NOTE TO MR. BLAKE FROM(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00498A000700070015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 20, 1976
• Content Type: NOTES

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DDIA R istry
File
Dear Mr. Blake:
1976
Attached is a draft report by a Center for the Study of
Intelligence team on the subject of CIA intelligence support
for foreign and national security policy making. The report
attempts to look realistically at the status of the Agency's
intelligence-policy connection today, and sets forth a few
suggestions for changes or for further study in several key
areas. The emphasis is pragmatic rather than philosonhical.
The Center and the team hone that the study will stimulate
thought and discussion, both on the specific conclusions it
reaches and on their broader implications for the Agency and
its role in the policy making process. Your comments are
invited and may be addressed to me or to I and
1 Center: 1036 Chamber of Commerce Building,
Additional copies of the report are available
extension
from the Center.
7drector, Center tor the
Study of Intelligence
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CIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AND
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING
CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF
INTELLIGENCE, OTR
January 1976
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION.. ..... 1
SYNOPSIS OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS... ? ?0 ?? 0?? 4
POLICY MAKING AND POLICY MAKERS ..... 00000000 0 .... 10
THE VARIETIES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 14
Current Intelligence
Broad Spectrum Reporting
Focused Coverage
Crisis Response Intelligence
Customized Service
In-Depth Analysis
Predictive Intelligence
THE FLOW OF WORDS AND PAPER............ .... 000 0 18
Changing Structural Arrangements
Getting Intelligence Through
Oral Intelligence and Personal Relationships
RECEPTIVITY........ .......... 000000000000 ..... 28
USE.... ........ ............................. .... 37
Problem Cases
Mixed--but Better--Results
"Picture Book" Examples
RECOMMENDATIONS. .................,0 ? . ..... ? 0 48
FOOTNOTES.. ....... 0400.600.0 ......... 000000.000000000 61
ANNEX A ............... ....?00?0043?0004 04?00?0????00?? 68
ANNEX B ................. 00 ........... 040000000000000 70
GLOSSARY........ 0000000000.0000 ..... 00004.00 ....... 00 73
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CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
CIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AND
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING
Thete i4 no phaze o the intettigence
buzine46 which i4 mo/Le impottant than
the ptopet kaationzhip between intati-
gence itzet4 and the peopte who uze itz
ptoduct. OddZy enough, thi4 taation-
'ship, which one would expect to a/stab-U.4h
it4a4 automaticatty, doe's not do this.
It iz eztabtbshed a's a tezutt o4 a gteat
cleat. o4 pe Sen, con.scious e.66ott and
i6 tikety to dizappean when the eigott
itetaxed.
Sherman Kent, Sttategic
Intatigence 6oft. Ametican
Wottd PoZicy, 1949.
INTRODUCTION
That an appropriate relationship between intelligence
and policy making is neither spontaneous nor self-perpetuating
has become increasingly evident over the years. Continuing
efforts are needed to maintain and improve it. As a contri-
bution to this process, the Center for the Study of Intelligence
has undertaken to examine the current state of the intelligence-
policy connection, focusing on CIA intelligence support. The
Center's study team' perused relevant literature, interviewed
a wide range of intelligence producers and policy makers,
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CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
CIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AND
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING
Thete i4 no phaze o the intettigence
buzine46 which i4 mo/Le impottant than
the ptopet kaationzhip between intati-
gence itzet4 and the peopte who uze itz
ptoduct. OddZy enough, thi4 taation-
'ship, which one would expect to a/stab-U.4h
it4a4 automaticatty, doe's not do this.
It iz eztabtbshed a's a tezutt o4 a gteat
cleat. o4 pe Sen, con.scious e.66ott and
i6 tikety to dizappean when the eigott
itetaxed.
Sherman Kent, Sttategic
Intatigence 6oft. Ametican
Wottd PoZicy, 1949.
INTRODUCTION
That an appropriate relationship between intelligence
and policy making is neither spontaneous nor self-perpetuating
has become increasingly evident over the years. Continuing
efforts are needed to maintain and improve it. As a contri-
bution to this process, the Center for the Study of Intelligence
has undertaken to examine the current state of the intelligence-
policy connection, focusing on CIA intelligence support. The
Center's study team' perused relevant literature, interviewed
a wide range of intelligence producers and policy makers,
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by a continuation of less-than-responsible criticism. The
battering the Agency recently has been taking at the hands
of a number of Congressmen and in the news media stands in
sharp contrast to the remarkably high respect policy makers
still accord it for professionalism and substantive compe-
tence. The panoply of intelligence products and services
the Agency provides is much appreciated, despite criticism
of specific products and areas.
It is quite clear, however, that quality intelligence
products cannot in themselves fulfill the Agency's policy
support mission. Intelligence must be effectively communicated
and assimilated if it is to provide an appropriate input to
the policy making process, and the study reveals a need
within the Agency to couple continued concern for quality
production with greater and more systematic attention to
dissemination, receptivity, and use.
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SYNOPSIS OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The dividing line that in traditional theory separates
intelligence and policy has become obscure. CIA intelli-
gence feeds into the policy making process in a wide variety
of forms and at many different levels. A significant part
of the intelligence message conveyed to top policy makers is
unidentifiably imbedded in policy papers or inextricably
interwoven in sets of options. The tendency of intelligence
and policy to become intertwined early in the decision
making process has intensified in recent years.
--The study suggests some measures to
improve intelligence producers'
understanding of the present complex
linkages with the policy making
process, and some steps designed to
increase the impact of the Agency's
products and services on the policy
people who produce the papers and
options upon which action often is
based.
The widespread use of human filtering mechanisms on the
consumer side results in the failure of much written intelligence
meant for high-level policy makers to reach them in the original
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formats and contexts prepared by the Agency. CIA intelligence
sometimes becomes just another anonymous bit of information,
and even when particular intelligence documents are forwarded,
principals often read only summaries written and attached by
their aides. Policy makers, moreover, take aboard copious
quantities of so-called unfinished intelligence. They
prefer to get raw items of current import immediately,
rather than to wait even a few hours for the raw factual
report to be accompanied by interpretation.
--The study recommends closer alignment
of written products to the realities
of how information is received,
screened, and processed by policy
makers. It also suggests considera-
tion of a new intelligence publica-
tion designed to help lessen problems
that can be created by the injudicious
use of uninterpreted raw information.
Some of the most important communication of intelligence
is now done orally. Much oral dissemination takes the form
of formal, prepared briefings, but informal exchanges are
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at least equally significant. Discussions that DDO Division
Chiefs have with Assistant Secretaries of State and NSC
Staff members should be widely recognized within the CIA as
constituting important avenues for the passing of substantive
intelligence. The strong natural linkages between the DDO
and certain policy makers probably could be exploited in the
overall intelligence support process more effectively than
at present.
--The study suggests a thorough look
at the prospects and problems of
oral dissemination and at the
establishment of mechanisms for
insuring that feedback information
and useful insights on the policy
milieu obtained by DDO officers in
contact with policy makers are
regularly shared with their DDI
colleagues.
Policy makers value and are receptive to the Agency's
products and services, but they tend to like some kinds of
intelligence more than others. They most appreciate receiving
unique pieces of information of the kind only intelligence
sources can provide. Analysis of unfamiliar or particularly
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complex material also is coveted; the Agency's work on
technical/scientific and military/strategic subjects is
highly regarded, and economic analysis is enthusiastically
received by those consumers who specialize in the economic
field. There is less admiration for the kind of intelli-
gence that corresponds to most policy makers' own expertise,
i.e., interpretive reporting on foreign political developments.
Policy makers tend in this area to look to intelligence for
the "facts," and they profess to regard much of the Agency's
interpretive work as of marginal utility. They do, however,
appreciate political analysis that answers specific questions
or performs a special service by using new techniques,
exploiting unfamiliar materials, adopting an imaginative
approach, or developing an unusual insight.
--The study suggests several measures
aimed at increasing policy maker
receptivity to the Agency's political
interpretation and analysis.
Policy makers genuinely desire probing, in-depth analysis
in all fields, and there is recognition that CIA has been
gaining ground on this front. There is, however, little
confidence in most predictive intelligence--whether the
Agency's own or the formal estimates of the Intelligence
Community.
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--There is a need for improvement in
predictive intelligence, and a hard
look at the estimative process
would be the logical first step.
The perennial--and probably interminable--problems of
insufficient feedback and secretiveness concerning policy
plans hinder intelligence responsiveness and adversely
affect intelligence quality.
--The study suggests some measures to
nitigate this situation, including
the development of improved capa-
bilities to independently assess
within the CIA questions policy
makers need answered now and to
independently anticipate the problems
they are likely to be faced with in
the future.
Close intelligence producer-policy maker relationships
are, nevertheless, important in assuring the relevance and
impact of intelligence inputs. 'lost policy makers are
reasonably enthusiastic about receiving intelligence, but
are continually distracted from it by the pressures of day-
to-day operational matters and the urgent demands that non-
intelligence people, paper, and problems levy upon their
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time and energy. Initiatives for improved relationships
must, therefore, come largely from the intelligence side.
Agency people have managed to develop close, helpful relation-
ships with a variety of policy people, and the intelligence
transmitted in these circumstances has strong impact. There
are, at the same time, cases where communication is sparse
and the intelligence product sometimes has little to do with
the focus of attention on the policy side. Developing and main-
taining good intelligence producer-policy maker connections
is, of course, particularly difficult in areas where policy
makers tend to feel most competent doing their own analysis.
--The study suggests that political
analysts take especially vigorous
initiatives to expand and improve
their contacts with policy people
by utilizing the kinds of approaches
that evoke positive responses.
There are clear advantages for the Agency in having multiple
points of contact and communication with the policy side.
These could be maximized by better coordination of policy
support rendered by various Agency components.
--The study offers a suggestion for
increasing organizational awareness
of disparate policy support activities.
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POLICY MAKING AND POLICY MAKERS
Sherman Kent and other early commentators on the
intelligence-policy connection3 posited policy makers who
consciously and carefully assembled information relevant to
their problems, weighed policy options and implications, and
proceeded to select courses of action. Intelligence provided
part of the factual and interpretative background for this
process and aided in the projection of the consequences of
alternative strategies. The role intelligence producers
were supposed to play was seen as sizable, yet carefully
delineated; they were admonished to guard against too intimate
an involvement in the policy making process lest they compromise
their impartiality and objectivity.
With the benefit of additional years of perspective on
the policy making process, it now seems doubtful that such
rational actor-based models ever adequately described it.
They surely fail to do so today. Increasingly sophisticated
analyses have revealed an intricate, often disorderly system
of human and institutional interactions that is incompatable
with traditional maxims about the role of intelligence. The
Decision Making models that emerged in the early 1960s4 and
more recent attempts to develop and apply sophisticated
conceptual frameworks--notably the Organizational Process
and Bureaucratic Politics models5--highlight the variety of
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forces at work in the policy making process. They provide
valuable insights into the dynamics of individual actuation,
organizational functioning, and bureaucratic maneuver.
Although the models deal with informational inputs and
communications channels in policy making, they unfortunately
tend not to single out intelligence for separate special
treatment.
The same is true of the intriguing work psychologists
and organization theorists have done on perception, informa-
tion processing, and decision making in individuals, small
groups, and bureaucracies.6 There have been some attempts
to apply the insights gained in these studies to foreign and
national security policy making,7 but without any systematic
effort to assess the impact of intelligence as distinct from
that of information in genera1.8
This study recognizes the utility of theoretical work
in a variety of fields, but is not cast in terms of a par-
ticular model or framework. It attempts a fresh, pragmatic
examination of the working elements in the intelligence-
policy relationship and a necessary starting point in this
examination is an understanding of the policy making milieu
into which intelligence support funnels.
Traditional thinking about this milieu tends to focus
on policy makers at the top--the Presidents and their closest
advisors. Unquestionably these figures play a key role,
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especially in crisis situations, but there also is a great
corpus of policy that is made or influenced by others--by
the incremental day-to-day decisions of country desk and
embassy officers, by the staff people who draft papers for
their principals, and by the innovative suggestions of
junior officers or aides.
Some policy decisions do rest on deliberations by a
very few. But others stem from recommendations of a high-
level body reviewing the work of a middle-level committee
that was derived from a series of options formulated at a
lower level on the basis of inputs from the next level down.
Policy can also result from nothing more than unchecked
momentum. Thus, policy makers must be thought of as many
and varied. Whether a policy determination occurs high,
low, or in-between, the set of people involved obviously
will vary with the subject and geographical area, and the
impact of intelligence will differ from case to case.9
Policy makers differ in interests, temperament, and
working styles. These variations are not always apparent,
however, and intelligence producers caught up in the effort
to provide day-to-day support sometimes fail to fully appre-
ciate resulting problems or opportunities.10 There is also
a less than complete understanding of areas of congruence
and divergence in attitude and approach between policy
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makers and different kinds of intelligence producers. This
is especially so regarding the operational orientation and
activist inclination that policy makers share with operations
officers.11
Policy people regard themselves as having certain
expertise and ample sophistication. They are accustomed to
interpreting, analyzing, and projecting, as well as planning,
deciding and operating. They tend, therefore, to be most
receptive to intelligence that provides new information,
makes the esoteric comprehensible, or answers a particular
question on their minds. Intelligence that attempts to do
for them what they believe they can accomplish competently
themselves generally is less well-received.
Intelligence, of course, often is only one among a
number of information sources available to policy makers,
and they are under no obligation to be guided solely by its
light. Policy may, in fact, be shaped by personal, bureau-
cratic, political, or other factors having little or no
relation to intelligence input.12 Intelligence producers
nevertheless are obliged to do their best to insure that
policy makers are aware of relevant intelligence and take it
into account.
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THE VARIETIES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
CIA intelligence feeds into the policy making milieu in
a wide variety of forms. The Agency's products and services
could be categorized in a number of different ways. One
such arbitrary format is developed below as an aid to the
analysis in subsequent sections of the paper. The categories
are not meant to be rigid, and there actually is considerable
overlap.
Current Intelligence, provided orally and by a varied
array of written products including finished intelligence
publications, FBIS output, and DDO disseminations, keeps a
core of top policy officials and a corps of others appraised
of a very wide range of developments. Current Intelligence
includes reporting, interpretation, analysis, prediction,
and even some customized service. Several different types
of products and services are embodied in the category.
--Broad Spectrum Reporting from CIA
is conveyed principally through the
National Intelligence Daily and
Bulletin and by the President's
Daily Brief. White House Spot
Reports, TDs and FBIS ticker help
keep this coverage current, and
some periodicals provide a reviewing
service.
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--Focused Coverage, by area or function,
is handled partly by directing to
certain policy makers only those
materials pertaining to their
responsibilities, and partly through
publications specially designed for
this purpose. Among the latter are
the informal staff notes sent to
selected policy people by OCI
divisions, the OER weekly on interna-
tional petroleum developments, and
DDSU periodicals with current
intelligence for policy people
having scientific, technical, or
strategic responsibilities.
--Crisis Response Intelligence is
provided when a fast-breaking
situation causes, among other
things, a great surge of incoming
traffic and acute need on the part
of policy makers to know quickly
what is happening and what may be
about to take place. It is usually
embodied in a series of up-to-date
situation reports.
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Customized Service is directly keyed to specific concerns
of policy makers. It may be supplied in response to requests
by policy people, special needs ferreted out by NIOs or others
in contact with consumers, or concerns that intelligence
officers determine independently. Examples include support
to the SALT and NEER delgations, some NIEs, and other material
produced by various Agency components, including the DDO.
In-Depth Analysis is the process of obtaining and evaluating
all available pieces of evidence which seem reasonably to bear
on an intelligence subject; seeking the counsel of other
specialists; developing, testing, and refining hypotheses;
and, finally, recording and issuing findings. The emphasis is
on comprehensiveness rather than speed. Analysis of this kind
for which the Agency has become respected is mostly in highly
specialized fields--scientific/technical, military/strategic
Or economic/financial. The Agency still is in the process
of establishing a reputatiou for routinely high calibre in-
depth political analysis or for compelling analysis on the
sort of broad questions that require interdisciplinary
attack--whether political/military, political/economic, or
all three.
Predictive Intelligence involves a willingness to think
the unthinkable and an ability to forecast discontinuities
as well as to identify trends. It includes much more than
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formally issued National Intelligence Estimates. Much
predictive intelligence work is done in Customized Service
and in certain kinds of In-Depth Analysis. Some also appears
in Current Intelligence. The National Intelligence Officers
have a special responsibility regarding the most critical
kind of predictive intelligence, the Alert Memoranda. These
are the DCI's formal warnings to top-level policy makers of
possible developments abroad of major concern to the United
States.
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THE FLOW OF WORDS AND PAPER
The breadth and depth of the production described in
the preceding section is impressive. Production of even the
finest intelligence does not, however, guarantee that it
will have an impact on the policy making process. The
intelligence message must be effectively communicated to
policy makers, and this means that it must be received as
well as sent.13 There are clearly a variety of factors
affecting delivery of the Agency's products and services.
Many of them tend to blur the intelligence message, and it
does not appear that the extent of their impact is fully
understood by intelligence producers.
Changing Structural Arrangement
Formal institutional arrangements create some of the
channels through which intelligence flows. Structural
patterns tend to change with the varying concerns and atti-
tudes of different sets of policy people, and the routes
intelligence travels are shaped accordingly.
In the mid-1950s, when Robert Cutler was Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs in the Eisenhower Administra-
tion, the NSC Planning Board had an established system for
intelligence tasking and for the consideration of formal
intelligence Estimates as a regular part of the process of
preparing policy recommendations for the NSC. The procedure
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was supposed to ensure that--as Cutler put it--"both the
Planning Board and the members of the National Security
Council would be inseminated (sic) with the Intelligence."14
Unfortunately, that was not the result; though there was
regular intercourse, the coordinated intelligence input
usually seemed to be sterile, and the unschooled policy
position often turned out to be impregnable.
The NSC machinery was substantially altered and then
used less and in looser fashion during both the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations. For CIA intelligence, this meant
both an expansion of the policy audience and an increased
receptivity to insightful intelligence not coordinated
within the Intelligence Community. In 1966, midway in
President Johnson's term, a new substructure was adopted
under the authority of the Secretary of State for "the
overall direction, coordination and supervision of inter-
departmental activities of the US Government overseas."15
It provided for a Senior Interdepartmental Group--headed by
the Under Secretary of State--and for a set of Interdepartmental
Regional Groups subordinate to it. The President, at the
same time, continued to take counsel from ad hoc groups and
from advisors outside the government on a certain number of
issues. Thus, the SIG/IRG never became the primary decision
making machinery under Johnson and Walt Rostow.
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When President Nixon took office, he and Henry Kissinger
replaced the system with the machinery still in nominal use
today: the National Security Council Study Memoranda and
Decision Memoranda. The NSSM approach has had the advantage
for CIA intelligence of opening up new opportunities for
productive working relationships between intelligence and
policy people. Partly as a result of Henry Kissinger's
being for a time both Secretary of State and Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs, however, structured use of
the NSSM-NSDM apparatus considerably declined)-6 Even so,
the NSSM-NSDM system has meant that the integration of
intelligence and policy considerations frequently is under-
taken at a relatively low level. This practice of mixing
intelligence and policy early in the game is not unique to
the NSSM-NSDM; it had become increasingly commonplace follow-
ing the Eisenhower administration, and during the Nixon and
Ford presidencies the tendency has simply intensified.
Getting Intelligence Through
The way in which the structural overlay has evolved has
resulted in an increasingly significant part of the intelligence
message being conveyed to top-level policy makers in other
than intelligence formats. Intelligence may be the implicit
stimulus for an action proposal, inextricably interwoven in
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a set of options, or unrecognizably recincarnated in a
policy paper. That a policy decision does not clearly
reflect an identifiable intelligence input, therefore, does
not conclusively demonstrate that intelligence played no
role. The impact of intelligence often lies in a difficult-
to-trace influence upon the people who drafted, reviewed,
revised and forwarded options or recommendations. The
importance of reaching these policy makers should not be
underestimated.
Intelligence producers must nevertheless aim for and
reach the top-ranking policy people. The path of written
intelligence to policy making principals, however, almost
always run through at least one set of their "gatekeepers,"
the staff assistants who screen, select, and summarize. The
widespread use of such human filtering mechanisms means that
much written intelligence produced by the CIA today does not
reach high-level consumers intact in its original context.
In fact, the identity of a particular item as a CIA-produced
piece of intelligence may be lost once it is excerpted,
digested, and imbedded amidst a collection of other equally
anonymous bits of information. Even when a particular intelli-
gence document actually does go through, the top-level
policy maker will, like as not, read only a summary of its
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contents written and attached by an aide.17 lqany policy
makers, moreover, tend to be unable to recall exactly where
in the voluminous daily flow of information they have picked
up particular items they find interesting or useful.
Personal delivery and oral exchange appear to be the
surest--sometimes the only--ways of guaranteeing that intelli-
gence--as intelligence--reaches those at or near the apex of
the policy making pyramid. The most notable recent instance
of personal delivery paying off handsomely, of course,
involved the President's Daily Brief and ?r. Ford's copy of
the National Intelligence Daily. The President normally
read them in the presence of the Agency officer who delivered
them right to the oval office. This arrangement not only
insured that these products got to and were read by the
President, it afforded an opportunity for daily interchange
between lir. Ford and the Agency that proved valuable in
providing intelligence producers with feedback on their
efforts and insights into presidential concerns.13
Oral Intelligence and Personal Relationships
There are several traditional forums in which intelligence
is conveyed orally. DCI briefings of the NSC, PTASAG, and
SRG usually are the first order of business when these
bodies meet, and regular substantive briefings of certain
Congressional Comittees have become standard. The TMST has
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since the late 1960s heavily utilized the oral delivery
form. fore recently, OER has been employing oral briefings
on a regular basis. Its presentations to top-level Treasury
Department officials and other ranking economic policy
makers--and its support to the briefers on their own staffs--
have been highly successful.19
A number of policy makers, busy as they are, seem
willing, oddly enough, to take time to be briefed even when
the process winds up consuming more time than it would have
taken to read a piece of written intelligence. Policy
people seem to like the idea of having someone at hand to
answer questions and take requests for further or different
information. Assured delivery and attention, instant feed-
back, and a chance to stay attuned to the policy makers'
concerns are cited by those who have done extensive oral
briefings as the key benefits to intelligence producers.29
There are, of course, potential pitfalls in providing
intelligence orally. It takes a certain kind of personality
to do the job successfully. The wrong approach can turn a
policy maker off to intelligence in any form. There also
are problems regarding monitoring what is said, correcting
mistaken impressions, and avoiding an inattention to caveats--
on either end of the exchange--that can result in tentative
conclusions being given more weight than they deserve.
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These problems do not appear to be unsolvable, they would
seem, in fact, to be outweighed by the positive benefits
that flow from oral delivery.
Informal personal contacts and conversations between
intelligence producers and policy makers also are respon-
sible for the delivery of a good deal of intelligence. It
is abundantly clear that operations officers are particu-
larly adept at developing and maintaining such contacts.
They are geared toward dealing with people by temperament
and experience, and high-level DDO officers often are long-
time acquaintances of ranking State Department officers.
Friendships and mutual respect born of service together
overseas carry over to relationships in Washington. The
need to regularly discuss operational matters, and the fact
that DDO officers normally represent the Agency on many
interdepartmental groups and committees, are important
factors in sustaining these contacts.
There is, moreover, a quite understandable preference
among many policy people to deal with intelligence people
they know and have had productive relationships within the
past. It also is evident that many policy makers have only
a vague understanding of the organizational division within
the Agency between intelligence collection and analysis.
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Even policy makers who are aware of how the Agency is
structured and who maintain regular contact with an NIO or a
finished intelligence producer will often turn to an opera-
tions officer for the answer to a substantive question.21
This may be because the policy maker finds it more convenient
to do so, or because he has particular respect for the
opinion of an individual he knows has served in the area in
question and dealt first hand with the people concerned. It
may also be because the operations officer not only can tell
the policy maker what is happening or may be about to occur,
he can discuss these matters in an operational context that
parallels the way in which the policy maker approaches the
problem. The operations officer, in other words, can speak
to the question of what the Agency can and cannot do to help
influence the course of events. This is a dimension that
is simply beyond the scope of those who produce finished
intelligence.22
There have been instances in which finished intelligence
producers have been very successful in developing productive
interchanges with their customers. Force of personality and
previous service on the policy side of things are two factors
that seem to bear heavily on the success of such efforts.23
Another factor is imagination and ingenuity in approaching
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policy makers with new ideas and specific suggestions about
ways in which intelligence can help them, rather than empty
handed, asking in vague fashion, "what can I do for you?"24
Degrees of success in establishing good personal
relationships with policy makers vary widely outside the
Operations Directorate. Many finished intelligence pro-
ducers lack the regular opportunity for contact with policy
makers that operations officers have by virtue of their
seats on policy-related, inter-agency committees, groups, or
task forces and ad hoc discussions of "operational" matters.
The pressure of day-to-day Production for publications,
moreover, tends to limit the amount of time finished intelli-
gence producers--analysts and managers alike--can devote to
developing and maintaining personal contacts with policy
people.
The NIO system, established in 1973, was intended in
part to alleviate this situation by creating high ranking
and highly visable bridges between policy makers and finished
intelligence producers. The results have been mixed. The
NIOs vary in their conception of their roles and in the
duties they choose to emphasize.25
Some finished intelligence
producers seem to believe that the system has relieved them
of any responsibility for consumer relations; others profess
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a desire to better their relationships with policy people,
but feel inhibited by the existence of an NIO--some complain
of being specifically discouraged from dealing directly with
consumers. 26
The lack of consensus among finished intelligence
producers and between them and the NIOs on the allocation of
responsibility for contacts with policy people appears to be
causing some confusion and frustration. Clearer delineation
of responsibilities would aid in efforts to improve policy
makers' receptivity to intelligence through personal
relationships.
The receptivity of policy makers to intelligence also
hinges very heavily on the subject matter of the material
offered, the policy makers' attitudes and preconceptions,
and on certain other matters to which we now turn.
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RECEPTIVITY
Physical delivery of intelligence, written or oral,
still does not insure that it will influence the policy
making process. Receptivity on the part of policy makers is
required. They must appreciate intelligence as worthwhile
and worthy of being taken into account.
Generally speaking, policy makers value and are receptive
to the Agency's support, but they like some kinds of intelli-
gence more than others. They tend to prefer hard--or hard
looking--facts to philosophical arguments, and they most
appreciate receiving from intelligence that which they
cannot--or cannot efficiently--provide for themselves.
Especially coveted is the unique piece of information
obtainable only from intelligence sources.
There is, thus, wide appreciation and brisk demand for
material that some intelligence producers tend to regard as
rather prosaic and routine--FBIS text, statistics, maps,
charts, and biographies. It is clear that these products
are more than raw inputs into the production of the finished
texts of national intelligence; they are regularly received
as independent products and used by policy makers who, right
through the top levels, also take on sizeable quantities of
so-called "raw" intelligence reports from the DDO.27
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RECEPTIVITY
Physical delivery of intelligence, written or oral,
still does not insure that it will influence the policy
making process. Receptivity on the part of policy makers is
required. They must appreciate intelligence as worthwhile
and worthy of being taken into account.
Generally speaking, policy makers value and are receptive
to the Agency's support, but they like some kinds of intelli-
gence more than others. They tend to prefer hard--or hard
looking--facts to philosophical arguments, and they most
appreciate receiving from intelligence that which they
cannot--or cannot efficiently--provide for themselves.
Especially coveted is the unique piece of information
obtainable only from intelligence sources.
There is, thus, wide appreciation and brisk demand for
material that some intelligence producers tend to regard as
rather prosaic and routine--FBIS text, statistics, maps,
charts, and biographies. It is clear that these products
are more than raw inputs into the production of the finished
texts of national intelligence; they are regularly received
as independent products and used by policy makers who, right
through the top levels, also take on sizeable quantities of
so-called "raw" intelligence reports from the DDO.27
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about events other than those in their own areas of
specialization. Others read only the coverage of develop-
ments pertinent to their specialities--and for the purpose
of assuring that they have not missed any important informa-
tion in their broader flow of traffic. The attention paid
to the more analytical articles in Broad Spectrum Reporting
also varies widely among policy makers, depending upon the
person's attitude, the subject matter involved, and the
quality of presentation.
But some NID readers--including some of the most
important readers--are not substantive experts on any partic-
ular area. The general educational service that the NID
performs for these consumers appears to be of considerable
importance. It seems clear that the Agency has to produce
some kind of written daily intelligence product for a varied
NID-level audience, and that no publication is likely to
please all of these people all of the time.
It is at least arguable, however, whether the resources--
especially analyst time--expended in producing the NID
correspond to what it can reasonably be expected to accom-
plish. A good case can be made for the proposition that the
NID's consumption of resources is out of proportion to this
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kind of publication's potential pay-off. Resource
allocations necessarily involve trade-offs, and the Agency
may be depriving activities that could have greater impact
on the policy making process.
Focused Coverage finds a generally receptive audience.
The economic, scientific, and technical publications are
widely read and well-regarded. There is also much favorable
opinion about OCI Staff Notes. Receptivity to these seems
to be the greater because they have individualistic flavor--
being the least edited and least coordinated of the many
political intelligence products.
Crisis Response Intelligence is an Agency strong point.
Policy people almost to a man prefer CIA Situation Reports
to similar products produced by other agencies. Intelli-
gence tends to be at a premium in crisis situations, but
policy people want to know more than what is happening at
the moment. They look to intelligence to anticipate and
answer the next questions even as they are just beginning to
arise.
Much of the Agency's most effective and influential
work takes the form of Customized Service; providing answers
to the questions posed by policy people, and focusing on the
issues which especially concern them. Intelligence producers
specializing in economic, scientific, and military matters,
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capitalizing on the strong interest in their material, have
succeeded better in establishing the kind of intelligence-
policy relationships needed for really productive inter-
change than have those concentrating on political subjects.
Despite varying degrees of acceptance for specific cate-
gories of intelligence, however, there is a conviction
widely held among policy makers that the Agency is a "can
do" organization--that it is willing and able to respond
quickly and helpfully on almost any kind of topic.
Many intelligence officers believe that customized
service could be made even more relevant and useful if
policy makers were persuaded to confide more about their
plans and activities. To some extent and on some subjects
this undoubtedly is so, and the quality as well as the
responsiveness of the intelligence product suffers. In
certain cases, policy makers realize that this is a price
their confidentiality entails--and they are quite willing to
pay it. They may, nonetheless, put a peculiar value on
intelligence judgments they they know are made without the
benefit of tightly held information available only to them.
Their explanation for this seeming anomoly is that intelli-
gence provides valuable checks on assumptions, and useful
alternative points of view, even when intelligence producers
are not privy to all that the policy maker knows. An argument
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can be made, moreover, for the proposition that a degree of
standoffishness on the part of policy makers is sometimes
beneficial in helping to diminish the danger of intelligence
becoming engulfed by policy making through enthusiastic
provision of customized service that causes important
longer-range issues to be overlooked or ignored in the
effort to tend to customers immediate concerns. On bal-
ance, however, the danger of irrelevance would seem to
outweigh that of overinvolvement, and there is ample justifi-
cation for persistent efforts to persuade policy makers to
be more forthcoming.
Policy people profess a high degree of receptivity to
In-Depth Analysis, and many say they would like to see more
of it. They tend, however, to have difficulty describing
with specificity the kind of thing they have in mind--although
they are on occasion able to point to examples.2L1
This
"I'll know it when I see it" attitude is paralled by annoy-
ance with intelligence producers who expect policy people to
suggest what intelligence can do for them in the way of In-
Depth Analysis. There is a far more positive attitude
toward the intelligence producer who has thought out in
advance what ought to be relevant and who arrives with a
first draft, an outline, or even a set of ideas.
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Policy makers generally have little confidence in the
Agency's ability to anticipate their concerns or in its
Predictive Intelligence. This is particularly so with
regard to formal National Intelligence Estimates, except for
those that deal with military/strategic subjects. It is
significant that NIEs are not usually accorded any special
treatment by'gatekeepers;' the NIEs undergo the same screen-
ing process as do seemingly less prestigious intelligence
products. Nany policy makers, in fact, seem to prefer an
incisive solo treatment by a good analyst to a "watered
down" estimate. Some, on the other hand, believe intelligence
producers benefit from the rigors
process, and express appreciation
dissenting views.
The generally negative attitude
of the formal estimative
for clear delineation of
toward predictive
intelligence is founded on the belief among policy makers
that the Agency's estimative record over the years has not
been very good. Policy makers, however, share with intelli-
gence producers the realization that predictive intelligence
is a difficult line of business. They understand that some
things are by their nature unpredictable and that others are
virtually impossible to predict accurately. What policy
people seem to want from predictive intelligence is an
identification of forces at work, an indication of which
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trends are lasting and which merely transitory, an exposition
of probable turning points, and an idea of what kinds of
signals will portend particular types of changes. Policy
makers especially want a helpful predictive performance on
matters of great import to the ITS. Failure to predict a
coup that produces little real change in an area of marginal
importance matters little to policy makers, if at all.
Failure to provide advance warning of events such as a war
in an area of major concern, however, is quite another
matter.
Intelligence producers must be skilled in both short
and long-range anticipation. Short-range anticipation is
really an extension of independent determination by intelli-
gence producers of the questions policy makers have, but
fail to make explicit, and the questions that should be on
their minds in a given situation whether they are there yet
or not. It involves anticipating the problems policy makers
will need to have addressed as the situation develops. At
present, this is at best a haphazard process in intelligence
production, with results depending largely on the time and
attention analysts and managers choose to give it. uo one
in the Agency has continuing responsibility for doing the
special kind of thinking required. An entity formally
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charged with such responsibility might significantly enhance
the relevance of finished intelligence products to policy
makers ? concerns.
Long-range anticipation involves foreseeing and warning
policy makers of broad or specific problems they are likely
to be confronted with in the future. It should be accompanied
by a readiness on the part of intelligence producers to
redeploy resources in preparation for future demands. It
must be noted, however, that policy makers are by their own
admission much less receptive to intelligence that attempts
to warn of a problem far down the road than to material that
helps them to cope with the day-to-day problems they face in
the here and now.
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USE
Even delivery to policy makers who recognize its quality
and relevance to the problem at hand does not mean that
intelligence necessarily will be the determining factor in a
particular decision.
The impact of intelligence often depends on factors far
removed from its intrinsic quality. Among these factors--
which may operate singly or in combination--are: whether
the intelligence message coincides with or runs counter to
preconceptions on the policy side; on how intelligence fits
in or conflicts with other counsels and pressures; the
ostensible 'hardness" of the intelligence and the extent of
unanimity of CIA elements--and of the Intelligence Community--
in advancing it; the state of interpersonal intelligence-
policy relationships; and whether different policy makers
are undecided, of the same mind, or divided in their approach
to the problem.
Thus, intelligence quality, the adequacy of communications
and the degree of policy receptivity all bear upon the impact
of intelligence. As the ensuing illustrative examples
indicate, optimum achievement in all three categories is
difficult.
2
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Problem Cases
Policy makers are, from time to time, quite capable of
deciding upon and becoming wedded to seemingly ill-conceived
and uncompromising courses of action. Intelligence in such
cases may ultimately help turn things around--but seldom
quickly or easily.
CIA's conservative evaluation of the effectiveness of
the various US bombing programs in North Vietnam was a
consistent example of sound, careful analysis, clearly
communicated. In contrast, the case originally made by
military intelligence that the bombing effort was paying
high dividends had an inherent weakness--the enemy resupply
effort continued at a high level. Yet Secretary of Defense
McNamara was not immediately persuadable that the CIA ,
appraisal was the correct one, and President Johnson took
years to convince. The policy makers' mind-sets and the
mixed signals coming from the Intelligence Community both
played a role.
During the period prior to and during the 1971 war
between India and Pakistan, CIA intelligence did much to
explain the motivations that lay behind Indian policy and to
describe the dire situation in East Pakistan. The analysis
suggested that India was impelled to take action in
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East Pakistan because of the unstable refugee situation, and
had at least some justification for assisting a Bengali
population oppressed by the West Pakistan military occupa-
tion. The US, nevertheless, "tilted" its support to the
Pakistani side. US leaders apparently chose to take a "big
picture" view of the situation, possibly seeing support to
West Pakistan as enhancing a developing Chinese connection
(Peking was West Pakistan's other major ally and an instru-
ment in getting US and Chinese officials together). A
further consideration for US policy makers was a profound
irritation with the government of India, which had shortly
before signed a 20-year treaty of peace and friendship with
the Soviet Union. Policy makers' attitudes were so firmly
shaped by factors other than intelligence that they paid no
great heed to it, except perhaps for such bits and pieces as
served to reinforce their views.
Quite a different sort of problem can arise in those
situations where a hot and seemingly hard piece of CIA
intelligence conveys exactly--or almost exactly--what the
policy makers are keen to believe. CIA's initial reporting
on the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic seconded the
worry that was already perturbing President Johnson and his
aides, i.e., that the rebel movement in the D.R. was Communist-
infested and that the US thus faced the danger of a "new
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Cuba in the Hemisphere." Subsequent CIA and INR intelligence
inputs provided a more accurate and balanced picture, but
they never quite caught up with the initial impression that
had been conveyed.
Policy makers can develop another sort of predilection,
becoming overly sure that intelligence will be able to pro-
vide them appropriate support. This attitude may lead to
unfortunate results if the expected intelligence is not
forthcoming or when it is impossible for the Intelligence
Community to implement policy decisions. In 1970, the
Israelis and Egyptians agreed to a limited cessation of
hostilities along the Sinai front. The US agreed to assist
in monitoring the agreement particularly in respect to the
introduction of Egyptian air defense equipment into a denied
area along the Suez Canal. The intelligence Community,
however, did not know the exact number of surface-to-air
missiles in the prohibited zone. There was, therefore, a
significant time lag before the US could confidently state
that the Egyptians were in violation of the agreement. As a
result, Egypt was able to ignore Israeli protests and build
up its forces in the denied area.
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Cuba in the Hemisphere." Subsequent CIA and INR intelligence
inputs provided a more accurate and balanced picture, but
they never quite caught up with the initial impression that
had been conveyed.
Policy makers can develop another sort of predilection,
becoming overly sure that intelligence will be able to pro-
vide them appropriate support. This attitude may lead to
unfortunate results if the expected intelligence is not
forthcoming or when it is impossible for the Intelligence
Community to implement policy decisions. In 1970, the
Israelis and Egyptians agreed to a limited cessation of
hostilities along the Sinai front. The US agreed to assist
in monitoring the agreement particularly in respect to the
introduction of Egyptian air defense equipment into a denied
area along the Suez Canal. The intelligence Community,
however, did not know the exact number of surface-to-air
missiles in the prohibited zone. There was, therefore, a
significant time lag before the US could confidently state
that the Egyptians were in violation of the agreement. As a
result, Egypt was able to ignore Israeli protests and build
up its forces in the denied area.
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A common occurrence is where intelligence is reasonably
sound, where it persuades some policy makers readily, but
where further data and argument are required by others. In
the latter part of 'lay 1967, when tensions between Egypt and
Israel had risen abruptly, high-level policy makers levied
a series of questions on the CIA--the two most important
being, Will there be war?" and 'Which side, if the 'TS stays
out, will win?" The "yes- answer to the first was readily
accepted, partly because Israeli officials were leaning on
their US counterparts to take the threat seriously. But the
Agency prediction that Israel would win--quickly and deci-
sively--was received with greater doubt. Secretary of State
Rusk and Ambassador to the U.1!. Stevenson nosed the most
vehement questions: DCI Helms came back with a reiteration
of the judgment and an amplification of the basis for it.
Even then Rusk was reluctant to accept the appraisal. Nis
comment was "I)ick, there is only one thing I want to say--as
LaGuardia once remarked, if this is a mistake, it's a beaut!"
Intelligence support that is quite difficult to appraise
is the "mixed bag" where intelligence does well in some of
its aspects, not so well in others. Those who conduct "post
mortems" have to evaluate the positives and negatives and
come out with an overall judgment. Often these conclusions
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turn out to be harsher in their appraisal of intelligence
performance than are the statements of the top policy makers
involved.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Intelligence
Community underestimated the imperatives that drove the
Soviet Union to place missiles in Cuba. Intelligence did
provide the first indication that the missiles had arrived
and enabled the US Government to verify missile deployments.
Intelligence derived materials were used to brief friendly
countries on the new development. And during the ensuing
naval embargo, reports from a high-level CIA source in the
Soviet military apparently provided President Kennedy some
additional assurances that the Soviet Union would not go to
war over Cuba.
The more recent October War was another example of good
and bad. Initially--and well ahead of time--the attention of
high-level policy makers was focused on the Middle East by
CIA intelligence reports that noted that possibility of
military action. On the negative side, the analytical
Community reinforced policy makers beliefs that war was not
in the offing. Once military action began, however, CIA
provided excellent crisis support including the critical
judgment that the Soviet Union would not place regular
ground forces in Syria.
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CIA reporting on the Cyprus explosion also had its ups
and downs. Analysts failed to predict the change in Greek
leadership on Cyprus and never adequately described the
motivations of the Greek "generals." CIA did provide
advance warning of the Turkish invasion of the island and
predicted the exact date. However, in attempting to ascertain
the size of the Turkish invasion force, CIA analysts relied
on the reporting from a defense attache who greatly over-
estimated its strength. Dependence on this source occasioned
a substantial error over how fast the battle would progress.
Picture Book Examples
Sometimes, albeit not too frequently, we find that
virtually everthing went right. Three instances in the Far
East area reflect the variety and range of importance of
these "picture book" situations.
Henry Kissinger and associates have been recurringly
concerned over the past half-dozen years about the degree of
tension between China and the Soviet Union and about the
danger of major hostilities between them. In response to
his urging, CIA has repeatedly assessed the issue, studying
the military and strategic posture on both sides and probing
into other aspects. The findings--in contrast to dire
predictions by other intelligence practitioners--have been
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consistently sound--and obviously helpful to the President
and Kissinger during a delicate period when they have been
nurturing new ties with China.
An instance of more measurable benefit had to do with a
recent determination on military aid to South Korea. High.-
level policy people were concerned over the direction and
levels of aid during the 1970s. They requested that flOD and
CIA undertake a detailed examination of the North Korean
"military threat"--i.e., of the forces of the North, their
equipment holdings, their likely strategy. This intelli-
gence study showed the need for a pronounced change in the
mix of equipment provided to South Korea- -more aircraft,
fewer tanks, etc.--and also indicated the feasibility of a
stretch-out in the planned delivery period. The study
became the basis for developing a new, and far more realistic
long-term military assistance program to South Korea.
An area in which the Washington-based Intelligence
Community is not regularly involved is that of tactical
intelligence support to the field. The use of unique
Community resources, a correct appraisal of the situation,
and a prompt warning to interested consumers provided a
quick salutory result in November 1972. A CIA-chaired
intelligence task force warned on the basis of cratology
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analysis that a squadron of Komar guided missile boats would
be moving from Chan-chiang- in South China south toward a
North Vietnamese port. US naval forces in the area were
alerted, and the boats were intercepted and destroyed.29
Other kinds of highly-specialized intelligence service
which CIA is capable of providing should not be omitted from
this "picture book" discussion. As Henry 7.issinger has pro-
ceeded with his long and painstaking diplomatic efforts to
bring about a tentative Egyptian-Israeli peace accord,
Agency specialists have assisted with crucial support in a
wide range of areas. Special note should be taken of the
CIA geographers whose detailed maps and intimate knowledge
of terrain have been particularly valuable, and of the
technicians who were able to advise on feasibility and
operation of an appropriate sensoring system.
A final example which must be noted here--though with a
reservation--is that of SALT support by the Intelligence
Community and particularly by CIA. It is clear that the
policy makers' confidence in intelligence-verification, in
the Community apPraisals of future missile force levels, and
in the direct assistance provided to decision makers by CIA
made the SALT agreements possible. It is equally clear that
this is presently the most important of all the intelligence-
support accounts. Whether the 10-year intelligence projections
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that underlie the treaty-negotiations will hold cannot be
foreseen. Thus, prudence dictates that intelligence support
for SALT not be evaluated as an absolute success until more
time has elapsed.
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RECOMIIENDATIONS
The research team believes that a number of measures
aimed at making the reality of the intelligence-policy
relationship more closely approximate the ideal are worthy
of consideration.
--An effort should be made to increase intelligence
producers specific understanding of the policy making
process.
--Recent and ongoing theoretical work
on decision making, organizational
dynamics, and psychological factors
should be selected, distilled,
related to the intelligence-policy
connection, and distributed to
analysts and supervisors on a
regular basis. A knowledgeable
individual should be given full-
time responsibility for the task.3?
--Discussion of policy making and the
role of intelligence, including
realistic specifics on how various
policy makers take intelligence
aboard, should become standard
practice within the Agency.
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--The Office of Training should
increase and sharpen the attention
its courses and seminars give to
policy making and the intelligence-
policy relationship.
--Opportunities to place intelligence
officers in rotational policy-
related slots outside the Agency
should be taken advantage of to the
fullest possible extent. The
experience gained by returnees
from these assignments should be
exploited by having them share
their perspectives with other
intelligence producers in appropriate
forums.
--Written intelligence products should be closely aligned
to the realities of how information is received, screened,
and processed on the policy side.
--A very short executive summary con-
taining the principal conclusions
of the paper should precede all
memoranda.
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--The Office of Training should
increase and sharpen the attention
its courses and seminars give to
policy making and the intelligence-
policy relationship.
--Opportunities to place intelligence
officers in rotational policy-
related slots outside the Agency
should be taken advantage of to the
fullest possible extent. The
experience gained by returnees
from these assignments should be
exploited by having them share
their perspectives with other
intelligence producers in appropriate
forums.
--Written intelligence products should be closely aligned
to the realities of how information is received, screened,
and processed on the policy side.
--A very short executive summary con-
taining the principal conclusions
of the paper should precede all
memoranda.
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--Papers aimed for the top policy
levels especially must seize
attention quickly and get to the
point rapidly.
--A paper should immediately tell the
reader why he should be reading it,
i.e., the problem or issue and its
implications for the US.
--Rationale for judgments, if too
long or too involved to be included
in the body of the paper, should be
attached as annexes.
--An-lytical differences should not
be obscured in the name of Intelli-
gence Community consensus. Policy
people clearly prefer alternative
interpretations to watered down
consensus.
--Thoughtful, clearly labeled
speculation regarding less likely
eventualities or the implication of
"irrational" actions by foreign
leaders should be encouraged,
especially in In-Depth Analysis.
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--A new intelligence product should be considered.
--There would be considerable receptivity
to ultra-current "Morning Briefing
Notes" on the part of the aides of
high-level policy people. The
purpose of such a publication would
be to make the recipients' morning
briefings and compilations sounder,
fuller, more consistent in their
use of intelligence information.,
and more reflective of the Agency's
view of what should be brought to
the attention of principal policy
makers. The idea is similar to
that of the once popular, internally
distributed night Journal. Distribu-
tion of the "Notes" could be made
so as to reach the desks of aides
as morning briefings were being
prepared.
--The "Notes" would be informal, non-
coordinated summaries and comments
on significant overnight traffic--
e.g., important State and Defense
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cables, T1110 reports, intercepts,
and press--not accounted for in the
The NIT) is more current than
the old CIB, but only the most
critical new items are usually added
in the wee hours, and they are often
only factual treatments. A widely
voiced criticism of the ill') is its
failure to be consistently relevant
to the ultra-current morning concerns
of many policy makers.
--The new product could be Prepared
by night NIT) representatives and
electrically disseminated at the
last possible moment.
--There is a need for serious study of what a realistic
estimative mission ought to be for the CIA and of what
resources the Agency ought to devote to it. Policy makers
seem to be less interested in estimative judgments ner se
than in the basis for them; i.e., the laying out of the
forces at work, the possible turning points, and the leverage--
if any--that the US has in determining the outcome.
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--A study of the estimative mission
would aim basically at generating
some suggested guidelines on the
scope, format, and most useful
organizational anroaches for the
production of estimates.
--It would need to be based princinally
on in-depth research with consumers
and producers, and the use of case
studies.
--Greater emnhasis should be placed on reaching mid-level
policy makers.
--Fuller advantage should be taken of
Publications aimed specifically at
this audience; they should cease to
be the step-children of top-of-the-
line products. To the extent Pos-
sible, content of such publications
as the NIB should be especially
tailored for the mid-level consumer.
Analysts whose accounts are relatively
inactive, for example, should
prepare longer, more analytical
items for the NIB.
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--Some predetermination should be
made, where possible, of the intended
audience for memoranda and other
intelligence papers so that they
can be tailored accordingly. If
the audience is primarily mid-
level, the paper might contain more
detailed background, explanation,
and argument than one designed
especially for senior officials.
--Although admittedly- difficult on a
consistent basis, intelligence
products should, to the extent
feasible, be addressed to intended
recipients by name.
--There should be increased organizational awareness and
coordination of disparate policy support activities.
--Consideration should be given to
the establishment of a centralized
Agency mechanism--perhaps computer
based--for improving intra-agency
awareness of ongoing policy support
projects, maximizing opportunities
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for contributory inputs, and helping
to make policy makers more aware of
the full range of potentially rele-
vant intelligence products and
services.
--A comprehensive study of the problems
and prospects of oral dissemination
should focus on the impact of oral
delivery on efforts to better
coordinate intelligence support.
--The Agency should try to increase policy maker receptivity
to its political interpretation and analysis.
--The aim should be to convince
policy makers that there is some-
thing about the Agency's work in
this area that separates the CIA's
finished political products from
the kind of thing policy people
believe they can do just as well or
better themselves.
--Efforts along this line should
include further attempts to impart
a measure of uniqueness to finished
political intelligence through
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sophisticated interweaving of
political, economic, military and
Psychological analysis. In this
regard, further study is needed of
the efficacy of various methods--
e.g., team approaches, cross-
disciplinary training, structural
reorganizations--of fostering truly
integrated inter-disciplinary
analysis.31
- It should be clearly understood
that the NIOs' important responsibility
for developing personal relationships
with consumers is not meant to pre-
clude other intelligence producer-
policy maker contacts at appropriate
levels, and political analysts
should be given the opportunity,
encouragement, and incentive to
take especially vigorous initiatives
to develop and sustain these rela-
tionships. Individual analysts
should be responsible for monitoring
Policy personnel changes and for
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making and keeping themselves
known as specialists with something
to contribute. They should be
aware of and utilize the hinds of
approaches that evoke positive
responses on the policy side, and
avoid the unproductive 'what can T
lo for you syndrome.
--The Agency should continue to impress upon policy
people the fact that the relevance and utility of intelli-
gence is directly related to their willingness to share
their concerns and other information with intelligence
Producers.
--Intelligence officers in contact
with policy makers at all
should persist in efforts
this point.
--Significant informational
levels
to make
gaps that
intelligence producers believe
Policy people might be able to fill
if they were so inclined should be
explicitly noted?both in formal
publications and informal conversa-
tions--so as to encourage communication
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and avoid misunderstandings concerning
the basis for intelligence judgments.
--Insufficient feedback and a degree of secretiveness
concerning policy plans and developments will persist,
however, and the Agency should also strive to improve its
ability to independently determine the questions policy
makers need answered.
--The DDO and DDI must work together
in this endeavor, and the DD0's
unique operational links to policy
officials should play a Rey role.
Regular meetings between DDO Division
Chiefs, NI0s, and representatives
from DDI production offices should
include detailed discussion of
policy makers current and incipient
concerns. Working arrangements
between DDO Division Chiefs and the
NIOs currently are positive and
helpful, but they generally fail to
achieve the mutually reinforcing
relationship needed between the DDO
and the producers of finished
intellience because there is no
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mechanism for insuring that insights
into concerns on the policy side
gained by the DDO are fully shared
with the DDI.
--Concern for improving the immediate relevance of
intelligence should not be allowed to obscure the equally
important need for the Agency to improve its ability to
independently determine the questions policy makers are
presently faced with and to anticipate the problems that
they will be confronted with in the future.
--Consideration should be given to
the establishment of broadly-based
mechanisms within the Agency charged
with routine review of substantive
areas with the mission of providing
continuity, consistency, and direction
for thinking ahead, challenging
accepted hypotheses, and sensing
changes in underlying trends. The
NIO system and the KIQs are steps
in this direction, but much remains
to be accomplished.
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--A great anticipatory burden will,
however, always rest on individual
intelligence producers. They must
avoid becoming so immersed in the
problems of the moment that they
fail to foresee those of the future.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Ramsey Forbush (ONE/OPR-ret.), Gary Chase (OCI), and
Ron Goldberg (OSR).
2. The extent to which the Agency will in the future be
called upon to provide increased intelligence support
to the legislative branch will depend in large part
on the outcome of the ongoing investigative process
ansd on how strongly Congress persists in asserting
its prerogative in foreign affairs. The study team
believes that the implications of the intelligence-
congressional relationship deserve separate study
when the still-evolving nature of that relationship
becomes more evident. The study also does not con-
centrate on the role of the DCI, since this position
transcends direction of the CIA and includes a great
deal of Intelligence Community responsibility.
3. See, for example, George Pettee, The Future of American
Secret Intelligence (1946); Washington Platt, Strategic
Intelligence Production (1957).
4. See Charles Lindbloom, "The Science of 'Muddling
Through'" in Public Administration Review, Vol. XIX,
No. 2 (1959) and The Policy-Making Process (1968).
See also, Synder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy
Decision Making (1962).
5. See, for example, Graham Allison, Essence of Decision
(1971) and Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and
Foreign Policy (1974). See also, Wilfrid Kohl, The
Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European
Relations" in World Politics, October 1975.
6. See, for example, Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance (1957); Robert Abelson, Theories of Cognitive
Consistency (1963); Katz and Kahn, The Social Psychology
of Organizations (1966); Harch and Simon, Organizations
(1953); Holsti and George, "The Effects of Stress on -ffe
Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers" in Political Science
Annual, Vol. 6 (1975).
7. See Joseph DeRivera, The Psychological Dimension of
Foreign Policy (1968); and John Steinbrunner, The
Cybernetic Theory of Decision (1974).
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S. Despite the lack of theoretical work specifically geared
to the intelligence-policy connection, sophisticated and
insightful studies that aid in understanding individual
and organizational behavior should be of interest to
intelligence producers. The Agency has tended to neglect
these areas, and this probably has adversely affected
efforts to make intelligence products more relevant and
useful.
9. There are, of course, those who would challenge application
of the term "policy maker" to anyone except the President,
his inner circle of advisors, and perhaps some key Under
Secretaries. Others would attempt to distinguish between
policy makers, advisors, and drafters. This paper arbi-
trarily uses the phrases "policy makers" and "policy
people" very broadly, to encompass a wide range of indi-
viduals who are involved in the policy making process
regularly or on an ad hoc basis. References to "top"
to "high-level" policy makers are to individuals at
or above the Assistant Secretary level. The rest are
those below that rank, i.e., mainly--but not exclusively--
at the desk level.
10. Intelligence producers are unlikely to become aware of
preferences and idiosyncrasies that affect policy makers'
receptivity to intelligence unless they engage in "market
research" through personal contacts with consumers. This
subject is dealt with further in a subsequent section.
11. The strong natural linkages between DDO officers and
certain policy makers are discussed more fully on pages
24-25.
12. An illustration of this kind of policy making appears
in the section on USE.
13. Communications theorists contend that no communication
takes place until there is a transference of meaning in
the mind of the receiver--see, for example, Thayer,
Communications and Communications Systems in Organization,
Management, and Interpersonal Relations (1968). This
distinction is dealt with in the sectras on RECEPTIVITY
and USE.
14. "Intelligence as Foundation for Policy," in Studies in
Intelligence, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Fall 1959).
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15. NSAM 341, quoted in Clark and Legere, The President
and the Ianagement of National Security (1969).
16. Specialized entities such as the Verification Panel
and its working group in which CIA intelligence
participation is particularly strong and effective
have, however, been increasing in importance.
17. At the State Department, for example, high-level
officials get their intelligence from INR, which,
in addition to producing its own analysis, selects,
summarizes, and comments on material from other
agencies. The fact that INR has coordinated an item
for a national intelligence publication does not
insure that it will endorse the item in its compila-
tions and briefings. The National Security Council
staff is another screening mechanism. Staff members
will be the last readers of intelligence documents
that they feel do not warrant higher-level attention.
Products sent forward invariably are accompanied by a
summary-extract-commentary which, unless coupled with
a recommendation that the paper be read in full, is
likely to be all that is read by key officials.
18. Every President since Harry Truman has received the
Agency's current intelligence, but in varying ways.
President Nixon, for example, received a package of
material from the White House Situation Room that con-
tained intelligence produced by several agencies includ-
ing CIA. President Eisenhower got oral intelligence
briefings from his staff. President Ford initiated,
but later discontinued, regular exchanges with an
Agency officer. Whether a new mechanism for personal
delivery of Agency products will be established is
presently unclear. The NSC system gives the Director
of Central Intelligence certain opportunities for
direct access to the highest-level policy makers,
especially during crisis situations. Beyond these
structured settings, however, the DCI's ability to
personally deliver intelligence directly to the top may
depend on his personal relationship with the President
and other key policy officials. This element in the
intelligence support process is critical in establishing
the overall impact down the line of the Agency's pro-
duct. It would appear that the support process can
best function when the DCI has direct and routine
access to the President.
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19. Much of the impetus for regular OER intelligence
briefings of high-level economic officials came from
former Treasury Secretary Schultz. When William Simon
took over at Treasury he decided that the presentations
were useful and should be continued. OER also polled
officials outside of Treasury to see if they wanted
their briefings to go on, and the answer was strongly
affirmative.
20. Economic policy makers have, as noted above, recently
become very receptive to orally-delivered intelligence.
The Pentagon, traditionally a heavy user of oral brief-
ings itself, is another receptive audience. The Agency
provided regular briefings on military and technical
subjects to Secretary of Defense Schlessinger. Oral
presentations are often given to various senior Defense
officials by CIA components.
21. One high-level State Department official, for example,
indicated that the DDO Division Chief with whom he
dealt on operational matters was also his major source
of substantive information. He did know the name of
the HIO responsible for the area, but noted that personal
contact was infrequent. Another State Department
official remarked that CIA analysis was first rate.
The analysis he referred to turned out to be a situation
report from a Chief of Station.
22. Within the context of this aspect of the relationship
between the operational officers of the Agency and
their policy making colleagues, resides one of the
traditionally more troubling internal problems for the
Agency in terms of policy support. Is intelligence
colored in ways which tend consciously or unconsciously
to favor an operational activity or course of action
upon which the Agency is embarked or involved? This
issue has troubled a number of outside commentators on
the Agency, most notably in connection with the Bay of
Pigs endeavor. The question is particularly difficult
and sensitive as a research topic and was not pursued
at length in this paper, although it warrants a hard
look in an internal Agency study.
23. An outstanding example of force of personality at work
is the case of OCI's Panama analyst several years ago.
The analyst convinced policy people of the value of
himself and his work to such an extent that he was
considered to be practically a member of the policy
team.
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23. (continued)
Intelligence producers who serve temporary stints on
the policy side often are able to develop insights and
cultivate personal relationships that can be extremely
useful when they return to their parent organizations.
The experience of one such individual during recent
Middle East negotiations is a case in point. Even if
a rotational assignment turns out to be permanent, the
former intelligence producer will carry with him an
understanding of intelligence that is likely to have a
positive effect on the intelligence-policy connection.
24. A case in point was a scale model of the Sinai peninsula
showing all terrain features that was given to policy
makers for use in the Middle East negotiations. CIA
provided the model on its own initiative, and it became
an invaluable tool during the discussions.
25. Some NIOs appear to accord their responsibility for
personal contact with policy makers first priority, and
the bulk of their effort is in this area. Others, how-
ever, tend to concentrate more of their attention on
the process of producing estimates and other--primarily
interagency--intelligence products.
26. Attitudes on this issue vary among the NI0s. Some do
appear to believe that they are supposed to be the
exclusive point of contact between finished intelli-
gence producers and policy makers, at least with respect
to high-ranking policy makers. Others, however, seem
quite content with the existence of parallel channels
of communication.
27. The FBIS product in particular is widely distributed both
electrically and in formal publications, and is viewed by
many intelligence consumers as a key Agency product. FBIS
Field stations often provide the first indication of a
coup or other important change within a country. Service
personnel did a commendable job, for instance, in report-
ing on the invasion of Cyprus from positions in the middle
of the battle. Occasionally, a foreign leadership will use
the open radio to present new policies for the first time
or will outline negotiating positions when speed is essen-
tial. The Mayaguez incident was a case in point.
The Agency's biographies of foreign leaders are also used
extensively. When dignitaries visit the US, policy makers
turn to CIA for insights into their background or personality.
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28. The following papers, produced over the last two years,
have been specifically referred to by policy people as
representing imaginative and helpful analytical work by
the Agency. In the cases of the interagency papers, CIA
was recognized as having played the leading role in
production.
--India: Developing Power or Developing Power
Vacuum (OPR)
--China in 1980-1985 and in the Year 2000 (OPR)
--The Mood in Egypt (OCI)
--Potential Implications of Trends in World
Population, Food Production and Climate (OPR)
--Military Implications of Technology Transfer
to the Soviet Union (Interagency)
--What's Wrong With Political Europe
the NIO)
--Authoritanianism and Militarism in
Europe (OPR)
--The Communist Party of Italy (OPR)
(Office of
Southern
--Soviet Commentary on the Capabilities of US
General Purpose Forces (OSR)
--A Soviet Land-Mobile ICBM: Evidence of
Development and Considerations Affecting
a Decision on Deployment (Interagency)
--Prospects for Determining the Accuracy of
Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missiles (Interagency)
(See Annex B)
29. The Komars were the first of their type to be provided to
North Vietnam by the Soviet Union. They were shipped by
freighter to Chan-chiang and off-loaded prior to their
high-speed run to North Vietnam. Had the Komars reached
their destination, they would have been a serious threat
to US Naval vessels on patrol nearby.
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30. Intelligence producers are likely to find that this
material will also provide highly illuminating insights
into the process of intelligence analysis.
31. Greater interdisciplinary synthesis would have a number
of beneficial effects. OER's success in building a
receptive audience for its products has been significant,
but this constituency consists primarily of a particular
group of economically-oriented policy people. There
remains a need for economic analysis to be truly inte-
grated with insights from other disciplines and presented
in a manner intelligible to the high-level policy maker
unfamiliar with purely economic terms and concepts.
Policy people value even speculative material that tells
them something about what makes an individual tick, and
the Agency's psychological profiles are well regarded.
Greater use of psychological insights might further
enhance appreciation for this aspect of the Agency's
work as well as increase receptivity to political
analysis.
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MORI/HRP THIS PAGE
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ANNEX A
The data forming the research base for this study was
developed in several ways. Some of it stemmed from a series
of discussions with senior intelligence and policy officials;
other conclusions came from the team's analysis of work done
by several staffs and task forces that have looked at the
intelligence-policy relationship over the years. These
include background papers developed by the Tfurphy Commission,
materials from the Intelligence Community Staff, and various
CIA consumer surveys.
An original intention of the study was to do a number
of detailed case histories of specific examples of the
intelligence support process in search of common lessons and
insights. It quickly became evident, however, that the
difficulty of tracking the development of a particular
episode in sufficient detail to warrant confidence in the
analysis would make this an unproductive venture. There
was, instead, a compromise in which individual cases were
used to illustrate broad general propositions regarding
intelligence support. A number of the cases were identified
by interviewees as illustrative of certain themes. In some
instances "post mortems" done by the Intelligence Community
staff were utilized, but in all the illustrations, the
interpretation is that of the study team.
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Specifically in terms of interviews, the team spoke to
more than 20 senior officials within the Agency and to
almost 40 middle-level officers and analysts. Twelve NIOs
or their deputies also were interviewed, along with four
members of the IC staff. Outside the Agency the team inter-
viewed four NSC staff members, the two primary PFIAB staff
members, and the Director of the White House Situation Room.
At the State Department, two Assistant Secretaries, one
Deputy Assistant Secretary, two members of Dr. Kissinger's
immediate staff, and a member of the Policy Planning Staff
were interviewed, along with a number of lesser policy
officials. In addition, the team spoke with the Director of
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. At the Defense
Department, the team saw three members of the Secretary's
immediate staff, several other officials, and the Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Two officials at the
Treasury with intelligence-related responsibilities were
also interviewed, and the team spoke to a member of the
Council on International Economic Policy.
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ANNEX B
An Analysis of Outstanding Intelligence Products
While doing the research for this study, the team
discovered several instances where consumers took the time
to send positive written responses back to CIA on papers
they deemed especially helpful. Other particularly useful
examples were mentioned by consumers in the course of inter-
views. Eleven of these specific products are cited in Foot-
note 28.
At first glance, these reports seem very dissimilar in
subject and approach. They deal across the board with
political, military, economic and technological problems.
They do not directly portray problems of immediate concern.
They are not of much use in the "firefighting" type of
policy making and they present more questions than answers.
What they do offer is an insightful look at areas where
there is an important US interest and most specifically
indicate why policy makers should be concerned or aware of
the subject or issue. The papers provide a level of detail
that policy makers would be hard put to package themselves--
if they had the time or inclination to do so--and present it
in a forthright and readable manner. The papers that deal
with political subjects overcome problems of policy makers'
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failure to share details of their activities and their
relatively low receptivity to CIA's political analysis by
approaching the subjects in broad, imaginative ways.
Most of the reports have the common thread of dealing
with an area of potential danger to US interests. The
policy maker is aware of the problem, but being mortal, has
only so much time in the day to turn away from fires that
are already blazing. In these cases, he finds it rewarding
and useful to rely on someone else to digest and evaluate
the mountains of information on a subject and provide him
with a cogent and thoughtful interpretation--not just of the
surface or of the moment but of the underlying considerations
as well. The papers on Southern Europe are notable examples.
We have mentioned in the body of the paper the special
role of intelligence producers working on military and tech-
nical subjects. Policy makers generally claim little expert-
ise in these areas, but most of the important decisions they
must make presuppose a substantial understanding. The
papers on military subjects noted as useful relate to the
Soviet Union but are applicable as general examples. They
provide considerable background knowledge but perhaps even
more importantly, they illustrate uncertainties. They make
complex material understandable and relevant to non-experts.
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One would be hard pressed to develop a single or simple
preferred written structure from these papers that could be
used to produce a consistently superior product. The ap-
proaches are as varied as the topics. If there is a common-
ality, it is that each of the authors went far beyond laying
out the obvious facts and deeply probed the underlying
concerns. There was no indication that the reports neces-
sarily contained points of view that represented what the
policy makers wanted to hear; i.e., that fitted previous
consumer perceptions or prejudices. In fact, most of them
were complimented for their boldness of conception and
thought.
The papers all clearly reflect deep and careful concern
with true analytical process and are sophisticated both in
writing style and in presentation. Charts and graphs are
used to make points more clear and to save words. Pictures
are used to break the flow of words into manageable sections.
It seems reasonable to conclude from these particular
reports that producers who make a concerted effort to care-
fully discern policy interests or who key into areas that
will be important in the near future are more likely to
increase the receptivity to their products. It seems equally
clear that an author, no matter how profound, faces a major
obstacle when writing on a topic that cannot be seen to
directly concern US interests. He is unlikely to find much
consumer interest. 72
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
CIB Central Intelligence Bulletin
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DDA Deputy Directorate for Administration
DDI Deputy Directorate for Intelligence
DDO Deputy Directorate for Operations
DDSU Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD Department of Defense
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research - Department
of State
MBFR Mutual Balanced Force Reduction
NIB National Intelligence Bulletin
NID National Intelligence Daily
NIB National Intelligence Estimate
NIO National Intelligence Officer
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
OCI Office of Current Intelligence - DDI
OER Office of Economic Research - DDI
OGCR Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research - DDI
OPR Office of Political Reserach - DDI
OSR Office of Strategic Research - DDI
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PDB President's Daily Brief
PFIAB President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
SALT Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate
SRG Senior Review Group
TDs DDO Field Reports
USIB United States Intelligence Board
WASAG Washington Area Special Action Group
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