STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

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• Publication Date: January 1, 1977
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STUDIES
IN
INTELLIGENCE-
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VOL. 21 No. 3 FALL 1977
TR-SINT 77-003
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CONTENTS
Page
Studies in Intelligence Awards for 1975 and 1976 .............................................. V
The Intelligence Community Post-Mortem Pro-
gram, 1973 - 1975 .................................................. Richard W. Shrryock 15
Intelligence pathologists (UNCLASSIFIED)
Rat-Race ...................................................................................... William Newton 29
Intelligence support for a presidential trip (UNCLASSIFIED)
There Are More Things-in National Estimates ................................ "Horatio" 37
More on Methodology (UNCLASSIFIED)
The Abwehr Myth: How Efficient Was German In-
telligence in World War II? .................................... Gerold Guensberg 39
The files of Nest Bremen (UNCLASSIFIED)
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature ................................................................ 47
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Intelligence pathologists
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
POST-MORTEM PROGRAM, 1973-1975
Richard W. Shryock'
For roughly two years, from late 1973 to late 1975, the US intelligence
community produced-fearlessly or fecklessly, depending on one's point of view-a
series of critical post-mortem assessments of its own performance in one or another
(usually trying) circumstance. There was, of course, some precedence for this unusual
activity, but not much:
? Intelligence production offices in the community had for years prepared
various kinds of post-mortems. But they did so only irregularly, and then
almost always in response to the complaints of high-level policymakers and
military officers who wanted to know what-had-gone-wrong within the very
same production offices. Rightly or wrongly, but understandably, post-
mortems produced in this fashion were frequently dismissed by their request-
ers and others as unresponsive and self-serving.
? A special subcommittee of the National Security Council Intelligence Commit-
tee tried a new, hybrid approach to the post-mortem problem in the early
1970s, producing, with the community's indispensable help, two or three
assessments presumably untainted by the special interests of the community.
(The best known of these seems to have been a paper on the community's
performance concerning the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.) But for eminently
understandable reasons, including their unofficial status and bureaucratically
peculiar origins, these post-mortems were largely ignored by both the policy-
makers who had indirectly commissioned them and the community officials
who were the supposed beneficiaries.
The principal architects of the 1973-1975 post-mortem program of the Intelli-
gence Community (IC) Staff sought to avoid problems of this character. They wanted
to create a system that would, somehow, serve the community's real interests and,
simultaneously, the "legitimate" (as opposed to the political and the purely policy)
needs of its critics.'
'Author's note: This article was prepared at the request of two members of the Board of Editors of this
journal. I have discussed its contents with one of them, and have conducted interviews with several past and
present officers of the intelligence community, but the views expressed herein are my own.
I have not had recent access to the post-mortem documents discussed here, so I have had to use my
memory and the resourceful press as major sources of information. Under the circumstances, some errors
may have crept unbidden into the manuscript. If so, I extend my apologies.
I should also explain that I have deliberately omitted almost all names from this account, partly
because they seem unnecessary in a non-scholarly, non-historical assay, and partly because it would be
unfortunate if readers were distracted by controversial references to individual luminaries.
Finally, on a more personal note, let me record the fact that the post-mortem program, for which I
bore a large responsibility, died quietly in 1975 without memorialization and without obituary. This, then-
belatedly-is that memorialization and that obituary. R.W.S.
'Mutual suspicions between policymakers and intelligence officers have always existed but, not so
surprisingly, seemed to reach a high point in the early 1970s. More than a few intelligence officers, for
example, saw in the NSC-sponsored post-mortem on the 1971 Indo-Pak war (cited above), an effort to
justify or shift blame for US policy before and during that conflict.
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A total order. Perhaps too tall, especially inasmuch as the post-mortem program
did not always enjoy the unalloyed support of the top IC Staff management. Still, the
principal distinguishing characteristics of the program, as it was in fact instituted in
November 1973, were: (1) official status, obtained via DCI and USIB (i.e., commu-
nity) sponsorship; (2) preparation by an organization (the Product Review Division-
PRD-of the IC Staff) that was separated, if not divorced, from any and all "line"
production and collection offices and that was charged with, among other things, the
preparation of post-mortems on a continual basis; (3) a serious, if not always successful,
effort by this organization to strike a balance between objectivity (normally the
privilege of the non-involved) and expertise (often the province of the involved); and
(4) the great amount of favorable and unfavorable attention paid several of the papers
by readers (and non-readers too) within and without the community.
Seven post-mortems were produced by PRD between December 1973 and
September 1975. Five of these were specifically requested by the DCI; one was asked
for by his Deputy for the Community; and one grew out of an IC Staff commitment to
the DCI. Geographically, four concerned one or another problem in the Middle East,
one dealt with Chile, one with India, and one with Southeast Asia. All are discussed in
some detail below.9
It is the contention here that on the whole this series of post-mortems was a
success, or at least not a failure. In any case, members of the community, together
with observers and critics in Congress and the Executive Branch, should be aware that
the program existed and for a time-until the unwelcome intercession of the House
Select Committee on intelligence (on which more later)-even prospered. For the
community might one day decide to revive a candid post-mortem process with similar
characteristics and objectives. It is likely, after all, to gain or accept only so much
nourishment from granting a monopoly on post-mortems to "outsiders" in Congress or
elsewhere. These, too, can be useful, but they should not be exclusive.
More important, the community could in the long run benefit from objective,
mostly self-initiated post-mortems because, however embarrassing they might prove to
be temporarily, they could help in a variety of ways to improve the quality of
intelligence-in production, in collection, and yea, even in management. This, at any
rate, is the hope of more than a few who not only understand the need for such
improvement but who also comprehend the essentiality of the community's services to
the nation.
The Seven Reports
1. The Arab-Israeli War, 1973: The cumbersomely titled "The Performance of
the Intelligence Community Before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A
Preliminary Post-Mortem Report," was published in December 1973. Soon thereafter
it became the IC Staff equivalent of a best seller; it received good reviews from
prominent critics (Kissinger wrote the DCI to say that it was "outstanding"), and it
was as widely read as its rather restrictive classification permitted. In a sober mood,
well aware that their best estimates about the likelihood of war had turned out to be
(as later headlined in the press) "starkly wrong," even members of the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB) praised the document for its thoroughness, objectivity, and
candor.
'Not discussed are several PRD papers issued during the same period which bore some resemblance to
port-mortem studies but which did not, for one reason or another, bear post-mortem designations. One of
these, interestingly enough, dealt specifically with an intelligence success; it was the only such paper ever
prepared in PRD and the only one ever asked for (by policymakers, the DCI, USIB, or, indeed, any high-
level community official). A post-mortem program, by its very nature, is likely to deal primarily with
shortcomings-real or presumed-although there is no theoretical reason why this need be so.
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os - ortems
The report itself reflected a prodigious amount of work and as much analytical
effort as could be brought to bear on a difficult problem, the dimensions of which
were clear but the causes of which were not. All pertinent intelligence published by
the community from May to early October 1973-daily items, memoranda, weekly
articles, Watch Reports, estimates, and research papers-was carefully read. Thou-
sands of individual collection reports from the Department of State, CIA, DIA, NSA,
and other agencies were also reviewed. Scores of intelligence officers and consumers
were interviewed. All the data thus assembled were sifted and analyzed, chronologi-
cally arranged to serve as reference aids, and then interpreted in preliminary reports
prepared by individual investigators. A paper (together with six annexes which were
later dropped) was then produced and finally, after review by the DCI and his Deputy
for the Intelligence Community, disseminated in early December.
In brief, after quoting from appropriate intelligence papers and examining the
pre-war information available to the community from a variety of sources, the report
concluded that: (a) a great deal of information indicating the imminence of an Arab
attack on Israel had been collected and distributed to analysts in the months
(especially September) prior to the outbreak of war;' (b) analysts, perceiving growing
Arab reliance on political and economic rather than military tactics to achieve their
aims vis-a-vis Israel, rejected the evidence suggesting the contrary and in almost
unequivocal terms predicted no war; 5 and (c) they did so essentially because they
were firmly committed to the (mistaken) proposition that an Arab attack could only
result in a disastrous Arab defeat, or even "national suicide;" 6 that any rational man
could foresee this; and that, inasmuch as the Arab leaders (e.g., Sadat and Assad) were
indeed rational men, they would obviously not make a decision to attack.
These conclusions of the post-mortem were relatively easy to reach, given the
clear record of misestimates. Not so easy to isolate, however, were the reasons why the
analysts clung so tenaciously to the faulty syllogism outlined above. But surely their
awareness of recent history had something to do with it; although they believed that,
sooner or later, war was probably inevitable, the analysts had been hardened by
previous false alarms. Further, the long string of Arab defeats helped reinforce the
analysts' faith in overwhelming Israeli military superiority. And the failure of the
Israelis themselves to anticipate the attack-despite all their sensitivity, experience,
and efficient intelligence machinery-reinforced the analysts' no-war consensus.
But, more specifically, what caused the analysts to hold so rigidly to this belief in
the face of good signs of Arab preparations for war? What led them to believe that the
Arab forces were no better than they had been in 1967, despite the years of additional
training and the receipt of vast quantities of new and better Soviet equipment? (A
joint CIA-DIA study published in July 1973, for example, asserted flatly that the
Egyptian Army could not cross the canal in force.) And-the biggest mystery of all-
* In the words of the report, as quoted in US newspaper accounts, US experts had been provided with a
"plenitude of information which should have suggested, at a minimun, that they take very seriously the
threat of war in the near term."
' As subsequently reported by the press and as stated in the report: "[A thorough search] failed to turn
up any official statement from any office responsible for producing finished analytical intelligence which
contributed anything resembling a warning.... Instead of warnings, the community produced reassur-
ances ... that the Arabs would not resort to war.... The principal conclusions concerning the imminence of
hostilities reached and reiterated by those responsible for intelligence analysis were--quite simply,
obviously, and starkly-wrong." It should be noted, however, that an analyst from one agency (which was
not responsible for finished analytical intelligence) did provide a briefing a few days before the Arab attack
that suggested that war might be imminent. But this warning was strictly unofficial, was addressed to only a
handful of officials, and was not put in writing.
B They were also beholden to the conviction that the Arabs, in lieu of war, had decided to resort to the
use of an oil embargo, or threat of embargo, as a means to pressure the West into forcing Israeli concessions.
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what made these same analysts totally forget the wisdom of the previous spring, when
State/INR produced an almost prescient memorandum which concluded that, in
certain circumstances (which in fact came to pass over the summer), the Arabs would
probably attack Israel in the fall, principally in hopes of achieving essentially political,
not military, objectives?'
The post-mortem study concluded with several pages of recommendations for
improvements in the way the community conducted its business. Better communica-
tions between and among the collectors and producers of intelligence-a problem as
old as intelligence itself-were urged, and some new machinery for accomplishing
this was suggested. The publication of a single community situation report during
crises-in lieu of the four discrete reports usually issued (on a several-times-a-day
basis)-was suggested. Ways of relieving the analysts of the burden of reading
countless "raw" information reports, including a controversial scheme calling for more
active screening and highlighting procedures on the part of collectors, were explored.,
A more effective system of community crisis "alerts" was proposed. And there were
other notions advanced, some suggesting in general terms the need for budgetary
reallocations (a bigger share of the pie for production offices). But, other than a
proposal to find a systematic way to present the views of "devil's advocates," there
were no recommendations that directly tackled the problem of analytical prejudices
and preconceptions.
2. Chile: Soon after the anti-Allende coup in Chile in September 1973, the officer
in PRD specializing in Latin American affairs was asked by the head of IC Staff to
conduct an informal post-mortem examination of intelligence coverage before and
during that event. His findings, issued in typescript in December 1973 (somewhat
delayed by the intervention of the higher-priority Arab-Israeli post-mortem), included
the judgment that although the analysts had done a respectable job of covering the
increasingly turbulent domestic Chilean scene, they had been somewhat remiss in not
really warning their leaders of the likelihood of a coup in the near term. It appeared to
him that sufficient good information was available in time for them to do so. All in all,
the PRD reviewer gave somewhat higher marks to DIA than CIA coverage.
The paper was never presented to or discussed by USIB or followed up by the
DC,I or any other senior community figure.
3. The Indian Nuclear Explosion: Though of modest size, the nuclear explosion
set off by New Delhi in May 1974 set off political shock waves around the world and
around Washington. The DCI wanted to know why he and his constituents had not
been forewarned and called for another post-mortem.
A full discussion of this intriguing question, under the caption "A Case of Wisdom Lost," is one of the
most interesting sections in the post-mortem. The power of preconceptions, together with the analysts'
understandable feeling that those who might fear war were only crying wolf, is thoroughly explored, but the
paper fails to provide an altogether satisfactory answer.
" One way of handling the "information explosion"-in this instance the number of discrete
information reports reaching analysts in the production agencies-is to computerize the data. This greatly
reduces the amount of paper reaching the analyst and permits him to summon information as he needs it.
Trouble is, this route is enormously expensive, is resisted by many mechanophobic analysts, and may not
lead to a solution of the problem in any event.
Mere is at least an interim alternative, and it was proposed in the report: cut down the flow of words
and paper to analysts by requiring the issuing agency to summarize, interpret, highlight, and condense (but
not analyze). Many items (but of course not all) normally sent on an "as received" basis could be held,
combined with other, similar documents, and disseminated in summary form, say on a weekly basis.
Trouble here is that analysts-who on the one hand complain about "too much mail" and on the other want
to read "everything"-do not trust anyone other than themselves to digest the material, i.e., all the material.
And the collection agencies, which may lack adequate resources for the job, are in any case reluctant to take
it on for a potentially ungrateful audience.
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The report, published in July 1974, pointed to a curious sequence of events and
raised a question about the way in which the community goes about its business. A
year and a half or so before the event, a National Intelligence Estimate discussing the
problem of nuclear proliferation concluded that India could (and indeed might)
explode a nuclear device at almost any time. After the publication of this estimate, the
flow of reports concerning Indian nuclear capabilities and intentions, hitherto
reasonably heavy, almost ceased. So too, partly as a consequence, did the coverage of
relevant material in intelligence periodicals and memoranda. Thus, in the months
preceding the actual detonation, the possibility was simply ignored in intelligence
publications.
The question, as more or less posed in the post-mortem: after the appearance of
the NIE, did the community somehow feel that, having fully discharged its duties
concerning this significant topic, it now could sit back and relax?
The answer was a frustrating "perhaps." At any rate, for whatever reason, the
collectors and producers alike seemed to lose interest in India's nuclear effort after the
NIE had pronounced on, the problem. The post-mortem, in a mood of diffident
daring, suggested that maybe, just maybe, this disinterest reflected a similar lack of
regard in the policy-making community as well.
The post-mortem also concerned itself rather extensively with the problem of
collection in countries with serious nuclear potential. It pointed out that, once a certain
state of readiness had been achieved (as in India), the decision of whether to explode a
device and to develop weapons was a political one and, in the event (again as in India),
might be made on political grounds. The paper then urged (as it subsequently
developed, with some success) that collection programs be revamped, requirements
and priorities be revised, and the character and interests of the human collectors
concerned be substantially altered.
4. The West Bank: A sequel to the Arab-Israeli post-mortem of December 1973
had been promised the DCI, and it appeared about a year later. Called "Military
Intelligence During an International Crisis: Israel's West Bank Campaign in October
1973," it provided a brief examination of intelligence coverage of that campaign and
suggested some significant possible consequences of that coverage. Although the
report was in this way a valuable addition to the body of intelligence literature, it did
not purport to be a post-mortem report of conventional breed.
5. Cyprus 1974: It was clear in late 1973 that the new Greek strongman, Ionides,
was likely to cast a covetous eye on Cyprus. Intelligence memoranda of the time
emphasized Ionides' aggessive interest in enosis, the reunion of Cyprus with the Greek
motherland, and, because of this, foresaw trouble ahead between Greece and Turkey.
Six months or so later, however, in early July 1974, intelligence analysts-
although by no means claiming that the issue was dead-suggested in effect that
American policymakers need not be concerned with a crisis in the immediate future.
Inter alia, they highlighted and implicitly endorsed a report from an "untested
source" that Ionides would not move against Cyprus in the near term. On 14/15 July,
however, Athens sponsored a coup in Nicosia that threw out the reigning Cypriot,
Archbishop Makarios, installed a Greek puppet regime, and in general set the stage for
enosis. Turkey invaded within the week, and war between the two NATO allies in the
eastern Mediterranean appeared imminent.
The DCI, knowning that he had been surprised by the coup, was concerned that
the community might have missed another one; if so, he wanted to know why; and so
he called for post-mortem number five. The result was "An Examination of the
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Intelligence Community's Performance Before and During the Cyprus Crisis of
1974," published in January 1975. This report, in the course of examining the
published record, concluded that the analysts had misperceived Ionides' intentions in
July. Perhaps they had been distracted by the Aegean seabed issue, which had flared
in late June and which had then received much greater emphasis in an estimative
memorandum than the Cyprus problem. Or perhaps they had made too much of the
misleading report that Ionides would not soon move against Cyprus because they
themselves did not wish to believe earlier signs (and their own fears) to the contrary.
Indeed, perhaps the analysts had been persuaded that it would be irrational of the
Greek leader to risk war with Turkey, the wrath of the United States, and the possible
intervention of the Soviets, all for the sake of Cyprus; that although he was hardly less
than eccentric, Ionides was not irrational; and that-in the now familiar syllogism-
[onides would thus not move precipitately (at least so long as the risks seemed so
large).
The Cyprus post-mortem report also pointed out, in a positive vein, that the pre-
July intelligence record on Cyprus was quite good. And concerning other topics of
major interest-the possibility of Soviet intervention, the probable reaction of the
Turks to the coup in Nicosia, and the outcome of the fighting on the island-it was
judged that coverage ranged from right-on-target (in re the Soviets) to pretty good
(the invasion) to adequate (the course of the fighting).
Concerning collection, the post-mortem noted some weaknesses, especially in
Athens, and some strengths, as in Nicosia and Ankara.
The Cyprus report created something of a stir immediately upon publication.
There were, for example, laments to the effect that the authors of the report had
enjoyed the advantages of hindsight, a curious but commonly voiced complaint. (Of
course they had. The process is by definition post, and a condition of such studies is
precisely that they can be made in the light of hindsight.)
One official charged (and was partly right) that the paper contained several
"factual errors," and an NIO asserted that the post-mortem fundamentally misappre-
hended the nature of estimative intelligence when it criticized analysts for their
failure to predict the coup. Further, some of these analysts felt themselves unjustly
accused of mistakes they hadn't made. This is surely not the time or place to rehearse
old argument about specifics, but some general observations are in order:
? It is true, of course, as the NIO suggested, that intelligence analysts, lacking
supernatural means of peering into the future, should not be expected to
predict with precision. (It is also true, and too bad, that many consumers of
intelligence do expect such predictions.) And certainly there is merit in the
often-heard proposition that highlighting the serious possibility that an event
will take place within the foreseeable future should be sufficient to alert
policymakers, who are then, in the great scheme of things, supposed to devise
appropriate responses.
? In the case of the Cyprus post-mortem, however, analysts were not faulted for
failing to make a precise estimate about, for example, the date of the coup
sponsored by Ionides. They were criticized, rather, for making what the
authors of the post-mortem perceived to be a negative estimate, viz., the clear
implicit estimate made during the first half of July in daily publications that
there probably would not be a coup in the near term. This estimate was
strongly reinforced during the same period by what the analysts did not
provide, i.e., anything akin to the kind of warning sounded earlier to the effect
that a crisis or a coup or some other major move by Ionides was likely, and
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fairly soon. At best, the backtracking in July muffled the alarm; at worst, it
would have told the policymakers that they could afford to relax for a spell. (In
fact, the policymakers did not relax, partly because in some instances they
simply weren't aware of what intelligence analysts were saying, partly because
in other cases they just didn't care what the analysts were saying.) Finally, in
sum, as the post-mortem suggested, if the analysts were right to sound warnings
in June-and they were-then they were wrong not to do so in July.
6. Egyptian Military Capabilities: In February 1975, the members of USIB,
meeting to consider a new NIE on the Arab-Israeli situation, made a last-minute
change in the paper, radically altering a key judgment concerning the likelihood of
war by estimating that the Arabs might attack Israel within a few days. They did so at
the urging of one member who cited a number of very recent items of information
which to him seemed to portend war. This member also cited a just-published
memorandum written by analysts in his agency; this offered a similarly alarmist view
and also presented a singular and (as it subsequently developed) distorted view of the
state of Soviet-Egyptian relations at the time.
The memorandum had been published only a day or so after the appearance of a
community paper that was relatively reassuring in re the prospects for war; this
community effort, sponsored by an NIO, had been concurred in by all major
intelligence components, including the agency now offering alarmist views at USIB.
Consumers (in, for example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, on the NSC Staff,
and in the State Department) were understandably indignant or confused by the
alarmist position of the second paper, especially since it made no reference to the
milder conclusions of the community analysis. Indeed, one consumer cabled his
principal in the field to say that the alarmist position was ill-founded--based on
erroneous evidence-and should be ignored.
The National Intellignce Officer responsible for the community memorandum
and the NIE thought that USIB should not have been so quick to amend a critical
judgment in an important estimate. The NIO asked the DCI to call for a post-mortem
look at the entire affair, and the DCI thereupon did so.
It was clear that this problem could not be handled in an orthodox way. It not
only involved some delicate information, several sensitive interviews, and a number of
private communications at high levels of the US Government, but it also focussed on
only one agency of the intelligence community. All concerned agreed that, although
the paper might in most respects resemble a conventional post-mortem report, it
would be (and in fact was) given only to the head of the agency involved.
The specific conclusions of this "private" post-mortem cannot be reproduced
here. But two of its recommendations, which regrettably came to naught, should be
mentioned.
One-rapping USIB on its collective knuckles-suggested that USII3 members
should not on their own alter NIEs on the basis of information presented for the first
time at the meeting called to consider that NIE. USIB should return a challenged
paper to the appropriate NIOs and analysts for immediate checking and possible
amendment. The other suggestion proposed, in the interest of potentially confused
consumers, that intelligence memoranda issued by one agency which contradict the
conclusions of recent community papers dealing with the same or similar topics should
acknowledge the fact, i.e., bear a specific notice acknowledging the differences.
7. Mayaguez: The Mayaguez and its crew of 39 were seized by the Cambodian
Communists on 14 May 1976. Within days the administration-taken completely by
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surprise-wanted to know what the intelligence community had known and reported
both before and after the seizure.
There was no time for a formal post-mortem, so a hastily assembled community-
wide chronology of events was prepared by the NIOs and a more ambitious narrative
account was rushed into print within three days by the IC Staff. This study revealed,
among many other things, that the government-intelligence and operational-policy
communities alike-lacked effective machinery for warning US merchant ships of
possible hostile actions.
In August of 1975, the DCI asked PRD to produce a more thorough and careful
post-mortem examination of the Mayaguez incident. Although he did not explicitly
say so, the DCI indicated that he was moved in part by his desire to show both
Congress and the White House that the community could examine its own perfor-
mance during an international crisis with care and publish its findings with candor.
And perhaps he hoped to head off any sensational and unjustified criticisms of that
performance by the staff and members of the then highly active Pike Committee.
The PRD inquiry confirmed the earlier judgment that the warning system for US
merchant ships was seriously deficient. In fact, there was no real contact between the
community and those elements in the departments of State and Defense involved in
the issuance of such warnings; intelligence officers had not even been aware that
offices in these departments were so involved.
The report also confirmed that no intelligence agency had foreseen Cambodian
seizure of a US ship. Prior to the event, there was some reporting by collectors of
actions against coastal shipping in the Gulf of Siam (where the Mayaguez was
intercepted), but most of these incidents seemed to involve only small coastal craft.
There were also a few reports of episodes involving larger ocean-going ships-
Panamanian and South Korean-but there had been no Cambodian seizures of these
ships. Analysts receiving these ambiguous reports did not see in them a harbinger of
hostile moves against US ships and thus (with one minor exception) did not mention
them in their publications. There were various other reasons why they failed to do so,
not the least of which were: (1) the almost complete dearth of information about the
organization, composition, policies, and intentions of the new Cambodian Communist
regime; and (2) the weariness of the community's analysts who covered Southeast Asia,
analysts who had just witnessed the sudden fall of both Cambodia and South Vietnam
and who were still trying to sort out the aftermath.
If, as the DCI wondered, the community could handle two simultaneous crises in
two parts of the world adequately, could it also cope with two crises in one part of the
world? For despite all the extenuating circumstances, it was simply a fact that had to
be faced that, in the week before the seizure of the Mayaguez, the analysts had known
from unclassified radio broadcasts reproduced by FBIS that the South Korean
government had issued a public warning to its merchant ships to avoid the Gulf of
Siam.
The post-mortem also looked closely into a question initially raised by the White
House: was there an excessive delay between the community's first knowledge of the
seizure of the Mayaguez and its notification of its principals in the White House and
elsewhere? The essence of the answer provided by the post-mortem was "yes." The
original CRITIC (Critical Intelligence) message received concerning the Mayaguez
arrived in the community's operations centers at about 5:30 a.m. (Washington time),
roughly two and a half hours before the President and the Secretary of State got the
word, much, as it turned out, to their consternation.
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The senior intelligence officers on duty when that first CRITIC message came in
were uncertain about both the fact and the significance of the seizure. (So too,
apparently, were a number of officials not in the intelligence commuity who were
notified well before the President and the Secretary.) Subsequent clarifying CRITIC
messages should have helped to resolve this uncertainty, but did not. To be sure, there
was some confusion about what had actually happened and a concomitant disinclina-
tion to grapple with the question of what the event might portend. There were also
some problems associated with the incorrect handling, timing, and numbering of the
CRITIC messages. And then, too, there was an understandable reluctance among
operations officers and others to rouse the top figures of the government from their
sleep; the CIA Operations Center, for example, was the first to notify its principal, but
did not do so until 6:35 a.m., the time of the DCI's normal awakening. But, as was
clear in hindsight, none of these circumstances constituted a legitimate reason for the
delay. Uncertainty is likely to attend the beginnings of any crisis. And clearing up the
unknowns prior to notifying those who will be responsible for managing the crisis not
only risks their wrath but also may jeopardize their ability to cope.
The post-mortem highlighted some of the problems associated with the CRITIC
system, and it recommended in unequivocal terms that in the future the appropriate
operations centers get in touch with each other immediately following the receipt of
an initial CRITIC message. Had such a procedure been in effect vis-a-vis the
Mayaguez, senior principals would almost certainly have been notified promptly.
Some Community Post-Mortems Not Produced
A number of formal community post-mortem reports that probably should have
been written during this period (1973-1975) were not. Performance concerning at
least three major developments-the leftist coup in Portugal in the spring of 1974, the
rapid collapse of Cambodia and South Vietnam a year later, and the Cuban
intervention in Angola in the fall of 1975-merited more careful and judicious
examination than it in fact received.
? The community's face was not visibly red in the aftermath of the surprise coup
in Portugal, nor did the community seem to blush because it had not foreseen
Lisbon's subsequent (temporary) drift toward Moscow. In any event, no one
called for a post-mortem investigation at the time. That came later, in effect-
during the hearings of the Pike Committee in the summer of 1975.
? In the case of Vietnam, PRD did, at the request of the DCI, hastily prepare a
paper-some called it a "mini-post-mortem"-that was given very limited but
high-level dissemination. This, however, was completed even before the fall of
Saigon and made no pretense of examining circumstances in a thorough way
and in the light of true hindsight. Several months later, again at the request of
the DCI, a second paper on the subject was prepared, but this time under the
aegis of an NIO. It, too, could not lay claim to any real post-mortem status, in
part because in this instance its principal drafters were examining their own
performance.
? Concerning the community's (and their own) performance regarding Angola,
the NIOs produced another post-mortemlike paper in early 1976, again at the
specific request of the DCI. This, however, was not a full-scale effort, nor could
it meet a test of objectivity.
? One 1976 development, unrelated to any specific event or crisis, may have
warranted post-mortem investigation, and that was the CIA's and the commu-
nity's unprecedented (and highly publicized) revision-from six percent to 11
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to 13 percent-of their estimate of the percentage of the Soviet Gross National
Product devoted to the military budget in recent years. Long carried at the
lower figure, the proportion was increased-some charged very tardily so-
after the receipt of new information and a prolonged study by teams of
community experts. The significance of the change seemed to lie not so much
in what it revealed about the size and strength of the Soviet military
establishment, but rather in what it told about the determination of the Soviet
leadership to allow the economy to bear such a burden. The change also raised
serious questions about the community's and especially CIA's methodology for
making cost estimates.
Post-Mortem Purposes ...
In a sense-because they reviewed and recounted the past-the community post-
mortem studies constituted a form of history. But they were history with a special
purpose; to provide present and future members of the community-analysts,
collectors, and processors, and managers alike-with a new means to measure and
improve their performance. These reports, in fact, sought objectively to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of the community's processes, systems, and attitudes, as
manifested during a particular period or vis-a-vis a particular problem, and they tried,
however imperfectly, to record the truth as best as could be ascertained.
To be sure, as already indicated, not all readers of these reports looked upon them
in a kindly light. Some analysts and collectors, for example, although not named in the
reports, felt themselves the targets of unfair criticism. But others recognized that there
was merit in a program that could, by design, avoid many of the problems afflicting
previous critical reviews of intelligence performance.
It was as if the Director, in establishing an independent post-mortem capability in
the IC Staff, was seeking a perspective not available either to the producers of the play
(the policymakers, who often believe themselves to be the only responsible critics) or
to the actors on stage (the performing intelligence professionals who frequently feel
themselves to be the only qualified critics).
? Intelligence post-mortems conducted or ultimately controlled by the policy-
makers can suffer from two conspicuous faults. They may reflect the relative
ignorance of their authors concerning intelligence matters and thus may even
neglect to ask the right questions, much less provide helpful answers. More
important, they may seek in a self-serving way to pin blame for one or another
policy problem on alleged intelligence deficiencies.
? Post-mortems conducted by the "actors" (in community production offices and
collection entities) may try to do the same sort of thing, i.e., shift blame away
from themselves. Or they may simply try to deny-sometimes correctly, but
only rarely convincingly-that any real problem existed in the first place.
This is not to say that community post-mortems can be immaculately conceived
or ever achieve the degree of objectivity they should strive for. Still, if post-mortems
are commissioned by a DCI who insists on dispassionate analysis, and are prepared by
qualified officers who have little or no stake in the outcome of the review, then they
hold the promise of a unique efficacy. Put another way, it is simply a truism that the
chances are better that the system will permit a constructive concentration on the
nature and causes of intelligence problems and intelligence successes if the post-
mortem task is undertaken by knowledgeable parties whose interests are not directly
affected by the post-mortem "verdict."
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Pos~l or ems
... and Principles
Little formal methodology guided (or could have guided) the preparation of the
community post-mortem reports. An effort was made, however, to meet certain
minimum standards in all the formally published papers. These can be stated as
general "post-mortem principles:"
? All published intelligence items relevant to a post-mortem investigation should
be obtained and read. These include individual current intelligence reports, or
portions thereof, as well as more ambitious intelligence studies such as National
Intelligence Estimates. The vast bulk of reporting from intelligence and other
sources should also be reviewed.
? As many as possible of the parties involved in the reporting and preparation of
relevant intelligence should be interviewed; a representative selection of
appropriate supervisors and office heads should be, too; and a fair number of
high-level consumers should be asked to comment as well. (The names of
individuals, however, should as a general rule be omitted from the published
post-mortem report.)
? The post-mortem team should doublecheck the opinions and facts it gathers in
the course of the investigation. The word of one intelligence officer or group of
officers cannot be taken as final, not because such officers are necessarily
suspect, but because they are as capable of shading meaning, or committing
inadvertent errors, or speaking from ignorance, as any other comparable group
of human beings. And sometimes what appear unquestionably to be facts turn
out not to be.9
? Many, perhaps a majority, of the members of a post-mortem team should have
served successful terms as intelligence analysts; some should be familiar with
the specific area or topic under scrutiny; and some should also be thoroughly
conversant with the various means of collection, At the same time, none of the
members of the team should have been personally involved in the work being
investigated; and none should function as representatives of any of the
community's components-each member should try to speak for the commu-
nity as a whole.
? The product of the post-mortem exercise should reflect judgments as inde-
pendent and objective as those presumably reflected in finished intelligence
itself. Post-mortem investigators, however, must ask themselves if the analysis
they are studying is itself in fact objective. Are there signs of institutional or
personal prejudice; riding of hobby horses; covering up or defense of past
errors of judgment; excessive fascination with or fondness of particular
countries or particular national leaders; or capitulation to the presumed policy
interests of the consumers?
? To be effective, post-mortem reports should be well presented. The way in
which even an eager readership receives a given report depends in part on how
6 To cite one example, during preparation of the post-mortem on the Mayaguez incident, investigators
fixed the times of the (simultaneous) receipt in Washington of the first three CRITIC cables on the basis of
machine-imprinted time stamps on the copies of those cables received by one particular operations center.
Subsequently (but not too late to make the necessary corrections in the draft) it was more or less fortuitously
discovered that those particular time stamps had been off by roughly half an hour, the result of a power
shutdown over the previous weekend. The resultant errors exaggerated the length of the delay-bad enough
as it was-between the initial receipt of the information by operations centers and the passage of that
information to senior principals.
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skillfully it is put together. Is it physically attractive, handy, easy to read? And
are its contents pertinent, reasonably concise, well written, and above all,
lucid? It is easier to extol clarity-and pertinence and concision and all the
rest-than it is to achieve it, so writers should be given some help; competent
editors can sometimes perform miracles.
Some Accomplishments
In the area of specific accomplishments, there is no theoretical limit to what a
good post-mortem can do. As a practical matter, however, and as demonstrated by the
fate of many of the recommendations of the community post-mortems issued in the
past, there are a variety of hard constraints. It is a lot easier to isolate problems than to
propose workable remedies. And it is, in turn, easier to propose such remedies than to
implement them.
The post-mortems and the Product Review Division were responsible, however,
for some specific and tangible improvements in the way the community conducted its
business and, perhaps, the way in which the rest of the government responded to the
community as well. For example:
? PHD's extensive work with watch and operations centers and in the general
area of warning intelligence was in large part an outgrowth of post-mortem
findings. Its various enterprises helped to lower the surprisingly high barricades
surrounding all the intelligence operations centers and to establish mutually
profitable contacts between these centers and similar centers in the White
House, State Department, and Pentagon. The old, almost exclusively vertical
lines of communication leading upward from each of these centers to its own
prinicipals were (loosely) tied-through telephone conferencing systems, per-
sonal contacts, a series of mutually profitable "business conventions," and the
adoption of a number of important common procedures-into a horizontal
network serving the government as a whole.
? In work that followed the revelations of the Mayaguez inquiry, PRD tackled
and solved a number of problems associated with the CRITIC system. It was
discovered that the CRITIC procedures and "rules"-designed to move vital
all-source information from the field to the President and other top officials in
Washington via the operations centers-badly needed overhauling. They were
in certain respects out-of-date, unrealistic, and incomplete, and they varied
from agency to agency. Indeed, there was no single system, only sets of
systems, and not all these were compatible with one another. As was the case in
the Mayaguez incident, this disarray had led to some problems and delays but,
fortunately, no intelligence disasters. A failure to bring community-wide order
into CRITIC, however, would have surely risked such a disaster in the future.
? Partly as the consequence of the revelations of the 1973 Arab-Israeli post-
inortem, the DCI and the community (working through the IC Staff and PRD)
in 1974 established a new form of estimative warning paper, the Alert
Memorandum. The inspiration of a senior officer in one of the community's
current intelligence offices, this kind of paper could when necessary be
produced very quickly with light coordination by secure telephone, and could
be delivered to top-level consumers in such a way as to virtually guarantee that
they would read it.10 A survey of Alert Memoranda was made by PRD in the
"These consumers had long complained that even when intelligence had "called it right," they
sometimes hadn't gotten the word. Kissinger, for example, is said to have told one of the rare meetings of
the National Security Council Intelligence Committee that a warning was not a warning unless it reached
him. And, of course, he had a point.
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summer of 1975 at the request of the DCI. It revealed that the system was
working well-more than a score had been produced under the aegis of the
National Intelligence Officers, and top consumers were in fact receiving and
reading the memoranda.
? The same Arab-Israeli post-mortem pointed in 1973 to the excessive number of
situation summaries published by components of the community during crises
and to the complaints of consumers about this unnecessary and confusing
duplication of effort. It then took three years of sporadic effort by PRD and
others to work out procedures for the production of a single national crisis
"sitsum" for high-level consumers." But a "charter" was finally drafted by
PRD and agreed upon by the community in 1976, and a national sitsum was
actually issued during a crisis some two months later.
The Decline and Fall of the Post-Mortem
There were many reasons why the once-promising community post-mortem
program died in the fall of 1975. Not least among them were shortcomings of the
program itself, the departure from the community of its principal sponsors, the effects
of bureaucratic politics and reorganizations, and a growing conviction among many
intelligence officers that candid critical reviews of past performances represented, at
best, an unbalanced look at the condition of the profession and, at worst, an
unnecessary exercise in self-flagellation. It seems unlikely, however, that any of these
circumstances, individually or in the aggregate, would have been controlling had it
not been for: (1) the public reaction against the Constitutional and ethical abuses, both
real and imagined, committed by CIA and the community over the course of two
decades; and (2) the effort to exploit that reaction by the House Select Committee on
Intelligence and its staff.
Although the House Committee initially professed a serious interest in evaluating
the activities of the community and especially of CIA-how much did they cost, what
were their risks, how successful were they?-its staff soon demonstrated that it was
more anxious to condemn the community than to examine it.12 It also demonstrated
that for this purpose it was eager to concentrate on the substantive end of the
intelligence business. Some of the post-mortems-forwarded to the Committee staff
under threat of subpoena-may have helped to inspire this strategy and were in any
event extremely useful to it.
In the end, the use and misuse of the post-mortems by the House Committee,
together with the reactions of those in the community who had to contend with the
Committee, were simply too much for the program. Still, the post-mortems then died
with more than a mere whimper. They died, in fact, to the rousing accompaniment of
a Constitutional confrontation between Congress and the President of the United
States, occasioned by the President's refusal to grant Congress permission to release
classified information drawn from the Mid-East post-mortem of 1973, and the Pike
Committee's determination to assert its right to do so, no matter what the position of
the Executive Branch."
11 It had also taken an order from the President to get the effort moving again. Truth is, both the
practical and bureaucratic problems associated with this sort of enterprise were and are enormously
complex.
" It did not really explore the reasons for the community's problems or show much interest in so
doing-although the post-mortems and other available sources provided a clear opportunity for sober
inquiry. Nor did it reflect on the Community's successes, of which, of course, there were many.
"Neither side seemed at all anxious to bring this matter to a head. The Chairman of the Committee
was apparently not sure he enjoyed the support of the House as a whole. The Executive was far from
confident that it would win a test in the Supreme Court, which is presumably where the matter would have
been decided had the stalemate persisted. Ultimately, of course, the Committee in effect caved in, although
the issue as such was not resolved.
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A post-mortem assessment of the 1973-1975 post-mortem program would no
doubt reveal many ways in which it could have been improved. It might, in addition,
uncover means to persuade in-house skeptics that future programs of comparable
intent need not resemble an exercise in masochism.
If, in fact, the decision is ever made to resurrect candid post-mortem procedures,
those responsible could do worse than to ponder some of the lessons of the recent past:
? large, formal post-mortem reports should only concern the community's
performance vis-a-vis especially important circumstances-such as major
international crises and key analytical or collection problems-and should be
produced only with the approval and bearing the imprimatur of the DCI. They
should receive a broad readership within the community, subject of course to
restrictions imposed by classification, and should be presented to the National
Foreign Intelligence Board (or its equivalent) for rumination, discussion, and-
if appropriate-action.
? The community's performance in less dramatic circumstances, involving
particular incidents, might best be treated in shorter, more informal papers,
disseminated on a more selective basis. These papers should be quite flexible in
content and form and could appear as often as events seemed to warrant. Such
papers might be issued as "Special Studies" or "Special Reviews," rather than
as post-mortem reports per se.
? The successes of the community should receive greater attention than was
customary in the 1973-1975 post-mortem series; not because the public
relations aspects of such emphasis are tempting, but because it is as easy-
perhaps easier-to learn from honest successes as it is from honest mistakes.
? Post-mortem reports and similar papers should be disseminated outside the
community only with the approval of the DCI. There should be no blanket
proscription of such dissemination; some papers could usefully inform, say, the
NSC, or even respond to its requests for post-mortem reviews. But it should be
generally understood that the primary audience for most community post-
mortems should be the community itself.
? The subjects of post-mortems should not be confined to assessments of
analytical and collection performance vis-a-vis a particular international
incident or development. Some papers should address such broad (and
sensitive) topics as: the quantity and quality of reporting and analysis on a
given country (e.g., China) over a period of years; the controversial procedures
followed last year during the preparation of the annual NIE on Soviet strategic
forces; and the benefits and costs of the community's maintenance of
competitive and duplicative analytical centers and collection programs.
Clearly, any future post-mortem staff would have more than enough to do. Even
so, to allay apprehensions, it should he made obvious to all that there would be no
trespass on the functions of the inspectors-general or the prerogatives of managers,
that it would not be the role of "post-mortemists" to seek out mis-or-malfeasance or to
supervise personnel. "Post-mortemists" are, however, historians of community error
and accomplishment and as such-if it is true that those who do not know history are
condemned to repeat it-are better read than ignored.
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Intelligence support for a presidential trip
RAT-RACE
William Newton
"Get your gear on-we're movin' out!" was an all too familiar phrase among the
combat units of the First Marine Division as we fought our way from island to island
toward Tokyo and the end of World War II. Somewhat naively, no doubt, I thought I
had heard the last of all that when I got back to the States the day after V-J Day. But
during nearly 20 years in the Office of Current Intelligence I was to hear, if not the
exact words, the same message many times, albeit generally from the Operations
Center rather than the company commander. Wars always start in the middle of the
night, ships get captured by Cambodians at ungodly hours, WSAG meetings are
convened on the spur of the moment, and Congressional committees are not bashful
about asking for a DCI briefing "at two o'clock this afternoon." If you are in the line
of fire when these horrors occur-and I was most of the time-you get your gear on
and move out fast, try to think sweet thoughts, and hope for the best.
Probably the record for this sort of thing was set early'on an October Thursday in
1966 when I was trying to write President Johnson's Daily Brief. Dick Lehman-then
Deputy DOCI-materialized at my desk and casually announced that I would be the
DDI Representative in the President's party during part of his imminent trip to the
Far East. Soft-spoken as always, he added, You should leave Saturday afternoon."
There followed a wild and memorable two weeks of getting to and thrashing
around in New Zealand, Australia, and Korea.' There were lots of problems, some
hairy moments, and some hilarious ones, all topped off by the definite impression that
the President and his party felt that the Agency was serving them well.
The problems began to raise their ugly heads almost at once, and it soon became
apparent that leaving by Saturday evening would take some doing. First of all, as
anyone knows, was the matter of a passport and shots. I had wandered over into the
bowels of the Pentagon only a week before to get my official passport renewed.
Naturally on that Thursday morning its whereabouts assumed the proportions of a
national mystery. After frantic calls and, believe it or not, a special messenger, Central
Processing finally laid hands on it. So far so good, but this was Thursday, and "yellow
fever shots are jiven only on Wednesdays." Why yellow fever?-that's not much of a
threat in Australia. Well, there were rumors (as always), one of which had it that
Vietnam might just happen to get onto the itinerary. None of the OCI hierarchy
wanted to lend any credence to that rumor by pleading my case anywhere, so I was
left to my own ingenuity pretty early in the game. A few phone calls, replete with
white lies, finally resulted in yellow fever shots at a hospital. After these two close calls
right at the start, the Boy Scout motto sounded not too ridiculous after all.
All this fingernail biting took up a fair share of Thursday, and a physical exam
pretty well accounted for Friday morning. Along with these administrative hassles
there were other considerations. After all, I was a "generalist" going to New Zealand,
' Bill Read, also of OCI, was already in the area and supported the party during the conference of
Asian leaders at Manila, and stops in Thailand and Malaysia.
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Trip Support
Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand-at least that was the plan at the moment-and I
couldn't appear utterly ignorant of these places. So during the relative calm of
Thursday evening I crammed on fact books, memos, and previous Daily Brief articles
until I knew the main issues confronting these countries, the principal cabinet officers,
and miscellaneous facts such as that sheep in New Zealand outnumber the people, and
that Chinese do almost the same for the Malays in Malaysia. I also remembered why
the King of Thailand was born in the United States: at a tense moment in a pre-NSC
meeting Mr. Dulles had asked this question-and was told that it was because his
mother was in the U.S. at the time.
Instant expert though I was, it was a relief to know that a special OCI task force
of genuine area specialists would be on 24-hour duty back at Headquarters, and would
cable me the regular OCI publications on schedule, with spot reports as events
dictated. A long session with the chief and principal officers of this task force on
Friday morning did much to restore my confidence. (Naturally, the questions I did
have to field had nothing at all to do with these sessions or my own cram course!)
During the entire trip this group kept me supplied, on time, with almost all that I
needed, and responded promptly to requests for further information so that I could
answer particular questions.
What questions? This touches on another of the problems that arose during that
Thursday and Friday. Assuming that I ever got to New Zealand, let alone anywhere
else (more about this later), what was I supposed to do? Fortunately, this problem was
met head on. Thursday evening I delivered the Daily Brief to Mr. Bromley Smith at
the White House, as was then the routine, even though my writing of it had ceased
abruptly that morning. Our front office had arranged for me to meet Mr. Walt
Rostow. He received me most cordially, and we speedily got our signals straight. I was
to brief him early every morning, again in the evening, and track him down at any
time, any place, should crises develop. He would keep the President up to date.
Rostow said I should also be prepared to handle his or the President's requests for
further information, and was delighted to hear that the task force and our cable
facilities were at his instant disposal. By the time he shook hands and said "See you in
New Zealand," I thought I knew what my mission was. There is nothing that can
equal getting one's instructions from the horse's mouth, rather than depending on the
inevitably garbled versions that come through channels. In addition to serving Rostow,
I was of course to report to I land assist him (or stay out of his way)
as required.
Friday afternoon, I darted into Central Processing just as safes were banging shut
for the weekend, and actually got my passport, orders, airplane tickets (with one vital
flight unconfirmed), and a cheery "Have a great trip."
Anyway, I finally got to New Zealand, after clearing one last hurdle-an hour's
en transit stop at Tahiti, with the inevitable daydreams of just plain staying there. We
touched down in Auckland while the Redskins were still in the showers after losing
their Sunday afternoon game to the Giants, to discover that in this urban sprawl it was
10:30 Monday morning. A few hours later I began working in Wellington, with an
acute understanding as to why the tennis pros object to playing a match under the
influence of jet lag. Around dinner time, shortly before becoming a basket case, I was
taken to my quarters. Since all the hotel rooms in Wellington had long been booked
for an international scientific convention, and the New Zealand Government (unlike
the Royal Hawaiian Hotel) was unwilling to throw people out on the streets because of
a hastily arranged Presidential visit, the teeming press corps and all but the four or
five top members of the party had to be billeted elsewhere. "Elsewhere" turned out to
be a large, decommissioned ferry boat that in better days had made the overnight run
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to South Island, and for the nonce was moored at the Overseas Terminal. No one was
sure how to pronounce the Maori name of this rust-bucket, but since it had a
distracting starboard list it was quickly rechristened the "Tiltin' Hilton." I've seen
doghouses bigger than my room, but the bed was an inch longer than I was and I
managed to doze for 13 hours.
Things began to happen the next morning, and except for local variations set the
pattern for the remaining stops on the trip. Several of the key aspects deserve special
mention.
First was the enthusiastic cooperation of thel and all our people,
which was evident from the moment of my arrival. (In New Zealand, as already
mentioned, we started working soon thereafter.) Everyone was glad to have someone
aboard who both knew Mr. Rostow and was aware of what kind of intelligence
support he and the President had been receiving in Washington, and who could take
the briefing job off their backs. Believe me, they had plenty else to do.
Equally important, preparations had been made. At every stop there was a desk
ready where I could work, and the secretary knew the local layout and could hear
cries of "Help!" Also, local officials whose cooperation was essential were on hand.
Within moments of arriving at the Wellington embassy, for instance, I was introduced
to the New Zealand internal affairs officer in charge of security for the visit. He had a
special pass that would get me through police lines and security guards, and gave me a
briefing on what to expect in the way of trouble ("Nothing"). At other stops, special
lapel buttons were waiting for me. These were honored by both the local security
forces and our own Secret Service, and assured immediate access to anyone I needed
to see. These trinkets were invaluable, especially at three o'clock in the morning when
there really wasn't time for the "Who are you'?" routine. The last morning at Seoul
airport I had no trouble getting through the crowd and out to the President's plane
with a last-minute report I thought Rostow should have.
The Chiefs were not bashful about employing me. In the middle of the
night in Can erra I was told to get myself to Brisbane the next day, to be there when
the party arrived in the evening; a special plane would be ready in the morning for
me and an embassy contingent. The first bitterly cold morning in Korea, where I had
arrived some three days ahead of the party, I was promptly shown to a desk, asked to
fish-eye a stack of TDCSs, write a fresh security assessment, and have it ready the next
morning. This time it was the secretary who yelled "Help!" when confronted with the
fossil bird tracks that pass for my handwriting, but we made the deadline amid thanks
from both American and Korean security officials.
Transportation proved to be something of a headache, but generally the
rallied around. When I got to Wellington, my unconfirmed reservation on Air New
Zealand to Australia was still unconfirmed. A local official, summoned to the embassy,
made comforting noises ("I'll do what I can"), but it was obvious that the government
was not going to bounce anyone. At best, this flight would not have gotten me to
Canberra until Thursday afternoon, whereas the party was arriving in the late
afternoon on Wednesday. The Chief of busy, and arranged for me to go
with the party, on Air Force Two. Considering the wild confusion around the
embassy, the sight of my luggage being carted away around noon did riot calm my
already upset stomach. Sure enough, when I finally got to Air Force Two, no one had
ever heard of me or the list of "reservations" that the embassy had compiled. This
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proved to be by no means the last time on the trip when the best of plans went awry,
and I was on my own. I found the pilot, an Air Force Colonel, and started talking-
with a generous sprinkling of Mr. Rostow's name. The ride was fascinating, the drinks
marvellous, and the Chateaubriand done to the turn.
Sometimes things got out of the I Icontrol. While I was in Australia,
someone at Headquarters discovered I simply couldn't get to Kuala Lumpur and
Bangkok in time to be of much help to the party, so cables started going everywhere. I
was told to proceed to Korea instead, and Bill Read, already in Manila, would go to
Malaysia and Thailand. Well, the Canberra embassy had set up a travel section in the
ballroom of the Rex Hotel. The place was a madhouse, with newsmen and heaven
knows who else scrambling for reservations and Australian TV filming the whole
scene. Try explaining-on candid camera-who you purport to be and why you have
to get to Korea.
At each step I was quickly taken to the communications room to learn about the
facilities and meet the young men who operated them, some of whom had been
specially detailed to support the trip. This was an invaluable help. Once I had the
chance to get acquainted and explain what sort of material would be coming in, whom
it was for, and why I needed it pronto, these men exerted themselves to the utmost. In
Korea, the party stayed at Walker Hill, a posh Korean R and R facility about a dozen
miles outside Seoul. So that I could operate from there too, =had gone all-out
to set up an auxiliary land-line facility, even flying in some o t e necessities from
Tokyo. All the various gadgets proved to be temperamental, however, and without the
zeal, the tool kits, and the incantations of the communicators (one of whom I had
already met in Australia), I wouldn't have had much to tell Mr. Rostow on a couple of
occasions. Also, once we understood each other, I could use the communicators as
watch officers, to alert me when anything other than the scheduled material came in.
They did this, assiduously, twenty-four hours a day. My job would have been
impossible without their dedication and expertise.
A trip like this is not a tourist jaunt; don't even take your camera. There are,
however, lighter moments, and chances to see old friends and to make new ones. The
first night at the Rex Hotel in Canberra, where the President was staying, things in the
lobby were pretty convivial. Our people ll of whom I knew, were
showing me a pleasant time, and the free drinks made it easier to put up with the
noisy demonstrators just outside, including the much-photographed blonde with
"Make Love, Not War" emblazoned on her interestingly configured T-shirt. Around
one o'clock-probably all for the best-my communicator/watch officer called, and I
had to go ferret out Mr. Rostow. That morning the Tiltin' Hilton's wake-up service
had me on my feet at 3:00 a.m., and we lost a couple of hours on the flight to
Canberra. For once I wished I rated over-time, just for the fun of making the
computer try to figure out how to pay someone for a twenty-five-hour day. On
another evening a friend who had been n Washington
treated me to some reminiscing and a 100-m.p.h. ri e back tote hotel in a red
Ferrari. On the Cathay Pacific flight from Hong Kong to somewhere in Japan, I sat
next to a Canadian journalist from Toronto, and we played over Maple Leaf hockey
games from the early `30s, including the not-so-sudden-death affair where, at ten of
two in the morning, nobody had scored. Such moments of relaxation are vital to
restoring one's perspective, and even sanity, during the frantic pace of such a mission.
At other times, all that will save you are the charms, potions, and mighty magic you
had the foresight to bring along. The evening before that 25-hour day I had devoured
some New Zealand sheep that Evel Knievel wouldn't have eaten, and ended up
deathly sick. The cold showers on the Tiltin' Hilton didn't help all that much, and I
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got through the early morning meeting with Rostow only by becoming a real-life Alka
Seltzer commercial.
And what about these sessions with Mr. Rostow? Here, too, the pattern was pretty
much set at our first meeting in New Zealand.
The President was to arrive in Wellington at about four in the afternoon.
However, the crowds were so tremendous and enthusiastic, and Mr. Johnson
responded so warmly, that the motorcade was soon inching its way through what
seemed to be a solid mass of cheering people. No one knew where Rostow was.
I had spent the afternoon going over the recently arrived material, and had
organized it into a fairly decent briefing by the time the party was supposed to arrive.
I had no way of knowing how many of the items Rostow had already seen, since I
knew that the White House was in communication with Air Force One. Anyway, I
was ready-but time kept slipping by, taking the edge off my briefing. Finally about
six-thirty a call came from the Ambassador's residence; Mr. Rostow was there, and
would like to see the Chief It wasn't at all clear that this meant me, too, but
the Chief insisted I come along. We got there through back streets and alleys, and
Rostow received us enthusiastically, but with the directness of the busy executive: no,
he didn't want to see me. He took the Chief by the arm and abruptly led him
into the library. They emerged in about five minutes, and someone told Rostow that
because of the crowds, the Governor General's reception had been postponed an hour.
Instantly he spun around, pointed at me, said "Well then, let's go," and was back in
the library ready for a briefing before I could move a muscle. Wondering where he
had played basketball, I followed to receive the first momentous question of the trip:
"What time does it get light enough here to play tennis?"
Somehow that broke the ice, and from then on our relationship, though business-
like, was relaxed and easy. What could have been taken as brusqueness, or
occasionally lack of attention, was simply intensity. He had a lot to do, and wanted to
get on with it. Like the next morning at 0630, when I arrived at the residence to find
Symington the younger, in immaculate whites, practicing his backhand in the living
room. Rostow, also in tennis togs, took me into the library for a session that he didn't
let drag on; he said he had to teach that young fellow a few things. At other sessions he
really was dashing, either to a meeting, a dinner, or to see the President, but he always
took time to go over whatever I had brought. His swirling mind would occasionally
send him off on tangents. Early one morning we were discussing Laos when something
in the middle of a sentence set up another train of thought. He grabbed the telephone
and snapped "Get me Bromley Smith." Brom, back in the White House (heaven only
knows what time it was in Washington!), answered a lot more quickly than the Fairfax
County police usually do. Rostow talked to him about something or other, said "Well,
have a nice day-or night," and with a mischievous grin took up the conversation on
Laos exactly where we had left it-in mid-sentence.
The "briefings" turned out to be my handing him-or his grabbing-one by one
the items I had brought along, fresh off the communications machine. He had
obviously gotten an "A" in someone's rapid reading course; he practically inhaled the
things. But almost always he made some comment or asked some question, provoking
frequently spirited discussions. Occasionally he even volunteered how he figured the
President would react, especially in regard to reported actions or statements of other
world leaders. Most of the comments I remember are hardly repeatable here.
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At our very first session, Rostow made plain that he was accessible whenever I
had something I thought he should know, and every morning gave me a copy of his
schedule for the day. This led to some unusual encounters. The message that the
communicators called me about that first night in Canberra didn't make much sense
for a while, but ultimately I figured it out: the business with the Chief in the
library in Wellington had been a request to use our communication facilities to send a
four-part message to Ambassador Lodge in Saigon without the State Department
people seeing it. The just-arrived communication said that, for some reason I'm not
sure I understood even then, the fourth part of that message had not arrived in Saigon.
One-thirty or no, I decided this was important, went upstairs, flashed my lapel button
at the horrified people in the small reception room, found Rostow's door, and knocked
a bit tentatively. It opened before I had time to get really scared. I can't say he was
happy, but he was grateful, and immediately made preparations to send off Part Four
again first thing in the morning. His chief concern was that we not wake up his
roommate, a snoring member of the President's staff whom I didn't know.
The next day in Canberra a report came in about some sort of.trouble in Laos,
and off I went to the tennis courts. At love-40 we had a baseline pow-wow, he asked
me to get an assessment from Washington, and wondered about what the Australians
thought of all this. By the time the match was over, the regular DDI rep had arranged
for him to be present when the Australian Watch Committee met to evaluate the
situation. Again, well after midnight in Brisbane, he opened his hotel room door to put
out his shoes and was confronted with his just-arrived briefer. A courtly "come in" was
followed by the decision that I deserved-or needed-a drink. He had just come from
a long session with the President, and was going over, with Bill Jorden, a presidential
speech this worthy had just drafted. ("You've got the tune, but not the words," was the
verdict.) The Scotch was great, the briefing discursive, the speech so-so-and six
o'clock closer with every word.
The briefings were not always given under such ideal conditions. Our last one was
in Rostow's villa in Korea, by which time a portion of his Washington staff had joined
him. In pajamas and propped up on a mass of pillows in a huge bed littered with
papers and books, he was dictating to one secretary, signing something with one hand
while tossing assorted papers with the other in the general direction of several aides.
He squinted at me over the top of his glasses, obviously impatient for me to get on
with the briefing. A nightcap on his head would have made him look exactly like my
idea of Voltaire. With all this going on it was not easy to keep his attention, but like
the orchestra and the soprano, we at least ended together.
Occasionally I had to wait to see him, as on one very early morning in that
improvised reception room upstairs in the Rex Hotel. I didn't mind, because suddenly
a tall, restless figure in a bathrobe and slippers appeared, obviously wanting someone
to talk to. My unfamiliar face elicited a "Who are you." I told the President what I
was doing on the trip, and that back in Washington I was one of the writers of his
Daily Brief. He said, "It's great-keep up the good work," and was off to other things.
Another time I was lucky to get to Rostow at all. The party finally got to Lennon's
Hotel in Brisbane around six in the evening, and our paths had not crossed since early
that morning in Canberra. I had gone down to see the party come into the lobby-a
small, long, and narrow place, with the elevators in a still narrower spot right across
from the dining room entrance. The uproar from the large, wildly friendly mob
clogging the street in front of the hotel was deafening, and by the time most of the
party, including Rostow, got into the lobby, one couldn't move in any direction.
Finally in came the President and Mrs. Johnson, while the cheering outside reached a
crescendo. With obvious relish and a "Here-we-go-again" look from Mrs. Johnson, the
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President bolted out the front door to face the crowd again. Rostow got to the elevator,
but I didn't stand a chance. The statuesque blonde next to me in the crush turned out
to be the assistant manager of the hotel. When my plight became evident, a friendly
"follow me" led to a trek through the kitchen, the laundry, and a back staircase to the
floor where Rostow-and the President-were quartered. Unless the surly chef with
the meat cleaver or the old lady brandishing the mop on the stairs were products of
Central Cover, we saw no security people. But the gesture certainly said something
about the friendliness of the locals, which was warmly displayed at every stop on the
trip.
The last morning finally came in Korea.' Things were slightly relaxed, and I
didn't have to start stumbling over the sleeping forms (I never knew quite who they
were-some of our security men, I think) encamped on the floor of my room until
four-thirty. After that last session with Rostow/ Voltaire, I was driven back to Seoul
over the road that a levee en masse of Koreans-little boys and girls, grizzled old
women, and bearded patriarchs, many with their feet wrapped in newspapers-had
been gallantly trying with picks, baskets, and their bare hands to resurface "for the
President." They made it, but he didn't. After all, the time of the helicopter had
arrived.
It was a gorgeous day at the airport, I had made my last delivery to the
President's plane, the farewell ceremonies were drawing to a close, and the excitement
was over. Almost, that is. As the President mounted the ramp to Air Force One, a
group of Korean school girls, massed some distance from the plane and decked out in
dazzlingly bright kimonos, burst into high-pitched song. The words weren't too easy to
follow, but the tune was "The Yellow Rose of Texas." The President went down that
ramp as if it were a fire-escape and strode coat-tails flying toward the singers. Before
the Secret Service could catch up, this towering man was shaking hands amongst a
squealing mass of ecstatic, tiny Koreans. Air Force One left a bit behind schedule.
I have tried to make the trip sound like fun. It was. Despite the frantic pace, the
constant uncertainty, and the lack of sleep, everyone-from the Aussie drivers who
manned their vehicles for 30 straight hours in Canberra to the highest members of the
Presidential party-rolled with the punches. Words were sometimes few, but never
short, and everyone tried to make everyone else's job as easy as possible. Bill Read
came away from Manila, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur with the same impression.
There can be little doubt that this sort of current intelligence support was useful
to and appreciated by the highest levels. It had been a splendid team effort on the part
of a lot of intelligence professionals. Mr. Rostow and others were clearly impressed
and grateful at this demonstration of the Agency's ability to be there with what they
needed, when they needed it. When all was over, Mr. R. J. Smith, then the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, wrote that "on trips like these, the professionals of OCI can
and do provide a signal service to our most important customers." I had long since
acquired the habit of agreeing with most things Jack Smith said, but this time I even
yelled "Bravo!"
2 By this time Secretary Rusk had joined the party, and I delivered most of the material sent to me to
him, as well. So did DIA reps, apparently from 8th Army. This made for an interesting race to see who
could get to the Secretary's villa first. I knew (but am not tellingl) which material he read first, regardless of
when it arrived.
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It was not Horatio, of course, but Hamlet
who discoursed on the limits of human
knowledge; the author does indeed appear
afflicted by both a whimsical if not pro-
found melancholy and a conviction that
something is rotten in the state of
Methodology.
THERE ARE MORE THINGS-IN NATIONAL ESTIMATES
The Long Slow Wind-Up:
I was reading an article the other day concerning the "problem of how a group of
individuals can, by a symmetric or democratic procedure with due attention to
individual preferences, come to make a group decision with which the individual
members are reasonably satisfied."' Here, I concluded, is a way to produce National
Intelligence Estimates without any footnotes!
I read farther and found that the proposed "group decision arrived at is
accompanied by a system of transfers of cash among the members of the group, which
transfers, roughly speaking, can be viewed as a means by which those who are
relatively content with the decision compensate those who are relatively discontent."
Even better. Not only can NIEs be produced with no footnotes, but the DCI has a
potentially equitable tool to equalize the budgets of the community agencies.
The Pitch
Here's how the procedure works. Assume that the eleven members of a branch
had to reach an equitable decision on which of their number would take Saturday
duty, when none wanted it. Each member would decide, privately, on the maximum
amount he would be willing to pay to have one of the others take the duty. Say one
decided this amount was $10. Since the process is mathematically symmetric-fair
and honest with no unilateral advantages for any side-when one decides to pay $10,
he must be willing to accept 10 times the amount to perform Saturday duty himself.
In other words, he must be willing, without substantial regret, either to pay $10 not to
have duty, or to accept $100-$10 from each of the other branch members-to
perform duty. After each member has decided on his amount, the branch member
with the smallest ? asking price is picked for Saturday duty. He gets his asking price,
and every other branch member pays his offering price or less. All are substantially
satisfied.
Implementation of the method for more complex group decisions is itself made
more complex through the use of set functions and other disagreeable mathematical
paraphernalia. But technicians can work out the details. The joy lies in anticipating
the brave new world.
The Swing:
Imagine, if you are able, that DIA and the Air Force think that the SA-5 is an
ABM, while the CIA, NSA, State, and Navy think it is a SAM. A deal could be worked
' Lester E. Dubins, "Group Decision Devices," American Mathematical Monthly, May 1977.
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Analysis by Barter
out with the CIA and NSA giving up 50 analytic slots each, State INR giving up 5, and
Naval Intelligence giving up 10. The 115 slots could then be divided between DIA and
Air Force Intelligence. Not only is the issue decided foresquarely with the SA-5 being
declared a SAM for a year, but with the Air Force and DIA having been given the
manpower to generate more persuasive arguments on the matter for use the following
year.
Who knows where it will all lead? The trading of modern large ballistic missiles
for so many metric tons of grain? A ban on long-range cruise missiles in exchange for
so many million cubic feet of natural gas? Who Knows?
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The files of Nest Bremen
THE ABWEHR MYTH: HOW EFFICIENT WAS
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II?
Gerold Guensberg
Ladislas Farago, a prolific writer on intelligence subjects, some time before 1971
gained access to National Archives films of captured German intelligence files. He
used them to write Game of the Foxes, ' a gospel for those who would believe in the
efficiency if not the infallibility of Third Reich German intelligence.
In 1945 the United States, Britain, and France had seized German documents
which could only be measured in tons, ranging from military personnel records to the
German foreign ministry files from 1870 to 1945. All but an infinitesimal proportion
of these documents were declassified between about 1958 and 1962, and returned to
the West German government. The remainder included some 55 to 65 reels of film of
records seized by the U.S. Navy at the Bremen Abwehr station. Documents considered
historically valuable had been filmed before the return of the documents to Germany,
and ultimately all films in U.S. hands, along with a few remaining hard-copy
documents, were transferred from their storage place in Alexandria, Va., to the
National Archives. The bulk of the documents had been declassified, and while such
action had not been taken with regard to the Bremen Abwehr files, some Archives
employees apparently did not differentiate in meeting the requests of researchers such
as Farago.
On 22 December 1976, however, with the passage of more than 30 years since the
end of the Second World War, virtually all of the remaining documents were
declassified. It thus becomes possible to make an unclassified evaluation not only of
the reliability of Farago-which is a side issue-but also of the efficiency he
attributed to the Abwehr.
Upon study of the Abwehr files, it is difficult to believe that Farago was working
from the same material, but he refers specifically to film reels of Bremen Abwehr
documents in his possession-there are in fact gaps in the numbering system for reels
now in the Archives holdings-and describes how he "stumbled across" the dusty
records in metal footlockers in a dark loft. (The archivists irately point out that they
have no dark lofts, that dust does not gather on their files, and that the microfilm reels
were shelved like any other records.) Farago tells of painstakingly breaking through
the puzzles of this fragmented information; actually, two of the reels Farago saw
contained the key by which he could easily identify the true name, biographic
summary, code name or cryptonym, and code number of every agent cited in the
Bremen records by code name or number. And from his examination, Farago would
have the Abwehr agents perform prodigious feats, when in reality they were collecting
useless, often nonsensical material in vacuum-cleaner fashion.
? Koedel, admired by Farago as one of the most productive Abwehr agents in the
United States, sends Germany information on the U.S. aircraft industry. Farago
fails to mention that Koedel got some of the information by reading LIFE
magazine.
' The Game of the Foxes: The Untold Story of German Espionage in the United States and Britain
during World War II (David McCay Co., Inc., New York, 1971).
39
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The Abwehr Myth
? Koedel forwards a detailed 38-page report on worldwide synthetic chemical
production and, in 1939, a report on U.S., British, and Japanese production of
such chemicals as sulphur, phenol, alcohol, acetone, glycol, and toluol. Farago
does not state that these were open publications of the Commerce Department,
available to anyone through the Government Printing Office.
? A German intelligence officer from Bremen reports a telephone conversation
he had from Italy in Novmeber 1940 with former Governor Philip La Follette
of Wisconsin, an avowed "America Firster." In his chapter, "The Edge of
Treason," Farago uses this report to brand La Follette an Abwehr agent. A
footnote to the report, ignored by Farago, specifies that La Follette is not an
agent but simply a former University of Wisconsin classmate of the Abwehr
officer, unaware of the latter's affiliation and hence not to be approached by
other Abwehr officers with follow-up questions.
The shortcomings of Game of the Foxes have already been amply detailed in
classified studies and reviews. What remains, and more to the point, is to determine
what the now-declassified Archives documents can tell us-and the general public to
the extent there is an interest-about the Abwehr.
To place the Bremen files in perspective, the Abwehr had its headquarters in the
OKW (Armed Forces High Command) in Berlin. There were district offices in each of
some dozen military districts of pre-war Germany, and branch offices operated by the
districts to handle specialized activities or to simplify logistic support of operations. As
the war spread, additional Abwehr offices were organized along the same lines in
occupied territories. A command or main office was an Abwehrleitstelle, or Alst; a
district office was an Abwehrstelle or Ast, which, confusingly, is German for "branch"
(as in tree branch); and a branch office was a Nebenstelle or Nest. In addition, there
were "Reporting Centers"-Meldekdpfe or Kriegsorganisationen (MKs and KOs), to
collect agent reports and forward them by wireless.'
The surviving elements of Nest Bremen files are among the few from the
operational Ast or Nest level to have fallen into Western hands. Presumably, the field
offices conceived espionage operations and recruited, trained, and deployed agents
abroad to obtain information considered vital to the German war effort. The Bremen
material might, therefore, have been expected to yield information regarding some
wartime German intelligence operations and provide insight into the day-to-day
business of a typical German intelligence field station-the modus operandi of the
Abwehr. But only in a limited sense do these reels-essentially an index-live up to
that expectation. There are complete lists of agents, catalogs of their equipment, and
detailed financial records. But most of the detailed operational records appear to have
been destroyed. The Abwehr's tradecraft will have to be judged on the evidence of the
reporting alone.
As mentioned above, Nest Bremen's agents are exposed in true name, matched
with psuedonym and code number.3 Their spy paraphernalia, from microdot to secret
ink and radio transmitter, is revealed. Pay records show how much was paid them,
and what special allowances their families received.'
The Nest Bremen reels list the positive intelligence collected by these agents in
peace and war. Judging from the register of report titles,' the Abwehr collected
2 A few examples: Nest Bremen was a field office reporting to Ast Hamburg in District X. In France,
Nest Bordeaux reported to Ast Angers under Alst Paris. Reporting Centers included KOs in Greece and
Spain, MK Leopold in the Middle East, and MKs in Chile and Brazil.
Biographic summaries of every agent appear on reels M202 and 203.
' Reels ML 163, 164, and 166 contain the expenditure ledger of Nest Bremen, along with a record of
foreign exchange disbursements.
' Report Titles are on Reels ML 166, 167, 168a, 169, 185, 186, 188, 190, and 191.
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information from every corner of the earth on every imaginable topic: threat of
imminent hostilities, military order of battle, formation of convoys, assessment of
political conditions, advanced weapons development, armament production, and
general industrial output. The listing seems to point to an impressive performance, but
close study of the actual reports 8 shows the information to be seriously defective: of
doubtful value and of questionable reliability. The reports also testify to extraordinary
gullibility and naivete on the part of both agents and Abwehr.
Agents showed little judgment, submitting information that certainly was useless
in terms of fighting the war. Consider agent S-2115 in the United States, who in 1940
submitted a report on U.S. cotton production from 1929 to 1938; or agent A-2018 who
submitted U.S. railroad statistics from 1910 to 1938 and farm statistics dating back to
the middle of the 19th century. Such lack of discrimination on the part of agents is
evidence of a woefully ineffectual supervision by the Nest and by Abwehr Command
in Berlin.
Here are some other examples of inane reporting for which Bremen expended its
resources and risked lives, chosen from a list which can be expanded ad nauseam:
? Detailed report on the New York water supply.
? Low morale in the United States due to war losses against Japan while
Communism is on the rise in the U.S. (Agent F-2376, June 1942.)
? Death ray research in Italy (1932).
? In the event of a British landing in Norway and violation of Swedish territory,
Sweden will enter war on Germany's side (1942).
? 3.5 million Chinese working in Russia, and 3 million more being placed at
Russia's disposal for winter campaign (1943/44).
The Abwehr performance in respect to the second front was especially dismal.
Consider:
? In case of an Anglo-American landing in Norway, it will occur in Drontheim
and Sweden will oppose such a landing. (March 1942.)
? Same substance repeated in October 1942 by agent R-3938.
? Anglo-American landing between Narvik and Murmansk. (August 1942.)
? Seven million troops in England ready and waiting for invasion (May 1944.)
(When this was doubted by Abwehr, the agent explained that not all were
assault trpops-many were support troops.)
? Invasion across channel is only a diversionary maneuver. Actual plans call for
air landings in France, Belgium, and Germany near concentration camps,
prison camps, and foreign labor camps. (Agent A-3862, May 1944.)
? No Western offensive this year or until Balkans in Allied hands, (Agent A-3182,
December 1943.)
? Landings to take place along Nice-Genoa and Yugoslav coasts. (S-3248, June
1944.)
? Landings scheduled for Denmark and Norway cancelled. (F-3234, July 1944.)
? Air landings planned in Austria-Hungary to forestall Russsian occupation. (S-
3248, August 1944.)
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The Abwehr Myth
? Landings planned along Italian Riviera, Trieste, and Venice to forestall Russian
advance on Austria-Hungary. (S-3248, August 1944.)
? Simultaneous attacks scheduled for Spanish Morocco and French North Africa.
(R-3764, November 1943.)
? Joint Anglo-American and Russian operation planned against Sweden and
Denmark aimed at occupying Pommerania. (F-3210, September 1944.)
It would seem that the Abwehr could have made its best record by ruling out any
place and date cited by a Nest Bremen agent for an Allied landing.
Meanwhile, insofar as Nest Bremen's reports are concerned, such critical events as
the embroilment of the Soviet Union or the United States in the war pass as non-
events. The files show no increase in reporting on the two countries-nor even a
temporary let-up in the trivial and the inconsequential. While the Abwehr channels
are clogged with paltry affairs, there is a total lack of reporting on the two major
Allied developments which proved to be of decisive importance: nuclear energy and
radar. Only twice is there reference to a heavy isotope of uranium, and then without
appreciation of the significance. And a lengthy analytical study of the British port of
Portsmouth, dated 1939/1940, gives a detailed description plus photographs of the
steel tower constructions guarding the channel approaches east of the Isle of Wight,
but the Abwehr is convinced that these towers are for use in connection with audio
detection of planes or against boat attacks.
The Nest Bremen agents deserve high marks, however, for providing ship traffic
information from all over the globe. Theoretically, U-boats could be guided to the
easiest and choicest targets promising maximum yield for minimum risks. There is
nothing dramatic or romantic about this type of systematic and pedantic recording
and yet, in the final analysis, this routine reporting activity, effectively carried out,
came close to forcing the British against the wall when in 1942 and 1943 U-boats sank
merchant ships at an alarming rate, causing Churchill to exclaim "The U-boat attack
was our worst evil."'
The Nest Bremen files reveal several major operations, especially against the
United Kingdom. In operation Edda, an agent who appears to have been a British
citizen transmitted nearly 400 messages between May 1942 and June 1944 from
Iceland. Commendably precise, Edda reported ship traffic in Iceland's harbors. Edda
wasted no time on political analyses of doubtful validity or dispensing strategic advice
as did other Abwehr agents. He describes real events, and they have a ring of
authenticity. He even succeeded in infiltrating British intelligence when he received
employment as clerk-interpreter. He was ill-rewarded by the Abwehr. Beginning with
message number 165, in which he announced that he had exhausted all funds, the
recurring theme of the Edda traffic was his need for money, his expectation that the
Abwehr would supply money, and finally, his utter dejection and disgust at the
Abwehr's bumbling performance. When he locates a potential recruitment and
addition to the net, he refuses to act, knowing that the Abwehr could not financially
support this agent. Of course, Edda may have been turned around and doubled by the
British (Double Cross Operation), 8 but there is no evidence in the Nest files that the
Abwehr ever doubted his bona fides.
Lena was another Nest Bremen operation which produced reams of information.'
In preparation for Sea Lion-the Nazi invasion of England-13 Lena agents were
Winston Churchill, The Second World War, IV, p. 125.
Edda may possibly have been COBWEB of the XX System. See John Masterman, The Double-Cross
System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1972).
' The Abwehr did not know that its most productive LENA agent had been turned around by the
British. See Masterman, op. cit., re TATE.
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dispatched into Britain. Lena 503 (or 3725) transmitted more than 1,000 messages
between September 1940 and September 1944. Even had the reporting been genuine
and not directed by the British, it was without merit whatsoever. Rated one of the
most productive agents of the Abwehr, Lena 503 transmitted trivial and useless
chatter-morale of the population-and woefully fragmentary disposition of aircraft.
Quite obviously the Abwehr itself was at a loss to know what to do with this agent, as it
pestered him with ludicrous requirements on the price and availability of bread, meat,
and other foodstuffs in Britain. The petulant reply of Lena 503 in response to one such
request is illustrative. On 29 August 1942, he transmitted: "In answer to question 32:
One can get as much bread as one wants. Haven't the haziest notion whether
consumption is rising or dropping. Only know that bread is not much liked in this
region. I myself don't like it either."
This is perhaps the major deficiency of the surviving Nest Bremen material. Even
when the results of an operation, i.e., intelligence messages, are available as in Edda
and Lena, there is a complete lack of information on the raison d'etre of the
operations; how they were conceived, and in response to what requirements. It is not
possible to learn how agents were spotted, recruited, and trained. There are no records
of the discussions between Nest, Ast, and Headquarters regarding the feasibility of 'an
impending operation, nor comments on the progress or effectiveness of operations
when they were implemented. All this material was destroyed by Nest Bremen.
Indeed, entire reels are devoted to an itemization of records destroyed, especially in
the period September to December 1944.10
Only one case is fairly well documented, and ironically it is this operation that
was declassified some years ago and made available to qualified researchers. It is the
case of "Scheich," which once again documents the fatuousness of the Abwehr. Two
German nationals, who in U.S. intelligence jargon had the elevated status of "staff
agents," not just the run-of-the-mill agents (Vertrauensmdnner or V-Mariner), oper-
ated for Nest Bremen on the Paris black market. One, Dr. Paul Kuehnert, was
officially involved in procuring critically required products on the French black
market while the other, Wilhelm Mertons, was placed in charge of confiscated
Hollywood film assets in Paris as a cover for his intelligence activities. Keeping their
home office in Bremen in suspense with tales of their high-level French contacts and
the great potential value of their even more important contacts among the tribal chiefs
of North Africa, Kuehnert and Mertons tied up the resources of German intelligence
in France which tried to track down this seemingly unsavory pair and finally arrested
them. Nest Bremen had, of course, failed to inform Ast Paris that their agents were
operating on French soil in the private reserve of a rival Abwehr unit. It is a delightful
tale of how imaginative and unprincipled men can exploit the weaknesses and slow-
wittedness of large organizations-especially intelligence agencies which, because of
internal security practices, tend to have little communications and are prone to tap in
darkness. The Scheich file is extensive and replete with personal requests of the kind
that would arouse the suspicion of even the most gullible manager. There are requests
for special phones, including authority to call abroad. There is a request for
assignment of an automobile, coupled with exemption from accountability on the use
of the car. Bremen officials are kept in constant motion in support of these two
nonproductive agents, who meanwhile are enjoying life in Paris. When the two are
investigated after their arrest, it is amusing to watch Nest Bremen's officers seek to
diminish the importance of the two. Unable to explain satisfactorily why they had two
agents operating in France without knowledge of the Paris Abwehr or approval of
10 Reels 52, 59, and 60 are devoted to destruction notices. Included are the files of about 80 agents of
Nest Breman.
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The Abwehr Myth
Berlin, they lie blatantly. This was an unimportant operation: two agents with whom
the Bremen station hardly had any contact; a dormant, low-level activity.
There is one topic to be gleaned from the Nest Bremen material which Farago
passed over lightly: the Abwehr's use of Jews. He notes that Waldemar von
Oppenheim, a German baron who was one-quarter Jewish, reported to the Abwehr on
his experiences traveling abroad in early war years. But there is nothing in Farago
about a Jewish agent named Loewy reporting from Haifa in December 1939; Karl
Israel Eisenmann of Karlsruhe and an Israel Well in late 1941; or what appears to have
been one complete net of Jewish agents known as the May Network. A Rumanian Jew
offered his shipping firm as a cover for an Abwehr activity debriefing German ship
captains operating in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.
Tekin Saygin, born Lichtenthal in Poland, converted from Judaism to Islam in
1934 and moved to Istanbul. In 1938 he offered his services to the Abwehr and
became "Turco," code number S-2118, Nest Bremen's most productive source on
activity in the ports of Istanbul, Port Said, Suez, and Alexandria. He made more than
40 reports in 1940, and more than 100 in 1941, becoming so prolific that the operation
was transferred from Nest Bremen to the Abwehr in Turkey for closer supervision.
The whole subject invites speculation. Were the Jewish agents recruited under
threat of concentration camp and death? If so, how could the Abwehr have any
reasonable confidence that they would not be doubled the minute they reached
neutral or Allied territory? The Gestapo was involved in the clearance of potential
agents, and is known to have objected to Baron Oppenheim because of his part-Jewish
blood; yet Oppenheim and dozens of other Jews and part-Jews were used by the
Abwehr. How could the Abwehr so consistently ignore or overrule the Gestapo?
The Nest Bremen material, in sum, shatters the myth of Abwehr efficiency so
carefully constructed in postwar literature. But it could do more, had not the very
magnitude of the captured hoard of intelligence documents largely condemned the
material to disuse. Consider, for example, the detailed exposure of Nest Bremen's
agents-many of them in foreign countries, and in some cases perhaps still of prime
intelligence importance. Consider, for example, Abwehr agent A-2009, a young
French naval officer serving on the cruiser Jeanne d'Arc. Born in 1912, with good
educational background and probably destined for a career in the French navy, he
offered his services to German intelligence in 1938. Motive: money. He very quickly
became one of the more productive agents in France, furnishing more than 100
reports over the next three years.
Given his educational background, it is quite possible that he rose to the higher
echelons of the French Navy during the 1950s and 1960s, when he would have been in
his prime forties and fifties. As far as I have been able to determine, no one in U.S.
intelligence ever tried to discover what had become of this French traitor. If he
remained an officer in the French Navy, or in one of the armed forces ministries,
should he have been identified to the French government or liaison service?
Or take the roster of potential intelligence assets inside the Soviet Union,
published by the German Abwehr on the eve of Germany's invasion of the USSR.
Russians who were considered anti-regime by the Germans must certainly have also
had potential as U.S. intelligence assets. Again there is no indication that this material
was ever exploited. Quite literally, the vast mass of operational leads was lost under the
sheer volume of captured material, and with the passage of time any further potential
for current-day intelligence needs now is gone. The Abwehr files, however, deserved
more than the attention they got from historians and imaginative authors.
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A retired operations officer, Paul Hartman, comments:
Mr. Guensberg seems to believe that there was a lack of intelligence exploita-
tion of the captured records. He might have a point, but only in the context that the
records could have been exploited to an even greater degree than they were, and that
the exploitation should have taken place sooner and with a greater sense of urgency.
When the sheer mass of captured paper is taken into account, it is to the credit of
the armed forces, OSS, CIG, and CIA that the documents were exploited to a fairly
high degree.
The early exploitation was done by the OSS CI War Room in London. Later
came efforts by the CIC, ONI, G-2, and others. Allied powers also began their
exploitation, and the Soviets were not excluded from access in the very early postwar
period.
The biggest flaw in these early efforts was that the records were not examined
systematically. In 1956, then DDP, Frank Wisner obtained approval from the then-
DCI Allen Dulles to have the CI Staff conduct a systematic analysis. All but a small
portion of this study was concluded by 1964, and work on the remaining segment,
continuing at a slower pace, was concluded in 1967. Each captured record deemed to
contain intelligence data was summarized, indexed, and included in the records of
the Directorate of Operations. Much of the same information was also fed into
appropriate computerized data banks. Items of interest to other U.S. agencies or
certain foreign governments were forwarded. As a result of this effort., more than
1,250,000 names of persons of intelligence interest-including all of the names on
the filmed index of Next Bremen-were recorded in the DDO's Main Index.
I recall that we ran across the name of the French naval officer early in our
examination of the German foreign ministry records. (The German foreign ministry
established a section, headed by a man named von Grote, which reviewed all
correspondence addressed by the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst to field stations,
bases, and personnel under diplomatic or other official cover. This foreign ministry
section even retained copies of the correspondence, and thus we were able to read a
great deal of Abwehr and SD correspondence in copies after the originals had quite
properly been destroyed by the intelligence agencies.) We were excited with our
find, and immediately advised the French, only to be told that they had received the
data from U.S. sources some time ago.
I cannot pinpoint the "roster of potential intelligence assets inside the Soviet
Union" referred to by the author in his final paragraph. On the eve of the invasion
of Russia, the Germans published a book entitled Handbook of the USSR which was
in effect a listing of names of and data on persons considered security risks from the
German point of view or who were known to hold views inimical to German
interests. Among the names listed, for example, was that of Klaus Fuchs, although
this did not come to light until after Fuchs had been caught and sentenced as a
postwar atomic spy for the Soviets. All of these names were appropriately recorded
in the DDO Main Index, along with similar German listings for areas other than the
USSR. If this is the book Mr. Guensberg is referring to, then the names in it are not
those of potential intelligence assets in the Soviet Union from our point of view.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
WILHELM CANARIS. By Heinrich Hoehne. (Bertelsmann, Munich, 1976.) (In
German)
Heinrich Hoehne, the Spiegel editor with an appetite for modern German
history, continues his canvassing of Hitler's Germany with a book on Wilhelm Canaris,
the enigmatic chief of German military intelligence, the Abwehr, during the Third
Reich. The book, now being translated for publication in the United States,
successfully helps penetrate the legend and mystery of the person Canaris, a process
that was begun by Abshagen in his paean to Canaris published shortly after the war.
Men of good will found it easy to sympathize with Canaris, for while he vacillated and
was, perhaps, not the most effective opponent of Hitler, he paid with his life for this
opposition. Opposition to Hitler does not always entitle one to placement on the honor
role. There is the case of Arthur Nebe, Chief of the German Criminal Police, who
unquestionably was involved in the anti-Hitler plot and who also paid with his life
after the assassination attempt failed on the 20th of July. But Nebe had volunteered to
lead one of the four Einsatzgruppen that entered Russia in 1941 in the wake of the
Germany Army with the sole purpose of exterminating the ideological enemies of
Nazi Germany. Canaris, however, had a legitimate claim, and sympathy for Canaris
grew in proportion when he was attacked by resurgent extreme right-wingers. In a
paroxism of hatred, they equated his opposition with treason. It was he who allegedly
betrayed plans of attack to Germany's enemies; it was he who sabotaged Spain's entry
into the war on Germany's side and. it was he who supported the inner opposition to
Hitler.
Canaris has not suffered only at the hands of his natural enemies. A recent
biographer, Klaus Benzing, did as much harm with a compassionate account that
bordered on self-pity. In this book, Benzing purports to quote from Canaris's missing
diaries, which Benzing claims to have buried in East Germany toward the end of the
war.
Hoehne's book is a valuable antidote, and the author steers expertly between
these dangerous cliffs of hatred and compassion. Most intriguing about the book is the
strange similarity between the Abwehr's ailments during the thirties and forties and
the current criticism of supposed excessive romanticism of the spy business-the
James Bond cult which critics complain dominates the field of intelligence. Hoehne
finds that this cult governed Canaris' Abwehr, which believed that the destiny of
nations and governments depended largely on the invisible workings of cunning
agents and effective intelligence services. Hoehne's description of the organizational
insufficiencies of the Abwehr reads like a recital of latter-day accusations against
intelligence organizations. Rapid expansion of the Abwehr produced a gargantuan
organization that often merely spun its wheels. It employed more case officers than
agents, and the education plus performance level of these was dismally deficient. In
the field stations, the situation was even worse, with routine intelligence rituals
producing rigor mortis; stations were the arenas for acting out vanities, and stations
were often victimized by intelligence swindlers or paper mills. Too many Abwehr
officers and agents were integrated into diplomatic posts abroad, and there were
constant jurisdictional disputes and squabbles with ambassadors on coordinating
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Books
intelligence operations to assure that they reflected German foreign policy objectives
in a particular country. The ambassadors were often unhappy with the Abwehr's
reporting, which, they felt, duplicated the reporting by the embassy's diplomats. Also,
it is noteworthy that it was not the maneuverings of the sinister SS and SD that finally
led to the demise of Canaris, but a dispute with the German ambassador in Spain over
the jurisdiction and duties of the Abwehr station.
A bitter dispute raged between the intelligence collectors in the Abwehr and the
analyst-evaluators of the various military services in Germany. The G-2 of Eastern
Front's General Staff (Fremde Heere Ost) was forever complaining of the miserable
quality of the Abwehr reports and, in general, was hypercritical of the Abwehr. Those
elitist staff officers looked down condescendingly on the usually less-educated Abwehr
intelligence officers. As a result there was a constant threat that the military attaches
might form their own intelligence networks so that the Army would not be dependent
solely on Abwehr reporting.
In the end the Abwehr was taken over by an ambitious, youthful, and ruthless SS
seeking a unified intelligence service under its own aegis. But it was not the
preponderance of the SS but rather the failures of the Abwehr that made this demise
inevitable.
As Hoehne demonstrates, nearly every major event was accompanied by a major
Abwehr failure. At the time of the Rhineland Occupation in 1935, Canaris was the
victim of his own agents' false reporting. These agents had reported that the British
and French general staffs had a unified action plan in case the Germans marched into
the Rhineland. Even later, Canaris' agents were never able to learn more than their
competitors in the press corps. Two years later during the Stalin purges, in which his
competitor Heydrich played a controversial role, we find Canaris perplexed. The
reporting of his agents was insufficient for him to understand the background of the
inner-Soviet crisis. The following year, during the Czech-Sudeten crisis, Canaris
feared that his reputation as Germany's first spy must have suffered seriously as
analyses and reports of the Abwehr proved consistently incorrect.
A year later came the war, which revealed another embarrassing weakness of the
Abwehr which could hardly have been kept concealed from Hitler. When the first
shot was fired, the Abwehr lost most its agent networks in France and in the UK.
There was no penetration of the enemy camp to provide the Abwehr with reliable
information. Helplessly the Abwehr puzzled over enemy troop concentrations along
the Western front as for weeks no reports arrived concerning enemy dispositions. The
ignorance of the Abwehr was exposed when the Army's General Staff began to plan
the Western offensive.
Next came Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Great Britain. The General Staff
levied the requirement for order of battle information. It was an unhappy moment,
for the Abwehr had no effective agents in the UK. Hastily a few agents were recruited
and dropped over England by parachute. They were promptly picked up by the
British intelligence, a fact that was, of course, not known to Canaris.
Then came Operation Barbarossa-the attack on the USSR-and again the
Abwehr was unable to provide the kind of information demanded by the General
Staff-a situation which soon became obvious to the intelligence analysts at the
General Staff when they began to calculate Soviet force strengths. The failures
continued: The Russian preparations for the defense of Stalingrad went unnoticed, as
(lid the preparations for the landings in North Africa by the Anglo-Americans. When
the Abwehr failed to anticipate the Anzio landings in January 1944, Hitler ordered an
investigation of the intelligence gaffe.
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Worse than the intelligence failures were the flaps the Abwehr did not even know
about. In the UK, the entire Abwehr organization was turned around. All information
reaching the Abwehr from its agents there actually was spoon-fed by British
intelligence. Then too, the Abwehr's worldwide sabotage and covert action program
was frustrated; eight saboteurs landing in the United States were arrested. Abwehr-
sponsored uprisings in South Africa, Afghanistan, India, and the Caucasus all failed.
As long as 35 years ago, Hoehne shows, Canaris fought and lost the battle for his
agency because he did not know and never learned that as head of an intelligence
service he had to be not just a spy, but an administrator. The Abwehr failed because of
the shortcomings of its leader's administrative abilities.
Gerold Guensberg
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