GENERAL ABRAMS (COMMENTS ON ABRAMS CABLES RE VIETNAM WAR)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1968
• Content Type: LIST

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General Abrams
(Comments on Abrams Cables re Vietnam War)
23 Aug 68 TOP SECRET William Bundy to The Secretary memo re
Responses from General Abrams on the Effects of
the Bombing in North Vietnam
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Wheeler to White House responding to
questions: What is the effect of our current bombing
operations in North Vietnam; What would be the military
effect of a cessation of the bombing; Since March 31 what
is the average number of trucks destroyed and trucks
damaged per week and what is the average number of trucks
sighted in the Panhandle per week; What is the estimate
of military casualties inflicted on the enemy each week
in the bombing of North Vietnam; ; and Is there any
possibility of providing for the President even an
approximate estimate of the additional casualties we
would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam?
26 Aug 68 Blind Memo, Comments on General Abrams' Response to
Mr. Rostow on the Effects of Ending the Bombing of
North Vietnam
*28 Aug 68 Bombing Effects Spread Sheet, including Rostow's Questions,
MACV Response, DIA Response, Remarks
*29 Aug 68 Carver to DCI Short Note forwarding Senator Boggs' 28
August remarks at the Democratic Convention (including
a quotation from General Abrams' cable) -- transcript
attached
30 Sep 68 Walsh to ADDI memo re Comments on General Abrams Response
on Effects of a Bombing Halt
Attachments: Abrams to Rostow
dated Sep 1968, further respo se to
questions imposed in (see
above)
Handwritten notes commenting on
4 Oct 68 IM, The Impact of Change in US Bombing Programs on
Communist Logistics Activities, Copies 9 and 10
(report responsing to Abrams cable )
9 Oct 68 Blind Memo, Comments on a Cable (Abrams' cable
Attachment: Abrams to Wheeler Cable
commenting on current enemy situation
and tentative assessments of these
developments
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General Abrams
(Comments on Abrams Cables re Vietnam War)
(Continued)
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*30 Oct 68 Ch/I/L to DD/OER memo re Abrams to Wheeler Cable
Attachments: Blind Memo, Comments on Abrams Cable
of -27 Oct 68 (no date)
Handwritten notes, dated 30 Oct 68,
commenting on Abrams Cable
Abrams to Wheeler Cable
evaluating the enemy's third offensive
and possible significance for the
future
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1 Nov 68
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program for Cambodia,
commenting on Abrams Cable
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.Cable re Adm. McCain's comments to Gen.
Wheeler an Gen,.. Abrams on a new com r ve collection
Attachment: Operations Center message re Status
of Enemy Truck Movements as of 3 Nov 68,
dated 3 Nov 1968
*11 Nov 68 I/L comments on Abram's Cable, dated 11 Nov 68
Attachments: Blind Memo, Comments on MACV Estimate
of Deliveries of Arms and Ammunition
to Sihanoukville by Sea, December 1966-
August 1968
I/TLC Blind Memo, OER Comments on
Current MAC-V Views of VC/NVA Logistics,
dated 13 Nov 68
Abrams to. Wheeler Cable dated
11 Nov 68, re Cambodia as a primary
enemy LOC
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19 Nov 68 OER Blind Memo, Comments on Abrams to Wheeler Cable
Regarding Enemy Logistical Activity in North Vietnam
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Attachment: Abrams to Wheeler Cablel _j dated 25X1
18 Nov 68, re movement of military
supplies, POL and building supplies
into Laos
* Filed loose.
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General Abrams
(Comments on Abrams Cables re Vietnam War)
(Continued)
11 Dec 68 Abrams to Wheeler Cable re report from an
unusually reliable agent of the possibility of the
first phase of the winter-spring campaign being set
for night of 12-13 December (including enemy
emplacements)
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9 Apr 69
to Ch/I/L memo re Preliminary Comments on ABRAMS
(I/L)
Preliminary Comments
on Cambodia
to
on
(ONE) memo re
Blind Memo,.OER Comments on General Abrams Cable
(There is no copy of Abrams 15 Dec 68 cable in.the file)
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 VIETNAM AFFAIRS STAFF
O/DCI
The Director
DATE I u$ 6
+Carvar, Jr.
Attached for your information is
a transcript of Senator Hale Bo3g&I
48 August remarks at tho Democratic
Convention. The q . otatfon from,
General Abrax, t z cable is on the
second page of this transcript,
+orge A. Carver, Jr.
eeia# Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs..
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COMMENTS OF SENATOR BOGGS AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION
out bias, this issue before this convention,
tain that the American people must agree, that we have debated here fully, openly, with-
SENATOR HALE BOGGS: Ladies and gentlemen, I thank all of you for your
time anti your patience, your attention. I think that all of you must agree, and I am cer-
fliclnhie worlda_ The Soviet ofl ck, an invasion of a srnuall country that only yes'tarcey ~,?vus
Ovdi+P are 5I',( l:i:dr i,arnila ters that we live in (a d`e'rv,+erous and u i i,t-,"
one world, that what l-iaupens evcrywhcrs) in the world arfrer;'s all of us, I would
a i e Ic +t I. t+ n fo;m 1
colt t' 1 g cqc t, in In , plat" 1.+I. '4'l11! :f) ily5 is Ifte) 6r. f
I have reserved only a minute or two for myself,' in conclusion. I would like
to make the observation that try as we may, hope as we work as we must, that the world is
MoscoVV's peac~e'ful ally, is an ominous reversal of the slow trend toward greater freedom and
independence in Eastern. Europe,
area. A large Soviet fleet has been deployed to the Mediterrean, preferring short-term
political advantage to long-range stability and peace. The Soviet Union has rushed arms
to certain Arab states to replace those lost in the Arab-Israel war of 1967,
the Middle East as strong as we could, and there was no disagreement. The Middle East
remains a powder keg. We must do all in our power to prevent a recurrence of war in this
And than I would turn to -- 1 would turn to another area on God's earth, the
Middle East, the Middle East, my friends, and we spelled out in this platform, referring to
And now, one final statement, and I will then ask the distinguished Chair-
man of this great convention then to put the question.
man, my Majority Leader, of whom I am so proud, and who presides as a permanent Cha,r-
0Ur f,o ttar~c3 pxovlei or ea ? ~8'i1'~r tB I SF~~P 02~ f Ot `fJ~1 0fJ7i~~1.
So we cannot, hope as we may, disassociate what happens all over the world,
I would say that I wish, I prof&undly wish from the depth of My. heart, with
every ounce of conviction that I may have, that' I could agree with my friend, 'foci Soren-
50,1 from New York, when lie said that there's nothing in the minority tliclt would endanr:;er
FOR PLJBLIC AFFAIRS. STAFF
 Apps oar. A ,, a se 2044/11/30 CIAO
Now what do we say about bombing. -- bombing -- listen to me, please --
those who agree and chose who disagree. That is, indeed; the Democratic procedure.
Bombing, stop all bombing of North Vietnam when this action wot)ld not er)rlunrnAr
representing Amcrrcans let us -- me be certain about, representing every shade of opinion,
including the Chairman of the distinguished Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, `wes
briefed on Czechoslovakia, and I ask the question, I aslk the question, can General Abrams
tc+,.~li tt[ U) c7)I iICUirles~ ... Wall, I along wit~n others, representing both political parties,
we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam unilaterally and unconditionally.
supply an answer to me of this question, and I pose the question. Is there any possibility of
your providing even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would face if
And the answer carne back, and here I read it to you These are not m vrords
that "- -hat, my friends -- that, my friends, concludes our dob(,tr - itana'a!r
you ilia y much.
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These are the words of General Abrarns.4"If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized
were to be suspended unilaterally, the enemy in ten days to two weeks could develop a cap-
ability in the DMZ area internis of scale, intensity and duration of combat on the order of
five times what he now has. I cannot agree -- I cannot agree to place our forces at the
risk which the enemy's capability would then pose,'' Q'1)
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Helms has directed that the
dissemination of this report be
strictly controlled. It is not under
any circumstances to be shown to or
discussed with non-CIA personnel.
Distribution within the Agency has
been strictly limited and recipients
are to exercise personal control of
their copy.
Intelligence Memorandum
THE IMPACT OF CHANGE IN US BOMBING PROGRAMS
ON COMMUNIST LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES
Top Secret
4 October 1968
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
4 October 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Impact of Changes in US Bombing Programs
on Communist Logistics Activities
1. The experience of over three and one-half
years of observing the impact of the Rolling Thunder
bombing programs shows little direct relationship
between the level and nature of given interdiction
campaigns and the movement of supplies from North
to South Vietnam. The level of logistics activity
is more directly related to the size of the enemy
forces in South Vietnam, the level of combat, and
enemy intentions. Hanoi seems fully capable of
delivering to South Vietnam the level of men and
supplies it deems necessary, even though the bombings
affect the ease, speed, and cost of delivery. The
Communists have taken full advantage of the oppor-
tunities presented by changes in the ground rules
for the US bombing program to ease their logistic
burdens and to improve the capabilities of the
system. The logistics base has been shifted south-
ward to points close to the current northern limits
of US bombing activities, and antiaircraft defenses
in the areas have been increased substantially.
Hanoi apparently has been unwilling, however, to
engage in any widespread deployments of its defen-
sive military forces so long as it feels that there
is any possibility of country-wide bombing or a
threat of invasion.
The 1968 Bombin Program
2. The 1968 bombing program, particularly as
modified by the current restrictions, has been the
most highly concentrated interdiction campaign
carried out thus far during the war. The new
campaign is focused on a region that is only 12 per-
cent of the total area of North Vietnam and has
been directed almost exclusively against a logistics
target system. If, for comparison purposes, we
equate Route Packages I, II, and III with the area
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currently open to bombing, we find that the 1968
campaign is significantly heavier both in terms
of the number of attack sorties and tons of ord-
nance dropped. In the first six months of 1968,
compared with the same period of 1967, the number
of attack sorties over this area increased by 3
percent and the tons of ordnance delivered in-
creased by 27 percent, as shown in the following
tabulation:
First Half
1967
First Half
1968
Attack sorties
37,610
38,640
Tons of ordnance
70,940
89,860
The increased intensity of the interdiction cam-
paign is even more apparent if comparisons are
made for the second quarter -- attack sorties have
increased by 24 percent and ordnance dropped by
46 percent.
Effectiveness of the Program
3. This intensified interdiction program has
yielded better returns in several respects. Truck
kills, for example, are at significantly higher
.,levels, increasing from an average of about 220
effective losses a month during the first quarter
of 1968 to an average of 515 a month during the
second quarter. watercraft de-
stroyed increased from a monthly average of just
over 100 in the first quarter to an average of
180 during the second quarter. The interdiction
program also has compelled North Vietnam to divert
an additional 12,000 fulltime workers to the
Panhandle to cope with the effects of air attack.
4. The current program has also been carried
out at a considerably reduced cost in terms of
human casualties. The number of North Vietnamese
casualties (military and civilian) resulting from
air strikes in the first half of 1968 is estimated
at about 6,300 persons, or just over 1,000 persons
a month. This casualty rate is only one-third of
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that inflicted on the North Vietnamese population
during the 1967 campaign. The 1968 program has
also been carried out with a significant decrease
in US losses of personnel. The loss rate for US
aircraft over North Vietnam during 1968 declined
to a low of 1.3 losses per 1,000 sorties. More
importantly, about one-half of the US personnel
downed since 31 March were rescued, compared with
recovery of less than one-third prior to 1968.
The Logistics Impact
5. The concentrated interdiction program has
not succeeded, however, in reducing the flow of
supplies from North Vietnam into Laos and South
Vietnam. The flow of Rear Services supplies moving
within the Panhandle of North Vietnam has shown
steady increases during 1968, from a monthly
average of some 90 short tons a day during the
first quarter to more than 240 short tons a day
during the second quarter. Supply activity has
been maintained at about this same high level dur-
ing the third quarter. Moreover,
=ehicle and watercraft activity as we,. as Rear
Services traffic make it clear that the enemy is
able to maintain this movement throughout the
area being bombed. Some 50 to 60 percent of truck
sightings during July and August were in Route
Package I. About 30 percent of the supplies noted
in Rear Services traffic with known final destina-
tion were destined for the DMZ area in the period
from July to 22 September 1968. In the second
quarter of 1968, only about 16 percent of these
supplies were destined for the DMZ area.
6. The same high rate of supply movement has
been maintained on Routes 15 and 137, the two major
roads leading from Route Package I to southern
Laos.
An even more signifi-,\
cant development in been the enemy's
ability to maintain this movement into Laos during
the current rainy season, as shown in the following
tabulation:
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7. The failure of the interdiction program to
bring about any meaningful reduction in the flow
of supplies to South Vietnam is explained princi-
pally by two factors -- the extreme difficulty of
interdicting a small, highly dispersed, easily
repaired, and fleeting target system and the low
level of logistics activity that this system is
required to support. The latter point is illus-
trated by two examples. The daily tonnages moved
from North Vietnam into southern Laos during 1968
require the utilization of only 15 percent of the
capacity of the two main road arteries that carry
this traffic. Similarly, a maximum of only 25 per-
cent of the capacity of the several road connections
between Laos and South Vietnam would be required to
handle the tonnages that have been available during
1968. To preempt this kind of movement, the
capacity of the road connections between North
Vietnam and Laos would have to be reduced by 85 per-
cent; the capacity of the road connections between
Laos and South Vietnam would have to be reduced by
75 percent. The experience of the Rolling Thunder
program to date indicates that sustained interdiction
of about 25 percent of capacity probably is the
best that can be expected on these rudimentary road
networks.
8. With these road systems being utilized at
a threshold so far below that which can be expected
from air interdiction, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that the level of bombing is not the principal
determinant of the flow of supplies. If the need
existed, there is no reason to believe that North
Vietnam could not increase the flow of military
supplies to levels considerably in excess of those
high rates being currently maintained.
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Determinants of the Logistic Flow
9. The major determinants of the level of the
enemy's logistics activities are the size of the
force he maintains in South Vietnam, the level of
combat, enemy intentions, and the amount of supplies
destroyed or captured by Allied forces. All of
these factors have contributed to a steady increase
in logistics requirements during 1968.
10. The trend to high levels of logistics
activity became apparent in the last quarter of
1967 at about the same time the enemy was mounting
preparations for the Tet offensive. From January
through August 1968, the size of the North Viet-
namese Army presence in South Vietnam increased
by more than 50 percent. At the same time, the
scale of combat increased dramatically, most par-
ticularly at the time of the Tet and May-June
offensives. The enemy's initiative this year is
reflected in the fact that battalion-size attacks
by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units during the
first six months of 1968 exceeded the total number
of attacks initiated in 1967. The net increase in
Communist strength coupled with the expansion of
enemy operations has contributed to a substantial
increase in Communist resupply requirements in 1968.
The total requirement for Communist forces in South
Vietnam is estimated at about 290 short tons a day,
with about 90 short tons of this amount coming from
external sources. This represents an increase of
more than 50 percent, compared with 1967, in the
amount of supplies that must be moved from North
Vietnam. The logistics task is also compounded by
the success of Allied ground forces in capturing
and destroying enemy supplies in South Vietnam.
During the first nine months of 1968, Allied ground
forces captured and destroyed more than 6,200 short
tons of enemy supplies. If all of these supplies
had to be replaced from sources in North Vietnam,
the additional logistic requirement would amount
to about 25 short tons a day. This is the equiva-
lent of seven trucks a day, or only about 10 percent
of the average daily tonnage delivered to southern
Laos during the first eight months of 1968.
Despite the increasing number of truck kills re-
ported in recent months, only a small percentage
of the supplies are being destroyed. Although no
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precise estimate is possible, it is virtually cer-
tain that enemy losses of supplies in transit do
not exceed 20 percent and are probably not much
greater than 10 percent. Losses at this rate do
not add any significant increment to the logistics
burden. This is particularly true of a system
which operates at only 15 to 25 percent of capacity
but is still able, on a sustained basis, to deliver
supplies from North to South Vietnam at a daily
rate twice that of actual requirements.
Adjustments to the Restricted Bombing Program
11. As they have during previous bombing pauses
or restrictions in US bombing programs, the North
Vietnamese were quick to take advantage of the
opportunities presented by the current restrictions
adopted on 31 March 1968. The measures adopted
were generally aimed at improving the efficiency
of their logistics system and improving their capa-
bilities to witi.stand continued air attacks. The
measures taken have been calculated and have not
been at the cost of increasing the vulnerability
or reducing defensive capabilities in the rest of
the country.
Logistics Activities
12. A number of measures designed to improve
and expand the logistics system have been undertaken
since 31 March.? The net effect of these steps has
been a southward shift of the logistics base to
points close to the northern limits of US bombing
activities (see the map).
13. Soon after President Johnson's 31 March
announcement restricting the Rolling Thunder pro-
gram to the area of North Vietnam south of the 19th
Parallel, there were indications that the largest
rail yard near the bombing area at Thanh Hoa was
being repaired and readied as a center for the
+-rnnRghinment of supplies south.
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e extent of transshipment activity as
well as the amount of goods noted in storage
throughout the city of Thanh Hoa have also continued
at a high level since May. There has been a low
level of supplies and materials stockpiled within
the yard, and
the turnover of goods continues at a relatively
fast pace.
14.
the first tangible evidence o enemy a or s to
improve and enlarge their logistic facilities within
the bombing sanctuary area close to the 19th Parallel.
Several extensive rail-to-road transshipment points
had been put into active operation at Tu My located
less than one mile north of the bombing restriction
line. Although both of the rail spurs at this
facility had been in place since at least January
1968,
is area a been arae v improve
15. In the coastal areas just north of the 19th
Parallel, several other improved transshipment areas
have been developed in the general area of Qui Vinh
(about 20 miles north of the 19th Parallel) and at
Cho Giat (about 10 miles north of the 19th Parallel).
Both of these areas are close to both the Hanoi-
Vinh rail line and highway Route lA -- the two major
overland transport arteries connecting these areas
with Thanh Hoa and points north.
16. a large,
new dispersed petroleum storage at u ai, located
about 15 miles south of the 19th Parallel.
17. A Giant Scale mission showed
that a probable POL-type pipeline, first detected
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under construction in July, is now about 30 miles
in length, with the northern end extending into
the Cu Dai storage facility. There is some likeli-
hood that despite the storage facilities at Cu Dai,
the northern terminus will eventually be farther
north. It could easily be extended northward to
meet the several storage transshipment points along
the rail line or the key inland waterway located
within the areas free of bombing.
Military Redeployments
18. With the exception of some large-scale re-
deployment of antiaircraft artillery defenses south
of the 19th Parallel, North Vietnam generally has
maintained the deployment of military forces that
existed prior to 31 March 1968.
19. Antiaircraft artillery defenses south of
the 19th Parallel have increased markedly since
March 1968. The number of antiaircraft weapons
deployed in the two southern Route Packages re-
portedly rose nearly 60 percent, from about 1,450
guns in mid-March to about 2,250 guns at the end
of August -- the majority of the increase coming
since June. This buildup was accomplished almost
exclusively by deploying 37-mm and 57-mm weapons.
The number of heavy (85-mm to 100--mm) guns deployed
in the area during the same period has decreased.
The number of SAM battalions estimated to be de-
ployed in the region has remained at five despite
the fact that the total in-country inventory of SAM
battalions has been increased. There apparently
has been no increase in the deployment of antiair-
craft weapons in the Laotian Panhandle since
31 March. However, shipments of antiaircraft
ammunition into southern Laos apparently rose
sharply in August, indicating a possible increase
in the deployment of 37-mm guns in Laos or South
Vietnam during August or shortly before.
20. The overall evidence of rather limited de-
ployment of North Vietnamese units and equipment,
therefore, reflects a somewhat cautious policy and
indicates an apparent unwillingness to degrade the
country's defensive capabilities. The relatively
rich target areas around Hanoi and Haiphong are
still heavily studded with antiaircraft units, and
SAM-defense capabilities in the area have been
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increased. The regime also has taken measures to
keep air and civil defense units in a high state
of readiness and full alert. The lack of southward
deployment of ground, artillery, and coastal defense
units probably reflects a decision not to reduce
the capability to defend against the possibility
of invasion by Allied ground forces. Current esti-
mates of the minimum home defense requirements of
the North Vietnamese armed forces indicate that
they could not engage in any large-scale southward
redeployment of forces without significantly de-
grading their home-defense capabilities. Hanoi,
in short, seems to be covering its bets and un-
doubtedly will not engage in any widespread
deployments of its defensive military forces so
long as it feels there is any possibility of a
renewal of country-wide bombing or a threat of
invasion.
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 I VY J1SUxt-nI
ase 200Njjf7-RDP78T
CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY
Information
Signature
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ti
Direct Reply
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on
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 R
OECU
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Comments on the ABR:AMS CABLE
Paragraphs 1 - 5 require no comment
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SECRET'
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 SECEl T
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I, In our vier, XA-C-V is considerably overstating Cambodia's
present role in the VC/NVA logistical system. TTe believe t7l,,ke4r lo
standing north - south overland supp iy routes from North Vietnam
through Laos, South Vietnam and corder areas of C odi a are still.
the principal supply channel for Coist forces in South Vietn.
These routes not only re%ain capable of meeting Co nist needs ie aite
tes that the volume being mo` ed soot:,-ard is aufficient to
d air strikes but actual truck traffic detected moving to southern
from t le tri-border area southward over
souther .y areas of South Vietnam. I indicate that 25X
cds of Commist forces in adjacent and more
9'2 were closed : ees than 33 percent of the time
calculated on a daily basis -- in the period August - October
}e unable to quantify from observations the .y
supplies
believe tax#t the Co riist use Cambodian coutro' * ed
d ~,ater,mys to move their supplies from the tri-border area
southward into III Corps. Avai: cble evidence belies Comunist use of
the Cambodian portions of the Se Kong and Route 19 for southward move-
ies
also evidence of east card flow of supplies on the Tou Le San, but
er direction on the Srepok.
segments of the Infi< < tr
Vietnam and the eastern
odia's Ratanakiri Province are
25XI
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a tivit ' is being o
i.nvoJ aed in the projects. This entire die' '
bioed &I f. Coalbodian ids Into the ar" indicat.S tbst the
der the 1nfor ti provided in 22A) 1
b;' +e track. . The fact that th
d cut whi l.e wive dissident
tic*tion 0:
d 1 c st. s route.
pis sib?.e evida ee of
y in the dives:
4.
b1.a `4e'
eeesive .
firmed de1live,
of ar to the Viet
the ca etjon of cross the
lnei ny n
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to probable deliveries of munitions under foreign mVitary essistan
contracts during the so period yields a total volume of
tons valued at about two-thirds of the total value of military assis-
tance available for drawing by Caxbodia during that period.
5- We question the validity of the estimate that FARK' s average
annual requirements for munitions is in the order of 350 tons. This
estimate is based upon 1963 expenditure patterns, which may have
changed considerably. have no alternative estimte to propose.
Iowever, such an estimate is an essential factor in measuring military"
deliveries against PARK needs, since about three-fourths of the con-
ad military aid shipments in the period cited consisted of ammo.
6. interagency delegation will carry full. details on these and
x
rather issues. We look forward to m tuai_ly beneficial exchange of
25
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
/3 ifinc 4f
TO:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
4'a .
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
FORM 55 24 I REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 25X1
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Paragraph: 11
We can neither confirm nor deny the info in this paragraph.
Approved For Releat1
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FORM
BEM US10-101
AUGN 54 lol WHICH RELACES
ED.
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 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300180001-7
DATE
10Ai, 69
Distribution:
Cys 1 & 2 - DCI via DDI
3 & 11- - Dean Moor (Member., NSC
Staff)
,Jj - DD/OER
6-SAVA
7 - OCI
8 - Ch/D/I
19 - Ch/I/Lv
11-ChINV
DD/OER:PVWalsh
(10 Apr 6g
ROOM NO.
4-F-118
I FORM 55 24 I REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
BUILDING Hq. Ej
.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
31 3._ .tuber 1968
TO:
DOER
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
fit-200,08 - Pre1L inar',f CoGents on
x%2 1 Ieccr r cable. Initiated
23 Deccrr'er for 0 for 0
D in preparing report on ble
trip to WA.
FROM:
DL
ROOM NO. BUILDING IF
E
FORM 55 24 I REPLACES FORM 36-8 (47)
1 FEB WHICH MAY BE USED.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
ad ~?
TO: P177
ROOM NO.
--
BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
FORM RFEB M 55 24 I REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 25Xin TRFCTOR
25X1 FOLL.Cl-TTNG COMM'~NTS PER R> F REr)fEST NOT COORDINATED WITH
INI VTF.+o OF T TM ELEMENT:
o CH NFPA1, COMMENTS
THERE IS MUCH THAT IS VALID IN GENERAL ABRAM' S ASSESSMENT.
J1,'EVFP1, ITS TONE IS OVERLY OPTIMISTI(-, ITS CONCLUSIONS NOT
1FFICIENTLY SAFE GUARDED. OUR FEELING IS THAT THE SITUATION IS NOT
L THAT RAT) FOP THE E ENY -- AT LEAST NOT YF.T AND AT LEAST NOT UNLESS
VWRY SUBSTANTIAL, SUSTAINED MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTION
ANN RE BROUGHT TO BEAR AGAINST HIM. IN IV CORPS, FOR EXAMPLE,
BELIEVE TOO MUCH STOCK HAS BEEN PUT IN INDIVIDUAL, AND IN
OME CASES, ISOLATED SIGNS OF DETERIORATION WHICH SHOULD BE
EMPERFD WHEN APPLIED TO THE CORPS AS A WHOLE. MILITARILY
HE ENEMY IS IN POOR AND DECLINING SHAPE IN THE DELTA, BUT
E SEE NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH A CRITICAL SITUATION AS THAT'SO
'ARR'LY DESCRIBED IN GENERAL ABRAMS' REPORT. IN PARTICULAR,
2 2
{TS FIFTH AND FINAL CONCLUSION THAT THE ENEMY "MIlST EITHER LOSE
HAT HE HAS LEFT IN IV CTZ OR REINFORCE IT WITH UNITS FROM
.LSFWHERF" APPEARS OVERDRAWN AND PREMATURE. THE ENEMY STILL
)BENS LARGE AREAS OF IV CORPS RY ANYONIF' S STANDARDS; AND HE
'ILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO DO SO UNLESS SUSTAINED MILITARY
4ND POLITICAL PR'c . p1R`?dCFl?r` aPl'?901~~~E~~A`II~~?~}$-IQQ5C:T NVA DIVISION HEADQUARTERS FROM II CORPS TO III CORPS
SE17'4S TO EMPHASIZE THIS. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THE SUB-
ORDINATE.. UNITS HAVE ACCOMPANIED THE HFADOUARTFRS AT THIS TIME, BUT
THEY MAY FOLLOW AT A LATER DATE. WE WOULD ONLY ADD THE POLITICAL
LEVERAGE CAN BE OBTAINED BY THREAT OF AN ATTACK AND THAT THE
ACTUAL MOUINTING OF AN ATTACK ON SAIGON DOES NOT NECESSARILY
FOLLOW FROM A DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS WHICH WOULD MAKE THIS POSSIBLE.
12. CAMBODIA. CAMBODIA IS THE ONLY TR1IF_ "SANCTUARY" THAT THE
ENEMY HAS BECAUSE IT IS ESSENTIALLY FREE FROM ALI..,IED AIR AND GROUND
OPERATIONS AND THE ENEMY HAS SPENT MANY YEARS DEVELOPING THE AREA
FOR HIS USE. IN ADDITION TO THE SANCTUARY STATUS, THE USE OF THE
"PARROTS BEAK" PLACES HIS FORCES WITHIN 65 KILOMETERS OF SAIGON.
ALTHOIIGHT LOIN LEVEL REPORTS OF DUBIOUS RELIABLILITY INDICATE THAT
SOME ENEMY ST1PPLIES ARE SHIPPED THROUGH THE PORT OF SIHANOIIKVILLE
WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE VOLUME IS NEARLY AS GREAT AS MACV
C_A I CIS. MOREOVER, THE TOTAL ORDNANCE I S COMPUTED BY ADDING THE
AMOUNT OF' UNIDENTIFIED OR REPORTEDLY MILITARY CARGO CARRIED BY
SUSPECT SHIPS ENTERING SIHANOIIKVILLE. FURTHER WE DO NOT BELIEVE
25X1THE
OPERATIONS STOP ALL OTHER CLANDESTINE SEA
R O S S I B L Y COME
PROBABLE THAT MOST COME DOWN THE LAOTION PANHANDLE INTO NORTH-
 25X1
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13.
573 VESSEL:34 dVjedr {I*R 1 tb' 04/J li]Q :3LDA-P T0 q ~A@ ,00 80Q 1f~'~TA9LE
T; LAOS. THESE U~ SS=~L,S WERE CARRYING 756 TONS OF RICE, ENOUGH
TO FE 'D 249(1109, ME NN FOR ONE MONTH. THE NIIMRER OF BOATS SEEN ON
THE TO+N?LE KONG WAS COMPUTED BY ADDING THE SIGHTINGS OF BOATS
R'=LTABLE,
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nfTNNNtG NORTH OF STEM PANG WAS UNLOADED ONTO TRUCKS TO BE TAKEN TO
RATANAKIRI PPOVINTr'E FOP US : BY THE VC/NVA IN BASE AREAS 7q11
70`? OR FOR CONSUMPTION BY THE FAPK TROOPS IN THE PROVINCE. THE
LATTER POSSI3IL ITY MMACV TENDS TO IGNORE.
25X1 ifs . SPORTS DID NOT STATE., THE AMOUNT OF RICE MOVING
25X1 hDRT i. IN FACT, TATED SPECIFICALLY THE THERE WAS
NO INFORMATION ON THE AMOUNT OF RICE CARRIED ON THE BOATS. IN
25X1
TM,rE.LVE TO FIFTY, DEPENDING ON THE SIZE OF THE BOAT. THE 756 TON
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 3..?...I 7 P ) I ILITA'KY sTTIiA TOn; r\1 r;. I, - Tc
R i TT R T 4 A ni n4p~r8 edl 2cl6ias ' OOitPII?+ 0 : GMT,-RDP?78TO2G OOQ30r 8Q( '7
0='.'T?ijS~5 RUT O''i 'MODI; (UUARr4'n RM5 TH i F ??T p-P UT
t.S
n`ir IIH~ 14 ) 1 \i?c ym'
r'TRLI?1' "' HAT THF. F; LT a ''!~S RSSN ~,Tfl J Arvin
T~IP, ' 1 HF r"?IT 1'? ' ' / 0 c`IP'I~:Tifh' T S 5HOT,ij\ir i MS TN.AT TT r,fTI.1. (~,71r1P1_.5T~'-
1 Y f`'RiI I., F. nr?y r,
)AY
NOW. I,,r 3.T .V THAT }{E ENh MY HAS t?~ E t F ALT
S1~RIOitS 91L0!,1 IN TV CORES Aivf T. NOT IN A POSITION TO MOUNT
S'RIO1;S OFFENSIVE ACTION IN IV CORPS--POP!1LAR APATHY, RECRUITING
DIFFICULTIES, AND VERY LO!-1 TROOP AND CADRE MORALE BEINS CONTRIBUT-
ING FACTORS. THIS COULD BE DECISIVE IF PROPERLY FOLLOWED UP, BUT
IT WILL.. TAKE TIME, PATIENCE, AND SWIFT ACTION TO PUT THE VC OUT
OF COMMISSION.
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 . T'`". 7NIT STTflA}1ON IN) Tp
a 7 S I IL. T OF ~2~P78d2~0'(?~bI3~d1~001-7
25XIH DELTA
ALSO THE U.S. 9TH DIVISION' WAS ASST( ETD TO TI-'- DEL-TA. THESE
i4AVF P11914177) OUT OF STATIC OFFENSIVE POSITIONS
1`1TO OO11NITRYSInE ANI1) HAVE HIT TI{I:' VC TN AREAS THAT THEY HAD
i~-EVIOUSI_Y FF..I.,T ~a~RF SAFE. THESE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN HEAVILY
`='TPPOt TFD BY ATP P01417R, AaTTL.I.'RY, AND n1AVAL FORCES. EXAMPLES OF
THESE OPFRATTONIS ARE THE SIINW R ATTACK IN THE SEVEN MOUNTAINS
A^.-in MORE RECENTLY IN! RASE AREAS x!70 AND 474. PRESENTLY
AN OPI:'RATTON IS BEING La1INICHEn AGAINST BASE AREA 482. THIS
Cr1STa NED PRESSURE AGAINST THE ENEMY, WHICH WAS THEN MAINTAINED
.1iRINC' THE SOI.ITWJEST MONSOON SEASON, HAS SCATTERED VC FORCE'S AND
'!!PT HIS MORALE. COUPLED WITH THE PURELY MILITARY ACTION, THERE HAS
BEEN A DETERMINED DRIVE AGAINST THE- VCI THROUGH THE PHOENIX PROGRAM
1:WHTCH IS PRODUCING BETTER RESULTS ALL THE TIME. ALSO THE PEOPLE
OF THE DELTA HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN RESISTING VC RECRUITMENT AND
TAXATION WHICH COMPOUNDS THE ENE MMY' S PROBLEMS AND FURTHER HURTS
HIS MORALE. IN SHORT, THE ALLIES ARE COOPERATION ANB COORDINATING
WITH EACH OTHER IN) A AGGRESSIVE MANNER AGAINST ALL ASPECTS OF THE
ENEMY AND THIS IS CAUSING THE PEOPLE TO RESIST THE VC ALTHOUGH
THIS CERTAINLY DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE PEOPLE ARE NECESSARELY PRO-
GVN.
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 + 7 , T V CORt'q WT LL RE~wwTRE_ STRONG ACTIONS N1TI I T AP T Y AUn
'P0L T T CAI.LYAp~ v6d ale ? 266 7f'/X: cKma[PIM26mkoOmOO"Oi001-' OT
REITEVF THAT TH7 VC 'SILL PAIN CONF1TSEn AND DISARRAYED FOR VERY
S_0X!G. TT TS TRUE. THAT Tu7RE ARE MANY INDICATIONS OF SAGGING
'0?AI_.E '3Y 3OTH CADRE AND 501.DTER 9 BUT SO R OF THE MORE SPECTACULAR
r.N?FORMATION IS AND OF 0.1TESTI01N3ABLE RELIABILITY, AND
THESE APPEAR TO SE SOMEW. HAT ISOLATED INCIDENTS. IT IS ALSO TP!TE
THAT THE. HOT CHANH PATE HAS I1`!f`,RFASEn RECENTLY, BUT THE FACT THAT
'COST OF THESE RALLIERS ARE COMING FROM GO CONG PROVINCE IS OME
~~ ASOni TO DOi1BT THAT THIS IS A CORPS-t-IIDE TREND OF SIGNIFICANT
PROPORTIONS. SOYE OF THE FORCES THAT WERE BADLY MAULED AND PUSHED
OUT OF SASE AREA A70 MOVED TO GO CONG AND THEIR DESERTION RATE IS
PPOBARLE DUE TO THE BAD SITUATION THEY WERE IN. UNITS THAT ARE
3An1..Y NAT1LED SHOULD HAVE A HIGHER DESERTION RATE, ESPECIALLY IF
MANY OF THE OFFICERS AND CADRE ARE LOST.
18. IT Mf1ST BE CONCLUDED THAT IV CORPS IS A BIG PLACE: AND
THAT THE FIM MY IS HURTING IN MANY AREAS BUT THAT HI IS NOT ABOUT
25X1 S E C R E T
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 25
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F OUR
FINAL SECTION OF
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OF 'E AT O TTE~ I N NY I V CORPS PR OV I LACES , I N FACT ,
I_ I Q , ,T 1 COMM ! ~, I,
RDU S FOR THE THESES THAT THE ENEMY RETAINS CONSIDERABLE
POLITICAL CONTROL. MILITARILY, THE VC MAY ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THE
SITUATION IN THE ~'"AYS SUCCE STED BY GENERAL ABRAMS AND '`C- ARE SURE
HE "'! ILL NOT ABANDON THE DELTA. I N ORDER TO BR I CIO ABOUT DESTRUCT 1 ON
OF THE VC IN IV CORPS THE ALLIES ILL HAVE TO INTENSIFY THEIR
-rn r, ND PRE EMPT liEMY COUNTER-?`EASURES. EVEN t~J I TH I NC?EASED
ACTIVITY AGAINST VC MILITARY UNITS AND THE VC1 AND AN ACTIVE CIVIL
ACT I ON PROGRA"; IT '?I ILL PROBABLY REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TI","E TO t'JI N
I N T HE DELTA.
CRUMPLE i N THE IMvMEDI ATE FU! URE. POLITICALLY, THE PROL 1 FEPAT I 0 !
S E C - T
S) T
\! N!\I Ni
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATI( "OP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDEiNTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
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INFORMATION
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Remarks :
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
TE
A
D
-Z /
jy%
f
A~
~'''
1C~~
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
FORM N0. 237 Use previous editions
2-61 L
(40)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 0-587282
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 Approved For Release 200
IOMP*
1T02095,Q00300180001-7
26 August 68
t BCT: Comments on General Abrams' Response to Mr. Rostov
on the Effects of Ending the Bombing of North Vietnam
1. We agree with many of General Abrams conclusions on the
effects of halting the Rolling Thunder program. A halt in the
bombing would result in the following:
Thousands of air defense and LOC workers would be
freed for other duties. We believe this is one of the
major costs that the bombing imposes on the North Vietnamese.
b. Supplies, including POL and axmnunition$ and personnel
could move with greater ease and rapidity to south Vietnam.
c. The railroad could be reopened as far south as Vinh.
d. Additional trucks be made available to support the
enemy forces in South Vietnam.
Artillery, aircraft, air defense and ground forces
could be massed north of the T with greater ease than at
present.
2. However, we disagree with much of the data in the message
some of the conclusions that stem from this data. The message
does not make, except in discussing the direct military effects of
a bombing halt in the area immediately north of the ], a strong
case for continuing the bombing. It overstates the effectiveness
of the air interdiction program against truck traffic and fails to
recognize that the bombing has never placed a relevant ceiling on
the volume of supplies that the North Vietnamese can send, if they
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choose, to the south. Specifically,
a. There is no justification for the conclusionthat
air attacks have been the primary agent for reducing truck
sightings
slow that trucks sightings in July averaged only 155 a day.
b. Trucks sighting data are used erroneously to support
an estimate that one week after a bombing halt southward
traffic would again be moving at the reported mid-July level
of 1500 tons a day of goods moving south. Truck sightings,
however, reflect traffic moving in all directions on many
missions and cannot be equated exclusively to a southward flow
of supplies to South Vietnam.
:1
Agreed DIA-CIA data
and this would represent an increase
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e. Eetimatee of from 5,,000 to 10,000 enemy casualties
month from the Rolling Thunder program are too high.
estimates of enemy casualties from the Rolling Thunder program
are subject to wide margins of error, but our research
ovs that total civilian and military casualties have not
been much more than 1000 a month this year.
f. A several-fold increase in the enemy's logistical
capability in the Panhandle will not necessarily result in
a corresponding increase in Allied casualties. The enemy's
ability to inflict casualties on Allied forces is more
dependent upon the availability of communist combat units
in South Vietnam and the enemy's ability to move men and
plies within South Vietnam, where his forces would still
be subject to air and ground interdiction.
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 Appr
C/DDI Exec S
Appr
ve o~>f~l.~s~
ve
SENDER WILL CHECK CLAS'" ~ICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
or *as 4 1/3 ? @t 1~ Q20 5R 0 fl0
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS.
1
DD/OER (Mr. Walsh)
2
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6
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Remarks :
FOLD
FROM: NAME
DATE
126 Aug
0500W '0
FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67
25X1
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 SENDER WILL CHECK CLASS 'CATION TOP AND BOTTOM
Appr 1-7
ved Fo~r1s 1/3 :
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
C/DDI Exec Staf 127 Aug
App ov Ftmnl l u i2eO41 I 01-7
FORM NO, 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67 !
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
DD/OER (Mr. Walsh)
2
3
4
5
6
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XX
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Attached for your information is
a copy of Bill Bundy's,comment to the
Secretary on General Abrams' cable on
the effects of the bombing.
FOLD HERE
FROM: NAME, ADDR
DATE
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300180001-7
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300180001-7
 UNCLASSIFIED when blgnk-TOP RE we-n att toA ), Sgcr t R c -A tg t'~a Iy dg rg d or declassi-
fied when filled in form ~~ii l d i~~n 1 8 ~d J lnleM" `I~-RUI 10 102UyruuM~,,Ou IOUVU I-
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or.classifiifd Top Secret within the iCIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded deAjrp,ed,.ar
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individ;'gals ' oSse official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
DATE
Approved Fo
OFFICE
Release 2004/11/30
DATE
: CIA-RDP78T
OFFICE
2095R000300180001-
DATE
TOP SECRET
FORM 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET (40)
8.73