervation of a particular peace,"
but only the destruction of
perialism can "eliminate alto-
gether the inevitability of wars
among capitalist countries...."
Stalin did not state, how-
ever, that the destruction of im-
perialism could be brought about
only through war between the
capitalist and socialist blocs.
On the contrary, he indicated
wars among the capitalist powers
were more likely than a war
directed against the USSR, al-
though the threat of the latter
had by no means disappeared.
There was a great deal of
theoretical sophistry in Stalin's
formulation, and it is probable
that he was pursuing primarily
political and propaganda objec-
tives in offering it. Neverthe:-
less, from the theoretical point
of view, it had certain advan-
tages. It preserved the Leninist
dogma in a formal sense, and
pointed to the eventual collapse
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of capitalism, but no longer
committed Soviet theoreticians
to belief in an unavoidable
catastrophe.
Theory Since Stalin's Death
Given impetus by the re-
newed stress on "peaceful co-
existence" which set in just
before Stalin's death, the
theoretical discussion continued.
An article published in the
November 1953 issue of Zvezda
took a different approach than
Stalin and once again attempted
a frank disavowal of the entire
doctrine. The author of the
article, M. Gus, argued that
human action could paralyze the
operation of the law of in-
evitable war.
This thesis was ruled out,
however, possibly because it
conceded more than was necessary
and might eventually undermine
belief in inveterate capitalist
hostility. Articles by V.
Khrushkov, chief of the Agita-
tion and Propaganda Department
of the central committee, in
the January 1954 issue of Kom-
Aunist and by T. Tereshkin in
a February issue of Zvezda
attacked the Gus thesis.
Tereshkin's article, a lengthy
and detailed rebuttal, was vir-
tually a verbatim reaffirmation
of Stalin's 1952 formulation.
The same general argument
was put forward in an article
appearing in the March 1954
issue of Military Thought. The
author, a certain Colonel Pyat-
kin, faithfully reaffirmed every
element in Stalin's formulation,
but betrayed confusion as to its
essential meaning. He spoke-,
for instance, of wars becoming
"almost inevitable" under im-
perialism, of being "especially
inevitable" under certain condi-
tions. 'Me United States is
intent on launching an aggressive
war," he asserted in another
place, but "whether or not this
war will be prevented or delayed
temporarily will depend upon
the relative strength of the
fighting forces which decide
the fate of peace and war."
The "peace movement," then,
can accelerate or put a brake
on the operation of objective
laws. It cannot paralyze them,
however, and the law of the in-
evitability of wars among capi-
talists remains in force.
At the same time, however,
the durability of "peaceful co-
existence" and the possibility
of averting a war between the
two great opposing systems were
further emphasized. Leontyev,
writing in Kommunist in Septem-
ber 1954, referred to the "ob-
jective inevitability of the
coexistence of states having .
different social systems,
throughout the length of a
whole historical epoch." War
between countries having dif-
ferent social systems, Leontyev
asserted, is not inevitable.
The danger of attack on the
USSR is an ever-present one,
however, and demands constant
vigilance and strengthening of
the Soviet state. The peoples
of the socialist bloc should
not, on the other hand, be in-
timidated by this threat, nor
should they lose faith in the
eventual triumph of Communism.
The Theory Today
Soviet doctrine thus no
longer presupposes that the USSR
must inevitably fight another
war. This position has been
reached only gradually, after
several false starts and much
"backing and filling." Be-
cause it has been worked out
fitfully, in response to the
sometimes-conflicting demands
of policy, propaganda and doc-
trinal purity, it is a patch-
work formulation based on a
number of theoretical com-
promises.
Uncertainty on such a pri-
'mary question was undoubtedly
an uncomfortable state of mind
to be in for Communist theoreti-
cians. It was, however, plainly
impossible to build a viable
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theoretical or propaganda posi-
tion on the assumption that war
was inevitable between the USSR
and the United States, a war
which, in the nuclear age, would
necessarily have frightful con-
sequences (possibly "the de-
struction of world civilization").
Insistence on this particular
dogma might have thrown in doubt
the soundness of other more
basic Communist doctrines, or,
at least, have created an atti-
tude of despair and futility
in the Soviet population and
among foreign Communists.
On the other hand, it would
have been difficult to discard
in its entirety a doctrine which
buttressed tne 'conflict image"
and repudiated the idea that an
era of sweetness and light might
eventually arrive. The doctrine
was not, therefore, entirely
scrapped. It was, instead, re-
vised in a way which preserved
both the semblance of doctrinal
purity and the sense of an ever-
present danger.
Soviet theoreticians were
faced with another dilemma--the
problem of reconciling "peace-
ful coexistence" of indefinite
duration with categorical in-
sistence on the eventual col-
lapse of capitalism. A way
out was found in the assertion
that peaceful coexistence would
last until the imperialist West
disrupted it, but that capital-
ism would crumble with or without
war.
A final problem, which has
apparently become more acute
during the past year, has been
to discourage the assumption
abroad that Soviet attachment
to peaceful coexistence is equiv-
alent to fear of war and that
the USSR is intimidated by the
American "position of strength"
policy. Soviet propaganda has,
therefore, begun to boast of
Communist-bloc strength and to
caution against feelings of in-
feriority. The USSR desires
peace, it is said, but is, never-
theless, strong and resolute'
and has less to fear from a new
war than the capitalist West.
What those responsible for
Soviet policy actually think on
this score remains obscure. If
theoretical formulations are any
guide, however, it is possible
to conclude that their thoughts
are hazy and incomplete, and
that this fact troubles them.
The doctrine in its present form
cannot serve as a reliable guide
to action, for it tells them
only that there is an alterna-
tive to war, but not how likely
it is that this alternative will
be achieved nor what the conse-
auences will be if it is not.
MALAYAN ELECTHONS
Malaya's first national
elections on 27 July will give
Malayans greater legislative
auu executive responsibilities
but will not affect ultimate
British control over the Federa-
tion's affairs. The United
Kingdom's control over foreign
25X1
affairs and defense will con-
tinue and the British high com-
missioner will retain his veto
over legislation. Economic and
financial posts probably will
continue to be filled by British
personnel.
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inequity, member organizations
are expected to continue their
successful co-operation :Liter
the elections. The Indian
organization provides little
strength and joined up largely
out of a desire to be "on the
bandwagon."
Expected to win a few seats
is Party Negara, a conservative
organization which is backed by
professional and commercial
leaders and by several of the
prime ministers of Malaya's nine
states.
The leader of the winning
party will be given the port-
folio for home affairs. The
most likely candidate for this
position is Abdul Rahman, chair-
man of the largest of the Alli-
ance organizations--the United
Malay Nationalist Organization.
Although the new council
has limited legislative respon-
sibilities, the high commissioner
is expected to give its demands
and recommendations careful
consideration. With the expecta-
tion of an Alliance victory and
in response to the Alliance
platform which proposes an am-,
nesty to the Communists, Brit-
ish authorities have already
prepared new, liberal surrender
terms which will be announced
after the elections. The high
commissioner is also expected
to accede after 27 July to an
Alliance request for the appoint-
ment of a constitutional com-
mission to review the Federa-
tion Agreement, the legal basis
on which the Malayan govern-
ment now rests.
Once established as the
dominant group in the council,
the Alliance will probably de-
mand an accelerated pace toward
self-government, for which the
British have set no date but
which Malayan parties want with-
in the next four years. Ir prep-
aration for self-government,
Lne alliance will insist on in-
creased Malayanization of all
levels of the civil service and
greater Malayan participation
at international gatherings.
It will probably recommend the
appointment of high-level Mala-
yan assistants in offices hith-
erto held by British personnel,
particularly those of the finan-
cial secretary, the minister for
economic affairs, the attorney
general, and the chief secretary.
The Alliance has a definite
program for handling the seven-
year-long "emergency" which was
declared to combat Communist
terrorism. It wants either to
end the emergency quickly or,
failing to do so, obtain out-
side help to finance continued
operations. The Alliance has
proposed offering a general ?
amnesty to the Communists to
end terrorism. If the Communists
refuse the amnesty, Alliance
leaders feel they would be in
a position to ask for an all-out
military effort by the people
of Malaya. Furthermore, Alliance
leaders argue it would then be
apparent that the war in Malaya
is only one sector of the larger
fight against Communist aggres-
sion, and they would recommend
to the high commissioner that
the United States and the United
Kingdom be approached for finan-
cial aid.
Alliance leaders appear
to have given little thought to
the probability that the Com-
munists would use an amnesty as
a cover for their increasingly
successful program of subversion
in Malaya and Singapore. Many
might be directed to "accept"
the proposed amnesty in order
to work above ground, both as
"reformed Communists" and to
infiltrate existing political
parties. Although the Communist
peace bid in June was for a nego-
tiated settlement, a renewal of
the offer in early July implied
that the Communist Party is amen-
able to any countersuggestion to
'end terrorism.
British colonial and Foreign
Office officials in London claim
to be satisfied thus far with
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Malaya's response to experiments
in self-government. National-
ist demands for accelerated
progress toward self-government,
based partially on Communist
protestations of peaceful in-
tentions, may, however, force
drastic changes in the British
schedule for Malaya.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET-AFGHAN TRANSIT AGREEMENT
Pakistan's denial of trans-
port facilities for Afghan ex-
ports has focused attention on
the Soviet Union's offer of a
five-year transit guarantee for
Afghan goods. If denied access
to its normal import-export
markets for an extended period
of time, Afghanistan might be
compelled not only to implement
the transit agreement with the
USSR but also to turn to the
USSR as an alternative source
for much of its imports and, to
a lesser extent, as a consumer
for its exports. The cost of
effecting this reorientation of
Afghanistan's foreign trade
would not be a significant ob-
stacle.
Approximately 2250 Rail Miles from
Tashkent to Leningrad
ash kent
No formal blockade exists
between Afghanistan and Paki-
stan, nor have formal economic
sanctions been imposed. How-
ever, since 1 June, traffic s
destined mainly for Pakistan,
India and the West through the
Khyber Pass, the transit point
for most of Afghanistan's for-
eign trade, has been
reduced to a trickle.
AFGHANISTAN
TRADE ROUTES
21 JULY 1955
200
MILES
Terme,
400
CHINA
AFGHANISTAN
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
(STATUS IN
DISPUTE)
Kandahar
Chaman
Quetta
KISTAN
NEW DELHI
INDIA
14798
ARABIAN SEA
The same is true of
the normally limited
traffic between Afghan-
istan and Pakistan on
the Chaman route to
the south.
Afghanistan's
foreign trade consists
chiefly of exports of
karakul skins, fruits
and nuts, wool and
cotton, and imports
of textiles, petro-
leum products, cement,
simple manufactures,
machinery, and motor
vehicles. Karakul
skins (Persian lamb)
and fruits and nuts
account for about
45 percent of the
value of the export
trade.
Imports of ma-
chinery, motor vehi-
dies and textiles from
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the United States and India,
the principal recipients of
these exports, account for some
40 percent of Afghan imports.
A substantial reduction in
trade in thesa items would
seriously aggravate a financial
situation already strained by
relatively large development
requirements. The crux of the
problem is the availability of
either practical alternative
routes for these commodities or
different markets.
Karakul, most of which goes
to New York through Karachi, is
extremely important to the
Afghan economy and accounts for
about 30 percent of foreign
exchange earnings. Transport
costs are of relatively small
significance in the export of
karakul, and the problem is
chiefly one of alternative
routing.
With Iran largely inacces-
sible because of its poor trans-
port network, there are two
alternative routes available.
One, now in use for Soviet-
Afghan trade, is by the road
running north from Kabul to the
Soviet railhead at Termez, and
thence by rail to Leningrad, an
established fur market. Road
transport costs involved would
be approximately the same as
for the established route through
the Khyber Pass to the railhead
at Landi Kotal, Pakistan. The
cost of hauling karakul skins
by rail to Leningrad would be
somewhat higher than taking
them by rail through Pakistan.
Sea shipment costs to New York
from Leningrad, however, are
con:iderably less than from
Karachi. The increased cost
of this alternate route, there-
fore, is relatively insignifi-
cant and would be no obstacle
to its use.
The only other practical
way of sending karakul to West-
ern markets is by air. Air
freight would be somewhat high-
er, approximately five per-
cent of the value of the skins
in New York. .Despite increased
cost, the use of air transport
may be preferable since air
transport would probably entail
fewer reorganizational problems,
and there is little danger that
Pakistan, as a member of the
International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), will inter-
fere with air service.
Fruits and nuts, other
important export items, are
exported mostly to the consum-
ing centers of Bombay and Cal-
cutta. About one third of the
fruit is dried, but the perish-
able quality of the remainder
makes long-haul transport both
expensive and impractical. It
seems likely, therefore, that
Afghanistan would be compelled
to export most fresh fruits, ?
and possibly even nuts and
dried fruits, to the USSR. The
amount involved could easily
be absorbed into the Soviet
market despite similar produc-
tion in the USSR. In any event,
political factors are likely to
be the ruling consideration.
Finding alternative mar-
kets for small amounts of Afghan
cotton and wool exports should
pose no serious problem for the
USSR, which has imported about
half of Afghanistan's export
of these commodities in the
past. Agreements call for the
USSR to purchase 80 percent of
total wool production in 1955.
The import of the remaining wool
and cotton production would be
relatively uncomplicated.
Afghanistan is unlikely to
implement the transit agreement
with the USSR, despite the
hardships of the informal Paki-
stani blockade, before another
round of talks with Pakistan.
At the moment, it appears that
an arrangement can be reached
whereby Afghanistan will guaran-
tee to keep its Pushtoonistan
propaganda at a low level in
return for the reopening of
.Pakistani consulates and the
normalization of trade rela-
tions.
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ARMS SOURCES OF NORTH AFRICAN NATIONALISTS
High French officials have
charged that the Arab states,
particularly Libya, are arming
nationalists in French North
Africa. Some arms may be sup-
Plied by the Arab states, but
available evidence indicates
that the vast majority of weap-
ons in the hands of the dis-
sidents are obtained locally--
mostly abandoned World War II
stocks.
This is borne out by the
materiel which French authori-
ties in North Africa have found
in arms caches, by the supplies
captured in clashes with rebels,
and by the weapons surrendered
last December by Tunisian fel-
lagha under an amnesty agreement.
Some weapons have been identir.
fied as having been issued by
the authorities to French set-
tlers living in isolated areas.
Numerous small caches of
arms have been discovered, partic-
ularly in Morocco. Most of
them contained light weapons
of World War II vintage, aban-
doned by the Allied and Axis
armies, and picked up by the
local population. Many of these
weapons were of Italian manu-
facture. One hoard discovered
in late February consisted of
an American-made carbine, an
"automatic weapon"--the first
found in the possession of
Moroccan terrorists--miscella-
neous explosives, and 12 revol-
vers. Another cache was said
to include munitions stolen
from British dumps in Egypt.
The French cited this discovery
to support their claim that the
Arab states were aiding the
nationalists.
Some 1,700 weapons were
turned in when the Tunisian
fellagha surrendered in Decem-
ber 1954. Despite rumors that
the fellagha hid their modern
arms, no cache is known to have
been discovered by French troops
which now occupy the former fel-
lagha strongholds.
9
Pistols and hunting rifles
are available on the local mar-
ket. While permits to possess
them may in some instances be
required, as they are in Tan-
gier, such regulations are no
serious deterrent.
The second source of arms
is probably loot from police,
military, and private arsenals.
Some weapons are alleged to
have been sold by French and
Spanish soldiers. Others fell
into dissidents' hands when
French military units were
ambushed. A few were undoubted-
ly acquired when native troops
deserted and joined the Alge-
rian rebels. Most bombs used
by North African terrorists are
homemade.
Arms smuggling, a tradi-
tional occupation in the Medi-
terranean area, probably is not
an extensive source for the
nationalists. Weapons reaching
North Africa by this means
probably originate in France,
Italy, Spain, Spanish Morocco,
or Libya. There have, conversely
been reports of arms smuggling
to Sicily from North Africa.
The French in the spring
of 1955 detailed naval units
to augment their normal anti-
smuggling service in an attempt
to intercept clandestine arms
shipnents which might be reach-
ing eastern Algeria by sea.
A few smuggled arms come
overhand between Libya and Al-
geria and Tunisia and between
the Spanish and French zones
of Morocco. More activity is
probable across the Spanish Moroc-
can border than over the desert
of the Libyan border because of
the more favorable terrain and
the shorter distance.
French border patrols in
both areas have apprehended
some smugglers, but few arms.
The British ambassador in Paris
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recently informed the American
embassy, however, that investi-
gation indicates that gunrunning
from Libya to Algeria is on a
larger scale than his govern-
ment had previously supposed;
Press allegations that arms
are supplied by the USSR or the
Soviet bloc cannot be substan-
tiated. Soviet bloc merchant
ships call occasionally at Al-
gerian ports and could off-load
a few arms surreptitiously.
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The extent of Communist
involvement also is not known.
PART III
The
shortage of arms is known to be
a serious deterrent to the
rebels operating in eastern
Algeria. The French director
of Algerian security services
recently informed an American
consul that if the rebels
could procure 1,000 rifles, they
would have no difficulty in
putting 1,000 men in the field 25X1
overnight.
If the North Africans should
manage to mount a successful
gunrunning operation, active
resistance to French authority
would be substantially enlarged.
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CONFIDENTIAL
surIPEPMENB
Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000600010001-6
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 10 of 10