STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 17 No. 4, Winter 1973]

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• Publication Date: December 1, 1973
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STUDIES
IN
INT"ELLIGENCE
VOL. 17 NO. 4 WINTER 1973
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CONTENTS
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Re-examining Our Perceptions on Vietnam ........ Anthony Marc Lewis 1
Have we been substituting subconscious assumptions for facts? SECRET
CIA, The Courts, and Executive Privilege ......... Lawrence R. Houston 63
Another privilege claim upheld.
D
The ironies of success and failure.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature ................................. 75
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No Foreign Dissem
How can a war in a small country like South Vietnam have involved a
superpower like the United States in the longest armed conflict of its history?
Marc Lewis postulates in this study that key intelligence judgments were fallible
because they did not take into account the Vietnamese perceptions of the situa-
tion-"the intercultural and psychological dimension," or, in short, how Americans
tended to substitute their subconscious assumptions for the facts on how the
Vietnamese think.
In the following article Mr. Lewis first discusses a relatively recent field
in international scholarship: intercultural studies. He establishes his yardstick for
the psychological realities of Vietnam on the basis of open literature-Kissinger,
Mus, McAlister, and the later book by FitzGerald, to name a few. He then pro-
ceeds to compare the Diem regime in 1954-1956 and in 1961-1963, as reported
in the public media and other open sources, with the viewpoints expressed in
the finished intelligence of State, ONE, and OCI. He concludes that the analysts
must have either ignored or been unaware of the basic cultural differences be-
tween the Vietnamese and the Americans.
In the concluding portion Mr. Lewis discusses some new training resources
and techniques which can help sensitize Americans to the unconscious distor-
tions of their perceptions of other cultures.
The author's text has been considerably abridged for publication in Studies
in Intelligence. In particular, his comprehensive survey and discussion of source
materials has been condensed. Readers who wish to examine the full original
text may do so either at the CIA Library in Headquarters Building, or the Op-
erations Training Reference Center of the Office of Training.
MORI/HRP
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Perceptions on Vie nam
RE-EXAMINING OUR PERCEPTIONS ON VIETNAM
Anthony Marc Lewis
As the post-mortems on Vietnam proliferate, and with the survival of an
independent South Vietnam still uncertain, intelligence officers as well as policy
makers and executors of policy have a compelling need to know what lessons
the record of American involvement holds. Is it possible to identify a single
aspect of this record stretching back over two decades which is likely to have
overriding importance for all officers concerned with foreign affairs? Would this
paramount aspect lie with the choices of action our leaders made, as compared
with the alternatives available to them? Should one concentrate on re-examining
the decision-making process itself? Or was the crucial factor the demonstrated
need simply for more experience in dealing with traditionalist, non-Western
societies?
A few voices have been warning that the proponents of these solutions are
missing the main point. These voices are saying Americans are "tripping over it
without seeing it"-that we must look within ourselves. The point is, most
Americans either have not attempted to see "the world of the Vietnamese" as
the Vietnamese do, or have perhaps tried and not known how to do so. Only
in the past decade has an increasing minority of young Americans been edu-
cated and trained for developing personal awareness of what may be the critical
factors: (1) the frequent and unconscious distortions in their-and everyone's-
perceptions of worlds other than their own; and (2) the ways each person
individually "constructs" the reality to which he is continually reacting. I might
add that we also need to learn how to organize what we learn at random about
a foreign people from our personal experiences in contemplating them or inter-
acting with them. In sum, we must learn to perceive "other peoples' words"
along a dimension which I shall call intercultural and psychological-and we
must do so systematically. *
I propose to test the finished intelligence concerning two periods of the
Vietnam story-1954-1956 and 1961-1963-for presumptive evidence of analysts'
attention or inattention to such an intercultural and psychological dimension of
the data involved. Before arriving at this main task, we shall first prepare our-
selves briefly by consulting some relevant observations and guidelines of promi-
nent government leaders, educators, and researchers, as well as experienced
journalists and outstanding Vietnam specialists. In addition, we shall need to
sort out our ideas on whose perceptions must concern us as we do or do not
find a text helpful for reflecting the intercultural and psychological dimension
of the data discussed. This distinction will force us to examine conscious and
unconscious influences in the work environment on an analyst's perceptions,
as well as his possible and unintentional influence on his known and unknown
readers. We will need practical indicators for spotting the kinds of evidence
we are seeking in the reports. Finally, I will conclude with a brief outline of
*Princeton's Hadley Cantril, a policy adviser to four U.S. Presidents, called persistently
for collection and coordinated use of the psychological information needed for this purpose.
See his The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research (Rutgers University Press,
New Brunswick, N.J., 1967), especially pp. 152 et seq.
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ercepftons on ietnam
the means presently available for strengthening the capabilities of the analysts
to cope with intercultural problems through education and training.
The Chicago Conference, June 1968
In June 1968, 26 distinguished scholars and foreign affairs officers met in
Chicago to search out and discuss the lessons Americans should learn from the
Vietnam experience, at a conference sponsored by the Adlai Stevenson Institute
of International Affairs. * Sharp splits appeared over the kinds of lessons on which
Americans needed to concentrate. Harvard's Huntington warned of the "mis-
placed analogies" which that conference itself might bequeath to future policy
makers. But Morgenthau rejected out of hand any implication that man can
learn nothing from the record of his experiences because each one is unique.
Schlesinger emphasized Americans' beliefs about their own peace-keeping role
in the world and how they have been deluded thereby. Kissinger highlighted
conceptual failures of American planners as sources of our difficulties in Viet-
nam. These conceptual errors persisted because the bureaucracies "run a com-
petition with their own programs and measure success by the degree to which
they fulfill their own norms." Hoffmann of Harvard presented in some depth
this case for looking inside ourselves to find the heart of the problem:
Whereas the machinery has exhibited rigidities and shortsightedness characteristic of
most modern bureaucratic establishments, the perceptions, conceptions, and criteria of
the bureaucrats can be explained only if we look beyond the institutions into the Ameri-
can political style as it has been shaped by American history-if we move from the
organization to the minds. The kind of changes we may want to introduce into the
machinery . . . depends on whether one believes the heart of the trouble is mechanical,
or whether one thinks, as I do, that the reasons go much deeper. . . . [A] part of the
answer lies in a certain form of ignorance. . . . Our understanding of South Vietnamese
society was poor, the expertise at our disposal limited. In such circumstances we tended
to distort our analysis by reducing South Vietnam's uniqueness to elements that seemed
familiar and reassuring, to features that we had met and managed elsewhere. . . . Our
misreading of reality and our self-confidence have led one another in a vicious circle
of ever-increasing delusions... .
The broader implications of our Vietnam experience can all be summarized in one formula:
from incorrect premises about a local situation and about our abilities, a bad policy is
likely to follow. * *
hidden Assumptions
We shall be giving much attention to various types of analysts' "hidden"
premises or assumptions as apparently reflected in the intelligence. These are
the principal keys to a person's distortions of perception-the basis or guide for
the meaning he gives to a current "happening"-as a series of stimuli act upon
one or more of his senses. When he assigns a meaning to stimuli, he usually
does so unconsciously. This is the way the almost instantaneous perception
*Transcripts of the oral and written contributions at this conference in June 1968 are
available in Richard M. Pfeffer (ed.), No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American
Foreign Policy (Harper, New York, 1968). Among the participants were: Henry Kissinger,
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Adam Yarmolinsky, Edwin Reischauer, Daniel Ellsberg, James C.
Thomson Jr., Sir Robert Thompson, Richard Barnet, Hans Morgenthau, Samuel Huntington,
Stanley Hoffmann, and Chester L. Cooper.
"Ibid., pp. 115-121, 193, 197. Born in Austria and educated in France, Hoffmann is Pro-
fessor of Government and also Research Associate in the Center for International Affairs at
Harvard. In 1968 he published Gulliver'.s Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy,
which he wrote at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford.
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process* works, and repeated assignment of the same meaning soon becomes
habitual. Hoffmann cites the American military view of the relevance to Vietnam
of "the Korean analogy" * * and the examples of successful counter-insurgencies
in Greece, the Philippines, or Malaysia. For our purposes here, we may usefully
cite some of his examples of the use by Americans of terms which for us have
connotations prompting hidden assumptions that distort our perceptions of the
political scene in Vietnam:
The tragedy of our course in Vietnam lies in our refusal to come to grips with those
realities in South Vietnam that happened to be decisive from the viewpoint of politics....
We failed to distinguish a sect from a party, a clique from an organization, a group of
intellectuals or politicians with tiny clienteles from a political movement, a police force,
officer corps, and set of rich merchants from a political class. We tended to attribute
South Vietnamese chaos to a combination of Communist disruptiveness and reversible
South Vietnamese mistakes . . . [without realizing] that those "mistakes" were, so to
speak, doubly of the essence.
In our examination of the finished intelligence about the political scene
we will want to give special attention to the kinds of "elements that seemed
familiar and reassuring" which Hoffmann cites. "Non-Communist parties," "po-
litical movement," "political development," "democratic practices"-these are
examples of an unlimited variety of "mirror image" terms*** which are highly
*Research on perception phenomena has intensified in the past two decades, and the re-
sulting theory for helping us understand these phenomena has been greatly expanded and
refined. Consult Bernard Berelson and. Gary Steiner, Human Behavior-Shorter Edition
(paperback, Harcourt, 1967), p. 147; and Hadley Cantril, "The Nature of Social Perception,"
in Hans Toch and Henry C. Smith, eds., Social Perception (paperback, Van Nostrand, 1968).
Berelson and Steiner sum up the function and significance of the perception faculty:
The facts of raw sensory data are themselves insufficient to produce or to explain the
coherent picture of the world experienced by the normal adult . . . sensory information
does not correspond simply to the perception that it brings forth . . . sensory impulses
do not act on an empty organism. They interact with what is already "in" the individual,
and what we immediately experience is the result of that interaction. We do not always
see or hear "what is there," in the environment, but also what we bring to the observing
situation.
Our perception faculty may be likened to a master switch directing and redirecting the formu-
lation and coloring of our views of the world. It may unconsciously bend or ignore reality in
order to maintain consistency in our views of the world or to preserve our commitments.
**David Halberstam. The Best and the Brightest (Random House, New York, 1972)
pp. 171-172, emphasizes that "even the best of the American military" as represented by
General Maxwell Taylor drew analogies with Korea "without considering the crucial dif-
ference ... the very nature of the war."
***These are terms which can be expected to evoke "mirror images" in persons who have
not trained themselves to check continually for the differences between the connotations of
a given term in a particular foreign culture area and in the U.S. They are called "mirror image"
terms because a person using, reading, or hearing them is apt to be really "seeing" in his mind
as he would in a mirror; hence, he is likely getting reflections of the ways the terms are under-
stood in America, and not in the other culture area to which he unconsciously assumes he or
another person using these terms is making valid reference. The most elusive mirror image
terms are those which hold connotations of our Western beliefs and values and notably those
which Americans rank especially high. Examples of such terms would include: "national
development goals," "efforts to reach a consensus," "search for a reasonable solution," "ex-
cessively cruel methods," "fair tactics." Hence, a vital step toward increasing one's awareness
of the deceptiveness of such terms is to make a close and thoughtful inspection of "what is
typically American or Western." Consult Edward C. Stewart, American Cultural Patterns:
A Cross-cultural Perspective (Regional Council for International Education, U. of Pitts-
burgh, 1971).
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likely to exert a deceptive and distorting influence on the perception faculty of
most persons. Such terms instantly trigger powerful cues to this faculty as it
invariably "reaches" for the meaning it will give to a current experience or an
idea brought to the person's attention.
One final alert is in order before we move on: our habits, shaped by our
personal past behavior and experience, so fill our waking hours that all of us
quite commonly miss or forget the enormous implications of habits of perception
for our future problems of understanding the world about us. Joseph H. DeRivera,
in The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy,* makes the point realistically:
It is difficult even to grasp intellectually the fact that we construct the reality in which
we operate. We take our perception of the world for granted. . . . We know what is
real. We live in this reality and we act accordingly.... If' someone else points out that
our perceptions may be wrong, we may intellectually admit the possibility, but we
continue to act as though our perceptions were true. We are familiar with illusions but
dismiss them as interesting playthings. Our reality seems so solid, and we feel so in
touch with it, that it is impossible for us to act with the realization that in fact our reality
is inferred by us and may not match the reality which future events reveal. It is precisely
in this feeling of certainty that the danger lies. (emphasis added)
Early Warnings of Americans' "Cultural Blinders" on Vietnam
Only a few voices gained wide public attention in America in the 1960s
by their emphasis on the hidden psychological and intercultural dimension of
the Vietnam problem. One was the voice of the Frenchman Bernard B. Fall, who
;gave more than a decade and finally his life as well in Vietnam in a wide-
ranging search for the hidden causes and meanings of the war.** In the April
1968 Atlantic Monthly James C. Thomson, Jr., one of State's Far East hands who
had joined the "Mac" Bundy team at the White House in 1961, contributed a
24-part answer to the question, "How Could Vietnam Happen?" At least half of
his reasons bear directly on the psychological and intercultural dimension of
American involvement in Vietnam. Some of these reasons tie into points we
shall be discussing, for example: the leadership's preconceptions of China on
the march and a monolithic Communist bloc; America's "profound ignorance
of Asian history and ... the radical differences among Asian . . . societies;" and
confused perceptions of the kind of war we were fighting. Henry Kissinger,
before joining the Nixon Administration, prepared an article for Foreign Affairs
which gave prominence to America's record of neglect of the psychological
dimension on Vietnam. On the results of the Tet offensive of January 1968, which
"overthrew the assumptions of American strategy," Kissinger wrote:
What had gone wrong? The basic problem has been conceptual: the tendency to apply
traditional maxims of both strategy and "nation-building" to a situation which they did
not fit.... We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought
physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. . . . The Tet
offensive brought to a head the compounded weaknesses ... of the American position.
To be sure, from a strictly military point of view, Tet was an American victory. .. . But
*(Merrill, Columbus, 0., 1968), p. 21.
* *See, for example, Fall's Last Reflections on a War (Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1967).
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in a guerrilla war, purely military considerations are not decisive: psychological and
political factors loom at least as large.... Both the Hanoi Government and the United
States are limited in their freedom of action by the state of mind of the population of
South Vietnam, which will ultimately determine the outcome of the conflict.
As for the magnitude of our problem of understanding the Vietnamese mind,
Kissinger cites the "vast gulf in cultural and bureaucratic style between Hanoi
and Washington." Then he adds tersely, "It would be difficult to imagine two
societies less meant to understand each other than the Vietnamese and the
American."*
Upon publication of the Pentagon Papers in the early summer of 1971,
former Secretary of State Dean Rusk gave an exposition on television of his
reactions to this event. At the outset of his talk, he made a highly revealing
admission-the first to be made publicly on this point by a key policy maker of
the mid-sixties-of a crucial misperception: "I personally, I think, underesti-
mated the persistence and the tenacity of the North Vietnamese." * *
A few journalists had already begun to analyze how such fateful mistakes
of judgment could occur at the policy level. As Stanley Karnow saw the problem:
A prime cause of America's setbacks in the Far East ... has been the delusion of our
policy-makers that they understood Asia. Two elements ... contributed to this delusion.
The first was the conviction that there must be measurable facts in Asia because, re-
garding ourselves as rational, we had to operate on the basis of facts. So in Vietnam, we
proceeded to "quantify" situations with statistics and graphs and charts that told every-
thing except the only important reality-what the people think. . . . Our lack of under-
standing has also led us to miscalculate our enemies, with the result that we have been
unable to estimate their response to force or diplomacy or a mixture of the two.***
Karnow as well as Kissinger points up a still more basic roadblock for intercul-
tural analysis than mirror images pose, though it subsumes them: "seeing a foreign
area in American terms," that is, weighing it into our calculations and evaluations
as if it "ran on our time" or by our ground rules. We shall be looking at some
of the better known kinds of local ground rules-traditional beliefs, values, and
norms-which make such a practice wholly unrealistic in Vietnam as elsewhere
in the traditional world.
But what the local people think is important is only one aspect of what
we shall be calling "the hidden psychological dimension" of the scene in Vietnam.
Equally vital for helping Westerners understand "the world of the Vietnamese"
is the way they think-how they put data together and reach conclusions. This
aspect of a traditionalist people's "differentness" can totally escape a Westerner's
attention if he looks at only the measurable or tangible products of their think-
ing. For both the "what" and the "how" of Vietnamese traditional thinking we
shall be turning to the French scholar and educator Paul Mus, who has been
generally acknowledged to be the West's outstanding authority on the Viet-
*Foreign Affairs (Jan. 1969), pp. 21.1-212, 214, 215, 217,. 220.
"The Washington Post, 2 July 1971,
***The Washington Post, 20 July 1970.
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namese society and culture.* In 1966, writing at Yale in his article titled
"Cultural Backgrounds of Present Problems" in Asia, he helps us to begin to
understand the Vietnamese mind:
Happily I am addressing America, the country whose philosophy-native, genuine, "abo-
riginal"--is closest to Asia, the land of pragmatism.... When an Asian approaches us
[Westerners] ... he is astounded to see how we withdraw into our thinking. We remove
the man. Look at Descartes ... making total abstractions of everything and starting from
scratch to rebuild the world on pure reason without putting anything of himself into
it. Quite often, unfortunately, this is the view of the academicians in our part of the
world....
We think in terms of concepts. They think in terms of the complete man. Confucius was
not interested in concepts because he was interested in the total man ... the Vietnamese
have not been trained in concepts and reasoning. They have been trained by a Confucian
civilization which impressed upon the people the way they should behave. . . . Con-
fucianism is not descriptive. . . . It is injunctive. It tells people how to behave.**
Breakthrough by Frances FitzGerald
Frances FitzGerald, daughter of former CIA Deputy Director Desmond
FitzGerald and a former student of Mus at Yale, brought Mus and "the hidden
psychological dimension" of the Vietnamese scene to the American people with
eclat in August 1.972. In her book Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the
Americans in Vietnam*** she aimed to tell the story of America's involvement in
Vietnam as it impinged upon and was seen by the Vietnamese. In doing so,
*Born in France in 1902, Mus was taken by his father to Tonkin (northern North Vietnam),
as a small child. He had his entire basic schooling alongside the Vietnamese young people,
became fully bi-cultural and came to know first-hand the workings of the Vietnamese mind.
After Oriental Studies in Paris in the early 1920s, he returned to Vietnam where he was
appointed in 1927 to the prestigious Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient in Hanoi, an appoint-
ment which led to research and study in depth of the historical background and the cultures
of Indochina. During and after World War II Mus served Free French intelligence in several
capacities in Indochina. In 1948 Mus left government service and Indochina, and took teaching
appointments at one of the "grandes ecoles"-the College de France-and at Yale. We will
be consulting Mus repeatedly in this paper. His magistral work, Vietnam: Sociologic d'une
Guerre (Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1952) has never been successfully translated. Its essential
message is, however, found in a re-worked text brought out in English-following Mus'
death in 1969, but with his blessing-by Princeton professor John T. McAlister, Jr., who
was a student of Mus at Yale (McAlister and Mus, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution,
Harper, New York, 1970). In addition, I have also used three articles by Mus in English,
which embrace a host of his themes: "The Role of the Village in Vietnamese Politics," in
Pacific Affairs (Sept. 1949); "Vietnam: A Nation off Balance," in Yale Review (summer
1952); and "Cultural Backgrounds of Present Problems," in "Vietnam: Evolution of the Crisis"
(symposium), in Asia, journal of the Asia Society (winter 1966.)
**For a discussion of the contrast between Westerners' logic and Vietnamese mental
flexibility in resorting to four systems of thought, see the article by Tran Van Dinh, former
Saigon charge d'affaires in Washington and member of President Diem's cabinet. "The Other
Side of the Table," in The Washington Monthly, Jan. 1970. Tran says:
"The Vietnamese, like most Asians, use a paradoxical logic which assumes that A and
non-A do not exclude each other. Paradoxical logic emerges under the name of dialectics
in the thought of Hegel and Marx. In that sense, Marxism is nearer to the Eastern way
of thinking than [is] Cartesian logic. . . .
* *'T'he publisher is Little, Brown & Co. The review by Martin Bernal in The New York Re-
view, 5 October, appears to me to be the most sophisticated and balanced. The subsequent quote
from FitzGerald is taken from a description of her by Myra MacPherson in The Washington
Post, 29 August L972.
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she highlights the contradictions and misunderstandings which have abounded
throughout this story, as well as the contrast of cultural elements and mind
sets which go far to explain them. The book made many best sellers lists, and
almost all reviews were unstinting in their praise and approval of her work.
Martin Bernal in The New York Review says "it is the first book I would recom-
mend to anyone to read on Vietnam." She herself reportedly has said:
It's not a scholar's book. I make a whole lot of large generalities that no proper scholar
would do. Some Chinese scholars would probably huff and puff about certain things.
My idea was to sort of overemphasize the contrast [between their culture and Westerners']
if necessary.
While she spent a good part of 1966 in South Vietnam and travelled widely
through the country, Bernal observes:
Quite rightly she has relied heavily on the work of others. Many sources are referred to
both in the footnotes and in the text. But her book is largely dominated by the work
of Paul Mus, Richard Solomon, Robert Shaplen, and Otare Mannoni.... In her chapters
on the National Liberation Front (NLF) she makes brilliant use of American intelligence
material....
Appropriately, Chapter I is titled "States of Mind;" it strives to convey
some sense of the vast psychological gulf between East and West. As the United
States became increasingly involved in South Vietnam in the 1960s, the television
pictures of the two countries' leaders were deceiving because "they did not show
the disproportion between the two powers." Yet this "only began with the
matter of scale." American officials spoke of supporting the Saigon government
in order to defend "freedom and democracy" in Asia, while the GIs discovered
that the Vietnamese "did not fit into their experience of either `Communists' or
`democrats."' Meanwhile, certain American analysts and officials did not see the
United States as interested in the form of the Vietnamese government or in the
Vietnamese, but rather as concerned "for containing the expansion of the Com-
munist bloc" and preventing future "wars of national liberation" around the world.
FitzGerald identifies three distinct grounds for misunderstanding and mis-
communication between Vietnamese and Americans: the incongruity of their
aims; American ignorance of Vietnamese problems; and the disparity of Viet-
namese and American frames of reference for giving meaning to general concepts
such as "freedom," "democracy" and "national problems." As a result of these
grounds for misunderstanding, both peoples necessarily had gross misperceptions
of the other's aims, motives, viewpoints, and expectations. FitzGerald sums up
her theme:
The unknowns made the whole enterprise, from the most rational and tough-minded
point of view, risky in the extreme. In going into Vietnam the United States was not
only transposing itself into a different epoch of history; it was entering a world qualita-
tively different from its own. Culturally as geographically, Vietnam lies half a world
away from the United States. Many Americans in Vietnam learned to speak Vietnamese,
but the language gave no more than a hint of the basic intellectual grammar that lay
beneath. In a sense there was no more correspondence between the two worlds than
that between the atmosphere of the earth and that of the sea. . . . To find the common
ground that existed between them, both Americans and Vietnamese would have to re-
create the whole world of the other, the whole intellectual landscape.
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SECRET Perceptions on Vietnam
We shall turn to FitzGerald's text as appropriate for her vivid expositions of
the "psychological worlds" of the Vietnamese and the Americans, the incon-
gruence of these two worlds, and the resulting problems.
Whose Perceptions Concern Us Here?
Ideally, for the closest practical reading on analysts' perceptions of a given
foreign situation or problem, we would probably want to identify and talk to
the one or more analysts producing intelligence on each of the subjects or
geographic areas involved. We might expect thus to determine quite accurately
to what extent the person or persons did or did not "wear cultural blinders" with
respect to the actual viewpoints, motives, aims, or expectations of the foreign
individuals, groups, or societies involved. But for our broad discussion here we
will necessarily take readings after the fact, based on written texts. In so doing,
we can at best hope to establish only presumptive evidence of the degree of
accuracy of Vietnam analysts' perceptions as these existed in the past, at the
time a given report was written.
In practice, of course, more than one person's perceptions become involved
in virtually all reports, by the normal functioning of the coordination process,
the supervisor's review of the draft, or the final review and approval by senior
officials. Yet the initiation and follow-through on a particular report are nor-
mally the responsibilities of a single analyst. Furthermore, those analysts who
hold "area" or "country" assignments generally have the final say on what is
characteristic of their area or country, or "what makes it tick." Hence, at a
minimum we shall assume that: in most instances an individual report on Vietnam
coming under our review will on the whole reflect the perceptions of a single
analyst; and in virtually all cases, any statements of what is characteristically
Vietnamese or Asian-or a consistent lack of attention to such data-will. reflect
the perceptions of country or area analysts with a direct responsibility for this
aspect of the reporting.
Yet intelligence organizations need to go farther than simply to assess a
given analyst's attention or inattention to the intercultural or psychological
dimension of his reporting. In addition, they need to take account of the bureau-
cratic-sub-cultural-influences on analysts' perceptions which flow from the
views and drives of peers, supervisors, approval boards, agency officials, and
the nation's policy-makers. Considerable research on these influences has been
published in recent years, and selected highlights can be helpful here. First
we sum up some basic research findings on how any group can influence the per-
ceptions of its individual members, and then we examine certain recent studies
of how such influences work in U.S. Government bodies concerned with problems
in foreign affairs.
Experiments publicized in 1952 by Solomon E. Asch showed that about
three-fourths of the persons he tested went along with the majority in their re-
spective groups on what they perceived to be going on in the room where they
were. In subsequent tests with groups, Richard S. Crutchfield found that con-
formity on political questions was likely to be greater, more unconscious, and
more permanent than conformity on visual perceptions. Ralph K. White, Pro-
fessor of Social Psychology at George Washington University, has pulled together
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lessons bearing on the Vietnam problem which may be drawn from such psy-
chological research.* He comments on the results of Crutchfield's experiments:
[The evidence] suggests that there is often a real change of attitude. Apparently, after
being told that everyone else agreed with a certain attitude item, many of the subjects
really changed their minds.
Why Early Perceptions Persist
White goes on to identify some basic psychological factors which in his view
probably helped shape and prolong the early perceptions of America's leaders
with respect to Vietnam:
1. "The virile self-image"-the view that, to ensure that one's image as a patriotic defender
of freedom would be preserved, a person must not appear to be faltering on anti-
Communism;
2. "Perceptual lag"-for example, for many persons the quite realistic view of the menace
of Communism in Stalin's day was not modified in step with subsequent shifts of
political alignments, leaders' intentions, and operating styles in Europe and Asia;
3. "Cognitive dissonance"-when actions are out of line with ideas, decision-makers tend
to align the ideas with the on-going line of action (for example, in 1967 when Defense
Secretary McNamara proposed a fundamental shift of policy objectives in Vietnam
based on a re-examination of the premises of existing policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
sharply disagreed and urged that McNamara's paper "not be forwarded to the Presi-
dent" because it implied such a sharp divergence from long-standing policy).**
4. "Selective inattention"-a tendency, once an attitude or course of action is firmly
adopted, "to retain thoughts that are in harmony with it and to discard others."
In White's view, the psychological significance of all these tendencies lies
"in the nearly total absence of evidence-oriented discussion" of the assumptions
behind prior policy decisions. The lack of analyses of such assumptions was a
major factor in Secretary McNamara's order of 17 June 1967 for the Pentagon's
study of the Vietnam War.***
Since the late 1960s, a host of "revisionist" scholars have published articles
and books, pressing either or both of the arguments that: the American leader-
ship's shift in the late 1940s to a hostile stance toward Vietnam's revolutionaries
gave a definite bias to the thrust of the United States' involvement in Southeast
Asia from the mid-1950s; and "demonstrable" distortions in American popular
and official perceptions of the potential roles of Communism in North and South
Vietnam, and of non-Communist forces in South Vietnam, were a prime cause
*Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars (Doubleday, Garden
City, N.Y., 1968) pp. 210-215; "Selective Inattention" in Psychology Today (Nov. 1971, pp.
47, 80) .
* *The Pentagon Papers ... as Published by the New York Times (Bantam Books, 1971),
p. 538. The Joint Chiefs' paper of 31 May argued that the "drastic changes" of policy advocated
by the Secretary "would undermine and no longer provide a complete rationale for our presence
in South Vietnam or much of our efforts over the past two years."
* * *Among those who had earlier called attention to this critical need were Under Secretary
of State George W. Ball and Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton (ibid., pp. 449,
510, 534). McNaughton had advised, ". . . the philosophy of the war should be fought out
now so everyone will not be proceeding on their own major premises and getting us in deeper
and deeper."
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of America's failure to achieve its goals in Vietnam well into the 1970s.* We
shall want to test the intelligence reporting especially for any indications of such
distortions in analysts' perceptions of the Vietnamese Communists' and non-Com-
unists' roles, as these were perceived by the Vietnamese people.
The Dynamics of Bureaucracy
Influences on individual foreign affairs officers' thinking flow also from the
dynamics of the bureaucracy within a Government agency or group. A seminal
study with this theme is Graham T. Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis. * * The author postulates three conceptual models-not
necessarily mutually exclusive for any given situation-of how decisions in the
foreign policy field are reached. The traditional view that a nation or govern-
ment works toward a calculated solution of a strategic problem is labelled "The
Rational Actor Model." This is played down in favor of two other models. "The
Organizational Process Model" views governmental behavior "less as deliberate
choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to
standard patterns of behavior . . . determined primarily by routines established
in this organizations. . . ." Finally, "The Government Politics Model" goes
further, looking within the leadership groups of an organization:
The "leaders" who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather, each
individual in this group is, in his own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The
name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players posi-
tioned hierarchically within the government. Government behavior can thus be understood
according to a third conceptual model ... as results of these bargaining games.... The
Governmental (or Bureaucratic) Politics Model sees . . . many actors as players . . .
who act . . . according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal
goals.. . .
The differing responsibilities of the players "encourage differences in what each
sees and judges to be important," and hence "priorities and perceptions are shaped
by positions."
While Allison writes about decision making in the field of government
policy, we wish to suggest here that the behavior patterns in his second and third
models may well be characteristic also of the processes by which analysts, super-
*In addition to FitzGerald, see: Townshend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (David
McKay, New York, 1969), especially ch. 1, "Roots of Intervention," and ch. 5 "Official
Optimism-Public Doubt" and John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and
America (Random House, New York, 1971), especially chs. 5 and 6, which are concerned with
the French and American involvement in Indochina- Hoopes was Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs, Jan. 1965-Oct. 1967, and Under Secretary of
the Air Force, Oct. 1967-Feb. 1969. Stoessinger has served as Acting Director and Director of
the Political Affairs Division of the United Nations since 1967. His thesis (pp. 3-4) is that "the
struggles between the United States and China and those between the United States and Russia
were not waged solely on the basis of objective reality," but also "in the realm of imagery and
illusion." For close-up glimpses of how preconceptions began to take shape in the minds of State
Department officers in the mid-1940s, see the staff study for the Senate Foreign Relations Corn-
roittee (The United States and Vietnam: 1944-1947, Study No. 2-92nd Congress, 2nd Session.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 Apr. 1972--pp. 2-5, 15-22) which was based on the
Pentagon Papers.
**Little, Brown, Boston, 1971, pp. 13, 67-76, 144-146.
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visors, and senior review boards reach decisions about the proper content of
finished intelligence. He acknowledges:
Few specialists in international politics have studied organizational theory. It is only
recently that organization theorists have come to study organizations as decision makers;
behavioral studies of foreign policy organizations from the decision-making perspective
have not yet been produced.
But he does not expect these gaps to remain unfilled. "Interest in an organizational
perspective is spreading rapidly among institutions and individuals concerned
with actual government operations." In 1972 Abraham F. Lowenthal built on
Allison's study for The Dominican Intervention,* which stresses how "naturally
and consistently" this intervention flowed "from ... established premises, widely
shared within the American foreign policy-making apparatus, at least in 1965."
Lowenthal asserts: "The power of preconception, reinforced by official rhetoric
and bureaucratic repetition, to determine foreign policy perceptions and actions
has rarely, if ever, been more conclusively demonstrated."
"Groupthink"
In 1972 and 1973, Irving L. Janis published the results of his study of four
"major fiascoes" and two "well-worked out decisions" in American foreign policy
in the mid-twentieth century. His book, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological
Study of Foreign-policy Decisions and Fiascoes, was followed up with an article
titled "Groupthink" in the Yale Alumni Magazine.** Janis' "groupthink hypoth-
esis" postulates "a specific pattern of concurrence-seeking behavior" in face-to-face
groups, "particularly when a `we-feeling' of solidarity is running high." His
definition:
Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judg-
ment that results from group pressures.
Drawing on the results of psychological studies of group behavior, he finds that
one's degree of susceptibility to groupthink depends on personality predisposi-
tions. The resulting deterioration of mental efficiency is marked by six major
defects in decision making, some of which recur through this paper as con-
tributing to distortions of analysts' perceptions. These defects include: failure to
re-examine prior decisions which later become untested hidden assumptions;
failure to "obtain information from experts who could supply sound estimates
of losses and gains to be expected from alternative courses"; and neglect of
information and judgments from persons whose views do not support "pre-
ferred policy."
Janis' analysis is closely corroborated by James Thomson:***
... the banishment of real expertise ... resulted fro mthe "closed politics" of policy
making as issues became hot: the more sensitive the issue, and the higher it rises in the
bureaucracy, the more completely the experts are excluded while the harassed senior
generalists take over.... The frantic skimming of briefing papers in the back seats of
limousines is no substitute for the presence of specialists....
* (Harvard U. Press.) pp. 145-147, 151-152, 155.
**The book was published by Houghton Mifflin, 1972, and the article appeared in Jan.
1973.
* * * Atlantic Monthly, April 1968, pp. 47-53.
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Chester Cooper,* former member of CIA's Board of National Estimates, con-
firms the relevancy of this point in the eyes of the intelligence world:
Second-echelon and working-level specialists . . . rarely have access to top policy-
makers.... Searching analyses and mid-range projections, if they are made at all, are
likely to shrivel and perish from neglect.
One additional category of persons-the readers of the finished intelli-
gence-must be included among those whose perceptions concern us here. Is
it possible than many finished intelligence reports run serious risks of miscom-
niunicating critical aspects of the intended messages because intercultural or
psychological differences in the understanding of terms are not pointed up?
We must assume that most readers of a given reports series are not in fact known
personally to the analysts preparing them, or to the review boards. In any event,
it is unlikely that analysts are very often certain of the readers' awareness of
the intercultural differences involved in particular aspects of a report.
Hence we propose the following basic guidelines:
Any written intelligence message risks misinforming and misleading
its readers if it does not alert them to the relevant local cultural and
psychological contexts of the key data reported and judgments offered.
At a minimum, this means that it should say how the local people in-
volved see, or are likely to see, the actual or anticipated situations. Addi-
tionally, the message should warn readers against dangerous mirror
images which particular English words, phrases, or language structures
are likely to evoke unconsciously in their minds.**
These guidelines may appear impractical, suggesting endless repetitions of
burdensome "background" data and caveats. But unless we can demolish the
above premise, we must work toward practical safeguards against miscom-
munication across cultural lines.
We shall be interested principally, then, in presumptive evidence of the
perceptions of: an individual analyst who, we can usually expect, drafted a given
report and "saw it through" the coordination and discussion process, with
violence done only rarely to his perceptions of what is characteristically Viet-
namese; several analysts functioning as country and/or area specialists who
would have reviewed or coordinated on Vietnam reports in the larger produc-
tion offices, though we are not likely to be able to distinguish their perceptions
from those of the originating analyst; and those unseen readers of the reports
who for the most part are likely neither to be Vietnam or Asia specialists nor
to have trained themselves to overcome the hazards of intercultural communica-
tion. We would be interested also in the various ways bureaucratic pressures
work to shape or modify analysts' perceptions, but direct evidence of these in-
fluences*** will be rare in the texts of the reports.
*The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. (Dodd, New York, 1970), pp. 457-458.
* *See the excellent chapter titled "Language, Perception, and Reasoning" in Glen H.
Fisher, Public Diplomacy and the Behavioral Sciences (Indiana U. Press, 1972), pp. 94-426.
Dr. Fisher is Dean of the Center for Area and Country Studies at the Foreign Service
Institute.
* * * For an account of one such case, see Willard C. Matthias, "How Three Estimates Went
Wrong," in Studies in Intelligence, Vol. XII No. 1, pp. 31-35.
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Indicators of Analysts' Attention to "Hidden Psychological Dimension"
As we turn toward our main task, we need clear indicators for spotting
analysts' attention or inattention to the intercultural and psychological dimension
of their tasks. The following will be useful indicators for this purpose; they
are consistent with the relevant behavioral science literature which we have
discussed or cited above.
Indicators (positive or negative) of attention paid to intercultural or psycho-
logical dimension of analytical tasks involving local persons, groups, and popu-
lations in foreign areas
Set A-Full Indicators: (Analysts show awareness of analytical problems posed
by the differences between the local and the American cultures and psy-
chologies)
1-Discuss such differences when they are a significant hazard to full com-
munication;
2-Sound alert to problems such differences may pose-e.g., warn of need to
reserve judgment appropriately until local perspective on situation is as-
certained;
3-Avoid mirror image terms if possible-e.g., words, phrases, language struc-
tures, ways of thinking which reflect psychology of Americans but not of
local nationals being discussed;
4-Point up necessary corrections in readings of such terms and language struc-
tures if better alternatives are not available for achieving more accurate
communication.
Set B-Partial Indicators: (Analysts show concern for what is on the minds
and/or what are known to be the cultural tendencies of the local persons,
groups, or population figuring in the analysis)
1-Cite the reported or assumed perspectives, attitudes, views, concerns, mo-
tivations, and/or expectations of local people;
2-Introduce or stress the "core forces" of the culture and/or sub-culture con-
cerned, i.e., the beliefs, values, commonly found priorities (rankings) of
values, norms, and ways of conceptualizing reality which predominate
within the culture or sub-culture concerned;
3-Discuss the reported or assumed perspectives, attitudes, views, concerns,
motivations, and/or expectations of local people in relation to the "core
forces" of the culture or sub-culture concerned.
In the context of this paper, the main task of the analysts is to point up the
differences between the American readers' culture and way of thinking, on the
one hand, and the relevant foreign culture and way of thinking, on the other
hand. We therefore rank as "Full Indicators" evidence that the analysts are, or
are not, pointing up such differences. Yet, partial "credit" must be given for in-
troducing only what is distinctive about the local culture and way of thinking;
by calling the readers' attention to generally unfamiliar foreign behavior pat-
terns, analysts can often prompt the readers' own efforts to make the comparison
with American ways and perceive at least some aspects of the differences. By
the same token, the analysts' own attention to-or lack of attention to-what is
on the minds of the local people or what "makes them tick" gives us clues to
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whether they are, or are not, "on the right track" for handling the intercultural
or psychological dimension of their task.
Political Realities in Vietnam, Spring 1954
To set the stage for our testing of the finished intelligence in the period
1954-1956, we summarize the political situation in the much-reduced portion. of
Vietnam which the French military were still successfully denying to the Viet-
minh in the late spring of 1954. With the exception of the Hanoi enclave, the
areas involved here later passed from the French to the independent regime in
Saigon during and following the Geneva Conference on Indochina of 26 April-
21 July 1954. We need to sketch the highlights of this scene, with emphasis
on. the psychological aspects. This will help us-in our subsequent references to
the finished intelligence-as we seek to signal presumptive evidence of the ana-
lysts' degree of attention to the psychological dimensions of their tasks.
Ngo Dinh Diem arrived in Saigon from France on 25 June 1954 under fairly
favorable international auspices but with formidable handicaps burdening his
internal tasks. With support from French and American officials, he was soon
appointed Premier of the State of Vietnam by Emperor Bao Dai, who had just
won French assent to "treaties of independence and association" on 4 June.*
The Emperor had accepted Diem's terms, which included full civil and military
powers as well as authority to determine the future status of the country and
establish a representative national assembly. Furthermore, in French law, the
State of Vietnam-i.c., "all of Vietnam"-had been a unified state since May
1.949, when the National Assembly in Paris had ratified abandonment of colonial
status for Coehinchina in the South. Now, only a "provisional military demar-
cation line" to facilitate regroupment of opposing military forces-not an inter-
national boundary-was to be drawn at the 17th parallel by the French and North
Vietnamese military representatives at the Geneva Conference. Pending elections
to be held in July 1956, political activities were not denied to either regime-
the Communist-controlled Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the North,
or Bao Dai's Government in the South-in the area controlled by the other. For
the moment, the psychological impact of the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May and
the continuing Communist pressure deepened the confusion and malaise in the
few areas still under the control of the French Army, notably in the vicinities of
I Ianoi and Saigon. Before June was out, Diem flew to Hanoi to set up a Com-
mittee for the Defense of the North and urge the local population to rally to
the South.
The Saigon regime's major campaign that summer for inducing hundreds of
thousands of Northerners to migrate to the South reflected a major political
problem facing Diem-that of creating a popular base in the South. He was an
*A. gradual transfer of authority and power had been taking place since 1948. See Bernard
13. Fall, The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (Praeger, New York, 1963 ),
pp. 212-223. Other principal sources utilized here are: "Lansdale Team's Report on Covert
Saigon Mission in '54 and '55," in The Pentagon Papers, pp. 53-66; George M. Kahin and
John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (rev. ed., Dial, New York, 1967) ; and Philippe
)evillers and jean Lacouture, End of A War: Indochina, 1954 (Praeger, New York, 1969, trans-
lated from French edition published in France in 1960), which provides a French perspective
on the opening American period. On the background of Diem's coming to power, see Cooper,
op. cit., pp. 120-128.
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Annamite-from Central Vietnam-and had virtually no support in the South
upon taking power. The Frenchman Devillers writes:
He found himself isolated, threatened, and without resources. He could rely only on a
close circle of friends-a virtual clan. The French and their agents, the police, the admin-
istrators, the soldiers, and the sects all hemmed him in. His only real encouragement came
from a number of resident and visiting Americans, including both civilian and military
officials. . . . [One] imperative was to recruit reliable and blindly loyal supporters who
would meet with the approval of American officialdom. . . . His political constituents
were the Catholics in the North who were about to come under the control of the DRV.
He had to bring the largest possible number of these Catholics south, no matter what
the costs. . . . They might be socially rootless, but they would owe him everything.
They could be relied upon to be uncompromising because of their fear of the Vietminh,
and their anti-Communism would recommend them highly to the Americans....*
In seeking political support from Southerners, Diem was severely handi-
capped by the French postponement until after World War II of active prepara-
tions for Vietnamese self-government. A major task was to create a viable alterna-
tive to the Vietminh in areas controlled by the French Army, especially the cities
and towns, but also in pockets of the rural areas inhabited by people of the
regional or "folk" religions, such as the Cao Dai. The base of this political al-
ternative would be the small Vietnamese upper class which had been raised up
by French colonial institutions. The French had already found, however, that
this foundation was shaky; it lacked the coherence and strength of a well-estab-
lished ruling class, and it was engaged in constant squabbling. In October, 1953,
for example, in the absence of any elected legislature, Bao Dai had appealed to
all major political leaders to attend a "National Congress" in Saigon which
might strengthen his hand in negotiations with the French. Bernard Fall, who
attended, writes: "That National Congress ... became a monumental free-for-all
in which nationalists of all hues and shades concentrated on settling long-standing
scores and in outbidding each other in extreme demands on the French and on
the Vietnamese Government." **
The Role of the Villagers
The most ominous shortcoming of the Vietnamese upper class-which was
shared by Diem, as we shall see-was its insensitivity to the need "to forge new
political links with the village population," in the words of Princeton Professor
John T. McAlister, Jr. It was a shortcoming which would fatefully handicap the
United States' intervention in Vietnam and Americans' perceptions of their un-
ending struggle with the Vietminh.*** As early as 1949, Mus had pointed up the
critical importance of forging political links with the villages. In a journal article
titled "The Role of the Village in Vietnamese Politics," Mus wrote:
The basic problems of Vietnam-whether they concern cooperation or resistance, nation-
alism or Communism, the programs and roles of the political parties, or similar questions-
can be properly understood only if they have been appraised from the standpoint of the
villages. Since the end of the war the French have succeeded in re-establishing themselves
in certain of the cities of Vietnam, but not in the interior of the country, the stronghold
*Op. cit., pp. 333-334.
"John John T. McAlister, Jr., Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution (Knopf, New York, 1969),
p. 7; Fall, Last Reflections on a War, p. 41.
* * *The steps by which the United States assumed the role of protector of the Diem regime
in 1954-and American misperceptions of this task-are well detailed in Halberstam, op. cit.,
pp. 121-154.
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creep tons on ie nam
of the villages. Since time immemorial these villages have held the key to the social
structure of the country and its outlook on life. . . . The conservatism of the villages
used to be contrasted with the new aspirations of those relatively few urban intellectuals
whose attitudes had been molded by contact with the French. In the present situation,
however, it is chiefly the conservative elements that seem to have congregated in the
French-held cities, while large areas of the countryside have resorted to armed resistance
under leftist leadership.... It is essential to discard at once any notion that in Vietnam
the French are dealing with nothing more than a mass of apathetic peasants who have
been terrorized by their leaders. When the writer had occasion two years ago to travel
behind the Vietnamese ( Vietminh] lines, he found widespread evidence of an organized
popular movement both at the front and in the rear.*
We shall want to examine closely the presumptive evidence of analysts' percep-
tions of this pivotal role of the countryside in influencing the political dynamics
of Vietnam. Perceptions of this role directly influence perceptions of Diem's views
and aims, and also of the political aspects of the Vietminh program and activities
in the South.
Diem's Background and Outlook
A critical handicap for Diem in his political task was the clear incongruity
between many of his principal beliefs, preconceptions, and biases, on the one
hand, and the practical requirements of the task, on the other. Diem's view of
the world and rationale for action were heavily influenced by several factors:
his family background in the mandarin class of Hue-the Annamite Imperial
capital; staunch Catholic beliefs; an unyielding opposition to French political
pretensions in Vietnam: restricted personal experience as an administrator rather
than a policy maker or politician; and a political philosophy from Europe called
"Personalism." A brief survey of these roots of his personality will help us grasp
the psychological world of this extraordinary but generally miscast ruler, on
whom for a decade America relied as the mainstay of its growing commitment
in Southeast Asia.
Diem's ancestors included some of the earliest Catholic converts in Vietnam.
dating from the seventeenth century. His father was a high official at the court
of Emperor Thanh-Thai at the turn of the twentieth century. This mandarin class
had lingered on in Central and Northern Vietnam after the French had reorganized
many institutions in the South for support of a plantation economy. Frances
FitzGerald suggests traits of the mandarin mentality, with implications for our
concern here:
The villages of northern and central Vietnam stood like small fortresses in the center of
their rice fields, closed off from the world by bamboo hedges. When the mandarin rode
out from the stone ramparts of his citadel, he traveled quite alone, a fish out of the water
of the population. The mandarin was more an ambassador from the court than a governor
in his own domain. He had only the authority to negotiate with the village council... .
If the negotiations broke down, he had no resort except the final one of calling in the
Imperial troops and burning down the hedges of the village. * *
In his extensive discussion of Diem's background,*** Bernard Fall empha-
sizes "a religious fierceness bordering on fanaticism, which must be fully under-
* Paci f is Affairs (Sept. 1949), p. 265.
**Op. cit., pp. 43, 81. The quotation is from Mus, Sociologic d'une Guerre, ch. 1, in. a
translation presumably rendered by FitzGerald.
* * *The Two Vietnams, pp. 234-252.
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stood before one can understand Diem's view of his role in Vietnam's somber
contemporary history." Fall elaborates:
His faith was made less of the kindness of the apostles than of the ruthless militancy of
the Grand Inquisitor; and his view of government was made less of the constitutional
strength of a President of the Republic [created October 19551 than of the petty tyranny of
a tradition-bound mandarin. To a French Catholic . . . stressing "our common faith,"
Diem was reported to have answered calmly: "You know, I consider myself rather as a
Spanish Catholic."
This religious militancy in Diem had obvious implications for his political role
in a country whose population was only 10% Catholic, and where political
dynamics were worked out to a greater extent by a variety of sects than by formal
political parties.
Diem's paternalistic approach to relations between governors and governed
comes through in several of our sources. Sympathetic as well as unsympathetic
sources, according to Fall, quote Diem as saying, "I know what is best for my
people." FitzGerald quotes Diem: "Society functions through proper relationships
among men at the top. . . . The sovereign is the mediator between the people
and the Heaven as he celebrates the national cult...." A French diplomat who
had many dealings with Diem compared him to the rightwing French nationalist
Charles Maurras, "whose absolutist views were too extreme even for the pre-
tender to the French throne." South Vietnam, concludes Fall, "was structurally
a republic, mostly to please its American godfathers, [but] in terms of the actual
relations between government and governed, it was an absolute monarchy with-
out a king.... It should hardly be surprising that any Madison Avenue attempt
to make a baby-kissing popular leader out of Diem would fail." Diem saw his
role as one of consolidating a truncated Vietnam, establishing an unchallenged
control by his government, and preparing the non-Communist areas for an even-
tual showdown with the Communist ones.
This view of his own role as Premier and later President of Vietnam was
buttressed by Diem's political philosophy of "Personalism," which had developed
in the 1930s in France, became identified with the liberal Catholic journal Esprit,
and spread throughout Europe. One of Diem's brothers, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who
served as Political Adviser and chief theoretician for Diem, had studied at the
prestigious French Ecole des Chartes in Paris, where he had been in. contact
with Emmanuel Mounier, prominent among the founders of Personalism. Brother
Nhu became much impressed by Mounier's ideas and transmitted his convictions
to Diem, who likewise shone as a student. (Diem had finished first in his class
at the French-run School for Law and Administration in Hanoi.) Here was a
philosophy, the Ngo brothers felt, which was "capable of counterbalancing the
type of primitive Marxism that the Vietminh was trying to `sell' to the Vietnamese."
Fall provides us a fairly coherent sketch of Personalism, which suffices for
demonstrating its intellectual and moral support to Diem and his entourage as
well as its usefulness as a political tool. The heart of the concept is expressed
by the Vietnamese term for Personalism-Nhan-Vi-meaning "person-dignity."
Hence, it emphasized human dignity and the value of the human person, chal-
lenging Communism's concentration on the good of the "masses" and the pro-
ducing classes, which often works to the detriment of the individual's "intel-
lectual, moral, and spiritual life." Personalism, then, was a rallying call-con-
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sistent with Catholic philosophy-against Communism. At the same time, Diem
used Personalism to attack some Western concepts of democracy. "Democracy,"
he once said, "is neither material happiness nor the supremacy of numbers ... .
[but] is essentially a permanent effort to find the right political means of assur-
ing to all citizens the right of free development."
In sum, factors affording Diem political advantages during his early tenure
as premier included: at least short-term military protection from the French;
strong indications that the United States would continue to take a firm stand
on preserving a Saigon regime free from Communist control; the Vietminh's
general sense of satisfaction with their anticipated gains from the Geneva negotia-
tions and willingness to bide their time before achieving political control of all
of Vietnam; Diem's strong nationalism and consistent personal record of opposi-
tion to French political influence; and the absence of any strong, country-wide
groups opposing his advent to power.
Political disadvantages for Diem included: the lack of preparation of the
country, in the prior era of French control, for national political activity or na-
tional administration, particularly in respect to relationships between the country-
side and Saigon*; Diem's lack of both political experience and any strong in-
clination to organize a political apparatus for ensuring political support on a
nation-wide basis; his lack of prior direct personal contact with the countryside;
his strong identification with foreign cultural influences; and certain strongly-held
beliefs and ideals which were not consistent with existing political priorites, yet
at the same time preoccupied his attention to an increasing degree.
Searching for Indicators in the Finished Intelligence
My search was confined to three series of finished intelligence reports: the
Intelligence Reports (IRs) of the Department of State's Office of Intelligence
Research; the Current Intelligence Weeklies (CIWs-now the Weekly Sum-
maries) of CIA's Office of Current Intelligence; and the National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) which the Director of Central Intelligence submits to the
President.
Among these, only State's IRs are in depth, running in some cases to more
than 50, even 100 pages. Hence the IRs should be the most likely of the three
series to permit clarification of relevant differences between the psychological
worlds of the American reader and a foreign community. Concerning OCI's
CIWs, we have contrary expectations: each issue in this series covers only high-
lights of selected current events and their significance, and does so on a world-
wide basis, with seldom more than two or three pages available for a given item.
Similarly, the NIEs are tightly compressed; those limited to a single country
usually run five to 15 pages. But the NIEs are produced by senior analysts who
have been-and usually still are-concerned with several countries. We antici-
pate that these officers have had in-depth experience with a variety of countries
and cultures, and hence are well sensitized to the importance of communicating
the closest possible approximation of a cultural context. Admittedly, in some
cases it is difficult to detect whether the analysts are saying little or nothing
concerning a local people's way of thinking about a situation in order to meet
*An excellent study of both the political and the administrative aspects is Robert Scigliano's
South Vietnam: Nation under Stress (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1963), especially chs. 2-4.
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space restrictions, or because data on the local viewpoint are unavailable, or be-
cause the analysts are not sensitive to the importance of that perspective.
Ngo Dinh Diem, 1954-1956-CIWs' Perspective
Ngo Dinh Diem first appears in the CIWs as prospective premier on 18
June 1954,* a week before he arrived in Saigon. For the American government
he clearly was an intelligence target of the highest priority. Back in early 1952
the National Security Council's comprehensive statement on United States goals
in Southeast Asia had declared:
With respect to Indochina the United States should . . . continue to cultivate friendly
and increasingly cooperative relations with the Government of France and the Associated
States at all levels with a view to maintaining and, if possible, increasing the degree of
influence the U.S. can bring to bear on the policies and actions of the ... authorities....
Specifically we should use our influence to promote positive political, military, economic
and social policies ... [including] the development of more effective and stable govern-
ments.. . . * *
In 1954, as the French military position in Indochina deteriorated rapidly,
the Eisenhower administration twice hinted to France that it was ready to inter-
vene with American forces. More than two weeks before Diem's arrival in Saigon,
the American Military Mission was activated with the arrival of its Chief, Colonel
Edward G. Lansdale, on 1 June. Its task was to build a base for paramilitary
operations in Vietminh-held areas. By mid-summer, however, Lansdale was ad-
vising Diem directly on the task of preventing a collapse of civil government.
On 4 August, in their preconditions for U.S. military aid to the Diem regime,
the joint Chiefs of Staff stipulated:
It is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in
control. It is hopeless to expect a U.S. military training mission to achieve success unless
the nation concerned is able effectively to perform those governmental functions essential
to the successful raising and maintenance of national armed forces.
Thus, by 18 June, when we first encounter Diem in the CIWs, Lansdale had
been in place in Saigon for more than two weeks, the existing Buu Loc govern-
ment continued to be paralyzed, and Diem already had the nod from Emperor
Bao Dai to take over shortly in Vietnam with sweeping authority. But the two-
page CIW refers only cryptically to "one Ngo Dinh Diem"; he was considered
to rate "well below Buu Loc in terms of political administrative ability." No
clues are given to what kind of man Diem was or how he saw the world.***
The CIW item of 23 July on the intentions of the French in South Vietnam
cites Diem as a cause of concern to them because he insisted that Hanoi was
"the cradle of the race"-to be retaken at all costs. This two-page report de-
scribes Diem only in the context of the French view of him as an "excitable and im-
*Virtually all documents which we cite in the three series identified above are classified
through SECRET-and are listed in the Intelligence Publications Index (IPI), which was
compiled and published by CIA on a continuing basis through the mid-1960s.
* *The Pentagon Papers, pp. 27-30. The immediately following data are from the same
source, pp. 1-21.
* * * State's Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition put out a three-page Biographic
Report on Diem, also dated 18 June. Earlier reports on Diem also had been produced by the
Department. These reports provided a fair number of clues to his viewpoints, including political
ones.
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pulsive nationalist" who should be removed from office. No additional glimpses
of Diem appear in this series until after mid-August.
The CIW of 20 August carries the first evaluation of the prospects for
developing a strong government in the South, and hence, for Diem to perform suc-
cessfully as premier. These prospects were judged to be unfavorable. The analysts
saw Diem as "rigid in his thinking and ill-informed on many matters of practical
administration." But they did not comment on the core elements of his per-
sonality-his beliefs, values, and norms-or on his views of his overall task
and problems, or on his motives and expectations. No references at all are found
in the CIW series concerning his personal, social, or political background. The
20 August report notes, "Presumably on moral grounds, he has not yet taken
into his government representatives of the Cao Dai and other war lord sects..., ."
But his thinking on this matter is not discussed in specific terms.
The 20 August report cites the conclusion of American officials in Vietnam
that Diem's Government did have "a greater potential for winning wide popular
support than any available successor." The reason cited for this view was that
the leadership was "irreproachably nationalist," "unprecedentedly honest,"
and genuinely anti-Communist. The premier himself enjoyed "wide personal
respect" for his integrity. But no hint is given of either the psychological or the
technical factors which might bear upon an objective of winning wide popular
support in Vietnamese terms. Furthermore, some of the adjectives intended to
describe the Vietnamese leadership-words such as "honest" and "anti-Com-
munist"-quite likely served as mirror image terms, thus misleading both the
writers and the readers. The analysts give no indication that they were aware of
this possibility.
Not until 8 December 1955-more than a year later--did a CIW again
take an overall look at Diem's political prospects. Meanwhile, his "progress
toward consolidating his regime and extending its authority" was cited only in
passing in a report of 10 February 1955. This CIW fails to reflect the State
Department's biographic report on Diem of 4 November 1954, which drew on
the cables Ambassador Heath in Saigon evidently prepared for the purpose of
briefing his replacement, General J. Lawton Collins. Heath had cast considera-
ble light on the direction of Diem's political thinking:
It soon became apparent Diem had indeed lost touch with the real situation in Viet-
nam.. . . He was all but paralyzed by what he did find ... [and] seemed unable to
move "off of dead center." . . . He has a reputation for honesty and patriotism ... [but]
is scarcely capable of influencing people, making friends, or undertaking determined
action. He seems to dwell in an ivory tower with a belief in his mission and leaving urgent
political negotiations largely in the hands of others. . . . He has largely lost whatever
support he enjoyed among Vietnamese political groups. It is difficult to establish how far
from the premier's palace the authority of the government extends, but it does not extend
very far.
In the 10 February CIW, the main focus is upon a rising threat to the
security of the Saigon regime. The government would probably soon be forced
to "deal with increasing dissidence on the part of the powerful politico-religious
sects." " Their ensuing intrigues, climaxed by the Binh Xuyen's attack on govern-
ment installations and the premier's palace on 29-30 March, drew detailed and
steady coverage in the CIWs through May 1955. The political issues in this
struggle, however, are given only brief and piecemeal coverage. The term
"politico-religious sects" is repeatedly used but with virtually no elaboration.
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The term "gangster society" as applied to the Binh Xuyen could not fail to
evoke mirror images.
Here was indeed a missed opportunity for the CIWs to shed light on Diem's
problem of winning popular support. For the sects themselves played a funda-
mental political role in the regions of South Vietnam, which does not come
through in these reports concentrating on the security aspect of the challenge to
Saigon. As Fall put it later, in Last Reflections on a War:
Regionalism in Vietnam is a fact of life which no amount of centralization can paper
over. For some unfathomable reason, the decision was made in 1954 [gradually] to
replace what was on the whole a well-decentralized administrative system by a truly
French-patterned, highly centralized administrative structure. More and more power
was heaped on the fragile shoulders of Saigon's central bureaucracy, while such "natural"
units of government as the region or the district either were abolished or lost all effective
power.... In the absence of a broadly accepted government, people of necessity must
fall back on the one structure of society they can trust-their religion.*
The French, who had not attempted to extend the political base of Cochinchina-
or, later, of the State of Vietnam-to embrace the villages, had instead subsidized
the sects as regional centers of power. Diem's refusal to continue this system thus
raised a question about his political views. What were his thoughts on finding
some alternative route for winning support in the countryside? The CIWs of
this period show no awareness of this major gap in U.S. political intelligence on
South Vietnam.
By December 1955 Diem was preparing for popular election of a "Con-
stituent" (Constitutional) Assembly. It was almost a year and a half since he had
come to power. Yet no hint of his political philosophy appears in the brief
report on the political situation in the CIW of the 8th. We learn only that "he
considers it imperative at this juncture to have an assembly on which he can rely."
Though opposition candidates were apparently to be allowed to run, "stringent
electoral procedures" were calculated to prevent many from being elected.
The next CIW to report on political developments, dated 31 May 1956,
provides an estimate that "South Vietnam's viability will be further bolstered by
the adoption of a constitution" by late June. "Effective control" would remain
with the presidency; "certain limitations" would be placed on the people because
Diem was convinced "full democracy must be withheld until the danger of Viet-
minh subversion subsides and an enlightened electorate develops." A follow-up
report of 19 July gave two paragraphs to the political scene, one of which reported
adoption of the constitution on 2 July and reiterated Diem's conviction that "some
sacrifice of the democratic aspects of government" must be endured under present
conditions. Again, terms such as "full democracy" and "democratic aspects of
government" could not be expected to communicate political concepts which
would be valid in the context of the Vietnamese scene.
What can we conclude concerning the OCI analysts' probable attention or
inattention to the psychological dimension of their reporting on Diem's political
outlook and policies as thus far reviewed? As we apply our criteria, we find
only negative indicators concerning attention to the differences between the
Vietnamese and the American ways of thinking (our set "A" of possible indicators
on page 13). If indeed, the analysts were aware of these differences, we can safely
question whether they were being realistic to assume an adequate level of
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awareness also in their readers. As for analysts' awareness of what was on the
minds of local groups or individuals, or "how their minds worked" (our set "B"
of indicators), we find a few positive indicators, all falling under the heading
of reported views, attitudes, concerns, motivations, and/or expectations. The
attention even to this category is intermittent and casual. We conclude that the
"psychological world" of the local individuals and groups discussed was given
minimal attention in the reports reviewed.
State's Reporting on the Diem Regime, 1954-1956
The first State Department IR which analyzes the Diem regime and its pros-
pects is dated 15 September 1955 and runs 76 pages.* Approximately one-half
of this report is devoted to the political scene. There are numerous positive
indicators of attention to "What was on the minds" of significant individuals
and groups. But, as was the case with CIA's CIWs, we find almost no discussion
of fundamentals of Diem's personality, or of his views of his overall task, or of
his motives and broad expectations.
What inspired and drove this virtual dictator of South Vietnam, whom
Washington had come around to backing fully,** is thus left to the imagination
of the reader. The unconscious result of the reader's perception process can be
to interpret the reported decisions and actions of Diem in the light of the reader's
own culture-hound preconceptions and assumptions. This result is all the more
likely because the report concentrates heavily on Diem's strategy and tactics for
strengthening the regime and overcoming threats to its security-factors which
in themselves are commonly rated important by American foreign affairs officers
and can sound deceptively familiar to them.
One qualification must be added concerning the State analysts' neglect
of Diem's views in the IR of 15 September 1955. "One of Diem's greatest handi-
caps," they wrote, "has been an almost pathological inability to trust leaders
who had previously been associated with administrations under French control."
The analysts' attention to why he distrusted many prominent figures provides a
more balanced perpective for understanding Diem's patterns of decisionmaking.
Had the IR of 15 September provided a sketch of Diem's perspectives on
the new State of Vietnam and on his role as premier, this would have served to
guide the reader toward the premier's approach to policy decisions. Instead, the
brief statements of his policies are made for the most part in general terms arid
raise risks of evoking mirror images. The stated policy objectives were to:
1) demonstrate the independence of Vietnam, its potential for democratic growth
and a degree of popular support sufficient to justify his claim to leadership;
2) restore national unity;
3) establish the authority of the national administration;
*IR 7045, "Probable Developments in South Vietnam through July 1956" (SECRET).
No IRs on any aspect of South Vietnam are cited in the IPI for the second half of 1954, and
my efforts to find any such reports through contacts with State/INR were unproductive.
* *Gen. J. Lawton Collins, serving in Vietnam as President Eisenhower's personal represent-
ative, had reported to Washington in December 1954 that Diem was unequal to his task and
urged that he be removed. Should Washington be unable to accomplish this, Collins recom-
mended as the alternative "re-evaluation of our plans for assisting Southeast Asia." Lansdale
stood behind Diem, and a counterattack brought victory over the sects on 28 April 1955.
The Pentagon Papers. pp. 19-21.
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4) divide and conquer with respect to those whose loyalties were parochial and whose
activities limited the internal sovereignty of the state;
5) prepare for election of a National Assembly as evidence of the democratic orien-
tation of the regime; and
6) accomplish reforms of administrative procedures and agrarian policies.
In each case, we find one or more abstract terms-standing for generalized
concepts-without reference to specific examples of objectives or methods. Such
uses of abstract terms are notorious occasions for complete breakdowns of
communication across cultural lines. Only if abstractions are accompanied by
detailed explanations of the personal frames of reference of the writer or speaker
can we hope to deter the reader or listener from "constructing the reality" of
the message as he perceives it. The IR under consideration does provide some
specific examples of the actual accomplishments of the Diem regime which
relate to its generalized policy objectives, but without giving us his exact goals.
Before leaving this in-depth IR of 15 September 1955, let us note what
attention the analysts give to how the population, political groups, and French
advisers in South Vietnam saw the Diem regime. Though treatment of this
aspect is no doubt thinner than was desirable, the State report provides critically
important clues to these views-a type of clue which we missed in CIA's CIWs:
A tremendous chasm remains . . . between governors and governed. The Vietnamese
people, war-weary and for the most part still village-oriented, continue to regard gov-
ernment largely in terms of its impositions rather than of its opportunities for participa-
tion, distrust leadership until shown that it can be trusted, and avoid all unnecessary
responsibility.
In essential respects, the political base of the national administration remains un-
broadened. . . . French interpretations of a desirable "broadening" of the government
have differed from the view of Diem and, to some extent, from that of the U.S. French
advisors have stressed the importance of including representatives of the long-standing
political parties in Vietnam and of the religious sects. Diem has refused to do this as
long as these groups failed to give undivided loyalty to the national administration. His
efforts to strengthen the government have resulted largely in the introduction of essentially
nonpolitical technicians on whom he believed he could rely. Such measures may have
contributed to increasing the competence of his administration but have not appreciably
widened the base of Diem's political strength.
Here, albeit in capsule form, is an analysis of Diem's basic vulnerabilities on
the political front, which were a major contributing cause of his violent end eight
years later. These weaknesses sprang from his political strategy and policy
objectives, which clearly called for serious intelligence analysis.
Moving forward now to 1956, we find that the major IR of that year on
Vietnam covers both the South and the North, is dated 23 May, and runs 105
pages.* About 15 pages focus directly on the political scene in South Vietnam-
less than half the space which had been given to this topic in the shorter IR of
15 September 1955. While an analysis of Diem's perspectives on his task is still
wanting, we note increased attention in general to the current views of indi-
viduals and groups concerning issues and events.
In a fair number of instances in the 23 May 1956 report, the analysts'
conjectures and ways of expressing such views and aspirations evoke mirror
images. A prime instance is the reference at the outset to Diem's "apparently
deep democratic convictions stemming from his education and experience under
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Western influence," which served to moderate the regime's movement toward
"paternalistic authoritarianism." We have already reviewed some of the strong
evidence for the proposition that Diem had no commitment to Western concepts
of democratic processes.* Furthermore, in the absence of any general discussion
of Diem's political philosophy in the IRs, we have no hint of what the analysts
themselves understood by the term "deep democratic convictions" or by another
expression, "deviations from these democratic principles," appearing nearby in
the same context. We speculate on how much consumers of finished intelligence
concerned with the support of Diem's regime may have read into this and similar
generalized references to his "democratic" convictions. A limited warning against
unwarranted assumptions which might be drawn from this term does follow
in the same paragraph:
In the face of surviving problems, and particularly in the context of the traditionally
conspiratorial nature of Vietnamese politics, it is virtually inevitable that the government
[will] not conform to Western ideals of democratic behavior for a period of years.
But do we also catch a hidden, culture-bound assumption here? Are the analysts
implying that the Saigon Government might conform to these Western ideals
eventually? We may infer at least that this was a goal which the analysts believed
was taken for granted by some readers of their reports.
Such inferences bring up a crucial question for America's goals and modus
operandi in the global role which it undertook beginning in the late 1940s.
The question can be put: how realistic is the common expectation of Americans
(and Westerners) that they can produce fundamental change in the life patterns
of non-Westerners? This expectation began to be challenged seriously in the
early 1960s but still lingers on as a hidden assumption in many official and un-
official programs. Broadly speaking, this assumption has been present for two
decades behind the far-flung efforts of Americans to advise and guide the South
Vietnamese on building a viable economy, society, and political state.
The assumption itself has sharply limited viability, as was forcefully stated
in 1962 by George M. Foster in a text for the general public:
Americans wear cultural blinders, of which we usually are ignorant, which prevent us
from fully understanding the needs and desires of the people we wish to help, and which
make us insensitive to the full range of economic, social, and cultural consequences re-
sulting from narrowly conceived developmental programs. Technological development is a
complex process. . . . Perhaps . . . the term sociotechnological development would clarify
our thinking, for development is much more than the overt acceptance of material and
technical improvements. It is a cultural, social, and psychological process as well. . . .
[including] a corresponding change in the attitudes, the thoughts, the values, the beliefs,
and the behavior of the people ... affected.... These nonmaterial changes are more subtle.
Often they are overlooked or their significance is underestimated. Yet the eventual effect
of a material or social improvement is determined by the extent to which other aspects
of culture affected by it can alter their forms with a minimum of disruption.**
* Westerners may be misled by the focus of the philosophy of "Personalism" on the
dignity or high value of the human person; they may assume this extended into politics, but
the adherents of Personalism appear to have limited its connotations largely to the moral sphere.
"Traditional Cultures: and the Impact of Technological Change (Harper, New York,
1962), pp. 1-3. See also The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America (McGraw, New York, 1967), by Theodore Geiger, Chief of
International Studies at the National Planning Association.
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The literature on this broad problem in the fields of overseas planning,
negotiations, and operations points clearly to a helpful two-part ground rule
which has been derived empirically from Western experience throughout the
"developing" world over more than two decades:
1-the members of any cultural group tend to resist change in their culture,
particularly in the core elements;
2--when the members do take new goods or procedures or concepts from
abroad which bring along foreign beliefs, values, or norms, they usually
manage to modify and adapt the imports to "fit into" or harmonize with
the existing culture.
This ground rule can serve analysts well for guiding readers concerning the
likely impact of policies which entail cultural changes abroad.
In sum, we find that State's reports, as anticipated, do give considerable
attention to what is on the minds of the individuals and groups involved in
the events discussed. But we conclude, on the basis of these reports concerned
with the Diem regime, that this attention is confined largely to "the surface
level" of the actors' thinking. We find only rare references to their deeper frames
of reference-such as preconceptions, values, beliefs-which would serve as
basic guidelines for understanding their present and future behavior. The most
serious gap is in the references to Diem himself, whose role was critical for the
success of American policy concerning Southeast Asia. Finally, mirror images have
been noted, which in some cases risk encouraging entirely unrealistic expecta-
tions concerning the outcome of American policy decisions for that area.
The Diem Regime as Reflected in the NIEs-1954-1956
In the National Intelligence Estimates, once again we search with care for
references to Diem and clues to analysts' awareness of the critical need in 1954-
1956 for America's leaders to understand his "psychological world." Such clues
are rare in the nine NIEs available to us for the period from April 1954 down to
17 July 1956. The only details to be found which are descriptive of the man him-
self touch on behavior traits-"his honesty and zeal," his being "rigid and un-
willing to compromise"-or on job effectiveness. The statements evaluating Diem's
performance during his first year in office rest for the most part on tactical
considerations. Such a statement concerned his quite unexpected success in
overcoming the Binh Xuyen organization's direct challenge to him in Saigon
between late March and early May 1955. The NIE of 2 May reflects the optimism
of the moment in Saigon and Washington:
The success of Premier Diem in operations against the Binh Xuyen, and in his stand
against Bao Dai, the French, and General Vy, has created a new and potentially revo-
lutionary situation in Vietnam.... Diem appears to hold the initiative in the phase that
is about to begin.... The French and Bao Dai will have to adapt themselves to a radically
new political situation dominated by Diem or by more extreme nationalist elements... .
The virtual expulsion of the Binh Xuyen from Saigon . . . has increased Diem's prestige
throughout Vietnam. . . . If he were forced from office, many of his followers would
probably undertake revolutionary opposition....*
*SNIE 63.1-2/1-55 (SECRET). The Pentagon Papers shows (pp. 20-21) that Lansdale
stiffened Diem's spine in this affair and provided strong organizational support.
SFiC
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The ONE analysts' apparent inattention to the deeper forces that "made Diem
tick"-his beliefs, values, norms, and perspectives-may well explain the posi-
tion they took on his hostility toward the French:
Prime Minister Diem's blatantly nationalistic and openly anti-French attitude has caused
many of the French on the scene . . . to assume a hostile attitude toward Diem and
work openly toward depriving him of ... support. If Diem had the full support of the
French, he might he able gradually to create a sense of national will and purpose in
South Vietnam.... However, the French are not likely to provide Diem with full and
positive support. Therefore, Diem will probably not be able to reestablish the authority
of the government throughout South Vietnam and tackle effectively the multitude of
pressing problems now facing the country. *
The implication seems to be that Diem should and could abandon this behavior,
and that "it was news." We have seen that considerable biographic data on Diem
had long since been made available by State's Office of Libraries and Intelligence
Acquisition. His adamant stand against the French presence in Vietnam had
been publicly known and had been sustained since July 1933, when he resigned
as Minister of the Interior after only two months of service and publicly accused
Emperor Ban Dai of being "nothing but an instrument in the hands of the French
authorities."
Besides Diem's "psychological world," South Vietnam's "world of political
realities" was of critical importance for the success of the Saigon regime. By
``political realities" we mean how the traditional system worked in practice-
e.g., how power was shared, exercised, and retained. Such methods are neces-
sarily imbedded in the local culture and hence are consistent with the local
psychology. An awareness of these underlying and largely hidden factors is
scarcely reflected in the four short NIEs produced between 21 May and 15
September 1954.*** These papers do make the points that: extreme factionalism
was increasing the chances of a military coup in May and June; the incoming
Diem regime appeared to have the "passive support of the leading nationalist
organizations and individuals" in July and August; and by September it appeared
to retain considerable unorganized popular support despite the crush of problems
to be met. But what were the power relationships between the factions and
regional sects, and between these and the military? What were the precedents
and the power factors involved when a national leader sought to win strong
support from the leadership groups? And, above all, where had the small urban
elites and the rural masses traditionally placed their allegiance and their
confidence? A correlation of the reported events with the broad framework
of local political dynamics is needed in order to grasp the significance of
developments in Vietnamese terms.
The next NIE, dated 23 November 1954, is the first in-depth analysis in the
series which followed Diem's advent to power. Now local factors are pointed
up which hindered development of a strong state in the South: geographic,
ethnic, social, cultural, and political differences throughout the area are method-
ically itemized. But little guidance is given for readers to establish the relative
*NIE 63-7-54, 23 November 1954, pp. 4, 8.
**Fall, The Two Vietnams, beginning p. 235, provides many indications of Diem's anti-
French bias, which apparently can be traced back to his mandarin father.
***N1Es: 63-3-54, 21 May; 63-4-54, 16 June: 63-5-54, 3 August; and 63-6-54, 15 Sept.
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influence of the individual forces or to understand how they worked to slow the
unification effort. Furthermore, in an apparent effort to explain why the people
had not rallied to Diem's call for unity, the analysts state:
The mass of the South Vietnamese have seen such a succession of crises in the last decade
that they have become in effect inured to political developments and unresponsive to
appeals.
Inasmuch as we find no evidence for this statement of a cause and effect rela-
tionship, the presumption is strong that the analysts were under the influence of
a mirror image. The statement implies that prior to the last decade the masses
had given attention to the country's crises and had been responsive to appeals
from the central government. The analysts were probably "seeing" a political
community with a fundamental rapport between the rural population and the
center of power, like the communities which had developed historically in
Western countries-but not in Southeast Asia.
Is this another instance of Americans' general lack of knowledge concerning
things Vietnamese? One of the first Americans to call attention to this deficiency
was Dolf Droge, the White House specialist and briefer on the Vietnamese who
has been addressing audiences throughout the country for almost a decade. His
plea for action on this public education front was strong during the war years:
If life views have a great deal to do with people's attitudes and your ability to reach
them, then it is high time we begin to take a look at the essential element in this war
and that is the Vietnamese. Now, the Vietnamese people, in this sense, have been so
poorly described in our public discussion of them that you literally have fantasy operating
on one side and reality operating 10,000 miles away. *
From late 1965, an excellent nine-page report by U.S.I.A.'s Research and
Reference Service was available on the Vietnamese peasant's beliefs, values,
and living patterns.** But for American intelligence officers the general dearth
of information in English, as well as in-depth understanding concerning Viet-
amese society and culture, was a severe hazard. This made it increasingly dif-
ficult to assess the outlook for a more effective regime in Saigon and a decline
of the Communists' power and influence in the South. A crucial unknown
quantity in assessments of both major questions was "the psychological world of
the peasant."
Thus far, the indications in the NIEs of attention to the cultural and psy-
chological dimension of analysis are indeed meager. Neither Diem's political
philosophy nor the behavioral patterns characteristic of the Vietnamese political
process are discussed or reflected. Local ethnic and societal differences are
cited but are not tied in with the political process and outlook. In one instance
we encounter a misleading implication that the political horizons of the rural
population had once extended to Vietnam's power center.
But, one may well ask, did the NIEs' shortcomings in these respects really
matter? Wasn't their primary function estimative-to come up with the outlook
and timely warnings for the policy makers and not to provide a thorough
analysis of how and why these estimates were determined? Indeed, the Pentagon
Papers, according to the editors of The New York Times edition, "reveal that
*From a tape recording of a talk titled "How the Vietnamese Sees the American," which
Droge presented at C.I.A. on 27 March 1970.
**R-138-65, titled "The Vietnamese Peasant: His Value System," October 1965
(UNCLASSIFIED).
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the American intelligence community repeatedly provided the policy makers
with what proved to be accurate warnings that desired goals were either un-
attainable or likely to provoke costly reactions from the enemy."* The Estimates
of 1954 and 1955 support this statement. The Estimate of 3 August 1954 warns
that the Vietminh administrative cadres in South Vietnam "have been in firm
control of several large areas of Central and South Vietnam for several years ...
and will probably remain in place." On 15 September 1954 the estimators see
growing prospects of an eventual extension of Communist control in the South
without large military operations. By 2 May the next year, they present what
they perceive to be the significance of such a development for United States
support to Saigon over the long term:
We believe it will be extremely difficult, at best, for Diem or any Vietnamese government
to build sufficient strength to meet the long-range challenge of the Communists.
The Estimate of 11 October 1955 states that the Communists in South Vietnam
have now concentrated on methods of political struggle.
So far so good. Yet the major Estimate of 17 July 1956** raises some ques-
tions. Did the estimators indeed have a solid enough grasp of the political realities
at work in South Vietnam, to be able to place new and changing forces in
proper perspective? The Diem regime is pictured as having greatly strengthened
its political position in South Vietnam after reducing the sects to political im-
potence and making a strong showing in the first elections for a national leg-
islature on 4 March. "No openly anti-Diem deputy" was elected, and 80 percent
of the eligible voters participated. Despite efforts by the Communists and
other resistence groups to disrupt and sabotage the voting, the elections were
calm and orderly. Yet Fall selects data on this event which give it a disquieting
cast in terms of its long-term significance. The winners "did not, needless to
say, include a single candidate who could be construed to be a representative
of the `loyal opposition'." North and Central Vietnamese candidates "with no
popular following whatever" were given newly created "refugee constituencies."
Two representatives of old-line nationalist and non-Communist parties ran
against government candidates, were elected despite heavy interference, but
were disqualified and replaced by government candidates in a run-off election.
Fall concludes that the South Vietnamese legislatures elected in 1956, 1959,
and 1963 were, in fact, "as homogeneous as those elected by the Vietminh in
1946 and 1960." * * *
What, then, of the actual viewpoints and convictions and desires of the
mass of Vietnamese? What clues to these bedrock forces beneath the surface of
the political scene did the analysts draw from the composition of the legislature
or from open sources describing the people? The 14-page Estimate of 17 July
1956 barely touches on the problem of delineating popular views:
Diem's success in by-passing the July 1956 election date without evoking large-scale
Communist military reaction will reassure many Vietnamese and encourage them to co-
operate with GVN programs to expose and root out Communism. If the Communists
were to undertake large-scale guerrilla action in South Vietnam, they probably would
*Pp. xx-xxi. The editors refer also to "some lapses in the accuracy of reporting and
intelligence."
**NIE 63-56, "Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam through Mid-1957."
***The Two Vietnams, pp. 258-259.
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not be able to develop wide-spread popular support. Public confidence in the GVN
combined with a general war-weariness may have already reached the point where any
effort to upset the government by force would lead to a strong popular reaction against
the guerrillas.*
No other references to popular attitudes are to be found in this paper; we can
only guess at the basis for arriving at the estimative conclusions cited. Clearly
they rest on certain assumptions about the state of mind of large numbers of Viet-
namese. Many are assumed to be already disposed to help in rooting out Com-
munists, provided only that Hanoi shows itself indisposed to retaliate against
Diem's refusal of nation-wide elections. No widespread popular sentiment in
support of any major guerrilla action by the Communists is assumed likely. And an
increase of public confidence in the GVN as well as an increase of war-weariness
is considered already under way.
But how realistic were such assumptions in 1956? Americans had little hard
information on current attitudes in Vietnam, but hoped fervently that the new
South Vietnamese nation would succeed in knitting itself together. Was this
the beginning of a national habit of relying on unexamined assumptions about
Vietnam, which hardened in the early 1960s when the policy makers began
to escalate America's commitment to Saigon? How critical for the future were
the favorable but undocumented assumptions of the intelligence community
about "the psychological and political worlds" of the Vietnamese masses in 1956?
We turn now to the reliable data which for the most part were available in 1956
in open sources, concerning the villagers' basic perspectives on politics and
political developments. These data will help us gauge the analysts' shortcomings
in attempting to reflect popular viewpoints of the Diem era.
The Vietnamese Villagers' Perspective on Politics
Our line of inquiry takes us into some of the most controversial. problems
of perception which Americans have faced in their entire experience with Vietnam.
Just how have Vietnamese villagers traditionally viewed the world of government
and politics? To what extent and for what reasons have the Southern villagers
been attracted to either the Saigon or the Hanoi regime since the Geneva Con-
ference, and been open to ideological or material inducements from either side?
And-the most subtle distinction of all-must it be assumed that Southerners or
Northerners who are cooperating with Communists in the military or the political
field are necessarily led more by Hanoi's control measures than by nationalism
or other issues? We turn to the outstanding scholars on the Vietnamese people's
"psychological world" in a search for fundamental clues to "realities" in these
matters.
McAlister and Mus** lay an ample foundation for understanding the Viet-
namese villagers' traditional perspectives on matters political, in chapters titled
"Sources of the Vietnamese Political Tradition" and "The Mandate of Heaven:
Politics as Seen from the Vietnamese Village." In the village one finds "the
*P. 14. "The July 1956 election date" refers to the stipulation in the Final Declaration
of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954, that "general elections shall be held in July 1956"
in both "zones" of the State of Vietnam. Neither Diem's Foreign Minister nor the American
Under Secretary of State signed this Final Declaration.
* *Here we are drawing mainly on The Vietnamese and Their Revolution, chapters 2 and 3.
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essence of Vietnamese culture" and also the "key answer" to this people's historic
problems. This answer lies in "that spirit of resistance" which once enabled the
culture to "resist the model [China] it was patterned on." The villages for cen-
turies preserved "a deep-rooted autonomy." Their councils of notables prevented
the state's authorities from knowing and dealing with the individual inhabitants.
The state-directed by the Emperor, the court, and the mandarin system-was
centralized and authoritarian, but the villages successfully preserved broad
freedom of local action well into the twentieth century. By Confucian tradition,
the villages were believed to possess a "virtue"-an inherent power-which
preserved them from the state's encroachments. Thus the "real world" of the
villagers traditionally was limited to their local world, and their customary free-
doms were safeguarded by certain beliefs and shrewd tactics for dealing with
the Emperor's mandarins.
The First Indochina War-the struggle against the French-led to drastic
changes of form in the villagers' relations with the state. In all areas of Vietnam
controlled by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)-which did riot
assume control of Hanoi until October 1954-the village councils were swept
away by the August Revolution of 1945. In these areas, the Communist leaders
laid the foundation for "a modern political community which they hoped would
lead Vietnam into the postcolonial world as a united as well as independent
country." The customary councils of notables were replaced by "a new type
of village committee." In support of these new committees, village society was
regrouped along radically new lines by creation of unions of workers, peasants,
women, the aged, tradesmen, former military, and other social strata. The Viet-
minh, replacing the Indochinese Communist Party, became the umbrella or-
ganization for the mass membership groups, which for the first time in Vietnam
"provided a stimulus and a rationale for popular participation in politics."
In those areas of the South which were under the control of the Saigon-
based State of Vietnam after the Geneva Conference, Diem abolished local elec-
tions of village councils in 1956 and increasingly exercised his dictatorial powers.*
Robert ScigIiano observes, in his in-depth study of political trends under Diem:
In certain important respects, the development of government institutions in South Vietnam
since independence has been marked by a sharp break with colonial and pre-colonial
tradition. . . . More important than the changes wrought by constitutional action have
been the administrative changes produced by executive decree. The uniform direction
of these decrees has been the strengthening of presidential power over the agencies of
the national government and the centralizing of national control over a burgeoning local
administration... .
With the abolition of village autonomy, the extension of central government controls into
the villages, and the development of new government programs, the administrative system
of the Republic of Vietnam has become more centralized than it ever was under the
emperors or the French, and is surpassed only by the Communist bureaucracy created in
North Vietnam.
Scigliano concludes, "In a Iimited sense, Diem did effect a revolution after coming
to power.' But the author perceives Diem's actions to have been "essentially
negative," calculated to strengthen him vis-a-vis his rivals for control of Vietnam.
His efforts were "hardly revolutionary" in the sense of infusing the system
*FitzGerald, op. cit., pp. 117-120. For a broad discussion of the villagers' view of the
world and Diem's treatment of the villagers, see also beginning p. 105.
* *Op. cit., pp. 29, 31, 33.
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with a new spirit and new personnel. The flag and the anthem remained those
of the former Emperor Bao Dai. "A general orientation of government adminis-
tration away from the people and toward Saigon" took stronger hold from 1956,
and was accompanied by "a commensurate break between the government and
the Vietnamese population."
The Village View of the Central Government
Now we are ready for a question which was pivotal for America's mission
in Vietnam but apparently was not raised by our policy makers or intelligence
analysts. How do Vietnamese villagers traditionally view a central government's
moves for revolutionary change in its relationships with the local governments
and communities? Outside the less traditional Mekong Delta, where patterns of
land tenure and social structure have long since broken with ancient custom,
the mass of rural Vietnamese view such drastic moves in the light of timeless
beliefs about the nature of society and the "true" auspices of revolutionary
change.* Society is considered to rest, not on a Western-style social contract
among men, but on a pact or bond among heaven, the land, and the ancestors.
The spirit of this bond is believed to be embodied in the living generation. The
instruments or executors of the bond are, simultaneously, the Emperor-the
image of heaven-the provincial governors, and the heads of families. All of
these prestigious figures in normal times are seen as being in harmony with "the
reason of the universe." Individuals have "to function within the system." There
is "no reality" for the individual apart from the social contract. In traditional
Vietnamese society, he has "only relative rights."
Moments of sweeping change in social conditions are viewed as the result
of a rupture of the harmony normally existing among the executors of the social
bond and "the reason of the universe." At these times, the traditional Vietnamese
is "apt to interrogate fate and the adaptation of men to that fate." He wants to
learn whether the leaders are moving "in accordance with that indescribable
something which has no name in our language but which in Vietnamese is
called Thidn minh, suggesting for us `the will of heaven' or `the heavenly man-
date'." McAlister and Mus tell us:
The only revolutions that Vietnamese political wisdom considers authentic are those that
effect complete change. The main proof of a party's right to power is a program that
provides new solutions for everything, and in East Asia this conception has forever been
familiar to the simplest countryman.... It is an odd mistake to believe that the Vietnamese
common man is concerned with nothing but his bowl of rice.... For centuries, even in
the poorest villages, there were a few local literati who progressively familiarized the
national consciousness with the principles of Chinese political thought.... An unerring
instinct assures [the people] that in crucial times their own reaction is what in the last
resort determines the fate of the nation.... The common man chooses between systems....
It is up to him through that choice to sanction the system, or "virtue," that is in harmony
with fate... .
To appear before the people, the supreme judge, with any chance of success as a messenger
of fate, a revolutionary party must show them all the signs of its mission. In this case
the people expect the sign of signs: the ease and fluidity of success. The revolutionary
party must succeed in everything as if miraculously. . . . [emphasis added]
*A comprehensive treatment of the traditional Vietnamese beliefs and attitudes cited
here is to be found in McAlister and Mus, op. cit., pp. 44-69, 88-89.
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The Vietminh's social and political revolution profited first from the
villagers' long-standing opposition to French policies. This stand caused the vil-
lagers to view their communities as endowed with a "virtue" antagonistic to the
monarchy, of which the French posed as "protectors." The repressive policies
carried out by the French colonial authorities prepared the minds of the people
for a type of "cosmic or climactic" revolution that was included in their tradition.
Hence, in 1945 when the revolutionaries became masters of the situation, "they
were expected to eliminate all the elements of the former system; compromises
were not anticipated."
The victors' position was vastly reinforced by unmistakable signs that they
had received the mandate of heaven. On 24 August 1945, the "Son of Heaven,"
Emperor Bao Dai, remitted his "seal and his sword" to the representatives of the
Vietminh and Ho Chi Minh. McAlister and Mus highlight "the astounding
scenario presented by the advent of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at
Hanoi and the effect it must have had on the Vietnamese masses:"
This bid for revolutionary power occurred amidst a whirlpool that swept everything
away-japanese occupation forces, foreigners of all kinds, and the national dynasty.
Yesterday's outlaws became on the world scene their country's leaders and proclaimed
themselves heaven-sent in the most classical of traditions. Therefore, the state of mind,
so to speak, of all Vietnam could not fail to transmit the great jolt all the way to the
farthest villages. Everything was possible, indeed inevitable, in the countryside the minute
heaven's decision was manifested in such an unimpeachable way in the capital.
Furthermore, the Vietminh leaders themselves very likely were intent
upon strengthening this "scenario." It would serve as a powerful confirmation for
the masses of the new regime's right to rule Vietnam, in keeping with the ancient
beliefs of the Vietnamese. This theme is developed in some depth by Tran
Van Dinh:
... the Vietnamese Communist leaders, besides being Marxist-Leninist, are predominantly
Confucianist and supremely mandarinal. In true Confucianist tradition and in conformity
with the dictates of Heaven ... they are seriously concerned about, and uncompromising
on, matters they see as relating to virtue, morality, loyalty, and ceremony.... For them,
elections are a process of formalization, a ceremonial to sanctify a Mandate from Heaven
that has been conferred already upon them and their party. . . . Though the Vietminh
had captured power in Hanoi on August 19 [19451, Ho Chi Minh waited until Sep-
tember 2, after the Mandate of Heaven had been ceremoniously transferred by the Son of
Heaven in the imperial city [Hue], to proclaim the independence of Vietnam. Just as
instructive as this timetable was Bao Dai's metamorphosis, after his abdication, from
a "lackey," "a puppet," and a "traitor" ... into a "Supreme Advisor" to the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam.... These events, and the attitudes that inspired them, go far toward
explaining why Ho Chi Minh and his party have ever since considered themselves the
legitimate rulers of Vietnam, the whole of Vietnam.... *
The Diem regime scored poorly by the traditional Vietnamese criteria for
an "authentic" revolution. "New solutions for everything," which McAlister and
Mus emphasize as one sign of the Vietnamese heaven's approval, were not
introduced. While radical changes were accomplished in the central government's
relationships with the countryside, no sweeping modifications of the political
role or the living conditions of the peasant took place.** Furthermore, the mani-
*Op. cit., p. 77. Department of State files show that Dinh has been in exile in the United
States since 1963 and has followed neutralist and National Liberation Front (NLF) lines
since 1968.
**On living conditions, see Scigliano, op. cit., ch. 5, "Economic and Social Development."
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festations of the new regime at the local level gave too strong an impression
of de 'la' vu.
Whether educated at home or abroad, the higher level civil service is heavily permeated
with Western values.... French influence remains strong in the Vietnamese school sys-
tem. . . . A Vietnamese government survey in early 1959 found that 36 per cent [of
public employees] had been at least 10 years in government service . . . [back to] the
period when French civil servants still dominated middle and upper government positions
and were extensively found in many lower ones as well.... The prevalence of French
influence in the backgrounds of Vietnamese civil servants has strengthened the con-
tinuity . . . between the institutions and practices of the colonial regime and those of
the present regime.*
Finally, "the ease and fluidity of success" which also would have been a sign
of heaven's approval of Diem was conspicuously absent during his first year in
office. Indeed, his refusal to share the responsibility for decision making beyond
his tight circle of confidants and family collaborators had a congealing effect
at all levels of government throughout his tenure.
But the truly critical failure of Diem-in the context of his and America's
stand against the Vietminh-was his blindness to the fundamental need for the
masses to gain a sense of belonging to the State of Vietnam which he headed,
in order to feel moved to give it their commitment. Thus, he failed completely
to perceive the rural population the way Hanoi did-as a vital ingredient of a
new national power structure. At the same time, he left the door wide open for
the Vietminh to win the loyalty of many villagers who had no prior commitment
to either side. We cite some of McAlister's relevant conclusions in his epilogue
titled "The future of Revolution in Viet Nam":
. . . The political changes that Diem brought to southern Viet Nam were deceptive.
Though he had succeeded in crushing the power of the political-religious sects . . , he
had not created any political organization capable of integrating these groups into
resilient governmental institutions. . . . It was thought that he had established a viable
political order. In fact Diem had merely made his own narrowly based group ... supreme
over all the other non-Communist political groups in southern Vietnam.. . .
The revolution that Ngo Dinh Diem brought about had its effect in the super-struc-
ture of politics in southern Vietnam; it did not reach the village foundation of Vietnamese
society. . . . Instead of political mobilization he saw his major task as political control
of such effectiveness that it prevented anyone else from mobilizing power.**
The growing political liability which Diem's local officials and ARVN repre-
sented in the mid-1950s is discussed at considerable length by FitzGerald. Their
frequent contempt and abuse of the peasants stemmed from both the nature of
Diem's centralized administrative system and the accelerating breakdown of
the traditional society.***
Villagers' Perspectives as Reflected in Intelligence, 1954-1956
We now return to the intelligence community's assumptions about "the
psychological and political worlds" of the Vietnamese masses, which we began
to examine with the major NIE of 17 July 1956. Clearly, these optimistic as-
sumptions had little or no basis in the political realities of the countryside in
*Ibid., pp. 48-50.
**The Origins of Revolution, pp. 354-361, passim.
***Op. cit., pp. 106, 107, 118, 119.
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South Vietnam, as could be ascertained by research on the deepest traditions
and cultural. mind sets of the Vietnamese people. Had our senior analysts over-
looked the necessary research, or did they regard the available data as having
an uncertain relevance to current popular attitudes? We cannot be sure today
which alternative was the actual case in 1956. But the evidence suggests that
mirror images and the then widespread wishful thinking of Americans may well
have influenced the analysts' actual perceptions. Wasn't it quite typically Ameri-
can to perceive a new ruler's successful moves against his opposition, as well
as his broad plans for economic and social reform, as evidence that he was a
"go-getter' who would "hang in there" until he "got the job done"? At the
height of the Cold War, weren't Americans predisposed to perceive a govern-
ment's programs as more effective in winning popular support than irregular
guerrilla forces were apt to be? Few American observers in the 1950s probably
were prepared to conclude by their own insights just how the basic beliefs and
cultural viewpoints of the rural Vietnamese would necessarily help shape the
villagers' current political attitudes. The vast majority of Americans lacked the
necessary specific training for this, and were likely to be unacquainted with
relevant historical precedents.
The blind spot on political realities in the National Estimate of 17 July 1956
was crucial at that point in mid-1956, when Diem had refused to go along with
all-Vietnam elections, and a revival of Communist insurgency in the South was
likely. The intelligence community saw such a threat primarily in military terms,
in part because it thought of Saigon as the center of control of political forces
in South Vietnam. In reality, however, Diem's strategy of working "from the
top down" in order to control the people left the field open for the Communists
to work "from the bottom up" to mobilize political support for their revolu-
tionary new order. Diem's approach was in the same direction the French had
taken for three-quarters of a century, leading to their Wagnerian finale at Dien
Bien Phu. The Vietminh proved to be the true revolutionaries, whose right to
rule and strategy for uniting the Vietnamese people appeared the more con-
vincingly authentic and promising through much of the countryside.*
No doubt the senior analysts at the Estimates level failed to assign adequate
weight to the political appeal of the Vietminh also because its threat to the
internal security of South Vietnam was given priority attention. The NIE of 17
July 1956 takes the position that "the Communist underground represents the only
serious threat" to that state's internal security. This paper goes on to say that
the overall political influence of the Communists "appears to have diminished in
the past year," even though the number of political workers in the South engaged
in subversive and propaganda activities is unknown.
How do CIA's CIWs and State's IRs compare with the 1956 NIE in reflect-
ing the villagers' political perspectives? As with OCI's reporting on Diem's
political outlook and policies, the CIWs' attention to the villagers' "political
world" is scant indeed. On 14 May 1954-a week after the DRV's victory over
France at Dien Bien Phu-a two-page CIW titled "Vietnamese Government
Paralyzed" concludes on the note of a "steadily deteriorating political situation"
in the areas controlled by Saigon. Yet only a single reference is made to popular
sentiments anywhere in Vietnam and this is a teaser without further explanation:
*FitzGerald discusses this contrast of approaches in considerable depth. Op. cit., pp. 84
et seq., and especially ch. 4, "The National Liberation Front," pp. 138 et seq.
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er p ions on
the population in the Vietminh-held areas, "though opposed to the Ho regime,"
would rather revolt than continue with the corruption of Bao, Dai's government,
according to the Minister of Labor. But we are left to guess what basis in fact
existed for this surprising generalization on opposition to the DRV regime at
the moment of the Vietminh's triumph. Equally relevant would have been some
reference to any positive attraction of the Vietminh-ruled population to the
Saigon regime.
Indeed, the CIWs of the 1954-1956 period give no indication of the Viet-
minh's view of its political task in the South. And the first mention that Diem
foresaw "a more subtle long-range problem" arising from the Vietminh's political
and economic "subversion" appears in the CIW of 6 September 1956. In the
previous reports the Vietminh's role in the South is viewed uniformly as a para-
military one. On 15 December 1955, Diem is reported to have inaugurated "a
village self-defense corps" in order "to counter Vietminh influence in rural areas."
On 19 July following, the conclusion that Saigon's "concern over long-range
Vietminh aspirations to gain control of South Vietnam is well founded" is not
explained.
State's Reporting on the Villagers
State's IRs again reflect considerably more attention to the "psychological
dimension" of analysis than do the CIWs. The IR of 1 February 1955 states that
the Communists have "greater popular appeal in Vietnam as a whole because of
their long identification with the struggle for independence." Such a reference
to the Vietminh's popular appeal on nationalist grounds-as distinct from its
coercive capabilities-is extremely rare in any of the three series of reports
we have examined. Yet, as we have seen, from the Vietnamese peasants' viewpoint,
many signs gave convincing evidence that the Vietminh leaders were now the
authentic successors to Emperor Bao Dai and the French throughout Vietnam.
The major IR of 15 September 1955, furthermore, clearly states that the Com-
munists' military strength in South Vietnam posed a lesser threat to political
stability than did "the political power of the Communist apparatus there."
All three series of intelligence reports, however, foster misperceptions by
placing the influence of the Vietminh in the villages of the South almost ex-
clusively in the context of secrecy and coercion-even before Diem's campaigns
against this influence had begun in earnest. As the reader is given no clues to
the basic political perspectives of either the Vietminh or the villagers, he cannot
help but be misled by mirror images reflecting his own preconceptions rather
than the realities in Vietnam. This is the inevitable effect of repeated use of
terms such as "subversion," "infiltration," "terrorism," "rooting out" Communists,
and "clandestine networks and activities." The IR of 6 April 1956 states:
Activities by the party itself were to be entirely clandestine. Popular front activities,
however, were to be both clandestine and overt and to use legal as well as illegal means
to achieve the objective of extending Communist rule over all of Vietnam.**
Of 19 paragraphs under the heading "Current Organization and Activity," only
four are concerned directly with overt influence of the Communists. And, what
is more relevant here, the psychological context of the Communists' or front
*IR 7045, "Probable Developments in South Vietnam through July 1956," p. 27.
**IR No. 7197, "Communist Subversion in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos," p. 4.
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groups' appeals to the masses is occasionally implied in part, but is nowhere
presented explicitly. The report concludes that "in the cities, where national
government control is strongest, the Communists do not appear to have been
successful in influencing the majority of the population." No reference is made
to the nature or extent of the Communists' influence in the countryside. The
earlier IR of 15 September 1955 does take into account the whole population
of South Vietnam, but without conjecturing likely or effective grounds for the
Communists' appeal:
The Communist apparatus in South Vietnam forms only a small minority of the total
population, and the political potential of this apparatus would seem to depend primarily
on its capacity to intimidate local officials and to secure support or acceptance from the
general population.
Both IRs we have cited reflect the existence-but only occasionally an
awareness on the writers' part-of analytical problems concerning the political
psychology of the Vietnamese. For example, questions about the attitudes and
roles of local officials and villagers come to mind in relation to the judgment
just quoted concerning the Communists' political potential, but these factors are
not defined. Again, the 6 April 1956 report teases us with: "There were areas
of Communist control and influence in every province south of the seventeenth
parallel" at the time of the 1954 cease-fire; and furthermore, "Communist efforts
to date have enabled them to retain much of the control" they exercised in the
South prior to the cease-fire. We are left to guess, however, what manner of face
the Communists presented to the populations of these many areas in the South
where clandestinity would have had little point, and also what the population's
responses were. Could it be taken for granted that the behavior patterns on both
sides were the same in these enclaves of the South-where the Vietminh was at
least to some extent still campaigning for acceptance-as in the North, where
it had long since secured its main power base? No details or judgments on these
basic factors are included, yet we do encounter a hint that the analysts were
aware of-and perhaps curious about-certain Vietnamese habits of thought and
action which later eluded the Westerner's understanding throughout America's
long involvement in Vietnam:
It is possible that Communist military potential in South Vietnam has been increased
in the past three months.... Communist cadres have undoubtedly maintained numerous
hidden caches of arms and supplies throughout Vietnam ... and, in the past, Vietnamese
Communists have displayed ability to transform apparently peaceful civilians into trained
guerrillas and suddenly to initiate large-scale guerrilla fighting in supposedly "pacified"
areas. *
The Villagers' Views of the Communists
In order to estimate the likely degree of distortion in the American reader's
mind as a result of this skimpy reflection of the villagers' political perspective,
we turn also to McAlister and Mus. Chapter 7 of The Vietnamese and Their
Revolution discusses "Marxism and Traditionalism" in Vietnam, and some of the
core elements of the Vietnamese culture which shaped the relevant popular
perspectives. A sub-heading in this chapter, providing us a suitable point of
departure, reads: "In the Traditional Language of Politics, Communism Has
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Seemed More a Fulfillment Than a Break with the Past." The authors first take
up the expression in Vietnamese for "socialism": xd hdi, with a following word
designating a political party. The ideographical sign xa by itself, however, can
refer to the traditional village with all its spiritual and social connotations for
the Vietnamese. Hdi means "union," "assembly," or "society." If we keep in mind
that village life is the most fundamental expression of Vietnamese society, "the
modern program of `socialization,' when expressed in a familiar idiom, does not
give small landowners, either actual or potential ones, the impression of a break
with their past." They perceive this program "to be a new fulfillment of their
traditions. . . ." McAlister and Mus round out their point:
In the consciousness of the Vietnamese masses, the word xd has a central value. It unfolds
a landscape-not a physical landscape but a sociological landscape.... Within [the Viet-
namese] society the village, or xa, comes before all else; one belongs to the village before
one belongs to oneself ... xd h6i hda [to socialize the land] thus suggests not a spurious
adventure and the disorder of social innovation, but the traditionally communal values
that are most reassuring to the masses.
How did the Communist leaders in Vietnam, as well as in China, adapt
their programs to suit peasant populations? These leaders were well aware that
"the terminology of doctrinaire Marxist propaganda" had little meaning for
villagers. There was "no proletariat in Vietnam prepared for a Marxist mission
of any kind." McAlister and Mus conclude:
The practical consequences of this are of the greatest significance for a political per-
spective in Vietnam. The peasant as an instrument of politics is, by reason of his numbers,
the only instrument that counts in Vietnam. If one goes against the nature of the peasants,
they are difficult to manage politically. If heaven seems to question those in power at
the time, an insurrection will follow no matter who is on top.
Hence, the Vietminh leaders posed as the people's champions aganist foreign
rulers and as the founders of a modern political community which would become
united and independent. The Vietnamese villagers could be expected on the
whole to perceive Communism and the Vietnamese Communist leaders' program
as quite consistent with their desires as well as their beliefs and traditions.
But would not the peasants neverthless be alienated by the Communists'
use of intimidation and other forms of pressure? Again, a mighty effort is neces-
sary if Americans are to re-examine their deepest hiddden assumptions. Are
we assuming that the Vietnamese concepts of personal rights to freedom from
coercion have some parallel with our concepts on this subject? Listen to McAlister
and Mus on the subject, "Traditionally, the Individual Existed within a Col-
lective Unit":
In traditional Vietnamese society every individual act carried out in a collective unit-
family, clan, village, etc.,-was governed and evaluated by relatives and neighbors... .
The individual always had his assigned part to play. . . . The approval of the group
was the invariable condition for action. . . . A reasonable being was one who became
aware of this system and of his place in it. . . . Through a conviction of the truth of
the system, the individual is permanently saved from himself; he realizes himself as
others see him and not as he sees himself introspectively.*
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Personal rights and personal freedoms in the Western sense are concepts
which clearly must not he assumed to exist in the minds of Vietnamese tradition-
dists. FitzGerald elaborates:
Of all the aspects of the Vietnamese revolution, it was [the]domination of the individual
by the state which Americans-even those most opposed to their government's policy
in Vietnam-found most difficult to come to terms with. . . . The moral problem for
the individual was to discover not what he himself thought or wanted, but what the
society required of him. . . . The French invasion effectively destroyed the Confucian
design for society and the universe. It did not, however, change the impulse to a social
and ideological coherency. For the Vietnamese, "freedom" in the Western sense meant ...
a disintegration of the personality ... [leading] only to social chaos and the exploitation
of the weak by the strong.*
In order to exploit this deep sense of conformity in the individual villagers,
the Vietminh after 1956 organized terror campaigns which resulted in the murder
of "the cream of village officialdom."** The leadership held the keys to the local
,communities' political orientation and hence to the attitudes and conduct of
!he members. The widespread removal of Diem's appointees paid a double
dividend for the Vietminh: the countryside saw further unmistakable evidence
n.nf their possession of heaven's mandate; and the successors of the deceased of.-
l'icials would be likely to pay increased attention to the Vietminh"s intended lesson.
Conclusions from Surveil of Finished Intelligence, 1954-1956
To summarize the findings, then, the Estimates of 1954 and 1955 realistically
warned of Hanoi's growing capabilities for winning out in the contest for power
with Saigon, but the major Estimate of 17 July 1956 swung sharply around to a
strongly optimistic view of Diem's chances of blocking any Communist guerrilla
)ffensive. The new elements in the picture, tipping the scales in the analysts'
minds, apparently were: Diem's clear-cut successes in overcoming the challenges
from South Vietnamese opposition groups in the spring of 1955; and Hanoi's
Failure to mount an overt retaliatory blow after Diem had successfully ignored
the July 1956 election date. The analysts based their new position squarely on
assumptions of probable increased popular resistance to any guerrilla offensive.
[hey did not bring out any evidence to support these assumptions.
Consultation in some depth of well-qualified sources on the culture and
psychology of the Vietnamese clearly undermines the assumptions of the esti-
mators. Not only had Diem failed to "build a bridge" to the hearts and minds of
the countryside, but the Vietminh had given top priority to the mobilization of
political support in the villages. In addition, the villagers tended-by habits
rooted in culture and history-to identify with the Vietminh and harbor suspicion
)f the bureaucratic and foreign influences associated with the Saigon regime.
American intelligence officers and policy-makers, for their part, were pre-
disposed by their culture to "put first things first," and hence concentrate on
lte immediate and highly visible security aspects of Saigon's problems in the
countryside, rather than on its less visible political tasks. The analysts' consequent
discussions of the Vietminh in the villages in a context of secrecy and coercion
tended to evoke mirror images instead of reflecting Vietnamese realities for
the American reader. In terms of the psychology of the Vietnamese, the concept
*Op. cit., pp. 208-210.
*Fall, The Two Vietnams, p. 281; and Last Reflections on a War, pp. 198-199.
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of Communism as expressed in their language was perceived as consistent with
what was familiar and highly valued in their immediate environment, and any
swing of local leaders toward Vietminh influence usually also brought over the
individual peasant, who was under heavy social pressure to conform with group
sentiment.
How may we sum up our overall findings in the finished intelligence for the
period 1954-1956, and what conclusions may we usefully draw from them? What
do our criteria or "indicators"* tell us about the analysts' apparent degree of
attention to the intercultural and psychological dimension of communicating
foreign situations and their significance to an American readership? What are
the implications of this record for the readers of the finished intelligence?
In respect to our Set "A" indicators-which focus on the differences between
local and American perspectives and problem-solving-we must conclude that our
findings are entirely negative. In none of the three series of intelligence reports
we have examined did we find the analysts discussing such differences, or ex-
pressing a need to reserve judgment on a point until additional information about
possible psychological differences could be obtained, or cautioning readers
against the misperceptions which might easily be triggered by the "mirror image"
terms employed.
We have pointed up the irrelevant "American-style thinking" likely to result
from such terms as they appear in a variety of contexts. The allegedly strong
honesty and anti-Communism in Saigon's leadership in 1954 were American but
not Vietnamese criteria for supporting the new Saigon regime. Diem's thinking
on "full democracy" in Vietnam may have extended to eventual provision of fuller
rights for the individual, but not to Western concepts of a people's controls
over its government. Prolonged conditions of crisis such as the Vietnamese saw
from the mid-1940s might well turn Westerners' attention away from national
political affairs, but could hardly have this effect on the Vietnamese masses,
whose political concerns did not yet commonly extend beyond their villages.
Hence, the only positive indicators we found are relevant only to our Set
"B" categories. These focus on what was in the minds of the local people without
relating explicitly to the psychological differences between them and Americans.
Furthermore, virtually all the positive indicators we have found fall within our
first sub-category of Set "B"-references to the thoughts, viewpoints, attitudes,
motivations, and expectations of the local people. Scarcely a reference has been
found to their much deeper beliefs, values, and norms which shape and channel
both their current concerns and underlying perspectives and motivations.
Indeed, almost all of our positive findings have been further limited within
the first sub-category of "B" to what was "in the forefront" or "on top" of minds
of local persons or groups at a given time. We have surfaced few references to
the underlying and more enduring layers of thought frames, such as perspectives
and attitudes. Thus, we found that analysts had seldom placed current views
and intentions of subjects, or estimates of their future actions, in a broader
perspective which would provide clues to either the importance of these elements
for the individuals or groups involved, or the likely directions and magnitude
of the anticipated actions.
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No Examination of the "Core Elements" of Personality
The virtual absence of references to the matrix of the personality-composed
of the individual's beliefs, values, and norms, as well as his personal rankings
within these categories-leaves a serious gap in the analysts' communication
of their messages. These elements may be thought of collectively as a major
coordinate always to be reckoned with in plotting the probable course of a
subject's thinking or actions. For example, these elements-when they and
their relative importance to the local person or group are sufficiently known--
may at times preclude any likelihood that the subjects will entertain particular
ideas or plans which may "make good sense" to Westerners; or, conversely, such
data may indicate that the local person or group is quite capable of harboring
ideas or plans which might not be likely even to occur to Westerners.
Without benefit of data on the formative elements of the personality, some
readers will draw analogies-whether warranted or not from cultures or sub-
cultures which they have learned do bear some similarities to a non-Western one
in question. Other readers will unconsciously draw analogies-usually in gross
error-from their own experiences with American or other Western cultures.
Furthermore, our findings also suggest that some analysts may not themselves
have attached sufficient importance to the cultural and psychological contexts
of the local situations and problems they must report and interpret. For example,
State's warning in May 1956 that the Saigon government would "not conform
to Western ideals of democratic behavior for a period of years" was accompanied
by an explanation which only scratched the surface. The analysts pointed by way
of explanation to "the traditionally conspiratorial nature of Vietnamese politics"
but said nothing about the deeper cultural sets of mind which shaped the
local perspective on politics. We conclude on the basis of the evidence reviewed
that analysts' own attention to cultural settings was most likely neither consistent
nor close, and hence must have left the way open for the distractions of mirror
images in their own minds.
Thus, analysts producing finished intelligence on Vietnam in the period
1954-56 appear to have run grave risks on two fronts: first, in the attempt to
communicate with readers-particularly those unknown to them-without for
the most part placing the messages in cultural context; and second, in their
own neglect of consistent and methodical attention to the cultural context, which
they needed to grasp in order to develop personal skills for the interpretation of
current developments and estimates of probable future trends abroad.
Spot Check in the Twilight of the Diem Era-1962-1963
The question arises at this point: how representative are our findings thus
far concerning the intelligence analysts' perceptions of-and success in com-
municating-the psychological world of the Vietnamese? Given the non-involve-
ment of American policy-makers in the internal affairs of Indochina prior to
the Geneva Conference of 1954, do we not need to look beyond the first two-plus
years of the United States' long subsequent involvement before we can draw
sound conclusions about analysts' perceptions of the local Vietnamese scene?
In response to these considerations, we turn to a brief examination of the finished
intelligence six years farther down the road. We re-enter the scene toward the
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close of the Diem era, when America had just begun to escalate its involvement
in Vietnam.
The South Vietnam scene had changed drastically by mid-1962. The "ever-
tightening controls over every kind of freedom long before Communist guerrilla
warfare gave them a semblance of justification" had long since led to "an
all-pervading air of capricious lawlessness" in South Vietnam. The institutional
changes envisioned in the 1956 Constitution appeared to be indefinitely post-
poned. As a result, Vietnamese paratroopers attempted a putsch on 11 November
1960, which apparently was aimed at persuading Diem to share power on a
basis broader than his family circle. The resulting official announcement of a
"sweeping reform program," however, did not produce more than promises.
The long-awaited establishment of local self-government, which later was con-
sidered to be essential to the success of the "strategic hamlet" program, became
"a meaningless distortion." Diem's re-election on 9 April 1961, even though
rigged, showed that he had lost a million votes since 1955 despite "a far larger
total electorate." Within a month, the new Kennedy Administration reportedly
decided to link offers of increased military aid with stronger pressure for internal
reforms in Saigon.*
Diem's policies, meanwhile, had spurred the rise of a South Vietnam Libera-
tion Front which called attention to itself by clandestine radio as early as 1958.
Ex-Vietminh groups, under the name of Resistance Veterans, issued a declaration
early in 1960 purporting to express Southern impatience with Hanoi's policy
of peaceful struggle for unification. At a meeting of the Vietnamese Lao Dong
Party in September 1960, Hanoi sanctioned a United Front and called for the
violent overthrow of the Diem Government and liberation of the South. The
National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam was formed in December
and was publicly recognized by Hanoi in late January 1961. It was clearly
dominated by Communists from its inception, and came to be called "the Viet-
cong" (meaning Viet Communists) by the Saigon regime and the Americans.
A strong case is made by Fall and other non-Communist sources, however, in
partial support of the NLF's claims to be speaking its own mind in condemning
and challenging the Diem regime.**
The insurgency in South Vietnam developed rapidly during 196:1; by mid-
year, Saigon had "lost control over large areas" of the country. The "resurrected"
Vietminh came to overshadow completely the non-Vietminh groups. Diem, mean-
while, "did not perceive that the war was first of all a political problem, and
could only be solved through primarily political means." He did not appreciate
the extent to which the insurgency "was a response to his continuing repression."
For him, the violence resulted from Communist subversion and made his recourse
to authoritarian measures essential.
Even while the Bay of Pigs invasion was still President Kennedy's prime
concern on the foreign scene, his attention was drawn to Vietnam on 12 April
1961 by Walt Rostow, senior White House specialist on Southeast Asia. Rostow
asserted that, with Diem re-elected, the time had come for "gearing up the
whole Vietnam operation." On 20 April the President ordered a prompt review
of the Vietnam situation. On 11 May he approved the deployment of only a
*See Fall, The Two Vietnams, pp. 268-278, and Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., pp. 99-108.
**Fall, The Two Vietnams, ch. 16; Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers as quoted in
ibid., pp. 357-358; Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., ch. V.
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400-man force, but stated the American objective with increased clarity: "to pre-
vent Communist domination of South Vietnam."*
Moving Toward Larger Commitments
In the following six months, a conflux of events and decisions pushed the
United States toward much larger commitments in support of this objective.
Whereas Diem had been cool in May to Vice President Johnson's feelers on
sending combat troops and working out a bilateral defense treaty, by October
"he was appealing to the United States to become a co-belligerent." The switch
was due to an accelerating rise in the Vietcong's offensive capabilities. Larger
units up to battalion size, equipped with heavy arms, could now carry out major
raids in urban areas. These forces, estimated at 17,000 men, nearly tripled
the level of attacks in September. By early October, several proposals within
the Washington administration called for major inputs of American ground
forces, with some emphasis placed on dangers of possible infiltration of Corn-
munist forces into Vietnam from Laos.
A Special NIE of 5 October, however, provided partially reassuring data.
It reported "that 80-90 percent of the estimated 17,000 VC had been locally
recruited, and that there was little evidence that the VC relied on external
supplies." The editors of The Pentagon Papers comment: "The intelligence esti-
mate also included a warning about the kind of enemy shrewdness and tenacity
that became reality." The President, faced with conflicting advice, decided on
11 October to send General Maxwell Taylor to Saigon on a study mission. One
of the alternative strategies to be considered by this "Taylor-Rostow Mission"
was a `bold intervention to `defeat the Vietcong' using up to three divisions
of American troops." Saigon's urgent request for troops and a treaty arrived
in Washington two days later. Following his meetings with Diem, Taylor pro-
posed sending 6,000 to 8,000 troops, both logistical and combat. The President
accepted all the major recommendations of the mission, and the formal announce-
ment of the American decisions came on 14 December 1961.
As immediate background for our exploration of the finished intelligence
commencing at mid-1962, we must consider what The Pentagon Papers' editors
term "A Spurt of Optimism" in the official American thinking on the war through
the spring and summer. A major root of this optimism may be found in Taylor's
reporting in the previous autumn. Taylor's point is highlighted by Halberstam,'* *
who was just coming to national prominence in 1962 by his reporting from Viet-
nam. Moving on from Taylor's frank identification of the dangers of escalation,
Halberstam writes:
Yet for all these drawbacks, Taylor reported, nothing would be so reassuring to the gov-
eminent and the people of South Vietnam as the introduction of U.S. troops (a crucial
departure, the American assumption here, that the government and the people of South
Vietnam were as one, that what Diem wanted was what "the people" wanted; a quick
assumption which haunted American policy makers throughout the crisis).
*The Pentagon Papers, pp. 79, 88-91, 118-125.
**Op. cit., pp. 170, 172. He calls the final Taylor-Rostow report of 3 November "an
extraordinary document" which provides "a great insight into the era." He adds: "It shows
a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the war (there was no discussion of the serious
political problems of the war in Taylor's cables)."
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Here again was the powerful mirror image of many Americans in and out of
government who tend unconsciously to see a government as "based on the consent
of the governed" and "created by the people and for the people."
Other grounds for optimism were found in the development of the strategic
hamlet program "as an all-embracing counterguerrilla strategy in rural Vietnam." *
This was a program to regroup the population into fortified hamlets in which
the government would undertake political, social, and economic measures "de-
signed both to weed out Vietcong sympathizers and to gain popular allegiance
through improved local services and better security." Diem adopted the strategy
for the Delta in March and for the rest of the country in August. The Pentagon
study observes, however, that Saigon and Washington had conflicting objectives:
while Washington saw this as a way for Saigon to win greater allegiance and
squeeze out the Vietcong, "Diem saw it as a means of controlling his population."
The study concludes that the program "failed dismally" like previous programs
tried by the French and the Vietnamese "because they ran into resentment if
not active resistance" from the peasants. The peasants had both practical objec-
tions to abandoning their fields and powerful beliefs rooting therm to the
lands and tombs of their ancestors.
Finally, according to The Pentagon Papers' editors, "the Pentagon study lays
a principal responsibility for the unfounded optimism of U.S. policy in 1962
and early 1963 on inadequate and relatively uninformed American intelligence
and reporting systems." Indeed, the Administration's decision to put in ground
combat troops was reached "without extended study or debate" or precise
expectation of what it would achieve. The official optimism peaked with the
plans which Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered begun in July
1962 for a military phase-out in Vietnam keyed to a victory over the Vietcong
by the end of 1965. Yet White House staffer Michael V. Forrestal told the
President in February 1963 "to expect a long and costly war." He explained:
No one really knows how many of the 20,000 "Vietcong" killed last year were only
innocent, or at least persuadable, villagers, whether the strategic hamlet program is pro-
viding enough government services to counteract the sacrifices it requires, or how the
mute mass of villagers react to the charges against Diem of dictatorship and nepotism.
Forrestal's report, which is included with the Pentagon study, adds that Vietcong
recruitment inside South Vietnam was so effective that the war could be continued
even without infiltration from the North. Of major concern to us will be indica-
tions that intelligence analysts did or did not provide adequate data on the
Vetnamese peasants' political perspectives and the relationship of these to the
fortunes of the belligerents.
CIA's Current Intelligence, August 1962-October 1963
CIA's weekly publication, which in the intervening period had been re-
named the Current Intelligence Weekly Summary (CIWS), carried nine pertinent
items in the 15-month period beginning in August 1962, according to the IPI
Index. In addition, two Special Reports on the Buddhist crisis of 1963 have been
examined-the first by the Office of Current Intelligence and the second by
the Directorate of Intelligence. The nine items on Vietnam in the CIWS reflect
no appreciable increase of attention to the intercultural and psychological
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dimensions of the reporting problems, by comparison with the CIWs of the
1954-1956 period. The two Special Reports do reflect an effort to place a major
political force of 1963-the Buddhists-in local cultural context, a reporting
tactic which apparently had no parallel in the earlier CIW reports on Vietnam
which were available to us.
The four-page item titled "Strategic Hamlets and Counterinsurgency in
South Vietnam" in the CIWS of 3 August 1962 will serve to illustrate the first
of these conclusions. Reviewing the first five months of the strategic hamlets
program, the analysts weight their discussion heavily on the side of "the me-
chanics" of its operation, with only a rare reference here and there to the
psychological aims and problems. The lead sentence places the program in the
perspective of Saigon's military efforts against the insurgents. These efforts
aim at "isolating Vietcong troops from the peasantry, tightening security and
expanding government control in the countryside, and releasing additional army
troops from static defense duties." In the second paragraph, concerned with
effectiveness of the program, this report states:
It suffers from lack of well-defined geographic priorities, and from failure to be inte-
grated into regional and provincial military planning. Steps are being taken to overcome
some of the weaknesses in the program.
The first mention of a psychological consideration appears on the second
page: regroupment of peasants in new villages "is to be by persuasion if possible,"
using "information programs to explain to the peasants the reasons for the
regroupment and the advantages to be gained...." On the third page we read
that the Diem government "is displaying a growing awareness of the need to
enlist public cooperation...." Now we encounter the first mention of peasant
reactions:
Although some hamlets are virtual fortresses and the inhabitants are reported enthusiastic,
in others peasant resentment has been aroused by arbitrary requisitions of labor and money,
by curfew systems which reduce the time spent working their fields, and by suspicions
that district chiefs are extorting hamlet funds. A recent government communique invited
the hamlet populations to submit complaints, and the Interior Ministry has set up a com-
mittee to ensure remedial action. One assistant district chief has been arrested for abuses.
It is strong evidence of the analysts' lack of an adequate intercultural
perspective on the reporting task at hand. They omit any mention of the strong
resentment felt by the peasants because of the extreme violence being done to
some of their deepest beliefs and values, involving their lands and the tombs
of their ancestors. * No mention is made of the likely indifference or disdain
of many peasants with regard to directives from the Saigon bureaucracy. The
somewhat extreme language used at the beginning of the first sentence of the
quotation may readily be associated with the extreme optimism of the reporting
in 1962 and 1963 by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).**
The short concluding paragraph provides sound points of overall interpreta-
tion by the analysts. Saigon's purpose-to control the countryside-is frankly
stated. The peasants' resulting hostility "may encourage cooperation with the
*Fitz(;erald, op. cit., (pp. 429-431), writes movingly and from personal observation of
the effects of the peasants' dislocations on their cultural sensibilities--notably their views of
the land and the family, which "were the two sources of national as well as personal identity."
"For a detailed treatment of this reporting and its consequences, see Halberstam, op. cit.,
pp. 183 et seq. and especially 186-187, 200 et seq.
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Vietcong." There is no statement, however, concerning the peasants' general
failure to undertake a commitment to Saigon or concerning their fundamental
perspectives toward the rival revolutionary forces. Nor is there any evaluation
of the reported expectations of Diem's brother Nhu, who was personally in
charge of the strategic hamlets program.
An ARPA Report
In the same month this CIA report was issued, the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA) published "The Vietnamese `Strategic Hamlets': A
Preliminary Report," which was prepared by John C. Donnell and Gerald C.
Hickey.* Both writers had previously spent several years in Vietnam, and
Hickey's work had been the study of a village in the Mekong Delta. More than
six pages of this 30-page report deal frankly and from first-hand experience with
the rural people-their views, needs, and roles in the strategies and tactics of the
counter-insurgency effort. The authors disagree with the view of "some Viet-
namese and American officials [who] . . . say, or imply . . . , that the rural
population is basically hostile to the Vietcong, and that it requires no more
than the hamlet fortifications themselves [and] . . . the regular military
forces ... to make the people grateful for these islands of security and turn
them into solid supporters of the Vietnamese government." To villagers with no
personal complaints against Vietcong terrorists, "the strategic hamlet presents
no visible advantages and may indeed . . . appear to them as having distinct
disadvantages." The authors admit that the subject matter involved in probing
for such insights into the peasants' minds is "extremely sensitive," permitting
them to obtain "only fragmentary" data. Hence they recommend acquisition of
"much more specific information than is now available on the rural population's
attitudes toward the Vietcong and the national government."
Equally crucial advice in this report was related to the implementation
of policy as well as to intelligence targets:
Ways should be explored that would permit people to take a more active and meaningful
part in the political life of their country. The government's political and social mass move-
ments .. . suffer from popular indifference and lack of identification. . .. The people
themselves ... do not receive a real sense of participation from their often sterile propa-
ganda functions.... They want to participate in other, more substantial ways.
Here indeed these field researchers touch the Achilles' heel of the American
effort in Vietnam. Nhu told one of the Rand writers in August 1961:
People say that our cadres should go out, work with the peasants, and establish a relation-
ship of affection and confidence with them to learn their needs. But if the cadres do this,
they are overwhelmed by the people's claims and demands. The only thing for the gov-
ernment to do is issue orders and back them up with force.
I infer that the CIWS analysts in 1963 probably had not had access to
either the long-existing open material on the Vietnamese psychology and culture
or the related field work being conducted by Rand.
*Memorandum RM 3208-ARPA, August 1962 (SECRET), produced by the Rand Corpora-
tion. Hickey was an anthropologist who went to Vietnam in 1956 with a Michigan State group
advising Diem. He tells his story in The Washington Post, 4 February 1973, p. C 5. Mus wrote,
in an article in Asia in 1966: "I strongly recommend that you read ... Hickey's Village in
Vietnam [Yale U. Press 1964]."
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The first of the two Special Reports on the Buddhists, six pages long,
is dated 28 June 1963-a month and a half after government forces touched off
Buddhist hostility on Buddha's birthday in Hue, the revered imperial capital.
While this report includes statements on how the Buddhists related to some
themes of interest to American intelligence, much attention is perhaps justifiably
given to factual information on the history, organization, leading personalities,
beliefs, and practices of Vietnamese Buddhists. But distortions of perception
are facilitated in readers' minds-and may be presumed to have been present in
the analysts' minds-by reason of the particular comments they made in an effort
to place the Buddhists in the perspective of Vietnamese politics.
What we find running through these comments are unconscious efforts
to categorize the Buddhists and their societal roles according to American
criteria. The analysts appear to have been guided by their American frames of
reference, which therefore evoke mirror images rather than images of Vietnamese
realities. For example, Buddhism is described through the report as a distinct
religion, though "flavored with ancestor cults and with Confucianist and Taoist
ethics and beliefs, and . . . modified by traditional Vietnamese animism." The
analysts concern themselves at the outset with the number of South Vietnamese
"who actively practice the Buddhist religion," estimated to total no more than
three million and said to be "preponderantly women." A "long Vietnamese tradi-
tion of religious freedom" is cited. But Western-type distinctions among the
basic institutions of Vietnam are thoroughly misleading, as FitzGerald succeeds
admirably at explaining:
Americans, and indeed most Westerners, have lived for centuries with a great variety
of institutions-with churches, with governments, with a patriarchal family, with indus-
trial concerns, trade unions and fraternities, each of which offered a different kind of
organization, different kinds of loyalties-but the Vietnamese have lived with only
three: the family, the village and the state. As the family provided the model for village
and state, there was only one type of organization. Taken together, the three formed
a crystalline world, geometrically congruent at every level.*
FitzGerald comments, with reference to the same period we are discussing,
that the American journalists in Vietnam wrote "long and somewhat puzzling
analyses" of the Buddhist demonstrations, in which they attempted to explain
how much the rebellion against Diem owed to "purely religious motives" and
how much to "purely political" ones. She adds, "Like most Westerners, these
journalists ... could not imagine the Vietnamese might not make the distinction;"
prior to the arrival of the European missionaries in Vietnam, "there was never
such a thing as a church" there.
For the very reasons FitzGerald gives, the Special Report of 28 June :L963
falls short on a major objective-to explain the basic role of the Buddhists on
the Vietnamese political scene. At the national level, according to the OCI
analysts, most Buddhist leaders reportedly had hoped "to keep the religious
issues isolated from broader political discontent" in the 1963 crisis, and had
avoided collaboration with Diem's opponents. But we must begin with the
deeper and historic political role of the Buddhists in Vietnam. According to
*Op. Cit., pp. 14-15.
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Fall, this was to be found at the regional level where the various sects had long
played a fundamental political role with the help of French subsidies. The
National Intelligence Survey: South Vietnam-General Survey* adds that
"Buddhist leaders project themselves as the guardians of the Vietnamese masses"
and have the advantages of being more numerous than other groups and
representing "a cross section of all levels of society." Fall sums up the basic
explanation of the Buddhists' dramatic intervention on the political scene in
South Vietnam in 1963:
But what made such Buddhist institutions as the Vien Hoa Dao (the Saigon Institute for
the Implementation of the Dharma) and religious leaders as the Venerable (Thich) Tri
Quang emerge as a political force was not so much their "hunger" for power as the total
absence of any kind of coherent political entity in the country, outside the National Lib-
eration Front.... * *
Thus, the Buddhists' struggle with the government in 1963 was significant
particularly because they led the first truly nation-wide protest of the masses
against the narrowly-based regime of Diem. This crucial point does not come
across in the Special Report of 28 June, which touches on the historic context
briefly and inadequately by stating:
Buddhist organizations, not unlike governmental administration in Vietnam, have tended
to develop around regional ties. Mass loyalties often focus even more narrowly on highly
autonomous pagodas. Nevertheless, some Buddhist associations have a centralized, national
framework with parallel clerical and lay hierarchies.
Much attention is given in this report to the divisions among Buddhists and the
question of Communist exploitation of their protests. But on the overriding
political significance of these events in the eyes of the Vietnamese people the
reports states only: "There seems to be little doubt that the intensity of the
Buddhist protests reflected general discontent over the entrenched, autocratic
rule of the Diems as well as specific grievances against their religious biases."
The second of the Special Reports mentioned above was dated 27 September
1963, almost exactly three months after the first, and was only three pages long.
It was clearly intended only to add to the first report and to modify certain
details. We quote two points from the lead paragraph which are of interest
here: "it is impossible entirely to separate Buddhist political aims from Buddhist
religious motivation"; and "many otherwise apolitical Vietnamese Buddhists
were forced to the conclusion that only through a change in the regime could
they win religious equality." The first point appears to square with FitzGerald's
description of the Vietnamese world of congruent organizations and loyalties,
The second point however, appears to imply that, in the minds of some Vietnamese
Buddhists, the political and religious worlds were normally distinct. Perhaps
the analysts were now on the right track, but they obviously were still handi-
capped by their Western preconceptions about the need for categories and clear
distinctions.
*October 1969 (SECRET in part), p. 72.
**The Two Vietnams, p. 284. Fall comments on "how totally meaningless" Diem's and
Nhu's Can-Lao organization "and other pseudo-political groups" turned out to be, as shown
by the failure of any of them to come to the help of their besieged leaders on 1 November
1963, during the coup which felled the Diem regime.
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State's Reporting, December 1962-September 1963
The Department's re-titled Bureau of Intelligence and Research produced
one major Research Memorandum (RM) in this period, which is dated 3 De-
cember 1962* and was prepared as a contribution to NIE 53-63. This RM
reflects considerably more attention to the psychological dimension of the
analytical task at hand than did the IRs we examined from the earlier period.
We now encounter much more guidance than we received in any earlier reports
concerning Diem's outlook on politics and the Communists' view of their task in
dealing with the peasants. The peasants' views, however, of politics and the
political ploys of both sides in the military conflict are still sketchy or missing
entirely. The strategic hamlet program, for example, is given almost two pages,
yet the only clue to the peasants' attitude toward it is a brief reference to the
"improving peasant morale" due to "the benefits of security." Although an
accurate evaluation could not yet be made, the analysts comment: "On balance,
the program appears successful." But this RM bluntly states :
There have long been major gaps in our knowledge of rural conditions in South Vietnam.
In view of the overriding importance that the Vietcong attaches to the countryside in
its strategy, these gaps have now assumed critical proportions. Although our knowledge
of rural conditions is improving . . . , any assessment of Communist political strength
outside urban areas remains questionable and at best tentative.
On the other hand, State's analysts-as we found was the case with CIA's
analysts-provide no clues which would indicate they were familiar with the
relevant basic viewpoints of the Vietnamese peasants which were described in
the available open literature.
We must be content here with a few highlights from the RM of 3 December
1962 which illustrate some of our generalized observations. Now more than a
page is devoted to Diem's and Nhu's perspectives on politics in a separate
sub-section captioned "Political Attitudes of Diem and His Family." A clear
distinction is made between the family's acceptance of the concept of democracy
as a goal and their "impatience" with democratic processes under the environ-
mental conditions existing in South Vietnam. Diem and Nhu therefore were
insisting that the people "must submit to a collective discipline until they
develop a greater national consciousness and a better sense of civic responsibility."
As for the distribution of power at the top of the society, the brothers were
convinced "that government is effective and dynamic only when its power is
closely held and exercised by a small, highly dedicated, and uncompromising
element at the very top through a machinery founded more on personal relation-
ships and loyalty than on formal or institutional chains of command."
The analysts note "some slight modifications" which have slowly appeared
in these attitudes in the past year, as a result in part of the growing magnitude
of the U.S. assistance "and its increasing orientation toward the needs of the
countryside." They go on to cite psychological pressures-seemingly from
American officials-behind the changes in attitudes:
More than ever before, they (the Ngo brothers) have been made aware that government
must not only be served but must also serve, that the peasant and his active participation
rather than his passive obedience may well be crucial for final victory over the Vietcong,
and that a little more sharing of power at the top would probably improve administrative
efficiency rather than lead to their ouster.
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But the evidence presented which might indicate that Diem and Nhu were
indeed influenced by these precepts is scant and inconclusive. The analysts state
there is no evidence from the record of past performance to indicate "that such
are their real objectives and expectations," despite their intense protestations
to American officials "that this has always been their basic approach." Yet, under
the heading "Diem's Position in the Countryside," Diem is said to have "unn
doubtedly . . . become increasingly aware of the serious need to improve the
public image of himself, his family, and his government:
He now travels extensively in the countryside, and his manner of talking with the peasant
has become more relaxed and sympathetic than before; during the last half of 1961, for
example, Diem made 18 known trips outside Saigon and visited 19 provinces. . . Both
Diem and Nhu have from time to time attended the inauguration of relatively small rural
projects. . . .
Finally, GVN and American officials working at the local level reflected "some
feeling that the popular appeal of, and support for, Diem and his government
in the countryside was improving." But they, too, were warning against "any
undue optimism" in view of the lag of social and economic measures behind
military successes and their belief "that the positive identification of the peasantry
with the government is still a long way off."
The Communists' approach to the peasants in South Vietnam is given more
than two pages in this RM under the heading "Political Capabilities." The Viet-
cong appear to have had "considerable success in reducing or supplanting govern-
ment authority in the countryside." Their political capability and strength there
are seen as bound up with their military presence and power, yet the report
gives an unusual degree of attention to their "non-violent, positive means" of
appealing to the peasantry. Such means include the purchase of rice and other
food from the peasants, taxing the wealthy, and even distribution of land to the
landless. The Vietcong call attention also to their own achievements and power
and Hanoi's record on keeping the North free of foreign control. Another ploy
is to spread "bizarre stories intended to limit popular participation in government
programs," thus exploiting the peasants' credulity and animistic beliefs.
Three Shorter Research Memoranda, Summer 1963
We shall take brief notice of three much shorter RMs which appeared
in the summer of 1963. * The report of 1 July titled "Strategic Hamlets" concludes
that program "has already proved effective in stemming Communist successes."
Admittedly, "mistakes will be made," but the government "has reacted quickly
to remedy and improve the situation." For example, the physical defenses of the
hamlets "admittedly vary in quality and, in some cases, leave much to be
desired." Only Communist sources are quoted on the peasants' specific objections
to the strategic hamlets program; the analysts refer to "the concern and hesitation
originally shown by the peasants," but report that much of this has disappeared.
We note here a markedly less critical approach to problems of communicating
the local cultural and psychological context, by comparison with the major
RM of 3 December 1962 discussed above. Again, as in the case of CIA's CIWS
of 3 August of the prior year, one suspects the influence of MACV's extreme
optimism in its reporting during the 1962-1963 period.
"RFE-58, 1 July; RFE-75, 21 August; and RFE-81, 11 September.
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The strategic hamlets program suffered a swift decline between mid-1963,
when Sir Robert Thompson recorded more than 8,000 strategic hamlets completed
under Diem's forced-draft schedules, and January 1964, when a joint American-
British-South Vietnamese survey team "picked up the pieces of the shambles."
Summing up, in 1963 Fall had considered that this program "was by far the
most significant failure of the U.S. effort in Vietnam." Halberstam reported in
considerable detail on a National Security Council meeting of 6 September 1963
at which CIA's Rufus Phillips, a protege of Lansdale and head of the strategic
hamlet program, attested to its failures from first-hand experience. Speaking
also from many years of personal acquaintance with Diem and Nhu, he stated,
"They had gradually lost touch with the population and with reality." *
The RMs of 21 August and 11 September 1963 focus on the ballooning
political crisis which began with the Hue incident of 7-8 May and climaxed
in the 1 November coup overthrowing the government. The analysts' portrayal
of the Buddhists and their political role concerns us here. Again we find Western-
type preconceptions similar to those which were pointed out in CIA's Current
Intelligence reports on the same subject. For example, State's analysts also appear
to have the illusion that religious and political motives are necessarily distinct
universally. The RM of 21 August states: "[among] at least the more activist
leaders, some . . . may have been politically motivated from the beginning."
Another preconception, which is typical especially of Western intelligence and
military professionals, is the view that, regardless of the area concerned, one
must identify ties and commitments among particular organized groups before
one may surmise that they exert real and important influence on one another.
Under the heading "Non-Buddhist Influence," the same report states:
We have no reliable evidence that the Buddhist leadership is in active collusion with the
Vietcong or with non-Communist oppositionist leaders. Various oppositionists undoubtedly
have made overtures to the Buddhists and have attempted to persuade them to continue
their protests at all costs. Some oppositionists may even have sought Buddhist support
to overthrow the government. However, so far the Buddhists seem to have avoided direct
involvement, although the [Buddhists'?] view that a change in government is necessary
coincides with, if it is not influenced by, oppositionist views.
The 1.1 September report features a sizable paragraph on the spread of
popular support for the Buddhists and on the "politically inactive" oppositionists'
encouragement of Buddhist leaders to maintain an uncompromising position.
Thus we find that State's reports, like CIA's Current Intelligence reports, fail
to reflect the full political role of the Buddhists in the 1963 crisis, as the only
nation-wide organization available to lead the mushrooming popular outcry
against Diem. The analysts report: "Only one reliable report indicated any
reaction in the countryside"; and "We have virtually no information on Vietcong
activity on this point in the countryside." But they fail to show any awareness
of the long-standing "political reality" cited above-the Buddhists' and other
sects' long-standing role as ad hoc spokesmen for the mass of Vietnamese.
The National Estimates, 1963
NIE 53-63 dated 17 April 1963 bears the title "Prospects in South Vietnam"
and appeared just prior to a number of challenges and re-examinations within
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official circles* of America's role in that country. Before testing this Estimate
for evidence of attention to the "psychological world" of the Vietnamese, we
examine a lesson it holds for us on the effects of the coordination process at this
highest level of production in the intelligence community. We find here perhaps
our best short and documented case study of how some senior CIA analysts
with drafting responsibility adjusted to the differing and conflicting perceptions
of their superiors, the contributing analysts, and the raw intelligence reports
from overseas. Clearly these adjustments by the drafting analysts turned out for
the most part to be concessions to others' blindspots concerning the political
realities of Vietnam.
In the original draft of the conclusions, the Estimates Staff took an un-
flinching stand on its convictions that the United States faced a grave testing
period in Vietnam:
A. There is no satisfactory objective means of determining how the war is going. The
increased U.S. involvement has apparently enabled the South Vietnamese regime to
check Communist progress and perhaps even to improve the situation in some areas;
however, it is impossible to say whether the tide is running one way or the other.
B. On the South Vietnamese side, new strategic concepts, such as the fortified hamlet ...
have strengthened the counter-guerrilla effort. However, very great weaknesses remain
and will be difficult to surmount....
C. The struggle in South Vietnam at best will be protracted and costly. The Communists
are determined to win control, and the South Vietnamese alone lack the present ca-
pacity to prevent their own eventual destruction. Containment of the Communists
and reestablishment of a modicum of security in the countryside might be possible
with great U.S. effort, but substantial progress toward Vietnamese self-dependence
cannot occur unless there are radical changes in the methods and personnel of the
South Vietnamese Government. Even should these take place without mishap, this
would only be a beginning; the Communists retain capabilities and support which
will require years of constructive effort to dissipate.
Willard C. Matthias, a member of the Board of National Estimates who helped
the Staff prepare this draft, discusses it in a short case study** of the process
by which NIEs may become modified before final approval. He considers this
original draft to be "essentially correct." We find it consistent with the Vietnamese
psychology and "the political realities" as we have been able to determine them,
though we would probably qualify the first sentence of Conclusion B.
Before considering what violence was done to this product of the analysts'
own perceptions, we may usefully sum up the "process of dilution," which began
with the Board of National Estimates. Without changing the main thrust of the
paper, the Board took the starch out of it:
With U.S. help, the South Vietnamese regime stands a good chance of at least containing
the Communists militarily. However, the modus operandi of the Diem government, and
particularly its measures to prevent the rise of contenders for political power, have re-
duced the government's effectiveness, both politically and militarily. We believe that
unless radical changes are made in these methods of government, there is little hope
that the U.S. involvement can be substantially curtailed or that there will be a material
and lasting reduction in the Communist threat.
Matthias considers "the serious weakness" of this change to lie with its shift of
emphasis away from "the inherent difficulty and long-term character of the
*Halberstam, op. cit., pp. 272 et seq.
**"How Three Estimates Went Wrong" (SECRET), Studies in Intelligence, Vol. XII,
No. 1, pp. 31-35.
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SECRET Perceptions an Vietnam
problem" to a close-range focus on the faults of the Diem regime. This led to
trouble in coordinating the revised draft with State's representatives. The paper
now "called into question the existing U.S. policy of working with Diem."
Furthermore, this emphasis on a "here-and-now," manipulable element of the
problem could raise visions of a handy solution over the short term; the original
paper had gone to considerable pains to stress that the problem was complex
and the end was not in sight.
The State Department's representative now reserved his position on this
aspect of the paper, and hence the USIB was obliged to look at it carefully.
Here are the highlights of Matthias' detailed account of what followed:
The DCI, then John McCone, was particularly uneasy about it, since it seemed to con-
tradict the more optimistic judgments reached by those in policy circles who had been
sent to Vietnam to make on-the-spot appraisals and recommendations. He therefore de-
cided to postpone USIB consideration and ask the Board to consult with some of those
who had been on such missions. The Board proceeded to meet with two high-ranking
military officers and two civilians in key policy-making positions....
None of these four consultations was particularly helpful. The witnesses seemed
reluctant to make a frontal assault on the judgments of the paper but equally reluctant
to endorse it. They showed a general tendency to take issue with a particular sentence
purporting to state a fact, rather than an estimative judgment. This or that was "too
pessimistic," but there was no clear line of argument why.... None of these consultants
was attempting to mislead, but the simple fact was that each of them in some way
and to some degree was committed to the existing U.S. policy, and none of them was
intellectually free at that point or in those circumstances to stand back and look at the
situation in the broadest aspects.
"Back at the drawing boards," the Staff members wanted to "stick to their guns."
But Matthias tells how he became inclined to "shade the estimate in a more
optimistic direction." In part his perception of the outlook appears to have
changed, but he was motivated also by having "to get an estimate through to
meet the DCI's new deadline." Matthias writes:
I began to think that perhaps we had been too gloomy.... If we stuck to the original
draft, the DCI and other CIA components might not go along with it; even if they did,
this draft might now evoke still greater departmental dissent than it had the first time
(since high-ranking personnel had now become engaged); in short, if we were so rigid
that we invited debate and amendment at the USIB, we might find ourselves with a
paper more offensive to our judgment than one which moved slightly toward a less
pessimistic view.
Thus this officer's mental process was one of testing and modifying his original
perceptions under the influence both of the differing perceptions of colleagues
and superiors, and also of practical production considerations.
We present portions of the revised text* of the conclusions of this Estimate,
which "rode easily through the USIB with the DCI's full concurrence":
A. We believe Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving.
Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly U.S.
involvement, are causing the Vietcong increased difficulty, although there are as
vet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt.
*The emphasis has been added to indicate points which are stated with markedly more
optimism than in the original draft. The warning with which the Staff had opened its state-
ment of conclusions-that there was no objective way to determine how the war was going-
was dropped. So also was the crucial warning of the Communists' determination to win.
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B. Assuming no great increase in external support to the Vietcong, changes and improve-
ments which have occurred during the past year now indicate that the Vietcong
can be contained militarily. . . . However, we do not believe that it is possible at
this time to project the future of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns
have yet to be fought, and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight... .
C. Developments during the last year or two show some promise of resolving the political
weaknesses, particularly that of insecurity in the countryside, upon which the in-
surgency has fed. However, the government's capacity to translate military success
into lasting political stability is questionable.
Laconically, Matthias contrasts the actual outcome in Vietnam:
Half a year later Diem was ousted, and the political and military situation degenerated
to critical proportions by the end of 1964.... A year or so after the date of the estimate,
Mr. McCone openly expressed regret for his own part in weakening what had been "right
the first time."
Thus, in this case at least, "the system" by which national intelligence at
the highest level is produced led to rejection of some ONE Staffers' perceptions
which had been remarkably accurate. One may easily speculate that those
perceptions, had they been reflected in the published Estimate, might have
aroused serious second thoughts among American policy makers on Vietnam
in mid-1963.
Before leaving NIE 53-63 of 17 April 1963, a brief look at the 10-page
"Discussion" section which serves as back-up for the "Conclusions" is in order.
Here, for the first time in the CIA reports examined to this date, we find several
passages, including an entire paragraph, devoted to description of the political
role, motivations, and concerns of the Vietnamese peasantry. "The primary aim
of the Communists is to secure control of the rural population." After 1957,
"perhaps most important of all, the government failed to develop a capability
to protect the peasant and the villager." The people "have no tradition of loyalty
to a government in Saigon." The peasant "has always accommodated himself
to whatever force was best able to protect or punish him...." Most peasants
are "primarily interested in peace...."
But we still note that virtually no attention is given to the Communists'
methods and grounds for appealing to the peasants, or the peasants' actual view-
points with regard to the Saigon government and the NLF. Indeed, we find an
appraisal of the NLF, which-with respect to the initial point it makes-is at
variance with accounts given by the highly respected open sources we have
previously cited and-with respect to its last point-is irrelevant as far as
political realities were concerned:
This organization [the NLF] currently has little following in Vietnam, is clearly a front
for the Communists, and its ostensible leaders are political nonentities.
Furthermore, the passages bearing on the mass of the population provide our
first persuasive evidence that analysts of a decade ago did not consider important
what we have termed the "core elements" of a culture. For these elements-the
basic beliefs, values, and norms which the people of a given culture share-are
almost completely omitted from consideration here as indeed they have been in all
the intelligence reports we have examined. As we turn shortly to the potential
of available education and training methods for strengthening analysts' inter-
cultural performance, we shall examine the key role these "core elements" of a
culture play in the formation of attitudes, motives, and decisions of a people,
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and some current techniques for identifying them and the order in which they are
ranked by groups and individuals within a culture.
One other Estimate on Vietnam was produced in 1963,* examining the
implications of the political crisis for the stability of the country, the Diem
regime, and the relationship with the U.S. The first of the "Conclusions" reached
in this Estimate was an expectation which the events of autumn bore out:
The Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam has highlighted and intensified a widespread and
longstanding dissatisfaction with the Diem regime and its style of government. If-as is
likely-Diem fails to carry out truly and promptly the commitments he has made to
the Buddhists, disorders will probably flare again and the chances of a coup or assassina-
tion attempts against him will become better than even.
But a set of conclusions concerning the Communists' likely role in coming
political events appears to reflect some of the same misleading Western pre-
conceptions we identified in the CIWS and RM series. The lack of evidence
of ties or cooperation between the Buddhists and the Communists is perceived
as a setback for the latter:
Thus far, the Buddhist issue has not been effectively exploited by the Communists... .
Nor do we think the Communists would necessarily profit if he [Diem] were overthrown
by some combination of his non-Communist opponents.
The analysts' perceptions are made clearer in the "Discussion" section of the
report:
The Buddhist issue would appear to be an obvious windfall for the Communists, but so
far there is no evidence that they have been able to exploit it effectively. They may have
penetrated the Buddhist clergy to some extent, but are not presently exerting any dis-
cernible influence... .
As we saw to be the case in the CIWS and RM series, the analysts here, too,
clearly are preoccupied with a Western-style interplay of political forces and
hence are unconsciously being misled by mirror images. There are no indications
that these analysts perceive the truly national role of the Buddhists-as spokes-
men for the nation-in the crisis of 1963, as the mass of the Vietnamese did.
Had the analysts done so, it seems likely that they would have given much less
play to what the Communists had been unable to do about exploiting the
Buddhists' challenge to the regime. For, we may properly ask, in the Vietnamese
Communists' eyes was there indeed a need to try to exploit this challenge? Did
it not, for the Vietnamese, transcend the normal interplay of political forces
which would characterize a state system already accepted by the people? Was
not the crisis of 1963 in effect a grass roots challenge to the system itself which
Diem had spawned, developed, and controlled? And did not his system lack
any of the marks of a traditional and national one, by Vietnamese standards?
If these assumptions based on McAlister's and Mus' findings are accepted, are
we not led to adopt a key assumption: that a truly revolutionary situation
existed in the eyes of the people of South Vietnam in 1963? Following this line
of thought, it is not difficult to believe that the Communists saw no need-indeed,
*SNIE 53-2-63, 10 July 1963, "The Situation in South Vietnam" (SECRET/Controlled
Dissem).
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cep ions on Me nam
may have viewed it as counterproductive-to mount political operations which
might have suggested that they were misreading the nature of the challenge.
Despite the more positive-although uneven-results of the search in the
finished intelligence on the 1962-1963 period, as compared with the earlier one,
I can scarcely take comfort from any record reflecting less than consistent at-
tention and a systematic approach to the kinds of problems of intelligence
analysis and communication which concern us here. Our overall examination of
the finished intelligence has turned up virtually no indicators of conscious at-
tention to psychological differences as such ("A-type" indicators), and only
intermittent indicators of what was on the minds, or what gave direction and
support to the thinking, of the Vietnamese ("B-type" indicators). Furthermore,
the lack of a systematic approach to the problems created by psychological dif-
ferences is eveident throughout the reports we have examined. For example,
when the estimators presented a methodical breakdown of the many cultures and
sub-cultures of South Vietnam in NIE 63-7-54, they gave no hint of what this
means in terms of differing attitudes, motivations, aims, and expectations,
and what the possible implications are for the local political scene or interna-
tional relations. When the estimators in NIE 53-63 provided their first description
of the political role, motivations, and concerns of the peasantry, they still did
not get to the bottom of "what makes the Vietnamese tick," that is, their belief and
value systems which provide congruence and rationality to their world. As
previously noted, virtually no traces of these keys to the local culture were found
in the reports examined.
Training Theory and Techniques for Improving Analysts' Perceptions
The lack of system a decade ago in analysts' approach to a local culture is
clearly seen in Cooper's subsequently published reactions to the growing political
crisis of 1963 in Vietnam. He had come up through the ranks in ONE to become
senior staffer for the Far East and Chief of the Estimates Staff. In the spring of
1963 he was on special assignment in Vietnam to find answers to the question,
"Can we win with Diem?" In The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam, he alludes
to his lengthy interviews with Diem and Nhu, inspections of strategic hamlets,
and a visit to a Montagnard village. But he admits to a deep sense of frustration
in his efforts to draw meaning from his experiences; he was "able to construct
only a two-page telegram to record the sum total of seven hours of conversation
with the President and his brother." His perception of why he felt so helpless is
typical of his generation of American foreign affairs officers:
I returned to Washington full of quandries [sic]. I was by no means sure that I had had
enough exposure to the relevant problems, or of my ability to interpret what I had
seen. There had been, typically, many explanations for any given situation. . . .
This was long the faith among many Americans working at overseas tasks:
enough exposure to problem-solving on the foreign scene insured one's ability
to handle the "local angles" involved. Even foreign area courses of the 1950s
and early 1960s were usually limited to inputs of useful information and judg-
ments about an area and its people. Any organized approaches to an under-
standing of Americans' problems of understanding them were rare.
With the mushrooming of behavioral science research and its application to
practical human problems over the past two decades, a science-based approach
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to solving the functional and personal problems of working cross-culturally has
become feasible. Exciting advances are being made in a new interdisciplinary
field of research, education, and training labelled intercultural or cross-cultural. *
Federal Government agencies have taken advantage of this new knowledge and
experience in only scattered instances. * * The bustle and the results-both outside
and inside the Government-have pointed almost exclusively toward the needs
of the American working directly-"interacting"-with foreigners. But certain
of the new techniques and programs show promise also for the intercultural
education and training of analysts located in the United States, who must strive
to understand the foreigner and his psychological world at a distance. I wish to
sketch the existing potential for this kind of preparation against: the overall back-
ground of on-going programs of instruction in the Government.
Let us keep in mind a "built-in" handicap we often encounter in seeking to
convince others of this potential. The new field of Intercultural Studies has barely
begun to be introduced into our public school system. Hence, the unconscious
deceptions of man's perception faculty-particularly the ever-present peril of
mirror image terms and thought processes-are not real, "here-and-now" con-
cerns of most Americans above 40 years of age. It is not surprising that any
intelligence officer beyond 40 who is worth his salt sees the world and himself
through very different lenses from those now increasingly being acquired by
the younger generation. The older officer is not usually very impressed-if he
is not indeed "turned off"-by the theory utilized in the new and more systematic
Intercultural Studies approach. Hence, his own perceptions of the new meth-
odologies for solving perception problems on foreign affairs tasks can themselves
hinder or even block his acceptance of the more scientific approach. Much good
will and exposure to the new educational and training techniques will be neces-
sary if our officers are to be better prepared for the intercultural dimension of
their tasks in the post-Vietnam world than they were in the preceding decades.
Specifically, what are the basic learning goals of the analyst, and what
teaching resources are available for improving his perceptions across cultural
lines? What basic courses and modules of instruction for this purpose should
be introduced into the Government's training of its foreign affairs officers? What
have we already learned inside CIA about instructional problems in the field?
Learning Goals
Two distinct kinds of learning by the analyst are possible for increasing his
effectiveness in working across cultural lines: intellectual learning-learning about
the problems, requirements, and resources involved; and behavioral or skill learn-
ing-learning how to do it, how to acquire the skills necessary for increasing
effectiveness.
*Richard W. Brislin, The Content and Evaluation of Cross-cultural Training Programs
(Institute for Defense Analyses, Science and Technology Division, Paper P-671, Nov. 1970).
For the connotations of "cross-cultural," see D.R. Price-Williams, Cross-cultural Studies
(Penguin, Baltimore, 1969), pp. 11-15.
**In the military, three programs were operational prior to the 1970s: the Army's Troop-
Community Relations Program; and the Navy's Personal Response, and Area Orientation/
Overseasmanship, programs. Among the civilian departments and agencies, only the Agency
for International Development and the Peace Corps have established broad and mandatory
programs to the present time. Brislin, op. cit., p. 57.
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The ultimate, job-related needs of the analyst lie with the second category
of learning, and we concentrate our attention on it. We begin with the priority
objective in this category: to learn how to acquire a habit of surfacing distortions
in one's perceptions of other cultural and psychological worlds. In general, the
task here is first to acquire a skill of repeated introspections into personal past
experiences. The purpose is to overcome unconscious assumptions that our views
and convictions about the world, as well as our more basic beliefs, values, and
norms, are held by reasonable and educated people everywhere. Reflections on
the personal circumstances and group associations which helped shape one's own
ways of perceiving his cultural and psychological world* can help him to
identify subjective elements of his personal perceptions. A person thus builds
a more solid basis for conscious comparison between his own perspectives and
those of people of a different culture. Jogging oneself repeatedly to make such
conscious comparisons will root a habit of surfacing perceptual differences. In
this way an awareness of the unreliability of one's own perspectives on the world
and rational for action is strengthened. In turn, the motivation becomes stronger
to acquire the new jogging habit in order to eradicate old habits of misperception
which would otherwise continue to limit one's effectiveness.
The HumRRO Technique
The process of introspective learning we have described can flow from
only a sustained program of self-training. The prospect is good, however, that
many learners' progress will be speeded by a behavioral learning technique
which has been under development since the mid-1960s at the Workshop in
Intercultural Communication of the Human Resources Research Organization
(HumRRO) of Alexandria, Virginia. This "Contrast-American" technique* * has
been used with most Foreign Service Officers at the Foreign Service Institute
since late 1972, and was made available for use in CIA in July 1973.
The new technique centers on live analyses of videotaped encounters be-
tween two persons-one an American, the other a person who has been trained
to reflect beliefs and values in complete contrast to those which are typical
of the majority of middle-class Americans. Each encounter features a conversa-
tion between these two, playing the roles of an American government official
on overseas assignment and a host country national. The live analyses are de-
veloped by a group of about eight or ten trainees discussing the videotaped
encounters under the guidance of a qualified trainer.
The task of the trainee-participants is to identify the single and typical
American cultural characteristic which the American in the videotaped en-
counter manifests in each scene of a sequence. This cultural characteristic is
the only constant running through all the scenes of a particular sequence. Thus,
the objective of the HumRRO Workshop's technique is "to develop the partici-
pants' ability to recognize the various subtle ways in which their own thought
processes, feelings, and behavior are influenced by cultural factors," aside from
the more familiar educational, occupational, and situational factors involved
in such encounters.
*See Herbert Kelman (ed.), International Behavior (Free Press, N.Y., 1965), pp. 588-92.
**See Brislin, op. cit., pp. 24-29.
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HumRRO's technique was demonstrated for the benefit of CIA's Office of
Training on 13 February 1973, with nine OTR officers and instructors serving
as participants. A majority of these participants were favorably impressed by
the results and recommended that the new technique be adopted for selected
personnel assigned overseas. Several of the participants, including the writer,
concluded that it would also benefit Agency staffers, such as analysts, whether
or not they were being so assigned.* A decision to acquire the necessary materials
was taken, and a three-day "training-the-trainers" course was conducted by
HumRRO personnel on 17-19 July 1973, with OTR and non-OTR personnel
participating. A trial run with the new technique, for testing its usefulness for
analysts in particular, is in order.
A second kind of essential skill-learning is to acquire skills for "getting
hold of" the perspectives, attitudes, motivations, and expectations of the people
of a given foreign culture, as well as its still more elusive "core elements"-the
people's beliefs, values, and norms. These learning targets have long been
widely-though not universally-recognized as highly desirable data for Ameri-
can personnel working in a foreign-culture area. In my experience, however, they
have generally been given a lower priority by supervisors considering a person's
qualifications for positions of foreign area analyst at Headquarters. In such in-
stances, it may be that American-style assumptions are already at work-for
example, that the important data for the analyst are "hard facts," and that "hard"
is to be equated with "visible" or "tangible."
I submit that the targets for our second kind of skill learning are very
much the proper business-are indeed priority requirements-for area analysts
regardless of the type of specialized intelligence with which they work. Though
we repeatedly looked for indications of these elements of the Vietnamese culture
in testing the finished intelligence on Vietnam, we have not yet made the case
for doing so.
Targets for Learning about a Foreign Culture
The first sub-category of learning targets here-a people's perspectives,
attitudes, motivations, and expectations-focuses the analyst's attention on a
people's mind sets or mental postures for thinking about their world-the persons,
groups, organizations, activities, problems, situations, and anticipated outcomes
which figure in their world of awareness. The second sub-category of learning
targets, which we term the "core elements" or inner drives of a people's culture-
their beliefs, values, and norms-focuses attention on a people's preconceptions
concerning the universe or "all created things;" which things are important; and
which human behavior patterns are "proper."
It is in this second sub-category that we look for some of the strongest
ethnocentric assumptions of a people, for these are the elements of their culture
they unconsciously assume are universals or "best for everyone." Yet, people
tend to articulate these core elements less than they do their immediate concerns.
*My memoranda to OTR's Special Assistant for Curriculum Development, dated 16
February and 14 March 1973.
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We are further handicapped because these crucial core elements of "what makes
a people tick"-which serve as both the foundation stones and the strands of
consistency among all aspects of their culture-cannot be examined directly. We
must be content to "study the shadows" of these systems rather than their sub-
stance; they have no substance which we can apprehend directly. We may
think of the belief and value systems as the reflections of a culture's "world view
and survival plan."
In a sense, however-even though seldom articulated-these systems
permeate the concepts and behavior patterns of a people. Hence, while an
analyst may wish to start off with someone else's list of the beliefs, values, and
norms of culture, for a sure grasp of these systems the analyst must himself
work at distilling the component elements from the people's expressions of their
concepts and from their physical behavior. It is here that these elements are
to be found with all the nuances of meaning they hold for the local nationals.
Accessible sources may be the immediate every-day concerns of the people-
including our first sub-category of learning targets-or their social organization,
law, history, monuments, intellectual achievements, and other enduring creations
of their minds.
Techniques for abstracting the core elements of a foreign culture from the
plentiful activities and products of the people have multiplied in the past
decade. Obviously, an American residing in a foreign area has the advantage-
by reason of his direct contact with the people and their environment-over
the headquarters analyst, in the quest for a sure grasp of these "keys to the
culture." But I have stressed the basic advantage to be gained from a systematic
and science-based approach to this task, regardless of whether one tackles it
on site or at a distance. It is appropriate here at least to identify some of the
new techniques for this purpose.
A device which is quite well adapted to the circumstances of the desk-bound
analyst is the "Culture Assimilator," which thus far is available for five cultures:
the Thai, Arab, Iranian, Greek, and Honduran.* These take the form of self-
study or programmed instruction texts presenting episodes of interactions be-
tween Americans and local nationals. The student selects from among four
possible interpretations for explaining each interaction. The guidance concerning
correct or "best" answers was validated in the countries concerned by informa-
*This device was developed in the mid-1960s, and has been undergoing evaluation by
social scientists at the University of Illinois Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory with
support from the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval Research.
Brislin (op. cit., p. 19) states that the technique involved "has been subjected to more
empirical study than any other training method." I have encountered a consistently enthusiastic
reaction to the Thai Culture Assimilator from a number of students with past experience in
Thailand. While these Assimilators aim "to prepare trainees for specific interpersonal situa-
tions" in another culture, Fred E. Fiedler, the principal investigator, believes that they also
should "expose members of one culture to some of the basic concepts, attitudes, role per-
ceptions, customs, and values" of the other culture. I prepared an outline titled "Dominant
Values and Behavior Patterns of the Thai," based on the Thai Assimilator, which is used in
OTR courses.
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tion supplied by host nationals who did not see the alternatives. The Culture
Assimilator has the double advantage of presenting information about a culture
and also developing a skill in detecting what is consistent with a given culture--
what "makes sense" to the people of that culture. At present, this device offers
the most efficient approach to development of this type of skill "at a distance."
A storehouse of training concepts and ideas which can be utilized for this
purpose is found in Peace Corps Cross-cultural Training,* Part II, "Specific
Methods and Techniques." For example, worksheets titled "Cross-cultural
Analysis" are designed to help the individual student learn about cultural dif-
ferences: first, by estimating on a scale where he himself, the "average American,"
and a given foreign cultural group stand with their attitudes or mind sets in-
volving commonly found beliefs and values; and then by encountering in
subsequent discussions the range of differing perceptions of the same rating
requirements, within his discussion group. The beliefs and values introduced
in this exercise relate to a well-rounded inventory of 32 major features of man's
environment and activities.
Two additional methods for building a skill or sensitivity with regard to
the belief and values systems of a given culture will be mentioned here briefly.
Neither of these methods has yet been systematized to the same extent as those
we have cited above, but both have long had an ardent and respected following.
The first method is to work through the language of the culture concerned. A
people's language is both a product and a bearer of their culture, and both their
speech and their thinking bear the stamp of their culture for life. The individual
has in effect learned to attribute those meanings to words which have come out
of the experience of his group. Thus, abstract terms in particular always "lose
something in translation." That "something" is in effect the sender's frames of
reference--a part of his culture which the receiver does not share. This explains
why we must dig hard to grasp what a people's beliefs, values, and norms
mean to them: a mere listing-even when rendered in their language-will not
suffice for us as foreigners. Hence, many of the words and phrases of a foreign
language can prompt us to search for local connotations, which necessarily arise
from the local behavior patterns and especially the people's mind sets and pre-
conceptions about the world. Probing the thought patterns behind the proverbs
and aphorisms of a people can be a fascinating and highly productive hobby in
the quest for "how the mentality of a foreign people differs from ours." **
* In 4 parts, sponsored by the Peace Corps' Office of Training Support, and published
by the Center for Research and Education, Estes Park (now at Denver), Colo., 1970. The
authors and compilers of this extensive and imaginative collection of materials are Albert
R. Wight and Mary Ann Hammons. Wight was an organizer of the Society for Intercultural
Training and Research (SITAR) and has had much field experience in this branch of training.
I found his one-week workshop for trainers well conceived and personally profitable. The
reference which follows in the text is to pp. 717-721 of Part II of the manual.
**I have found that this hobby could easily become an obsession. For useful theory and
examples on the entire subject, see John B. Carroll (ed.), Language, Thought and Reality:
Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (M.I.T., Cambridge, 1969); Ralph K. White,
"'Socialism' and `Capitalism': An International Misunderstanding," (Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1966);
"Language, Perception, and Reasoning" in Clen H. Fisher, op. cit.; and Francis Hayes, "Sarcasm
of `Don' Juan Del Pueblo" [on proverbs as guides to a people's beliefs and. values] (in Hispania,
V. 35, No. 1, Feb. 1952.)
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A second method of skill-building in this quest is to pursue a program of
selective and in-depth readings. This effort should focus on the following ef-
fective categories of readings on a people or cultural group:
1) Psychological or sociological novels, stories, or "books of wisdom" such as the Hebrews'
Book of Proverbs, or works by the "great minds" of a people, best read in the original
if possible-examples would be Balzac, Thomas Mann, Cervantes, Confucius;
2) Descriptions and interpretations of a culture by bi-cultural writers with social or
behavioral science training; examples are Sania Hamady's work on the Arabic and
Gilberto Freyre's on the Brazilian cultures;
3) Documentary material-with a minimum of filtering by the editor-drawn from a
people's uninhibited expressions of their thoughts; examples are Oscar Lewis' books-in-
eluding much original taped conversation-and the "Village Series" now being pub-
lished by Pantheon Press.
Available Courses-and Urgent Needs
Now, what kinds of courses and instruction modules are being offered in
the foreign affairs agencies, and what kinds are needed by the intelligence com-
munity, to help analysts reduce the distortions of perception of the foreign scene?
Only two organizations-the Foreign Service Institute and the United States
Information Agency-now have, in part at least, regularly scheduled courses for
this purpose.* Furthermore, neither of these courses lies in the field of skill
teaching. CIA's Office of Training has experimented over the past five years
with brief orientation modules of one day or less-in the intellectual learning
category-which were inserted into both the introductory course for all new
professional employees of the Agency and the Intelligence Production Course.
We see an urgent need for the foreign affairs agencies to provide in-
struction for both intellectual and skill learning for intercultural analysis. A
broad orientation for new staffers on the critical implications of distortions of
perception, job-related problems, and recommended self-study strategies is a
reasonable minimum, for the function and limitations of the perception faculty
are not yet included in the basic education of most Americans. Furthermore, a
growing number of practical guidelines for improving intercultural communica-
tion are becoming available, and Government trainers can tie these directly to
a variety of possible on-the-job requirements. Also, as we saw, the learner must
train himself for the acquisition of the necessary skills, and an early introduction
to self-training aids is timely. Finally, seminars like FSI's and USIA's can stimu-
late useful intellectual learning by analysts already on the job.
It is in the field of support for intercultural skill learning, however, that
the government agencies should make their major effort. Proper guidance in
the strategies for skill learning which we have identified clearly requires a
course in some depth-easily two weeks or more-with heavy reliance on the
use of case material and exercises. To my knowledge, no such course presently
exists in government for use by intelligence analysts. I believe it is imperative
to provide such a course at the earliest possible date.
*The respective course titles are: Psychological Dimensions of Diplomacy: Concepts
and Approaches; and International Communication. A third organization-the Defense In-
telligence School-plans to introduce an elective course in this category in the coming winter.
Limited quotas of registrants from other agencies are admitted to the two presently existing
courses.
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My recent experience in mounting and running a pilot program of brief
instruction for learning about the hazards of perception and their implications for
job performance has taught me much about both the rewards and the hazards
of this kind of undertaking. Disbelief and emotions often get in the way, as
they commonly do also when one broaches this subject to analysts at the desk.
The disbelief is of two basic kinds: occasionally individual students and analysts
on the job are sharply defensive about a re-examination of their "personal ability
to assess reality," even before they have taken a hard look at what intercultural
training is all about; some remain unimpressed by the rationale for long-term
efforts to improve perception-the problem seems theoretical, "not real," to
them. On the other hand, some students, analysts, and supervisors cannot believe
that very many professional personnel are not already working on the problem.
This last group consists of persons who are already aware of intercultural com-
munication problems, but they are often not aware of the unawareness of others
on this score, or the benefits of the newer educational and training resources.
This is perhaps because neither the psychological dimension of intercultural
analysis nor the new teaching techniques are commonly discussed as such by
analysts in the work-a-day world.
Hence, in the classroom both kinds of disbelief have at times engendered
boredom in some students, and even resentment of a day spent with the subject.
The provision for discussion groups in more recent years has reduced the number
and intensity of these adverse reactions by demonstrating more clearly the needs
of individual students. In the case of analysts and supervisors on the job, both
kinds of disbelief have deterred support from the ranks for more methodical
preparation of analysts for the intercultural dimension of their tasks. Yet I have
identified an increasing number of students and older hands who are reacting
to this situation with a growing ardor for forward action. It was in this cause
that I found the incentive and the energy to research and write this paper.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Another privilege
claim upheld
CIA, THE COURTS AND EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Lawrence R. Houston
Over the years, CIA has had many occasions to negotiate in the various
courts on the problem of security of its records and particularly of its intelligence
sources and methods. Normally, some sort of accommodation has been reached
to cover the needs of the court and the requirements of security. Only twice
has the Agency been forced to the final step of claiming executive privilege.
Both of these occasions were in civil actions wherein the claim of privilege
is given weight by the court but does not bring about dismissal of the action
as would be the case in a criminal trial..
The most recent case resulted in an interesting opinion by judge Marvin E.
Frankel, the Federal District judge in question. The case arose out of an in-
surance dispute in which action was brought by Pan American Airways. On
September 6, 1970, Pan American was operating a Boeing 747 airplane on
its scheduled route from Brussels, Belgium, to New York City, with a stop
in Amsterdam, Holland. On the flight from Amsterdam to London, two of
the passengers produced hand guns and grenades, forcibly took command of
the crew and the passengers, and ordered the pilot to proceed to Beirut,
Lebanon. The hijackers, though not themselves Arabs, were working with and
for the Palestinian operation called the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP). In collaboration with other PFLP people who met them in
Beirut, they laced the aircraft with explosives during and after a stop in the
Lebanese capital. Then they caused the airplane to be flown to Cairo, Egypt,
lighting fuses just before landing to ignite the explosives. The large complement
of passengers and crew thus had scant minutes to disembark and flee as the
plane landed at Cairo, before the craft exploded, burned, and was totally
destroyed.
Pan American, of course, carried insurance coverage. This was in two
packages. The so-called "all risk" insurance was carried by a group of American
insurance companies to the full value of the plane, $24 million, and the policy
contained a "war risk" exclusion. In other words, the American companies would
not pay for loss caused by an act of war as defined in the policy. Pan American
then obtained war risk coverage in two lots, $14 million from a Lloyd's group
in London and $10 million from the United States Federal Aviation Authority.
The "all risk" defendants were adamant that the loss was due to an act of war,
and the other two defendants were just as firm that this hijacking did not come
under the war risk exclusion. Pan American, therefore, brought suit against all
the groups, and left it to the Federal District Court in New York to interpret
the various policies.
Several large and expensive teams of lawyers started research into all
aspects of the episode and the background of those involved. Early in the
course of this preparation, Mr. Lawrence E. Walsh, representing the American
defendants, came to see me and Mr. John S. Warner, then Deputy General
Counsel. He claimed that the British defendants had had the help of documenta-
MORI/HRP
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UNCLASSIFIED Executive Privilege
Lion from official British intelligence components to assist in building their
case and, therefore, he claimed that the American defendants had the right to
inspect any and all American intelligence records in any way pertinent to the
subject. We explained the security problems involved, particularly in the source
and method area, and that these would present real obstacles to making available
intelligence documentation. As a former Attorney General, Mr. Walsh actually
had some familiarity with this subject.
We did not commit the Agency to any production of records. Mr. Walsh
subsequently obtained an order for discovery directed, among others, to the
Department of Defense, Department of State, and CIA, directing the production
of all records having to do with the episode in which the plane was destroyed,
with the complete background and history of the PFLP and a large number of
named individuals connected therewith, and with a number of other specifically
identified subjects. The only body of unclassified material that was responsive
in any way was a compilation of FBIS reports on the subject, which was offered
but not accepted by the "all risk" insurers. We asked the United States Attorney
to try to negotiate some middle position, as did State, but State finally gave
defense counsel access to its records including classified material.
A. rough appraisal of what a full response to the discovery order would mean
for CIA indicated that there would be a minimum of over 5,000 items, the
majority of them raw reports, many from highly sensitive sources, all involving
security problems to one degree or another. We also came to the conclusion that
while there was much valuable intelligence material in this, the salient facts
pertaining to the destruction of the plane and to the PFLP were readily available
from open sources. We, therefore, felt the American defendants would not be
prejudiced in their case by failing to have CIA records. Accordingly, we entered
a formal claim of sovereign immunity in answer to the discovery order, an action
that must be taken personally by the Director. The claim was supported by an
affidavit which set forth the security problems, including the danger, particularly
in this case, to lives and well-being of sources who might be exposed through
the court process. The case was argued at great length by eminent counsel
for some of the outstanding firms in the country, as well as by the United States
Attorney.
On 17 September 1973, judge Frankel handed down his opinion, which was
long and dealt with the issues in great detail. In short, he came to the conclusion
that the PFLP was not an organized military operation, and the hijacking was an
isolated act not related to any military operations so that it did not come within
the exclusion of the war risk policy and the American companies defending
were ordered to pay the judgment in full. He then dealt specifically with the
CIA claim of privilege, and his treatment is best set forth in the judge's own
words as follows:
The all risk defendants have unleashed manpower, suited to the sums
at stake, in massive works of factual and legal research. Lavish dis-
covery has been had of State Department, FAA, and FBI documents
to learn about the PFLP, the Middle East struggles generally, and the
disputed hijacking. Several inches of secret and otherwise classified
State Department papers have been made a peculiar sort of secret annex
to the record, with counsel and the court (dubitante) submitting to
"clearance" procedures for access. All risk counsel also demanded,
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however, secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents, and
this agency, after some procedural rituals, interposed the "secrets of
state" privilege. Ultimate determination of the issue thus posed was
postponed until after trial. The all risk defendants at this point make
the heady claim that if all else fails, they should have judgment for this
reason against the "United States."
There is a threshold question of some magnitude whether the
problem should be considered as one of discovery against the Govern-
ment as a party. The all risk defendants have, strictly speaking, no claim
against the United States, which has sold insurance to the plaintiff.
The Government's "proprietary" role as insurer does not comfortably
or conveniently lead to the conclusion that all its agencies, however
separate, must be treated as fractions of this single "party" for discovery
purposes. It might well be held that the applicable standards for dis-
closure are those of the Freedom of Information Act and that the all
risk argument is ended by the duly imposed "secret" classification under
the ruling in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973).
But even viewing The Government as a monolith, and applying
inter partes rules of discovery, the risk argument fails because:
(1) the claim of privilege appears to have been justified in the
circumstances, at least when measured against
(2) the trivial showing of alleged need for disclosure.
The CIA Director explained the refusal to disclose, even for in
camera inspection, on the ground that:
"The revelation of the identity of these sources to the Court or to the parties
to this litigation could result not only in their loss to the Central Intelligence
Agency for the future but also in serious physical danger to a number of
them who are risking their lives and careers to assist us."
The circumstances apparent to the court from the entirety of this case
render this a realistic and convincing concern. The setting reeks of
violence and danger. The loss of American and other lives through
terror is a vivid part of our evidence. But there should be no need
to linger over this. With characteristic responsibility, all risk counsel
reported during the trial that one of their witnesses had probably lied
in cross-examination, and that the explanation appeared to be potential
physical dangers to him had he done otherwise. The matter was left
at that. It seems appropriate to pay similar heed to the representation
of the CIA without yielding an iota of the court's responsibility and
power to judge for itself the grounds of a claim of privilege.
This conclusion is reached easily in this case because the asserted
needs for disclosure are shadowy and speculative at best. It is said
that CIA documents might indicate (by hearsay, of course) payments
by Arab governments to the PFLP. But the all risk defendants had the
PLA Commanding General on the stand for days and did not even ask
about this. Moreover, other evidence adduced by the all risk defendants
showed there were no such payments, or none of consequence. It is
argued that CIA hearsay might disclose PFLP intent and "aims and
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operations during 1970." But surely our record, including reams of
State Department hearsay, to say nothing of PFLP's non-reticent func-
tioning, is ample on that. It is argued that the all risk defendants tried
unsuccessfully to procure a witness from the PFLP, and. that the CIA
files would be or show "other sources of alternative evidence." But
this persists in overlooking the hearsay rule and is otherwise a matter
of unlikely conjecture.
In short, we have here, with the perspective of a huge record,
a "formal claim of privilege set against a dubious showing of necessity."
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). The "formal claim"
was made in a setting of substantial assurance that legitimate concerns
for security and human life were at stake. Against that were extensive
alternative sources, including broad disclosures by government agencies.
The court is led upon the record as a whole to the firm judgment that
the "intelligence" sought would not have enhanced significantly the
factual knowledge needed for this lawsuit.
It is concluded, under the principles of United States v. Reynolds,
that there was no occasion for insisting upon in camera inspection of
the documents and that there is no basis either for the extraordinary
judgment the all risk insurers seek or for any other "sanctions."
It was, of course, gratifying to have the Agency claim of privilege upheld.
However, there was still one point of concern left open by this opinion. There
have been several degrees of privilege running back through legal history.
Recent discussion has tended to differ between a claim of government privilege,
which has to do with confidential communications within the government, and
a claim of sovereign immunity which is based on security considerations per-
taining to the national interest. The difference is that in the government privilege
the courts take it upon themselves to review the information to see if it is
relevant and necessary to the case, but there is a body of law which indicates
that the claim of sovereign immunity is not reviewable by the courts. It is this
latter interpretation which we had placed on our claim. However, it will be
noted judge Frankel took a differing view as he says:
It seems appropriate to pay similar heed to the representation of
the CIA without yielding an iota of the court's responsibility and
power to judge for itself the grounds of a claim of privilege.
Whether he meant actually court review of the material involved or whether
he had in mind some further demonstration. of the need to protect the information
is not quite clear. In this case, of course, the outcome was completely satisfactory.
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The ironies of
success and failure
NATHAN HALE'S MISSION
"How beautiful is death when earned by virtue.
... What pity it is
That we can die but once to serve our country."
Joseph Addison, Cato
One of the ironies of the world of clandestine activity lies in the fact that
almost all of its popular heroes are the ones who were caught. Ironic, perhaps,
but obvious-inasmuch as, if you aren't caught, chances are no one will ever
hear of you. For every 10,000 Americans to whom Nathan Hale and John Andre
are familiar names from grammar school on, there is hardly one who has ever
heard of Abraham Woodhull or Robert Townsend or Edward Bancroft.
In the 20th century the concept of the spy, while still retaining a hefty amount
of its traditional pejorative content, has acquired a certain glamor which it didn't
have in the 18th and 19th-enough, in fact, to encourage an appalling amount
of amateur and semi-professional activity performed in sufficiently inappropriate
contexts and with sufficient clumsiness to ensure a plethora of embarrassing
failures. By the criterion of failure mentioned above, we ought thus to have,
at the present time, a bagful of heroes. That we don't is confirmatory of the
basic dictum of ends justifying means-whether you wind up a hero or a villain
in espionage (providing, of course, you get caught) depends largely on public
agreement regarding the desirability of the ends. If, by popular agreement, the
ends to be served by the spy's mission are "patriotic," he is a hero; if they aren't,
he isn't.
By the Fourth of July, 1776, the colonies had been at war with the Mother
Country for more than a year. Until then, things hadn't gone too badly. The
Redcoats had been ignominiously chased back from Concord and shut up in
Boston. The pyrrhic victory of Bunker Hill had gained them precisely nothing.
Howe-by neglecting to occupy Dorchester Heights-had committed the first
of a series of blunders which went far toward assuring the eventual success
of the Revolution and had betaken himself to Halifax to re-fit and await further
orders.
To Washington in Cambridge, commanding an army which proudly referred
to itself as "Continental," it seemed clear that when the British returned it
wouldn't be to Boston. By now it would be patently obvious to King and Cabinet
that they were going to have to put down rebellion in all thirteen colonies;
it was no longer to be simply a question of reducing one obstreperous New
England town. Plainly the British would attempt to establish a beachhead and
a base of operations from which they could undertake to invest the entire eastern
seaboard.
There was little doubt in Washington's mind where this attempt would
be made. New York had a harbor which could shelter the entire Royal Navy.
It was the key to the Hudson-Champlain highway to (and from) Canada which,
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s fission
once occupied and secured, would cut New England off and split the colonies.
The city was large enough to supply winter quarters for a sizable force and
was already known for a heavy ballast of Tory sympathy. So sure was Washington
of all this that as early as January, he had allowed General Charles Lee to go to
New York to begin organizing its defenses. And the day after Howe's evacuation
of Boston, the first Continental units left Cambridge for Manhattan.
Throughout the spring and early summer Washington's army worked fe-
verishly to make the city defensible. It wasn't an easy job, and Washington would
have preferred not to have to try. But he had his orders; Congress wanted New
York held at all costs. Batteries, entrenchments, strong points were dug and
constructed at key points on the island by an army only too painfully aware
that both the Hudson and East Rivers were deep enough for the largest ships-
of-the-line and equally aware of its own acute shortage of artillery. As Dor-
chester Heights commanded Boston, so Brooklyn Heights dominated New York,
and General Washington, not wanting to repeat Howe's mistake, occupied and
fortified the position as best he could. Then he and his army waited for Howe's
return.
At the beginning of July, the British came back, and-as Washington had
guessed-they came back to New York. Cornwallis and Clinton sailed in from
their unsuccessful attempt against Charleston, South Carolina. Sir Billy Howe,
his troops rested, re-equipped, and reinforced, pulled in from Halifax, and his
sea-going brother, Admiral Lord Howe, arrived from England. with a large naval
force and transports crammed with thousands of British troops and German
mercenaries. Howe landed his forces on Staten Island and began, in his usual
leisurely way, to prepare an assault on the city. The Continental Army on
Manhattan peered at the forest of masts in the Narrows and speculated on its
ability to deal with one of the largest overseas expeditionary forces in Europe's
history. They wondered where and when Howe would strike.
Howe was in no hurry, and the "when" didn't become apparent for another
month. The "where" turned out to be Long Island. On the morning of 27 August,
Howe loaded his troops into boats and moved them across the Narrows to
Gravesend Bay. General Israel Putnam, a fierce fighter but a bad tactician,
deployed his forces to meet him, unfortunately leaving his left flank unguarded.
Howe hit him precisely there, turned his flank, collapsed his line, routed his
force, and committed the second blunder which helped lose England her colonies.
With the Americans fleeing pell-mell across the Gowanus marshes toward
Brooklyn, Howe called off the pursuit which, had he let it go on, would have
destroyed the Continental Army and ended the war. A two-day nor'easter then
blew up, preventing the British fleet from entering the East: River, and Wash-
ington, in a brilliant night-time Dunkirk, evacuated the remnants of his battered
army to Manhattan.
Realizing the impossibility of holding New York, Washington proposed
to Congress that he be allowed to burn the town and retire to the mainland
rather than risk being trapped on Manhattan island. While he waited for an
answer, he took under consideration and intelligence problem of the first magni-
tude: What were Howe's intentions? He didn't worry about his capabilities;
it was all too evident that Howe had the capacity to do just about anything
he wanted. His brother's fleet controlled the rivers, his own army-well-trained
and equipped-outnumbered the Americans (since their losses on the 27th)
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by more than two to one. But what did he intend to do? Would he move north,
cross into Westchester, and cut off the whole island? Would he move against
some point mid-way up the island and throw a cordon across to the Hudson,
thereby trapping the Americans in the town? Would he perhaps make an assault
directly on the town itself?
In vain Washington canvassed all his available sources. He sent General
Clinton with 100 men on a raid across Long Island Sound from New Rochelle
to round up a few Tories who might be able to tell him what the British seemed
to be doing. But British naval patrols intercepted the raiders and prevented
their landing. There seemed to be only one other way to get the information
he needed. He called in Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton, commander
of his newly organized Ranger Regiment and asked him to canvass his officers
and come up with a volunteer for an espionage mission to Long Island.
Among Knowlton's company commanders was a young captain from Con-
necticut-21 years old-who had just transferred into the new regiment. His
name was Nathan Hale; he had graduated from Yale with the class of '73, had
taught school for some 18 months, and had sat out the siege of Boston as a
captain in Colonel Webb's 19th Connecticut Foot. Hale was an intensely idealistic
young man, seized with a burning ardor for independence, and filled with an
almost overwhelming desire to perform a signal service for his country.
It had been no help to these inner drives of his to be forced to endure
eight months of inactivity in Cambridge. The crowning ignominy for a young
officer aching to lead his troops in combat had been the assignment of Webb's
regiment to remain in reserve in New York during the Battle of Long Island.
Following the initial debacle, Colonel Webb's Nineteenth was ordered across
the East River to support the disorganized and demoralized troops now trying
to hold a small perimeter in Brooklyn. It took its place in the line the evening
of the 27th but-without firing a shot-was ordered back out again two days
later with the evacuation to Manhattan the night of the 29th.
When, therefore, a couple of days later, Hale was offered a place in Knowl-
ton's Rangers-a new organization calling itself "Congress's Own" and intended
as a small, elite reconnaissance outfit-he jumped at the chance, hoping that such
an assignment would give him the opportunity he craved, to see some action.
That it would have if he hadn't gone on his espionage mission, is one of the
ironies of his short and tragic story.
Knowlton assembled his officers the morning of Tuesday 10 September,
briefed them on the situation, and asked for volunteers. In response he got
a large measure of dead silence. Finally Lieutenant James Sprague, a veteran
of the French and Indian War, voiced the thoughts of his brother officers:
"I'm willing to fight the British and, if need be, die a soldier's
death in battle, but as for going among them in disguise and being
taken and hung up like a dog, I'll not do it."
Knowlton made another appeal, got no response, and dismissed the meeting.
Hale was upset. In his idealism, he too felt the role of spy to be a dis-
graceful one. But, offensive or not, here was the chance to serve he'd been
waiting for. Wanting to talk it over with someone, he sought out his Yale class-
mate, Captain William Hull. Years later Hull recorded the conversation in his
memoirs.
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UNCLASSIFIED Hale's Mission
Sensing that Hale was about to volunteer, Hull tried to dissuade him. He
pointed out the essentially dishonorable nature of the job and the ignominious
and inevitable fate if he got caught. Hale's famous words on the gallows are
familiar to everyone, but what he said to Hull is perhaps somewhat more
interesting:
"I wish to be useful," Hull reported him as saying, "and every kind
of service, necessary to the public good, becomes honorable by being
necessary." Then he went on, "If the exigencies of my country demand
a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious."
Hale went back to Knowlton and volunteered for the assignment.
The details of the mission are maddeningly meager. What is known with
reasonable certainty is only that he and his company first sergeant, Stephen
Hempstead, left New York by land on or about 12 September, went out the
Connecticut shore as far as Norwalk, were then set across the Sound by a
Captain Pond in the sloop Schuyler during the night of 15-16 September, and
that Hale went ashore at Huntington, Long Island, while Hempstead returned
to Norwalk with instructions to wait there either until Hale returned or until
he received other word from him. Hempstead also reported that Hale adopted
as cover the role of a Tory schoolmaster seeking refuge from Connecticut and
looking for a job on Long Island. He was dressed in a civilian suit of "Holland
brown" cloth, wore a round broad-brimmed hat, and carried his own Yale diploma
to establish his bona fides as a qualified teacher. This also meant, of course,
that he was using his true name. Hempstead also remembered that Hale took off
his silver shoe buckles and left them with him stating that they would not "comport
with his supposed calling."
And that is all that is known of Hale's mission from the morning of 16
September until the night of the 21st when, according to General Howe's day-
book for 22 September:
"A spy from the Enemy (by his own full confession) apprehended
last night, was this day Executed at 11 o'Clock in front of the Artillery
Park."
As Hale and Hempstead moved up the Connecticut shore looking for a
boat to take them across the Sound, events were taking shape behind them
which were going to alter the mission drastically. On the morning they left
New York, Thursday the 12th, Washington got his answer back from Congress.
The lawmakers in Philadelphia ordered him not to burn the town since it
"... could undoubtedly be recovered even should the enemy obtain possession
for a time." The question of evacuating the city, however, they left to Wash-
ington's own discretion, and he immediately ordered a withdrawal to the upper
end of the island to begin the following day-Friday the 13th. His intention
was to occupy Harlem Heights and await Howe's next move. By Sunday morn-
ing, the 15th, more than half the army was dug in on the heights but, of the
rest, some 3,500 were still doing rearguard jobs in New York arid the remainder
were strung out in a long thin line along the East River protecting the evacua-
tion route.
At seven a.m., Howe's intentions suddenly became clear. Under cover of
a heavy naval bombardment, he moved a large body of light infantry and Hessian
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grenadiers across the East River and landed them at Kip's Bay, now the foot
of 34th Street. The defending Americans, still unnerved from the debacle of the
week before and unused to the kind of heavy cannonading they were getting
from the British frigates, broke and ran even before the assault wave hit the
beach. Not even Washington's personal presence was able to stem the retreat
and by noon Sir Billy and his staff were able to come ashore.
Howe then proceeded to make the third blunder in the series which saved
the Revolution. There were still 3,500 Continental soldiers in Lower Manhattan
who could easily have been cut off. But Howe, a leisurely and methodical man,
felt that he needed to secure and organize his beach-head before sending his
troops across the island to seal it off. Having given the appropriate orders for
this, he, General Sir Henry Clinton, and Loyalist Governor Tryon repaired to the
Murray mansion on Murray Hill and relaxed with cakes and claret and the
charming Mrs. Murray.
With the British high command thus pleasantly occupied, General Putnam
led the remaining 3,500 Continentals up the west side of the island and, in the
nick of time, got them out of danger. The following day, at the moment Hale
was landing on Long Island, his regiment, Knowlton's Rangers, was spear-
heading a pre-dawn raid on Howe's northern outposts which developed into
the Battle of Harlem Heights. Knowlton was killed in the engagement but the
day was successful for the demoralized Americans, giving them their first look
since Bunker Hill at the backs of the Redcoats.
It would be hard to imagine a situation more ironic than Hale's had now
become. Wanting more than anything else to take his men into battle, he had
opted instead to undertake a mission both dangerous and distasteful to him.
On the day he left Norwalk to cross the Sound, Howe's attack erased the question
he'd been sent out to answer. The day he landed on Long Island saw his regi-
ment distinguish itself in the action he longed to participate in. Unhappily un-
aware of all these things, however, Hale "set off on his mission.
How he spent the next six days can only be a subject for speculation and,
over the years, many people have speculated over many pages. There are all
sorts of stories, rumors, conjectures, and local myths concerning where he went,
what he did, where he was captured, even where the artillery park was located
in front of which he was hanged.
Halo's earliest biographer, Isaac Stuart, for example, writing in 1856 and
relying on local Long Island tradition, has Hale making his way to Brooklyn,
across to New York, and then all the way back again to Huntington, where he
was captured because he mistook a British patrol boat for one coming to pick
him up. This is hardly likely. It calls for a lot of travelling for only six days, and
the distance from Huntington to New York makes it improbable that, having
been taken the night of the 21st, he could have been returned to New York in
time to be executed at 11 a.m. on the 22nd. Other versions have him hailing a
boat from the British brig Halifax from the east shore of Manhattan under the
impression it was friendly; or crossing the East River and being picked up in
Flushing by Lt. Colonel Robert Rogers, the turn-coat commander of the Loyalist
"Queen's Rangers;" or-by far the most likely-being taken while trying to
pass the British picket guards less than a mile and a half from his own troops.
Some versions also include the statement that he was recognized and denounced
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by his cousin Samuel Hale of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, a staunch Loyalist
who was with Howe's army as a deputy commissary of prisoners.
Probably the best job of reconstructing Hale's movements is that done by
Corey Ford,* who brought to the task not only the results of an exceedingly
painstaking and thorough piece of research, but also a large measure of first-
hand experience with the realities of espionage deriving from his service with OSS.
Ford speculates that Hale, after landing at Huntington, must very soon
have learned of Howe's occupation of New York and recognized the essential
uselessness of continuing the mission on Long Island. He would have realized,
thinks Ford, that if anything was to be gleaned from the mission, he would
have to go into New York to get it. The Brooklyn ferry would be closely con-
trolled, but Loyalist provision boats went daily from Long Island ports to supply
the troops in the city. Ford has him going as a crew member on one of these
boats from Oyster Bay to New York. Once there, he would have moved cau-
tiously from one British installation to another, listened to coffee-house gossip,
made notes and sketches, and in general done what a careful and conscientious
agent is supposed to do.
On the night of the 20th, however, an event took place which made his
eventual capture almost inevitable. The city caught fire and a third of it was
totally destroyed. What Congress had expressly forbidden Washington to do
had now happened anyway, and the General, watching the :red sky from the
balcony of the Morris Mansion on Harlem Heights, remarked to his aide, Tencli
Tilghman, "Providence, or some good honest fellow, has done more for us than
we were disposed to do for ourselves."
The fire seems to have started accidentally, but there is no doubt that many a
"good honest fellow" of Patriot persuasion played arsonist and contributed ma-
terially to its getting out of control. Enraged British soldiers and. Loyalist citizens,
trying desperately to cope with the conflagration, did in fact catch several of
them in the act and either bayoneted them on the spot or threw them into the
flames. Obviously security would be greatly tightened in the wake of this disaster
and extensive attempts made to round up the guilty. Stringent measures would
be taken to keep civilians from leaving the city, especially northward toward the
American lines. It would seem obvious that Hale's chances of getting through
the lines would now be greatly worsened, and equally obvious that he must in
fact have been picked up while trying to work his way up to Harlem.
In reconstructing Hale's capture, Ford also brings in the Tory cousin. He
conjectures that Hale, caught by the picket guard, was brought first to General
Robertson, one of Howe's brigade commanders, to whom he gave his cover story
and showed his Yale diploma. Robertson, struck by the similarity of name with
that of the deputy commissary of prisoners, sent for Samuel who identified his
cousin, by a birthmark, as Nathan Hale of Coventry, Connecticut, Captain in
the Continental Army. Hale was thereupon stripped and searched, his notes
and sketches found in his shoes, and the jig was up. He them freely admitted
to his identity and his mission and it remained only to inform the British com-
mander-in-chief of the capture and request orders as to the disposition of the case.
Howe's headquarters were at the Beekman Mansion, an elegant country
estate overlooking the East River at what is now 51st Street and First Avenue.
*Ford: A Peculiar Service (Little Brown, Boston/Toronto, 1965).
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Thither Hale was led and the situation explained to the General, who, without
the formality of a trial, ordered the prisoner remanded to the Provost Marshal
to be hanged the next morning. He was then placed for the night under guard
in the greenhouse on the Beekman estate.
On the evening of the 22nd a flag of truce approached the American lines.
Washington dispatched his Adjutant General, Colonel Reed, to meet it, ac-
companied by Major General Putnam and Captain Alexander Hamilton. The
officer accompanying the flag identified himself as Captain John Montresor,
Chief Engineer of His Majesty's Forces in North America and Aide-dc-Camp
to General Howe. The official purpose of the flag was to convey to General
Washington, General Howe's protest of an illegal and inhumane weapon-a
cut-off nail inserted in a musket ball-several of which had been found in
abandoned American quarters in New York. Orally, however, and in addition to
the official written communication, Montresor told Reed that a Captain Hale
had been arrested the previous night within the British lines and had been
executed as a spy that morning.
Later that night William Hull got from Hamilton the news of his classmate's
fate. He went immediately to Tilghman, asked and was given permission to
accompany the flag by which Washington's answer would be delivered on the
24th. Washington's official message made no mention of Hale or of the fire.
It merely apologized for the "wicked and infamous weapon." Hull, however,
found opportunity for a few words with Montresor about the fate of his friend
and classmate. In his memoirs he recalled the conversation in some detail:
I learned the melancholy particulars from this officer, who was present at the execu-
tion, and seemed touched by the circumstances attending it. He said that Captain Hale
had passed through their army, both of Long Island and York Island. That he had pro-
cured sketches of the fortifications, and made memoranda of their number and different
positions. When apprehended, he was taken before Sir William Howe, and these papers,
found concealed about his person, betrayed his intentions. He at once declared his name,
his rank in the American army, and his object in coming within the British lines.
Sir William Howe, without the form of a trial, gave orders for his execution the
following morning. He was placed in the custody of the Provost Marshal, who was a
Refugee [Loyalist], and hardened to human suffering and every softening sentiment of
the heart. Captain Hale, alone, without sympathy or support, save that from above,
on the near approach of death asked for a clergyman to attend him. It was refused. He
then requested a Bible; that too was refused by his inhuman jailer.
"On the morning of his execution," continued the officer, "my station was near
the fatal spot, and I requested the Provost Marshal to permit the prisoner to sit in my
marquee, while he was making the necessary arrangements. Captain Hale entered: he
was calm and bore himself with gentle dignity, in the consciousness of rectitude and
high intentions. He asked for writing materials, which I furnished him: he wrote two
letters, one to his mother* and one to a brother officer." He was shortly after summoned
to the gallows. But a few persons were around him, yet his characteristic dying words
were remembered. He said "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country."
Thus ended a story of little significance in the annals of war. An agent
dispatched on what turned out to be a useless errand, caught partly because of
insufficient preparation and only elementary attention to cover, partly because
of circumstances beyond his control, immediately and unceremoniously executed,
*Hull-or Montresor-slipped here. Hale's mother had been dead for years. The letters
were to his brother Enoch and to Colonel Knowlton. He didn't know that Knowlton had been
killed on the 16th.
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and buried in a forgotten grave-on the whole a series of events quite unlikely,
on the face of it, to provide the material for making a patriotic legend or a
national hero. But such is the power of the word-a garbled quotation from
Addison, spoken by a condemned man on the gallows-that one quick sentence
spoken in precisely the right circumstances can illuminate in one brilliant flash
a whole landscape of human motivation. Hale is what he is in the American
pantheon not because of what he did, but because of why he did it. From the
early 19th Century on, the chroniclers of Hale have been tireless in their recital
of this fact. To a man they have insisted on contrasting Hale and Andre-the
one universally admired and pitied by both sides, eulogized and ultimatedly
re-buried in Westminster Abby; the other buried unnoted except by his family
and friends and almost forgotten until many years later. Their judgments of the
two men are invariably made on the basis of the motivation shown by their last
words; Andre concerned only with his personal reputation: -1 beg the gentlemen
to bear witness that I die as a soldier," Hale concerned that he could no longer
serve his country's cause.
Perhaps the final irony in Hale's story is that the fact that we know it at
all is due solely to the presence at his execution of one British officer who was
sufficiently sensitive to his demeanor and impressed by the character of his
motivation to have befriended him, to have heard what he said on the gallows,
and to have passed it on to his friends.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
TWICE THROUGH THE LINES. By Otto John. (MacMillan, Ltd., London,
1972.)
Dr. Otto John is an enigmatic man. His autobiographical Twice Through
the Lines* answers few of the questions raised in earlier discussions** of his
round-trip defections. Why did the man who headed the West German security
service, the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV), go to East Berlin on
the night of 20 July 1954? His own answer, repeated and elaborated in his book,
was that Dr. Wolfgang Wohlgemuth-whom John considered a close friend-
was in fact a Soviet agent who, acting on orders, drugged and kidnaped John.
This version has aroused strong skepticism in the West. Studies' 1960 review
of the case, "The Defections of Dr. John," dismissed his account as having
"foundered on facts that later came to light." Still later testimony, on the other
hand, strongly supported John. Two knowledgeable defectors from the Soviet
State Security Service, for example, have said that John was never a KGB agent.
One of them has added that the MGB in Karlshorst, East Germany, first drew
up a plan for John's abduction in the summer of 1952, under the supervision
of General Yevgeniy Petrovich Pitovranov. They tried to carry it out and missed
very narrowly-because John at the last moment decided to take his own car
to his next appointment in West Berlin, instead of riding with Wohlgemuth.
It really doesn't matter much whether John was drugged in 1954, as he
says, or drunk as Wohlgemuth claims. There now are adequate grounds for
accepting the view that when John came out of his stupor, he did not know
where he was or why he was there.
His critics, especially those in West Germany, have asked why John did
not defy his captors, refuse to make pro-Communist speeches over the East
Berlin radio, and demand his freedom. John grapples with this question in Twice
Through the Lines. He says that those who have never been in his predicament
should be slow to judge him. He adds that he was stunned and frightened.
As a third defense, he maintains that the speeches he made were such caricatures
of himself and his views that he was astounded when the West failed to detect
his signals and took his utterances at face value. Even if all three claims are
true, they still fall somewhat short of a satisfactory answer to the question.
The third and most mysterious of the riddles does not concern John's
character or motives. It is the intriguing question of why the KGB's attitude
toward John is one of steadfast malevolence.
On 15 November 1968-before the first publication of Zweimal Kam ich
Heim, Dieter Stein, then the Moscow correspondent for Der Stern, was invited
by one "Vladimir Apollonovich Karpov" to meet him at a favorite KGB restaurant.
"Karpov" claimed to be a former KGB colonel who had been John's case officer
in the USSR. He said that the KGB had never recruited John because it already
had the BfV so well penetrated that it did not need him. He maintained that
*Originally published in German as Zweimal Kam ich Heim (Econ Verlag, Duesseldorf,
1969).
* *See Studies in Intelligence, "The Defections of Dr. John," Vol. IV, No. 4, and "Inside
Darkest John," Vol. V, No. 2.
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John came to East Berlin voluntarily, for a prearranged meeting with the Soviets.
"Karpov" argued that John was a dissolute and vacillating man who initially
chose not to return to West German, much to the surprise of the Soviets, and
that his later "escape" to the West on 12 December 1955 was no escape at
all-the Soviets just let him go. On 14 February 1972 Der Spiegel printed a fuller
version of this attack, based on an interview with "Karpov" by a West German,
Hans Frederik.
John was released from prison in West Germany on 28 July 1958 after
serving more than three years of his four-year sentence. His campaign to gain
a new trial, prove his innocence, and achieve full rehabilitation has not been
successful to date. In effect, he is a ruined man. Why then, does the KGB
persist in throwing rocks?
John does not even ask this question. He speculates about why he was
kidnaped, theorizing that the Soviets used him as a red herring to conceal the
role of their agent Hans Felfe, and also to cross-check information given them
by Philby during World War II. These stabs in the dark seem far off target,
for Felfe was Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) rather than BfV, and the Soviets
have much better ways of checking Philby's veracity than by questioning John.
The Soviets had and still have a number of reasons for disliking Otto John.
He was a British agent. He belonged to the 20th of July group, a largely non-
Communist, anti-Nazi conspiracy which is played down by the USSR because
its existence and actions run counter to the Soviet distortion of the history of
that period. Yet the Soviets have shown not merely dislike, but virulent hatred
of John, and for nearly 20 years, long after he could have been considered an
effective foe or threat. They know why, of course, and perhaps John knows
too. But neither side is talking about this point. John does talk at quite some
length in Twice Through the Lines, but the book is polemical and a little evasive.
The whole story has yet to be told.
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THE SECRET TEAM: THE CIA AND ITS ALLIES IN CONTROL OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD. By L. Fletcher Prouty. (Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973. 496 pp.)
Dr. Sherman Kent once remarked about Andrew Tully's CIA: The Inside
Story that it was "the worst bad book" he had ever read. That accolade now
can be passed along by this reviewer to The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies
in Control of the United States and the World by Colonel L. (for Leroy) Fletcher
Prouty, Colonel, U.S.A.F. (ret). This book, with its pretentious title, consists
of 426 pages of text and another 50-odd pages of appendices. Reading it is like
trying to push a penny with one's nose through molten fudge. To make matters
worse, the type is small and the margins are small; if there was ever any
editing attempted on the text, it is not apparent, for otherwise the book would
be less than half its present length, if it were lucky. The publishers announced
a first printing of 10,000 copies and are prepared to issue a second printing.
If there are 10,000 people in the United States who can get through this book
from beginning to end, this reviewer will be amazed.
Colonel Prouty's writing is a stylistic nightmare. Paragraphs do not hang
together; thoughts, if any, do not come through very well; and, if he wins any
prizes at all, it will be for repetitiousness. Attempts to check out his "facts"
indicate that, in many instances, he had the barest nodding acquaintance with
them. Assuming that Prouty took no classified documents with him and has
had no access to official files, he has had to rely on his memory years after the
incidents he tries to describe, and his memory betrays him often.
Colonel Leroy F. Prouty was a regular Air Force officer who, in 1955, was
a Lt. Colonel in the Special Activities Branch, Directorate of Plans, U.S.A.F.
Subsequently, he was a member of the staff in the Office of the Special Assistant
for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) in the Joint Staff of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. In these assignments, he was the Focal Point Officer for
contact by the CIA on matters pertaining to military support of some of the
Agency's paramilitary programs. His work with the Agency largely concerned
logistics, cover and funding, and he had a small staff to assist him. He held
these positions from 1955 until 1963, retiring from active duty as a full Colonel
in the latter year.
In his relations with CIA, Colonel Prouty was initially quite cooperative,
but, as time progressed, his actions reportedly became more of a hindrance than
a help. Reasons for this seem to vary. Some people allege that Prouty felt the
Agency had not given him sufficient backing for his promotion to full Colonel,
the rank he ultimately achieved. This was primarily an Air Force problem, not
CIA's. Others feel that Prouty resented the fact that he wasn't an "insider" on
Agency operations; that he was only a support man from whom much opera-
tional data was concealed for security reasons or his lack of "need-to-know."
From the standpoint of security, Colonel Prouty's book runs very close to
the edge. Much of what he writes concerns events and operations which were
once highly classified but are now history, and it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to make any case against him that would stand up in court. He is
very chary in using any names of CIA personnel. The dust wrapper on the book
notes with seeming pride that "Not being a CIA man, he was exempt from taking
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the oath of secrecy." The blurb adds that "Being the Focal Point Officer put him
in a very privileged position...." That he has abused this "privileged position,"
there can be no doubt; that he has distorted many of the events and conditions
he describes does him no honor as an officer. His subsequent writings and TV
appearances are in the same vein.
What is "The Secret Team" of which Colonel Prouty writes? One can best
recount Prouty's own definition given in his first chapter (pp. 2-3) :
The Secret Team consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government
who receive secret intelligence data . . . and who react to those data, when it seems
appropriate to them, with paramilitary plans and activities.... At the heart of the
Team, of course, are a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National
Security Council.... It is often quite difficult to tell exactly who many of these men
are.... All true members of the Team remain in the power center whether in office
with the incumbent administartion or out of office with the hard-core set. They
simply rotate to and from official jobs and the business world or the pleasant haven
of academe . . . it is a bewildering collection.
But his main villains never change; these include Allen Dulles (far and away
the top "villain" whom Prouty has called "a scheming opportunist,") aided and
abetted by such "CIA-controlled" persons as General Maxwell Taylor (whom
Prouty calls a "Judas goat"), and McGeorge Bundy.* Thus, Prouty's writings
fall into both the "kiss and tell" and the conspiracy theories of history, as the
personnel of the "Secret Team" some big, some small, wend their way (mostly
illegally in Prouty's view), planting their people throughout the Government
and perusing their allegedly nefarious schemes throughout the world.
Space does not permit this reviewer to rebut all the wild fantasies, reckless
charges and errors about the CIA with which this book abounds. In Part IV:
"The CIA: Some Examples Throughout the World," Prouty devotes eight chapters
to "kiss and tell."
Chapter 17 affords an example in Prouty's account of the loss of a C-118
cargo plane shot down off course over Soviet Armenia on 27 June 1958. Ac-
cording to Prouty, all nine men aboard were CIA men, and the aircraft was
Dulles' "personal plane." In fact, all nine were Air Force personnel, three of
them Air Force officers detailed to the Agency. The airplane was the one
normally used for two trips a month from Wiesbaden to the Middle East. Prouty
attributes the incident to a greenhorn navigator new to the area; actually there
was a master navigator on board who was well acquainted with the Middle East.
The C-118 was flying by dead reckoning because of weather, and there is at
least a suspicion that the Soviet beacon at Batumi was overriding the Turkish
beacon at Trabzon in a deliberate effort to lure the aircraft off course. All of
these fact were known to Colonel Prouty at the time. He faults the CIA for en-
trusting "a most highly secret cargo" to such a flight when it could have been
sent more securely, he believes, by commercial airlines. It is quite evident from
the surprisingly light interrogation of the crewmen by the MVD and their rela-
tively quick release (7 July) that the Soviets had no inkling of the connection
with CIA, and had found nothing in the crash-landed aircraft to indicate it was
anything but what it purported to be-a routine cargo flight.
*Prouty has added another name to his list. In the October 1973 issue of the new left
magazine, Ramparts, he writes that General Alexander Haig "owes much of his career to his
CIA connection."
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Chapter 18 on containment is largely a collection of arrant nonsense, based
on Prouty's thesis that by 1959 the Agency was about to run operations itself as
it saw fit. He charges that, by combining secret intelligence and secret operations,
Allen Dulles had created
a force of unequaled power ... an agency, which by bypassing all of the barriers
of the law and of the NSC, and with the men, the money, and materials sufficient to
carry out any operation anywhere in the world ... [left Allen Dulles] for all intents
and purposes, in control of the foreign policy and clandestine military operational
power of the United States for combat in the Cold War. . . . Dulles had positioned
CIA personnel and Agency-oriented disciples inconspicuously throughout the Gov-
ernment and in many instances had positioned the CIA throughout the business
world and the academic community as well. (p. 339.)
Prouty states that the legislators and the Truman Administration which had
created the CIA in the National Security Act in 1947 "were the same men who
most staunchly protested against and denied to the Agency the right to become
involved in clandestine operations." (p. 341.) This is self-contradictory and
erroneous, and if the author doesn't know it, he certainly should. In fact, on the
very next page he writes that "Congress expected that there would be clandestine
operations; ... which the highest echelon of the Government would plan and
direct." As the Agency's legislative Counsel in daily touch with the Congress
during the consideration of the CIA provisions of the National Security Act of
1947, this reviewer can state that the Congressional Committees approved the
language of the Act in such a manner as to authorize the Agency's clandestine
intelligence activities, although espionage was more in their focus in 1947 than
convert action. Prouty's tortured thinking in trying to prove the illegality of many
of CIA's operations is nowhere more apparent than in this chapter. The full
growth in the 50's of the world-wide Communist menace is to Prouty largely
an invention of CIA's clandestine planners looking for something to do. His
charge that we kept such matters secret from Congress is false, for CIA's over-
sight committees were kept well in the picture; that we kept such operations
secret from the American people is inherent in the nature of security and clan-
destine operations, as Prouty would have been the first to admit at the time.
Prouty closes this chapter on one of his more sinister notes when he writes
of the shoot down of the U-2 over Russia on 1 May, 1960 and the collapse of the
Summit Conference in Paris that month. Of the flight Prouty darkly states that
"The very fact that what was done could have been done so easily according to a
sinister plan, not an accident or Soviet act, serves only to fuel the thought that it
might have been done on purpose. Such a simple thing as failure to supply the plane
with sufficient hydrogen for the flight could have resulted, just as it did, in the
certain flame-out of the engine and the subsequent failure of the mission-or success
of the mission, depending upon the secret intent of those who dispatched it. . . . It
would lead an observer, at least one who was very close to the inside activity, almost
to believe that there is a great force somewhere that does not want to see a peace
crusade succeed; or, to put it in active terms, that wants to promote professional
anti-Communism and all that the term has come to mean during the past inglorious
decade in Vietnam." (p. 354-355.)
Had Prouty been privy to the development of the U-2 and its operations (which
he was not, as it was handled by another group in the Pentagon, obviously to
Prouty's annoyance), he would have known that hydrogen was not a factor
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in the U-2's flight. He seemingly ignores the fact that the U-2 was shot down.
In this paragraph quoted above, he reaches perhaps the lowest ebb in his con-
spiratorial theories and again does much dishonor to himself.
Prouty on five separate occasions cites as gospel the syndicated article
which appeared over former President Truman's signature in the Washington
Post of 21 December 1963 and which is highly critical of CIA. Readers of Studies
in Intelligence are aware that this article was ghosted for President Truman,
and that, in all probability, he never even saw it before publication.* In fact,
Mr. Truman appeared to be astounded and denied the thrust of the article when
it was shown to him a few months after publication by Allen Dulles. One
cannot fault Prouty with not knowing that President Truman had not written
this article. What one can fault Prouty for is his happy acceptance of the Truman
statement as gospel, and his exploitation and use of it to blackguard the CIA
when he should have realized from his personal experience that the "Truman"
article did not comport with the facts.
Prouty's characterization of Daniel Ellsberg as a "former CIA agent" does
the Agency no favors, as Ellsberg never worked for CIA. This is a fact that
Prouty easily could have checked, as it has come up before and been denied.
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BRITISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. By Jock Haswell. (Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, London, 1973.)
Mr. Haswell has written a rather frothy piece on British military intelligence
which-although not very valuable to the professional intelligence officer-
does make good, light reading.
Haswell is a retired army major now employed at the British School of
Service Intelligence, where he is involved in the writing of manuals and out-
lines for students on a variety of intelligence matters. In his off-duty time he
writes military histories, such as The First Respectable Spy: The Life and Times
of Colquhoun Grant, Wellington's Head of Intelligence. His military service during
World War II was in India, Africa, and Burma with the Queen's Royal Regiment.
When he retired from active duty in 1959 he had held no intelligence assign-
ments, and he has never had more than limited access to sensitive classified
material.
His book is sprinkled with anecdotes of British military intelligence operations
over the past two centuries, which the reader may find useful in casual con-
versation about the intelligence business. For instance, one cannot but feel a
good deal of sympathy for the poor intelligence personnel of the British Expedi-
tionary Force in World War I when crusty old General Haig ordered them out
to scout the terrain through No Man's Land for British tank attacks. They were
even required to lay out tapes marking the route to the German trenches.
Of particular interest is Haswell's description of British intelligence during
the Boer War-a war not much studied in the United States. Many of the
basic problems which still plague military intelligence plagued the British.
First, the analysts in London correctly pointed out that the Boers would force
a war, but the government wished not to believe it, and did not. On the other
hand, the intelligence people had earned a reputation for crying wolf, and
thus their warnings had less impact than they should. When war finally came,
the British lacked a trained or deployed intelligence arm, and walked blindly
into military debacles. And, despite lessons hard-learned in South Africa, the
British Army a few years later entered World War I without a trained intelli-
gence corps
Old hands will find some amusing and instructive features in Mr. Haswell's
book, but I would not recommend it for serious reading by young intelligence
officers. A thread of a message runs through the book. Haswell seems enamored
of the notion that normal discipline, methodic approaches to problems, and the
military tradition in general are contrary to the spirit of the intelligence officer
or soldier. In his view, intelligence work requires an individualistic free spirit,
who is actually better off without military training. Haswell berates the military
in general for failing to appreciate the marvelous qualities of intelligence officers.
All this may flatter the egos of intelligence personnel but it is a poor sermon
to preach. The fact of the matter is that military intelligence operations must
be in the hands of well-disciplined people. Certainly ingenuity is extremely
useful in the intelligence field, but it is also extremely useful in all military
endeavors, and proper military discipline does not detract from it. Further,
intelligence is a service to the military commander, planner, and decision maker.
Arousing the hostilities of intelligence people toward their customers does little
good for intelligence.
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In point of fact, Haswell throughout his book tends to make a case against
his own sermon. Manv of the anecdotes which he has chosen to relate are tales
of derring-do of various intelligence operatives which had very little to do with
the collection and delivery of information to the military commander. Haswell
thus illustrates and validates one of the sore points in the historical relationship
between military intelligence and the rest of the military profession. That is,
there has always been a strong tendency on the part of intelligence services to
spill over into the operational field and to organize what can properly be termed
"private armies." The uncoordinated heroics of personnel allegedly on intelligence
missions has rarely contributed greatly to the overall success of armies in the field.
The reader will find Haswell's book of historical interest for the period up
through World War I. Unfortunately for Mr. Haswell, he seems to have run out
of factual material of interest from that point forward. This may also account
for his rather romantic view of the nature of intelligence personnel and their
relationship to military affairs in general. Since World War I, technology has
been applied to the intelligence function and weapons have been developed
which require very precise intelligence support in peacetime as well as war.
As a result, military intelligence, both in the United States and the United
Kingdom, has achieved its place in the sun. Today the numbers of people in-
volved in intelligence, the masses of data collected, the sophistication of analysis,
and the swift communications for its dissemination have laid on intelligence a
requirement for the same standards of discipline and method that apply to the
military profession as a whole. Science and technology have taken the romance
out of all aspects of warfare and placed a high premium on professionalism.
The same is true of military intelligence.
Daniel U. Graham
Major General USA
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